2:13-cv-00217 #46

PHILIP S.
LOTT (5750)
STANFORD E. PURSER (13440)
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
J OHN E. SWALLOW (5802)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Facsimile: (801) 366-0101
Email: phillott@utah.gov
Email: spurser@utah.gov
Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Herbert and John E. Swallow

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

DEREK KITCHEN, individually; MOUDI
SBEITY, individually; KAREN ARCHER,
individually; KATE CALL, individually;
LAURIE WOOD, individually; and
KODY PARTRIDGE, individually,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GARY R. HERBERT, in his official capacity
as Governor of Utah; J OHN SWALLOW, in
his official capacity as Attorney General of
Utah; and SHERRIE SWENSEN, in her
official capacity as Clerk of Salt Lake
County,

Defendants.

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF STATE
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil Case No. 2:13-cv-00217-RJ S

J udge Robert J . Shelby

TABS 59b TO 61a
(1014 - 1078)
Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 46 Filed 10/11/13 Page 1 of 74
ii

APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tab # Description Page

PART ONE
LEGAL MATERIALS

1. Utah Code 30-1-2

1
2. Utah Code 30-1-4.1

2
3. Utah Constitution Art. 1, 29 (Amendment 3)

3
4. H.J .R. 25, J oint Resolution on Marriage (as originally filed)

4
5. H.J .R. 25, J oint Resolution on Marriage (Senate Floor Amendments)

6
6. H.J .R. 25, J oint Resolution on Marriage (final, reflecting Senate amendments)

7
7. Chart: The definition of marriage: State statutory and constitutional
provisions
9
8. Chart: The definition of marriage: State ballot measures

13
9. Chart: The language of State constitutional bans on domestic partnership and
other non-marital unions
18
10. Chart: Court decisions on the marriage issue

23
11. Chart: Pending cases on the marriage issue

25
12. J urisdictional Statement, Baker v. Nelson, No. 71-1027 (U.S. Supreme Court
Feb. 11, 1971)
27
13. Amicus curiae brief of Social Science Professors, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No.
12-144, and United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sup. Ct. J anuary
2013)
40
14. Amicus curiae brief of Scholars of History and Related Disciplines,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Sup. Ct. J anuary 2013)
81
15. [Reserved]

16. [Reserved]

iii

PART TWO
MATERIALS ON ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

17. Affidavit of William C. Duncan and Exhibit 1 (curriculum vitae)

127
18. Excerpts from Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election,
November 2, 2004
150
19. Vote count on Amendment 3, by county, with totals, and with percentages

155
20. Campaign materials for Amendment 3

156
21. Campaign materials against Amendment 3

171
22. New accounts, press releases, and editorials regarding Amendment 3

183
23. Fund-raising and expenditures in the Amendment 3 campaign

222
24. Affidavit of Dr. J oseph P. Price and Exhibit 1 (curriculum vitae)

223
25. [Reserved]

26. [Reserved]

PART THREE
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATIVE FACTS

27. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (3d ed. 2011).
232
28. THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE, MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN
PRINCIPLES (2008).
280
29. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES (2006).
318
30. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES (DAN CERE, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR),
THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH
AMERICA (2005).
362
31. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES ET AL. (ELIZABETH MARQUARDT,
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR), THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING
GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDRENS NEEDS (2006).
413
32. COMMISSION ON PARENTHOODS FUTURE & INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN
VALUES (ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR), ONE PARENT
OR FIVE: A GLOBAL LOOK AT TODAYS NEW INTENTIONAL FAMILIES (2011).
457
33. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES (ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, NOVAL D.
GLENN, & KAREN CLARK, CO-INVESTIGATORS), MY DADDYS NAME IS
DONOR: A NEW STUDY OF YOUNG ADULTS CONCEIVED THROUGH SPERM
DONATION (2010).
529
iv

34. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE:
UNVEILING THE DANGERS OF CANADAS NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 63-78
(Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrows eds., 2004).
669
35. Margaret Somerville, Childrens human rights and unlinking child-parent
biological bonds with adoption, same-sex marriage and new reproductive
technologies, 13 J . FAM. STUD. 179-201 (2007).
687
36. Margaret Somerville, Childrens Human Rights to Natural Biological Origins
and Family Structure, 1 INTL J . J URISPRUDENCE FAM. 35 (2010).
710
37. Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, What About the Children? Liberal
Cautions on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY,
STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS 173-192 (Robert P. George & J ean Bethke
Elshtain, eds., 2006).
732
38. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Does Marriage Protect Child Well-Being?, in THE
MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS 197-212
(Robert P. George & J ean Bethke Elshtain, eds., 2006).
752
39. Seana Sugrue, Soft Despotism and Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MEANING OF
MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS 172-96 (Robert P.
George & J ean Bethke Elshtain, eds., 2006).
770
40. THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORGE SIMMEL 128-32 (Kurt H. Wolff, trans. & ed.,
1950).
797
41. CLAUDE LVI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 39-42 (J oachim Neugroschel
& Phoebe Hoss trans. 1985)
804
42. G. ROBINA QUALE, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE SYSTEMS 1-3 (1988).

810
43. EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 310-13 (1994).
815
44. CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON A CHANGING
INSTITUTION 7-8 (Kingsley Davis, ed., 1985).
819
45. J AMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 40-41, 168-170 (2002).

823
46. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, SEX, CULTURE, AND MYTH 10-11 (1962).

831
47. DADDY DEAREST? ACTIVE FATHERHOOD AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (Kate
Stanley ed., 2005).
834
48. DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT
FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF
CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 139-63 (1996).
837
49. William J . Doherty et al., Responsible Fathering: An Overview and
Conceptual Framework, 60 J . MARRIAGE & FAM. 277-292 (1998).
852
50. KRISTIN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., MARRIAGE FROM A CHILDS PERSPECIVE:
HOW DOES FAMILY STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE DO
ABOUT IT?, a Child Trends Research Brief (2002).
868
51. Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States: incidence and disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478-85 (2011).
876

v

52. ELIZABETH WILDSMITH ET AL., CHILDBEARING OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE:
ESTIMATES AND TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, a Child Trends Research
Brief (2011).
884
53. SAMUEL W. STURGEON, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY STRUCTURE
AND ADOLESCENT SEXUAL ACTIVITY, a familyfacts.org Special Report
(November 2008).
890
54. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Administration for Children &
Families, Office of Planning, Research & Evaluation, Distribution of Abuse
and Neglect by Family Characteristics, in FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4)
892
55. Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive,
Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 75-96 (2005).
936
56. Douglas W. Allen, High school graduation rates among children of same-sex
households, 11 Rev. of Econ. Of the Household (published on-line September
26, 2013).
959
57. Mark Regnerus, How different are the adult children of parents who have
same-sex relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 752-70 (2012).
983
58. Mark Regnerus, Parental same-sex relationships, family instability, and
subsequent life outcomes for adult children: Answering critics of the new
family structures study with additional analyses, 41 SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH 1367-77 (2012).
1002
59. Loren Marks, Same-sex parenting and childrens outcomes: A closer
examination of the American psychological associations brief on lesbian and
gay parenting, 41 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 735-51 (2012).
1013
60. WILLIAM C. DUNCAN, MISPLACED RELIANCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
IN THE PROPOSITION 8 CASE, Vol. 5, No. 6, an Institute for Marriage and
Public Policy Research Brief (2012).
1030
61. J OHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 4-5, 27-29, 31-37,
55-57, 59-60, 76-104, 117-120, 227-28 (1995).
1035
62. J OHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION 6-16, 84-93, 102-08, 143-44 (2010).
1089
63. Douglas Farrow, Why Fight Same-Sex Marriage?, TOUCHSTONE, J an.Feb.
2012
1121
64. Ross Douthat, Gay Parents and the Marriage Debate, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
J une 11, 2002.
1128
65. INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES (BENJ AMIN SCAFIDI, PRINCIPAL
INVESTIGATOR), THE TAXPAYER COSTS OF DIVORCE AND UNWED
CHILDBEARING: FIRST-EVER ESTIMATES FOR THE NATION AND ALL FIFTY
STATES (2008).
1131
66. BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR ALL OUR
FAMILIES & RELATIONSHIPS (J uly 26, 2006).
1175
67. SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON, AND ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS
MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 1-2, 6-12, 23-36 (2012).
1202
vi

68. DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 3-4, 11-21, 55, 91-106,
120-25, 171-75, 179-201 (2007).
1227
69. [Reserved]

70. [Reserved]

PART FOUR
CANADIAN AND BRITISH LAW JOURNAL ARTICLES

71. Matthew B. OBrien, Why Liberal Neutrality Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage:
Rawls, Political Liberalism, and the Family, 1 BRIT. J . AM. L. STUDIES (Issue
2, Summer/Fall 2012, May 1, 2012).
1291
72. F.C. DeCoste, Courting Leviathan: Limited Government and Social Freedom
in Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 42 ALTA. L. REV. 1099 (2005).
1352
73. F.C. Decoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Society, and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 619 (2003).
1377
74. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J . FAM. L. 11
(2004).
1403

Dated this 11
th
day of October, 2013.

J OHN E. SWALLOW
Utah Attorney General

/s/ Philip S. Lott
Philip S. Lott
Stanford E. Purser
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
Attorneys for Defendants Gary R. Herbert
and John Swallow

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 11
th
day of October, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which sent notification of such filing to the
following:
Peggy A. Tomsic tomsic@mgplaw.com
J ames E. Magleby magleby@mgplaw.com
J ennifer Fraser Parrish parrish@mgplaw.com
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
170 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-3605

vii

Ralph Chamness rchamness@slco.org
Darcy M. Goddard dgoddard@slco.org
Salt Lake County District Attorneys
2001 South State, S3500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210

/s/ Philip S. Lott

By way of comparison, social science research with small convenience samples has repeatedly reported no signicant dif-
ferences between children from gay/lesbian households and heterosexual households. These recurring ndings of no signif-
icant differences have led some researchers and professional organizations to formalize related claims. Perhaps none of these
claims has been more inuential than the following from the 2005 American Psychological Association (APA) Brief on Les-
bian and Gay Parenting.
12,13
Not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any signicant respect relative to
children of heterosexual parents.
Are we witnessing the emergence of a new family form that provides a context for children that is equivalent to the tra-
ditional marriage-based family? Many proponents of same-sex marriage contend that the answer is yes. Others are skeptical
and wondergiven that other departures from the traditional marriage-based family form have been correlated with more
negative long-term child outcomesdo children in same-sex families demonstrably avoid being disadvantaged in any sig-
nicant respect relative to children of heterosexual parents as the APA Brief asserts? This is a question with important
implications, particularly since the 2005 APA Brief on Lesbian and Gay Parenting has been repeatedly invoked in the cur-
rent same-sex marriage debate.
2. Statement of purpose
The overarching question of this paper is: Are the conclusions presented in the 2005 APA Brief on Lesbian and Gay Parenting
valid and precise, based on the cited scientic evidence?
14
In the present paper, seven questions relating to the cited scientic
evidence are posed, examined, and addressed.
15
Two portions of the APA Brief are of particular concern to us in connection with these questions: (a) the Summary of
Research Findings (pp. 522), and (b) the rst and largest section of the annotated bibliography, entitled Empirical Studies
Specically Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children (pp. 2345). In the latter section (pp. 2345), the APA
references 67 manuscripts. Eight of these studies are unpublished dissertations.
16
The 59 published studies are listed in
Table 1 of this paper, providing clear parameters from which to formulate responses to the seven outlined questions, next.
2.1. Question 1: how representative and culturally, ethnically, and economically diverse were the gay/lesbian households in the
published literature behind the APA brief?
In response to question 1, more than three-fourths (77%) of the studies cited by the APA brief are based on small, non-
representative, convenience samples of fewer than 100 participants. Many of the non-representative samples contain far
fewer than 100 participants, including one study with ve participants (Wright, 1998; see Table 1). As Strasser (2008) notes:
Members of the LGBT community. . .vary greatly in their attitudes and practices. For this reason, it would be misleading to
cite a study of gay men in urban southern California as if they would represent gay men nationally (p. 37).
By extension, it seems that inuential claims by national organizations should be based, at least partly, on research that is
nationally representative.
Lack of representativeness often entails lack of diversity as well.
17
A closer examination of the APA-cited literature from the
Empirical Studies (pp. 2345) section of the APA Brief reveals a tendency towards not only non-representative but racially
homogeneous samples. For example:
12
The APA Briefs stated objective was primarily to inuence family law. The preface states that the focus of the publication. . .[is] to serve the needs of
psychologists, lawyers, and parties in family law cases. . .. Although comprehensive, the research summary is focused on those issues that often arise in family
law cases involving lesbian mothers or gay fathers (APA Brief, 2005, p. 3). Redding (2008) reports that leading professional organizations including the
American Psychological Association have issued statements and that advocates have used these research conclusions to bolster support for lesbigay parenting
and marriage rights, and the research is now frequently cited in public policy debates and judicial opinions (p. 136).
13
Patterson, p. 15 (from APA Brief, 2005).
14
Kuhn (1970/1996) has stated that there is an insufciency of methodological directives, by themselves, to dictate a unique substantive conclusion to many
sorts of scientic questions (p. 3). To draw substantive conclusions, a socially and historically inuenced paradigm is needed. Research is then directed to the
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies (p. 24). Indeed, paradigmatic biases, and other inuences, can make us
vulnerable to discrepancies between warranted and stated conclusions in the social sciences (Glenn, 1989, p. 119; see also Glenn, 1997).
15
Kuhn (1970/1996) has noted that when scientists disagree about whether the fundamental problems of their eld have been solved, the search for rules
gains a function that it does not ordinarily possess (p. 48).
16
These unpublished dissertations include: Hand (1991), McPherson (1993), Osterweil (1991), Paul (1986), Puryear (1983), Rees (1979), Sbordone (1993), and
Steckel (1985). An adapted portion of one of these dissertations (Steckel, 1985) was eventually published (Steckel, 1987) and is included in the present
examination; the other unpublished work is not included in Table 1 of this paper.
17
Of the 59 published Empirical Studies Specically Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, no studies mention African-American, Hispanic,
or Asian-American families in either their titles or subtitles. The reference list in the APA Briefs Summary of Research Findings (pp. 1522) is also void of any
studies focusing on African-American, Hispanic, or Asian-American families. None of the Empirical Studies Specically Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and
Their Children (pp. 2345) holds, as its focus, any of these minorities. (Note: Three years after the 2005 APA Brief, Moore (2008) published a small but
pioneering study on AfricanAmerican lesbians.)
736 L. Marks / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 735751
001014
Table 1
Publications Cited in APA brief on lesbian and gay parenting (pp. 2345).
Author and year GayLes N Hetero N Stat used Cohen
N
Stat
power
Outcome studied Hetero compar
group
Bailey et al. (1995) 55par; 82chl 0 T-test/Chi 393 N/A Sexual orientation None
Barrett and Tasker
(2001)
101 0 T-test/Chi 393 N/A Child responses to a gay parent None
Bigner and Jacobsen
(1989a)
33 33 T-test 393 No Parents reports of values of
children
Fathers
Bigner and Jacobsen
(1989b)
33 33 T-test 393 No Parent reports of parent behavior Fathers
Bos et al. (2003) 100 100 MANOVA 393 No Parental motives and desires Families
Bos et al. (2004) 100 100 MANOVA 393 No Parent reports of couple
relations
Families
Bozett (1980) 18 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Father disclosure of
homosexuality
None
Brewaeys et al. (1997) 30 68 ANOVA 393 No Emotional/gender development DI/Non-DI
Couples
Chan et al. (1998a) 30 16 Various 393 No Division of labor/child
adjustment
DI Couples
Chan et al. (1998b) 55 25 Various 393 Reported Psychosocial adjustment DI Couples
Ciano-Boyce and
Shelley-Sireci (2002)
67 44 ANOVA 393 No Division of child care Adoptive Parents
Crawford et al. (1999) 0 0 MANOVA 393 N/A 388 Psychologists attitudes N/A
Flaks et al. (1995) 15 15 MANOVA 393 No Cognitive/behavioral/parenting Married Couples
Fulcher et al. (2002) 55 25 T-test/Chi 393 Reported DI/adult-child relationships Parents
Gartrell et al. (1996) 154 0 Descript. N/A N/A Prospective Parent Reports None
Gartrell et al. (1999) 156 0 Descript. N/A N/A Reports on parenting issues None
Gartrell et al. (2000) 150 0 Descript. N/A N/A Reports on parenting issues None
Gartrell et al. (2005) 74 0 Descript. N/A N/A Health, school/education None
Gershon et al. (1999) 76 0 Reg. 390 N/A Adolescent coping None
Golombok et al. (1983) 27 27 T-test/Chi 393 No Psychosexual development Single mother
families
Golombok et al. (2003) 39 134 Various 393 No Socioemotional dev./relations Couples &
singles
Golombok and Rust
(1993)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Reliability testing of a pre-school
gender inventory
Golombok and Tasker
(1996)
25 21 Pearson 783 Reported Sexual orientation Children of
single mothers
Golombok et al. (1997) 30 83 MANOVA 393 No. Parentchild interactions Couples &
singles
Green (1978) 37 0 Descript. N/A N/A Sexual identity None
Green et al. (1986) 50par; 56chl 40par; 48chl Various 390 No Sexual identity/social relations Single mothers
Harris and Turner
(1986)
23 16 ANOVA/Chi 393 No Sex roles/relationship with child Single moth. &
fath.
Hoeffer (1981) 20 20 ANOVA 393 No Sex-role behavior Single mothers
Huggins (1989) 18 18 T-test 393 No Self-esteem of adolescent
children
Divorced
mothers
Johnson and OConnor
(2002)
415 0 Various N/A No Parenting beliefs/division of
labor/etc.
None
King and Black (1999) N/A N/A F 393 N/A 338 College students
perceptions
N/A
Kirkpatrick et al. (1981) 20 20 Descript. N/A No Gender development Single mothers
Koepke et al. (1992) 47 couples 0 MANOVA N/A N/A Relationship quality None
Kweskin and Cook, 1982 22 22 Chi-Sqr 785 No Sex-role behavior Single mothers
Lewis, 1980 21 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Child response to m. disclosure None
Lott-Whitehead and
Tully, 1993
45 0 Descriptive N/A N/A Adult reports of impacts on
children
None
Lyons, 1983 43 37 Descriptive N/A No Adult self-reports Divorced
mothers
McLeod et al., 1999 0 0 Mult. regr. N/A No 151 College student reports N/A
Miller, 1979 54 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Father behavior & f-child bond None
Miller et al., 1981 34 47 Chi-Sqr 785 No Mother role/home environment Mothers
Morris et al., 2002 2431 0 MANCOVA N/A N/A Adult reports on coming out None
Mucklow and Phelan,
1979
34 47 Chi-Sqr 785 No Behavior and self-concept Married mothers
OConnell, 1993 11 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Social and sexual identity None
Pagelow, 1980 20 23 Qual/Descr. N/A N/A Problems and coping Single mothers
Patterson (1994) 66 0 T-test 393 No Social/behavioral/sexual identity Available norms
Patterson (1995) 52 0 T-test/Chi/F 393 No Division of labor/child
adjustment
None
(continued on next page)
L. Marks / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 735751 737
001015
1. All of [the fathers in the sample] were Caucasian (Bozett, 1980, p. 173).
2. Sixty parents, all of whom were White comprised the sample (Flaks et al., 1995, p. 107).
3. [All 40] mothers. . .were white (Hoeffer, 1981, p. 537).
4. All the children, mothers, and fathers in the sample were Caucasian (Huggins, 1989, p. 126).
5. The 25 women were all white (Rand et al., 1982, p. 29).
6. All of the women. . .[were] Caucasian (Siegenthaler and Bigner, 2000, p. 82).
7. All of the birth mothers and co-mothers were white (Tasker and Golombok, 1998, p. 52).
8. All [48] parents were Caucasian (Vanfraussen et al., 2003, p. 81).
Many of the other studies do not explicitly acknowledge all-White samples, but also do not mention or identify a single
minority participantwhile a dozen others report almost all-white samples.
18
Same-sex family researchers Lott-Whitehead
and Tully (1993) cautiously added in the discussion of their APA Brief-cited study:
Results from this study must be interpreted cautiously due to several factors. First, the study sample was small (N = 45)
and biased toward well-educated, white women with high incomes. These factors have plagued other [same-sex parent-
ing] studies, and remain a concern of researchers in this eld (p. 275).
Similarly, in connection with this bias, Patterson (1992), who would later serve as sole author of the 2005 APA Briefs
Summary of Research Findings on Lesbian and Gay Families, reported
19
:
Despite the diversity of gay and lesbian communities, both in the United States and abroad, samples of children [and par-
ents] have been relatively homogeneous. . .. Samples for which demographic information was reported have been
described as predominantly Caucasian, well-educated, and middle to upper class.
In spite of the privileged and homogeneous nature of the non-representative samples employed in the studies at that
time, Pattersons (1992) conclusion was as follows
20
:
Despite shortcomings [in the studies], however, results of existing research comparing children of gay or lesbian parents
with those of heterosexual parents are extraordinarily clear, and they merit attention. . . There is no evidence to suggest
that psychosocial development among children of gay men or lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to that
among offspring of heterosexual parents.
Table 1 (continued)
Author and year GayLes N Hetero N Stat used Cohen
N
Stat
power
Outcome studied Hetero compar
group
Patterson (2001) 66 0 Various 393 No Maternal mental health/child
adjustment
None
Patterson et al., 1998 66 0 Various 393 No Contact w/grandparents & adults None
Rand et al. (1982) 25 0 Correlations 783 No Mothers psychological health None
Sarantakos, 1996 58 116 F-test 393 N/A Childrens educational/social
outcomes
Married/non-
married
Siegenthaler and Bigner,
2000
25 26 T-test 393 No Mothers value of children Mothers
Steckel (1987) (Review) N/A N/A N/A No Psychosocial development of
children
None
Sullivan, 1996 34 couples 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Division of labor None
Tasker and Golombok,
1995
25 21 Pearson/T 783 No Psychosocial/sexual orientation Single mothers
Tasker and Golombok
(1997)
27 27 Various 393 Reported Psychological outcomes/family
rel.
Single mothers
Tasker and Golombok
(1998)
15 84 ANCOVA/
Chi
785 N/A Work and family life DI & NC couples
Vanfraussen et al.
(2003)
24 24 ANOVA 393 No Donor insemination/family
funct.
Families
Wainwright et al. (2004) 44 44 Various 393 No Psychosocial/school/romantic Couples
Wright (1998) 5 0 Qualitative N/A N/A Family issues/processes/
meaning
None
N/A = Not applicable (e.g., In connection with statistical power, qualitative studies and studies without heterosexual comparison groups are coded as N/A).
18
Examples of explicit or implicitly all-White (or nearly all-White) samples include, but are not limited to: Bigner andJacobsen (1989a,b), Bozett (1980), Flaks
et al. (1995), Green (1978), Green etal. (1986), Hoeffer (1981), Huggins (1989), Koepke et al. (1992), Rand et al. (1982), Siegenthaler and Bigner (2000), Tasker
and Golombok (1995, 1998), Vanfraussen et al. (2003).
19
Patterson (1992, p. 1029).
20
Patterson (1992, p. 1036) (emphasis added).
001016
Pattersons conclusion in a 2000 review was essentially the same
21
:
[C]entral results of existing research on lesbian and gay couples and families with children are exceptionally clear. . .. [The]
home environments provided by lesbian and gay parents are just as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to
enable psychosocial growth among family members.
Although eight years had passed, in this second review, Patterson (2000) reported the continuing tendency of same-sex
parenting researchers to select privileged lesbian samples. Specically, she summarized, Much of the research [still] in-
volved small samples that are predominantly White, well-educated [and] middle-class (p. 1064).
22
Given the privileged,
homogeneous, and non-representative samples of lesbian mothers employed in much of the research, it seems warranted
to propose that Patterson was empirically premature to conclude that comparisons between gay or lesbian parents and het-
erosexual parents were extraordinarily clear
23
or exceptionally clear.
24
There is an additional point that warrants attention here. In Pattersons statements above, there are recurring references
to research on children of gay men/parents. In 2000, Demo and Cox reported that children living with gay fathers was a
rarely studied household conguration.
25
In 2005, how many of the 59 published studies cited in the APAs list of Empirical Stud-
ies Specically Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children (pp. 2345) specically addressed the outcomes of children
from gay fathers? A closer examination reveals that only eight studies did so.
26
Of these eight studies, four did not include a het-
erosexual comparison group.
27
In three of the four remaining studies (with heterosexual comparison groups), the outcomes
studied were:
(1) the value of children to. . .fathers (Bigner and Jacobsen, 1989a, p. 163);
(2) parenting behaviors of. . .fathers (Bigner and Jacobsen, 1989b, p. 173);
(3) problems and relationship with child (Harris and Turner, 1986, pp. 1078).
The two Bigner and Jacobsen (1989a,b) studies focused on fathers reports of fathers values and behaviors, not on chil-
drens outcomesillustrating a recurring tendency in the same-sex parenting literature to focus on the parent rather than
the child. Harris and Turner (1986) addressed parentchild relationships, but their studys male heterosexual comparison
group was composed of two single fathers. Although several studies have examined aspects of gay fathers lives, none of
the studies comparing gay fathers and heterosexual comparison groups referenced in the APA Brief (pp. 2345) appear to
have specically focused on childrens developmental outcomes, with the exception of Sarantakos (1996), a study to which
we will later return.
In summary response to question 1 (How representative and culturally, ethnically, and economically diverse were the
gay/lesbian households in the published literature behind the APA Brief?), we see that in addition to relying primarily
on small, non-representative, convenience samples, many studies do not include any minority individuals or families. Fur-
ther, comparison studies on children of gay fathers are almost non-existent in the 2005 Brief. By their own reports, social
researchers examining same-sex parenting have repeatedly selected small, non-representative, homogeneous samples of
privileged lesbian mothers to represent all same-sex parents. This pattern across three decades of research raises signicant
questions regarding lack of representativeness and diversity in the same-sex parenting studies.
2.2. Question 2: how many studies of gay/lesbian parents had no heterosexual comparison group?
Of the 59 publications cited by the APA in the annotated bibliography section entitled Empirical Studies Specically
Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children (pp. 2345), 33 included a heterosexual comparison group. In direct
response to question 2, 26 of the studies (44.1%) on same-sex parenting did not include a heterosexual comparison group. In
well-conducted science, it is important to have a clearly dened comparison group before drawing conclusions regarding
differences or the lack thereof. We see that nearly half of the Empirical Studies Specically Related to Lesbian and Gay Par-
ents and Their Children referenced in the APA Brief allowed no basis for comparison between these two groups (see Table
1). To proceed with precision, this fact does not negate the APA claim. It does, however, dilute it considerably as we are left
with not 59, but 33, relevant studies with heterosexual comparison groups.
2.3. Question 3: when heterosexual comparison groups were used, what were the more specic characteristics of those groups?
We now turn to a question regarding the nature of comparison samples. Of the 33 published Empirical Studies Specif-
ically Related to Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children (APA Brief, pp. 2345) that did directly include a heterosexual
21
Patterson (2000, , p. 1064) (emphasis added).
22
Patterson (2000, p. 1064).
23
Patterson (1992, p. 1036).
24
Patterson (2000, p. 1064).
25
Demo and Cox (2000, p. 890).
26
Bailey et al. (1995), Barrett and Tasker (2001), Bigner and Jacobsen (1989a,b), Bozett (1980), Harris and Turner (1986), Miller (1979), Sarantakos (1996).
27
Bailey et al. (1995), Barrett and Tasker (2001), Bozett (1980), Miller (1979).
001017
comparison group, what were the more specic characteristics of the groups that were compared? The earlier examination and
response related to question 1 documented that, by Pattersons reports, Despite the diversity of gay and lesbian communi-
ties. . .in the United States,
28
the repeatedly selected representatives of same-sex parents have been small samples [of lesbi-
ans] that are predominantly White, well-educated [and] middle-class (p. 1064).
29
In spite of homogeneous sampling, there is considerable diversity among gay and lesbian parents. Considerable diversity
exists among heterosexual parents as well. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the present article noted recurring differences
in several outcomes of societal concern for children in marriage-based intact families compared with children in cohabiting,
divorced, step, and single-parent families.
30
Many of the cited ndings are based on probability samples of thousands (see
Table 2).
Because children in marriage-based intact families have historically fared better than children in cohabiting, divorced,
step, or single-parent families on the above outcomes, the question of what groups researchers selected to represent het-
erosexual parents in the same-sex parenting studies becomes critical. A closer examination of the 33 published same-sex
parenting studies (APA Brief, pp. 2345) with comparison groups, listed chronologically, reveals that:
1. Pagelow (1980) used single mothers as a comparison group (p. 198).
2. Hoeffer (1981) used heterosexual single mothers (p. 537).
3. Kirkpatrick et al. (1981) used single, heterosexual mothers (p. 545).
4. Kweskin and Cook (1982) used women from Parents without Partners (p. 969).
Table 2
Brief overview of 15 intact/divorce/step/single family studies.
(N) Number of reported participants
Probability Is the study based on a probability sample?
Comp Grp Is a probability sample used as a comparison group?
Long Does the study employ measurements across time?
Key ! = Yes; X = No
(N) Probability Comp Grp Long
Amato (1991) 9643 ! ! !
Aquilino (1994) 4516 ! ! !
Brown (2004)
a
35,938 ! ! X
Chase-Lansdale et al. (1995)
b
17,414 ! ! !
Cherlin et al. (1998)
c
11,759 ! ! !
Ellis et al. (2003) 762 ! ! !
Harper and McLanahan (2004)
d
2846 ! ! !
Hetherington and Kelly (2002)
e
1400 ! ! !
Jekielek (1998) 1640 ! ! !
Lichter et al. (2003)
f
7665 ! ! X
Manning and Lamb (2003) 13,231 ! ! X
McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) (based on four data sets)
PSID
g
2900 ! ! !
NLSY
h
5246 ! ! !
HSBS
i
10,400 ! ! !
NSFH
j
13,017
k
! ! !
Mitchell et al. (2009)
l
4663 ! ! !
Nock (1998)
m
3604 ! ! !
Page and Stevens (2005)
n
2023 ! ! !
Total 148,667
a
National Survey of Americas Families (NSAF).
b
United Kingdom study and sample.
c
United Kingdom study and sample.
d
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men and Women (NLSY).
e
Virginia Longitudinal Study (VLS).
f
National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG).
g
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
h
i
The High School and Beyond Study (HSBS).
j
National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH).
k
This is the total original sample. The sub-sample is unlisted but is likely smaller.
l
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
m
n
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
28
Patterson (1992, p. 1029).
29
Patterson (2000, p. 1064).
30
See Footnotes 210 for documentation.
001018
5. Lyons (1983) used heterosexual single mothers (p. 232).
6. Golombok et al. (1983) used single-parent households (p. 551).
7. Green et al. (1986) used solo parent heterosexual mothers (p. 175).
8. Harris and Turner (1986) used 2 male single parents and 14 female single parents (p. 105).
9. Huggins (1989) used divorced heterosexual mothers
31
(p. 123).
10. Tasker and Golombok (1995) used heterosexual single mothers (p. 203).
11. Tasker and Golombok (1997) used single heterosexual mothers (p. 38).
We see that in selecting heterosexual comparison groups for their studies, many same-sex parenting researchers have not
used marriage-based, intact families as heterosexual representatives, but have instead used single mothers (see Table 1).
Further, Bigner and Jacobsen used 90.9 percent single-father samples in two other studies (1989a, 1989b).
32
In total, in at
least 13 of the 33 comparison studies listed in the APA Briefs list of Empirical Studies (pp. 2345) that include heterosexual
comparison groups, the researchers explicitly sampled single parents as representatives for heterosexual parents. The re-
peated (and perhaps even modal) selection of single-parent families as a comparison heterosexual-parent group is noteworthy,
given that a Child Trends (2002) review has stated that children in single-parent families are more likely to have problems than
are children who live in intact families headed by two biological parents.
33
Given that at least 13 of the 33 comparison studies listed in the APA Briefs list of Empirical Studies (pp. 2345) used
single-parent families as heterosexual comparison groups, what group(s) did the remaining 20 studies use as heterosexual
representatives? In closely examining the 20 remaining published comparison group studies, it is difcult to formulate pre-
cise reports of the comparison group characteristics, because in many of these studies, the heterosexual comparison groups
are referred to as mothers or couples without appropriate specicity (see Table 1). Were these mothers continuously
marriedor were they single, divorced, remarried, or cohabiting? When couples were used, were they continuously mar-
riedor remarried or cohabiting? These failures to explicitly and precisely report sample characteristics (e.g., married or
cohabiting) are signicant in light of Browns (2004) nding based on her analysis of a data set of 35,938 US children and
their parents, that regardless of economic and parental resources, the outcomes of adolescents (1217 years old) in cohab-
iting families. . .are worse. . .than those. . .in two-biological-parent married families.
34
Because of the disparities noted by
Brown and others, scientic precision requires that we know whether researchers used: (a) single mothers, (b) cohabiting moth-
ers and couples, (c) remarried mothers, or (d) continuously married mothers and couples as heterosexual comparison groups.
Due to the ambiguity of the characteristics of the heterosexual samples in many same-sex parenting studies, let us frame
a question that permits a more precise response, namely: How many of the studies in the APA Briefs Empirical Studies section
(pp. 2345) explicitly compare the outcomes of children from intact, marriage-based families with those from same-sex families? In
an American Psychologist article published the year after the APA Brief, Herek (2006) referred to a large, national study by
McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) comparing the children of intact heterosexual families with children being raised by a sin-
gle parent. Herek then emphasized that this [large scale] research literature does not include studies comparing children
raised by two-parent same-sex couples with children raised by two-parent heterosexual couples.
35
Isolated exceptions exist
with relatively small samples (as discussed shortly in response to question 4 and as listed in Table 1), but they are rare.
Given what we have seen regarding heterosexual comparison group selection, let us revisit three related claims. First, in
1992, Patterson posited that
36
:
[N]ot a single study has found children of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any respect relative to children
of heterosexual parents.
Pattersons (2000) claim was similar
37
:
[C]entral results of existing research on lesbian and gay couples and families with children are exceptionally clear. . ..
[The] home environments provided by lesbian and gay parents are just as likely as those provided by heterosexual par-
ents to enable psychosocial growth among family members.
Lastly, and most signicantly, we turn to the APA Briefs Summary of Research Findings on Lesbian and Gay Parenting,
also single-authored by Patterson (see p. 5)
38
:
Not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any signicant respect relative to
children of heterosexual parents.
31
Four of the 16 [divorced] heterosexual mothers were either remarried or currently living with a heterosexual lover (p. 127).
32
Of the 66 respondents, six were married, 48 were divorced, eight were separated, and four had never been married (Bigner and Jacobsen (1989a, p. 166).
This means the sample was 90.9% single.
33
Moore et al. (2002); for an extensive review, see Wilcox et al. (2011).
34
Brown (2004, p. 364) (emphasis added).
35
Herek (2006, p. 612).
36
37
38
Patterson, p. 15 (from APA Brief, 2005), (emphasis added).
001019
In all three of these claims (including that latter from the 2005 APA Brief), Patterson uses the broad and plural term het-
erosexual parents, a term that includes marriage-based, intact families. This broad claim is not nuanced by the information
that, with rare exceptions, the research does not include studies comparing children raised by two-parent, same-sex couples
with children raised by marriage-based, heterosexual couples. Further, no mention is made that in at least 13 of the 33 ex-
tant comparison studies referenced in the Brief (pp. 2345), the groups selected to represent heterosexual parents were
composed largely, if not solely, of single parents. We now move to another related examination of the APA Brief.
2.4. Question 4: does a scientically-viable study exist to contradict the conclusion that not a single study has found children of
lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged?
There is at least one notable exception
39
to the APAs claim that Not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay
parents to be disadvantaged in any signicant respect relative to children of heterosexual parents.
40
In the Summary of Find-
ings section, the APA Brief references a study by Sarantakos (1996),
41
but does so in a footnote that critiques the study (p. 6,
Footnote 1). On page 40 of the APA Briefs annotated bibliography, a reference to the Sarantakos (1996) article is offered, but
there is no summary of the studys ndings, only a note reading No abstract available.
Upon closer examination, we nd that the Sarantakos (1996) study is a comparative analysis of 58 children of heterosex-
ual married parents, 58 children of heterosexual cohabiting couples, and 58 children living with homosexual couples that
were all matched according to socially signicant criteria (e.g., age, number of children, education, occupation, and so-
cio-economic status).
42
The combined sample size (174) is the seventh-largest sample size of the 59 published studies listed
in the APA Briefs Summary of Research Findings on Lesbian and Gay Parenting (see Table 1). However, the six studies with
larger sample sizes were all adult self-report studies,
43
making the Sarantakos combined sample the largest study (APA Brief, pp.
2345) that examined childrens developmental outcomes.
Key ndings of the Sarantakos study are summarized below. To contextualize these data, the numbers are based on a tea-
cher rating-scale of performance ranging from 1 (very low performance), through 5 (moderate performance) to 9 (very high
performance).
44
Based on teacher (not parent) reports, Sarantakos found several signicant differences between married fam-
ilies and homosexual families.
45
Language Achievement Married 7.7, Cohabiting 6.8, Homosexual 5.5
Mathematics Achievement Married 7.9, Cohabiting 7.0, Homosexual 5.5
Social Studies Achievement Married 7.3, Cohabiting 7.0, Homosexual 7.6
Sport Interest/Involvement Married 8.9, Cohabiting 8.3, Homosexual 5.9
Sociability/Popularity Married 7.5, Cohabiting 6.5, Homosexual 5.0
School/Learning Attitude Married 7.5, Cohabiting 6.8, Homosexual 6.5
Parent-School Relationships Married 7.5, Cohabiting 6.0, Homosexual 5.0
Support with Homework Married 7.0, Cohabiting 6.5, Homosexual 5.5
Parental Aspirations Married 8.1, Cohabiting 7.4, Homosexual 6.5
a
a
Sarantakos, 1996, pp. 2427.
Sarantakos concluded, Overall, the study has shown that children of married couples are more likely to do well at school
in academic and social terms, than children of cohabiting and homosexual couples.
46
The APAs decision to de-emphasize the Sarantakos (1996) study was based, in part, on the criticism that nearly all indi-
cators of the childrens functioning were based on subjective reports by teachers.
47
The Sarantakos study was based, in part,
on teacher reports. However, teacher reports included tests and normal school assessment (p. 24). Subsequently, it may be
39
Other arguably contradictory studies are reviewed by Schumm (2011).
40
41
Among the diverse types of gay/lesbian parents there are at least two major categories that warrant scholarly precision: (a) two lesbian or gay parents
raising an adopted or DI (donor insemination) child from infancy with these and only these two parents; and (b) two lesbian or gay parents raising a child who
is the biological offspring of one of the parents, following a separation or divorce from a heterosexual partner. The Sarantakos sample is of the latter (b) type. In
terms of scholarly precision, it is important to differentiate and not draw strong implications from a to b or b to a. Indeed, the author would posit that
adopted versus DI children may also warrant separate consideration. The core issue is that precision is essential and overextension of ndings should be
avoided. This same issue is of serious concern in connection with the tendency to overextend ndings regarding lesbian mothers to apply to gay fathers (see
Regnerus, this volume).
42
Sarantakos (1996, p. 23).
43
In order, these six studies include: (1) Morris et al., 2002 (N = 2431), who addressed adults reports of coming out; (2) Johnson and OConnor (2002)
(N = 415), who addressed adults reports of parenting beliefs, division of labor, etc.; (3) Crawford et al. (1999) (N = 388), who addressed psychologists self-
reports of gay adoption; (4) King and Black (1999) (N = 338), who addressed college students perceptions of gay parents; (5) Bos et al. (2003) (N = 200), who
addressed parental motives and desires; and (6) Bos et al. (2004) (N = 200), who addressed parental reports of couple relations. These foci are not childrens
outcomes.
44
45
Social Studies Achievement is signicant at the p = .008 level; the eight other differences are signicant at the p = .000 level.
46
47
APA Brief (2005), Footnote 1, p. 6 (emphasis added).
001020
argued that Sarantakos decision not to rely solely or extensively on parent reports, as is done in most same-sex parenting stud-
ies, is a strength, given parents tendencies towards bias when reporting on their own children.
48
Sarantakos
49
also drew data
from school aptitude tests and observations, thereby modeling a research ideal of triangulation of sources.
50
In fact, the study
integrated not only three data sources to triangulate; it featured at least four (i.e., teachers, tests, observations, and child re-
ports). Further, the study controlled for education, occupation, and socio-economic status and then, based on teacher reports,
compared marriage-based families with gay/lesbian families and found nine signicant differenceswith children from mar-
riage-based families rating higher in eight areas. By objective standards, compared with the studies cited by the APA Brief,
the 1996 Sarantakos study was:
(a) The largest comparison study to examine childrens outcomes,
51
(b) One of the most comparative (only about ve other studies used three comparison groups),
52
and
(c) The most comprehensively triangulated study (four data sources) conducted on same-sex parenting.
53
Accordingly, this study deserves the attention of scientists interested in the question of homosexual and heterosexual
parenting, rather than the footnote it received.
As we conclude the examination of question 4, let us review a portion of APAs published negation of Sarantakos (1996)
study
54
:
[Children Australia, the journal where the article was published] cannot be considered a source upon which one should
rely for understanding the state of scientic knowledge in this eld, particularly when the results contradict those that
have been repeatedly replicated in studies published in better known scientic journals.
For other scientists, however, the salient point behind the Sarantakos ndings is that the novel comparison group of mar-
riage-based families introduced signicant differences in childrens outcomes (as opposed to the recurring no difference
nding with single-mother and couple samples). We now turn to the fth question.
2.5. Question 5: what types of outcomes have been investigated?
With respect to the APA Briefs claim that not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay parents to [have] dis-
advantaged [outcomes], what types of outcomes have been examined and investigated? Specically, how many of the same-
sex parenting studies in Table 1 address the societal concerns of intergenerational poverty, collegiate education and/or labor
force contribution, serious criminality, incarceration, early childbearing, drug/alcohol abuse, or suicide that are frequently
the foci of national studies on children, adolescents, and young adults, as discussed at the outset of this paper?
Anderssen and colleagues cataloged the foci of same-sex parenting studies in a 2002 review and reported
55
:
Emotional functioning was the most often studied outcome (12 studies), followed by sexual preference (nine studies),
gender role behavior (eight studies), behavioral adjustment (seven studies), gender identity (six studies), and cognitive
functioning (three studies).
Examination of the articles cited in the 2005 APA Brief on Lesbian and Gay Parenting yields a list of studied outcomes that
are consistent with Anderssens summary, including: sexual orientation
56
; behavioral adjustment, self-concepts, and
sex-role identity
57
; sexual identity
58
; sex-role behavior
59
; self-esteem
60
; psychosexual and psychiatric appraisal
61
;
socioemotional development
62
; and maternal mental health and child adjustment.
63
48
It is well replicated that individuals tend to rate the group with which they most identify more positively than they do other groups. This positive bias
includes within-family ratings Roese and Olson (2007).
49
Sarantakos is the author of several research methods textbooks (2005, 2007b) and the author/editor of a four-volume, 1672-page work in Sage Publications
Benchmarks in Social Research Series (2007a).
50
Triangulation is a means of checking the integrity of the inferences one draws. It can involve the use of multiple data sources, . . .multiple theoretical
perspectives, multiple methods, or all of these (Schwandt, 2001, p. 257). In effect, the standard of triangulation is advocacy for checks and balances.
51
Six of the 59 studies listed in the 2005 APA Brief (pp. 2345) had larger samples, but, as discussed earlier, they all focused on adult reports of adult
perceptions and outcomes.
52
For example, Brewaeys et al. (1997), Golombok et al. (2003, 1997), MacCallum and Golombok (2004), and Tasker and Golombok (1998).
53
In spite of the strong design with respect to triangulation, the Sarantakos study does not appear to be based on a true probability sample, nor is it or a large
sample (although it is a subsample of a 900-plus study). The study is rigorous by comparison to other same-sex parenting studies, but is limited compared with
most of the nationally representative studies on intact families listed in Table 2.
54
Patterson (2005) in APA Brief, p. 7, Footnote 1.
55
Anderssen et al. (2002, p. 343).
56
Bailey et al. (1995) and Golombok and Tasker (1996).
57
Patterson (1994).
58
Green (1978).
59
Hoeffer (1981) and Kweskin and Cook (1982).
60
Huggins (1989).
61
Golombok et al. (1983).
62
Golombok et al. (1997).
63
Patterson (2001).
001021
With these focal outcomes identied, it is noteworthy that all of the aforementioned outcomes of societal-level concern
are absent from the list of most often studied outcome(s) as identied by Anderssen et al.
64
In response to the present arti-
cles question 5 (what types of outcomes have been investigated for children of gay/lesbian families?), it may be concluded: In
the same-sex parenting research that undergirded the 2005 APA Brief, it appears that gender-related outcomes were the dom-
inant research concern. To be more precise, Table 1 lists several categories of information regarding the 59 published empirical
studies; one of these categories is the outcome studied. More than 20 studies have examined gender-related outcomes, but
there was a dearth of peer-reviewed journal articles from which to form science-based conclusions in myriad areas of societal
concern.
65
One book-length empirical study
66
entitled Same-Sex Couples (Sarantakos, 2000, Harvard Press) did examine several issues
of societal concern. In connection with the questions raised in the present article, this study:
(1) includes a diverse sample of lesbian and gay parents instead of focusing on privileged lesbian mothers (question 1);
(2) uses not only one but two heterosexual comparison samples; one married parent sample and one cohabitating parent
sample (questions 2 and 3);
(3) examines several outcomes of societal concern (question 5); and
(4) is unique in presenting long-term (post-18 years old) outcomes of children with lesbian and gay parents (question 6,
addressed later).
This studys conclusion regarding outcomes of gay and lesbian parents reads, in part:
If we perceive deviance in a general sense, to include excessive drinking, drug use, truancy, sexual deviance, and criminal
offenses, and if we rely on the statements made by adult children (over 18 years of age). . .[then] children of homosexual
parents report deviance in higher proportions than children of (married or cohabiting) heterosexual couples (Sarantakos,
2000, p. 131).
The 2005 APA Brief does not cite this study, again leaving us to more closely examine the claim that Not a single study
has found children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any signicant respect relative to children of heterosex-
ual parents (p. 15).
The Sarantakos (2000) study also includes the report that the number of children who were labeled by their parents as
gay, or identied themselves as gay, is much higher than the generally expected proportion (p. 133). However, the study
also notes areas of no signicant heterosexualhomosexual differences (i.e., Physical and emotional well-being, p. 130),
consistent with the 2005 APA Briefs claims. All of these ndings warranted attention in the 2005 APA Brief but were over-
looked. Of most interest to us here, however, is the novel attention of Sarantakos (2000) on multiple concerns of societal
importance, including drug and alcohol abuse, education (truancy), sexual activity, and criminality.
In any less-developed area of empirical inquiry it takes time, often several decades, before many of the central and most
relevant questions can be adequately addressed. This seems to be the case with same-sex parenting outcomes, as several
issues of societal concern were almost entirely unaddressed in the 2005 APA Brief.
2.6. Question 6: what do we know about the long-term outcomes of children of lesbian and gay parents?
In the preceding response to question 5, the outcomes of intergenerational poverty, criminality, college education and/or
labor force contribution, drug/alcohol abuse, suicide, early sexual activity, early childbearing, and eventual divorce as adults
were mentioned. Close consideration reveals that the majority of these outcomes are not child outcomes. Indeed, most of
these outcomes are not optimally observable until (at the earliest) mid-late adolescence or early adulthood (and in the case
of divorce, not until middle adulthood). As discussed in question 5, virtually none of the peer-reviewed, same-sex parenting
comparison studies addressed these outcomes.
67
Additionally, of the 59 published studies cited by the APA 2005 Brief (pp. 2345), it is difcult to nd comparison studies
of any kind that examine late adolescent outcomes of any kind. The few that utilize comparison groups have comparison
groups of 44 or fewer.
68
Let us further explore the importance of a lack of data centered on adolescents and young adults.
Table 2 identies 15 of the hundreds of available studies on outcomes of children from intact families (as contrasted with
comparison groups such as cohabiting couples and single parents). One of these studies included a data set of 35,938 chil-
drenone of the largest. . .nationally representative survey[s] of US children and their parents.
69
Based on analysis of this
64
65
Including: intergenerational poverty, criminality, college education and/or labor force contribution, drug/alcohol abuse, suicide, sexual activity and early
childbearing, and eventual divorce.
66
This study is a later, larger, and more detailed report on the earlier mentioned Sarantakos (1996) study. The sample of that study was larger than the other
comparison samples in Table 1.
67
Gartrell and colleagues (1999, 2000, 2005) have commenced to do so, but in 2005 they were reporting on children who were only 10 years old (with a
sample size of 74 and no heterosexual comparison group).
68
I.e. Wainwright et al. (2004).
69
Brown (2004), p. 355.
001022
nationally representative sample, Susan Brown emphasized, The ndings of this study. . .demonstrate the importance of sep-
arately examining children and adolescents. She then explained
70
:
Although the outcomes of children (611 years old) in cohabiting families. . .are worse. . .than those of children in two-
biological-parent married families, much of this difference. . .is economic. . .. In contrast, regardless of economic and
parental resources, the outcomes of adolescents (1217 years old) in cohabiting families. . .are worse. . .than those. . .in
two-biological-parent married families.
In short, in the case of cohabiting families and two-biological-parent married families the differences in childrens out-
comes increase in signicance as the children grow older. The likelihood of signicant differences arising between children
from same-sex and married families may also increase across timenot just into adolescence but into early and middle
adulthood. For example, research indicates that [d]aughters raised outside of intact marriages are. . .more likely to end
up young, unwed mothers than are children whose parents married and stayed married, and that [p]arental divorce in-
creases the odds that adult children will also divorce.
71
Longitudinal studies that follow children across time and into adulthood to examine such outcomes are comparatively
rare and valuable. We briey turn to a key nding from one such study that followed children of divorce into middle adult-
hood. Based on a 25-year longitudinal study, Wallerstein and colleagues (2001) state:
Contrary to what we have long thought, the major impact of divorce does not occur during childhood or adolescence.
Rather, it rises in adulthood as serious romantic relationships move center stage. When it comes time to choose a life
mate and build a new family, the effects of divorce crescendo (p. xxix).
Wallersteins research, like nearly all of the studies in the same-sex parenting literature, is based on a small, non-repre-
sentative sample that should not be generalized or overextended. Her longitudinal work does, however, indicate that effects
[can] crescendo in adulthood. Did any published same-sex parenting study cited by the 2005 APA Brief (pp. 2345) track the
societally signicant long-term outcomes into adulthood? No. Is it possible that the major impact of same-sex parenting
might not occur during childhood or adolescence. . .[but that it will rise] in adulthood as serious romantic relationships
move center stage? Is it also possible that when it comes time to choose a life mate and build a new family that the effects
of same-sex parenting will similarly crescendo as they did in Wallersteins study of divorce effects? In response to this or
any question regarding the long-term, adult outcomes of lesbian and gay parenting we have almost no empirical basis for
responding. An exception is provided by the ndings from self-reports of adult children (18 + years of age) in Sarantakos
(2000) book-length study, but those results not encouraging. This is a single study howevera study that, like those cited by
the APA Brief, lacks the statistical power and rigor of the large, random, representative samples used in marriage-based fam-
ily studies (see Table 2). We now move to a nal related empirical question regarding the same-sex parenting literature.
2.7. Question 7: have the studies in this area committed the type II error and prematurely concluded that heterosexual couples and
gay and lesbian couples produce parental outcomes with no differences?
The Summary of Research Findings in the APA brief reads, As is true in any area of research, questions have been raised
with regard to sampling issues, statistical power, and other technical matters (p. 5). However, neither statistical power nor
the related concern of Type II error is further explained or addressed. This will be done next.
In social science research, questions are typically framed as follows: Are we 95% sure the two groups being compared are
different? (p < .05). If our statistics seem to conrm a difference with 95% or greater condence, then we say the two groups
are signicantly different. But what if, after statistical analysis, we are only 85% sure that the two groups are different? By
the rules of standard social science, we would be obligated to say we were unable to satisfactorily conclude that the two
groups are different. However, a reported nding of no statistically signicant difference (at the p < .05 level; 95%-plus cer-
tainty) is a grossly inadequate basis upon which to offer the science-based claim that the groups were conclusively the
same. In research, incorrectly concluding that there is no difference between groups when there is in fact a difference is
referred to as a Type II error. A Type II error is more likely when undue amounts of random variation are present in a study.
Specically, small sample size, unreliable measures, imprecise research methodology, or unaccounted for variables can all
increase the likelihood of a Type II error. All one would have to do to be able to come to a conclusion of no difference
is to conduct a study with a small sample and/or sufcient levels of random variation. These weaknesses compromise a
studys statistical power (Cohen, 1988).
It must be re-emphasized that a conclusion of no signicant difference means that it is unknown whether or not a dif-
ference exists on the variable(s) in question (Cohen, 1988). This conclusion does not necessarily mean that the two groups
are, in fact, the same on the variable being studied, much less on all other characteristics. This point is important with same-
sex parenting research because Patterson (1992, 2000) and the 2005 APA Brief seem to drawinferences of sameness based on
the observation that gay and lesbian parents and heterosexual parents appear not to be statistically different from one an-
other based on small, non-representative samplesthereby becoming vulnerable to a classic Type II error.
70
Brown (2004), p. 364.
71
Wilcox et al. (2011), p. 11.
001023
To make the APA Briefs proposition of sameness more precarious, in a review published one year after the APA Brief in
the agship APA journal, American Psychologist, Herek (2006) acknowledged that many same-sex parenting studies have
utilized small, select convenience samples and often employed unstandardized measures.
72
Anderssen et al. (2002) simi-
larly indicated in their review of same-sex parenting studies, The samples were most often small, increasing the chance to con-
clude that no differences exist between groups when in fact the differences do exist. This casts doubt on the external validity of
the studies.
73
With these limitations noted, the 2005 APA Brief explicitly claimed that ndings of non-signicant differences
between same-sex and heterosexual parents had been repeatedly replicated (p. 7, Footnote 1).
Reasons for skepticism regarding the APA Briefs claim that ndings have been repeatedly replicated rest in Neumans
(1997) point that the logic of replication implies that different researchers are unlikely to make the same errors.
74
How-
ever, if errors (e.g., similarly biased sampling approaches employing small, select convenience samples
75
and comparison
groups) are repeated by different researchers, the logic behind replication is undermined. As has been previously detailed in
the response to question 1 in this article, same-sex parenting researchers have repeatedly selected White, well-educated, mid-
dle- and upper-class lesbians to represent same-sex parents. This tendency recurred even after this bias was explicitly identied
by Patterson (1992, 2000).
76
Further, repeated sampling tendencies in connection with heterosexual comparison groups (e.g.,
single mothers), were documented in response to Question 3 in this paper. These repeated (convenience) sampling tendencies
across studies that employed different measures do not seem to constitute valid scientic replication.
An additional scientic question raised by the above information regarding small, select convenience
77
samples is
framed by Stacey and Biblarz (2001) who reveal that many of these [comparative same-sex parenting] studies use conventional
levels of signicance. . .on miniscule samples, substantially increasing their likelihood of failing to reject the null hypothesis.
78
Was the APAs claim that Not a single study has found children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged. . .
79
based on
clear scientic evidence or (perhaps) Type II errors? In response, we now turn to the APA-acknowledged but unexplained cri-
tique of low statistical power in these studies (p. 5).
The last three editions of the APA Publication manual (1994, 2001, 2010) have urged scholars to report effect sizes and to
take statistical power into consideration when reporting their results. The APA 5th Publication manual (2001) in use at the
time of APAs 2005 Brief on Lesbian and Gay Parenting stated:
Take seriously the statistical power considerations associated with your tests of hypotheses. Such considerations relate to
the likelihood of correctly rejecting the tested hypotheses, given a particular alpha level, effect size, and sample size. In
that regard, you should routinely provide evidence that your study has power to detect effects of substantive interest
(e.g., see Cohen, 1988). You should be similarly aware of the role played by sample size in cases in which not rejecting
the null hypothesis is desirable (i.e., when you wish to argue that there are no differences [between two groups]). . .
(p. 24).
This awareness of statistical power in cases when you wish to argue that there are no differences bears directly on
same-sex comparative research. The APA 5th Publication manual (2001) continues:
Neither of the two types of probability [alpha level or p value] directly reects the magnitude of an effect or the strength
of a relationship. For the reader to fully understand the importance of your ndings, it is almost always necessary to
include some index of effect size or strength of relationship in your Results section (p. 25).
Let us review three statements from the APA 5th Publication Manual for emphasis:
(1) The APA urges researchers to: Take seriously the statistical power considerations and routinely provide evidence
(p. 24).
(2) The APA identies a specic concern with sample size and statistical power in connection with cases where authors
wish to argue that there are no differences between compared groups (p. 24).
(3) The APA concludes: It is almost always necessary to include some index of effect size or strength of relationship in
your Results section (p. 25).
The APAs rst highlighted exhortation is that an author should routinely provide evidence that your study has sufcient
power. . .(e.g., see Cohen, 1988) (p. 24). The reference cited here by the APA is the volume Statistical Power Analysis for the
Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.) by the late psychometrician Jacob Cohen, who has been credited with foundational work in sta-
tistical meta-analysis (Borenstein, 1999). In his APA-cited volume, Cohen states:
72
Herek (2006), p. 612.
73
Anderssen et al. (2002), p. 348.
74
Neuman (1997), p. 150.
75
Herek (2006), p. 612.
76
Further, single mothers have been repeatedly selected to represent heterosexual parents as documented in this papers response to question 3.
77
Herek (2006), p. 612.
78
Stacey and Biblarz (2001, p. 168), Footnote 9.
79
001024
Most psychologists of whatever stripe believe that samples, even small samples, mirror the characteristics of their parent
populations. In effect, they operate on the unstated premise that the law of large numbers holds for small numbers as
well. . .. [Citing Tversky and Kahneman] The believer in the law of small numbers has incorrect intuitions about signif-
icance level, power, and condence intervals. Signicance levels are usually computed and reported, but power and con-
dence levels are not. Perhaps they should be.
But as we have seen, too many of our colleagues have not responded to [this] admonition. . .. They do so at their
peril (p. xv).
Let us contextualize the law of small numbers with respect to the same-sex parenting studies cited in the APA Brief. The
combined non-representative sample total of all 59 same-sex parenting studies in the 2005 APA Brief (pp. 2345) is 7800
80
(see Table 1). By comparison, Table 2 lists 15 prominent studies that contrast childrens outcomes in intact, single-parent, di-
vorced, and/or step-family forms using large probability samples and comparison groups.
81
The average sample size in these
studies is 9911
82
a gure larger than all 59 same-sex parenting studies combined (7800).
We now turn to another question relating to Cohens statements: How many of the published same-sex parenting studies
with a heterosexual comparison group cited in APAs Brief (pp. 2345) provide[d] evidence of statistical power, consistent
with APAs Publication Manual and the admonition of Jacob Cohen who is cited in the APA manual? An examination of the
studies indicates that only four of the 59 did so.
83
In addition to Cohens (1988) statement that statistical power is ignored at our own peril, he offered several tables in his
volume for researchers to reference. Employing these tables, statistical experts Lerner and Nagai (2001) computed the sam-
ple sizes required for a power level of .80, or a Type II error rate of .20, or one in ve ndings (p. 102). At this power level,
the minimum number of cases required to detect a small effect size
84
is 393 for a T-test or ANOVA, or 780-plus for Chi-Square
or Pearson Correlation Coefcient tests.
85
In Table 1 of this report, the 59 published same-sex parenting studies cited in the APA
Brief (pp. 2345) are compared against these standards. A close examination indicates that not a single study, including the few
that reported power, meets the standards needed to detect a small effect size. Indeed, it appears that only two of the comparison
studies (Bos et al., 2003, 2004) have combined sample sizes of even half of the minimum number of cases.
86
In their book-length examination of same-sex parenting studies, Lerner and Nagai (2001) further indicate that 17 of the
22 same-sex parenting comparison studies they reviewed had been designed in such a way that the odds of failing to nd a
signicant difference [between homo- and hetero-sexual groups] was 85% or higher.
87
Indeed, only one of the 22 studies they
analyzed revealed a probability of Type II error below 77 percent, and that study did nd differences.
88
These methodological
concerns (and others) were raised and explained in Lerner and Nagais monograph (see pp. 95108), and in an 81-page report by
Nock (2001) preceding the APA Brief.
89
Nock concluded:
All of the [same-sex parenting] articles I reviewed contained at least one fatal aw of design or execution. Not a single one
was conducted according to generally accepted standards of scientic research. . .. [I]n my opinion, the only acceptable
conclusion at this point is that the literature on this topic does not constitute a solid body of scientic evidence (Nock,
2001, pp. 39, 47).
80
This gure (7800) includes same-sex parents and their children, as well as heterosexual comparison samples (1404), psychologists (388), and college
students perception reports (489).
81
Table 2 lists 15 studies that contrast childrens outcomes in intact families compared with other family forms using large, probability samples and
comparison groups. The focal topics of these studies are not sexual preference, gender role behavior. . .[and] gender identity (Anderssen et al., 2002, p. 343),
but outcomes such as educational attainment, labor force attachment, and early childbearing (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994, pp. 2021 ), as
recommended in the earlier examination of question 5. Further, all but two of the 15 studies employ longitudinal designs, as recommended in the earlier
examination of question 6.
82
This gure is the result of 148,667 divided by 15 studies.
83
These include Chan et al. (1998b), Fulcher et al. (2002), Golombok and Tasker (1996), and Tasker and Golombok (1997).
84
By way of context, in a 67 study meta-analysis of the average differences in outcomes between children with divorced and continuously marriedparents,
Amato (2001) reported an average weighted effect size of between 0.12 and 0.22 (a 0.17 average) with an advantage in all ve domains considered to
children of continuously married parents (p. 360). These effect sizes of about .20, although statistically robust, would be classied by Cohen (1992) as small
effect sizes. Even so, based on the data, most family scholars would agree that children whose parents remain continuously married tend to fare slightly to
moderately better than when parents divorce. However, large numbers were needed to determine this small but important effect. Indeed, most effect sizes in
social science research tend to be small. Rigorous and sound social science tends to include and account for many inuential factors that each has a small but
meaningful effect size. In social science, detecting a novel large effect from a single variable (whether it is divorce, remarriage, or same-sex parenting), is a
comparatively rare occurrence. If we are to examine possible effects of same-sex parenting with scientic precision and rigor, related examinations would, like
Amatos work, be designed and rened to detect small effect sizes.
85
Cohen (1988) proposes a relatively high power of .90 for cases where one is trying to demonstrate the r [difference] is trivially small (p. 104). If the .90
power were applied, the required sample sizes would further increase. However, because none of the studies in Table 1 of the present report approach the .80
power levels, .90 calculations are unnecessary here.
86
The minimum number of cases is 393. The two Bos et al. studies both have combined samples of 200. Four other larger samples are not comparison
studies Crawford et al. (1999), Johnson and OConnor (2002), King and Black (1999), and Morris et al. (2002).
87
Lerner and Nagai (2001, p. 103).
88
The single exception was Cameron and Cameron (1996) with a comparatively low probability error rate of 25%. This study, like the Sarantakos (1996) study
mentioned earlier, did report some signicant differences between children of heterosexual and homosexual parents but, like Sarantakos (1996), was not
addressed in the body of the 2005 APA brief but was instead moved to a footnote on p. 7. See Redding (2008) for additional discussion (p. 137).
89
For similar critiques preceding the 2005 APA brief, seeNock (2001), Schumm (2004), Wardle (1997), and Williams (2000). For similar critiques post-dating
the 2005 APA brief, see Byrd (2008), Schumm (2010a,b, 2011), and Redding (2008, p. 138).
001025
More specically, Nock identied: (a) several aws related to sampling (including biased sampling, non-probability sam-
pling, convenience sampling, etc.); (b) poorly operationalized denitions; (c) researcher bias; (d) lack of longitudinal studies;
(e) failure to report reliability; (f) low response rates; and (g) lack of statistical power (pp. 3940).
90
Although some of these
aws are briey mentioned in the 2005 APA Summary of Research Findings on Lesbian and Gay Parenting, many of the signif-
icant concerns raised by Nock or Lerner and Nagai are not substantively addressed.
91
Indeed, the Lerner and Nagai volume and
the Nock report are neither mentioned nor referenced.
To restate, in connection with the APAs published urging that researchers: Take seriously the statistical power consid-
erations and routinely provide evidence, the academic reader is left at a disadvantage.
92
Only a few comparison studies
specically reported statistical power at all and no comparison study approached the minimum sample size of 393 needed
to nd a small effect.
The authors response to question 7 has examined how comparisons have been made from a research methods stand-
point. In summary, some same-sex parenting researchers have acknowledged that miniscule samples
93
signicantly in-
crease the chance to conclude that no differences exist between groups when in fact the differences do existthereby
casting doubt on the external validity of the studies.
94
An additional concern is that the APA Briefs claim of repeatedly rep-
licated ndings of no signicant difference rested almost entirely on studies that were published without reports of the APA-
urged effect sizes and statistical power analyses.
95
This inconsistency seems to justify scientic skepticism, as well as the effort
of more closely assessing the balance, precision, and rigor behind the conclusions posed in the 2005 APA Brief.
3. Conclusion
The 2005 APA Brief, near its outset, claims that even taking into account all the questions and/or limitations that may
characterize research in this area, none of the published research suggests conclusions different from that which will be
summarized (p. 5). The concluding summary later claims, Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that home environments
provided by lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and enable childrens
psychosocial growth (p. 15).
96
We now return to the overarching question of this paper: Are we witnessing the emergence of a new family form that
provides a context for children that is equivalent to the traditional marriage-based family? Even after an extensive reading
of the same-sex parenting literature, the author cannot offer a high condence, data-based yes or no response to this
question. To restate, not one of the 59 studies referenced in the 2005 APA Brief (pp. 2345; see Table 1) compares a large,
random, representative sample of lesbian or gay parents and their children with a large, random, representative sample of
married parents and their children. The available data, which are drawn primarily from small convenience samples, are
insufcient to support a strong generalizable claim either way. Such a statement would not be grounded in science. To make
a generalizable claim, representative, large-sample studies are neededmany of them (e.g., Table 2).
Some opponents of same-sex parenting have made egregious overstatements
97
disparaging gay and lesbian parents.
Conversely, some same-sex parenting researchers seem to have contended for an exceptionally clear
98
verdict of no differ-
ence between same-sex and heterosexual parents since 1992. However, a closer examination leads to the conclusion that
strong, generalized assertions, including those made by the APA Brief, were not empirically warranted.
99
As noted by Shiller
(2007) in American Psychologist, the line between science and advocacy appears blurred (p. 712).
The scientic conclusions in this domain will increase in validity as researchers: (a) move from small convenience sam-
ples to large representative samples; (b) increasingly examine critical societal and economic concerns that emerge during
adolescence and adulthood; (c) include more diverse same-sex families (e.g., gay fathers, racial minorities, and those without
middle-high socioeconomic status); (d) include intact, marriage-based heterosexual families as comparison groups; and (e)
90
Four of these seven issues are addressed in the present paper. The exceptions include researcher bias, failure to report reliability, and low response rates.
91
The 2005 APA Briefs Summary on Research Findings acknowledges criticisms of same-sex parenting research including: (a) non-representative sampling,
(b) poorly matched or no control groups, (c) well-educated, middle class [lesbian] families, and (d) relatively small samples (p. 5). The respective
responses to these criticisms in the APA brief are: (a) contemporary research on children of lesbian and gay parents involves a wider array of sampling
techniques than did earlier studies; (b) contemporary research on children of lesbian and gay parents involves a wider array of research designs (and hence,
control groups) than did earlier studies; (c) contemporary research on children of lesbian and gay parents involves a greater diversity of families than did
earlier studies; and (d) contemporary research has beneted from such criticisms (p. 5). The APA Brief does not challenge the validity of these research
criticisms but notes that improvements are being made.
92
See Schumm (2010b) for more comprehensive, article-length treatment of these statistical issues.
93
Stacey and Biblarz (2001, p. 168).
94
95
Schumm (2010b).
96
The APA Brief also states that the existing data are still limited, and any conclusions must be seen as tentative. Also, that it should be acknowledged that
research on lesbian and gay parents and their children, though no longer new, is still limited in extent (p. 15). For some scientists, these salient points seem to
be overridden by the APA Briefs conclusions.
97
This reality has been disapprovingly documented by Shiller (2007).
98
Patterson (1992).
99
In 2006, the year following APAs release of the brief on Lesbian and Gay Parenting, former APA president Nicholas Cummings argued that there has been
signicant erosion of the APAs established principle (Shiller (2007), p. 712). . .that when we speak as psychologists we speak from research evidence and
clinical experience and expertise (Cummings (2006), p. 2).
001026
constructively respond to criticisms from methodological experts.
100
Specically, it is vital that critiques regarding sample
size, sampling strategy, statistical power, and effect sizes not be disregarded. Taking these steps will help produce more meth-
odologically rigorous and scientically informed responses to signicant questions affecting families and children.
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TAB 60

iMAPP Research Brief
Institute for Marriage and Public Policy Vol. 5, No.6, October 2012
MISPLACED RELIANCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE IN THE PROPOSITION 8 CASE
William C. Duncan, Legal Analyst
In its opinion invalidating the California marriage amendment, Proposition 8, the trial court
relied heavily on social scientist witnesses and statements of professional organizations for a
number of propositions the court believed required the result.
1
This has been a common tactic in
the litigation aimed at securing a judicial redefinition of marriage.
There's reason to believe that this reliance is misplaced.
For example, the court cites a "Position Statement" of the American Psychiatric Association for
the proposition that children of same-sex couples are harmed because the couple cannot marry
and an American Medical Association "Policy" that same-sex couples experience health
disparities as a result of the current definition of marriage. The American Psychiatric Association
statement is, as the court note, a "Position" rather than a scholarly article. The sources cited in the
statement are all other policy documents rather than research findings. The American Medical
Association policy document is likewise devoid of citations.
These kinds of problems seem to be endemic in similar organizational statements on same-sex
parenting issues. The statements of the American Anthropological Association and the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
2
are likewise free of cites. The groups issuing many
of these statements also endorse a range of causes to which social science considerations are
tangential at best.
3
They have also been subjected to criticism within their ranks.4
The politically motivated nature of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
was highlighted by a colloquy from the Proposition 8 trial. After reading the Academy's
statement that "Lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender people have faced more rigorous scrutiny
than heterosexual people regarding their rights to be or become parents," counsel said to the
plaintiffs' child development expert, Dr. Michael Lamb (who is prominently used as an expert in
these types of cases): "Dr. Lamb, there is not a rich empirical literature relating to child outcomes
of transgender individuals, is that right?" Dr. Lamb responded, "I'm not familiar with it, no."
Counsel then asked, "And there is not a rich literature on the child outcomes of the children of
bisexuals, correct?" Dr. Lamb responded, "That's correct." Counsel then stated the obvious
conclusion: "So this statement is not based in empirics, but, rather, in politics, correct?" Dr. Lamb
concurred: "Well, I can't speak to the basis. That would be my understanding, yes."s
There are many problems endemic in a reliance on these kinds of professional organization
statements. Daniel N. Robinson, professor of philosophy at Oxford and Georgetown Universities
and past president of two divisions of the American Psychological Association, points out: "Even
when there is relevant expertise within the discipline of psychology there is no a priori basis
upon which to credit a given Board or Council with possession of it. Scholars and scientists do
not vote on matters of fact, nor do they install theories into positions of supremacy by fiat."6 This
is true because "[m]oral authority does not inhere in committees, boards, councils, or
memberships, but in the weight of reason attached to arguments for and against actions of a
certain kind."
7
The organization's "concern" "is not an argument."
8
Ultimately, Dr. Robinson
WWW.IMAPP.ORG
001030
explains what "is unsound in the APA's policy of advocacy is the apparent conviction that the
moral categories of right and wrong are simply brought into being by a show of hands."
9
Indeed, these kinds of statements by professional organizations are susceptible to direct political
influence as illustrated by the recent controversy over a statement of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists that was edited by an associate White House Counsel (who
inserted a crucial sentence into the statement) and then relied on by courts in cases involving
abortion laws.1o This led journalist William Saletan to argue, "Judges have put too much faith in
statements from scientific organizations. . . . Judges should stop treating the statements of
scientific organizations as apolitical. Such statements, like the statements of any other group, can
be loaded with spin. This one is a telling example."
11
Dr. Robinson points out that "the composition of the APA could change and could come to reflect
any number of reactionary impulses."
12
Would it then be reasonable for another court to rule that
marriage must be defined as the union of a man and a woman if the APA's leadership were to
change and vote to rescind its' current policy endorsement?
To take another example, the findings of the Proposition 8 trial court regarding child outcomes
relied heavily, almost exclusively, on one expert witness (a psychologist discussed below) and on
a document produced by the American Psychological Association. The statement does not
contain citations and admits to serious limitations. The four findings that proceed the language
quoted by the court below say that (1) sexual identities of "children of lesbian mothers" develop
similarly to those of heterosexual parents though "[f]ew studies are available regarding children
of gay fathers," (2) children of lesbian mothers have few differences in personality development
than children of heterosexual parents (with the same note about the lack of studies of gay
fathers), (3) children of gay parents have normal social relationships, and (4) children of gay
parents are not more likely to be sexually abused.
13
Then, based on this thin record, it comes to
the conclusion quoted by the court which conflates "lesbian and gay parents" even though the
statement notes a dearth of research about the latter. This hardly promotes confidence in the
"scientific" nature of the assertions.
Dr. Michael Lamb, the developmental psychologist whose testimony was so influential with the
court, seems to exemplify the risk that non-scientific considerations may play an inordinate role
in expert evaluations of research. For example, he acknowledged at trial that a number of his
earlier articles had noted the importance of fathers in children's development. For instance, that
"it is disturbing that there appears to have been a devaluation of the father's role in western
society such that many children may suffer affective paternal deprivation."
14
Some other
examples from his early articles include:
"[b]oys growing up without fathers seem to have problems in the area of sex role and gender
identity development, school performance, psychosocial adjustment, and perhaps in the
control of aggression" IS
"[b]oys growing up without fathers seem especially prone to exhibit problems in the areas of
sex role and gender identity development"l6
He had also written about differences between men and women in terms of parenting: "[t]he data
suggests that the differences between maternal and paternal behavior are more strongly related
-2-
001031
to either the parents' biological gender or sex roles, than to either their degree of involvement in
infant care or their attitudes regarding the desirability of paternal involvement in infant care."
17
Yet, in the decision of the Proposition 8 court, Dr. Lamb's testimony was relied on by the court
for the conclusions that "[t]he gender of a child's parent is not a factor in the child's adjustment"
18
and "[c]hildren don't need to be raised by a male parent and a female parent to be well-adjusted,
and having both a male and female parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will be
well-adjusted."
How then to explain this discrepancy? One might assume that research developments since Dr.
Lamb's earlier statements had contradicted the earlier conclusions. Yet this is not the case. In fact,
Dr. Lamb admitted at trial that there are a number of areas in which a father's absence is
meaningful for child outcomes. For instance, admitting:
that "[t]he increase in father's absence is particularly troubling because it is consistently
associated with poor school achievement, diminished involvement in the labor force, early
child bearing, and heightened levels of risk-taking behavior."
1
9
that boys without fathers are "prone to poor school performance."
2
o
that boys without fathers fare worse in terms of psychosocial adjustment.
21
that there are differences in terms of self-control and delinquent behavior in adolescence
between boys with and without fathers.
22
"that nurturant fathers may contribute greatly to the psychological adjustment of their
daughters."23
that nurturant fathers "may facilitate their [daughters'] happiness in subsequent heterosexual
relationships."24
that there are "some fairly long-term associations between the quality of the relationship that
young children have with their fathers and the way that they interact as young adults with
their own peers."25
In addition, Dr. Lamb conceded at trial that there are indeed differences between men and
women that have implications for child development, admitting:
that mothers and fathers are different in a number of respects, that those differences may
be the result of their different genders, and that being raised by people with such
differences is beneficial for children.
2
6
that it was an accurate summary of the literature to say "[r]esearch clearly demonstrates
that children growing up with two continuously married parents are less likely than other
children to experience a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and social problems not only
during childhood but also in adulthood" and that this "distinction is even stronger if we
focus on children growing up with two happily married biological parents."
27
that it was an accurate summary of the literature to say "[w]e conclude that in practice the
kind of mother-father relationship most conducive to responsible fathering in
contemporary U.S. society is a caring, committed, collaborative marriage. Outside of this
arrangement, substantial barriers stand in the way of active, involved fathering."
2
B
that it was true that children in average intact married families do better than children in
average single and stepparent families.29
-3-
001032
that there are differences between men and women-that men are more likely than
women to become incarcerated, be involved in violent altercations, perpetuate sexual
abuse, become addicted to alcohol, and to engage in aggressive behavior; that men and
women suffer from different diseases at different times; that women tend to live longer
than men; that men are disproportionally represented on the bottom of the bell curve for
cognitive abilities; that men are less likely to graduate high school than women; that men
cannot breastfeed; and that men earn more money than women.30
that he had stated, in regards to parenting, that men and women are not "completely
interchangeable with respect to skills and abilities."3
1
that gender "is one of those variables that can have ripple effects in a variety of different
ways on the way in which people behave, and can in a variety of ways affect the way they
behave with their children."32
It is hard to reconcile these statements with the conclusions of the court noted above that are, in
turn, based on expert opinions. That is, unless we consider the very real possibility that the
conclusions are influenced by factors other than scientific research.
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that individual experts and professional organizations'
opinion statements on same-sex parenting and same-sex marriage questions so significantly
illustrate political and cultural pressures. Sociologist Norval Glenn of the University of Texas,
Austin explained: "Given the widespread support for same-sex marriage among social and
behavioral scientists, it is becoming politically incorrect in academic circles even to suggest that
arguments being used in support of same-sex marriage might be wrong."
33
Similarly, two of the
more enthusiastic supporters of family change (including redefining marriage) admit: "[T]he
political stakes of this body of research are so high that the ideological 'family values' of scholars
play a greater part than usual in how they design, conduct, and interpret their studies."34 They
note further: "[T]oo many psychologists who are sympathetic to lesbigay parenting seem hesitant
to theorize at all" and are apt to "downplay the significance of any findings of differences."3s
What is disconcerting, however, is the endorsement of these opinions as legally significant "facts"
that are "beyond dispute," as the district court found in striking down Proposition 8. Such a
conclusion ignores the role of ideology in social sciences and is itself an ideological statement, not
a scientific one.
Notes
1
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Gay Lesbian, Bisexual, or Transgender
Parents Polict) Statement (October 2008) at
http://www.aacap.org/cs/root/policy statements/gay lesbian transgender and bisexual parents
policy statement.
3 The American Anthropological Association has positions on boycotting the state of Arizona
(http://www.aaanet.org/issues!press/Arizona-Immigration.cfm) and the American Medical
Association on abortion, global warming, recycling, gun control and others (http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/15/digest of actions.pdf).
4
See Peter Wood, The Marriage Debate Goes Multicultural, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, April 26,
2005 at http://old.nationalreview.com/commentlwood200504260810.asp (criticizing the American
-4-
001033
Anthropological Association statement); Letters to the Editor 110 PEDIATRICS 419 (2002) & Letters to
the Editor 109 PEDIATRICS 1192 (2002) (publishing letters critical of the American Academy of
Pediatrics' 2002 statement).
5 Trial Transcript, 1052-1054, 62:15-64:3.
6 Daniel N. Robinson, Ethics and Advocactj 39 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 787, 788 (1984).
7 Id. at 792.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 790.
1
0 William Saletan, When Kagan Played Doctor, SLATE, July 3, 2010 at
http://www.slate.com/id/2259495/pagenum/all/#p2.
II Id.
12
Robinson, 39 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST at 793.
13
American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions For a Better Understanding of
Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality, 5 at http://www.apa.org/topics/sexualitv/sorientation.pdf.
14 Trial Transcript, 1071:7-10.
18
It should be noted that this statement is actually not supported by the evidence the court cites
since the three sources the court notes actually say that a person attracted to another person of
the same-sex are not necessarily bad parents which is a far cry from the conclusion that a parent's
gender is entirely unrelated to child outcomes.
19 Trial Transcript, 1073: 6-9.
22 Trial Transcript, 1074-75: 25-3.
27 Trial Transcript, 1098:3-8, 14-16.
29 Trial Transcript, 1102-03:23-4.
30 Trial Transcript, 1057-58:22-19.
33 Norval D. Glenn, The Struggle For Same-Sex Marriage 41 Soc'Y 25, 27 (2004).
34 Judith Stacey & Timothy Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter? 66
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY REVIEW 159, 161 (2001), accord Rober Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, No Basis:
What the Studies Don't Tell Us about Same-Sex Parenting.Washington, DC: Marriage Law Project 56
n.27 (2001), and Walter R. Schumm, What Was Really Learned from Tasker & Golombok's (1995) Study
of Lesbian & Single Parent Mothers?, 94 Psycho!. Rep. 422, 423 (2004).
35 Id.
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TAB 61

John R. Searle
The Construction
of Social Reality
001035
THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Simon &. Schuster Inc.
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Copyright 1995 by John R. Searle
All rights reserved,
including the right of reproduction
in whole or in part in any form.
First Free Press Edition 1995
THE FREE PREss and colophon are trademarks
of Simon &. Schuster Inc.
Designed by
Manufactured in the United States of America
10
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Searle, John R.
The construction of social reality I John R. Searle.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references.
JSBN-13: 978-0-02-928045-4
ISBN-I 0: 0-02-928045-1
JSBN-13: 978-0-684-83179-4 (Pbk)
ISBN-I 0: 0-684-83179-1 (Pbk)
1. Social epistemology. 2. Philosophy of mind. I. Title.
BD175.S43 1995 94-41402
121-dc20 CIP
001036
The Building Blocks of Social Reality 5
function, no answer to the question, What's it for? we are left with
a harder intellectual task of identifying things in terms of their in-
trinsic features without reference to our interests, purposes, and
goals.
The invisibility of the structure of social reality also creates a
problem for the analyst. We cannot just describe how it seems to
us from an internal "phenomenological" point of view, because
money, property, marriages, lawyers, and bathtubs do not seem to
have a complex structure. They just are what they are, or so it
seems. Nor can we describe them from the external behaviorist
point of view, because the description of the overt behavior of peo-
ple dealing with money, property, etc., misses the underlying
structures that make the behavior possible. Nor, in turn, can we
describe those structures as sets of unconscious computational
rules, as is done by contemporary cognitive science and linguis-
tics, because it is incoherent to postulate an unconscious follow-
ing of rules that is inaccessible in principle to consciousness. And
besides, computation is one of those observer-relative, functional
phenomena we are seeking to explain.
2
If neither the internal phenomenological nor the external be-
haviorist point of view is adequate, what then is the correct stance,
the correct methodology, for describing the structure of social
reality? To start with, in this chapter and the next, I will use a first-
person intentionalistic vocabulary to try to lay bare certain ele-
mentary features of social ontology. Later, in Chapter 6, I will
show how some, though not all, of the intentionalistic apparatus
can be explained in terms of, and ultimately eliminated in favor of,
what I have elsewhere called the "Background" of capacities, abil-
ities, tendencies, and dispositions.
Fundamental Ontology
Since our investigation is ontological, i.e., about how social facts
exist, we need to figure out how social reality fits into our overall
ontology, i.e., how the existence of social facts relates to other
001038
The Building Blocks ofSocial Reality 29
3. Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing count as
the root of all evil in the United States.
As always the discovery of referential opacity is a crucial point. In
this case it provides a clue that there is a mental component
in institutional facts. The intentionality-with-an-s of the verbal
formulation is a clue that the phenomena represented are inten-
tional-with-a-t. A great deal hangs on this, as we will see in subse-
quent chapters.
Various social theorists have attacked my account of the dis-
tinction between regulative and constitutive rules,
10
but I think my
account is right as far as it goes. The problem is that for our pre-
sent purposes it does not go far enough. We still need a more thor-
ough account of rules and institutions. And we need to answer a
lot of questions. Are all social facts institutional facts? Are there
constitutive rules of, for example, wars and cocktail parties? What
makes something into a "constitutive rule" anyway? Hardest of all,
how do we make the connection between the fundamental ontol-
ogy of conscious biological beasts like ourselves and the appara-
tus of social facts and human institutions?
1 will have more to say later about the form of constitutive rules
and how they relate to the ontology of institutional facts. My aim in
this chapter is to assemble the pieces, and I now have the three I
need: the imposition of function on entities that do not have that
function prior to the imposition, collective intentionality, and the
distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. With these in
hand we can now turn to the construction of institutional reality.
001041
Creating Institutional Facts 33
even if no one ever knew that it was counterfeit, not even the
counterfeiter. In such a case everyone who used that particular
token would think it was money even though it was not in fact
money. About particular tokens it is possible for people to be sys-
tematically mistaken. But where the type of thing is concerned,
the belief that the type is a type of money is constitutive of its being
money in a way we will need to make fully clear.
For some institutional phenomena, such as money, what I say
applies more to types than tokens, for others, such as cocktail par-
ties, it applies to each individual token. For the sake of simplicity I
will assume that the reader is aware of the distinction, and I will
speak of the self-referentiality of institutional concepts in generat
without making the distinction in every case. Later I will try to ex-
plain the difference between self-referentiality as applied to types
and as applied to tokens.
But if the type of thing in question is money only because peo-
ple believe it to be money, if "money" implies "regarded as, used
as, or believed to be money," then philosophers will get worried,
because the claim seems to produce either a vicious infinite
regress or a vicious circle. If part of the content of the claim that
something is money is the claim that it is believed to be money,
then what is the content of that belief? If the content of the belief
that something is money contains in part the belief that it is
money, then the belief that something is money is in part the be-
lief that it is believed to be money; and there is, in turn, no way to
explain the content of that belief without repeating the same fea-
ture over and over again. Later on, I will try to show how to avoid
this infinite regress. At this point, I am just calling attention to a
peculiar logical feature that distinguishes social concepts from
such natural concepts as "mountain" or "molecule." Something
can be a mountain even if no one believes it is a mountain; some-
thing can be a molecule even if no one thinks anything at all about
it. But for social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phe-
nomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon. If, for exam-
ple, we give a big cocktail party, and invite everyone in Paris, and if
001044
Creating lnslilutional Facts 35
function as money, but money must come in some physical form
or other.
What is true of money is true of chess games, elections, and
universities. All these can take different forms, but for each there
must be some physical realization. This suggests what I think is
true, that social facts in general, and institutional facts especially,
are hierarchically structured. Institutional facts exist, so to speak,
on top of brute physical facts. Often, the brute facts will not be
manifested as physical objects but as sounds coming out of
peoples' mouths or as marks on paper-or even thoughts in their
heads.
4. Systematic Relationsllips Among
lnslilulional Facts.
An institutional fact cannot exist in isolation but only in a set of
systematic relations to other facts. Thus, for example, in order
that anybody in a society could have money, that society must have
a system of exchanging goods and services for money. But in
order that it can have a system of exchange, it must have a system
of property and property ownership. Similarly, in order that soci-
eties should have marriages, they must have some form of con-
tractual relationships. But in order that they can have contractual
relationships, they have to understand such things as promises
and obligations.
Furthermore, quite apart from the logical or conceptual re-
quirement of interrelationships of institutional facts, it just turns
out that in any real life situation one will find oneself in a complex
of interlocking institutional realities. The restaurant scene de-
scribed in Chapter 1 illustrates this: at any instant in the scene,
one is (at least) a citizen, an owner of money, a client, a bill payer;
and one is dealing with property, a restaurant, a waiter, a bill.
It might seem that games are counterexamples to this general
principle, because, of course, games are designed to be forms of
activity that do not connect with the rest of our lives in a way that
001046
56 The Construction ofSocial Reality
one has to reach a rock bottom of something that is not itself any
form of status-function. So, for example, as I said earlier, all sorts
of things can be money, but there has to be some physical realiza-
tion, some brute fact-even if it is only a bit of paper or a blip on a
computer disk-on which we can impose our institutional form
of status function. Thus there are no institutional facts without
brute facts.
This discussion anticipates a discussion of realism I will pre-
sent in Chapters 7 and 8. It could not be the case, as some antireal-
ists have maintained, that all facts are institutional facts, that there
are no brute facts, because the analysis of the structure of institu-
tional facts reveals that they are logically dependent on brute
facts. To suppose that all facts are institutional would produce an
infinite regress or circulari1y in the account of institutional facts.
In order that some facts be institutional, there must be some
other facts that are brute. This is a consequence of the logical
structure of institutional facts.
Systematic Relations and the Primacy
of the Act over the Object
Our fourth question was, Why are there always certain sorts of
systematic relations among institutional facts? And the fifth was,
Why do institutional acts seem prior to institutional objects?
The most obvious reason why there are systematic relation-
ships among the various sorts of social facts of the 1ype that I tried
to describe is that the facts in question are designed for precisely
that purpose. Goven1ments are designed to impact on our lives in
all sorts of ways; money is designed to provide a unit of value in all
kinds of transactions. Even games, which are explicitly designed
to be insulated from the rest of our lives, nonetheless employ an
apparatus-of rights, obligations, responsibilities, etc.-that, as I
remarked earlier, is intelligible only given all sorts of other social
facts.
The explanation for the apparent primacy of social acts over so-
001050
Creating Institutional Facts 57
cial objects is that the "objects" are really designed to se1ve agen-
tive functions, and have little interest for us otherwise. What we
think of as social objects, such as governments, money, and uni-
versities, are in fact just placeholders for patterns of activities. I
hope it is clear that the whole operation of agentive functions and
collective intentionality is a matter of ongoing activities and the
creation of the possibility of more ongoing activities.
Unconsciously, we have throughout this discussion been ac-
knowledging this point by our talk of institutional facts rather than
institutional objects. Such material objects as are involved in insti-
tutional reality, e.g., bits of paper, are objects like any others, but
the imposition of status-functions on these objects creates a level
of description of the object where it is an institutional object, e.g., a
twenty dollar bill. The object is no different; rather, a new status
with an accompanying function has been assigned to an old object
(or a new object has been created solely for the purpose of serving
the new status-function), but that function is manifested only in ac-
tual transactions; hence, our interest is not in the object but in the
processes and events where the functions are manifested.
The priority of process over product also explains why, as sev-
eral social theorists have pointed out, institutions are not worn
out by continued use, but each use of the institution is in a sense
a renewal of that institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we use
them but constant use renews and strengthens institutions such
as marriage, property, and universities. The account I have given
explains this fact: since the function is imposed on a phenomenon
that does not perform that function solely in virtue of its physical
construction, but in terms of the continued collective intentional-
ity of the users, each use of the institution is a renewed expression
of the commitment of the users to the institution. Individual dol-
lar bills wear out. But the institution of paper currency is rein-
forced by its continual use.
The sixth and final feature we need to explain concerns the role
of language in institutional reality, and to that topic I devote the
next chapter.
001051
3
Language and Social Reality
The primary aim of this chapter is to explain and justifY my claim
that language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality. I
have made this claim in general terms but I now want to make
fully explicit what I mean by it, and to present arguments for it. At
the end of the chapter I will mention some other functions of lan-
guage in institutional facts.
I said in the last chapter that it seems impossible to have insti-
tutional structures such as money, marriage, governments, and
property without some form of language because, in some weird
sense I have not yet explained, the words or other symbols are
partly constitutive of the facts. But this will seem puzzling when
we reflect that social facts in general do not require language.
Prelinguistic animals can have all sorts of cooperative behavior,
and human infants are clearly capable of interacting socially in
quite complex ways without any words. Furthermore, if we are
going to say that institutional reality requires language, what
59
001052
Thus we can refer 01' fail to refer to "the touchdown we scored at
the end of the fourth quarter" or "the President of the Uniled
States" in the same way we can succeed m fail to refer to "The
Evening Star," but the difference is that the creation of thecate-
gory of touchdowns and presidents is already achieved by the
structures according to which we attach status-functions to the X
terms, because the existence of these features is created by at-
tachment of the status-functions.
Think of it this way: What stands to the sound "cat" as its mean-
ing is what stands to the piece of papm as its function as a dollar
bill. However, the sound "cat" has a referential function that the
piece of paper does not have. For example, the sound can occur in
sentences where the speaker in uttering the sentence refers to a
cat. Pieces of paper, even pieces of paper construed as dollar bills,
are not in that way used to refer. But the practice of using pieces
of paper as dollar bills creates a class of entities that cannot exist
without the p1actice. It creates the class of entities: dollar bills. In
order that the practice should exist, people must be able to think
the thought "This piece of paper is a dollar bill," and that is a
thought they cannot think without words or other symbols, even if
the only symbol in question is the object itself.
Other F'unctions of Language in
Institutional Facts
This discussion has been vmy abstract and has concerned the
conditions of the possibility of the creation of institutional reality,
linguistic or otherwise. But if we consider actual natural lan-
guages such as French 01' German and the actual complexity of
social institutions, we can see several other reasons why institu-
tional facts require language.
First, language is epistemically indispensable.
I said that in the structure of institutional facts we impose a Y
status-function on the X term, which it does not perform solely in
001054
Language and Social Reality 77
virtue of its physical constitution. But now how are we to tell
which entities have this status function imposed on them? For
many causal agcntive functions-not all-it is reasonably easy to
tell which objects are chairs, tables, hammers, and screwdrivers
because you can read off the function from the physical structure.
But when it comes to money, husbands, university professors, and
privately owned real estate, you cannot read off the function or
status from the physics. You need labels. In order that we can rec-
ognize bits of paper as money, for example, we must have some
linguistic or symbolic way of representing the newly created facts
about functions, because they cannot be read off from the physics
of the objects themselves. The recognition of the fact that some-
thing is money requires that it be linguistically or symbolically
represented. I will have more to say about this feature in the next
chapter, when we discuss what I call "status indicators."
Second, the facts in question, being inherently social, must be
communicable.
If the systems are to function, then the newly created facts must
be communicable from one person to another, even when invisi-
ble to the naked eye. You must be able to tell people that you are
married, that you are the chairman, that the meeting is adjourned
if the system is to function. Even in simple cases of institutional
facts, this communicability requires a means of public communi-
cation, a language.
Third, in real life the phenomena in question are e(dremely
complel(., and the representation of such complel(. information
requires language.
Even the most apparently simple act of buying and selling has
great complexity, as we saw in our example of ordering beer in a
cafe at the beginning of the book. Because the structure of the
facts exists only to the extent that it is represented, complex facts
require a complex system of representation for their existence;
and such complex systems of representation are languages.
001055
Fourth, the facts in question persist through time independently of
the duration ofthe urges and inclinations ofthe participants in the
institution.
This continued existence I'equires a means of representation of
the facts that is independent of the more primitive prelinguistic
psychological slates of the participants, and such representations
are linguistic.
001056
4
The General Theory
of Institutional Facts
Part 1: Iteration, Interaction, and Logical Structure
Generalizing the Analysis
So far I have given a preliminary account of institutional facts,
using the example of money more than any other sort and em-
phasizing the special role of language in institutional reality. I
will use the tools we have assembled to give an account that de-
scribes the structure not only of money but also of marriage,
property, hiring, firing, war, revolutions, cocktail parties, govern-
ments, meetings, unions, parliaments, corporations, laws, restau-
rants, vacations, lawyers, professors, doctors, medieval knights,
and taxes, for example. I do not know how to tell the story for each
of these with the simplicity of the story about money. To general-
79
001057
The General Theory of Institutional Facts (Part I) Bl
the italicized expressions in the previous sentence express institu-
tional concepts, and the facts reported all presuppose systems of
constitutive rules operating through time.
To develop the analysis further, let us try to tell a story about
marriage and property analogous to the one we told about money.
Such institutions originate in the sheer physical and intentional
facts involved in cohabitation and physical possession, respec-
tively. Property begins with the idea that I have got this, it is mine.
Marriage begins with people simply living with each other, and in
the case of monogamous marriage, having a sexual monopoly on
each other. Why are we not satisfied with these arrangements?
Why is it not enough that I possess this in the sense that I have
physical control over it and why is it not enough that we just live
together? Well, for some people and perhaps for some simple so-
cieties it is enough; but many of us think we are better off if there
is a system of collectively recognized rights, responsibilities, du-
ties, obligations, and powers added onto-and in the end able to
substitute for-brute physical possession and cohabitation. For
one thing, we can have a much more stable system of expectations
if we add this deontic apparatus; for another, we don't have to rely
on brute physical force to sustain the arrangements; and for a
third, we can maintain the arrangements even in the absence of
the original physical setup. For example, people can remain mar-
ried even though they have not lived with each other for years, and
they can own property even though the property is a long way
away from them.
Whatever the advantages and disadvantages, the logically more
primitive arrangements have evolved into institutional structures
with collectively recognized status-functions. Just as in the case of
money, we have imposed, by collective intentionality, new status-
functions on things that cannot perform those functions without
that collective imposition. However, one special feature of these
cases is that often the function is imposed by way of performing
explicit speech acts. In such cases the speech act itself is an in-
stance of a status-function imposed on a status-function; and it is
001059
Tile General Theory of Institutional Facts (Part I) 83
tutions, then it is a consequence of the account that there will be
a hierarchical structure of the creation of a large number of insti-
tutional facts. Thus, going through the example of marriage: Mak-
ing certain noises counts as uttering an English sentence, uttering
a certain sort of English sentence in certain circumstances counts
as making a promise, making a promise in certain circumstances
counts as entering into a contract, entering into certain sorts of
contracts counts as getting married. The marriage ceremony cre-
ates a new institutional fact, the marriage, by imposing a special
function on a set of speech acts. But the creation of the marriage
imposes a new status and therefore a new function on the indi-
viduals involved. They are now "husband" and "wife." And the fact
that they are husband and wife, like the marriage itself, is an insti-
tutional fact.
I hope it is clear from these examples that a pattern is emerg-
ing. The crucial questions to ask are, On what exactly are the
status-functions imposed and what exactly are the imposed
status-functions? In the case of language and money the answers
are relatively simple: for language the statuses are imposed on
types of sounds and marks; and though the functions of language
are numerous, the primary functions are those of representing
the world in the various speech act modes.
1
For money, the sta-
tuses have typically been imposed on bits of metal and paper, and
the function are those of serving as a medium of exchange, repos-
itory of value, etc. In the case of marriage, the situation is a little
more complicated. The status is initially imposed on a set of
speech acts, those that constitute the marriage ceremony, but
those speech acts function to create a new institutional fact, the
marriage. But tl1e marriage itself imposes new status-functions on
the parties involved, the status-functions of being husband and
wife, which carry specific rights and obligations. Now this pattern,
the creation of a new institutional fact, usually by the performance
of a speech act, where the speech act itself imposes a function on
people, buildings, cars, etc., is characteristic of a large number of
social institutions. Property, citizenship, licensed drivers, cathe-
001061
The General Theory of Institutional Facts (Part I) 85
queathing, partial transfer, mortgaging, etc., of property. The
characteristic devices used are speech acts-deeds, bills of sale,
registration papers, wills, etc.; and it is no accident that these are
usually called legal "instruments." All are cases of status-functions
imposed on speech acts. And, of course, the original speech act is
already a case of imposed status-function. So, for example, a bill of
sale simply records the fact that I sold you, for example, my car. It
is an assertive speech act, but it now can count as your title to the
car pending the issuance of new registration papers.
Once a society has the institution of property, new property
rights are usually created by speech acts, as when I give some-
thing to someone, or by speech acts accompanied by other sorts
of acts, as when I exchange property for money. Suppose I give my
watch to my son. I can do this by saying, "It's yours," "You can have
it," or more pompously with the performative, "I hereby give you
my watch." I have now imposed a new status-function on these
speech acts, that of transferring ownership. These speech acts in
turn impose a new status-function on the watch, that of belonging
to my son, that of being his property.
I said that the institutional structures enable brute physical
possession in the case of property, or brute physical proximity in
the case of marriage, to be replaced by a recognized set of rela-
tionships whereby people can be married even though they are
not living with each other, and people can own property even
though the property is far away from them. To achieve this re-
markable intellectual feat, we must have what I have called status
indicators. Just as the paper certificates, when they were re-
deemable in gold, were status indicators for value, so we have an
acknowledged system of legally recognized marriages and prop-
erty rights. And we have status indicators in the form of marriage
certificates, wedding rings, and title deeds, for example. Even
when I am a long way from my house or my wife, the institutional
structures enable me to remain an owner or a husband, and, if
need be, to demonstrate that position to others through the use of
status indicators. In such cases, the institutional facts substitute
001063
the new functions, of marriage and knighthood, to the degree that
paper is arbitrarily related to the function of money; but at the
same time they are not matters of necessity either. One can imag-
ine and even construct all sorts of perfectly acceptable ways of get-
ting married or becoming a knight. And because of this slack
between the conditions specified by the X term and the function
specified by the Y term, cultures differ in the qualifications they
require for the performance of the same or similar functions. For
example, in most Anlerican states, the status of "attorney" requires
the possession of a graduate law degree, passing a state bar exam,
and swearing in. In Britain, on the other hand, no graduate law
degree is required, but such things as being articled to a solicitor
for a certain period of time or dining regularly at the Inns of Court
count towards qualification. It is not at all obvious how these two
different sets of conditions are supposed to enable the possessor
to serve the same function, that of legal counsel. Nonetheless, the
respective accrediting agencies apparently think they do.
The bifurcation of the imposition of status-functions into the X
andY components has some important consequences for our in-
vestigation. First, the status expressions admit of two definitions,
one in terms of the constitution (the X term) and one in terms of
the imposed agentive function (theY term). Thus currency can be
defined in terms of its origin and structure: Certain sorts of paper
issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (X term) are U.S.
currency. But currency can also be in part defined as, and indeed
is described on the face of U.S. currency as, "legal tender for all
debts, public and private" (Y term). A touchdown is when you
break the plane of the goal line with the ball in your possession
while the play is in progress (X term), and a touchdown is six
points (Y term).
Codification
A test for the presence of genuine institutional facts is whether or
not we could codify the rules explicitly. In the case of many insti-
001065
tutional facts, such as property, marriage, and money, these in-
deed have been codified into explicit laws. Others, such as friend-
ship, dates, and cocktail parties, are not so codified, but they
could be. If people believe that a certain set of relationships in
which they are involved is a case of friendship/date/cocktail party,
then the possession of each such status is constituted by the belief
that the relationship does in fact possess that status, and the pos-
session of the status carries with it certain functions. This is
shown by the fact that the people involved have certain sorts of
justified expectations from a friendship/date/cocktail party, which
they do not have from an identical set of arrangements about
which they do not believe that it is a friendship/date/cocktail party.
Such institutional patterns could be codified if it mattered tre-
mendously whether or not something was really a cocktail party
or only a tea party. If the rights and duties of friendship suddenly
became a matter of some grave legal or moral question, then we
might imagine these informal institutions becoming codified ex-
plicitly, though of course, explicit codification has its price. It de-
prives us of the flexibility, spontaneity, and informality that the
practice has in its uncodified form.
It should be clear from these examples that there is a gradual
transition and not a sharp dividing line between social facts in
general and the special subclass of institutional facts. In my soci-
ety "going for a walk with someone" names a social fact but not
an institutional fact, because the label assigns no new status-
functions. It just labels the intentionality and its manifestation.
The characteristic institutional move, however, is that form of col-
lective intentionality that constitutes the acceptance, recognition,
etc., of one phenomenon as a phenomenon of a higher sort by im-
posing a collective status and a corresponding function upon it.
The function is always internally related to the status in the sense
that it could not be that status if it did not have that function. The
criterion is always this: Does the assignment of the label carry
with it the assignment of some new functions, for example, in the
form of rights and responsibilities, which can be performed only
001066
if there is collective acceptance of the function? By this criterion,
"husband," "leader," and "teacher" all name status-functions; but
"drunk," "nerd," "intellectual," and "celebrity" do not. And, to re-
peat, it should be obvious that there is no sharp dividing line.
A fascinating test case for this account is war. War is always a
form of collective intentionality; hence it is a war only if people
think it is a war. But in typical wars, the sheer events count as hav-
ing a certain legal or quasi-legal status that is supposed to impose
certain responsibilities and rights on the participants; and in such
cases the war is more than just a social fact; it is an institutional
fact. Furthermore, as with marriage, there are ways in which the
institutional status is supposed to be imposed. Thus in the case of
the war in Korea, the American authorities at the time were very
anxious that it not be called "the Korean War" (it was called "the
Korean conflict") because it did not satisfy the legal definition of
war, since no war had been legally declared in accordance with
the Constitutional provision for a declaration of war. They had a
choice: If it was a "war," it was unconstitutional; so it was not a
"war"; it was a "United Nations police action," a different status-
function altogether. Since the phenomenon did not satisfy the X
term for imposing the status-function, the Y term "war" was not
applied. By the time of the Vietnam War, these sorts of evasions
had been abandoned and the sheer physical and intentional facts
warranted the application ofthe term "war," even though the legal
situation was no more that of a declared war than had been the
case in Korea.
"War" thus oscillates between naming a type of large-scale so-
cial fact and a type of institutional fact. The test for the distinction
is whether the term "war" is used to label an existing set of rela-
tions or whether it implies further consequences that derive from
its recognized status as a "war." This is related to how the war
came to exist. War as social fact can exist no matter how it came
about, but under the U.S. Constitution, war as an institutional fact
exists only if it is created by an act of Congress, a type of speech act
I call a Declaration. Perhaps after Vietnam and the Persian Gulf
001067
The General Theory of Institutional Facts (Part 1) 91
erty while the police pointed their guns at them and ordered them
to stop. The looters simply ignored the police, with no further con-
sequences. "Why are you doing this?" asked one reporter. "It's
free," the thief replied. All this was watched by millions on televi-
sion. The police power of the government is usable only against
very small numbers, and even then on the assumption that nearly
everyone else accepts the systems of status-functions. Once the
number of lawbreakers is more than tiny, the police typically re-
treat to the station house, or put on a ceremonial show of acting as
if they were enforcing the law, as in Los Angeles, or quite often ar-
rest the law-abiding citizenry. In Berkeley during the same period
of rioting and looting, a store owner was arrested because he had
armed himself with the intent of defending his store, and this ar-
rest occurred while looters robbed nearby stores unhindered by
the police. In many democratic societies, once the number of law-
breakers reaches critical mass, the police force is largely for
show.*
The point for our present discussion is that we cannot assume
that the system of acceptance is backed by a credible system of
force. For one thing the system of force is itself a system of accep-
tance. Police forces and armies, for example, are systems of
status-functions. But more important for our present purposes,
the system of force presupposes the other systems of status-
functions. We cannot assume that Leviathan will come to our aid
in a genuine crisis; on the contrary, we are in a state of nature all
the time, but the state of nature is precisely one in which people
do in fact accept systems of constitutive rules, at least nearly all the
time.
More spectacular examples are provided by the collapse of the
Soviet empire in the annus mirabilis, 1989. Anyone who visited the
'I originally became aware of this during my first term as an undergraduate at
Oxford, when I attended the annual Guy Fawkes riots of that era. The Proctors
and Bulldogs apprehended me, a passive spectator, rather than confront the ac-
tual participants, who were much too dangerous.
001069
countries of the Soviet empire over the generation prior to 1989
could see that the whole thing was maintained only by a system
of terror. Most people did not think that the system of status-
functions was morally acceptable, much less socially desirable.
But there did not seem to be anything that anyone could do about
it because the whole system was maintained by an elaborate ap-
paratus of police powers backed by the armed might of the Soviet
military forces. Efforts at reform such as the Czechoslovak
"Prague Spring" of 1968 were brutally crushed by the Soviet Army
with the help of the domestic secret police. In Czechoslovakia,
every tenth person was made to spy on the other nine and report
any sign of disaffection to the secret political police. In the GDR
the system of police surveillance was even more thorough and
ruthless, to the point that even husbands and wives were forced to
report on each other. No one-no qualified expert on the Soviet
system, no diplomat, no journalist, and no tourist-could predict
in the mid-1980s that the whole system would collapse suddenly
and within a few years. It collapsed when the system of status-
functions was no longer accepted. The fear of Soviet intervention
was no longer credible, and the indigenous police and military
were unwilling to attempt to maintain the system. In the GDR the
army refused to fire on the opposition even when ordered to do so.
I do not believe there is any single motivation for the continued
acknowledgment of institutional facts. It is tempting to some to
think that there must be some rational basis for such acknowledg-
ment, that the participants derive some game theoretical advan-
tage or get on a higher indifference curve, or some such, but the
remarkable feature of institutional structures is that people con-
tinue to acknowledge and cooperate in many of them even when it
is by no means obviously to their advantage to do so. When institu-
tions are maintained largely by habit, they can also collapse quite
suddenly, as when people lose confidence in their currency or
cease to recognize their government as a government.
Marx, believing that the most fundamental interests were class
interests, said that all history is the history of class struggle. But
001070
The General Theory of Institutional Facts (Part l) 93
the surprising thing is how little of history is about class struggles.
In the great upheavals of the twentieth century, for example, na-
tionalloyalties proved much more powerful than class solidarity,
and conationals of all classes slaughtered enemy nationals of all
classes with passion and enthusiasm. International class solidar-
ity counted for next to nothing. And in most of these great up-
heavals, the systems of constitutive rules that sustained the class
distinctions were preserved, even though all sorts of other institu-
tional changes took place; and in places where the institutional
structures sustaining the class structure were destroyed-for
example, Russia in the first war, China after the second-their de-
struction was not one of the war aims of their enemies. Imperial
Germany was not out to create a Bolshevik state in Russia, nor was
Maoism an objective of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.
The point I am trying to illustrate is that there is no simple set of
relations among motivation, self-interest, institutional structure,
and institutional change.
Perhaps the most amazing form of status-function is in the cre-
ation of human rights. Prior to the European Enlightenment the
concept of rights had application only within some institutional
structure-property rights, marital rights, droit de seigneur, etc.
But somehow the idea came to be collectively accepted that one
might have a status-function solely by virtue of being a human
being, that the X term was "human" and the Y term was "possessor
of inalienable rights." It is no accident that the collective accep-
tance of this move was aided by the idea of divine authority: "they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." The
idea of human rights has survived the decline of religious belief,
and has even become internationalized. The Helsinki Declaration
on Human Rights is frequently appealed to, with varying degrees
of effectiveness, against dictatorial regimes. Lately there has even
been a movement for the recognition of animal rights. Both
human and animal rights are cases of the imposition of status-
function through collective intentionality.
001071
In general status-functions are matters of power, as we will see
in the rest of this chapter. The structure of institutional facts is a
structure of power relations, including negative and positive, con-
ditional and categorical, collective and individual powers. In our
intellectual tradition since the Enlightenment the whole idea of
power makes a certain lype of liberal sensibility very nervous. A
certain class of intellectuals would rather that power did not exist
at all (or if it has to exist they would rather that their favorite op-
pressed minority had lots more of it and everyone else had lots
less). One lesson to be derived from the study of institutional facts
is this: everything we value in civilization requires the creation
and maintenance of institutional power relations through collec-
tively imposed status-functions. These require constant monitor-
ing and adjusting to create and preserve fairness, efficiency,
flexibility, and creativity, not to mention such traditional values as
justice, liberty, and dignity. But institutional power relations are
ubiquitous and essential. Institutional power-massive, perva-
sive, and typically invisible-permeates every nook and cranny of
our social lives, and as such it is not a threat to liberal values but
rather the precondition of their existence.
Some Types of Imposition of
In order to investigate the logical structure of institutional reality,
I first want to ask: what sorts of new facts, new powers, new causal
structures can people create by creating status-functions, when
status-functions exist only because they are believed to exist?
Where physical functions are concerned the only limitations
are provided by the sheer physical possibilities. The history of
technology is the history of how accumulated knowledge and or-
ganized desires have utilized technical possibilities. But when it
comes to institutional facts, improvements in technology do not
change the possibilities. We cannot impose an electrical charge
just by deciding to count something as an electrical charge, but
we can impose the office of the Presidency just by deciding what
001072
we will count as becoming President, and then making those peo-
ple President who meet the conditions we have decided on. The
intensionality-with-an-s of the sentence form "X counts as Y in C"
is a clue to the intentionality-with-a-t of the phenomena. Because
neither the X term nor theY term permits substitution of corefer-
ring expressions without loss or change of truth value of the
whole statement, we have good reasons to suppose that the
"counts as" locution specifies a form of intentionality. The possi-
bilities of creating institutional facts by the use of this formula are
limited by the possibilities of imposing new features on entities
just by collectively agreeing that they have those features. Our
question now is, What are the forms and limits of the institutional
imposition of function?
At first sight institutional facts seem utterly bewildering in their
variety. We can make promises, score touchdowns, get tenure, be-
come President, adjourn the meeting, pay our bills, and fire our
employees all by way of institutional facts. But within this enor-
mous variety of subject matter there are actually only a very few
general formal properties of institutional facts.
Because the creation of institutional facts is a matter of im-
posing a status and with it a function on some entity that does
not already have that status-function, in general the creation of a
status-function is a matter of conferring some new power. There
would not be much point to imposing the status-function named
by the Y term if it did not confer some new power on the X term,
and most (not all) creations of institutional facts are precisely
conferring powers on the X term, or performing some truth
functional operation such as negation and conditionalization on
the creation of the power. In the simplest case, theY term names
a power that the X term does not have solely in virtue of its X
structure. In cases where the X term is a person, that person ac-
quires powers that he or she did not already have. In cases
where the X term is an object, the user of that object can do
things with it that he or she could not do solely in virtue of its X
structure. Thus money, passports, driver's licenses, and sen-
001073
Their opposites are matters of negative honors. Thus, if you are
censured for your bad behavior, reprimanded by your superiors,
or voted the least popular in your class, these are all negative
honors. No further powers, positive or negative, need apply.
Our question is, In the formula "X counts as Y in C/' how many
types of "Y"s are there? Because institutional facts are structured
by collective intentionality and because there are strict limitations
on the possibilities of creating institutional facts, we ought to be
able to answer this question. So let us begin naively by listing some
formal features of institutional reality.
The Y status can be imposed on several different ontological
categories of phemomena: People (e.g., chairmen, wives, priests,
professors); objects (e.g., sentences, five dollar bills, birth certifi-
cates, driver's licenses); and events (elections, weddings, cocktail
parties, wars, touchdowns). The people, objects, and events in-
teract in systematic relationships (e.g., governments, marriages,
corporations, universities, armies, churches). Often theY status
is imposed on people and groups of people in virtue of a set of
preexisting preinstitutional relations among them. Thus a collec-
tion of people might constitute a city-state, or a man and woman
might constitute a married couple, but such constitution is not
simply in virtue of being a collection of people of the right size,
but rather in virtue of the relations among the members of the
collection.
What then are the features of objects, events, and people that
are imposed by the new status-functions? My first suggestion is
that the category of people, including groups, is fundamental in
the sense that the imposition of status-functions on objects and
events works only in relation to people. This should not be sur-
prising, since it is a general feature of agentive functions. It is not
the five dollar bill as an object that matters, but rather that the
possessor of the five dollar bill now has a certain power that he or
she did not otherwise have. Just so, it is not the screwdriver as an
object that matters, but rather that the possessor of the screw-
driver now has a power that he or she did not otherwise have.
001075
This suggests what I think is in fact the case, that the content of the
collective intentionality in the imposition of the status-function
will typically be that some human subject, singular or plural, has
some power, positive or negative, conditional or categorical. This
will be directly the case where the status is imposed on an agent,
as in, e.g., Jones is President, and indirectly the case where the
status is imposed on an object, as in, e.g., this is a five dollar bill.
Another formal feature to note is that the usual distinction be-
tween the internal and the external points of view applies to insti-
tutional facts. In this book we are interested primarily in the
internal point of view, because it is only fmm the internal point of
view ofthe participants that the institution can exist at all. The an-
thropologist from outside the institution may see the potlatch, for
example, as performing functions of which the Kwakiutl partici-
pants are totally unaware, but the whole feast is a potlatch in the
first place only because of the collective intentionality and the im-
position of status-functions by the participants, and this, whether
conscious or unconscious, can exist only fmm the internal first-
person point of view.
Even within the internal point of view there are some formal
distinctions to be made. At the microlevel the individual sees
money as a medium of exchange and store of value and he or she
sees marriage as a collective lifetime promise between a male and
a female partner. But at a macrolevel, planners and organizers,
even from an internal point of view, see the institutions as having
different functions, though the status assigned in individual cases
is the same. The bishop sees the function of marriage as glorifying
God and producing social stability, and the central bank sees the
supply of money as a way of controlling the economy. The impor-
tant point is that the internal microlevel is ontologically primary.
There is no way that the bishop, the head of the Federal Reserve
Board, and the anthropologist can have their points of view with-
out the lowest-level participants in the very trenches of money
and marriage having the basic form of intentionality that consti-
001076
tutes the structure of institutional facts. Furthermore, the mi-
crolevel participants may have all sorts of other functions that
they want the institutional entities to perform for them that are ir-
relevant to the basic ontology. Thus many people want money for
power and prestige, and for them that is a basic function of
money. Among the ruling dynasties of Europe marriage was a tool
of dynastic power. (Alii bella gerunt, tu feli?C. Austria nube: Happy
Austria, other nations wage wars, you marry.) And marriage has
performed such ulterior functions even among the humble. The
point is that all this works only given the basic ontology of the
ordinary collective intentionality in the street, so to speak, impos-
ing a status-function according to the formula.
If we look at institutional facts with these points in mind, it
seems to me that status-functions fall into certain broad cate-
gories. As a first stab at classifying these-we will have to make im-
provements later-! will provisionally divide them into four broad
categories, which I call Symbolic, Deontic, Honorific, and Proce-
dural.
1. Symbolic Powers: The Creation of Meaning
The point of having symbolic powers is to enable us to represent
reality in one or more of the possible illocutionary modes. In such
cases we impose intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically
intentional. And to do this is to create language and meaning in all
its forms. The imposition of the intentionality on a certain type of
physical structure determines both a formal structure-the syn-
tal(.-and a meaningful content-the semantics. Thus, for exam-
ple, the phonetic/graphemic type "II pleut" counts as a sentence of
French, and "Es regnet" counts as a sentence of German. On phys-
ical sounds and marks we impose the statuses word, sentence,
and syntax generally. And on different syntactical objects we have
in these cases imposed the same semantic content. They both
mean "it's raining." Symbolization is essential to the other forms of
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