Ticu Constantin
TRACING MEMORIES VERSUS COMMON MEMORIES.
A NEW TAXONOMIC APPROACH
Ticu Constantin
Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, « Al. I. Cuza » University, Iasi, România
tconst@uaic.ro
ABSTRACT
Starting from the meaning of the
„flashbulb memories” in the view of Martin
Conway, an authority in the field of memory,
the author of this study made a comparative
analysis, sustained by an empirical research,
and finally drew a different taxonomic conclu-
sion.
Thus, while M. Conway considers that
both „vivid memories” and „traumatic memo-
ries” belong to the category of „flashbulb
memories”, this study argues that all three
types are subsumed to another and larger cate-
gory, the author has called „tracing memories”.
He identified enough similarities between
flashbulb, vivid (positive), and traumatic
memories, to have reasons to consider them as
tracing memories, opposite to the common
memories. On the other hand he noticed differ-
ences between the three kinds of tracing
memories, able to make them distinct between
each other.
The empirical data reveal that the differ-
ences between flashbulb, traumatic and vivid
memories are mainly induced by the weight
(intensity) of the predictive factors for the
memories detailing, and the difference be-
tween the tracing memories and the common
ones emerge from the differences in the con-
figurations of the factors that are responsible
for the memories detailing level.
According to the results reported by dif-
ferent researchers of autobiographic memory,
the mechanism that lie at the bottom of re-
membering the memories over a longer period
of time seem to be the emotional impact and
the importance attached to the events. (Con-
way 1995, 1997; Conway and Rubin, 1993;
224
Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986, Eysenck,
1995). The attached emotion and the impor-
tance to an event make the memories about it
be frequently recalled in mind or during dis-
cussions with other people being thus consoli-
dated.
In M. Conway and D. Becherian (1987),
Pillemer and collab. (1988) and M. Conway
(1995) demonstrate that emotions (either nega-
tive or positive) are important factors in creat-
ing persistent memories, the intensity of emo-
tion felt in the very moment of the event and
the impact on the personal life are predictors
of the event clarity. Using linear regression
analysis, M. Conway and D. Becherian, in a
1987 research, have demonstrated that conse-
quences, emotion and repetition uniquely and
significantly correlate with the vivacity of the
personal events. For unimportant memories,
only the changes in the emotional state fore-
cast the memories vivacity. (Conway, 1995, p.
70).
M. Conway (1995, p.71) presents and
analyzes a series of studies building up by Pil-
lemer et al, proving that emotion is the critical
factor in tracing memories during the first
three years of college and in other studies Pil-
lemer et al (1986) identified a very similar
pattern. Taken together both studies offer us a
strong argument that emotions (both negative
and positive), together with the importance
attached to the event and its consequences in
time represent important factors in building a
persistent memory.
Another research trend proved that the
memory of the information assimilated by
learning or that of the less important personal
information (details of the everyday life) fol-
low a desolation rate represented by a monoto-
nously decreasing curve (logarithmic curve).
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
This was the main conclusion of the research
conducted by H. Ebbinghaus, one of the first
researchers of the retention (learning) and
oblivion processes of the useless material: the
oblivion (forgetness) is faster at the beginning
( in the first minutes, hours, days) and slower
after some time (weeks, months, years).
The life time distribution of memories;
the 66 years old group
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
year 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
1935
Age under 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
years
Figure 1. The life-time memories distribution ; the
curve that we obtained on the sixty-six-year old
group (105 s).
In exchange, the personal autobiographic
information follow a non-monotonous distribu-
tion/retention curve, with two periods and the
number of recalled memories is: a) signifi-
cantly larger – adolescence and early youth
(between 15-25) and the last period of life (the
last twelve months); b) significantly smaller
for the first decade of life (the childhood am-
nesia) and after the first period of life (after
30-35), especially at over-forties. Results con-
firming this idea have been reported by a large
number of researchers: J. L. Monteil (1993);
Rubin (1989); D. C. Rubin s.a. (1986); Frank-
lin si Holding (1977); M. A. Conway, S. J.
Anderson (1997) etc.
I have arrived at the same conclusion by
conducted a similar research on a group of 594
subjects using two different techniques of data
gathering1. The Figure 1 below is the curve
1
I have used in this research two data sampling tech-
niques : the stimulus word technique (25 stimulus words)
and the one of the most important moments in life. The
result is 5.457 events, evoked as being the most importnt
in one’s life (2.373 events for the 20 years old subjects ;
2.114 for the 46 years old subjects ; 1.010 for the 66 years
that we have obtained on the basis of the re-
search data (2001) and it illustrates the prob-
ability of the memories appearance every 10
years, for a typical sixty-six-year old subject.
But analysing the typical events de-
scribed by the investigated subjects (5,597
events recalled as the most important of their
lives and 14,176 as an answer to 25 clue
words), I have asserted the hypothesis that,
among the autobiographical memories there is
a special category of memories that participate
in obtaining such a memories distribution
curve. Besides the “autobiographical land-
marks” memories, marking the beginning or
the end of certain periods of life (“First Job”,
“Birth of the First Child”, “Faculty Admis-
sion” etc), there are three categories of memo-
85 90 95 year
ries frequently referred to in personal narra-
50 55
1999
60 65 tions, in the description of personal experience
or their most important life events. These
memories – named “tracing memories”, do not
follow the resolution rate represented by the
forgetting curve and have been staying accu-
rate tens of years after the original event took
place.
We consider that the category of tracing
memories is made of: a) “flashbulb memo-
ries”- memories about the context or back-
ground in which we receive a surprising pub-
lic event of great individual/national impor-
tance b) “vivid memories” - intensely positive
memories about positive surprising life events;
c) “traumatic memories”– negative memories
about unpleasant traumatic life events.
In this material we present the results of
our research on these persistent memories,
which have lasted over time and kept the de-
tails precisely. In the beginning we shall ex-
pose a synthesis of the three types of memories
and then we shall make a comparative analysis
with arguments that they are different catego-
ries of memories and can not all be included in
the category of flashbulb memories. In the
old subjects). On the same group of subjects, the number
of the events evoked and dated as a response to the 25
stimulus words was of 14.176 / 6.450 events for 20 years
old subjects ; 5.243 for 46 years old subjects ; 2.483 for 66
years old subjects).
225
 Ticu Constantin
second section of this material, we shall pre-
sent a research approach whereby we have
checked up if there is a similitude between the
three categories of memories (flashbulb, trau-
matic, vivid ones) in contrast with the rela-
tively common memories. Otherwise, wether
the first three memory categories (that we have
included in the “tracing” memories category)
have a similar structural and functional pattern
which differs from the one of the relatively
ordinary memories. We think that the answer
to this question is extremely important because
the tracing memories are the main memories
depending on which the individual’s autobio-
graphic and social memory is built up defining
and offering narrative “landmarks” in the per-
sonal history.
TRACING MEMORIES: FLASHBULB,
TRAUMATIC AND VIVID MEMORIES
“Flashbulb” Memories
The concept of “flashbulb” memory was
first suggested by Roger Brown and James
Kulik, in 1977. They consider that when emo-
tionally intense events happen during one’s life
his memory retains both those events and min-
ute details of some unimportant background
elements for many years.
In a research study published in 1994 and
then in a volume edited in 1995, M. Conway
carried out a very serious analysis of the con-
cepts regarding the “flashbulb”- type memo-
ries elaborated until then and, on the basis of
his own extensive research, he suggested an
explanatory pattern for the functional mecha-
nisms of the “flashbulb” memories. Analysing
the memories about the Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher’s resignation, M. Conway con-
cludes that the main construct that operates in
forming “flashbulb” memories is represented
by the knowledge/interest one (knowledge and
information about the events development or
the individual’s interest in the political field).
The greater the construct value is, the more the
levels of the personal and national importance
(that the individual attributes to the event),
emotion (expressed by surprise and feeling
226
intensity at the news reception moment) and
rumination (expressed by recalling in mind and
discussions following mass-media information
and debates) increase. This significantly con-
tributes to the variation of the other constructs
and, finally, although indirectly, to the varia-
tion of all the measured variables.
If the importance is positively associated
with the affect and rumination levels, affect
and recollection do not influence the knowl-
edge/interest and importance constructs.
Therefore, in the pattern suggested by M.
Conway, the effect of knowledge/interest and
importance on “flashbulb” memories is indi-
rect and operates by means of the affect and
rumination constructs that it directly influences
(Conway, 1994).
This is the most important conclusion in
M. Conway’s theory: that the accuracy of the
“flashbulb” memories increases directly pro-
portionally to the emotional experience (ex-
pressed by surprise and experience intensity).
In conclusion, when one individual attached
reduced importance to an event, this happens
in a field which he/she has neither too much
information in, nor a special interest in, but
there is a minimum emotion level and the
three sub-components contribute to the build-
ing of a “normal” memory. But when an event
is considered as having a great national or per-
sonal importance, that is grafted on some for-
mer information or interest in the field and
finally brings about a high level of surprise and
emotional intensity; this is the situation when
“flashbulb” memory may occur. In the volume
“Flashbulb Memories” (1995), M. Conway
extends the concept of “flashbulb memories”.
Besides the public memories, in the cate-
gory of “flashbulb memories” he includes the
memories referring to personal events, directly
experienced by the individual not like a “spec-
tator”, as in public memories. This time, in the
category of “flashbulb memories”, M. Conway
includes both vivid intense positive memories
(“vivace memories”) and negative, traumatic
ones (“traumatic memories”). As we shall try
to demonstrate in the next pages and in the
“Research Data” section, the three memories
categories are still distinct from one another;
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
the type and the weight of the factors that lye
on the basis of their building, maintaining and
recollection are different, although they have
common features.
Traumatic memories
Traumatic memories come from negative
events or incidents, perceived by the individual
as threatening at the moment they occur, with
a very negative emotional impact and an ex-
ceptional feeling intensity, being evaluated
with medium and long- term negative conse-
quences. The effect of trauma and the trau-
matic events have been analyzed by psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists since the 19th century.
Pierre Janet and S. Freud are among the first
remarkable analysts in the field.
In 1925 Pierre Janet recognized the im-
portance of the trauma recollection in the ori-
gin and development of the emotional dis-
eases, but he also admitted that many feeling /
emotional disorders are not in connection with
traumatic memories, consequently we have to
avoid “detecting” traumatic memories where
they do not really exist. He also referred to the
importance of depression in generating vulner-
ability to the traumatic experiences. In his
opinion, a pre-existent depression and a low
self-esteem increase the vulnerability to the
post-traumatic-stress syndrome.
The traumatic recollections may vary as
consequences, according to the previous ex-
perience in traumatisms, previous self-esteem
and the extent in which the current traumatism
feeling will debilitate the self-esteem, enhance
the helpless feeling and touch the past experi-
ences of the previous unsolved traumatisms
(Green, neurosis 1, p.2) 1993.
S. Freud considers that the neurosis
ethiology lies in the traumatic experiences,
especially in those that the individual felt dur-
ing his/her childhood. The recall of these ex-
periences, their verbalization and psychical
elaboration would constitute the therapeutical
effect of the analytical cure together with the
abreaction act. Although in the first part of his
theoretical work, S. Freud stated that there lies
a real traumatic experience at the basis of the
current neurotic conflict - usually a sexual
one - in the second part of his life, he recon-
sidered this aspect asserting that the sexual-
origin “traumatic memories” that lie at the
basis of neurosis are not real events, but vi-
sions with sexual content from the individual’s
childhood. On the other hand, in Freud’s opin-
ion, the childhood amnesia (the small number
of memories from the early years) is explained
by the fact that a large number of this period’s
traumatic memories are “hidden”, “covered”
by unimportant common memories, named
“screen-memories”.
The main role played by the trauma
(physical, emotional, sexual or ne-
glect/abandon one) in creating a variety of
symptomatic behavioural and emotional stress
is more and more in the nowadays specialists’
attention. According to recent studies, the
long-term consequences of precocious child-
hood traumatisms are very difficult to predict
and depend on a large number of variables.
These variables refer to: the nature, duration,
intensity and significance of a trauma; the fre-
quency and time interval the traumas have
occurred; the age, the preexistent state of
health, the temperament and the victim’s con-
stitution. The severe repetitive traumas may
lead to a phobic anxiety and panic attack. The
trauma may be in connection with a lot of
symptoms, including depression, anxiety,
drugging abuse etc. The various trauma symp-
toms may include the absence of a coherent
self-image, a low self-esteem, defensive repeti-
tive or self-destructive behavior, instable mood
and even hallucinations. (Green, 1993).
One of the most frequent trauma syn-
dromes is the Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome
(PTSD). Shelve (1995 aped Van deer Kola and
Fisher 1996) considered that the PTSD com-
plexity is better understood as a co-occurrence
and some interrelational pathogenic processes
including:
a) an alteration of the neurobiological proc-
esses affecting the stimuli discrimination (ex-
pressed by an attention arousal and decrease),
b) the acquisition of a fear-conditioned an-
swer to the trauma stimuli and
c) the alteration of the cognitive scheme and
227
 Ticu Constantin
the social understanding of the situation
Referring to the PTSD incidence, Foy
(1992) reports a PTSD rate of 30-50% among
the Vietnam war veterans, 45% among the
beaten women, 50% among the abused chil-
dren, 65% among the adults sexually abused in
their childhood and 35% among the rape vic-
tims. Horovitz and Reidbord (1982) show that
90% of a heterogeneous large group of PSTD
pacients report frequent intense recollections
of the traumatic events.
As Van deer Kola underlined, traumatic
memories may be differently encoded in com-
parison with the memories about ordinary
events, probably because of the alteration of
the attention focussing ability or collision be-
tween the extreme emotional activation with
the hypocampic memory functioning.
The results of the research work con-
ducted by B.A. Van der Kolk and Rita Fisler in
1996 on 46 individuals suggest that there are
significant differences between the way peo-
ple/individuals experience the traumatic
memories and memories about other signifi-
cant personal events/experiences. The study
argues the idea that traumatic memories are
dissociated and initially stored as sensorial
fragments without a real descriptive compo-
nent. All the subjects admitted that they had
begun to develop a narrative account about the
trauma after a time interval. Some of them
who had been sexually abused in their child-
hood were not able yet, as adults, to develop a
complete account referring to what had hap-
pened to them. They simply had only frag-
mented memories confirmed by other peo-
ple(Van der Kolk and Fisler, 1996).
Traumatic amnesia
Analysing the studies that underlined the
existence of traumatic amnesia, Van der Kolk
(1996, p. 3), stressed that amnesia – for some
or all the trauma aspects – has been noticed at
various traumatized patients. Thus the amne-
sia after traumatic experiences with partial or
total later memories recover has been reported
in numerous studies on ex-warriors, natural
disaster or accidents survivors, kidnapping
victims, physical or sexual abuse victims etc.
228
The Dissociation
Christianson (1982) demonstrated that
when people feel fear or threat, they experi-
ence a significant narrowing of their con-
sciousness and they simply remain centred on
the main perceptual details. The intense emo-
tional experience and the narrowing of the
consciousness field associated with the cen-
tring on perceptual aspects determine the so-
called “memory phobia” hindering the trau-
matic events assimilation and integration (their
synthesis) and separate the traumatic memories
from the normal consciousness (Van der Koln
& Fisler, 1996; Critchlow, 1998). The disso-
ciation refers to an experience division: the
elements of experience are not integrated in an
unitary whole, but stored in the memory as
isolated fragments under the form of sensorial
perception, emotional states or behavioural
reactions. Whereas the dissociation may tem-
porary serve as an adaptive function, on a long
term – the missing of the integration of trau-
matic memories seems to be the critical ele-
ment that leads to the development of a com-
plex bio-behavioural change, named the Post
Traumatic Stress Syndrome.
Repression
The conscious attempts to forget a trau-
matic episode can reduce the information ac-
cessibility. In the most case studies reported by
J. W. Schooler (1997), the subjects confess
that having been abused they tried not to think
about the event any more and put it out of their
minds This voluntary behaviour may lead in
time to the loss of the memories about the
traumatic event even if later, in circumstances
that would allow this some details could be
recovered. Another process, this time uncon-
scious, repression, refers to the fact that be-
cause of some unconscious defence mecha-
nisms memories about some traumatic experi-
ences are unconsciously rejected, suppressed
in such a measure that they are not reachable
to consciousness anymore.
The concept of repression has a long his-
tory in psychoanalysis, but a fragile support in
the research itself. In his studies, Freud pre-
sents repression as a defensive and uncon-
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
scious process that protects the “self” from the
threatening material. It is not possible to do
such an experimental lab research in order to
prove the pertinence of this concept because
it suppose simulating some extremely trau-
matic and treating situations. As we mentioned
above, the clinical studies on psychogenic am-
nesias other arguments for the existence of the
defensive repression was greater than that of
the unimportant one (5.8/5.1). In 1997 D.L.
Schachter underlined, in the case of retrograde
amnesia, that the psychic trauma brings about
massive but temporary amnesia extended on a
large section of the personal past.
Extended oblivion or intense remembrance?
There are many research works which
demonstrate that individuals sexually abused
in the past may experience periods of amnesia
of the traumatic event putting it out of their
conscience. Therefore certain forms of tempo-
rary memory loss are often associated with
trauma. It paradoxally trauma may be con-
nected to either a strong remembrance or an
extended oblivion.
A study by Wilkinson (1983, apud.
Schachter, 1997) – on people witnesses of a
tele-ski fall in Kansas city showed that almost
all these people had obsessive memories about
the trauma none of them reporting amnesia
about that dramatic event. Almost half of them
The threatening affects the sub-
ject’s current self image and
self respect
Rape
Singular event Singular physical abuse with
sexual shade
Repeated sexual abuse
Repeated event Repeated war traumas
Degrading detention, “rehabilita-
tion”
Involved involuntary driving back, invol-
Mecha- untary defence and avoiding
nisms mechanism
Possible demoting amnesia
Table 1. Types of traumatic events; causes and consequences
tried to put the disaster out of their minds and
almost a third reported post-traumatic mem-
ory-problems caused by ceaselessly event re-
membrance. According to M. Conway’s re-
view, similar conclusions have been drawn by
other researchers; they all underline that there
is an amazing accuracy in reporting the details
about the incidents in different situations: rob-
bery with gunshots and deads (Yuille and Cut-
shall, 1986), witnesses or participants to seri-
ous offence situations (Fisler, Geiselman and
Amador, 1989) or kidnapped children (Terr,
1979, 1983). They all conclude that the details
about all these traumatic situations are ex-
tremely vivid and can be accurately described
after long periods of time.
In our opinion, the tendency of the trau-
matic memories either to be minutely kept in
mind and sometimes remembered untimely or
strongly rejected and scarcely accessible
(sometimes forgotten) is linked to the way the
individual perceives the threat by the traumatic
episode to the current “self” (the current self-
esteem and self-image). If threat was perceived
only in the past, then memories about the inci-
dents seem to be very well kept in mind.
If previous threat is relevant also for the
current moment affecting (both in the past and
in the present) the subject’s self-esteem and
self-image (as in sexual abuse or rape) then it
is possible that unconscious defence mecha-
The threatening does not affect the sub-
ject’s current self image and self re-
spect
Robbery
Natural disasters
“Flashbulb” memories (public)
Detention
War
Sometimes involuntary repression, the
effort not to think any more; sometimes
recollection
Possible intensive remembrance
229
 Ticu Constantin
nisms to be involved; in time, they are pulled
out of the conscious area.
As for memories perceived as not being
threatening to the current self anymore, most
of the time an intense remembrance may oc-
cur, either during inner recollections or in so-
cial context descriptions., At least in the be-
ginning, we may encounter the obsessive in-
trusion of the event images in the situation the
images being rejected or avoided.
If we take into account both the factor-
presence or absence of threat to the current self
and the factor uniqueness or repetition of the
traumatic event, then the description and the
classification of some traumatic events types,
of the implied mechanisms (unconscious or
conscious repression) and of the effects on
amnesic contents – they all may be represented
as in Table 1.
At least in the beginning the individual
must make voluntary efforts to reject these
traumatic episodes perceived as threatening to
the current self. Simultaneously with this con-
scious repression we think that some uncon-
scious defence mechanisms will work being
responsible for the repression of the amnesic
contents in the unconscious and their dissocia-
tion in the conscience.
We believe it is wrong, only on the basis
of the conclusions of the studies on natural
disasters or accidents, to argue that for trau-
matic memories an intense remembrance may
occur rather than repression or amnesia of the
traumatic event. Post-event reactions may be
different for a sexual-abuse event in compari-
son with car-accident events.
Thus what differentiates the two types
of traumatic memories making some of them
memorable and others very difficult to remem-
ber is connected with the way the individual
perceives or not the threat that the event
memories exert on the post-event self-image
and self-esteem.
Vivid Memories
Vivid memories represent the positive
equivalent, opposite to the traumatic memo-
ries. When they are asked to describe their
230
most important life memories, the subjects are
tempted to describe their positive vivid mem-
ory events.
There are only a few references to vivid
memories in the specialized literature. Usually
these references are made in the context of
research works about the accessibility of
memories (Linton, 1975, 1986; Wagenaar,
1986) the way of memories’ distribution over
the entire life (Fromholt & Larsen, 1991, 1992;
Besides & Fitzgerald, 1998) or flashbulb
memories (Conway, 1995).
Fromholt & S.F. Larsen (’91 and ’92)
abandoned the idea of “index-words”, asking
the subjects to talk about their most important
life events for 15 minutes. This was the first
autobiographic memory approach in similar
terms to “vivid memories”. The results con-
firmed the former studies conclusions: the
most important life memories are distributed
similarly to those obtained by means of index-
words. Besides conducted similar research
studies on 30 normal individuals and 30 indi-
viduals affected by the Alzheimer syndrome;
the distribution of their memories on the entire
life being similar for both groups and accord-
ingly with the previous studies.
Gergen & Gergen (1992) specify that “in-
tense memories represent a part of this per-
sonal story and the increase of their appear-
ance frequency happens during the identity
building period.”
Neisser (1998) adds that not all intense
memories are formed during this period but
without contradicting the fundamental hy-
potheses formulated by Fitzgerald.
According to the most researchers’ opin-
ion, the first circumstance of a repeated event
is better remembered and serves as a model for
later similar events. Supplementary arguments
are offered by Cohen and Faulkner’s studies;
they agree that 20% of the intense memories
reported occurred “for the first time”, 73% are
“unique in a life time”; and only 7% for gen-
eral events. The data presented by Cohen and
Faulkner do not contradict Fitzgerald’s reason-
ing (1998). Fitzgerald asserted that only 14%
of the “general memories” from this period are
memories referring to events “experienced for
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
the first time”, while Cohen and Faulkner con-
sidered a percentage of 20.
In a research study conducted by Rubin
and Kozin (1984, apud. Conway, 1995), 58
students described the three most intense/vivid
memories and then evaluated them on 7 step
scales with regard to: personal and national
importance, surprise, personal consequences,
intensity, emotional changes and repetition.
From the total of 174 memories, 31 were
related to accidents, 20 to sport events, 18 to
heterogeneous relationships, 16 to animals, 9
to death, 9 to the first week at college, 9 to
holidays, 5 to public appearances and 5 to
school incidents; only 4 memories were related
to public events. In the second stage of the
study, Rubin & Kozin isolated the most fre-
quent types of events and the subjects evalu-
ated then on scales the whole list of the above-
mentioned events. The evaluation averages
were: consequences (3.45), surprise (3.68),
emotional changes (4.07), and repetition
(3.76), all of them below the 7 steps scale av-
erage.
M. Conway and D. Becherian (1987) de-
veloped a study in which subjects had to recall
an event without any special personal impor-
tance and another one with a special personal
importance and then fill in a FM (Flashbulb
Memories) questionnaire for both of them. The
emotional intensity of the important event was
greater than that of the unimportant one
(5.8/5.1). Having analysed the regression, it
was found that consequences, emotion and
repetition correlate with the personal events
vividness uniquely and significantly.
In other research works developed by Pil-
lemer (1998) and M. Conway (1995) it has
been demonstrated that emotions (both nega-
tive and positive) are an important factor in
building up tracing memories and the intensity
of the emotion felt at the moment of the event
and the impact on personal life are predictors
of the event clarity. Moreover, referring to an
unpublished study, Conway (1998) showed
that the emotional intensity and the repetition
significantly and positively correlate to the
memories vividness (Conway, 1995, p. 73).
Thus according to Conway’s conclusions
drawn after analysing the data in these studies,
personal importance, emotional intensity and
sometimes personal consequences were asso-
ciated with intense memories (M. Conway
considered them as FM events – flashbulb
memories). An important feature of this
memories category is due to the fact that they
often refer to experiences had “for the first
time”.
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE TRACING MEMORIES
In our opinion, in spite of sometimes
contradictory results and dissimilar opinions,
as they have resulted from the data analysis
previously presented and from the explanatory
patterns proposed by different authors, the
three categories we have taken into account
have some common characteristics and some
differential elements:
Common characteristics of the traumatic,
vivid and flashbulb memories
Time persistency
All three types are persistent in time,
many unexpected details about the original
event may resist tens of years later. As we
have shown before a single problem appears as
for the traumatic memories when, although
rarely, partial or total amnesia phenomenon
may occur. But a recovery of these memories
is possible after some time even in these situa-
tions.
High emotional impact
All the three memories categories have a
memorable character because of the intense
emotional impact experienced in the moment
of their reception. For the vivid-type memo-
ries, the impact is positive, for flashbulb type it
is variable (for many Romanian subjects in-
vestigated about the 22 December events
flashbulb memories we identified feelings os-
cillating between fear, hope and happiness);
for the traumatic-type memories, the impact is
obviously negative. All three memory types
are experienced with a high level of surprise
231
 Ticu Constantin

and intensity in comparison with normal
memories.
Great importance attached
The importance of memories is firstly ex-
pressed in terms of personal importance. The
traumatic-type memories, as well as the vivid
or flashbulb-type memories are considered by
the individual to have had a special importance
for his/her later evolution. As we underlined
above, in the case of flashbulb memories “im-
portance” is one of the main constructs in the
model that M. Conway suggested. Thus impor-
tance was evaluated in terms of both personal
and national importance. Importance may be
evaluated in a negative sense (rejected, unac-
cepted) – when the event influenced the sub-
ject’s later evolution negatively or in a positive
sense – the event being perceived like source
of positive changes for his/her later evolution.
Intense remembrance
All three types are intensely recalled. For
traumatic-type memories, subjects often try to
avoid recall being avoided and rejected. The
tendency to avoid recollection may appear also
after events which finally had benefice effects
(as the subject himself /herself admits) because
it would awake unpleasant experiences (for
example, the fear and pain of a difficult con-
finement).
Elements differentiating between memories of
the traumatic, flash and vivid type
Above we have passed in review the
characteristics common to the three types of
tracing memories. But we consider that , be-
sides the common factors that intervene in the
processes of maintenance and recollection of
these memories, there are also specific factors
that make each of them work distinctly sub-
jecting to distinct principles.
The main differential elements of the
three types of memories refer to: posi-
tive/negative feature, witness/ main character
positive effect on self-esteem, type of remem-
brance; threat perception in the past/present.
They can be represented as in Table 3.
In order to conclude and demonstrate the
distinctiveness of the flashbulb-type memories
and the vivid or traumatic types, we believe

REMEMBRANCE
ACCEPTED, VOLUNTARY REJECTED, INVOLUNTARY
NEGATIVE “Flashbulb” memories “Traumatic” memories
IMPOR (unaccepted) (“The terrorist attack on NewYork”) (“Rape attempt”)
TANCE POZITIVE “Vivid” memories “Landmark/life stage” memories
(appreciated) (“You have a boy!”) (“Divorce”)

Table 2. The importance and remembrance as determinant factors for tracing memories

“Vivid” memories “Flashbulb” “Traumatic” memories

memories
Pozitive - negative characters positive variable negative
Main character or witness main character witness main character
Self-esteem effect positive neutral negative
Self-scheem effect assimilation tendency no disassimilation tendency
The revocation need yes yes no
Self threat (past) no moderate, variable yes
Self threat (present) no no sometimes yes

Table 3. Differential elements of the vivid, flashbulb and traumatic memories

232
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
the following ideas as being the most impor-
tant and worth to be mentioned:
• the details retained in flashbulb memories
refer to the “reception frame” of some public
events and not to personal events;
• in the “flashbulb memories” situation, the
individual is the spectator and not the main
character, as in traumatic or vivid memories;
• the public events that bring about
flashbulb memories may affect only indirectly
the individuals’ lives while the events that
bring about vivid or traumatic memories have
a direct impact on the individuals’ lives;
• the public events bringing about flashbulb
memories have a weak impact on individual
self-esteem; they can influence only the collec-
tive or identity self-esteem, while the events
that bring about traumatic and vivid memories
have a strong and direct effect on the individ-
ual self-esteem.
OVERVIEW
As we previously mentioned, searching
other authors’ theoretical patterns and our own
research results, this thorough examination
suggested us that “tracing” memories represent
a special category of memories, with special
features. Thus, in the autobiographic memory
(part of the episodic memory) distinctly from
other types of memories, the tracing memories
prove to be very persistent in time, with a
strong emotional impact and the subjects
evaluate them as having important conse-
quences on their lives and having extremely
intense remembrance. In the same time, this
category has also distinct sub-categories, each
of the memories component (traumatic,
flashbulb, vivid) functions in a particular way
because of their differential elements.
The aim of our research work was to
check up if, by reference to some factors as:
period of time, surprise, intensity, conse-
quences and recall - there is a similitude be-
tween the tracing memories (flashbulb, trau-
matic, vivid) in opposition to the relatively
“ordinary” memories. In other words, the first
three types of memories that we have included
in the category of “tracing” memories have a
similar functioning and structure pattern, being
different from that of the relatively “ordinary”
memories.
METHOD
Participants
The data we present we present here for
analysis refer to the two distinct research
works using the questionnaire as the main
method: one of them was implemented in May
– June 2001 on 596 individuals and the other
one in June 2001, on 432 subjects.As we shall
make only few references to the first study( in
connection with the data concordance), we
shall make the discription of the investigated
group and the method utilized only for the sec-
ond research group .The investigated group
(432 subjects) had the following structure:
Education: 14.6% secondary school; 49.9%
highschool; 35.5% graduate;
Sex: 48.1% females, 51.9% males;
Age: 13.6% under 20
38.4% 20-29
17.1% 30-39
14.3% 40-49
16.6% over 50
Measures
The measures used for the present study
were very closed to the ones used by M. Con-
way: (1994, 1994). The questionnaire had
three sections, each of them asking to recall
and evaluate a different type of event:
• relatively ordinary events (“Please, think
about the last one moment you had to deal
with a policeman on duty”);
• flashbulb events (“Please, think about the
moment when you heard on radio/TV the be-
ginning of the 1989 Romanian Revolution and
Ceausescu’s runaway”);
• vivid events (“Please, think about one of
the most beautiful, surprising and special
event/moment of your life);
233
 Ticu Constantin

• traumatic events (“Please, think about one
of the most unexpected, unpleasant and trau-
matic events/moments of your life”)
After identifying and recalling the event
(in writing, in few words) the subject was
asked to evaluate, for each separate situation,
on five-step scales, the following elements:
the rank of memory’s details (1-very few de-
tails; 5-a lot of details); the surprise of the
event (1-not at all; 5-very surprised); the inten-
sity of experience (1-not very intense, 5-very
strong intensity); consequences on personal or
national life – in flashbulb events situation (1-
not at all; 5-very important); the frequency of
ated, on the average, as being recalled rarely in
comparison with the vivid-events one. We
believe this difference is explained by the hu-
man tendency to remember more frequently
the pleasant events than unpleasant one. The
surprise-value was estimated as being more
intense for vivid events in comparison with the
traumatic ones, while the consequences were
estimated as being more important for the
traumatic memories in comparison with the
vivid ones.
Comparative reprezentation of the vivid and
traumatic evaluation mode (596 s)
5,0

recalling (1-very rare; 5-very often). All four

three types of events have been evaluated us- 4,0

ing the same technique (the 5-step scale);

moreover, the subjects were asked to specify
3,0
the period of time passed from the moment
the event happened. Vivid memories
2,0

Traumatic memories
The research hypothesis
1,0
details surpise intensity consequences rumination

We assumed that the vivid, traumatic,

flash memories have a common pattern, differ-
ent from that of the “ordinary” memories. This
involves the following subordinate hypothesis:
• There are statistically significant differ-
ences between the relatively ordinary memo-
ries and the tracing ones (the flashbulb, trau-
matic, vivid) regarding to the evaluation of the
surprise, consequences and recall;
• The detailed description of each of the
three categories of memories is dependent on
different factors configuration; both in nature
and in weight of each of them in the process of
evaluation each event.
5,0
Figure 2. Traumatic and vivid memories evalua-
tion (N=596 Ss)
It is noticeable that – on the 432 subjects
group, we have got almost identical values for
both types of events. In the second study, in
addition we asked, more, for the evaluation of
the “Revolution Unleash/Ceausescu’s Run-
away (flashbulb event) and the evaluation of
the relatively ordinary event (“Last encounter
with a policeman”)
Comparative evaluation of the four types of
memories (432s)

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4,0

People were asked to identify one of the 3,0

most traumatic/unpleasant event and one of the Vivid memories

most beautiful/happiest event of their lives, 2,0
Traumatic memories
both events being evaluated regarding the di- Common memories
mensions of details, surprise, intensity, conse- 1,0
Revolution memories
quences and recall, with values over the aver- details surprise intensity consequences rumination

age. Figure 3. The evaluation of memories (N=432 Ss)

The rumination variable for traumatic
events is an exception which subjects evalu-

234
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
Thus, we created the possibility of a
comparative analysis of the way the four types
of events are evaluated by the same group of
subjects and of the relative weight of variables
years interval, surprise, intensity, conse-
quences and rumination, in a predictive pattern
of the detailing memories rate about these
events.
Looking for an ordinary event, we es-
timated that the age, the educational level, sub-
jects' life experience would be very different
and that is why we could refer but to a casual
event, with a similar value for all subjects (at
least theoretically) as close as possible to
commonplace, but the subjects had some ele-
ments of it for being able to evaluate it. Unfor-
tunately, we could not refer to an absolutely
common event because it could belong to the
category of events the individuals had no
memory about and a comparison could not
have been made. .
The relatively common event we used as
comparison reference point (“The encounter
with a policeman”) is not really the prototype
for an absolutely common event. On the con-
trary, as the subject is able to remember and
evaluate it, it already belongs to the category
of events bringing about persistent memories.
But, if there are statistically significant differ-
ence between the method of evaluating this
event and the noteworthy ones, so much the
more there will be differences between an
absolutely ordinary event and a noteworthy
one, differences on which basis we can make
inferences referring to building up and main-
taining persistent detailed memories.
A first data evaluation shows us the dif-
ferences in the evaluation of the four types of
memories. The relatively common event was
evaluated at very low values as consequences
and recall and at average values for details,
surprise and intensity (statistically significant
differences at values p<.001). The detailing
rank of the memories about these moments is
similar to that of the “revolution” event.
Between the other types of events (vivid,
traumatic and flashbulb ones) all differences
are significant (when p<.001), with the follow-
ing exceptions: the detailing rank of the
memories is similar between the relatively
common memories and the flashbulb type
(“Revolution”); the surprise has been similarly
evaluated for the flashbulb memories and the
vivid type; the intensity the vivid memories
were experienced with was equivalent to that
of the traumatic type events; the recall was
similar for the flashbulb and traumatic type
memories.
Considering the detailing degree of
memories as an indicator for their persistence
and analysing the correlations of this variable
with the others variables (surprise, intensity,
consequences, rumination, years interval), for
each of the four types of memories we notice
specific configurations. The detailing degree of
a memory (how many details a subject has
about it, in his/her subjective perception) posi-
tively correlate with all the other variables.
EVENT
general revolu- vivid traumatic
tion
DETAILS 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
SURPRISE .253** .342** .100* .200**
INTENSITY .08** .630** .342** .377**
CONSEQUENCES .140** .275** .315** .303**
RECALL .188** .357** .321** .237**
LONG TERM -.155** , -.048 -.059
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-
tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-
tailed).
Table 4. Correlations between the detailing degree
of memory and other variables.
We observe only two noticeable excep-
tions: there are no correlations between the
detailing of the memories and the years-
interval variable (from the event) for the vivid
and traumatic-type events, and for the vivid
events, the correlation between detailing
memories and surprise is a little significant. It
is remarkable the great correlation coefficient
(r=630, p<0.01) between the detailing degree
of the revolution memory and the intensity the
235
 Ticu Constantin

event was experienced with, the later seem to
be the main indicator of building up and main-
taining stabile, detailed memories about the
event.
So for analyses seem not to make evident
significant differences between the four types
of memory, except for the relatively ordinary
events where the greater time intervals are the
less distinct these events details tend to be.
Detailing vivid or traumatic memories do not
depend on their oldness taking into account
that the event oldness average was of nine
years for the vivid events, 8.5 years for the
traumatic and 5.3 years for the relatively ordi-
nary one. These results have confirmed that as
for relatively ordinary events loss and dissolu-
tion are dependent on time, thus in concor-
dance with the research on the oblivion curve.
Along the same line, it is remarkable that as
for the other categories of memory the time
passing seem not to affect their details, and
that is argument for the idea that "tracing"
memories constitute a special memory class
with distinct characteristics.
Supposing that there are structural differ-
ences in the way the variables we have taken
into account intervene in building up memories
about these events, we decided to make a lin-

Model Summary

Std. Error of Change Statistics

Model R R Square Adjusted R Square the Estimate R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change
1 ,220a ,048 ,047 1,1272 ,048 62,518 1 1233 ,000
2 ,337b ,114 ,112 1,0880 ,066 91,252 1 1232 ,000
3 ,432c ,187 ,185 1,0427 ,073 110,514 1 1231 ,000
4 ,605d ,366 ,364 ,9210 ,179 347,787 1 1230 ,000
a. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA

b. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN

c. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN, REMEMOR

d. Predictors: (Constant), SURPRIZA, CONSECIN, REMEMOR, INTENIST

Table 5. The variables introduction impact in the model for tracing events
Coefficients a

Standard
ized
Unstandardized Coefficie
Coefficients nts
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 3,094 ,107 28,906 ,000
SURPRIZA ,207 ,026 ,220 7,907 ,000
2 (Constant) 2,188 ,140 15,597 ,000
SURPRIZA ,203 ,025 ,216 8,039 ,000
CONSECIN ,240 ,025 ,256 9,553 ,000
3 (Constant) 1,725 ,141 12,192 ,000
SURPRIZA ,191 ,024 ,202 7,860 ,000
CONSECIN ,153 ,025 ,163 6,003 ,000
REMEMOR ,265 ,025 ,286 10,513 ,000
4 (Constant) ,595 ,139 4,285 ,000
SURPRIZA 2,550E-02 ,023 ,027 1,099 ,272
CONSECIN 8,300E-02 ,023 ,089 3,645 ,000
REMEMOR ,150 ,023 ,162 6,479 ,000
INTENIST ,571 ,031 ,490 18,649 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: DETALII

Table 6. The regressive equation coefficients for the tracing events.

236
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach
ear regression analysis for rendering evident
how these variables contribute in building up
memories and for the variables weight in a
predictive equation. In the linear regression
analysis we aimed at the class of tracing
memories (as cumulated values of the flash,
vivid and traumatic memories) and then at the
class of general memories ("The latest encoun-
ter with a policeman").
The independent variables were : interval
of years from that event, the surprise of the
event, the intensity the event was experienced
with, the consequences on the possible life and
event rumination frequency; the detailing de-
gree of the memory being the dependent vari-
able.
The prediction equation of the detailing
degree of the tracing memories (as cumulated
values of the flash, vivid and traumatic memo-
ries), has the following elements:
• adjusted R2 is 0.364, that means the model
explains 36% of cases;
• introduction in equation of the first four
variables (surprise, consequences, rumination
and intensity) significantly improves the pat-
tern prediction (Sig F Change <.001);
• the F test values (Anova) and the signifi-
cance coefficients having values of p<.001
confirm the fact that the model is valid.
• The pattern constant value is of 0.6 , the
evaluation of detailing degree starts from a
threshold of 0.6 on our 5 step scales;
• The regression equation could be ex-
pressed by the formula: detailing degree of the
memory = 0.6 + (0.57) intensity + (0.15) rumi-
nation + (0.08) consequences.
• The beta standardized coefficients show
that the intensity variable is three times more
important than the rumination variable and six
times more important than the consequences
variable in predicting/determining the detailing
degree.
These results reveal that the detailing de-
gree of the memory about an noteworthy event
greatly depends on the intensity this event was
experienced with and almost insignificantly on
the personal consequences attached to that
event. The same analysis indicates us that the
pattern is not complete, that there are also
other factors which influence the detailing
variable of the memories.
After a similar analysis of the event we
considered relatively ordinary event ("the lat-
est meeting with a policeman") we established
that, for an R2 adjusted to 0.10 (a very limited
predictive potential, for only 10% of the
cases), we obtain a valid pattern in which only
intensity and intervals of years variables have
an explanatory potential; detailing degree of
the memory =2,4 + (0.25) intensity + (-0.13)
interval of years. It means that the greater the
intensity an event is experienced with and the
less the time interval from that event are, the
more the detailing degree of the memory about
it is. As we have already mentioned , it is im-
possible the isolation of some absolutely ordi-
nary events, for comparing them with notewor-
thy events, because they should respect some
similarity terms (time interval from that event,
significance equal in value or equally distrib-
uted to all subjects are minimal elements use-
ful in evaluating these events), that is why we
asked for quite striking events since the sub-
jects have memories about it and they can be
evaluated. Only by extrapolating could we
state that ordinary events respect the same
condition.
The first conclusions we draw from here
demonstrate that memories about noteworthy
events have a common pattern, different from
that of the relatively ordinary memories, be-
cause:
• they are evaluated at high levels of inten-
sity, surprise, consequences and rumination, in
comparison with the relatively common event
taken as a milestone;
• their detailing degree does not depend on
the time-factor (their oldness);
• emotional intensity of the experienced
events plays an important role in building up
and keeping the tracing memories. Personal
consequences associated to these events and
the surprise of the experienced event have
minimum contributions.
• the memories about the relatively common
event taken for comparison, firstly, depend on
the emotional intensity at that moment and this
237
 Ticu Constantin
time in the second plan we find the interval
from that moment and not the recollection fre-
quency, as in the case of the tracing memories,
all of them being at a very reduced predictive
probability value.
In both analyses, the regression equations
show that there are also other variables which
condition the detailing degree of the memories
referring to these events, variables that are not
included into our equation.
Carrying out our analysis even further,
into what we have called the class of tracing
memories, the same type of linear regression
analysis has been achieved for each component
memory. Thus, referring to the evaluation of
the memories regarding the “Announcement of
the Revolution / Ceausescu’s running away”,
the regression equation, having as dependent
variable the detailing of memories and as in-
dependent variables the surprise, the intensity,
the consequences and the recall, have evi-
denced the following aspects:
• the adjusted R2 is of 0.437, which means
that the model explains 47 % of the cases,
heaving a great prediction rate;
• the progressive introduction of the vari-
ables into the equation (surprise, consequence,
rumination and intensity) considerably im-
proves the pattern prediction (Sig F
Change<.001);
• the F test (Anova) values and the signifi-
cance coefficient having constant values
p< .001 show that the model is valid;
• the constant of the model is of only 0.2; it
is remarkable that this constant value does not
contain residues namely three variables which
can be involved in predicting the dependent
variable;
• for this constant, the significance coeffi-
cient is higher than .05, which means that our
model is completed that explaining / predicting
the detailing degree of the memory for the
flashbulb event do not occur any other vari-
ables besides those encountered in the model;
• the surprise and consequence variables do
not have a major contribution to the model
(from separate analyses of the regression equa-
tions made by excluding these variables we
238
inferred that they are included in the constant);
• the regression equation could be expressed
by the equation: detailing degree of the mem-
ory = 0,2 + (0,61) intensity + (0,15) rumina-
tion;
• correlated with this formula, the beta stan-
dardized coefficient show that the intensity
variable has four times more important contri-
bution than the recall variable.
In conclusion, the prediction of the detail-
ing degree of the memories about a flashbulb
event, the only necessary variables are the in-
tensity, with which this event has been re-
ceived and the frequency with which the sub-
ject has recalled this event. If we go back to
Figure 2, we can see that in the model obtained
by M. Conway the affect (which contains as a
main variable the intensity) and rumination,
are the only constructs that directly influence
the recalling attributes. Our results agree with
the ones obtained by the English author, al-
though his study was done with reference to
another event, in a different cultural space and
using different design and methods of statisti-
cal analysis from those used by us. For detail-
ing vivid memories, the obtained valid model
has a less potential (R2 = 0.132), the main pre-
dictive variables for the detailing degree of
these memories, with a similar predictive po-
tential (standardized coefficients of similar
magnitude) being: intensity, rumination and
consequences: the memories detailing = 2.5 +
(0.13) recall + (0.21) intensity + (0.08) conse-
quences. In other words, there is a predictive
pattern for the vivid memories detailing, but
this has a low predictive / explaining potential,
his main determinants being rumination fre-
quency, intensity in the event has been re-
ceived with and the importance attached to that
event.
In the analysis aiming the traumatic
memories detailing, the obtained valid model
has R2 = 0.194 (that explains almost 20% of
the cases), and the regression equation can be
expressed by the memories detailing formula =
1.3 + (0.34) intensity + (0.16) consequences +
(0.08) recall. It means that in explaining the
memories referring to traumatic events (or in
the prediction of their detailing degree) the
 Tracing Memories versus Common Memories. A New Taxonomic Approach

THE EVENT constant interval the sur- intensity conse- rumina-

TYPE (unstan- in years prise (standard- quence tion
dardized (standard- ized coef- (standard- (standard-
coefficient) ized coef- ficient) ized coeffi- ized coef-
ficient) cient) ficient)
Common (rela- 2.4 -.131 .221
tive)
Tracing 0.6 .490 .089 .162
Flashbulb 0.2 .569 .146
Vivid 2.5 .179 .126 .188
Traumatic 1.3 .270 .212 .112

Table 7. The coefficients of the regression equation (Synthetic table)

first place is occupied by the intensity with
which that event has been experienced and the
importance of these events consequences (the
standardized coefficients having close values)
and a secondary place is occupied by those
events rumination frequency.
If we collate the corresponding standard-
ized coefficients of the four kinds of regression
equations (of the four predictive models) we
can see that:
• the intensity variable (the intensity with
which the event has been experienced) is the
main explanatory variable for all the models;
this variable is defining in building up
flashbulb memories (shocking memories about
public events);
• the long term variable (the memory old-
ness) has a predictive value only for the model
referring to the relatively common/ banal
events;
• the surprise variable, although it signifi-
cantly correlates with the detailing degree of
the memories for each of the four types of
events, bring no major contribution to any of
these models;
• the main differences between the predic-
tive model of detailing of the relatively com-
mon memories and the predictive model of
tracing memories detailing are: (a) the differ-
ent weight of the intensity variable, (b) the role
played by the events oldness in the first model
and (c) the importance of the recall and conse-
quence variables for the second explanatory
model;
• Inside the tracing memories class, while
for the flashbulb memories the reception emo-
tional intensity of the event is decisive, the
recollection having a minor role, in the case of
vivid and traumatic memories, all the three
variables are important, the remembrance in
the vivid memories and intensity, in traumatic
ones; being somehow detached from the oth-
ers.
• The only complete explanatory model is
the flashbulb type memories. It means that
explaining the memories about the revolution
we have two variables (intensity and recall)
which depending on them are enough to pre-
dict, the detailing degree of these memories.
For the other situations, the models are incom-
plete (there are expressed also other variables
in the constants magnitude, which can contrib-
ute to increase the model accuracy, of their
predictive degree).
CONCLUSIONS
The first and the second hypotheses of
the research have been confirmed. It means
that there are significant statistical differences
both in the way surprise, intensity, conse-
quence and recall are evaluated for relatively
common memories (“The meeting with a po-
lice officer”) and the tracing ones, and between
the latter components (flashbulb, traumatic,
vivid memories). Unfortunately, the check-up
of these hypotheses cannot give us any guaran-
tee that these differences are at the basis or the
result of different building up, maintaining and

239
 Ticu Constantin
recalling processes of these memories.
The third hypotheses, which stated that
memories detailing for each of the 3 categories
of memories (flashbulb, traumatic and vivid
ones) are dependent upon a different configu-
ration of factors, both as type and weight, is
also confirmed. As we have shown above, in
the explanatory models for the four categories
of memories there are different variables, with
different explanatory potential. The only si-
militude in terms of predictive variables / fac-
tors is that between the vivid and traumatic
memories: in both cases, detailing is dependent
on the intensity with which the event has been
experienced, the consequences importance
upon the personal life and the recall frequency
of that event in mind or in discussions with the
others. But, as the results show, the weight of
these factors is different: for the vivid memo-
ries, the recall has the main importance, the
remembrance frequency about those moments,
while for the traumatic memories the recall is
less important, being decisive the intensity
with which the event has been experienced and
the importance attached to its consequences
upon personal life.
Of great importance is the conclusions re-
ferring to the flashbulb type events – “The
beginning (announcement) of the revolution in
mass media / Ceausescu’s running away”. The
memories referring to this special event of our
social memory and, by extrapolation to other
flashbulb type events in the social memory are
dependent upon two factors (variables): the
intensity with which the moment has been ex-
perimented and the later event recall. Accord-
ing to our analyses, these two factors are suffi-
cient to explain the variability degree of the
flashbulb type memories detailing, the predic-
tive model achieved by us being complete (it
does not accept any other variables) and hav-
ing a high prediction potential (the model ex-
plains 47% of the cases - a higher value for the
regression equations).
These results confirm the model proposed
by M. Conway (1994, 1995) to explain the
building up the normal and flashbulb type
memories. With the only difference that the
English writer, an authority in the field, offers
240
a larger extension to the flashbulb memories
concept (“flashbulb memories”) and considers
as belonging to the flash type also the personal
event memories in which the individual is di-
rectly involved, not only as a "spectator", like
in public memories. In the flashbulb type
memories, M. Conway (1995) includes also
the vivid intensive, positive memories (“vivid
memories”), as well as those negative, and
traumatic ones (“traumatic memories”). As we
have mentioned in the second section (“The
comparative analysis of tracing memories”),
there are indeed many similarities, as well as
remarkable differences between the three types
of memories, referring, in our opinion, to dif-
ferent kinds of memories, which observe the
distinct principles of building, maintaining and
recollection.
Through this study we support this point
of view with arguments from the analysis of
the empiric data, showing that between the
four types of memories (common, flashbulb,
traumatic and vivid ones) there are not only
differences of weight (intensity) of the ex-
planatory factors, but also different configura-
tions in explaining the detailing degree of
these memories.
Although we accept these arguments as
being convincing, we do not consider the de-
bate closed, because we do not have the cer-
tainty that these are the only factors involved
or that these are the causal ones, responsible
for creating, maintaining or recollection the
four types of memories.
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