Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution. The Facts Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3 After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a

prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion. The Ruling of the Trial Court In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6 Hence, this petition. Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a posttrial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7 Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel. The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. The Ruling of the Court We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10 The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from postarraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15 We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads: Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twentyfive pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied) This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19 Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon

rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasioffense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34 Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence

of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the prewar colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38 Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. xxxx . . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention: Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied) Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42 On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: [T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to

property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: . The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x xxxx The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious

physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43 Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus: The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied) Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasioffense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasicrime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense

with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period. Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses. The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows: [T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows: When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied) By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365. Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasicrime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus reconceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its

conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasicrimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1 A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x: [T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court. [W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55 Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasicrimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 174504 March 21, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayans July 26, 2006 Resolution1 which granted private respondents demurrer to evidence. Factual Antecedents On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-ranking public officer, being a ViceMayor of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS (P61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P61,765.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.3 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October 20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.

On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion4 for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution5 granting the motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer6 to evidence. Sandiganbayans Ruling On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz: WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken. The testimony of the prosecutions lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his Report (Exhibit "D") that the accused had indeed liquidated his cash advances did not help the prosecution but rather weakened its cause of action against the accused. At the time this case was filed in Court, the accused had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof in the total amount of P61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.7 Issue Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.8 Petitioners Arguments Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private respondent, an accountable officer, received cash advances in the total amount of P120,000.00 to defray the expenses of the Public Assistance Committee and Committee on Police Matters covering the period January-March 1993, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the private respondent settled his cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor sent a demand letter to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within 72 hours from receipt thereof, and (5) the private respondent received said letter on December 22, 1995 but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated period. Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances sometime in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one of the elements of the offense charged. Hence, the settlement of the cash advance would not exonerate the private respondent but only mitigate his criminal liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be rendered futile since accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate the same beyond the period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so. Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Private Respondents Arguments Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most, constitute an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer9 is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.10 Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11 For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.12 The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.13 In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondents non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly. Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made. SECTION 128. Penal Provision. Any violation of the provisions of Sections 67, 68, 89, 106, and 108 of this Code or any regulation issued by the Commission [on Audit] implementing these sections, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-33114 or the "Rules and Regulations on the Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of Cash Advances" which implemented Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 pertinently provided 5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES 5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows: 5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month pay period. 5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of the year; subject to replenishment during the year. 5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines. Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall constitute a valid cause for the withholding of his salary. xxxx 5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period of two (2) months, it must be returned to or deposited immediately with the collecting officer. 5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash fund, the AO shall refund any unexpended balance to the Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the necessary official receipt. xxxx 9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR xxxx 9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for AOs within the station and three months for AOs outside the station from date of grant of the cash advance, the Auditor shall issue a letter demanding liquidation or explanation for non-liquidation. 9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation or explanation is received, or the explanation received is not satisfactory, the Auditor shall advise the head of the agency to cause or order the withholding of the payment of any money due the AO. The amount withheld shall be applied to his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally liable for failure to settle his accounts.15 (Emphasis supplied.) As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage to the government arising from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an essential element of the offense punished under the second sentence of Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA

Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the mere failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the gravamen of the offense. Verily, the law seeks to compel the accountable officer, by penal provision, to promptly render an account of the funds which he has received by reason of his office.16 Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law and its implementing rules, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of the prosecutions right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.17 In United States v. Kilayko,18 the accused was charged with a violation under Section 12 of the Chattel Mortgage Law19 which prohibited the mortgagor from selling the mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee while the debt secured remained outstanding. The accused was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the Information. After the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we acknowledged that the trial court erred in interpreting Section 12 when it ruled that the subsequent payment of the secured debt extinguished the accuseds criminal liability arising from the unlawful sale of the mortgaged property. Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment dismissing the Information, although based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on the merits from which no appeal lay on the part of the prosecution as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.201avvphi1 In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,21 after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were of the view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice. However, we ruled that such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set in: In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked. It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous. As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane

cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties - Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter. However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.22 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner, vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 20022 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42. On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows: That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death. With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4 On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5 However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original

Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7 On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be rearraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8 On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence. In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy. In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.

Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide stands.13 In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to murder. On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds: THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15 Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondents ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea. Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy. Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again

be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case. In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case. Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended. In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide. The parties filed their respective Memoranda. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.17 In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. The Courts Ruling The petition is not meritorious.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner -Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18 is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit -SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. xxx If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides: SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz: The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects: 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed; 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.20 In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee. While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta

without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21 Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner. While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner. Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious. Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: xxxx (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the

same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.24 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25 It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.26 Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1wphi1 The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again -If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides: SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information. Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with

which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.28 Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier. We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.29 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 167526 July 26, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. DANTE TAN, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution2 and February 24, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433. The facts of the case are as follows: On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1,4 in relation to Sections 32 (a)-15 and 566 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832. The Information7 in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads: That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR 55485776, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed and pursuant thereto. CONTRARY TO LAW.8 The Information9 in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:

That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the beneficial owner of 75,000,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares, a registered security which has been sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations prescribed pursuant thereto. CONTRARY TO LAW.10 After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty11 to both charges and the trial ensued. On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence,12 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "E" with sub-exhibits, Exhibits "K-1," "K-10" and "K-11," "Q," "R," "S," "T" and "W" with sub-exhibits, and Exhibit "X." On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order13 admitting Exhibits "A," "B," "W" and "X," but denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated therein. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in an Order14 dated January 27, 2004. In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence15 and to admit the attached Demurrer to Evidence. On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order16 granting respondents Motion for Leave to File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondents attached Demurrer. The RTC also ordered petitioner to file an opposition. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition17 to the Demurrer to Evidence. Respondent then filed a Reply.18 On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order19 granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.20 On April 12, 2004,21 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA assailing the December 11, 2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders of the RTC.

On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing considerations, it would be futile to take further action on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED outright for evident want of merit. SO ORDERED.23 In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.24 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005. Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone assignment of error, to wit: RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE FROM PROSECUTING ITS CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.25 The petition has no merit. Notwithstanding the RTCs grant of respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner contends that the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy. Specifically, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not apply in cases decided by the trial court without jurisdiction and in violations of petitioners right to due process.26 In People v. Sandiganbayan,27 this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.28 The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.29 These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the

RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,30 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus: x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.31 After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition, this Court finds that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondents demurrer to evidence. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.32 In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied due process of law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit: More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.34 In addition, in People v. Bocar,35 this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court, to wit: It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that the parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before respondent Court. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.

Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. x x x36 Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,37 this Court held that there is no double jeopardy when the trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus: The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are therefore null and void. Likewise, for being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.38 In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,39 this Court ruled that the prosecutions right to due process is violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence, thus: The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. x x x40 Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC violate petitioners right to due process?" On this note, this Court rules that petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondents demurrer. On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an opposition to petitioners formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC, petitioner filed a "Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence."41 Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of evidence. On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of evidence.42 The motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the

same was granted by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.43 After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition44 to the demurrer. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was prevented from completing its presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, formally offer its evidence and oppose respondents demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence after having initially rested its case and then continue its presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as petitioners right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no application to the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the abovementioned considerations. Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant respondents demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Accused Dante Tans Demurrer to Evidence and The Prosecutions Opposition Thereto."45 Petitioner contends that instead of acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted respondents demurrer to evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition for certiorari to question the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC. While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit.46 We are bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.47 To reiterate, the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioners attempt to put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondents demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence. Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by

the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired, thus: To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a-1) and 36 (a), it is necessary to prove the following: (1) the BW Resources Corporation ("BW") has equity securities registered under the Revised Securities Act; [2] that the equity securities of BW Resources Corporation are divided into classes, and that these classes are registered pursuant to the Revised Securities Act; (3) the number of shares of BW Resources Corporation (authorized the number of shares of BW Resources (authorized capital stock) and the total number of shares per class of stock; (4) the number of shares of a particular class of BW stock acquired by the accused; (5) the fact of the exact date, the accused [becomes] the beneficial owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular class of BW shares; and (6) the fact, the accused failed to disclose his ten (10%) percent ownership within ten days from becoming such owner. It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were not proven or established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 and Section 56 of Revised Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the prosecution never presented in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW Resources Corporation. This document is very vital and is the key to everything, including the conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the BW Resources Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a prosecutions evidence renders impossible the determination of the ten (10%) percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no focal point to base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an owner of ten (10%) percent.48 There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecutions case, there is to this Courts mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy. Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.49 While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. On a final note, this Court is aware of this Courts Third Division Decision dated April 21, 2009 entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines50 wherein respondent argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the prosecution. This Court denied the petition and ruled for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision

involves Criminal Case No. 119830,51 which is distinct and separate from Criminal Case No. 119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the resolution of the case at bar is without prejudice to the proceedings that are being conducted in Criminal Case No. 119830 at whatever stage it may be. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2004 Resolution and February 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. RESOLUTION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;1 (b) Motion for Reconsideration;2 (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.4 The Omnibus Motion The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5 specifically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any other member of the Court. The Court resolves to deny the respondents motion for lack of merit.

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition.6 On March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondents Motion dated March 18, 2003. The respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled to another member of the Court who had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already been submitted for decision. On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the respondent.7 The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court: The respondents reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court.8 The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from participating in the deliberation of the respondents Motion for Reconsideration: Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the Court during the February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to participate in the deliberations on the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on petitioners motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the Court. It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts are available to the parties or to any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on February 18, 2002 but

by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are informed of what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of the parties.10 It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions. Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Courts Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a motion for disqualification must be denied when filed after a member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered.11 The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondents motion for reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral arguments. The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Whether Prospective or Retroactive The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002. He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondents right to due process and equal protection of the law. The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused. In this case, the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao

Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was designed to derail his bid for the Senate. In their comment on the respondents motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the "refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had not yet even commenced to run. In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation of the right of the accused to due process. In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar. The Court finds the respondents contentions to be without merit. First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that: In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.12 In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.13 Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.14 To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relating forward.15 The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall apply.16 The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose.17 A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.18 In Cometa

v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent."20 While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will."21 In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the States right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then. If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule. In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus: The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these

criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 199922 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule.1a\^/phi1.net As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956): We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.23 Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurters opinion in Griffin v. People,24 he said, "it is much more conducive to laws self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which he wrote for the Court." Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist: 99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?25 Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.26 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-

99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 11027 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality. The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112 were filed with the RTC on June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated.28 The respondents plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic for the 2004 elections has no factual basis whatsoever.29 The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen. The respondents contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due process and would violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused. Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined.1a\^/phi1.net It is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a requisite whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.30 In determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered. The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-

101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are different from those in this Court. The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such admissions are (a) made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer "for such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.s order dismissing the cases. The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits that there is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this Court, the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable cause. The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. The contentions of the respondent have no merit. First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933,31 the respondent32 sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP.33 When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy, praying that: 13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a "sworn written

statement charging a person with an offense" as basis for the commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112.1awphi1.nt For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article III, 21, Constitution).34 The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP: (e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117.35 Indeed, the CA granted the respondents petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent, through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995? ATTY. FORTUN: That is my submission, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Let us see your reason for it? ATTY. FORTUN:36 First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37

Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my submission. ATTY. FORTUN:38 No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy? ATTY. FORTUN: Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is right. ATTY. FORTUN: They are two different claims. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it. ATTY. FORTUN: Very well, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are not invoking double jeopardy? ATTY. FORTUN: As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson? ATTY. FORTUN: Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: So, the answer is yes? ATTY. FORTUN: No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes it. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later. ATTY. FORTUN: They are two different (interrupted) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Are you not resting on 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: So, you are resting on 8,117? ATTY. FORTUN: Not exclusive, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN: The Constitution which gave life to 8,117. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To speedy disposition? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.39 Second. The respondents answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double jeopardy, thus: JUSTICE SALONGA: Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar? ATTY. FORTUN: It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC. JUSTICE SALONGA: You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City. ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature? ATTY. FORTUN: It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial. JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity of the accused. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the offended party. ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused? ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional dismissal.40 The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a

finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases: JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the proceedings? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the petitioner in this case? ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court do? ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident."

JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer for any further relief? ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case? ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal. JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed? ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.41 In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that: Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.42

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads: Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a partys attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party.43 It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission.44 A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel.45 As declared by this Court: ... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, ... they bind the client, whether made during, or even after the trial."46 When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent. The respondents contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company:47 ... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are binding "for the purpose of the case ... including appeals." While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondents motion for a judicial determination of probable cause will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the respondents arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of

the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief.48 A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided beyond them is coram non judice and void.49 Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC50 and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist."51 One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were assigned, through the customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of the RTC of Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacsons Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. SO ORDERED.