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Could the Tanks of 1918 Have Been War-Winners for the British Expeditionary Force?
Author(s): Tim Travers Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 389-406 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260897 . Accessed: 15/10/2013 10:09
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Tim Travers
Could the Tanksof 1918 Have Been War-Winners for the British ExpeditionaryForce?
Tanks in the first world war have had a varied evaluation and press. Originally, histories of the Tank Corps of the British Expeditionary Force by tank supporters such as Major Clough Williams-Ellis, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart generally saw the tank as a revolutionary weapon that played a central role in making the victory of 1918 possible, although acknowledging that it was still only one arm among many in producing a combined arms conclusion to the war. More recently, however, the Tank Corps has had a poorer press due to its seeming vulnerability, mechanical problems and high loss rates in 1918. One common viewpoint is that expressed by the historian John Terraine, who wrote bluntly: 'It is clear that both mechanically and humanly, the tank of 1918 was not a war-winning weapon ... '. A more positive assessment is provided by Bidwell and Graham, who point to some of the attributes of the tank when deployed with properly co-operating infantry, but who still conclude that 'the dominant fact about the tank was that it was not durable'. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that, if properly used, and available in sufficient numbers, tanks could have played a more decisive role in 1918, perhaps even as a war-winning weapon. The argument really revolves around two inter-related and crucial considerations. First, were there enough tanks available in 1918 to mount a series of major offensives, and thus act as the central weapon of a successful mechanical strategy? And, second, could they have been used in a more efficient way in 1918, and thus have been both more effective and at the same time have avoided the costly losses that actually did occur? If so, the tanks could have been used more frequently in properly prepared and co-ordinated major offensives, and more would have been available for these offensives. But before
Journal of ContemporaryHistory (SAGE, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 27 (1992), 389-406.
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Journal of ContemporaryHistory
looking at the first question concerning numbers, it is important to note that from late 1917 to mid-1918, in the British army, the War Office, the Army Council and the War Cabinet, there was a significant debate going on between the adherents of what may be called mechanical warfare, and those of what may be called traditional warfare. This debate was stimulated by a shortage of manpower, but with the successful, surprise tank-infantry-artillery offensives of Cambrai, Hamel and Amiens, there was a very real possibility of the mechanical warfare supporters winning this debate.2 The believers in mechanical warfare insisted on using machines to the greatest extent possible, and generally referredto the central place on the battlefield of tanks, aeroplanes, machine-guns, Lewis guns, trench mortars, gas and artillery, together with whatever infantry were required to advance or hold a position. The supporters of traditional warfare, on the other hand, thought of infantry (manpower) as the centre-piece of battle, and considered that artillery and mechanical weapons such as tanks and aeroplanes, etc., were merely the auxiliary means of assisting the infantry forward. The British army was not divided simply into these two camps, since many officers' ideas fell in between, and it is clear that the argument was really about fundamental attitudes and perceptions of warfare. But these two positions representedthe extremes, and reflectedon the one hand the thinking of Douglas Haig as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF and his GHQ,as supporters of the traditional viewpoint; and a miscellaneous group, which included Winston Churchill as Minister of Munitions, most officersin the Tank and Machine Gun Corps, Lt.Gen. Sir William Furse as Master General of the Ordnance, Henry and a series of individual Wilson as CIGS and Tim Harington as DCIGS, believers in various forms of the mechanical option.3 Typical of the varied 'mechanical' attitudes was that of Furse, who was opposed to the mass use of infantry in the attack, and who instead suggested using more tanks, smoke and artillery and fewer infantry. Then there was General Lord Home, commanding First Army, who wrote in June 1918 that
Shortage of man-power must be met by increase of mechanical appliances which I will term machine-power. In this, I include Artillery, Machine Guns, Lewis Guns, Tanks, and any other proved appliances for supporting infantry by inflicting loss on the enemy.
Another mechanical supporter was Lt.-Col. G.M. Lindsay, Machine Gun Advisor to First Army, who in July 1918 wrote that 'the Attack
Travers: The Tanks of 1918
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of the future will be one in which one of the main considerations will be Machines, (i.e. Aeroplanes, Tanks, etc.), carrying forward with them a force whose armament is automatic small arms and mortars'.4 It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to delve deeply into this debate, except to point out that it existed and influenced the way that tanks were thought of and used, especially at the level of Haig
and GHQ.
Let us turn to the first question, that of tank numbers. It has usually been assumed that after the important Amiens tank-artilleryinfantry offensive, of 8 to 12 August 1918, there were insufficienttanks available to mount other similar major assaults. This idea was directly stimulated by the tank casualties sustained in the Amiens offensive, and by a misreading of the tank statistics. Thus John Terraine, among other historians, remarksin his book To Wina War, that on 12 August 1918, the last day of the Amiens offensive, there were only six tanks left fit to fight, and so understandably 'the German empire was not going to be overthrown by six tanks . . '. Similarly, Bidwell and Graham note that 414 tanks started the Amiens offensive, 'but only 145 were runnerson the second day, 85 on the third, 38 on the fourth and 6 remained on the fifth'. These figures are taken from the British OfficialHistory, and are therefore reliable.5 There is also no doubt that tank losses had been heavy at Amiens, and contemporary Tank Corps figures give much the same statistics. These Tank Corps figures show that although 425 tanks had started on 8 August, only 145 started on 9 August, 74 on 10 August, and 39 on 11 August. The clear implication is that by 11 August, 386 tanks had become casualties (425 minus 39). But the key word to notice here is that the figures refer to the numbers of tanks starting each day, not necessarily the number of those available. Thus, J.F.C. Fuller states that by the evening of 8 August, the tank crews
were so exhausted by the great distance covered, the maximum penetration effected being about 7? miles, and the heat of the day, that it was necessary to resort to the formation of composite companies for the next day's operation, few reserves remaining in hand ....
The problem here, then, was lack of reserves, rather than actual tank casualties. Then for the operations of 12 August, the last day of the Amiens offensive, Tank Corps HQ did not cease activity because there were no more tanks available, but because the GOC Tanks (MajorGeneral Hugh Elles) said the ground had become unsuitable to continue operations (i.e. the offensive was now reaching the old
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Somme battlefield), and so only the 10th Tank Battalion was ordered to maintain operations with III Corps. Finally, in a letter from the War Office to the Ministry of Munitions on 17 August 1918, the War Office stated that 'During the present operations over 120 Tanks have become casualties through artillery fire'. This would mean that although more tanks might have been disabled for other reasons, only some 120 out of 425 had actually been knocked out by enemy fire. 6 These figures, and the argument that fewer tanks were actually hit than is normally supposed, are reinforced by another set of documents. These give the following tank numbers for the week ending 17 August 1918, only five days after the Amiens offensive had concluded. According to this 'Return of Tanks', there were in France, on charge to the BEF, on 17 August 1918, in fit running order: 122 Mark V* (heavy troop-carrying) tanks, 242 Mark V heavy fighting tanks, 250 Mark IV heavy fighting tanks, 124 Medium 'A' Whippet light tanks, 29 gun carrier tanks, 175 tank tenders, 10 Renault tanks, and 16 Armoured Cars, for a grand total of 968 fit tanks. These figures do not include tanks in the process of being salvaged and repaired, of which there were another 153 in the Mark V heavy fighting-tank category. It should, however, be noted, in fairness, that the total of 968 fit tanks would probably include tanks in training schools in France, although this is not stated.7How, then, to reconcile the numbers of tanks seemingly lost at Amiens with the considerable number of fit tanks just five days after the battle ended? It would appear that many tanks had not actually been knocked out but had suffered either minor damage and had been temporarily withdrawn, or there were mechanical breakdowns, or tanks had run out of petrol or had been withdrawn for refitting, or tank crews had been unable to continue due to heat and exhaustion. In this last case, which was perhaps the most common problem, crews in fighting tanks could only last an average of eight hours. Yet most of these factors, such as mechanical breakdowns and crew fatigue, tended to be temporary problems that could be overcome fairly quickly.8 Thus many tanks and crews at Amiens had only become temporarily unfit, and could have returned to the battle within a short space of time, while the number of tanks actually put out of action and presumablyrequiringrepairsat the central workshops, amounted to some 200 rather than 386. Therefore, it was the lack of reserve tanks and crews more than any other factor which prevented the Tank Corps from continuing the Amiens offensive with larger numbers of tanks. Another aspect of tank numbers was the rate of
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repair of seriously damaged tanks. There are no hard and fast repair figures, but it would seem that repair rates increased as 1918 unfolded. Hence, in late August, the number of tanks per week being repaired was 18, while in early September it was between 20 and 30, and in late October, the number of Mark Vs being repaired weekly had jumped to between 33 and 35.9 This, too, would have played a part in the recovery of the Tank Corps during and after the Amiens offensive, but the numbers of heavily damaged tanks being repaired were too small to have a significant impact on tank availability. Another possible variable in the seemingly large number of tanks available for operations after Amiens was the production rate. According to official figures, there were 400 Mark V heavy fighting tanks due to be produced by June 1918, and at the same time, the Mark IV had been phased out, and the production of the Mark VIII and Medium C was just beginning. However, according to Ministry of Munitions figures, tank production of all types amounted to only 129 in July 1918, and 81 in August. A typical delivery to France seems to have been the 34 tanks of all types delivered in the first week of September 1918, and this figure seems to have been the average throughout October.10 Thus it would seem that the low tank production also did not do much to alleviate the problem of tank numbers, due to a multitude of design, labour and production problems in Britain. It was, in fact, the very durabilityof tanks on the battlefield, plus the reasonably swift recovery of crews and the rapid rejuvenation of tanks with minor repairs, that allowed tank numbers to remain at a remarkably high level overall, despite occasional downturns in availability figures due to time spent salvaging the more seriously damaged tanks after major tank engagements. This question of durability relates to the fact that tanks and their crews were actually very hard to destroy completely. On the one hand, very few tanks indeed were written off as beyond repair. Thus, some 1,993 tanks and armoured cars had been engaged between 8 August and the end of the war in November 1918, and of this total 887 were salvaged after being hit or ditched. But according to two sources, Williams-Ellis and Fuller, only 15 were struck off the strength as being beyond repair, for an extremely low 0.75 per cent destruction rate. A slightly higher loss rate was anticipated,although not recorded, by Major-General Elles, the Tank Corps commander. On 5 September 1918, Elles thought that he might lose 30 to 40 tanks out of more than 1,173 tanks and armoured cars in action since 8 August, for an anticipated loss rate of between 2.5 per cent and 3.4 per
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cent. Then at the end of October 1918, Elles gave a round figure of a total of 50 tanks actually abandoned, which gives a tank loss rate of 2.5 per cent. Therefore, whichever figures are taken, almost all tanks and armoured cars that had been hit or ditched were surviving, either through minor repairsby the tank crews themselves, or through being salvaged, the latter being assisted by the fact that the BEFwas continually advancing and so almost all tanks on the battlefield could be reached and recovered. Having been salvaged, only a very small percentage of tanks were beyond repair. Moreover, it was claimed by the Tank Corps on 12 October 1918, that since 8 August practically all the equipment of every tank hit or ditched had been salvaged.' In fact, the numbers of fit fighting tanks in France remained high, despite the continuous action requiredof them and their crews. Thus, taking the following tank types of Mark IV, Mark V, Mark V* and Medium A, there were 261 available on 30 August (including 127 Mark Vs) despite the fierce fighting of the previous ten days; 177 of the same tanks fit on 7 September (including 85 Mark Vs); 357 on 15 October (including 125 Mark Vs); 317 on 19 October (including 134 Mark Vs); 289 on 26 October (including 95 Mark Vs); 305 on 2 November (including 100 Mark Vs); and 235 on 9 November (including 98 Mark Vs), despite the general impression that the BEF had run out of fighting tanks by the end of the war. These figures do not include tanks in training schools or under repair.12 Such statistics also hide the problem of spares for the tanks, which were in short supply. Had more spares been available, then fit tank numbers would have been even higher. The shortage of spares was due to the actions of Colonel Albert Stern, head of the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department (MWSD), who was more interested in increasing the number of tanks than in supplying spares. The proper ratio of a full set of spares to one new tank should have been 3 to 1, but this was not established until around October 1918. Indeed in 1917, it was calculated that each tank (Mark IV), on running 3 miles per day for 14 days required20 tons of spares, and if for one month, the need was for 50 tons of spares! As a result a 'Battle of the Spares' took place between the Tank Corps in France and the MWSD for some two years from late 1916 to late 1918. Hence, the ability of the Tank Corps in France to repair tanks was less than it should have been, and yet the numbers of fit tanks still remained high.'3 Continuing with the question of durability, if the tanks themselves tended to survive almost all of the time, what of the tank crews?Here, again, crews tended to survive most artillery hits. Thus in one sector
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on 23 August 1918, eight tanks were hit, but only one man was slightly wounded, while the tanks themselves were out of action 'for only a short period'. Nevertheless, because the Tank Corps was a relatively small body of men, and because the crews were continually being reused, there was a high percentage casualty rate during August of 27.5 per cent for officers and 20.56 per cent for other ranks. Yet if these statistics are translated into actual casualty figures, it appears that the Tank Corps suffered only 700 casualties during the Amiens offensive. Also, some of this casualty rate related to temporary problems of exhaustion, and carbon monoxide poisoning and heat problems because of poor tank ventilation, ratherthan through crews being wounded, killed or captured. Similarly, the infantry being transported in the Mark V* tanks sufferedvery seriously from heat, in fact the heat in these tanks sometimes reached a wet bulb temperature of 86?F, only 3 degrees below the heat at which the body would lose the ability to control its own temperature.'4Nevertheless, the low number of actual casualties in the Tank Corps during Amiens would have been even lower to crews (and tanks) if the Tank Corps had been able to have a greater say in the conduct of operations after the initial attack on 8 August, such as better artilleryprotection, and attacks in larger numbers through the use of reserves. Therefore, this raises the second question outlined at the beginning of this article - could the tanks have been used in a more efficient way during 1918? Certainly, there were many ways in which the tanks could have offered greatervalue to the BEF, and perhaps could even have been the decisive weapon in 1918. But there were various reasons why this did not happen. First, and probably the most important reason why the tanks did not occupy a more central role was the negative attitude of as J.F.C. Fuller remarked, it was not the tank the Haig and GHQ: critics objected to, but the Tank Corps' opinions regarding the tank. in the mechanical versus Apart from the position of Haig and GHQ traditional debate discussed above, there was a structural problem. Because the Tank Corps had its own General Officer Commanding and General Staff, who took care of operations, training, Intelligence and administration, the Tank Corps developed its own doctrine and ideas about the tank independently. Therefore, as Major-General Sir J.E. Capper, Director-General of the Tank Corps, wrote in June 1918, this situation
has resulted, as all such special organisations must, in the Tanks and their employment being but little studied by those Higher Commanders, who have had
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no special experience with them, and by the General Staff as a whole. No real advantage can be obtained from the use of Tanks on a large scale unless the General Staff studies them in the same way as it studies their uses and limitations of other arms of the Service.
was making Obviously Capper did not think the General Staff at GHQ a proper attempt to study and understand the tank as a weapon, nor were tanks understood by army staff, or indeed by senior officers as a whole. So Capper suggested that the GOC Tank Corps should go to as like the that Chief GHQ Adviser, Artillery, Army HQshave a Tank like Tank also the and that a Tactical School be Group, Artillery, established to train senior officers. Major-General Elles fully agreed, and commented that: 'In the meantime, we have the main fault that the General Staff, GHQ, won't function on tanks, and this has its effect throughout the army.' Therefore, 'armiesget no guidance from above except by suggestion'.15 The net result of this structural problem was that the needs of the Tank Corps in battle were to a large extent ignored. One major difficultywas that there were never enough tanks put aside as a reserve before an offensive such as Amiens commenced, so that fresh tanks and crews could maintain the offensive without loss of efficiency. In October 1918, J.F.C. Fuller declared that without a 100 per cent tank reserve, the 'fighting efficiency of Tank units falls to pieces within 72 hours of their going into action'. Fuller's belief was fully borne out by the declining numbers of tanks available in the Amiens offensive. Even if this decline mostly related to factors other than enemy artillery fire, it seems that the proportion of tank losses, according to Liddell Hart, increased as the number of tanks involved decreased. Hence, when tanks attacked in large numbers, and with 100 per cent reserves, other factors being equal, the tanks possessed a very considerable advantage. Part of the reason for the lack of tank reserves was lack of knowledge, part was due to the indifference of and part was due to the lack of tank numbers. Yet the lack of GHQ, tank numbers was itself caused by the indiscriminateand wasteful use of tanks in 'penny packets', as the BritishOfficialHistorian, BrigadierGeneral Sir James Edmonds, described it. Edmonds stated that 'it is to be greatly regretted that no mass tank attack was made [after Amiens], not even planned'. Hence, if tank numbers had been preservedand allowed to accumulate, and if proper reserveshad been set aside for each offensive, and proper tactics used, i.e. the withdrawal of tanks after two or three days, by which time the initial
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break-throughs should have been achieved, then tanks would have made a much greater contribution to 1918.16 The mention of tactics relates to another major difficulty for the Tank Corps. Clearly, tanks were vulnerable to German artilleryfire if they were not protected by their own artillery, or given support by infantry in close co-operation, or protected by smoke, mist or an early dawn start, or given the advantage of a surprise attack. Attempts were made to help the tanks through smoke and artillery barrages, through better preparatory training with infantry (the tanks worked especially well with the Australian Corps), and through aircraft locating and/or firing at anti-tank artillery. Yet the impression is that because tanks were seen by GHQ and senior staff as simply auxiliary to the central role of the infantry and artillery, their particular needs were subordinated, and so greater tank losses than necessary occurred. This took place, for example, with the 5th Tank Brigade at Amiens, who remarked that artillery failed to give proper support to the tanks from the second day (9 August) of the offensive. As the 5th Brigade stated later on, in dawn attacks and with smoke, tanks were protected, but it was daylight assaults with no artillerysupport 'that is expensive .. .'. Thus, as the Amiens offensive carried on, there was disorganization and very little protection for the tanks, so that on 11 August, a Canadian Brigade commander reported that 15 tanks were hit outside Parvillers (actually 12 out of 16), probably by the same anti-tank artillery piece or battery: 'This meant that Tank after Tank went up against an impossible situation and was lost to the use of the attacking infantry. This was magnificent, but it is not war.' In other words, tanks were not being supported, and were simply wasted. In addition, from 21 August onward, German anti-tank defences stiffened, just as the tanks were starting to be used in small and vulnerablegroups, and so were being asked to do more than they were capable of achieving. One example of this comes from the senior staff officer of the Tank Corps, who on 25 August wrote of his 9th Tank Battalion:
10 Tanks are moving tonight... and are due to operate with 2nd Canadian Division about dawn. Owing to fatigue of crews and lack of time for Reconnaissance or Liaison with the infantry these tanks cannot be relied upon to obtain good results if used tomorrow 26th.'7
Long after the war, General le Q. Martel, a Tank Corps staff officer in 1918, remarked correctly that some Divisional commanders had
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asked more of tanks than they could give. But when Tank Corps commanders objected, there were charges of lack of discipline from GHQ and lower commanders. An example of this seems to have occurred on 27 September 1918, in the Canadian Corps. In this incident, a Canadian Brigade commander wrote that his Brigade was only allotted three tanks, and that the tank commander told him that his tanks were old (probably Mark IVs), that when they reached the edge of Bourlon Wood they would have to go back and be refuelled, and that the condition of his personnel was not good. The Canadian commander retorted that since the tanks were not going to be of any assistance to him, he had no further time to waste on him or his tanks. This Brigade commander obviously had little understanding or sympathy with his inadequate force of three tanks. In contrast, from the other side of the picture, the 4th Tank Brigade reported that in late September and October 1918, mobile operations were causing the tanks great problems. Infantry commanders did not realize the stress of daily movement of tanks, did not know that you could not use tanks two days in a row in these situations, did not realize that you should not use twelve tanks where four would do, and did not understand that tanks did not have to be used just because they were allotted. The report went on to instance the case of the attack on Beaurevoir village on 5 October 1918, where tanks did great execution against German machine-gunners, even if the infantry (of 25 Division) twice failed to follow the tanks. Perhaps this was because the infantry were not even warned that tanks would be used, and in any case they had no idea of the use of tanks, hence, 'there was no cooperation between the two arms'."8 Therefore, for the most part, from late August to the end of the war, there were really two separate types of campaign being fought the mechanical, tank-oriented method, and the traditional method. Yet when tanks were given protection, when there was time for reconnaissance and liaison, when infantry were previously trained with tanks and co-operated well in battle, tanks could save infantry casualties, and at the same time achieve considerable results. It was noted in the official Weekly Tank Notes that the Australian Corps worked particularlywell with tanks, and so their casualties were light at Amiens because they used 'Section Single File Formations and took immediate advantage of the opportunities created by the Tanks'. When tanks used the protection of the mist and the infantry were close behind, then there was success, and the infantry had fewer losses. One set of statistics appears to support this assertion. Since the
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Australian Corps was recognized as co-operating very well with the tanks at Amiens, while the Canadian Corps were not noted for their work with the tanks, it is noteworthy that while the Canadian Corps sufferedapproximately3,500 casualties, the Australian Corps suffered less at under 3,000. Moreover, the Australian Corps captured 183 officers, 7,742 other ranks and 173 guns, compared with the Canadian Corps capture of 114 officers, 4,919 other ranks and 161 guns. In addition, the contrast would have been even greaterif the Australians and the Tank Corps had not sufferedvery considerably from flanking machine-gun and artillery fire coming from Chippily Ridge, which had not been eliminated as arrangedby the neighbouring III Corps.'9 Another useful way to evaluate the evidence of tank effectivenessat the ground level is to survey the tank battle sheets, usually written up two to three days after a tank action by the commander of each tank, or if he was a casualty, by his substitute. The tank battle sheets provide full information on the action of each individual tank, including which unit the tank was co-operating with, time of start and finish of operations, the state of the tank and crew, crew casualties, numbers of six-pounder and machine-gun rounds expended, hours spent in action, remarks on possible improvements for the tank and its tactics, and a description of the action. Previous historians do not seem to have used these sheets, which, however, are extremely useful for evaluating the real part played by the tanks. Looking at all the sheets of the 8th Tank Battalion at Amiens, for example, which operated with 4 Australian Division, and which was the tank unit that was overlooked by the previously-mentioned Chippily Ridge, it is apparent that by and large tank crews went through one of three experiences. Either, first, the tank did not perform well due to mechanical or human reasons: for example, the tank failed to start or offered support for the infantry but then suffered mechanical problems during the offensive, or the crew helped the infantry but then were compelled to cease operations during the offensive due to fumes and heat; or second, the tank produced useful results with the infantry before being hit or ditched; or third,the tank produced useful results with the infantry, and was not hit or ditched. Reviewing the overall results of the 8th Tank Battalion, it can be seen that - 8 tanks fell into the first category (mechanical problems), 16 were in the second category (useful but hit or ditched), and 12 in the third category (useful and rallied), out of a total of 36 tanks in action. (Each battalion operated 36 fighting tanks, and in the case of the 8th Battalion these were Mark Vs, plus 6 training tanks.) Given that the
400
hit and ditched tanks could almost all be repairedor rejuvenated,and adding together categories two and three, it can be argued that this reflected a 77 per cent success rate for this tank battalion in a well organized tank-infantry co-operative action.20 Still another, but more hazardous method of tank evaluation, which gives the detail and emotional flavour of the Amiens offensive, is to cite some of the tank commanders' descriptions of the action. From category three emerges Sergeant Brown, commanding tank #9363, a Mark V male tank (males carried 2 six-pounder guns and 4 machine-guns, as opposed to the female version, which carried 6 machine-guns):
Left starting point at 5 am to reach Green [start] Line at 7.30 am. 13th Batt. AIF joined us ... & led us up to Green Line. Commenced our advance from Green Line at Zero + 4 pm with 13th AIF following at 1/100 yards. The infantry kept in good order behind tank except for short periods when we were delayed by the extremely steeply [sic] terracesacross our route. We engaged many machine-guns & parties of the enemy infantry with Hotchkiss & 6 Pds. fire, also an enemy Battery of three guns, when we approached it we found it abandoned. About the end of our advance we ran along the bottom of a very steep valley full of Horse Lines and Dug-outs. I went into one dug-out & captured approx. 50 of the enemy, & I should think in all approx. 300 men were captured after the infantry came up. Gnr. [Gunner] Whatling (Second Driver) & Butchart (Gunner) fainted from Exhausting [sic] & heat. Reached Red Line [the objective] zero + 6 waited then one hour while infantry consolidated then rallied under Sect Comm. at Dudgeon Wood [the rallying point].2'
Sergeant Brown's tank succeeded in its aims without mishap, but Lieutenant Murray's tank, #9152, was less fortunate, in category two, although achieving good results:
I left the Green Line at 8.20 am & encountered enemy infantry about 800 yds in advance of same. From this [time] onwards we had excellent targets for about 2 kilos [kilometres] for our 6 Pdr & machine-guns in enemy Machine-Gun positions & parties of enemy infantry. On reaching the gully running North and South ... we met with a fairly determined resistance from concealed machine-gun positions, but we were successful in getting our infantry into these positions without loss. Great difficultywas experienced about this time owing to the nature of the ground & I was obliged to direct the tank from outside. About this time four of the crew were overcome by the heat & fumes & were unable to serve their guns but I was enabled to keep both 6 Pdr guns in action by serving one myself. From this time onwards the crew of fit men consisted of my driver, one gunner, & myself. Advancing towards the red line we continued to get many excellent targets & captured the Red line without difficulty. I then advanced in front of the infantry's final objective & about 200 yds in front succeeded in
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rounding up about 50 prisoners. I noticed at this time that the infantry on the left seemed to be slightly behind the line of the general advance; I went to their assistance & succeeded in enabling them to advance. I again advanced towards the Blue [exploitation] line & encountered some dug-outs. A few well-directed bursts of fire brought out a number of armed men on whom my driver & myself had some good pistol shooting killing about 9 from 15 yd range. On this the remainderto the no. of about 30 surrendered & we drove them back toward our infantry. I then proceeded along the front toward some Mark V stars but in doing so received a direct hit which killed one & wounded four. Another hit on the track put us out of action. I then returned to my rallying point.22
Lieutenant Murray's tank had contributed much to the advance before being hit, as was the case with just about every tank in category two. Those tank commanders in category one, however, normally simply reported that mechanical trouble caused their tanks to come out of action, although some, such as Sergeant Sherwood, commanding tank #9385 (female), also noted that his first and second driver had become exhausted due to heat, and this played a part in this tank having to withdraw. In fact, heat and exhaustion were noted by many tank commanders. Overall, however, the most significant aspect revealed by the 8th Battalion's tank battle sheets is that the tanks really did play a decisive role in enabling the Amiens offensive to succeed, especially in overcoming enemy machine-gun resistance, and in clearly reducing Australian infantry casualties. But all of this occurred because on the 4 Australian Division front, tank and infantry units did operate in a mutually supporting way, judging by the overwhelming majority of tank battle sheet reports which particularlynote that the tanks advanced in front of the infantry, who were normally close up - some 150 to 200 yards behind the tanks. Surprise, mist and smoke also helped the tanks of the 8th Battalion, even though they suffered greatly from the Chippily Ridge flanking
fire.23
Finally, it may be useful to attempt a brief analysis of casualty figures in order to suggest the effectiveness of tank-centred warfare. BEF casualty figuresfor the period of the Amiens offensive were some 22,000, which compares with 24,000 for the French First Army, which was operating without tanks during the offensive. Considering the dates 21 August to 17 September, BEF infantry and cavalry casualties amounted to 105,943, while from 8 to 31 August, the total number of tanks engaged was 1,184. Then from 18 September to 11 November, the BEFinfantry and cavalry casualty figure increased to 158,440, just at the time the number of tanks had dropped to 706,
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between 1 September and 20 October. These comparative figures, though they do not fully overlap, and leaving aside other variables, do suggest that when infantry attacks went in as part of well-prepared and large tank-infantry-artillery offensives, casualties were lighter than when infantry attacked with fewer tanks. As for the Tank Corps itself, casualties for Amiens, as previously mentioned, were only some 700, and from 8 August to 10 October, casualties were just 3,188.24 There also exists a series of calculations in Munitions files, which purport to show, for example, that at the Hamel tank-infantryartilleryattack in July 1918, one infantry division with two battalions of tanks was equivalent to three infantry divisions. J.F.C. Fuller also undertook a study of tank economics in July 1918 that revealed the casualty-saving side of tank warfare. And in September 1918, the G.F. Davidson, Assistant Controller of Mechanical Supply (ACMS), there were a to attack that 1,000 yard front, required several argued men with rifles for every yard of front, plus 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition; but if only 10 tanks were allotted, just 10 men per unit in support were required, with minimal ammunition.25 In conclusion, it is necessary to address the two specific questions raised;were larger numbers of tanks available in 1918 than previously thought? And could the tanks have been used more efficientlyin 1918? As far as the first question is concerned, the argument is that 968 fit tanks and armoured cars were available directly after the Amiens offensive, and that tank numbers remained high from Amiens to the end of the war. In this context, 'high' means the availability of tanks in sufficient numbers so that if tanks had been preservedand allowed to accumulate, rather than thrown into operations in a frequently haphazard manner, then sufficient numbers would have been fit for use in major tank-artillery-infantry offensives in the latter part of 1918. This raises the second question of appropriate use. Here it is argued that with proper reserves and protection, and applied for the first two or three days of an offensive, tanks could have provided (and did provide at Amiens), the centre-piece and break-through weapon of a series of large-scale offensives in 1918. All of this required a and among senior commanders. But, as a change of attitude at GHQ German officer captured in late August 1918 remarked, if the BEF attacked with infantry, artillery and tanks, then they would always get through. But he said that other combinations were not so successful.26Such evidence could be multiplied, although the hypo-
403
thetical question concerning the possible impact of a differently employed and supported Tank Corps is by definition not fully answerable. However, enough information exists at least to argue that although tanks could certainly not have won the war by themselves, they would have saved infantry casualties. Also judging by the success of the surprise tank-artillery-infantry offensives of Cambrai, Hamel and Amiens, tanks had the continuing ability to break open any geographically suitable front and initiate mobile warfare. Tanks were undoubtedly mechanically poor in 1918, there were production and spare part problems, and there is very little comparison with the much greater value of the tanks of 1939 and 1940. Moreover, tank victories in 1918 would also have required similar efforts on the part of the allies of the BEF.Yet, the suspicion remains that the tank problems of 1917 and 1918 were really as much mental as mechanical, and these problems existed at the GHQ command level, and in the minds of some senior commanders who opposed the emphasis on tanks, and tried to starve the Tank Corps of personnel and influence. Properly used rather than wasted, and with sufficient support at the highest command levels, tanks could have made a much greater contribution to a possibly earlier and less costly Allied victory in 1918. Tanks were not war-winners by themselves, and it is important not to claim too much for a better understood Tank Corps. Perhaps the fairest conclusion, in philosophic terms, is that tanks should have been a necessary but not sufficient cause of victory in 1918.
Notes
1. Major Clough Williams-Ellis and A. Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps (London 1919); Brevet Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918 (London and New York 1920); Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks. The History of the Royal Tank Regimentand its Predecessors, Vol. 1, 1914-1939 (London 1959);John Terraine, To Win A War. 1918. The Year of Victory (London 1978, Papermac edition, 1986), 117; the same idea is noted in Terraine, White Heat. The New Warfare, 1914-1918 (London 1982), 224, and in Daniel Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory: Canada and the Great War (Edmonton 1987), 556; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, FirePower, British Army Weaponsand Theoriesof War, 1904-1945 (London 1982, 1985), 137. A recent book, which emphasizes the problems of tank production is A. J. Smithers, A New Excalibur: The Developmentof the Tank, 1909-1939 (London 1986). See also David Fletcher, Landships: British Tanks in the First World War (HMSO:
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London 1984), and Fletcher in J.M. Winter, The Experienceof World WarI(London 1988), 100, who writes that 'It would be wrong to claim that tanks won the war, but they did provide an answer to the stalemate of trench warfare.' 2. The debate is described in Tim Travers, 'The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918:GHQ, Manpower and Technology'. TheJournal of Military History, 54, 2 (April 1990), 179 ff. 3. Ibid. 4. W.T. Furse, MGO, 'Notes on the Report of a Conference', 17 December 1917, J.F.C. Fuller papers, 1/299, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London University (hereafterKCL). General Lord Home, GOC First Army, to GHQ, 16 June 1918; and Lindsay to HQ, First Army, 2 July 1918; in 'Pr6cis of Lectures' by Lindsay on the Machine-Gun Corps, December 1918, Lindsay Papers, Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum, Bovington, Dorset. 5. Terraine, To Wina War, 116;Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 137; BrigadierGeneral Sir James Edmonds, Military OperationsFrance and Belgium, 1918 (London 1947), vol. 4, 517, and vol. 5, 95. 6. For the official numbers of tanks starting at Amiens, see Tank Note #7, in MUN 4/4979/2, Public Record Office, Kew Gardens (hereafter PRO). J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War.224. For Elles on 12 August 1918, Minutes of Tank Corps Conferences, 12 August 1918, WO 158/840, PRO. For numbers lost to artilleryfire, see Cubitt (War Office) to Ministry of Munitions, 17 August 1918, MUN 4/2799, PRO. 7. 'Return of tanks, week ending 17th August 1918', signed by J. Keane, Assistant Director of Artillery, MUN 4/348, PRO. An exactly similar returnfor the week ending 19 August 1918 occurs in MUN 4/4979, PRO. 8. 5th Tank Brigade, 'Report of Operations with Australian Corps from 8 August to 15 August, 1918, Supplementary Report', vol. 4, 1/259, J.F.C. Fuller Papers, KCL. 9. Tank Note #4, concerning 21-25 August 1918, MUN 4/4979/2; Tank Board Committee, 5 September 1918, and 24 October 1918, MUN 4/4949/4; PRO. 10. Official M.W.D. '[Mechanical Warfare Department] Programme, 1stApril 1918 to 30th March 1919'. MUN 4/348; 'Comparative Tables Showing Estimates of Tank Production 27 February 1918 and September 1918'. MUN 4/2801. On tank delivery, Tank Board Committee, 12 September 1918, and 10 October 1918, MUN 4/4979/4; PRO. 11. For tank loss rates, see Williams-Ellis, The TankCorps, 271; Fuller, Tanksin the Great War, 286-7; and Major-General Elles, speaking at the Tank Board Committee, 5 September 1918, MUN 4/4979/4, PRO. At the same board, Fuller noted the number of tanks days operated between 8 and 21 August. For equipment salvaged, Tank Note #10, 12 October 1918, MUN 4979/2, PRO. 12. Tank numbers are derived from detailed 'Weekly Tank State' figures in MUN 4/ 6400, PRO, except for the 15 October figures which come from History of the Ministry of Munitions (HMSO: London 1922), 12 volumes, vol. 12, part 3, 69. 13. Complaints about Stern are in Liddell Hart, Talk with Sir John Keane (Assistant Director of the Artillery in 1918), 9 November 1947, 11/1947/20, Liddell Hart Papers, KCL; on calculations of spares needed, Lt.-Col Searle (Technical Advisor to Heavy Branch, Machine-Gun Corps [forerunner of the Tank Corps]). 'Report on Tanks', 24 March 1917, WO 158/838, PRO; strong complaints about lack of spares, in Elles to Capper (Director-General Tank Corps), 26 April 1918;Capper to Elles, 29 April 1918; and Elles to Capper, 15 June 1918; WO 158/816, PRO; and on finally getting the spares matter right after two years, Fuller to Tank Board, no date,
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in Tank Board Committee, 10 October 1918, MUN 4/4979/4, PRO. 14. Weekly Tank Note #4, Concerning Operations 21-25 August, 1918; and for percentage casualties, Weekly Tank Note #10, 12 October 1918; MUN 4/4979/2; on heat in Mark V* tanks, Tank Corps HQ Report, 21 September 1918, MUN 4/4979/4; regardingTank Corps casualties at Amiens, Major-General Elles to GHQ, 20 October 1918, WO 95/94; PRO. 15. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, xviii. Major-General Sir J.E. Capper to Elles, 'Proposed reorganization of the Tank Corps to bring it more into the Army', 18 June 1918; and Elles to Capper, 23 June 1918; WO 158/816, PRO. 16. J.F.C. Fuller to Tank Board, no date, in Tank Board Committee, 10 October 1918, MUN 4/4979/4, PRO; Edmonds, Military OperationsFrance and Belgium. 1918, vol. 4, 156; Liddell Hart, The Tanks, 184. 17. 5th Tank Brigade. 'Report of Operations with the Australian Corps from 8 August to 15 August 1918', Appendix G; and 'Report on Operations with the Australian Corps, 23 August 1918', 4; vol. 4, Tank Corps Operations, 4th and 5th Brigade, J.F.C. Fuller Papers, 1/259, KCL. Brigadier-General Griesbach to 1 Canadian Division, 'Lessons from the recent fighting', 24 August 1918, 5, vol. 5, Griesbach Papers, MG30 El5, Public Archives, Canada. Major Hotblack (GSO 1, Tank Corps HQ), '3rd Tank Brigade State [includes 9th Tank Battalion] 8pm 25 August 1918', 25 August 1918, WO 95/94, PRO. 18. Liddell Hart, Talk with General Martel, 29 March 1948, 11/1948/7/, Liddell Hart Papers, KCL. Brigadier-General Victor Odlum, GOC I th Canadian Brigade, 'Narrative of Operations . .. from September 27th to October 2nd, 1918', 4 December 1918, 2, vol. 22, Odlum Papers, MG30 E300, Public Archives, Canada. 4th Tank Brigade, 'Report on Operations, September 27 to October 17, 1918', 11, vol. 4, Tank Corps Operations, 4th and 5th Tank Brigades, J.F.C. Fuller Papers, 1/259, KCL. 19. Weekly TankNotes #2 and #3, referringto Amiens, 8 August to 12 August 1918, MUN 4/4979/2, PRO. Terraine, To WinA War, 111. 20. 8th Tank Battalion Battle Sheets, Tank Museum, Bovington. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, 180-1. 24. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, 185, for French and BEF Amiens figures. The other statistics come from Edmonds, Military OperationsFrance and Belgium, 1918, vol. 5, 562; 'Operations on the Western Front', Green File, 2, 'Total Estimated Casualties', Lawrence Papers, National Library of Scotland; Major-General Elles to GHQ, 29 October 1918, WO 95/94, PRO. 25. Tank Statistics, MUN 4/6400; J.F.C. Fuller, 'Notes on Tank Economics', 25 July 1918, MUN 4/4979/27; G.F. Davidson, ACMS, 'Comparison of Utility of Armament, CMS', 18 September 1918, MUN 4/6400; PRO. 26. General Sir John Coleridge to Edmonds, 12 March 1938, recalling the statement of the German officer captured on 21 August 1918, CAB 45/184, PRO.
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Journal of ContemporaryHistory TimTrovers is Professor of History at the University of Calgary. He has written widely on military history and has published The Killing Ground. The British Army, the WesternFront and the Origins of Modern Warfare, 19001918 (1987), and How the War was Won. Commandand Technologyin the British Army on the WesternFront, 1917-1918 (1992).

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