YOLANDA CABALLES vs.

DAR FACTS: The 60 square meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire 500-square meter property. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes. Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawa-an in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge. On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. TRIAL COURT The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. MAR (DAR) DECISION The Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification dated January 24, 1983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings: That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is devoted to bananas; That this case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which act is prohibited b law; and That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations. APPEAL The respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its Order of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu. RECONSIDERATION The respondent DAR, through its new Minister, herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Order dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous Order dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.

THE FINAL DECISION OF THE DAR The DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as tiller thereof. Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the

purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that "the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters." SUPREME COURT WHETHER OR NOT ABAJON CAN AVAIL BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 10 OF RA 3844. YOLANDA CABALLES Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner. DECISION The private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous. Section 2 of said law provides: It is the policy of the State: (1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as " an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.

DAR The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner, Andrea Millenes, hence, a tenancy relationship existed between the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R. A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).

DECISION The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; The subject is agricultural land; There is consent; The purpose is agricultural production; There is personal cultivation; and There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement , it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner. WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF FILED AGAINST ABAJON SHOULD BE DECLARED AS PROPER FOR TRIAL. YOLANDA CABALLES Since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume. DECISION The remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice. The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to resume The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief." The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are: 1. 2. 3. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destructions. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.

The private respondent cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof. The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was allowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings. RAFAEL GELOS vs. CA and ERNESTO ALZONA FACTS: The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, and belonging originally to Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. On September 4, 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform

because of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared proper for trial and so de-archived and reinstated. RTC It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs. CA It held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona. He was also held liable for the payment of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. SC WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION WAS PROPER UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT. GELOS A factual conclusion made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals DECISION It is true that in Talavera v. Court of Appeals, we held that a factual conclusion made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find with the respondent court that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court mis-appreciated the facts when it ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondent. The circumstance that the findings of the respondent court do not concur with those of the trial court does not, of course, call for automatic reversal of the appellate court. Precisely, the function of the appellate court is to review and, if warranted, reverse the findings of the trial court. Disagreement between the two courts merely calls on us to make a specially careful study of their respective decisions to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the facts at hand. The Court has made this careful study and will sustain the decision of the respondent court. WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER INTO A TENDENCY AGREEMENT BUT ONLY A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. ALZONA They only entered into a contract of employment and not a tenancy agreement DECISION It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that 'Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit." (The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work on the said farm.) These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tendency agreement but only a contract of employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before that agreement was concluded, the former tenant of the land, Laocadio Punongbayan, had executed an instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private respondent. It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona intended to cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.

GELOS He is illiterate and that they were tricked into signing the agreement. Also, it was not notarized.

DECISION His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it himself before signing it. Atty. Pampolina said the agreement was not notarized because his commission as notary public was good only for Manila and did not cover Laguna, where the document was

Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggest that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer.

executed. At any rate, the lack of notarization did not adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the agreement, which, significantly, Gelos and his wife do not deny having signed. The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them. As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

WHETHER OR NOT GELOS IS A TENANT. A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. (Emphasis supplied) For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's conduct - although the latter is the most important element. According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest." The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon. The petitioner's wife claims that Alzona made her husband sign the invoices all at one time because he allegedly needed them to reduce his income taxes. Even assuming this to be true, we do not think that made the said payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner never denied having received them. TRINIDAD GABRIEL vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN FACTS: Pilar Pangilinan entered into a contract of lease with the father of Trinidad Gabriel. The subject of the contract of lease was a fishpond covering an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental was on a yearly basis. Trinidad Gabriel inherited the property upon the death of her father. Honoring the previous contract of lease, Gabriel entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with Pangilinan on a year to year basis at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in the month of January. The work in the fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them. These were done by Pangilinan, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond until 1956 when he became ill. Thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his instructions to the workers. Desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself, Gabriel notified Pangilinan in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957. Upon request of Pangilinan, she extended the lease for another year. On November 19, 1958 she again wrote Pangilinan that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demands he however ignored. On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan. She prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.

The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. RTC After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended, it seems clear that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order has become final, the plaintiff may request for the settling of the initial trial. Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, the RTC fixed the period of the lease up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of possession to her, to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the amount due the other, the same would bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made. Reconsideration was denied. CA The controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household, hence, the case must be brought to the Supreme Court. SC WHETHER OR NOT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANT WAS A LEASEHOLD TENANCY OR A CIVIL LAW LEASE. PANGILINAN Pangilinan insists that the relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. GABRIEL Gabriel maintains in effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case. DECISION There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following requisites must concur: 1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household; 3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household; 4. 5. That the land belongs to another; and That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in

money or in produce or in both. There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties". Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not been raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household" The record shows who helped work the land in question, and We quote: "It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond." A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one. We are, therefore, construed to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ACQUIRED JURISDICTION. Yes. Since the relationship is of ordinary leasehold agreement, then, the RTC acquired jurisdiction.