ilitary

eVlew
U. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In This Issue
+ Barge Ship
+ New Planning System
+ Kermit Roosevelt lecture
November 69
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hag, Jr.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General Frank B. Clay
The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.
Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
Cambodia's Borders WG CDR M. K. Chopra, Indian AF, Ret 3
Nationbullding
COL Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA 10
The New Army Planning System LTC David E. Shepherd, k., USA 18
China's Petroleum Industry Niu Sien-chong 23
West Africa Searches for Stability LTC Jack R. Sadler, USA 28
NATO's Defense Strategy GEN Nino Pasti, Italian AF 39
Coercion and Fear in the Soviet Armed Forces Vyacheslav P. Artemiev 51
Barge ShiP-freighter of the Future Claude O. Lanciano, Jr. 56
PW and Captured Document Doctrine COL John A. Hemphill, USA 65
Armed Forces Managers in aNew Era LTC Robert H. Drumm, USAF 72
A Kermit Roosevelt Lecture:
Communication as aMilitary Art
LTG Sir John Mogg, British Army 80
Soviet Airpower
John W. R. Taylor 89
Military Notes
97
Military Books
105
Reader Forum
110
library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 Rev
The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the
US Army Dr the Command and General Staff College.
EdItDr II CIIItf
COL Donald J. Delaney
AmcIate Editor
COl Keith ... Monroe
Army War tollege
Assistant EdltDr
LTC A. Leroy Covey
features Editor
LTC Robert G. Main
Production Editor
Helen M. Hall
Spanl$ltAmlrican Editor
LTC Nestor L Berrios
Brazilian Editors
LTC Romero Lepesqueur
LTC Juarez A. Gomes
Pulillcatlon otIIcer
MAl Donald E. Tuman
Art and alsip
Charles A. Moore
MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Commend and General staff College, Fort leav
enworth, Kansas, In English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for prInting of ibis publication has
been approved by Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.
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College, Fort leavenworth, Kanses 66027.
:IItlttnry ittritm
Amarb Anult
The Military Review announces the selection of the following article
from the September 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD
ARTICLE:
"The Problem of Power"
Raymond J. Barrett
Mr. Barrett suggests that we ignore at our peril the fact that the United
States is a great power. The world cannot ignore us and we cannot escape
the responsibilities of a great power. Vietnam has been a hard lesson and
is proof that we need new methods. We need new approaches and new
techniques. Nations, like individuals, must continue to learn in order to
survive. It is vital that we learn correctly the lesson of Vietnam.
*
*
*
COMING:
Alvin J. Cottrell, in "Soviet-Egyptian Relations," notes that the rearming of
the United Arab Republic since June 1967 has been very costly to the Soviets.
They now have a considerable military presence in the UAR and the Mediter
ranean. This increased involvement has heightened the possibilities of a direct
United States-USSR confrontation. The Soviets must restrain President Gamal
Abdel Nasser from a preemptive attack on Israel if they are to hold their
newly won position of prominence in the Middle East.
Anthony Harrigan, in "Northern Defense Frontier," sees the Arctic being
opened to commercial development on a major seale with the giant icebreaker
tanker SS Manhatta:/l pioneering a transcontinental, deepwater, all-season tanker
route to the Alaskan north slope via the historic Northwest Passage. This in
creased interest extends to strategic factors and to questions concerning defense
of land, air, and sea along a frozen frontier. This northern development poses
new challenges and demands on military professionals.
1969
Search for Firm Borders
Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, IndUm Air Force, Retire4
A
VISITOR to Cambodia is im
mediately struck by two phe
nomena---the magnificence of its
treasures in the shape of Angkor Wat,
and its air of excitement over the
border issue. The two are different, of
course, and yet if one looks deep into
Cambodia's past, they are not unre
lated.
Angkor Wat is a famous temple,
considered the largest religious build
ing in the world and the greatest sin
gle work of architecture in Southeast
Asia. Constructed in the 12th century,
it lies among a complex of about 600
monuments extending over 60 square
miles. It is a memorial of the times
wHen Kambuja, as Cambodia was then
called, was an empire, extending from
the Bay of Bengal to the South China
Sea. Its highly advanced civilization,
then, is a matter of great pride for the
Cambodians today and is a mainspring
of inspiration for them.
3
CAMBODIA
But subsequently, Cambodia fell on
evil days, and one of the causes of its
decay was the exhaustion of resources
through luxurious layouts, including
the frenzy of temple constructionS.
Angkor Wat is a landmark not only
of the glory of Cambodia, but also
of its decay to which its present trav
ails can be traced.
Historical Bacqround
To appreciate the border predica
ment which has colored so much of
Cambodia's national and international
attitudes, it is useful to refer to its
history. By the time the internsl pres- '
sures began to tear up the country,
external foes also appeared. Among
them were the Thais, originally from
Yunnan in China, who launched. a
series of attacks from the north and,
in 1431, sacked Angkor, the ancient
capital. On their heels came the Viet
namese from the east. For the next
400 years, Cambodia was a bone of
contention and a battleground for
these two peoples. In 1846, they fought
their last major war on the soil of
Cambodia.
By then, a third force appeared on
the scen&-Franc&-which held Cam
bodia as its protectorate from 1864 to
1941. During the greater part of
World War II, Cambodia was occupied
by Japan. After the war, it was at the
mercy of the Allied Powers. It de-
Wing Commander Malutra.i K. Chrr
pro, Indian. Air Force, Retired, is
militery correspondent ffYl' the Eng
lisk-language Indian. newspeper, The
Indian Express. A frequ.ent con.tribft,.
tor to the MUdTARY REVIEW, he is the
oothor of "India on. the Eve of the
Second Defent1e Pltm" which /J/PPeared
in the J_ry 1969 issue. This article
on. Cambodia wae written. by the
authfYl' after a. 'lJiBit he made to that
country in May 1969.
clared its independence in November
1953 and was included in the Geneva
agreement on the Indochina states in
July 1954.
Invasions by foreigners, contests
among them for Cambodian territory,
internal destruction, fear of more re
sourceful neJghbors, pride in the past,
and hope for developing rich and
beautiful country are the factors
swaying the Cambodian mind.
Cambodia's .Claims
In this context, the recognition of
Cambodian borders is important for
both their political and their emotionsl
value. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the
Chief of State, claims that his coun
try's borders. as they existed at the
time of the declaration of independ
ence and the signing of the Geneva
agreement, should be accepted. This
claim. he asserts. also has a historical
and legal basis.
For instance, Cambodia's frontiers
with Thailand were determined as a
result of the Franco-Thai treaty of
1907, confirmed. in 1937. In 1946. when
Thailand returned Cambodian Prov
inces captured during World War II,
reinforcement of the treaty of 1937
was specifically mentioned. A year
later. the Washington Franco-Siamese
Conciliation Commission submitted its
report which the Thai leaders also
accepted. Thus, the Thai-Cambodian
frontiers should be considered fixed
and settled.
In actual practice, matters have not
been that simple. and interstate dis
putes have occurred.
The dispute with Thailand has cen
tered mainly over the Preah Vihear
temple. located on the northern Cam
bodian-Thai border along the Donrek
Mountain chain. Both countries agreed
to refer it to the International Court
of Justice whose award, given in 1962,
MHituJ Rmew
4
CAMBODIA
went in favor of Cambodia. But that
did not satisfy the Thai leaders who
reasserted their claim and talked of
appealing the decision. However, no
appeal has been filed. On the other
hand, the Thai Government now says
that it renounces its claim for good.
But in its turn, Cambodia is not
satisfied so that the temple-easy
access to which, incidentally, is pos
sible for geographical reasons only
through Thai-Cambodian cooperation
-remains a heavily guarded area.
Apart from this, however, both coun
tries acknowledge that the entire fron
tier between the two countries has
been demarcated with markers on the
ground.
With Vietnam, the dispute is two
fold. First, it concerns small areas in
the vicinity of Kampot, Chau Phu,
Mimot, and Lomphat along the Cam
bodian-Vietnamese frontier. Embrac
ing only a few villages, the total terri
tory involved is extremely small.
Second, it involves certain islands in
the Gulf of Siam. There are a number
of these, but even the largest, called
Hon Antay and Hon Doc, around
which the rest are clustered, are only
an acre or two in size and practically
uninhabited. Their importance lies not
so much in size as in the fact that they
mean an addition to territorial waters.
The largest and most important is
land in the gulf is Dao Phu Quoc. Its
present value is in its fishing facili
ties. It is one. of the two places in Viet
nam where there is found the rare
fish yielding the popular sauce called
5
CAMBODIA
mwc mom, heavily in demand through
out Vietnam. Phu Quoc could be con
verted into a naval or airbllSe, from
which the southern coastal arellS of
Cambodia, lIS well lIS Vietnam, could be
dominated. While Cambodia does ex
pre118 apprehension on this point, it
does not seem to dispute the owner
ship of the island which maps nor
mally show lIS lying within Vietnamese
territory.
OIfer WItIIdrawIi
Cambodia's l border with Laos is
comparatively small_bout 200 miles
long. Early this summer, the Royal
Lao Government made an ofter to ac
cord it recognition, but later the ofter
WIIS withdrawn. Neither with Laos nor
with Vietnsm have the frontiers been
demarcated on ground, but, should
this be done, not much territory is
likely to be involved in dispute. In
fact, the size of territory is not at the
heart of the border problem among
the Indochina states-the rub lies
somewhere else.
Prince Sihanouk says that, despite
treaties, Thailand invaded Cambodia
and seized Cambodian territory dur
ing World War II. He also says that,
Khmer Serei, a militant opposition
body, hIlS its bllSes in Thailand.
Against LaOs, the allegation is that
the Lao population along the border
receives moral and military aid from
the other side to subvert the Phnom
Penh authority. .
With Vietnam, the problem is fur
ther complicated. The government of
North Vietnam, lIS well lIS the Viet
Cong of the Republic of Vietnsm
(RVN), both state that they recognize
Cambodia's sovereignty within the
existing borders. Since Cambodia con
siders these two bodies lIS the ruling
authorities of North Vietnsm and the
Republic of Vietnam respectively,

technicallf, it should have no border
problem with V i ~ But while ig
noring the Saigon Govermnent, Cam
bodia expects it to declare recognition.
That its frontiers should be recog
nized and respected by all parties
point
Cambodian troops keep watch alomg the
frontiers
of Cambodia's demand. It feels this
hIlS not been conceded all round. For
this and other ressons, it does not have
diplomatic ties with many countries.
Until recently, there was a misunder
standing with the United States also
on this issue which hIlS apparently
now been removed and may lead to the
resumption of their diplomatic rela
tions.
Besides interstate feuds, rooted
largely in history, recent events have
also had their impact upon Cambodia's
border problem. Of these, the wars,
insurgency, and civil strife in the
states of Indochina have obviously
exercised powerful in1luence.
IIOItIIJ InInI
Developments since the Geneva ac
cords of 1964 are well known. By these
accords, all hostilities were to cease,
foreign troops were to be withdrawn,
and the states of the region were to be
allowed to live in peace. The contrary
has happened. Both Vietnam and Laos
are engulfed in war, and Thailand is
involved in the efforts to establish se
curity. Fortunately enough, Cambodia
has not developed into a war theater,
but, at the Slime time, the conftarra
tion around has heightened tensions
and has made Cambodia all the more
border conscious.
Two Aspects
In this perspective, the border prob
lem has two faces as viewed from the
side of the Communists and of the al
lies. In the course of their fighting,
the troops of North Vietnam and the
Viet Cong have both violated Cam
bodian territory. Part of the supply
route from Hanoi to Saigon passes
through Cambodia-the so-called "Si
hanouk trail." Toward the end of last
year, the situation became serious
when the North Vietnamese began to
occupy parts of the two eastern Prov
inces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri,
and the Viet Cong established their
own pockets in the southeast.
When in Cambodia last May, I
learned that complaints to this effect
had been made to the International
Control Commission. But for quite
some time, the commission had been
rendered ineffective by war conditions,
and, in any case, the Cambodian Gov
ernment could give it little help in
carrying out investigations. To rid
Cambodia of inftltrators to the satis
faction of all concerned would thus be
one of the points of negotiations 'in
Paris.
While the Communists do not admit
their own presence, the allies have
......111..
CAIIOIIIA
admitted the action taken by them in
the pursuit of war. Their aircraft,
they say, have undertaken overftights
across the Cambodian territory, and
RVN troops have had to chase the
Viet Cong occasionally to their en
campmentS in the Cambodian border
regions. The United States is under
stood to have sent a team to find out
the damage, if any, caused by its
bombera to local population and prop
erty and to consider as
Cambodia claims.
Pow.r CeafroItltlon
In addition to accentuating local
confticts, wars also have hardened
great power confrontation in the re
gion, with powerful impact upon Cam
bodia. During the last few years, there
have been numerous moves and coun
termoves which baffle an outsider, but
some trends are unmistakable.
Red China has sought to make its
presence felt by offering financial aid,
establishing factories, building an im
posing stadium, and, in general, creat
ing an air of confidence and friend
ship. Until the end of 1967, it was the
main supplier of small arms to the
Cambodian Army. But this benevo
lence has been compounded with the
imposition of Mao Tse-tung's thought,
pressurization through North Viet
nam, and encouragement of the Com
munist elements in the country. At one
stage, Prince Sihanouk reacted vio
lently, closing down some of the Chi
nese institutions and expelling some
of its nationals.
The supply of Chinese arms has
now apparently ceased, and, thanks to
"cultural revolution" and other causes,
Red China seems to be rather on the
sidelines than in the arena of Cam
bodia. But its shadow across the coun
try, deep and long, is alI too visible.
Since the arrival of the new Soviet
7
CAMBODIA
Ambassador at the end of 1967, the
nature and tempo of Soviet relation
ship have undergone a change. From
negligible assista1lCe, and that in the
cultural field, there have been exten
sive exchanges of dillegations.
The supply of MiG-J.7's to the Cam
bodian Air Force last yesr was hailed
heartily by Cambodian authorities.
More Soviet aid is expected which
Pbuom Penh needs badly, partly be
cause of t h ~ stoppage of arms from
Red China alld partly because of the
mcrease in' the Cambodian armed
forces from 80,000 to 40,000 over the
last two years. The Soviets hold an
other trump card m the shape of their
influence over Hanoi which might be
used at the Paris peace talks or. to
help in the expulsion of North Viet
namese infiltrators.
Emblssles Established
By and large, it appears that Com
munist powers have done well in this
country. Pbuom Penh is one of those
few capitals of the world where the
Viet Cong have a full-fiedged Em
bassy. Last May, an Esst German Em
bassy was also established. In the
press 'of North Vietnam and the Viet
Cong, Cambodia is generously ap
plauded. Compared to this, Western
Powers do not have much to show.
Cambodia's relations with the Federal
Republic of Germany, for instance, are
all but broken and, with the United
States, have only recently shown some
signs of improvement after a break of
four years.
All this does not mean the triumph
of communism, but it does indicate an
orientation toward the Communist
powers. Yet this agam should not be
considered a permanent phenomenon
in Cambodia's intemationallife. "We
survive by our maneuvers m the field
of diplomacy," Prince Sihanouk once

remarked, adding that he did not mind
being called Machiavellian-''to save
the ekin of my race."
Cambodia's search for firm frontiers
continues, but a few undeniable facts
have already emerged. Border disputes
with the neighbors do not involve'
much territory and, given the appro
priate climate of peace, could be
settled without much ado. In this
connection, considerable ground has
already been prepared.
The violation of Cambodia's fron
tiers is largely a tragic consequence
of the wars in Indochina and should
normally cesse after a proper peace
settlement. Above all, during the last
16 years of its independence, Cam
bodia has emerged ss a state with a
well-defined identity in all respects,
i1lCluding frontiers within which the
Cambodians bave becn able to estab
lish soverl!ignty.
11Ir.. LlSS8IIs
In the process of this search, cer
tain lessons have becn prOjected which
are beneficial for Cambodia, the other
states of Indochina, and the world
community interested in the region.
First, much of the solidarity of
Cambodia is due to a vital decision
taken by the Geneva Conference in
1954-that there shall be only one in
disputable authority in the country.
The proposal that the Vietminh, de
scribed as "Khmer Resistance Forces"
and "Vietnamese Military Units" in
the agreement and which formed the
rebel element, should be aIlocated a
separate zone in the country vis-a-vis
the Royal Cambodian Government was
rejected.
As a result, the kind of situation
that has arisen m Laos between the
Royal Lao Government and the Pa.tket
Lao, each allocated a separate zone,
wss avoided. True, there has been opo
MlliIIrJ Rnl..
position in Cambodia, but Phnom Penh
has been able to deal with it effectively.
Liquidation of dual control and estab
lishment of single authority should
then be one of'the primary objectives
of peace settlement in Indochina.
Having thus come to the helm of
affairs, the Cambodian statesmen be
gan to build and develop the infra
structure of their political and ec0
nomic life. This included a constitu
tion, a political party, and a planning
apparatus.
The Cambodian Constitution is a
blend of authoritarianism and demo
cratic freedoms under which a stable
government has functioned, sustained
by the personality of the Prince, as
well as the loyalty and intelligence of
the Ministers. This is, perhaps, the
norm more suitable to the countries
of the Orient than unbridled democ
racy.
Cambodia has sought and received
foreign aid and still needs it to exploit
its rich resources, improve agriculture,
establish industry, learn teehnical
know-how, and extend communica
tions. But by and large, it has de
pended upon self-help rather than
foreign help. Throughout the country,
roads, schools, dispensaries, small in
dustrial plants, and minor irrigation
works have come into being through
local resources. The Cambodians are
CAMBODIA
intelligent, hard-working, honest pe0
ple, readily responsive to dynamic
leaderihip.
Self-reliance, then, is the founda
tion of the strength and stability of
Cambodia, unlike some developing
countries where foreign assistance is
reckoned as the mainstay and is fre
quently wasted.
In treading the dangerous path of
independence, enveloped by the clouds
of war and under the shadow of global
conflicts, Cambodia has had to resort
to special devices. It has shunned al
liances. It does not swear by any par
ticular ideology of which one hears
so much elsewhere. It does appear to
lean toward this or that power bloc
now and then, but that has not meant
permanent affiliation.
It is the constant refrain of Prince
Sihanouk that his country is non
aligned, that he wants to be friendly
with all countries. He is by no means
a complete success, but Cambodia un
der him presents the image of a state
which will allow no interference in
its internal affairs, which wants to
live and progress peacefully within
recognized, stable frontiers, and which
is neutral. This might well be the
pattern of settlement and peace not
only for Cambodia, but for all the
states of Indochina.
N"....., 1889
8
Maintenance Personnel
in Nafionbuilding
Colonel Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, United Bttdes Arm.
T
HE developing world has from
60 to 80 percent of its popula
tion engaged in agriculture. The im
provement of agricultural production
is not only the key to economic
growth, but is the initial step to
ward increasing the living standards
of this vast majority.
Although agricultural production
can be increased in the initial stages
without mechanization, later a sus
tained rate of growth cannot be main
tained without it. It is in the prepa
ration for mechanization, and during
it, that the United States and, more
sPecifically, the US Army can make
a unique contribution as a part of
its stability operations and nation
huilding mission. The ski1ls of its
maintenance personnel may assist ma-
MIlItuJ InI.. 10
terially in maintaining and repairing
the equipment and machinery essential
to growth and expansion of agricul
ture.
A major objective in the economic
development of emerging nations is
to increase the individual earnings of
the mass of the people and thus in
crease ,available capital. Regrettably,
the inhabitants of the poorer coun
tries must spend most of their earn
ings on merely surviving. The amount
of income that remains for invest
ment is so small it cannot provide the
stimulus essential to the development
process. Additionally, with the bulk
of the population engaged in agricul
tural production, any increase in earn
ings must come primarily from higher
agricultural productivity.
Roles of AlrlcuHure
Actually, agriculture plays three
major roles in the transition from a
traditional society to that period
marked by economic takeoff. First,
it must supply more food for home
consumption by the increasing popula
tion, for transfer to urban areas where
the 'population growth is dispropor
during the transition, and for
export where it will earn foreign ex
change credits.
Colonel Lawrence E. Van BUBkirk
is Commanding Officer of the Red
River Army Depot in TelW8. He holds
a B.S. from Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan, an M.B.A. from
the University of Chica.go, and is a
graduate of the US Army Command
and General Staff College and the US
Army War College. He has 86f'11ed m
G1iad4lc4nal, Germany, OkinaWIJ, mad
Korea. Other 48BignmentB ineludB duty
with the AugUBta Arsenal in Georgill,
with the Detroit Ordnance District in
Michigan, and with the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
in W48hington, D. C.
unONBUILOINS
Second, agriculture operates on the
demand side of the economy. The
rising real incomes, created by higher
productivity, serve as a stimulus to
consumer goods production. The in
dustrial sector development also can
be oriented toward prodUction of cap
ital items for agriculture such as
chemical fertilizers, farm machinery,
and diesel pumps. The rising rural in
comes are available for taxation by
the government to help finance the
social overhead capital required by
the modem economY.
The third role of agriculture during
this period is the investment of a
substantial part of its surplus income
in the industrial sector.
If the investment is not done volun
tarily, tbe government must accom
plish it either through a redistributive
tax system or by actual land owner
ship reform. Japan initially used the
latter method to finance its industrial
growth. The government purchased
large holdings witb industrial bonds
and resold tbe land in smaller units
to farmer-operators. Payments made
by these peasants were used to pro
vide capital for industry and social
overhead.
A&rIcuHur. Sets Pace
Most economic takeoffs have oc
curred immediately after or concur
rently with radical changes in agri
cultural techniques. The changes have
generally occurred when the individual
landowning farmer recognizes that
the new techniques, landholding
rangements, and marketing system
may provide him a greater income.
The adoption of the new methods and
organizational arrangements, together
with the resulting increase in produc
tivity, set the pace of economic prog
ress, particularly in the early stages
of development.
11
NADONBUILDING
An accelerated growth in agricul
tural productivity will make a greater
quantity of food and raw material
available at relatively lower prices.
Wage earners will spend less of their
income on food, thus increasing the
e1fective money demand for other
goods. This rising demand will make
it profitable for entrepreneurs to in
vest in the production of a greater
quantity of Consumer goods. Thus,
the demand for, more workers in these
industries can be met by the release
of agricultural workers which is made
possible by the productivity increase
in that sector.
Food Casts
The declining food costs also pro
vide a higher real income and offset
pressure to raise the workers' money
wagea. This insures the continued
profitability of industrial investment
and encourages further expansion.
Domeatic food supplies must keep pace
with the population expansion and
rising demand for food. If they fail
to do so,' increased food costs will
slow down or halt economic growth.
The country with heavy population
pressures and slow growth of domestic
food production must purchase food
from abroad. As a result, it utilizes
funds required for capital investment
in industry or for social overhead
capital. As food deficit pressures in
crease, more resources will be diverted
from investment in growth areas of
the economy.
The ,production of agricultural sur
plus is critical to continued economic
growth. It is a source of both foreign
credit earnings through export of the
surplus and industrial capital derived
from savings.
As an example, during the first 25
years after the Meiji Restoration,
Japan depended upon land taxes and
special agricultural levies to provide
its local and national revenues. These
receipts were used for both current
expenditures and for social overhead
capital. Savings from the agricultural
surplus were transferred from the
agricultural sector through the fiscal
system to investments serving indus
trial and service sectors. Profits from
industry were relatively untouched
and available for reinvestment in in
dustry.
Industrial Growth
The role agriculture plays in pro
viding foreign credits and its linkage
with industry can be seen in develop
ments in Thailand. 'In response to a
steady downward trend in rice prices,
the Thai farmer shifted to production
of new crops. Corn and kenaf have
become important cash crops and have
developed into leading export products.
Since the Thais grow corn primarily
for export, an entire processing and
marketing system had to be developed
to move the corn to its overseas mar
kets.
Numerous new plants have been
built in response to agricultural crop
processing requirements. In this for
ward linkage category are a corn
flour plant milling 60 million pounds
annually for export, a rice-bran-oil
factory producing vegetable oil from
bran, a sugar refinery representing a
3.5 million-dollar investment, and a
tapioca flour mill producing 40,000
pounds daily for export. A multimil
lion-dollar bag plant uses kenaf grown
in Thailand to produCe bags which it
sells to the Thai farmers for hauling
and storing their crops.'
The rapid development of commer
cialized agriculture has provided a
Military R,vI,.
12
NATIONBUILDINII
stimulus to light industry, and sub
stantial domestic capital is being in
vested. As commercial growing in
creases, the agricultural-related indus
tries are also "expanding. Because of
the more complex tecbnology involved
in manufacturing the products, new
fertilizer and insecticide plants have
improved tools and machinery must
be introduced to obtain further in
creases in productivity.
This concept was followed by the
United Nations team and the Libyan
American Technical Assistance Serv
ice in the preparation of the develop
ment plan for Libya. In the first stage,
This Colombian road was eonstrneted to link agricultural areas with markets for
Increased production of farm products
been constructed with foreign capital
and technical assistance.
A developing country characteris
tically has an absolute overpopulation
in agriculture. The number of workers
could be reduced, yet the same output
would be obtained. Another character
istic is the exceedingly low level of
agrarian tecbniques associated with
tools and equipment which are limited
in quantity and primitive in nature.
Under these conditions, productivity
can be increased initially by improv
ing tecbniques without resorting to
capital expenditures. At a later stage,
agriculture was to be improved by
training farmers, improving tech
niques, and increasing acreage under
cultivation. Only in the second and
third stages were laborsaving inno
vations planned for agriculture.'
Agricultural productivity can be
increased through the use of improved
plant strains, by application of chemi
cal fertilizers, and through the adop
tion of improved plowing, weeding,
and harvesting tecbniques. However,
the introduction of improved equip
Benjamin H. Bimrlna. EeotlOtJdc Dft'elopm.ntc:
Pro_. Pri...."'" ood Polklu. W. W. Norton
4 Co.. Inc., N. Y .. 1959, p 705.
13
NATIONBUILDINB
ment and special machinery is ulti
mately required to increase individual
productivity so that labor can be
released to meet industry's demands
and sustain economic growth.
WIly Mechanization?
The primary purpose of machinery
is to increase the output of each man,
not to make each acre more productive.
However, improvements in equipment
can make an appreciable contribution
to raising cropl yields per acre. This
is accompliohed through better per
formance of various operations and
by more timely completion of activi
ties. A more thorough preparation of
the seedbed with its concurrent in
crease in weed destruction is possible
with mechanical equipment. Invaria
bly, it will produce a greater yield.
Timeliness of operations is i m p ~ r
tant because there is only a short
period between the time soil can first
be worked and the optimum planting
time for the growing season. Better
equipment means soils can be worked
earlier and faster than with primitive
tools, thus assuring planting at the
best possible time. Rapid harvesting
with improved implements insures
that the operation can be completed
during the peak quality period a,nd
before losses occur. Any improvement
of equipment which speeds plowing,
weeding, and harvesting gives the
farmer more control over the elements
and results in better yields.
In those nations having large land
areas available for exploitation, the
use of tractors and tractor-drawn
machinery will facilitate expansion of
the cultivated area. In other countries
where small-scale agriculture predomi
nates, there is room for substantial
technological progress in equipment,
even though the degree of mechaniza
tion would be far from that of the
United State!!. In recent years, con
siderable progress has been made in
adapting farm machinery to the re
quirementa of small-ecale agriculture.
Small garden tractors are exten
sively used in Europe. In Japan, their
use has increased until over 1.4 mil
lion were in use in 1961, and the in
crease continues at a fast pace. Taiwan
has established a power tiller manu
facturing industry in competition with
Japan, and the conversion from buf
falo power to gasoline-driven tillers
is proceeding rapidly.
Power Sources
The development of the small, gen
eral purpose power tiller has made a
source of power available to the small
scale farmer for tilling, water pump
ing, spraying, milling, and transport
ing. Japan is probably the farthest
along the road toward mechanization
of the smail producer. Electric motors
furnish the power source for sta
tionary equipment BUch as irrigation
and drainage pumps, huskers, and
threshers. Gasoline engines serve as
a mobile power source for tillers,
plows, spraying equipment, and dust
ers.
Taiwan is following the Japanese
pattern of equipment usage, but it is
still in the early stages of mechaniza
tion. In Thailand and Vietnam, gaso
line-powered irrigation pumps are
beginning to compete with the tradi
tional water wheel and basket lift.
Processing equipment for agricul
tural products is one of the first areas
suitable for mechanization. Small
gasoline engines provide the power
to operate rice mills, grind fiour, shell
corn, and press sugarcane. While these
activities have been accomplished in
the large, central market centers by
mechanical means, the local village
level operation has been by primitive,
MIl/tIrJ InI..
14
NAnONBUILDING
US At.."
Skills required to support an agricultural development program are similar to those
required of a soldier-mechanic
hand-operated equipment. The eur
rent trend is toward development of
smaller units which can be operated
in the village marketing area.
The types of equipment which will
be used in agricultural production in
the emerging nations are not neces
sarily complex. However, they do re
quire a degree of familiarity with
machinery not currently available in
a culture where implements generally
are wooden and either hand operated
or animal drawn.
Introduction of mechanical equip
ment will require the concurrent de
velopment of fundamental mainte
nance skills in the agricultural sector.
Additionally, certain technical skills
must be developed in sufficient quan
Hen_If 1869
tity to provide repair capabilities at
convenient locations for the equip
ment users.
The AgencY for International De
velopment has the primary responsi
bility for providing assistance in
agricultural development. However,
the US Army can make a substantial
contribution to a training program
designed to provide mechanical skills
in support of the agricultural devel
opment programs. The Army has been
teaching mechanical skills to soldiers
in many Asian nations and South
America since the end of World War
II. While the skill level required for
a soldier-mechanic is considerably
higher than the level needed in the
agricultural sector, the same instruc
15
NAnDNBUILDIN8
tional skills and techniques can be
employed.
The type of personnel required for
such a training program are engineer
equipment sptclausts, automotive me
chanics, welders, and machinists. The
personnel inventory contains large
n u m b e ~ of highly competent non
commissioned officers in all of these
categories. Although the Army cannot
afford to conduct training simultane
ously in all of the countries requiring
assistance, 'it could provide training
teams to a number of countries.
Such a program would not be the
permanent responsibility of the Army.
Instead, the Anny's task would be to
establish the programs, provide the
initial instruction team, and teach the
local country's military personnel to
operate the program. As soon as the
program was functioning properly, the
Anny's team would be withdrawn and
made available for assistance in an
other area.
Training Program
The program to train farmers in
the skills required for operation of
relatively simple machinery should be
designed to meet the needs and avail
ability of the current farmer, as well
as training young men who intend
to, farm. The operating farmer can
nqt spend an extended period of time
away from his land. Therefore. a
system of training centers located to
take advantage of road networks, pro
viding easy access from the villages,
and operated similsrly to agricultural
extension courses, would be more ef
fective than a central training point.
Tbe young men Who have not en
tered upon a career can beat be given
their initial training while living at
a central school where they are avail
able for full-time instruction. Because
of the nature of the training. the me
chanic-artisan can best be taught at
a central location where the teaching
talents and technical equipment can
be concentrated: Therefore, the train
ing system should consist of both a
central school for full-time instruc
tion in either operating skills or trade
skills and a series of training centers
where operating skills are taught on
a part-time basis.
Such a system would be developed
in conjunction with local army per
sonnel as a part of the nationbuilding
program. Some of the basic skills re
quired in agricultural maintenance are
being taught at local army schools by
personnel trained by the US Army.
It would be a relatively easy matter
to develop the lower skill level courses
required for the agricultural training.
With the local army stationed through
out the country, some of the posts
could serve as either a regional train
ing center or a control point for cen
ters located in their vicinity.
Sauree af Trainees
Students for the central school
would come from three sources:
Servicemen receiving their pre
release training in agricultural-ori
ented occupations.
Graduates of primary and sec
ondary schools who plan to work in
the agricultural sector.
Implement makers and wood
workers from the villages.
These men are currently engaged
in agricultural repair work; they are
ready to accept change; and they are
not resistant to new ideas. By their
knowledge and experience, they are
the most likely to shift easily to the
use and repair of engines and machin
ery. Unlike the first two sources who
must find a job and suitable location
after receiving their training, the
third group would be able to return
MIlItarJ Rlllew
18
to their jobs in their native villages.
In many countries, the army's pre
release training in vocational skills
is an integral part of the over-all
educational and economic development
programs. In Colombia, for example,
the armed forces contribute to the
support of the Apprenticeship Insti
tute in Bogota and send their service
men there for the last months of their
service. The Peruvian Army built its
own prerelease training establish
ments where conscripts receive three
months of compulsory training in
specific skills. Israel's Nahal Program
is a complete integration of voca
tional agricultural training with mili
tary training for specially selected
young men and women.'
The central school program for
operators could be patterned after
the mechanical trade courses of the
US high schools' vocational agricul
tural courses. A basic knowledge of
mechanics, electric power, plumbing,
and metalworking will provide the
basis for understanding the opera
tion of equipment to be introduced
now and in the future. The Congo
Center for Mechanized Agriculture
at Kinshasa is an example of this
type of school. Students come from aU
areas of the country to learn the
proper operating and maintenance
techniques for farm machinery.'
The central school program for
mechanic-artisans should develop ba
sic skills in automotive maintenance,
electrical equipment repair, welding,
and metalworking.
The regional training center should
concentrate on development of a hasic
knowledge of simple mechanical skills
NAnONBUILDINIl
required for operation and mainte
nance of uncomplicated farm machin
ery. It should include an understand
ing of the equipment's limitations, as
well as its advantages. Demonstrat
ing locally available equipment is the
most effective teaching technique.
Pakistan's experiment at Comilla
could serve as a basic concept for
regional training center operations.
Individuals from' the surrounding
areas come to the academy at Comilla
for classes once a week. Model farmers
from each village or cooperative learn
new farming techniques, then return
to their respective villages and spread
their knowledge through actual dem
onstration on their farina. They also
conduct classes in their village.'
Such a program can be readily
adapted to teaching, operating, and
maintenance of equipment. The farm
ers would not be taken away from
their work for long periods; they
could develop their knowledge over a
period of time; they would be working
in their own village area where in
struction could be adjusted to local
conditions; and they would receive
instruction on equipment and tech
niques adaptable to their needs.
In most of today's emerging na
tions, agriculture is the key to success
ful economic development. Large num
bers of the soldiers from these coun
tries come from the countryside and
return there after their service. The
prerelease training in up-to-date agri
cultural techniques, particularly in
the mechanical skills required to sup
port mechanization, will provide thou
sands of efficient farmers. Training
such as this by our mobile training
teams could inject a new and dynamic
force into economic development.
'Lou" Dapree, Tlu! ComiI/4 B",,,.mn...c: A
Sc:Mmw: for VillBge D 8 1 1 ~ t in Eut PaJriItan,.
American Universities Field Staft, N. Y. 19S.,
p 18.
NIVlmber 1869
17
The New Army
Planning System
Lieutenant Colonel David E. Shepherd, Jr.. Ulfitelf Stlllelt Arm.
C
ULMINATING a year and a
half of study, the Army has re
cently announced a new family of
Army strategic plans. The new plan
ning system prescribed in Army Reg
ulation 1-1, The Army Planning Sys
tem, brings Army practice in line
with current procedures of the Joint
Chiefs of Stafi' (JCS) and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
The Army had for some time recog
nized that its planning system had
not evolved with changes in the deci
sion-making environment. At the out
set of the study. two points signifi
cantly inftuenced the review of the
Army's planning system. First, the
basic goal was to strengthen and im
prove the existing objectives and re
source planning systems. A radically
new system was not desired, and new
procedures would he introduced only
where a void had developed. Second,
emphasis was placed on strengthening
the force objectives and resource re
quirements planning systems as opo
posed to contingency and capabilities
systems.
The study analyzed Army input re
quirements for the joint strategic
planning system and OSD planning,
programing. and budgeting documents.
It concluded that Department of the
Army plans did not meet the require
ments of the JCS and OSD systems.
In addition. they were not consistently
effective in presenting Army views to
the Secretary of Defense arriving at
major decisions.
The revised Army planning doc
uments reftect the principal force ob
jectives and resource requirements of
the Army staff. More specifically. they
provide an Army analysis of world
wide threats. They plan the effective
use of forces and resources currently
available and give the appropriate
Army commanders responsibility for
execution of the capabilities plan.
They develop recommended military
strategy. objective forces. and related
resources required to support those
Milltlly Review
18
PWINING SYSTEM
ARMY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (ASOP)
ARMY FORCE DEVD.OPMENT PLAN (AFIIP)
ARMY STRATEGIC PLAN (ASCII)
ARMY PLANNING DOCUMENTS
ARMY ANAl.YSIS OF INTELUGENCE (AAO
Figure 1.
forces. Finally, they structure ap
proved Army forces and resources in
order to execute the strategy and to
achieve the military objectives (Fig
ure 1).
The lead document of the series is
Lieutenant Colonel David E. Shep
herd, Jr., i8 with the Ofliee of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Opera,tiOflB, War PZa.1I8 Division,
WCI8hington, D. C. He holds a MCI8ter's
degree and a B.A. in Interna.tional
ReZa.tiOflB from the University of
Oklahoma, and WC18 graduated from
the US Army Command and Genera.Z
Staff College in 1961. His Cl8Bignments
include duty with the BId Airborne
Division, Fort Bra.gg, North Carolina,;
the ,.th Missile Command in Korea;
the Oklahoma Military District; Spe
cial Warfare Center, Fort Bra.gg;
Headquarters, Army Southern Com
mand, Pana,ma; and with the Agency
for Interna.tiona.Z Development in
Vietna,m and India from 196,. to 1966.
Nne_... '881
the Army Analysis of Intelligence
(AAI). The AAI will be produced in
three volumes to cover the long-range
(10 to 20 years), midrange (two to 10
years), and short-range (zero to two
years) planning periods. The AAI pro
vides finished intelligence to satisfy
the specific needs of Department of
the Army users. The AAI strengthens
the Army planning system by provid
ing a vehicle for developing contribu
tions to the Joint Intelligence Esti
mate for Planning (JIEP) ; by analyz
ing the threat for specific application
to Army plans; by providing threat
analyses for Army studies and war
games; and by reducing the num
ber of "case-by-case" threat analyses
required to support the Army staff.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel
ligence is responsible for preparing
the AAI.
The second document in the set is
the Army Strategic Objectives Plan
18
PLANNING SYSTEM
(ASOP). This is, perhaps, the most
important document of the set and
provides single-purpose and direction
to Army force objectives and resource
requirements planning. The ASOP
deals with midrange and long-range
periods, and provides the basis for
developing Army contributions to the
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JS
OP), the Joint Long-Range Strategic
Study (JLRSS), and the Joint Re
search and Development Objectives
Document It is also the
basic docuntent for developing Army
comments on tentative decisions an
nounced by the OSD. Primary em
phasis in the ASOP is on the mid
range planning period.
Volume I of the ASOP is developed
in parallel with volume I of the JSOP
and the Army views on
national military strategy. For Army
planning, volume I provides the recom
mended military concept, strategy,
and objectives and guides the develop
mimt of ASOP volume II, analyses
and force tabulations.
Volume II of the ASOP analyzes,
develops, and presents alternative
forces, associated resource require
ments for each force, costs and risks
associated with each force, and a
recommended Army objective force to
execute the recommended military
strategy. This volume of the ASOP
develops the Army portions of volume
II of the JSOP and supports the Sec
retary of the Army in developing his
comments to the OSD decision-making
process.
Among the alternative forces in the
ASOP is a force approved during the
previous year by the Secretary of De
fense in his force and resource deci-.
sions. The ASOP analyses of this
force will project costs and risks as
sociated with those decisions. Only
reasonably attainable objective forces
RELATIONSHIP OF ARMY-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF-OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PLANS
Figure 2.
Military Rnlew
20
PlANNINS SYSTEM
PlANNING SEQUENCE
_1tMJ9&J _ItMJJ1O _1tM1!1I
IASOID I F A I I A S 0 I 0 IF. A I I A S o 0 I
. -'
Uj.!

I All I'lL I :II
..,........


rf'
ri
..115
I _*':11 1sT
1-.

_I'lL I
'1I ..I.. lP_*...!.. r,J
I
),.II'ILI
3\
I
iiiiP li J

BPI'lL
I 1.... 1- .... I,

"31
t.

"rl
=
=
jjTIT
---..... -----.... --
..
IIOOlIIIIIJIT' III'IISIIIIIS _
IIl'II1lIIIIIIT III'IISIIIIIS -
-
-
- -... ftNIIM:;
--..
JOIIrIlTBllGllll:fImMIERJII"-UIIJ')
JlIIIl SlIAItSIC _ lUll UICPI
__I1ISIIIII!II1ICIJIClIIAI)
_ SlIAItSIC _!1MIASI:II
JlIIIl __SlIAItSIC S1IIDY WSSI
JlIIIlII5fMQI __tI.BIMl __
JlIIIl SlIAItSIC tI.BIMllUII USOfI
___IWI
__tI.BIMllUII \I!II'J
---
_ FIlICE _lUll !.VIII')
___1IGIfII
Figure S.
and resource requirements will be
contained in the ASOP.
The ASOP will strengthen the
Army planning system by assembling
and concentrating all objective force
and resource requirements planning
into one effort and one document at
the time when it can most persuasively
inlluence the OSD and JCS decisions.
Responsibility for preparation of the
ASOP is assigned to the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Military Operations with
support being provided by other Army
staff agencies.
The third document of the revised
Army planning system is the Army
Force Development Plan (AFDP).
The AFDP develops the approved
force structure of the Army. It is in
tended to assure the systematic at
tainment of an army with a balanced
structure of combat, combat support.
Nove.ber 18&9
21
PLANNING SYSTEM
and combat service support forces. It
will facilitate achieving a proper bal
ance and effectiveness in using re
sources to support the forces and to
execute the strategy.
The AFDP is prepared in two vol
umes with volume I-the force devel
opment the baseline
force, and with volume II-the Army
force program-addressing the budget
year force which includes the baseline
forces plus temporary forces.
The new AFDP will improve the
Army planning system by separating
the structuring of the approved force
from the development of the objective
forces. It provides the approved force
structure and the unit readiness ob
jectives in detail compatible with. the
integrated readiness measurement
system and with the requirements of
the programing and budgeting activi
ties. Responsibility for preparation of
the AFDP is assigned to the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Force Development.
The last document in the Army
planning system is the Army Strategic
Capabilities Plan (ASCP). The ASCP
retains substantially the same form
and content of previous editions. It
provides guidance to the Army stsff,
Army agencies, and commands, and
Army component commands of the
unified commands. It discusses em
ployment and support of Army forces
during the short-range planning pe
riod. It reftects specific objectives to
be attained within existing programs
and budget limitations. The twice-an
nual publication of the new ASCP
insures that it is in phase with the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP) and produces timely guidance
to Army staffs and commands. The
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations remains responsible for
preparing the ASCP. The relationship
of Army plans is shown in Figure 2.
The time-phased production sched
ule for the Army family of plans
shown in association with the cor
responding OSD and joint documents
appears in Figure 3. .
The primary objectives of the re
vised Army planning system are de
signed to:
Provide timely Army data to the
planning and decision-making activi
ties of the Secretary of Defense to ob
tain major force and resource deci
sions.
Contribute to the formation and
presentation of joint military strat
egy, force objectives, and other mat
ters of the joint strategic planning
system.
Provide integrated and timely
direction, guidance, and pUrPOse to
Army staffs and commanders.
MHItarJ RnI
22
Chino's
Niu Bien-chong
T
HE real situation regarding
Communist China's oil resources
is still a riddle. Indeed, since 1949,
China's main petroleum effort has been
concentrated in the search for oil de
posits. In the course of the First Five
Year Plan (1953-57), Peking claimed
to have explored about 112,000 square
miles of territory and to have located
11 crude oil deposits. After 1957, sta
tistics became scarce and increasingly
unreliable; however, it would appear
that the pace of exploration was
stepped up during the Second Five
Year Plan and the Great Leap For
ward (1958-62).
The following regions have been
proved to contain rich oil reserves:
the Chiuchuan Basin of Kansu, the
Tsaidam Basin of Tsinghai, the Dzun
garia and Tarim Basins of Sinkiang,
the central area of Szechwan, and the
",Ylllbr 1869
Sungari-Liao Plain of Manchuria. It
is alleged that the oil reserve regions
have a total of about 1.5 million square
miles, nearly equal to 40 percent of
the total area of China. In addition,
there is a remote possibility of drilling
for oil under the sea on the continental
shelf.
There are also large reserves of
combustible shales in China. The
search for oil shales has been pursued
even more vigorously through the
whole country. The most important
shale deposits are found at Fushun
in Liaoning and Moming in Kwang
tung,
Itis difficult to estimate accurately
the oil reserves of Communist Chins.
Figures range from several billion
tons to tens of billion tons. For a
comparatively accurate measurement,
however, mineral reserves would be
23
I
I A N
el1lMEIt
eLANCHOW '* CBIUCBVAN BASIN
t F8AIDA. _.I8lN a.
TSINGHAI
c
HI.
A
classified into three grades: grade A:
reserves which are definitely exploit
able; grade B: reserves which can be
exploited at a reasonable cost; and
grade C: those reserves exploitable
only at great cost. According to this
classification, the petroleum reserves
of Communist China may be tabulated
as shown in the chart.
Important 011 Complel
The most famoua oilfield in China
with a proud tradition is Yumen field
in Kansu. It was discovered by Na
tionalist geologists in 1936. Produc
tion began in 1938 and rapidly in
creased through the period of the
Sino-Japanese War. The Communists
have expanded facilities considerably
in this region. The total reserve is esti
mated as 300 million tons, with a cur
rent annual output of over 1.7 million
tons. Output is expected to reach 2.3
million tons in 1970. At present, the
Yumen region should be regarded as
the most important oil complex in Red
China although the most promising
resources appear to lie farther west
the Karamai field in Sinkiang and the
Tsaidam Basin of Tsinghai.
The Karamai field is situated along
the northwestern perimeter of Dzun
garia Basin. It is the largest oilfield in
China, covering an area over 1,700
square miles with a reserve estimated
at 2.2 billion tons. Present output is
reported at three million tons per year.
Based on geological investigation, the
Nill Sien-clwng iB with the National
DefBfUle Plan.n.ing Bureau of the Re
public of China. Governmen.t in. Til"'"
wan.. He 8erved in. the Chin.e8e Army
iMring World War 11, and hol4s a
Bachelor of ScillflCe degree from the
University of Nanking. HiB article,
"World Revolution and People's War,"
a'jYJHJfJ,red in. the March 1968 iB8ILe of
the MILITARY REVIEW.
Nn....., 1969
PETROLEUM INDusm
Tsaidam Basin seems to be the most
promising field for future exploitation.
However, the development has been
seriously hampered by difficult ge0
graphical conditions and the shortage
of transportation. Current production
is probably nQt over one million tons
a year.
The Taching oilfield in southwestern
Heilungkiang has been exploited on a
Clilaa Petroleum Raene.
Metric Tons
(billions)
Grade A .78
Grade B 1.12
Grade C 6
Totsl 7.90
large scale since 1962. Peking claimed
that, by the end of 1966, the annual
output would be three million tons.
It is doubtful that the goal has been
reached, however. Another important
oil source in Manchuria is the oil shale
of Fushun. According to estimates of
Japanese experts, the total reserve is
about 5.4 billion tons. The develop
ment of this resource was begun by
the Japanese in 1930.
Maximum wartime output of shale
oil was 550,000 tons a year. Current
production has been over one million
tons annually. Besides shale, Fushun
is also rich in coal which can be used
as raw material to produce synthetic
oil. Today, Fushun ia one of the most
important industrial complexes in
Manchuria.
With the exception of the Taching
field, all the important natural oil de
posits are concentrated in western
China. In contrast, the major shale
deposits are in the coastal regions
25
PE1ROLEUM INDUSTRY
Manchuria, Kwangtung, and Hopei.
It appeal'll that too much attention has
been given to the production of shale
oil and synthetic oil. Although the
shale deposits are relatively rich and
their distribution is rather wide
spread, their value is not as high as
originally expected. Oil produced from
the coal also is losing ground because
of high cost and low quality. In the
long run, therefore, China will place
greater on natural crude oil.
ModtratI Production
Despite the feverish search for new
fields and the building of many small
plants to produce oil from shale and
coal, the total output of petroleum has
remained moderate. At the end of
1967, annual oil production was about
15 million tons. Technological
wardness and transportation difficul
ties have obviously slowed down the
speed of development. These formi
dable obstacles must be overcome be
fore the bottleneck can be cleared. In
the light of conditions in Communist
China, however, great progress in
these spheres seems unlikely in the
near future.
All the major Chinese oil production
centel'll have their own refineries and
other extracting facilities although
capacities are varied. For instance, the
refinery in the Yumen region pos
sesses a capacity of about 900.000
tons. but that at Lenghu in Tsinghai
possesses only 100.000 tons.
The Lanchow refinery is considered
the largest in China. After several
stages of expansion, current annual
capacity has reached 2.3 million tons.
Major products include high-grade
aviation fuel, as well as ordinary gaso
line. diesel oil. and lubricants. The
final planned target is five million
tons.
The Tushantze refinery, situated
near Wusu in northwestern Sinkiang,
is the largest refinery in the Sinkiang
region. Although the Tushantze oil
field was the earliest in Sinkiang, its
output is limited, and its importance
has been drastically reduced since the
discovery of Karamai field. Therefore,
the Tushantze become an
reftnery workers to greater
output
independent unit and has begun to
use crude oil from Karamai as its
principal raw material. Its present
capacity is one million tons a year.
In addition, the refinery at Karamai
also has a capacity of 600,000 tons.
Thanks to the foundation built by
the Japanese, 14anchuria has been de
veloped as an important complex of the
oil industry. Independent refineries
are situated at Chinghsi. Chinchow,
and Dairen, with a combined capacity
of 1.5 million tons. In addition, the re
finery located at Taching field can also
process 600,000 tons 'a year.
MlliIIIJ Roln
The refinery in Shanghai is an ex
ception to the general rule that major
refineries are situated close to the
oilfields. Its annual capacity in the
pre-Communist period was 200,000
tons. With the expansion by the C o m ~
munists, its capacity has now in
creased to two million tons. Another
large petro-ehemical plant has been
built in Nanking which uses the crude
oil produced in Szechwan. Its current
capacity has reached 300,000 tons a
year, and may increase to three mil
lion tons after completion.
The Pelting regime has consistently
made great effort to expand its re
finery capacity. However, it is more
difficult to establish a refinery than
to exploit an oilfield. At one time, the
Soviet Union was the main supplier
of technology and equipment to
China's petroleum industry. Total
sales of refinery equipment in 1960
were' about six million dollars, but
they Idropped to a mere $800,000 in
1964. Since 1965, Romania has been
far more active in lending a hand to
Peking's oil industry. In addition,
some refinery and other equipment
have been imported from western Eu
rope and Japan.
In October 1964, the Peking reign
declared that China was ''basically
self-sufficient" in oil production. Cur
rent crude oil production is about 15
million tons, with annual consump
tion not over 13 million tons. In this
sense, Communist China has attained
its goal of self-sufficiency. However,
the consumption of liquid fuel and
other petroleum products is closely
pmOLEUM INDUSTRY
controlled. If the Communists should
ease their controls or if their industry
achieves further progress, oil con
sumption would increase immediately.
In short, the meaning of so-called
''basic self-sufficiency" is ambiguous.
On the other hand, China's main prob
lem is not the supply of crude oil, but
rather a lack of highly refined petro
leum products. This shortage has been
grave enough to influence the technical
standards of China's air force.
Communist China is relatively
wealthy in oil resources. Even if the
figures published by Peking are not
entirely reliable, Chinese oil reserves
still should be regarded as consider
able.
The geographical distribution of
Chinese oil resources, however, is ex
tremely uneven. The principal deposits
are concentrated in the northwestern
and northeastern parts of the country.
This factor determines the location of
China's petroleum industrial centers
and puts heavy drain on the already
overloaded Chinese transportation sys
tem. Furthermore, these regions are
close to the frontier of the Soviet
Union. Henee, they are highly wIner
able to ground and air attack. This
fact presents a difficult problem to
Communist China's strategic planners.
Petroleum and its products are to
day not only the foundation of modern
industry, but also of military power.
At present, Communist China is not
able to afford any large-seale war,
either conventional or nuclear. The
situation of its petroleum industry
seems to be a controllinf factor.
27
West
Africa
Searches for Stability
Lieutenant Colonel lad!: R. Sadler. United Slate. Armg
M
ILITARY coups have rocked
Africa in nation after nation
for more than a decade. No fewer
than 29 of the 39 independent African
states have experienced attempted
coups, and, of these, 14 have been suc
cessful. West Africa has shared in
these upheavals. Since December 1965.
the governments of six of the 13
former British and French colonies in
west Africa have been taken over by
the army. In one of these-Nigeria
a bloody civil war still rages.
The colonial history or the particu
lar pattern of government adopted by
the new states evidently has made lit
tle difference. Instant democracy has
not worked. In each country, the only
21
institution with discipline, organiza
tion, and the ability to enforce law
and order hae proved to be the army.
To the surprise of most Western ob
servers, these coups have been wel
comed with relief by a people tired of
graft and inept politicians.
Rnsons for Interventions
The news of people dancing in the
streets following the military takeover
in Ghana in 1966 no doubt seemed
bizarre to Western intellectuals. How
ever, an experienced African reporter
noted:
. in 'Virtually aU matters that
liberals value, almost any group of
West African officers is far superior
to the average one-party eabinet of
professional politicians who have been
running the countries.'
There have been a variety of rea
sons for these interventions, with each
state having its own unique set of
circumstances. Tribalism, religious
splits, economic problems, and a host
of other difliculties contributed to the
events that triggered the coups in
~ u r Lewb. 'Afrlea'. OtBeen Take Com
mand,"' De B.porter. 2& Karch 1986,. p 86.
Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Sadler is
with the Office of the IJeflUty Chisf of
Staff for Military Operations, Depart
ment of the Army. A graduate of the
US Army Command and General Staff
CoUege and the US Army War CoUege,
he received his B.A. from Virginia
Military Institute, Lezington. He
served with the 1st Cavalry Division
during the Korean War; gradtuJ.ted
from the Army's Foreign Area Spe
cialist Program (Hindustani) ; held
assignments in the Office of the As
sistant Chief of Staff for InteUigence,
Department of the Army; served on
the staff of the Commander in Chief,
Pacif/e Command; and eommantled an
artillery battalion in the 9th Infantry
Di'lliBion in Vietnam.
11m..... ,.
WEST AFRICA
west Afriea, but rampant, flagrant .
corruption and political stagnation
belong at the top of the list.
The reasons for this lie in the area's
distinctive colonial history. The states
of east and central Africa had to fight
a long and sometimes bloody battle for
their freedom. Before independence,
the p e o p l ~ of the area had had to
fight for economic and political rights
in a society in which white settlers
had entrenched themselves and thrown
up the barriers of racial discrimina
tion. This type of struggle produces
men of ability and character. In west
Africa, on the other hand, indepen
dence had come virtually without a
struggle as the colonial powers recog
nized and accepted the drive for in
dependence that swept Asia and
Africa in the 1960's and early 1960's.
The result was a conglomeration of
new states born into a big and
complicated world, and woefully ill
equipped for nationhood either ge0
graphically, economically, or politi
cally.
Seo_leal Barriers
Geographically, west Africa hae
some of the most illogical boundaries
in the world. The British and French,
as they carved out and divided up
their west African colonies in the late
1800's, did so without any precise
knowledge of either the terrain or
tribes involved. Many of the interior
boundaries are merely geometric lines.
The most serious problem created,
however, relates to human geography.
In every state in the area, these ar
bitrary borders either cut tribes in
two or grouped together those that
were mutually hostile. As indepen
dence came, these ancient rivalries
surfaced and soon led to political frag
mentation and regional separatism.
Nigeria is such a case. Moslem
21
WEST AFRICA
Hausa of the Northern Region mis
trust the Torok of the ,Wl!Btj!m Re
gion, and both the Rausa and Yoruba
fear and resent the lbos of the East
ern Region for their superior aeeom
pliBhmenta in education and com
merce. This antagonism led ultimately
to civil war as the lbos attempted to
tion generally limited to one or two
exportable products. Dahomey, for ex
ample, derives 80 percent of ita for
eign exchange from palm products and
psanuta. Guines, Togo, and the Ivory
Coast are dependent on coffee and
cocoa: Mali on peanuta and dried fish:
and Sierra Leone on diamonds. Excep
secede and establish their own state
Biafrs.
Perhaps the most absurd geo
graphic creation of all is Gambia.
This former British colony is nothing
more than the banks of a river, 800
miles long and roughly 20 miles wide,
totally surrounded by French-speak
ing Senegal, with a population of
285,000, and whose sole cash crop is
psanuta.
Economically, the colonial legacy
was one of a largely agricultural, sub
sistsnce-type economy, with virtually
no industry and a foreign trade posi
3D
tions to this general penury at the
time of independence were Ghana and
Nigeria, but inefficiency and corrup
tion gradually wrecked the economies
of both these states.
Politically, the west Africans in
herited from France and Britain many
of the manifestations of nationalism,
even if the substance of nationhood
eluded them. They sought the same
status symbols and marks of respect
for themselves and for their nations
that their colonial masters had dis
played. The apparently compelling
need to show the colors was seen in
IIDitIIJ InIIw
WEST AfRICA
the outsize delegations to the United
Nations, the imposing new state build
ings, and the uneconomic national air
lines that soon appeared.
PerIls of
It is dilIlcult and expensive, at best,
to get a new government started, and
national pride can compound the prob
lem. Mauritania, for example, bad a
Directorate of Forests and Waters al
though it has no forests and only one
river: Upper Volta calls its only
quarter-mile of dual highway the
Champs Elysees: and Dahomey, with
a per capita annual income of 70 dol
lars, boasts a six million-dollsr presi
dential residence that is larger than
Buckingham Palace. Even so reso
lutely independent a nation as Mali
has gone each year to persuade some
country to fty its paratroops so that a
''mass'' drop illIn be the piece de reaM
a1lCe of the Army Day Parade.'
, When such pomp and strutting are
accompanied by blatant corruption, a
downhill economy, political disorder,
and deep ethnic and religious animosi
ties, parliamentary democracy's days
are numbered. It is not surprising
that the armies-which are the most
disciplined, honest, and, paradoxically,
most democratic elite in their nations
-were the group most disturbed by
the signs of corruption and failure.
Political leaders in the newly in
dependent states invariably painted a
bright future for the people and the
nation, and they were soon in trouble
when the better life did not material
ize. For most west Africans, inde
pendence came to mean prosperity
mainly for the politicians while their
own standard of living improved little,
if any, and, in some countries, actually
dropped. Developments in Ghana and
IImIUII/' 1881
Nigeria were typical of the economic
and political decay that took place
throughout much of west Africa.
The government of Gbana's Presi
dent Kwame Nkrumah, a popular
leader at the time of independence,
grew steadily more autocratic until it
became virtually a dictatorship. Nkru
mah built a personality cult that
rivaled that of Joseph Stalin, and
reveled in such titles as "The Re
deemer" and Majesty."
Free speech was suppressed, opposi
tion political psrties were eliminated,
and political opponents were confined
without trial.
Villi of BaabupfcJ
When the army took over, it found
1,100 political prisoners in jail. Cor
ruption was staggering. Tens of mil
lions of dollars went into the pocketa
of Ghana's Ministers. Six months
after the army's takeover, they were
still trying to estimate the total
amount that Nkrumah and his cohorts
took from their gaudy empire.' Men
who claimed to he democrats behaved
like emperors.
In addition to this individual self
enrichment, Nkrumah's regime dis
sipated an estimated 560 million dol
lars in foreign exchange on prestige
projects and unrealistic schemes such
as construction of a Palace of African
Unity, built for a one-week conference
at a cost of more than 10 million dol
dars. The nation's cocos crop was
bartered for Czech suede shoes, Chi
nese Communist canned goods, and
Soviet Volga cars while serious short
ages developed in such staples as ftour,
tea, cheese, and matches. By the end
of 1966, the country was on the verge
of bankruptcy.
In Nigeria, the situation just prior
to the coup was as bad, if not worse
LewU. ...,. cit.. p Ia.
31
When the army took over, it discov
ered that the. Finance Miniater had
expropriated an estimated 80 million
dollara in graft by such devieea aa
raiaing tariffs to protect his own
private shoo factory and doing the
same for others for a price. 'On the
politieal side. rigging of federal and
regional elections had become so
shameless that the voters, in effect,
were disenfranchised. This led even
tually to sucIi dissatisfaction that
materialized simply because one or
both armies were not able to get to
the point of dispute.
In addition, the officer corps were
traditionally apolitiesl and even the
senior military leaders were virtually
unknown outside army circles. It waa
the politicians, not the soldiers, who
had brought independence. No mili
tary leader in any west African state
esme close to matching the president
or party leaders in prestige or cha
\
ARMY S1REIISlII (1984r
lIIauritania .
Senegal .
lIIaIl . .
Guinea .
600
2,500
8,100
4,800
Sierra Leone 1,800
Ivory Coast 4,000
Upper Volta 1,000
Niger . 1,000
Dahomey
Togo .
Ghana
Nigeria
,
800
200
9,500
9,100
violence broke out following the Oc
tober 1965 general elections in which
an eatimated 200 people were killed!
In both Ghana and Nigeria, cor
ruption had reached gigantic propor
tions, constitutional government had
broken down, and a state of lawless
ness waa approaebing rapidly. The
armies watched with growing concern.
Despite the warning signs, almost
no one expected the army leaders to
move. There were good reasons for
this. In the first place, the armies, al
though well organized and eftieient by
regional standards, were small (see
chart) and poorly equipped. Because
of limited transport and a generallaek
of' interior roads, logisties posed an
especially perplexing problem. More
than once since independence, armed
clashea over border disputes have not
risma. In the move for independence,
it waa the politician who organized
society and disciplined its msmbers.
The military men, on the other hand,
usually were inactive or even played a
negative role because of their mem
bership in the colonial army.
The French tended to view the role
of the colonial army, aaide from its
security function, essentially aa a
means of giving the African soldier
the ehaJlce to assimilate French cul
ture. Although a few clearly outstand
ing young Afriesns were sent to
Saint-Cyr for training, the vast ma
jority of the natives were not per
mitted to rise above noncommissioned
officer rank. As a result, the majority
of the men who beesme senior officers
in the new states had not led a unit
larger than squad or platoon size, and
held to no particular politiesl ideology,
if they thought about polities at all.
The British followed a policy of
recruiting among the rural groups
32
WEST AFRICA
and, where possible, from groups with
a martial tradition. In Ghana and
Nigeria, for example, the enlisted per
sonnel were recruited mainly from the
northern, mostly illiterate Moslem
tribes. The officer trainees, on the
other hand, came primarily from the
southern, better educated, Christian
dominated communities.
A few promising young men,were
sent to the Royal Military Academy at
National pride led Mauritania to form a Directorate of
it has no forests and only one river
Sandhurst each year (Ghana had 47
Sandhurst graduates in its officer
corps in 1962), but most of the senior
officers in all four of the former Brit
ish colonies came from the noncom
missioned officer ranks of the colonial
army. At the time of independence in
1957, only 10 percent of Ghana's of
ficers were Ghanaians.'
The British, even more than the
FrllDcb, imbulld tbll African officer
corps with B spirit of political nonin
volvement. Even in Ghana and Nige
ria, which had by far the largest
armies in west Africa, the army lead
L. Vall Den Bershe. "The Role af the
Anny In CoutemporaD' Africa: AlrieG R8PO"t"t.

of Natal, South Africa.
Nlnmbar 1889
era were considered to be staunchly
apolitical rlght up to the eve of their
coups.
The majority of the west African
students who attended college before
independence studied liberal arts or
law, and this is still the case. The
result was an educated elite skilled in
political theory, but lacking in tech
nical or economic "know-how and to
tally ignorant and
its uses. Major General Henry T.
Alexander, the last British officer to
serve as Ghana's Chief of Defense
Staff, commented that no civilian of
ficial in Ghana, including President
Kwame Nkrumah, really understood
the difference between a company and
a division.
The gulf between civil and military
groupa in the ex-French colonies was
even Wider. 'l'hc Frcnch-1lducatcd lead
ers of tbe independence movements
had adsorbed an ideology that was ex
pressed largely in Marxist terms. As
students, they had found that it was
the leftist lP,'0ups in France that were
most sympathetic to African aspira
tions, and, therefore, were most ap
33
WEST AFRICA
pealing to the yowig Africans. They
found their. niches later in political
organizations, law oftIees, and labor
unions-almost never in the army.
It is not surprising that such men,
when they became the political leaders
of their nations not many years later,
viewed the army mainly as a "party
militia." Ghana's Nkrnmah sPOke for
the majority of west African politi
cians when he said: "The most im
portant role of our army is to 888ist
in the exec\ution of projects of na
tional development."
Mali's President Modibo Keita told
his army that its first job was to in
crease its work in political education.
Such views carried in them the seeds
of conftict. Assignments to village
well-digging or weed-chopping proj
ects or to political indoctrination cam
paigns were hardly more appealing to
the professional officers and men of
the armies of west Africa than they
would be to those of the US Army.
Armies Bqfn to Mov.
In what has been called "the winter
of coups," west Africa's armies, disil
lusioned and bitter, began to move. In
the classic domino pattern, four gov
ernments fell in rapid succession
from December 1966 to February
1966. One year later, a ftfth takeover
occurred, and, in March 1967, a sixth
regime yielded to military rule.
The first government to go was
Dahomey's. In December 1965, the
commander of the 8OO-man army, Gen
eral Christophe SOlllo, intervened to
end rampant political dissension. He
dissolved all political parties and took
personal control of the state. General
Soglo had led an earlier coup in 1963
and had Immediately turned control to
a coalition of politiCians, but bitter
factionalism had persisted.
Zartman. "". cit., p 188.
The following month, Upper Volta's
Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colo
nel Sangoule LamiMllS, seized power
following a long period of political
tension capped by three days of riots
in the capital. The deposed civilian
President said thet he welcomed the
coup and rejOiced at the results.
Also in January, the Nigerian Army
took over in the wake of months of
political and tribal violence that had
left mors than 1,000 people dead." In
an exception to the generallY bloodless
j
west African coups, Nigeria's Prime
Minister and two regional governors
were killed during the takeover.
In February, Ghana's government
was toppled by the army, and Nkru
mah fted into exile to Guinea.
In January 1967, Togo's Army
Chief, Colonel Etienne Eyadema, led a
coup and established a mixed, civilian
military National Committee of Rec
onciliation to run the country.
In March 1967, the army of Sierra
Leone, led by Sandhurst-trained Brig
adier Andrew T. Juxon-Smith, took
over. He cited the familiar charges of
corruption and mismanagement and
the need to unite the country.
Military Rale
"It is easy to seize power, difficult
to surrender it--snd perhaps most dif
ficult to use it effectively."
Once in power, west Africa's mili
tary leaders obviously faced the ques
tion of how to use it and for how long.
The first priority in each country
clearly was to establish order and in
sure internal security. Thereafter, the
general lines on which the new mili
tary governments conducted affairs
followed a similar pattern. All came
out for economy in public expendi
"_ Africa, F!oe. But lIMp In TroubJ....
u.s. N.., .t W ~ R-. It October lat6. p
100
Claude E. Welch. Jr.. "n-. A11thorIt3r In
west ~ ... " C_t BIItorw. _ 1966. p 15S.
WEST AFRICA
p
et 11'1.1""'_'" PAo","
Dahomey broke relations with Peking and reestabUshed relatlol1ll with Taiwan
tures, and exposed and publicized the
corruption of the politicians. They
placed civilian experts iii departments
requiring special knowledge such as
foreign affairs, and there was an im
mediate switch away from an attitude
sympathetic to the Communist bloc.
Dahomey broke relations with Pe
king and reestablished relations with
Nationalist China. Ghans called home
all its trainees in the USSR and East
ern Europe, began phasing out its
Soviet advisors, closed the Cuban
Embassy, and ousted the Chinese
Communist diplomatic mission. In
each state, a foreign policy position
of neutrality was reaflirmed, but with
an angling toward understanding with
the West. Political parties were
banned, and many politicians who had
been particularly corrupt were tried
and jailed.
The military leaders have not found
their task easy, and there have been
serious failures as well as successes.
The Nigerian civil war, touched off in
May 1967 when the military governor
of the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region
declared the area independent (Bia
fra), continues. Casualties from the
fighting and from starvation already
number in the hundreds of thousands.
Despite some initial Biafran suc
cesses, the Federal Nigerian Army
now controla all but a fraction of Bia
fra's territory, including its ClIpital
of Enugu. Barring the introduction of
mercenaries or other substantial out
side support for Biafra, the superior
strength of the federal armed forces
eventually should be decisive.
In Dahomey, rival factions soon de
veloped along tribal lines within the
army. In December 1967, the govern
ment, headed by General 8011'10, was
overthrown by a junta of younger of
WESlAFRICA
leers. .The cause wl'I' a
strike'by the country's civil servants
teachers to protest salary
by.the 808'10 regime as part
of an austeritY program to ease the
state's problems.
The major factor behind the coup,
however, was a growing split between
northern and southern factions in the
army. The six-man junta is dominated
by northern Widji-Widji officers; Gen
eral SoglOi is a Mon tribesman from
the south.lronically, Soglo had singled
out regionalism and tribalism as ma
jor faults of the politicians he had
removed from office.
April Mutiny
In Apri11968, Sierra Leone's junta
was overthrown in a mutiny led by
army noncommissioned officers who
called in two former officers to head a
new National Interim Council. The
council restored civilian rule in May,
and political maneuvering by the
country's two tribally based
parties began immediately. The army,
also split by tribal factions, reportedly
lacked elrective leadership as a result
.of the arreat or exile of many of its
senior officers following the April
mutiny. Continuing political and tribal
tensions and the undisciplined stste of
the army olrer the prospect of more
trouble ahead.
Ghana's military government ap
pears to be a suceess story. The ruling
junta headed by Lieutenant General
Joseph A. Ankrah has rescued the
country from the brink of bankruptcy
and virtual]y given the nation a new
start. Ankrah has cut government ex
penses sharply and reversed the huge
trade deficit that existed when he took
over.
Although most Ghanaians praise
Ankrah, many are chafing for a re
turn to parliamenury rule. Recogniz
ing this as a natural desire, Ankrah
has appealed for political restraint
during a period of intensive activity
preparatory to the return of civilian
rule. When political parties and elec
tions are allowed, Ankrah no doubt
will be a leading candidate for the
presidency.
Perhaps the most encouraging sign
in allot the countries which have had
a coup is this: In not one state has a
\ military regime shown a desire to es
tablish a permanent system of mili
tary government. Without exception,
the military rulers have used their
power to sanction the authority of
civil servants-sometimes with and
sometimes without the assistance of
selected politicians-to devise new
political institutions.
Prospective Coups
What are the prospects for further
coups in west Africa? It is highly
probable that more will occur-in
some states that already have had
them and in others that have not. In
Dahomey and Sierra Leone, for ex
ample, the original coup leaders al
ready have been ousted by rival
military factions. In many of the
states that have not experienced a '
military takeover, the symptoms of
tribalism, regionalism, corruption, p0
litical abuse, and economic decay exist
in the same pattern that prompted
military intervention in neighboring
states.
It has been ssid that Africa's strug
gle for independence only started with
the achievement of release from colo
nialism, and that Africans are only
now beginning to think deeply about
their societies and institutions. This
clearly applies to west Africa. As lead
ers of the new states, both civilian and
military, seek to find the makings of
a nation in their own cultures and
MllitIrJ Rnl
31

f
traditions, and to shape some of the
old values into modem ones, they no
doubt will make some profound mis
takes. This almost inevitably will be
reflected in new coups.
Experienced officials indicate that
no government in Africa can be re
garded as secure, and that it might
easily take 20 years before the Afri
can revolution has run its course and
a meB8ure of stability has been
achieved: No one can predict where
Africa will end up in terms of either
international alignments or the kinds
of governments that will emerge. In
the context of current realities in
west Africa, it is difficult to argue
with this assessment.
US Role
us civilian and military leaders
have had several encounters with the
tasks and costs inherent in trying to
assist faltering governments (the Do
minican Republic, Congo, Laos, the
Republic of Vietnam). In each case,
there were compelling reasons for US
involvement.
Does the situation in west Africa
portend similar involvement for the
United States, perhaps in the next
five years? Probably not, since the
problems that have caused, and will
continue to cause, instability and
strife in west Africa are internal do
mestic issues that relate to ethnic and
regional rivalries. shaky economies,
and a dearth of experienced, respon
sible leadership. No state is threaten
ing to invade its neighbor, and, despite
aggressive efforts by the USSR and
Communist China, they have failed so
far to gain a solid foothold in the area.
Despite the Socialist orientation of
most west African politicians and
large-scale aid to severalststea (Mali,
Guinea, and Ghana each has received
more than 100 million dollars in loans
WEST AFRICA
and grants from the USSR), Soviet
and Chinese Communist in1luence and
prestige have declined since 1961. At
tempts at subversion such as resulted
in Guinea expelling the Soviet Am
bassador in 1961 for involvement in
a plot to overthrow the government,
a poor record of deliveries coupled
with the shabby quality of Soviet
goods, and Chou En-lsi's often quoted
observation in 1964 that "Africa is
ripe for revolution:' in the words of
a Ghanian official have given Africans
an inoculation against communism.
forelp Influence
British and French ties with their
former west African colonies, although
subject to periodic strains, continue
to be by far the strongest foreign in
tluence. The senior west African mili
tary officers, most with extensive serv
ice in the colonial armies, have re
tained the habits and many of the
personal friendships developed during
these years. Promising young men
still go to Sandhurst, Saint-Cyr, and
other militsry schools in Britain and
France.
Barring development of a threat
ened Communist takeover in one of
the states. which now seems an im
probable eventuality, it is unlikely
that a US military presence in west
Africa will be required or desirable.
This would not exclude limited quan
tities of military equipment such as
trucks or radios which might require
transient delivery and training teams,
and obviously it does not exclude eco
nomic aid which is desirable. There
clearly is a growing US interest in
west African affairs, and this is
matched by the west Africans' aware
ness of this interest.
US press coverage of the Nigerian
civil war, for example, has been ex
tensive, and both sides have employed
37
WEST .AFRICA
public relations firms to promote their
clailDS in US news media. Despite this
heightened interest and the sympathy
evoked by accounts of the plight of
innocent victims of the Nigerian fight
ing, US opinion-both public and of
ficial-clearly f.vors a hands-olt pol
icy. '
In the period .>of social and political
evolution that lies ahead in west Af
rica, other major internal upheavals
are bound to occur, and the armies
will be directIy involved. These will
be internsl altairs. If an outside mili
tary presence in any form-combat
units, support units, or advisors-is
needed or invited by the west African
states, it should be British or French,
or provided by a group of other Afri
can states or by the United Nations.
This is no place for US military in
volvement.
We have attempted to discourage arms buildups iu Afriea beyoud the
needs of internal seeurity and legitimate self-defense. With very limited
economic resources, most Afriean countries wouid prefer to concentrate these
resources on economic and social development, rather than on expensive and
nonproductive weapenry.
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer 11
(African Altairs)
MII/IIIJ RnI..
38
A . l l t % ) ~
FromOrbia
Defense Strategy
General Nino Pastl, ItalifUl Air Foree
I
N GENERAL, the potential uses of nuclear weapons are not;;,
clearly understood, and there is a tendency. especially among
military leaders, to place too much reliance on them. If aggreasion
by the conventional forces of an enemy cannot be halted by con
ventional means only, many strategists contend that a considerable
employment of tactical nuclear weapons will change the unfavorable
balance of forces on the battlefield and give victory to the defensive
side. In this way, it has been suggested, nuclear weapons can solve
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's defensive problems. I have
doubts about this line of thought. From it, a Maginot Line-type
psychology may develop.
Although nuclear weapons are usually separated into strategic
and tactical classifications, this division is far from clear and
convincing. What may be tactical for Canada and Portugal may be
strategic for nations bordering the Iron Curtain.
Even when tactical nuclear weapons are aimed solely at military
objectives inside the satellite nations, and even when considerable
restraint is adopted, intensive use of such weapons could cause
serious Injury to the civilian population, with all the inherent
political repercussions. If the enemy employs the same kind and
number of weapons in retaliation against NATO lands, the losses in
Europe would be so great as to be unacceptable and incompatible with
N.vellll., 1881
NATO'S DEFENSE STRATEGY
any real defense. Europe is too densely
populated for a substantial exchange
of nuclear weapons not to be disas
trous.
Weapon ClassIfication
A better method is to classify nu
clear weapons according to their in
tended use: against the Soviet Union;
weapons against the eatellites; and
battlefield weapons. Weapons against
the Soviet, Union are those targeted
against Soviet territory. What is really
important 'in the case of weapons
against the satellites is the location of
their targets rather than their range.
Battlefield nuclear weapons are em
ployed to a shallow depth in the battle
field zone (from zero to 20 or 30
miles). They would be used against
enemy forces which have actually in
vaded NATO territory.
For the first time in history, of
fensive weapons of unprecedented de
structive power, capable of wiping out
mankind in an extremely short period
of time, have been created. They can
be employed within a few minutes
since they do not require a long and
This article WCUI ctmdensed
from tlu original which a'JYP6(1l7'ed
in ORDIS, No.1 Spring 1969, pub
Zished by tlu Foreign Policy Re
search I1/.8titute of the UniverBity
of Pennsylvania. CO'p/Jright
1969 by the Trustees of the Uni
llersity of Pen1/.81fl'Vfl.1/.ia.
Gooeral PCUlti WCUI formerly
Deputy for Nuclear Affairs for
the Supreme AUied Corm1Ullluler,
Europe, at Supreme Headqua.r
ters, AUied Powers, Europe, dur
ing 1967-68. He WCUI the Italian
Representatille to the NATO Mil
itary Committee in WCUlhington
from, 1968 to 1966, and, during
1958-59, he WCUI Vice Chief of
Staff of tlu Italian Air Force.
costly process of mobilization. There
is no practicable defense against such
weapons
Because of this totally new situa
tion, man has rediscovered an old
truth: There are two fundamental ele
menta necessary to wage a war
namely, armed forces and the will to
fight. When it becomes impossible-
that is, too dangerous-to deal effec
tively with the enemy's armed forces,
we must operate against his will to
fight. This is what is normally called
the deterrent. The deterrent is psy
chological pressure on the enemy's will
for the purpose of convincing him that
war would be disastrous for both sides.
Second-Strike Capabilities
Second-strike capability is the basic
component of deterrence. Today, the
United States and the Soviet Union
have second-strike capabilities suffi
cient to destroy one another, even if
one or the other launches a surprise
nuclear attack. The deterrent is basi
cally a "political" means of avoiding
war; it is not a military weapon be
cause, if employed, it would cause the
destruction of both sides, rendering
any "victory" meaningless. In order to
perform its preventive function, the
deterrent must be credible. It is not
sufficient that it is real and strong;
the potential enemy must believe it to
be real and strong.
Credibility is of two kinds: political
and military. To be politically credible,
a deterrent must be effective' against
major' aggression only. Since actual,
employment of the deterrent is equiv
alent to mutual suicide, such extreme
action would be unjustified and thus
unbelievable in response to a minor
aggression when vital interests are
not at stake.
This point, so simple in its philo
sophical essence, causes serious prob-
Military ReYlew
48
AirV.i-.,_
A GenDu crew prepares a Penhlag mill
aile for firing. Both the United States
and West German armed forces have
these wespons available for NATO use.
The, can deliver nuclear warheads to'
targeta 480 miles distant.
lems within the alliance. NATO has
no agreed yardstick for measuring
aggression, for determining when it is
major or minor or when it changes
from minor to major. To put it more
simply, we do not know when the
United States and the Soviet Union
may judge that aggression in Europe
"...lIIIer 1888
NATO'S DEFENSE STRA1E8Y
is major. Therefore, it is legitimate
for European countries to question
whether the United States would be
ready to employ its strategic nuclear
weapons for the defense of Europe,
thus taking the risk of being de
stroyed, in turn, by Soviet retsliation.
US Commitment
There is no direct anewer to this
question. However, the Soviet Union
has so far earefully avoided any pro
vocative action in Europe which might
have produced a direct military con
frontation, even when NATO conven
tiOnal forces were weaker than the
Warsaw Pact forces. This is a clear
indication that the Soviet Union has
taken seriously the US commitment
to defend Europe with all necessary
means.
On the other hand, Europeane have
no alternative but to rely on the
United States. For financial reasone,
it is impossible for each European na
tion to produce its own deterrent. A
common deterrent, financed by all Eu
ropean nations-one that might be
within their present financial capa
bilities-would not be credible be
cause the decision to employ it would
require agreement by all participating
natione.
This leads to another ingredient of
political credibility: the deterrent
must be under the direct control of
a single political authority. At the
time of decision, the general situation
would be so serious that no time for
protracted discussions or agreement
would be available. If the deterrent
could not be employed within minutes
of the outbreak of major aggression,
its effectiveness would be dubious, and
its preventive potential lost. In the
present state of BaIkanization in Eu
rope, an internationally controlled de
terrent would be highly ineffective.
41
NATO'S DEFENSE STRATRY
To be militarily credible, the deter
rent must be effective whatever the
enemy's course of action. This means
a second-strike ilIlpability. To obtain a
second-strike capability, the following
ingredients, among others, are essen
tial:
A large quantity of nuclear war
heads.
A considerable number of de
livery systems, diversified (ground
based and sea-based missiles, air-based
weapons, and aireraft), prl)tected, dis
persed, mobile, ready to be launched
on a moment's notice.
A number of satellites to locate
enemy targets.
A highly accurate detection net
to provide immediate information
about ellemy employment of nuclear
weapons.
A reliable communications net to
collect and centralize all necessary in
formation at the decision level, and to
transmit orders promptly to the exe
cuting units.
A nuclear organizational struc
ture and forces constantly at peak
readiness in order to react within min
utes in any emergency.
The best possible defense against
enemy strategic weapons.
It is equally important that each
component of the nuclear second-strike
force be constantly improved to kecp
pace with a quickly developing tech
nology.
While it is difficult to estimate the
total cost of a deterrent, there is no
doubt that it is far more expensive
than any European nation can afford
at present. Of course, both the political
and military limitations of a European
deterrent would disappear if Europe
were united as a . single political en
tity. Until such time, an alliance be
tween the European nations and the
United States is essential for the de
fense of Europe.
The basic difference between nuclear
weapons against the Soviet Union and
satellite and battlefield nuclear weap
ons is that, while the former are em
ployed against targets located within
Soviet territory, the latter are em
ployed against targets outside the
USSR. This is a crucial distinction
because the use of nuclear weapons
against the Soviet Union would almost
inevitably trigger the employment of
the deterrent by hoth sides. The em
ployment of satellite or battlefield nu
clear weapons would not necessarily
produce the same result. Thus, while
nuclear weapons against the USSR
must not be used except as a last re
sort, other nuclear weapons may be
used if and when necessary in order
to defend Europe; their use might not
be incompatible with the defensive
aim.
Two Conditions
The two basic questions that a
NATO nuclear doctrine must answer
are the following: When must nuclear
weapons be used? How should they be
used?
If the enemy is the first to employ
nuclear weapons, NATO must immedi
ately employ its own nuclear weapons
in accordance with the doctrine pro
posed later in this article. But this
event seems extremely improbable. If
the enemy has not used nuclear weap
ons, NATO must still use them when
the following two conditions exist
simultaneously: the enemy aggression
threstens the political integrity of one
or more NATO nations, and no other
conventional forces are available in
time to counter enemy aggression.
These are the two conditions which
justify, and make credible, the initial
MllitIIJ .nI.. 42
NATO'S DEfEIIS SlRAlEBY
NATO armor is proteeted from low-altitude air attaek daring maneuvers hy HAWK
air defense missiles
employment of nuclear weapons. It is
essential not only that the two condi
tions exist, but that public opinion
inside and outside NATO be fully in
formed and prepared for this eventu
ality.
There must be effective political
preparation. We must be able to prove
that what we did was right, the issue
was vital, and we had no other means
to defend ourselves. We must remem
ber that it is not easy to estsblish
who is .the aggressor and who is the
defender. In spite of the fact that
NATO will never initiate aggression,
enemy propaganda will do its best to
convince world public opinion of the
contrary.
We must also keep in mind the
likely reaction of world opinion against
the side which first uses nuclear weap
ons. Either we would have to succeed
in convincing world opinion that their
use was absoluteJy essential and that
we had no other means of halting the
aggression, or we would risk losing at
the conference table what we might
have gained on the battlefield.
It is not possible in peacetime to
determine at what point enemy ag
gression threatens the political integ
rity of one or more NATO nations.
This will depend on the political situa
tion existing when the aggression ac
tually takes place and on the sensi
tivity of the theater where the aggres
sion occurs.
What is essential is that NATO
must clearly state the principle that
it is fully prepared to use all necessary
weapons, including nuclear weapons,
in order to prevent the political col
lapse of one or more NATO nations
through armed aggression. The politi
cal authorities of the nation concerned
are in the best position to judge when
nuclear weapons must be used in their
territory; hence, their agreement is
mandatory before any nuclear weap
ons are used for its defense. Of course,
the agreement of the nation that owns
the nuclear warheads is also manda
tory.
Finally, time is a vital element. Be
cause requests are justified only when
the military situation is acute, any
N."lIber 1888
1IA1O'S'DEFEIISE S1RA1EaY
delay in,the employment of nuclear
w,.P9na 1hl&ht have smolls unfavor
In order to shorten
$f fltner Jrood', cOmmunications are
nell!fed':for a ;r!'pid exehange of mes
infohDation, and the NATO
Council mlUlt be conStantly informed
oLtha JJUlitary sitllation so that it will
to resPond to a request to
emplO)f'nuc1ear weapons.
When and if all the available con
venti.l resources; both NATO's and
th, nation's, h{Lve been employed with
out.success in stopping the enemy's
8ggi-ession, . and ita penetration has
compromised the political stability of
one or more NATO nations, the em
ployment of nuclear weapons is essen
tial.
EDem, Options
Options 'open to the enemy after
NATO starts to employ nuclear weap
ons, as well as subsequent NATO reac
tions, must be taken into consideration
in order to reach the best possible bal
ance between advantages and disad
vantages. The enemy's options are: to
stop fighting, go on fighting conven
tionall1, retaliate with the same kind
and number of nuclear weapons as
employed by NATO, or escalate to the
employment of nuclear capabilities.
Let us assume that the enemy em
ploys the same kind and number of
nuclear weapons employed by NATO.
This is the most likel1 move following
NATO's employment of battlefield nu
clear weapons, provided the enemy is
determined to go on fighting. The
power of the nuclear fire makes it im
possible for the enemy to continue
using only conventional weapons while
NATO employs nuclear ones.
After the first few battlefield nu
clear weapons were used by NATO, the
enemy would be compelled to change
his postllre from conventional to nu
clear and replace the units destroyed
or disorganized by the nuclear fire.
This might slow down or stop his ad
vance for some time.
The most positive aspect of the first
employment of battlefield nuclear
weapons would be the delay imposed
on enemy ground operations. But this
delay would not last long, and the
enemy, by employing nuclear weapons,
in tIIm, would again exert pressure
on NATO forces greater than they
would be able to withstand. Nuclear
weapons employed by both sides would
wreak comparable destruction upon
both sides, and would not alter the
imbalance of conventional forces
which favors the enemy.
Deeper Interdiction
Almost inevitably, NATO would be
compelled to use nuclear weapons for
deeper and deeper interdiction in or
der to prevent the arrival of enemy
forces on the battlefield. The enemy
would foIlow suit and again any mo
mentary advantage would be lost by
NATO. After a limited period of time,
NATO might have exhausted its avail
able ground units. The enemy, having
a greater number of units, might still
be able to support the ground battle
and be in a stronger position than be
fore.
More simply stated, the employment
of equal nuclear firepower by both
sides would not change the balance of
conventional forces except at the be
ginning when an advantage could be
gained by the side which first em
ployed it, and at the end when an ad
vantage would be gained by the side
which had more ground units avail
able.
The Soviet Army is particularly well
trained, equipped, and organized for
nuclear warfare and may be in a
better condition to wage such a war
MIlItarJ RnI
NATO'S DEfEIISE STRATEGY
than the NATO forces. Politically, the
use of a considerable number of nu
clear weapons in Europe, particularly
when they are employed for deep in
terdiction, would produce unacceptable
destruction. Furthermore, because
battlefield nuclear weapons would not
be employed inside Soviet territory,
they would have a limited deterrent
effect, if any. on the Soviet will to
halt aggression. Hence, this is not the
way to employ NATO's tactical nu
clear weapons.
The first use of a few battlefield nu
clear weapons may be in NATO's im
mediate interest, but, if the enemy
responds in kind, we must not do more
of the same. NATO must try to find a
solution for the.. defensiye problem.
This means a new step in deliberate
escalation. A few "warning nuclear
weapons" must be employed within the
satellite countries which have sup
ported or requested the enemy's ag
gression. The aim of these weapons
is not so much to destroy or delay the
enemy forces as to show our determi
nation and our political cohesion. In
other words, NATO must convince the
satellite countries and the Soviet Un
ion that we are prepared to run to
gether all the necessary risks for col
lective Atlantic defense.
To add credibility to the deterrent
effect of exploding a few nuclear weap
ons inside the satellite countries,
NATO must have a general nuclear
plan directed against the satellite
amt .er_ at training site. The Soviets have not provided the
Warsaw Pact countries with missiles having a uuclear capability.
Ntnldler 1818 4S
NATO'S DEfENSE STRATEGY
countries with a credible secondstrike
capability and a fun range of targets
-military, industrial, and' urban
similar to the US nuclear plan against
the Soviet Union. Knowing that NA
TO has the means to destroy them,
the satallita governments might exert
stronger pressure against the Soviet
Union to halt the war.
"Warning nuclear weapons" might
be detonated at sea near the enemy
cosst or high in the sky, avoiding dam
age to the enemy; or they might be
used against isolated military targets
in order to destroy the target while
avoiding casualties among the civilian
population; or they might be employed
against isolated industrial installa
tions, avoiding major urban centers.
The choice of targets must he made
according to the political situation ex
isting at the time of the aggression.
This employment requires detailed
political preparation to stress NATO's
determination and political cohesion,
and to prevent its being construed 88
the beginning of a general nuclear
war. If the enemy responds in kind,
NATO should not use additional
"warning" weapons for the reasons al
ready stated-destruction of Europe
and limited or no deterrent effect on
the Soviet Union. Rather, NATO
would have to take another step in
escalation by shooting one or two
"warning nuclear weapons" inside So
viet territory, even though this would
be a most dangerous step toward gen
eral nuclear war.
Short Steps of Escalation
In sum, battlefield nuclear weapons
and satellite nuclear weapons must be
employed, if and when necessary, to
demonstrate clearly our firm determi
nation to accept every necessary risk
in order to defend NATO. But their
use must indicate short steps of escala
tion between conventional and general
nuclear war.
If the steps are not credibly shown
to be sufficiently short, the Soviets may
ucalate, in their turn, by using such
weapons extensively in Europe-a de
velopment that is not acceptable to the
Wut European nations. It should be
clearly realized that the deterrent
value of "battlefield" and "satellite"
nuclear weapons is small against the
Soviet Union, but they can be effective
against the satellites.
Number, mix, delivery means, and
targets for such weapons must be
chosen so that they constitute a vital
component of the forces we need for
defense. But too many of these weap.
, ons are deployed today in Europe. In
such large numbers, they may give the
impreasion, on both sidu, that we
would employ large quantities of them
before going on to the next step-the
employment of nuclear weapons on
Soviet territory. This is in no way a
deterrent for the Soviets who might
NO"", .nI..
48
believe they have sufficient time, while
Europe is being devastated, to halt the
aggression before suffering any direct
punishment.
An examination of Warsaw Pact
forces and doctrine yields the follow
ing conclusions: On the military side,
the Warsaw Pact force posture is a
clearly defensive one based on deter
rence. On the political side, it is an
aggressive posture designed to influ
ence the will and cohesion of the
NATO nations. The Warsaw Pact
strategy is designed to enable the
Communists to gain political advan
tages without fighting a war.
Soviet Navy
Similarly, the increasing emphasis
the Soviets are placing on their navy
points in the same direction. The navy
adds considerably to their deterrence,
but, because they have no effective
air component to support the tleet, and
because they are still unable to influ
ence conventional ground battles by
delivering expeditionary forces at any
substantial distance from home bases,
the offensive conventional capabilities
of the growing Soviet Navy remain
limited. Politically, however, the So
viets will be able to show their tlag
in all oceans and be in a better posi
tion to counter more effectively the
influence of the US Navy.
The central front is a highly sensi
tive sector because of its political and
military importance, the division of
Germany, and the peculiar situation
of Berlin.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia has
not materially changed the balance. In
spite of the fact that the Warsaw
Pact forces directly facing NATO in
central Europe have increased their
over-all strength, and that their cen
ter of gravity has moved nearer to the
Iron Curtain, I do not believe the gain
.IIudler 1.
NATO'S DEFENSE STRAKGY
in military forces has balanced the
loss in political cohesion. The 14
Czechoslovakian divisions that were
fully reliable before the August 1968
invasion can no longer be counted on
in case the USSR decides to launch an
aggression against NATO. In addi
tion, the Czechoslovakian population
has stubbornly resisted Soviet political
pressure.
Emp',rment of Air Forces
In case of a surprise attack, the
defense would have to stop or delay
the enemy advance for a sufficient pe
riod of time to reinforce the threat
ened sector. Frontline NATO forces
would be able to deny success to the
enemy provided there is time for their
redeployment. The immediate massive
employment of superior NATO air
forces should help to gain the neces
sary time, and no employment of nu
clear weapons should be necessary.
If the enemy decided to reinforce his
ground units before attacking, NATO
would have to utilize the warning
period to reinforce its defensive
forces. The immediate massive em
ployment of all available air forces
would be essential in order to give
NATO the longest possible time for
mobilization, reinforcement, and rede
ployment before the use of nuclear
weapons became essential.
If the Soviet Union is able to deploy
a large number of divisions and their
necessary logistic support in central
Europe, then NATO's prospects for
stopping the aggression with conven
tional forces decrease. The length of
time NATO would be able to contain
aggression without employing nuclear
weapons would depend upon the num
ber of Warsaw Pact divisions deployed
and the amount of warning time given
by the Soviets' preparation.
NATO tlanks seem to be weaker
47
than <the center vis-a-vis the Warsaw
However, on the fianks,
Soviet forces would be directly in
volved at the beginning of any ag
and thus it seems highly
improbllble that Moscow would initiate
any direct confrontation with NATO.
The following measures seem to be
any conventional enemy aggression
must be planned, prepared, and fought
in the spirit that it is the best way to
defend Europe, and not in the belief
that it is a preliminary phase before
an inevitable nuclear engagement
takes place. However, if and when,
for any reason, conventional forces
A British Barrier tactical fighter In a vertical takeoli'. The author asserts that em
phasis for NATO air forees should be on ground support rather than air defense.
best ways to prevent or halt aggres
sion on the ftanks:
Prompt deployment in the threat
ened region of NATO units of differ
ent nationalities, including Americans,
in order .to demonstrate that aggres
sion in any part of Europe is aggres
sion against NATO as a whole.
. Immediate massive employment
of air forces.
Reinforcement by sea.
A clear statement that no mili
tary fait will be accepted by
NATO.
NATO's conventional reaction to
cannot stop the enemy's aggression,
and the political existence of one or
more NATO nations is threatened,
then the use of nuclear weapons would
be mandatory. NATO must leave no
room for doubt or misunderstanding
on this point.
NATO's ability to stop indefinitely
a surprise attack or a large-scale at
tack without employing nuclear weap
ons depends, to a large extent, on its
ability to exploit its air superiority
against_enemy armor during the first
hours of the aggression.
AU fighter bombers and, if neces-
MIlItarJ Rnllw
sary, all fighter aircraft must be im
mediately employed to destroy the
enemy's armored forces on the battle
field, while all light, medium, and
heavy bombers must be immediately
employed in a close interdiction role.
The availability of even a few B-6!'8
or similar heavy bombers would add
greatly to the defense of NATO. The
psychological and military impact of
their commitment would be important,
particularly if they were used to rein
force the fisnks.
Air Superiority
Too much importance has been at
tached to the battle for air supremacy.
When employing conventional weapons
and when massive air raids are not
possible on either side (because of the
high wlnerability of the attackers to
surface-to-air missile defenses, and be
cause there are not sufficient aircraft
available to support the necessary
number of raids), the battle for air
superiority is a long and uncertain
job. If NATO air forces are employed
to fight air superiority battles, we may
lose the ground battle before we gain
control of the air.
The Middle East war is highly mis
leading if we try to apply its lesson to
Europe. First, the two contenders had
no nuclear weapons. Second, they were
not directly supported by nations with
a substantial capability to increase
their air forces. Finally, the geo
graphical area was limited compared
with that of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. Thus, to apply the experience of
the Middle East war to any possible
European war would be dangerous.
Measures such as aircraft redeploy
ment and on-base dispilrsal, protection
on the ground, camoufiage, and a com
bination of high and low surface-to-air
and gun defenses would be sufficient
to prevent unacceptable losses to
NATO'S DEFEIISl STRAtEGY
NATO air forces. The defense of
ground units must be assured by
means other than aircraft-for ex
ample, guns, rockets, and missiles.
Against low_altitude enemy raids, the
effectiveness of air defense carried out
by interceptors is limited.
In any case, the highest priority
mission to be assigned to NATO air
forces is the stabilization of, the
ground battle. Only -after this mission
bas been accomplished should an air
superiority battle be envisaged, de
pending on the political and military
situation prevailing at the time.
DelIYa" Means
The emphasis placed on aircraft
as a means of delivery for nuclear
weapons dates from the years 1954-55
when intercontinental ballistic mis
siles were not yet in existence and air
craft were the only delivery means
available. Because of the great lead of
the United States over the Soviet
Union, both in air offense and air de
fense, it was believed that the United
States had nuclear superiority and'
would be able to maintain this in
definitely. The "massive retaliation"
strategy had at tbat time a crushing
deterrent effect. This explains the pri
ority assigned to air offense, defense,
superiority, and survivability.
Today, the basic delivery means for
nuclear weapons are missiles, and the
great majority of these are bardened
or have mobile launchers so tbat they
are far more survivable to a surprise
attack than aircraft. ,By keeping air
craft on the ground in Europe waiting
for their nuclear employment, NATO
risks having them destroyed before
they have a chance of being used, and,
in the meantime, they will not be ful
filling their vital role during the con
ventional phase of an aggression.
One point of particular importance
NATO'S DEFENSE STRATE"
,
is the possibility that the enemy may
achieve a quick limited sueeess and
force NATO to accept a fa.it a.ccompli.
The possibility of a 1a4t a.ccompli de
pends on NATO as much as on the
other side. If NATO chooses not to
accept it but to fight back against the
aggression as long as necessary to
restore the integrity of its territory,
there will be no fa4t accompli.
In other words, if NATO maintains
its political &lid military solidarity
and makes it clear that it will never
join in diplODiatic discussionli\ before
the integrity of NATO territory is re
stored, no fa4t a.ccompli is possible.
The enemy will be convinced that he
can gain no success through a limited
surprise attack, and NATO public
opinion wi1llmow that the alliance has
both the will and the means to defend
itself effectively, north, center, or
south.
We have not yet reached a clear
understanding of the escalation psy
chology. To be effective, eScalation, in
the political field, as well as in the
conventional and nuclear military
fields, must produce at least one of the
two following results: the opposite
side is unable to match the escalation,
and for this reason ends by losing the
contest; or the opposite side lacks the
strength to survive the damage
wrought by escalation. If neither of
these results occurs, escalation will
produce only a higher level of tension
or destruction with no advantage to
either side.
The advent of the nuclear age and
the large number of independent na
tions have given a new dimension to
the psychological-political aspect of
escalation. In this context, certain
measures are needed for the defense
of NATO territory. These must aim at
achieving the following results.:
Demonstrate that NATO has the
will and the means to defend its terri
tory against any aggression, minor or
major, in any theater, north, center,
or south, and that it will never accept
a fait a.ccompli even of limited scope.
Make credible the employment of
nuclear weapons, if and when neces
sary, in such a way as to minimize the
danger for the NATO countries and
maximize it for the Warsaw Pact
countries.
Produce these results without
any substantial numerical increase in
conventional forces, and with a possi
ble decrease in the battlefteld.and sat
ellite nuclear weapons deployed in
Europe, thus keeping the way open for
detente with the Warsaw Pact coun
tries.
Effectively counter Soviet politi
cal pressure by giving public opinion
in the West a credible assurance of the
NATO capability to defend alliance
territory with the resources currently
available. Such a defense, which is im
possible without NATO, must not be
an obstacle to detente, but it must
discourage the Soviets from stsrting
any minor aggression intended to be a
probe against NATO's solidarity and
determination.
M1I1tarJRnI..
10
(oeraon and Fear
in the Soviet Armed Forces
Vyaeheslav p. Artellliev
I
N THE Soviet Union, there are two major supports for
the Communist regime and the entire System of coercion
and fear. The lIrst of these is the army, including the in
ternal troops of the Ministry of the Defense of Public Order
and the troops of the Committee of State Security. The sec
ond is the system of police investigation and control, in the
form of organs of state security and militia (police), whose
prtinary function is not justice, but, rather, the defense of
state interests. These are the means for insuring absolute
obedience.
In considering the system of coercion existing throughout
......... 1..
11
SOVIET ARMED FORCES
the Soviet state, one may examine
separately the special methods utilized
in the Soviet armed forces. It must be
kept in mind that the functions of the
military forces and the conditions of
military service differ substantially
from all other governmental agencies
and activities within the Soviet Union.
The armed forces are a particularly
complicated and powerful part of the
state system. They have, during recent
years, taken on political
significance.
Political Control
The revolution in the mUitary art,
which has taken place with the ap
pearance of nuclear missiles and the
equipping of the armed forces with
complicated new equipment, has
brought many changes in the army.
But despite basic changes in organiza
tion, the system of command and con
trol, and metliods of conducting mili
tary operations, training, and political
control, the most significant problem
remains the discipline and political
reliability of the soldier.
For the Communist regime, the
army can be an effective support for
the maintenance of power and the
achievement of goals, but it can also
present a danger in case there is a loss
of political control and a weakening of
leadership. The armed forces are a
Vf/ache8la'll P. Arlemiel1 is G former
officer in the Soriet Armf/ lind G
gra,d,v4te of the'SotJiet WGr coUege
(Frutlle MilitGrr At:ademy). He is DC
i"!reseGrch of the SotJiet II1/S
tem lind Ms written eztenril1elf/ on
the S011iet arme4 forcss. He is the au
thor of "Officer Courts of Honor in
the Soriet Arme4 Forcss" which Gpo
fJ6IImJ" the N011ember 1'968 isBUe of
the MILl't.uy REVIEW. This article
WII6 trenslate4 from the R'UBMn by
Ricluml P. Olayberg.
special organization, particularly in
the Soviet Union. In the military serv
ice, the slightest negligence, omission,
or inability to organize-the most in
significant, at first sight, errors in or
ganization and execution--ean lead to ,
catastrophic results. The gravity of
these has no equal among similar ac
tivities in other branches of govern
ment service.
The interests of the regime, the
specific characteristics of the life snd
activities of armed men, and their
military and political direction demand
exceptionally,strict political and super
visory contrbl and responsibility for
violations 9f diSCipline. The system of
political control, military law and
order, and the military criminal code
are, indeed, distinguished by their ex
ceptional severity and even ruthless
ness.
Strict Laws
The Western mind is struck by the
harsh nature of Soviet criminal law
currently in force. However, these
laws arose from necessity. They can
be explained only by the political
distrust which the regime feels toward
its armed forces. This forces the party
and government to estahlish and main
tain within the armed forces a system
of political control on a scale unknown
and impossible within the armies of
the West.
Soviet military law states that the
use of persuasion in military discipline
does not exclude the necessity for use
of coercion. The Disciplinary Code of
the armed forces further states: "The
command of a superior is law to the
subordinate." The MilitGry Criminal
Code makes failure to obey an order
a criminal offense for which a person
may be imprisoned from one to 10
yesrs. In time of war, he may be
given capital punishment.
Milltarr Rni..
52
v. I. Lenin said that strict discipline
was necessary in the army and that,
to rule, one must not waver, but must
be harder and stricter than the Capi
talists. The present Disciplinarg Code
of the armed forces of the USSR
obliges every commander ''to take all
means of coercion up to the use of
weapons in case of disobedience by
subordinates for the reestablishment
of order and discipline." The use of
weapons by a commander to obtain
obedience from his subordinates is
legal not only in wartime, but also dur
ing peace. The regulations emphasize
that this is not only the right of the
commander-it is his duty.
BasIc Elem,ents
In general, the system of coercion
and political control in the Soviet
armed forces is composed of five basic
elements, each having its special forms
and methods:
Disciplinary measures which are
the exclusive right of the commander.
Measures which the party and
Comsomol can take.
Social means which are used for
the strict differentiation of service
personnel by duty and rank.
Judicial measures which are car
ried out by the military procurator's
office and military tribunals with their
organa of observation and investiga
tion.
Operational Chekist measures
which are taken by the military organs
of the Committee of State Security
and the Counterintelligence Sections.
These are also known as Special Sec
tions which organize widespread nets
of secret informers-the seksoty-in
all troop units and military institu
tions.
Thus, every serviceman-be he sol
dier, sergeant, officer, or general
finds himself completely surrounded
NtVlllller 1888
SOYEr ARMa FORCES
by a tight circle of control, both covert
and open, by the most varied means of
persuasion and coercion, including
physical violence. Even Marshals of
the Soviet Union, honored before party
and government, externally haughty
and unapproachable, feel the constant
presence of this five-sided press.
Such a system stiftes initiative and
originality. It leads, of course, to mas
sive obedience, but, in case of a seri
ous crisis-military or political-such
blind obedience is fraught with the
danger of such catastrophes as the Red
Army suffered at the beginning of the
German invasion during World War
II.
The entire system of coercion is held
together, controlled, and directed by
the military section of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) through the
Chief Political Directorate of the So
viet Army and Navy. In units of divi
sion level or higher, organs of this
53
SOVIET ARMED
the Soviet statJ one may examine
separately the special methods utilized
in the Soviet armed forces. It must be
kept in mind that the functions of the
military forces and the conditions of
military service differ substantially
from all other governmental agencies
and activities within the Soviet Union.
The armed ;forces are a particularly
complicated and powerful part of the
state system. They have. during recent
years, taken on unprecedented political
significance.
Political CDIItroI
The rel'olution in the military art.
which has taken place with the ap
pearance of nuclear "missiles and the
equipping of the armed forces with
complicated new equipment. has
brought many changes in" the army.
But despite basic changes in organiza
tion. the system of command and con
trol, and methods of conducting mili
tary operations. training, and political
control, the most significant problem
remains the discipline and political
reliability of the soldier.
For the Communist regime. the
army can be an effective support for
the maintenance of power and the
achievement of goals. but it can also
present a danger in case there is a loss
of political control and a weakening of
leadership. The armed forces are a
Vvaches14l1 P. Artemiell is G former
offictlt' in the S01liet Arm!g and a
gra.dtu1.te of the"SoviBt War CoUege
(F'fUnle Militllt"t/ Academtg). He is oc
cupied. m.reeeGrch of the SoviBt 8'/18
tem and. Me written ezte1l8i1lely on
the Soviet lJf'11Ied. forces. He is the au
thor 01 "Officer Courts of Honor in
the S01Iiet Armed. Forces" which ap
November 1"868 issue of
the l\llLl'l'ny REVIEW. This article
was tf'flIM14ted. frum the Russian by
RickMd. P. Cl4vberl!.
special organization. particularly in
the Soviet Union. In the military serv
ice, the slightest negligence, omission,
or inability to organize-the most in
significant, at first sight, errors in or
ganization and execution-can lesd to
catastrophic results. The gravity of
these has no equal among similar ac
tivities in other branches of govern
ment service.
The interests of the regime, the
specific characteristics of the life and
activities of armed men, and their
military and political direction demand
exceptionally,strict political and super
visory control and responsibility for
violations pf discipline." The system of
political control, military law and
order, and the military criminal code
are, indeed, distinguished by their ex
ceptional severity and even ruthless
ness.
Strict Laws
The Western mind is struck by the
harsh nature of Soviet criminal law
currently in force. However, these
laws arose from necessity. They can
be explained only by the political
distrust which the regime feels toward
its armed forces. This forces the party
and government to establish and main
tain within the armed forces a system
of political control on a scale unknown
and impossible within the armies of
the West.
Soviet military law states that the
use of persuasion in military discipline
does not exclude the necessity for use
of coercion. The Disciplinary Code of
the armed forces further states: "The
command of a superior is law to the
subordinate." The Military CrimilUll
Code makes failure to obey an order
a criminal offense for which a person
may be imprisoned from one to 10
years. In time of war, he may be
given capital punishment.
MIlIWy Rnl
52
SOVIET AlMa FORCES
V. I. Lenin said that strict discipline
was necessary in the army and that,
to rule, one must not waver, but must
be harder and stricter than the Capi
talists. The present Disc;plimJ.ry Code
of the armed "forces ot the USSR
obliges every commander "to take all
means of coercion up to the use of
weapons in case of disobedience by
subordinates for the reestablishment
of order and discipline." The use of
weapons by a commander to obtain
obedience from his subordinates is
legal not only in wartime, but also dur
ing peace. The regulations emphasize
that this is not only the right of the
commander-it is his duty.
Basic Elellllllts
In general, the system of coercion
and political control in the Soviet
armed forces is composed of five basic
elements, each having its special forms
and methods:
Disciplinary measures which are
the exclusive right of the commander.
Measures which the party and
Comsomol can take.
Social means which are used for
the strict differentiation of service
personnel by duty and rank.
Judicial measures which are car
ried out by the military procurator's
office and military tribunals with their
organs of observation and investiga
tion.
Operational Chekist measures
which are taken by the military organs
of the Committee of State Security
and the Counterintelligence Sections.
These are also known as Special Sec
tions which organize widespread nets
of secret informers-the 8eksot7l-
in
all troop units and military institu
tions.
Thus, every serviceman-be he sol
dier, sergeant, officer, or general
finds. himself completely surrounded
NlVer 1888
by a tight circle of control, both covert
and open, by the most varied means of
persuasion and coercion, including
physical violence. Even Marshals of
the Soviet Union, honored before party
and government, externally haughty
and unapproachable, feel the constant
presence of this five-sided press.
Such a system stifles initiative and
originality. It leads, of course, to mas
sive obedience, but, in case of a seri
ous crisis-military or political-such
blind obedience is fraught with the
danger of such catastrophes as the Red
Army suffered at the beginning of the
German invasion during World War
II.
The entire system of coercion is held
together, controlled, and directed by
the military section of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) through the
Chief Political Directorate of the So
viet Army'and Navy. In units of divi
sion level or bigher, organs of this
53
SOVIET ARMED FORCES
military section of the party are called
''political sections."
These political sections are subor
dinated neither to the military com
mand in which they are located nor to
the Ministry of Defense. They have at
their disposal a huge apparatus of p0
litical officers-party observers in the
army to whom has been given great
authority. In the program of the
CPSU, adopted at the 22d Congress, it
was stated 'that:
The f o u ~ of military orgl1/ll,f,.
mtilm iB the leode7"Bki4J of the Com
munist pa,rty II11fIr the IIrmed forces
aM the st'f'engthening of the role and
influence of Po.riy orga.nimtiMaB.
Pllrty organizationll should. penetrate
into allllBpects 01 the life 11M tictivi.
tisB of Uu IZ4"III6tl forceB.
Ideolqlcal Prunre
Political organs, besides their func
tions of control, carry on an enormous
amount of work directed at the Ideo
logical education of servicemen at all
levels. The task of this particularly
one-si4ed indoctrination is to achieve
unlimited loyalty to the gOals of com
munism. The military oath identifies
loyalty to communism with loyalty to
the homeland.
Party slogans show the general
tenor of military law: "A violation of
one's oath is the worst form of crime."
This is the basic leitmotiv of military
law. So much significance is attached
to ideological pressure, to the molding
of the thoughts of the people, that p0
litical elements are included in all
types of activities, training, troop
life, and education. Constantly, even
against their will, suggestion takes
root in the consciousness of the sol
diers, acquiring finally the strength of
hypnosiS and leading to an automatic
sequence of thought and to a lack of
ability to analyze critically.
Repression remains the major
means of coercion and fear, of mainl
taining and strengthening military
discipline. In the Military Criminal
Code, revised and approved by the gov
ernment In December 1958, changes
were introduced which further in
creased the severity of penalties in
comparison with the code of the Joseph
Stalin period. Furthermore, for the
first time, there was established crim
inal responsibility for a series of acts
not covered by the earlier code.
Criminal responsibility for viols
tions of military law which were not
dangerous to society have been reduced
by this law while it has been made
more severe for those acts which
present significant danger. Interest
ingly enough, this latter category in
cludes violations of the principle of
unquestioning obedience in whatever
form it may appear, violations of mili
tary discipline and order, and also
refusal to serve in the armed forces.
Types 0' Punishment
The Military Criminal Code for vio
Istions of military law and order pro
vides for punishments starting with
simple diSCiplinary messures, progres
sing to imprisonment, where there is
high possibility for long sentences,
and, in case of a crime committed dur
ing military operations, capital pun
ishment. Everything depends on the
personality of the criminal, the cir
cumstances of the crime, its results,
the time, and place. In this regard, the
laws are such that military tribunals
have wide discretionary authority in
determining the degree of punishment
for violators.
Soldiers and sergeants serving as
draftees sentenced under peacetime
conditions to imprisonment from three
months to two years can be sentenced
for the same period of time to a disci
SOVIET ARMED FORCES
plinary battalion by decision of a mili
tary tnounal. After they bave served
out their punishment In the disci
plinary battalion, they are obliged to
finish their required term of service
in their former units.
During wartime, violators sentenced
to imprisonment for periods up to two
, years are simply sent to the front to
expiate their crime. During the last
war, punitive attack units were
created for sentences running from
two years up to capital punishment.
Convicted soldiers and degraded offi
cers were sent to these Without distinc
tion. Thus, instead of imprisonment
for many years or execution, military
tribunals were given the right to set
aside sentences and send the con
demned to these "battalions of death."
The most elfeetive means of coercion
of the masees of Soviet soldiers In
wartime were the so-ealled "blocking
detachments" created in JulY 1942.
These blocking detachments consisted
of special troops of the People's Com
misaariat for Inte\'lllltional Mairs.
They were deployed to the rear of the
frontline units and had the task of
opening fire on their own eomrsdes in
the event of an unauthorized retreat.
This form 01 coercion fully justi1led
itself, as has the entire punitive policy
of the Communist regime.
ire 4WIe to Send in your CHANGE OF ADDRESS
To assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to
submit promptly both your old and new address, including Zip code-four
weeks in advance, if possible. Address to Military Review Subscription
Service, Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col
lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 .
......... 1...
I
T HAS been said that nothing is
80 powerful as an idea whose time
has come. Such an idea is the barge
ship. a new concept in ocean freight
transportation. It has the merit of
being able to meet a present need with
new found practicality and economy.
The barge ship system now appears
ready for introduction to a highly
promising career.
~ ___ of author.
The objectives of the system are:
To eliminate port congestion and
ship-size limitations resulting from
harbor depths and inland waterway
restrictions.
To increase the cargo handling
rate by a factor of 10 over conven
tional break-bulk vessels.
To provide a system which can
economically transport the wide range
of cargoes in ocean transport.
IllIIta1J Rnl
18
To provide a cargo-handling sys
tem compatible with existing cllstoms,
practices, and labor conditions in most
areas of the world.
To provide maximum flexibility
for military operations.
The barge ship is the heart of a
new shipping concept of using a fast
oceangoing vessel to carry a large
number of low-cost preloaded barges.
The barges, which are of uniform size,
NlVlIlDbar 1869
BARGE SHIP
are physically picked up by the ship
at the loading port and "transported
to their destination where they are
omoaded for tinal delivery. The ship
is capable of handling in one shipment
a great diversity of cargo cl4sses such
as vehicles and refrigerated, liquid,
or bulk cargo. It can also be used
without the barges as a bulk carrier
or for shipment of van containers.
Major Expansion
The barge ship concept is a radical
departure to a transport system.which
has gone essentially unchanged since
the earliest annals of waterborne com
merce. Its design represents a coming
together of several favorable tech.
nological and economic factorll that
determine both the requirement and
themeans by which it can be achieved.
The US mercbant marine ill on the
threshold of a major expansion which
cannot be deferred. While there may
be debate about when and how the
resources are to be provided, there is
no denying the need for a significant
shipbuilding program.
The present requirement is not
simply for a step-up in the ship con
struction, but for a virtual renewal of
our merchant fleet. Within another
two years, it will be necessary to re
place all of our World War II ships
and many of our postwar ships as well.
Each month sees literally a score of
these assets fall into obsolescence.
They are then either retired to the
scrap pile or patched at high cost for
limited extended use.
On the question of what kinds of
ships should be built, there is Bome di.
vergence of opinion. The barge ship
seems to be the single proposal which
can benefit from all underlying argu.
ments.
Among the contemporary develop
ments giving rise to the efficacy of
57
BARilE SHIP
_ ~ N _
Artist's concept of a Snbw cJaaa barge carrier cIiaeharabtg ita loaded barges on a
2,000-ton elevator at the stem of the vesseL Three of these ships are muler contract
for ccinatruetiOD. They will be the larBest common-carrier cargo liners ever built for
the US merelumt III81'iJIes.
the barge ship is the trend toward
large vessels. They offer economy in
construction, manning, powerplant ef
ficiency, and speed. Unlike other large
cargo ships, a barge ship with all of
these virtues is relieved of the penalty
of deep draft because it need not dock
for cargo loading and unloading. The
C1mulB O. La:ncUmo, Jr., ill em 0p
erations Resea.reh. AMly,t toith. the
US Army Combat De11fifqpmentB C_
ma.nd T ~ Agtme1l at Fort
E'UltiB, Virginia. He IIttendetl thIJ US
Na,wf, Aeodemti a.nd ill II gradAl.ate of
the Amerietm Umllersity, WGBh6r.gton,
D. C. He B8N1ed with. the US Mercha,trt
Marine in. the EV4'Of/flG. theater of
operations duri.g W0ri4 War 11 a.nd
has Bim:e held. fllGriM-rela.te4 'JIOIIitilms
with the Depa.rtment of DeftmBB.
mother vessel can anchor in deep
water where the barge units may be
picked up or offloaded.
Another trend which the berge ship
accommodates effectively is the accel
erated change to unitization of cargo.
The tendency of some authorities to
regllrd barge ships and contsiner ships
as mutually exclusive categories is in
error. The barge ship system can be
regarded as the ultimate of this uniti
zation trend, for its barges are inte
gral containers large enough to accept
practically all freight in either loose
or packaged increments. A fair state
ment is that barge ships are container
ships of the most nonrestrictive type.
They provide the means by which vir
tually all cargo can be unitized.
Other shipping trends are increased
MDiIIrJ 1n1n
58
BARCE SHIP
C_oI_
The bolt-Uke barges of welded steel are
81Iitable for harbor, Inland, and short
coastwise towing. The hold Is practically
all within the square of the hald>.
roll-on and roll-off vehicle shipments
and the employment of large helicop
ters for unloading and lighterage serv- .
ice. The barge ship is entirely com
patible with both of these develop
ments.
One of the most favorable considera
tions for the barge ship system is
compatibility with the philosophy un
derlYing all such developments. This is
an attempt to change the focus of at
tention frqm mode segments and
transfer operations to an overview of
a master shipping system. There is
",,...1_
now an awareness that oVllr-aU distri
bution el!iciency can best be rea1ized
by a transportation framework of in
termeshing subsystems, handling a
reasonable number of standardized
unit sizes.
The barge ship provides a system
by which the expensive prime mover
is uncoupled from thll relatively cheap
freiglit-carrying shell or warehouse
portion. This classic problem in trans
port economics was solved earlier in
other transportation modes. The best
and earliest example is the railroads.
More recent applications of the prin
ciple are push towing of coupled
barges on the inland waterways and
the use of tractor-trailer rigs on the
highways.
One of the many advantages of the
load separation principle is that the
materials handling and movement op
erations are performed simultaneously.
This minimizes the time the ship must
spend in POrt and thereby maximizes
its productiVe use for movement.
While the barge ship offers im
provements in the shipping cycle, the
terminal aspects are particularly nota
ble when COlUPllred with conventional
COMPARABLE BARSE SIZES OF CURRENT DESIGNS
tal Ughter lh. Sea Barp
Length, over-all 61% feet 97% feet
Breadth 31 feet 85 feet
Depth 13 feet 13% feet
Height, maximum 14% feet 15% feet
Draft 61Al feet 101Al feet
Hatch opening 42 feet by 21 feet 90 feet by 31 feet
Capacity 18,500 cubic feet 37,400 cubic feet
Deadweight, maximum 250 tons 850 tons
0
51
&MUSHIP
T. ' .. _"
e..,.,... .f _
Artist's vermon of the fIIIh barge ship. Eleven of these ships have been approved for
constrnction and operating anbaidy by the Maritime Administration. The firat should
, atsrt operating the latter part of next year.
cargo vessels, as well as other con
tainer ships. The barges, stowed in
advance of the ship's arrival and
moved to the pickup point by tugs,
are ready for shipboard loading when
the ship arrives. The ship possesses
either a heavy lift crane or an elevator
transfer system. Whichever facility is
used, barge transfers are made over
the stem of the ship.
Fixed harbor facilities, with the
exception of the use of harbor tug
service for barge movement, are not
required. Although barges for com
mercial use are, for the most part,
designed for movement by tugs, they
can be provided with their own pro
pulsion drives at small loss of cargo
space. The shallow draft permits use
of marginal wharves usually in abun
dant supply at all river mouths and
bays. Commercial operators do not re
quire a beaching capability; however,
this could be provided.
The expensive part of the ship
the hull and powerplant-is not re
quired to stand idle during loading or
unloading of the cargo carried in the
barges. The combined effects of the
barge ship's high speed and its rapid
turnaround in port will permit it to re
duce voyage time to about half of that
required by a break-bulk ship.
The increased powerplant cost for a
high ocean speed is justified by the
higher ratio of ship running time to
total operating time. Propulsion plant
idle time is low, roughly comparable to
tankera. It is this kind of employment "
profile which will probably make a
nuclear-powered ship commercially
productive. -
MlliIIIJ In...
80
BARBE SHIP
Spec:ial advantages derive from the railcar shipments, the barge ship-
use of barges apart from the operating ments will lend themselves to com
economics of the ship proper. They puter tracing by barge numbers, as '
may, in many cases, be losded at the well as location within the barge.
shipper's plant, like boxcars, then A major gain might be realized by
moved to their destination without the using the barges as Boating ware-
necessity for further transfer of con- houses from which cargo could be re-
tents. The barge loads would avoid moved as needed. On the other hand,
the congestion, delays, and other prob- if there is a demand for a maximum
lems commonly experienced in cargo cargo Bow, all barges could be un
transshipment. Transit time, break- loaded simultaneously without inter-
age, and pilferage could all be consid- ference. Their rectilinear form and
erably reduced. shallow depth with most of the deck
The cargo in the barges is not ex- area within a single large hatch al-
posed at intermediate ports, is never lows ready access to the csrgo.
restowed, and provides excellent se- Once moored at a wbarf, the cargo
curity because the steel hatches must could be unloaded either by fixed or
be mechanically opened to gain aecess. mobile crane or by a set of forklift
Also, because each shipment would re- trucks. As another alternative, the
main intact during most of the transit barge could be unloaded by helicopter
period, the separation of loads and offshore. This could be practical if the
as a Boating ware
COII",- 01 4..
The barge earrler ean be used for fast deplo11llent of military roll.on and rollolf
equipment without any conversion work
NIVber 1869
II
BARGE SHIP
house. It is also apparent that, with
out transferring cargo, the barges
could be towed in coastal or inland
waterway line hauL
A question related to the' kind of
shipa which should be built is the
institutional arrangement for the pro
vision and operation of the merchant
rates. A key issue is the control of
Government-subsidized ships in na
tional crises, declared or undeclared.
The design of ships lias a decided
bearing on their suitability for com
mercial as well as logistic use by
the military. Until the advent of the
barge ship, there was validity in the
COMPARATIVE CHARACtERISTICS OF twO CURRENT BARGE SHIP DESIGNS
ala Ship' BetIbH Ship"
Length, over-all 814 feet 874 feet
Beam, maximum 100 feet 106 feet
Service speed
23 knota at 82,000 shaft 21 knota at 82,000 shaft
horsepower at design horsepower at design
draft f 2 f ~ feet draft of 28 feet
Draft, maximum 86 feet 89 feet
Liquid capacity
6,000 tons 26,000 tons
(154,000 cubic feet) (800,000 cubic feet)
Total barge capacity 60 unita = 12,500 tons 88 unita = 17,600 tons
(800,000 cubic feet) (1,400,000 cubic feet)
Lift capacity 600 tons 2,000 tons (2 barges)
Load and discharge 12% hours 8 to 12 hours
cycle
Two us tblpP.... compuleo have __for. total of 11 of _ ohIpo.
A __for __of _ obi.,. '" ........ oat for bid.
marine whether used in commercial
trade or serving in direct support of
foreign aid and military operations.
The question involves such considera
tions as the source of funding, do
mestic versus foreign construction,
building and operating'subsidies, and
service and manning patterns.
These issues are hotly debated by
groupa directly affected. It is generally
agreed, however, that the Nation re
quires a viable merchant marine as a
guarantee that adequate shipping will
be available at all times at reasonable
Department of Defense philosophy,
emerging during the 1960's, which
held that commercial ships were, by
and large, ill-suited for military use,
particularly in initial deployment op
erations. This is no longer true as
most of the reasons that make the
barge ship attractive to commercial
users apply to military use as well.
In addition, the harge ship's flexi
bility and adaptability provide special
possibilities for military needs. Ita
high speed, large capacity, and rapid
loading and diseharge give it the capa
12
bility of meeting both floating prede
ploy,ment of military Btocks and rapid
deployment for which the fast deploy
ment logistics (FDL) Bhip is being
proposed.
The FDL Bhip program iB a siren
song of false promise tending to di
vert money and effort from a broad
miBsion capability to one of Bpecialized
employment. There iB Bubstance to the
observation of critics that the FDL
shipa will be Bitting warehouses of no
value in peacetime. While it is true
that a Bhip, even a military Bhip, may
not be where you would wish in an
emergency, a truer test of a program
is the capability of response to all
foreseeable missions compared with
underlying cost.
Major AdYlDtips
In contrast to tying up FDL shipB
in predeployment of military equip
ment, the barge ship concept offers
the alternstive of predeployment of
prestoc:ked barges only. By maintain
ing these floating stocks at forward
bases, they would be available for ship
pickup and delivery when deployment
is required. In this Bcheme, high-per
formance ships will not be needlessly
tied up at tremendous expense.
There will, of course, have to be a
sufficient number of barge ships in
commercial service and, perhaps, even
some control of sailing schedules to
assure requisite responBe. Another
major advantage of the barge ship
over the FDL ship is that there is no
sacrifice of efficiency in going from
initial tactical loads to the subsequent
resupply role. Both tasks would be per
formed with a high role of efficiency.
The barges could provide relatively
cheap protection of military cargo in
protected storage under direct mili
tary control. Their location could be
changed as circumstances dictate. Like
NmUer 1881
BARIE SHIP
the FDL ship, they could be provided
with humidity controL Military barges
could be self-propelled and designed
for beach landing of vehicles over
ramps. They might be fitted out for
many operational uses other than
transportation BUch as command com
munication centers, barracks, or float
ing depots stoc:ked with a wide variety
of supplies.
Addltl.... Uses .
While the barge ship is designed
to Berve commercial operations pri
marily;as a barge carrier, it could,
without modification, also Berve as:
A ro11-on and ro11-off ship for
trucks, trailers, and other militsry
vehicles.
A van container ship which may
be discharged by helicopter.
A pallet carrier or unitized cargo
ship.
A quasi-tanker.
A special heavy lift ship (highest
capacity afloat).
An amphibious assault ship.
The United States cannot afford a
split merchant marine fleet with a de
fense support contingent kept manned
and in a standby BtstuS during
peacetime. Ship construction and man
ning costa are too high not to use them
to full productive advantage. There is
no significant conflict between desir
able military features and commercial
features. By serving a profitable com
mercial application, the barge ship
fleet could, in addition to assuring
economy, provide a ready springboard
for emergencY diversion.
Although the barge ship concept
offers great promise, what is needed
now is an effort to standardize barge
sizes if not the ships. Inasmuch as
there are only two barge sizes and
two ship designs at present, this would
IS
BARilE SHIP
seem to be an achievable goal. Perhaps
the best way of elfeeting standardiza
tion would be for the Government to
modify present designs and procure
ships at its own expense to be leased
to commercial operators with immedi
ate leaseback agreement.
Once a sufficient fleet of barge ships
comes into existence, the Department
of Defense will be justified in buying
some barges for military use. With
regard to military resupply missions,
some of the barges may be identical
to those procured for commercial use.
They may, therefore, be pooled in a
manner similar to the 5,200-car de
fense rail interchange fleet.
The esse for the barge ship is con
fused only to the extent that it has
not yet received widespread recogni
tion and acceptance. The idea of
carrying preloaded barges constitutes
more than a novel shipping arrange
ment. It is a completely new approach
to sea transportation which has only
recently been made possible. The barge
ship can eminently meet present needs
with a viable fleet as a tool of com
merce and defense. It will, without
doubt, be the freighter of the future.
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MllitIrJ Rni..
84
PWand
Captured Document Doctrine
Colonel John A. Hemphill, United States ArmR
T
HE problem of what to do with
prisoners of war (PW's) has
perplexed military llommanders from
the beginning of rooorded history.
Gengis Khan killed his prisoners, but
Alexander the Great and Hannibal
forced prisoners to serve in their
armies. There are accounts of slavery,
dungeons, and starvation as a PW's
fate.
In modern times, steps have been
N.vmlIer 1868
taken to eliminate brutality and to
standardize PW treatment. However,
one part of the PW subject has not
changed over the llenturies-the PW
continues to be a valuable source of
information and an important link in
the production of intelligence.
For the modern US Army. opera
tions such as in Vietnam are a new ex
perience. In contrast to the two World
Wars and the Korean Confiict, there
85
A eaptured insurgent is a firsthand, last-minute observer of guerrilla operations and
plans
are no frontlines, no adjacent friendly
divisions, and no rear areas containing
an 'echelon of higher headquarters.
Instead, there is a fluid battlefield with
an elusive enemy. The command and
control pattern has changed with bri-
Colonel John A. HemphiU ill with
the Ol/ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military ()pertttione, WtJ8hington,
D. C. He ill a gmdiuate of the us Mili
tary Academy, Armed Forees Staff
CoUege, and the US Army War Co/'
lege. He ktJB s6f'1Jed with tke 7th In
fantry Di'lliBion in Korea: with the
74th Regim.ent.IU Combat Team, Fort
DWenB, MtJ88Gehusett8: HetJdqvmrl;erB,
AltJ8kGn Command: with the 1st Cav
alry DiMon (Airmobile) and 9th
Infantry DiMon, VietMm; and with
Headt}fuJ,rters, O ~ e of Personnel Op
_none, WGBhington, D. C. '
gade command posts usually located at
such a distance from division head
quarters that the brigades conduct
virtually independent operations.
The subordinate battalions of the
brigade, often widely separated, con
duct small-unit operations to find the
insurgent forces. When a significant
insurgent force has been located, the
brigade and its battalions build up
firepower and conduct a coordinated
operation. However, these operations
are generally brigade controlled and
not the multiple-division coordinated
operations envisioned for higher in
tensity warfare.
Operating on a luid battlefield, the
brigade and battalion commanders re
quire fresh information to keep pace
with the fast tempo of operations.
MllitarJ Rnl,. 88
PW's
Newly captured PW'e and documents
are important sources. of this informa
tion as they have been in past con1licts.
But the commander must have the
capability to obtain this information
before its timelineSs is lost. This capa
bility should be provided for in US
Army doctrine.
Adequate Doctrine?
Doctrine contains the fundamental
principles guiding military actions.
These principles provide the guidelines
for organization and equipment that
determine capability and operational
procedure. US Army doctrine for bri
gade and battalion PW and captured
document operations was conceived for
general and limited war. Is the doc
trine adequate for stability opera
tions?
The characteristics of internal de
fense have changed the military op
erational pattern. In general and lim
ited war, the military forces create
their own operational environment.
Both sides have established frontlines
and rear areas. Progress is marked by
the capture of key terrain features
which usually results in the tactical
defeat or destruction of the defending
enemy forces. The brigade and bat
talion commanders plan their opera
tions based upon terrain-oriented ob
jectives and intelligence of the defend
ing enemy. If the enemy gives up the
objective without a fight, this is a
"plus" and generally accelerates the
operation. But the characteristics of
stability operations are different.
In stability operations, there are no
well-defined frontlipes and rear areas.
All areas are an actual or potential
battleground. The objectives are the
insurgent's forces, underground in
frastructure, logistic support system,
and support by the population. From
the brigade and battalion point of
view, the predominant differences
from general and limited war are the
fiuidity of the battlefield and the dif
ficulty in fixing the location of the in
surgent forces.
In over-all terms, the insurgent is
generally the weaker military force.
He cannot afford a major battle with
stability forces until he gains a pre
ponderance of strength. The insurgent
must use mobility, clandestine loca
tions, and advantageous terrain to off
set the stability force's superiority.
His is a war of continuous movement
dictated by the capability of the ter
rain and population to shield his loca
tion. To prevent annihilatiOn, the
insurgent must retsin the capability to
strike and then withdraw before his
initiative is lost or the stsbility forces
can employ their superior firepower
against him.
Dllferent Problem
The stability force commanders
have a different problem. They must
find the insurgent and maintain con
tsct until their superior firepower can
be built up and employed. In a war
with frontlines, enemy withdrawal is
a battlefield victory. In stsbility op
erations, the withdrawal is the insur
gent's way of changing the location of
the confiict to another area where he
will have the advantage.
In stsbility operations, the brigade
and battalion commanders do not
achieve suceess by taking a terrain ob
jective or forcing an adversary to re
treat. Suceess is gained only through
the complete destruction of the insur
gent force. To destroy the quarry, con
tsct must be maintsined with an
effective pursuit. However, the insur
gent has a variety of options to con
duct his withdrawal. To counter, the
stsbility force commander needs im
mediate, up-to-date information on the
87
PW'I
enemy's plans and strength. The bri
gade and battalion commande1'8 eaDn(>t
wait" the time required for higher
headquarters 1;0 deVelop intelligence
for their next operational phase. The
information is needed immediately if
relentle88 pU1'8uit is to be initiated
without hesitation.
YIIuIta SOUn:es
Captured insurgents, refugees, and
defecto1'8 are firsthand. iaat-minute ob
serve1'8 of'the adver8al'y's operations
and pianB. ,.Also, doeuments and per
sonal lette1'8 often are a valuable
source of recent information. How
ever, capture is not enough. The "bri
gade and battalion commanders must
have the available capability to acreen,
interrogate, t1'8nslate, and evaluate
their sources immediately after cap
ture in order to obtain timely informa
tion. An hour's delay, especially when
operating. in difficult terrain or under
the cover uf darkne88, is often enough
time for the insurgent to slip away.
In Vietnam, it is not uncommon for
a unit to spend over 90 percent of 0p
erational time searching for, and less
than 10 percent fighting, the insur
gents. Most contacts are broken by the
insurgents under the cover of dark
ne88. Prisone1'8 and doeuments are uf
limited immediate value to the bat
talion commander who does not have
the organic or attached capability to
interrogate or translate thoroughly,
The US Army's doctrine sets the
guidelines for a commander's opera
tionsl proeedures and outlines his
ope1'8tional capability. This does not
imWY that the commander cannot use
initiative and ingenuity, but doetrine
places a/limit on these attributes. To
be etrective. doetrine must conform
and change with the operational en
vironment.
US Army doetrine concerning PW!s
is based upon the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 12 August 1949 (GPW) which
preacribes the humane treatment of
captives. The GPW principles are pro
feseed by the United States, but are
not recognized in many of the unstable
areas of the world. In any situation,
the United States would desire pris
oners taken by the insurgents to be
treated humanely and, in kind. would
treat its PW's with the same princi
ples. The GPW, as an internationally
recognized agreement, provides the
common guidance that all belligerents
may follow in respecting the individ
ual rights of PWs.
When US military combat units
were introduced into Vietnam in 1965,
the US command in Saigon announced
that its soldiers would follow the GPW
in the treatment of captives. This
establishes the precedent for US Army
PW doetrine for stsbility operations
to be based upon the GPW's princi
ples.'
Objectives and PrInciples
The objeetives and principles of cur
rent US Army PW doetrine are con
cerned with assisting friendly opera
tions within the limits implied by the
IaWI!! of land warfare to include the
GPW. These objectives and principles
set the goais and paramete1'8 for PW
operations and guide the development
of doctrine. These objeetives are:
Acquisition of maximum intel
ligence information within restrictions
imposed by the law of "land warfare.
Prevention of escape and libera
tion.
United Stateo, the BepllW. of VletDam.
Vletaam hage _eel the GPW. Both
States aad the Bepu_ of Vietnam are
e. pl'ovlilOll8 while North
Co1IIi haft _ to al>l>a
Commuulaia have takea
llot a ,!pato.,. to the
eollVeDtlon.. eontmda that US pilota
captured In their tftritoq ue crlmtnaJa and
jeet to Nol'th VletDam .... laws.
IIUItIIy Rn'l. II
Pdaoners of war need to be Interrogated at battalion and brigade level Wore
PW's
Promotion, through example, of
proper treatment of US personnel cap
tured by the enemy.
Weakening the will of the enemy
to resist capture.
Maximum use of PW's and civil
ian internees as a source of labor.
The principles are:
Humane treatment.
Prompt evacuation from the com
bat zone.
Provisions of opportunity for
prisoner interrogation.
Instruction of troops in the pro
visions of international agreements
and regulations relating to PW's and
civilian internees.
Integration of the procedures for
evacuation, control, and administra
tion of PW's and civilian internees
with other combat service support
operations.
With the exception of objectives re
garding use of PW's as labor, these
objectives and principles apply to the
brigade and subordinate units. For
brigade and battalion stability opera
tions, there are contradictions between
the second and third principles. The
principle of providing for PW inter
rogation is primarily aimed at division
and above. However" it does have ap
plications to PW evacuation and con
trol at all levels. In general, the
objectives and principles are satisfac
tory for internal defense situations,
but not all current US Army PW doc
trine developed within these guidelines
is adequate for brigade and subordi
nate unit-level stability operations.
Prisoners are usually captured by
the! hattalion's frontline troops. The
doctrinal guidance to the capturing
forces is to disarm and then to per
form the five "S's"--ilearch, silence,
segregate, safeguard,
at WI! typical US Army division eoUeetion eamp located at Bear Cat, RepubUe of
Vietnam
""'.bar 1869
19
PW'a
ing the search phase, the PW's and
documents are tagged with a card giv
ing pertinent facts concerning the cap
ture. The documents are forwarded to
the battalion intelligence officer (S2)
and the prisoners are evacuated to the
battalion PW collection point.
This doctrinal guidance is sound and
simple to follow. Emphasis is placed
upon preventing escape and evacua
tion to a place of jess danger for inter
rogation. 1l0wever, because of the
quick evacuation and lack of interroga
tion capabilIty, the company com
mander does not obtain the needed
timely information.
Inteliliellce Support
The company commander does not
have an orlianic intelligenCe support
capability, but the battalion has this
capability in the intelligence officer
and intelligence sergeant. The primary
function of. both is to advise the bat
talion and subordinate commanders on
enemy intelligence and information,
but neither is required to have the
capability to interrogate PW's or to
translate documents. This requires
special qualifications-interrogator
and' interpreter-that are not organic
to the combat battalion. The emphasis
is to evacuate PW's and documents as
quiekly as possible to brigade and divi
sion for interrogation or translation.
The principal tactical interrogation of
PW's and evaluation of documente
take place at division level.
The field army, or equivalent level
headquarters, military intelligence
(M!) battalion provides each division
with an III detachment. This detach
ment has themission of providing spe
cialized intelligence and counteril1tel
ligence functions which require special
skills in the utilization of foreign
languages.
The detachment includes an inter
rogation prisoner of war (IPW) sec
tion with interrogation and document
translation capability. Although divi
sion is the tactical focal point for PW
operations, the normal procedure is'to
attach IPW teams to committed bri
gades. This provides the capability to
conduct formal interrogations and to
scan documents for tactical informa
tion. The IPW teams are a valuable
asset to the brigade commander and
his staff.
Depending upon the number of in
terpreters, the IPW team usually con
sists of approximately four to eight
people. The number of personnel lim
its the team's ability to screen and
determine accurately the true intel
ligence value of each PW and docu
ment. The thot:Ough analysis must be
left to higher echelons where time is
lost in transit; processing, and dis
semination of the gained intelligence.
When this intelligence arrives at the
brigade and battalion level, it has be
come history and is of little value.
Specialized Operations
US Army doctrine envisions the
temporary attachment of IPW person
nel below the brigade level for
specialized operations. But this is not
encouraged. Also, the battalion com
mander may request brigade IPW
teama to come forward to interrogate
selected PW's before being evacuated
from the battalion operational area.
This has advantages in that the bri
gade interrogators should be familiar
with the battalion's operation, and the
PW's information should be up to date.
If IPW support cannot be obtained,
the doctrinal g1.Iiclanee is fpr battalion
and subordinate commanders to rely
on assigned noninterrogator personnel
who have a language capability and
some interrogator experience. There
is unlikely to be any personnel in a
MRItarJ .n"_ 70
combat battalion with a significant in
terrogator or indigenous langnage ca
pability. When required, battalion and
lower units probably will be provided
an interPreter. This appears to be a
satisfactory solution, but much de
pends upon the capability of each
individual interpreter. Logically, the
better trained and more capable inter
preters will be placed in higher prior
ity assignments than with a combat
battalion.
Interrogation is an art requiring
special training in questioning and
examining an individual. TQ be most
effective, the interrogation of a PW
should begin as soon as possible after
capture. Being captured, even volun
tarily, is a harrowing experience. At
this time, the PW can be expected to
talk more freely and to lack the ability
to remember security lessons. To ex
ploit this vulnerability, the interro
gator should begin his examination
with minimum delay.
PW interrogation and document
translation immediately after capture
would enhance the brigade and bat
talion capabilities to conduct a rapid
pursuit and other operations with the
least possible hesitation. To eliminate
delay in obtaining this enemy in
formation, the battalion and the bri
gade commander require an adequate
IPW capability that will meet their
stability operations requirements.
The US Army's doctrinal principle
of prompt evacuation from the com
bat zone states:
PrisonerB of wa.r Bhall be ella.cuated,
a.s Boon a.s po88ible a.fter their capture,
PW's
to campB Bitua.ted in. em a.rea. fa.r
en.ough from the comba.t zone for them
to be out of dAmger Prisoners of
10M shall fWt be Umt.ecesea.rilll ezposed
to danger while a.WGiting ella.cua.tion
from a. fighting zone.'
Any point is a likely point of insur
gent attack to include PW collecting
points, higher headquarters, and PW
compound locations. The GPW princi
ples must be followed, but should be
interpreted in accordance with the
type conflict involved. GPW does not
prohibit retaining a PW at brigade,
battalion, or lower levsl for interroga
tion unless the PW would be subjected
to danger from known or suspected
combat. Unless there is continuous
fighting, the point of conflict in a
stability operation is difficult to pre
dict. The brigade and battalions should
not maintain PW compounds or hold
documents fQr excessive periQds. Both
shQuld be evacuated to higher head
quarters as soon as the command's
tactical requirements are fulfilled.
In reevaluation of current doctrine,
the emphasis must be placed upon the
characteristics of internal defense con
flicts and operational requirements of
stability forces. The key to success in
brigade and battalion stability opera
tions is the capability to destroy the
insurgents. This capability would be
greatly enhanced with a PW and cap
tured document doctrine conceived in
context with the distinctive character
istics of internal defense stability op
erations.
Field Jlanual 27-10, TIuJ ZA.. / ZA. WGr/GnI.
Department of the Atm7, WuhInatoD, D. C., 18
1. 1966. p 89.
Nn...... 1... 71
Lieutenaut Colonel Robert B. Drumm, United Stote8 Air Force
This article represents research
01 current m471l1gerial periodicals
by Lieutetllmt Collmel Harold C.
Detlinu, Lieutenant Collmel Carl W.
Grant, Lieutenant Colcmel ( C k a ~
lain) Rickard D. Trapp, Major Rob
ert C. Boyd, Major Jack E. Ladds,
and Major WiUis G. Womack, stu.
dents 01 ClasB 68-B, ProluBional
PerBonnel Management CourBe, Air
University Institute lor Prolu
Bional Development. Writing and
preparation was accomplished by
72
tke Research Project Manager,
Lieutenant Collmel Robert H.
Drumm.-Editor.
M
ILITARY managers since the
start of World War II have
pondered, "What makes the contem
porary military man run1"
Years ago, and, to a great extent,
today, primary functions were accom
plished by the military man under
an authoritarian-based management
method. The military service is still
Military Rill
MANAGERS
discussed in today's business schools uneducated, must-be-Ied mass of in
as one of two basic authoritarian man dividuals to a current-day technolog
agement models! The other model is ically and information-oriented pop
the Roman Catholic Church. The sup ulace.
porting base given for the military
system is the courts-martial, and for
the Church_communication.
Authoritarian Evolution
Military and civilian managers find .
basic authoritarianism no longer ac
ceptable in its traditional sense. Fac
tors which brought about the creation
of authoritarianism centuries ago no
longer exist. Most people who carried
the weapons of war had little formal
education. Most could neither read nor
write. They relied on individuals with
some education to tell them what to do.
For the purpose of a unified and com
mon force, blind obedience to a central
knowledgeable authority was required.
Control of this force was maintained
through fear of punishment.
Today's military force in the United
States has evolved from an early-day,
Koonts and Cyril O'DODD.eU. Principlu
tI S;:k I::d
;. l::f::
Edition. 196'. p 11.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
Drumm, US Air Force, is witk tke In
stitute for Professioool Development,
Air University, MazweU Air Force
BlUe Alabama. His IUsignments in
duty in Korea, 191.8; in Guam,
191.9; Personnel Planning, Headq'Ul!.r
tel'S Air Training Command, 1959-56;
in Hawaii, 1956-59; Aerospace Medi
cal Division, Air Force Systems Com
mand, Brooks Air Force BlUe, Te=,
1959-6,,; and witk tke Flight Test
Center, Edwards Air Force BlUe, Cal
ifornia, until kis present IUsignment.
He holds an M.S. degree in Psychology
and is a graduate of the Defense Man
agement Systems Course of tke Naval
Postgraduate School and the Air War
CoUege Seminar Program.
Educational Influence
Generally, the more education an
individual acquires, the more he tends
to think and act independently. Ap
proximately 60 percent of the 1968
high school graduating class in the
United States entered college that fall.
The forecast is that one-half will grad
uate with a baccalaureate degree in
four years. Within the next 14 years,
two-thirds of our population living in
metropolitan areas will have attended
college.'
As more and more individuals
with college training enter the work
force, the more they will affect the
economic and motivation aspects of
our Nation's society and culture. From
an economic standpoint, the educated
person has the ability to comprehend,
operate, and invent sophisticated new
processes. From a motivation stand
point, the qualitative increase of edu
cated individuals has transformed the
work force into an inquiring, informa
tion seeking, and, compared to past
standards, a sophisticated group.
What does the increase in educa
tional level of the populace have to do
with traditional forms of managing
people in the Armed Forces? One rea
son is, the more people are educated to
a level of experience where they are
capable and desire to think for them
selves, the more they resent authori
tarianism as a form of management.
Technological advances have paral
leled this evolution in the education or
experience level of people. Future tech
nology will require fewer people in a
Warren s. Bennis. "The Comhur Death of
Bureaucracy," Revno. Volume 56.
Number 8. MardI 1967. p 28.
N'Vlllber 1969
73
MANABERS
Figure 1.
given work function. This trend is
changing ,the value of work to some
thing not yet clear.
Man's needs are also changing and
maturing. These needs, as described
by Dr. Abraham H. Maslow and
others, are:
.Physiological-thirst, hunger, and
sex.
Safety-security and health.
Social-identification and affec
tion.
Egoistic-prestige, success, and
self-respect.
Self-fu1ft1lment--desire for per
sonal growth.
Traditionally, these needs are pre
sented in a hierarchy. Figure 1 depicts
this hiel'archy and indicates the rela
tive importance of these needs.' Under
this concept, physiological needs are
basic, and self-fulftllment needs, which
are never completely satisfied, are the
highest and not necessarily important
until lower needs are satisfied. Accord
ing to Douglas M. McGregor, man is
a wanting animal. As soon as one of
his needs is satisfied, another takes its
place in an unending process from
~ R. JluJow. Moti1Jatioft 4ftd "fIr
cmall,., Harper 6 Row. N. Y., 1954, pp 80-106.
birth to death. A satisfied need is not
a motivator of behavior.'
A national cultural or economic
change from scarcity of goods to
plenty could result in sociological ad.
vances which provide the same goods
to nonachievers and achievers alike.
Welfare programs would provide food,
clothing, medical care, and other basic
needs. If this happens, lower needs
would then be more satisfied, and pat
terns of psychosocial needs would
change from the format shown in
Figure 1 to one that emphasizes higher
needs. As this change continues to
progress, the needs structure may
form patterns of diminishing lower
needs and expanding higher needs
(Figure 2). Under this hypothesis,
man would devote more and more
energy to ego satisfaction and self
fulfillment.
Considering changes in our society
and national culture, military man
agement methods which are basically
authoritarian oriented seem to have
evolved into a silent standoff. On one
hand is the primary mission to be ac
complished, and on the other is au
II1II ....If 111 .... __
Figure Z
MllitIrJ .nl..
74
MAllACERS
thoritarian tradition. When examined
in the light of contemporary manage
ment research, many authoritarian
oriented traditions have little to do
with actuaUy accomplishing the work
task.
Traditional Constraints
Most.of today's Armed Forces are
engaged in work that is comparable to
civil industry. However, certain mili
tary authoritarian traditions dictate
that thIs civil-oriented workload first
have a separate and additional con
straint imposed before it is accom
plished. This constraint is separate
from the defined work. Most of the
time, these traditional constraints in
volve additional time, money, and
effort.
To circumvent these constraints,
Congress and the Department of De
fense have established programs that
place more and more civilians in jobs
previously held by uniformed person
nel. Through these programs, work is
conducted without what some Armed
Forces managers call "traditional mili
tary folderol."
A visitor from outer space evaluat
ing the current traditional Armed
Forces management system probably
would describe it as a ladder of in
creasingly higher paid and higher
grade quality control clerks-from
private to four-star general and civil
ian employees General Schedule (GS)
1 to GS-18. Most decisions, whether
verbal or written, are reviewed and
passed, step by step, up the ladder
through a bureaucratic hierarchy
maze. Only in this manner can the
traditional SYB (Save Your Back
side) system of authoritarian manage
ment be perpetuated.
Most file cabinets in the authori
tarian, tradition-managed office are
stuffed with paper to prove someone
",,,Idler 1881
has accomplished something already
directed in a published regulation.
Procedures for compiling and storing
historical data in the Armed Forces
also continue this process of retaining
material for the SYB system.
A change in the basic Armed Forces
management system is needed. The
longer it takes to make these changes,
the more civilian-directed programs
will be created to circumvent tradi
tional military methods.
An example of dissatisfaction with
current Armed Forces management is
expressed by ex-military pilots who
are now t1ying for civilian airlines. Ac
cording to the pilots, one of the beat
features of civilian life is that, after
they finish their flight, the company
leaves them alone until the next time
to fiy. These pilots are not harassed by
collateral duties such as survey officer,
fund drive chairman, shots, officer of
the day, records checks, ad infinitum.
Civilian pilots who need professional
training get it, and they do not have
someone constantly looking over their
shoulders checking for compliance
with extraneous, but traditional, mili
tary matters.
Manalement Implications
A large military force is still re
quired as a function of national power.
If this force is required, what is the
answer to the dilemma of pilot reten
tion, a stable military force, and other
personnel management problems that
may be caused by traditional Armed
Forces management methods?
Part of the answer may be the ap
plication, by the military services, of
recent behavioral science research
findings concerning what motivates
people in the work force under today's
cultural, technological, and informa
Robert B. Blake and Jane S. Mouton. TA8
AI"",,"""'" Grid. Gull Publlahl .... Co.. 11th Print
ina. 1968. pp 167..168.
75
tion-oriented society. The military
management system of traditional bu
reaucratic autboritarianism appears
to be out of joint witb contemporary
realities brought to light by research.
Contemporary management tbeory
based on behavioral science research
places heavy emphasis on tbe potential
of today's "tbink for yourself" in
dividual. This theory reinforces ideas
set forth by philosopher Johann Wolf
gang von Goethe who stated:
If ylYU treat G mall, lUI he iIr, he wiU
remain lUI hi! iIr. If Yf1U treat him lUI if
he were wlult he could be and 81wuld
be, he wiU become wlult he could be
and Bh01dd. be.
Research by Dr. Frederick Herzberg
and Dr. David Whitsett at Case West
ern Reserve University has brought
fortb startling conclusions about tbe
way contemporary man views his work
environment. One of tbe more com
monly held ideas is that the opposite
to those matters which di88Btisfy pe0
ple at work will give tbem satisfaction.
Dr. Herzberg, in his "Motivation
Hygiene" tbeory, contends tbis idea is
not true. His research experience in
dicates tbe opposite of those items
which satisfy people produce no satis
faction, not dissatisfaction. Those that
produced dissatisfaction produced no
dissatisfaction when they were absent
-not satisfaction.
Mona, Factor
One of the more controversial re
sults of this research was tbe position
of pay as a hygiene factor and not as
a motivator. Traditionally, authori
tarian managers believe most em
ployees will be better motivated if
given more and more money.
Money is important, but it is not
all .important. Money is the most im
portant maintenance factor, according
to Dr. Herzberg. However, it is not a
motivator in today's transient worker
market. Money will hold people on the
job if otber elements, such as those
which provide motivation, are equal
for your competitor. Civil industry
seems to be the Armed Forces largest
competitor for personnel talent. Con
gress has passed military pay raise
after pay raise in order to stay with
or come close to the personnel com
petition offered by industry. Military
base pay has increased 40 percent
since 1962. However, reenlistment
rates have dropped 30 percent."
If money is not the most important
factor, what is? Behavioral science re
search indicates achievement, recogni
tion, work itself, responsibility, ad
vancement, and growth as important.
Those factors which do not motivate,
but simply satisfy, employees are sal
ary, policy, administration, supervi
sion, and interpersonal relations.
AuUtoritarlan Attitude
Dr. M. Scott Myers supports Herz
berg's findings. He describes the
traditional view of work under au
thoritarian management as tbe Fayol
oriented functions of management
planning, leading, controlling, and
doing (Fignre 3). This process basi
cally excludes lower level personnel
from the managerial environment and
develops, subliminally, management's
authoritarian attitude of people at
work. Dr. Myers indicates this at
titude forms managerial assumptions
which describe workers as uninformed,
unintelligent, uncreative, irresponsi
ble, and immature. Because of tbese,
lower level people require managers
who are intelligent, informed, creative,
responsible, and mature. T
"P.,. BIkes Fall to End Re-Up DiP." Air Fon:e
X...... Volume 29. Number 18, 11 December
18S8. p 1.
t'1L Scott Ibers. "'Every Employee a Manager.OJ
Calilomits lIIQUD'HI4tIlt BetMtO. Volume 10, Num
ber 8. SPriDlr 1988. p 12.
Military Revie.
78
__
11M
-
WD
lenge tradition appear doomed. How
ever, not all military leaders practice
blind adherence to authoritarianism.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, be
lieved by many to be a strict trsdi
tionalist, stated:
1
00
I I
-
r.. _
..... -_.. _--
-"
__
..... -"
"",-,,"''''l1li.
...........
---.. -_..
_.. _..
-""'-"' -_.......
Figure 3.
This authoritarian attitude forms a
gulf between the manager and subor
dinates. Under this superior position
method of management, subordinates
frequently consider themselves as just
another tool in the process of produc
tion or service. Subordinates do what
is required and that is all to satisfy
the inflexible inanimate monster. Work
itself under this context is mean
ingless.
For work to be individually mean
ingful and motivational, it must in
clude factors now held to be exclu
sively "managerial in the traditional
authoritarian system. These tradi
tional factors must be looked upon by
supervisors as involving subordinates
and as a means of participation and
goal orientation for both subordinates
and supervisors (Figure 4).
Can contemporary managerial at
titudes prevail in the military serv
ices?
On the surface, idess which chal
""I.ber 1889
There ill, among the ma8S of in
dividuals who ca.rry the rifi,es in. war,
a great amount of ingerw.ity a.nd ini
tiatille. If men. c<m naturally a.nd with
out restraint talk to their officers, the
products of their resourcefulness be
come alla.ila.ble to aU. More01ler, out of
the habit grows mutua.l conjid.ence, a
feeling of partnership that ill the es
sence of esprit de corps. An. army fea.r
ful of its officers ill never as good as
one that ~ t s and confides in its
leaders."
Other military lesders also saw the
need for flexibility and individual ini
tiative away from blind authoritar
ianism. One of these was Lieutenant
General Claire L. Chennault. However,
Dwiabt D. Eisenhower. Cf'Vlde itl E . ~ .
Douhledal> .. Co.. Ine.. Gud... CI",. N. Y 19'9.
p au.
_.......... "-_.....
--"'-"--"-
- ........ _----
--...""....................._,,
-...........
"'
_-
__11l1li_
-_........... _.. -"" .....
-_.. "" ...........
Figure 4.
77
IANACUS
he also points out that, under the
traditional military authoritarian sys
tem, there are dire consequences for
one who attempts to use initiative and
potential outside the system. General
Chennault broke with tradition many
times during his stay in China and
got away with it, insofar as some of
his inflexible superiors were con
cerned. He said:
I believe that, lUI a reBUlt of my own
ezperienc/l, no officer should heBita.t6
to break iQith tmdition, if, in. his judg
ment, a ilepa.rture will impr01le the
chan.ceB of success for his unit or his
side in the O1Ier-aU picture.
However, I am obliga.tetl to point
out, any officer who decides to depo;rt
from the C'ltBtoma.ry method of mili
ta.ry business by ezercising his indi
1Iid1.U!lity must be fully prepa.red to
accePt the C01I8equ.en.ces of failure. He
can. be cerlain that those C01I8SquencSS
will be immediate and probably pain
ful. I have known several officers who
failed, miserably after "ecuting their
orders in strict conformity with d0c
trine, accepted techn.iques, and estab
lished practices who were deconz.ted
and promoted promptly. In some of
these cases, it WIUI my firm belief that
a resort to individwlism might have
averted failure or at least diminished
the degree of failure."
New research findings concerning
managing people confirm the basic con
cept that people have greater potential
beyond what traditional management
now conaiders possible.
Is a radical departure from authori
tarianism in the Armed Forces pos
sible? I believe it is and can result in
increased production and service pro
vided the time and training money are
General Claire L. Chennault. us
toeo=:!'s!i'
Tralt, AI. F_ Magad..... November 1967, p
109.
available. Regardless of the branch of
service, transition-whether to a new,
higher performance aircraft, new type
of tank, or recently developed naval
vessel-depends upon the perceptual
sets of personnel involved. An arbi
trary division of these sets into three
categories by generation would show:
Those higher grade staif indi
viduals who have considerable experi
ence with older type equipment and
methods-during the past 2O-year pe
riod. These would be designated senior
managers.
Those managers who are cur
rently involved with the most up-to
date operational equipment. These
would be the middle managers with 10
to 20 years' experience.
Those younger personnel who are
currently in a transition stage, learn
ing what is expected. These are per
sonnel with less than 10 years' experi
ence.
Courses Required
The primary eifort for change
should probably be made within the
middle management age and experi
ence group. They need training pro
grams designed to bring them up to
date in newer management research
results and trends. This could be ac
complished through expansion of mod
ern management courses in senior
military schools, civilian courses in
contemporary executive development,
and programs oifered by the National
Training Laboratories. Government
schools already oriented toward con
temporary management theory are the
US Civil Service-sponsored executive
seminars held both on the east and
west coast and the professional man
agement courses conducted by the Air
University Institute for Professional
Development at Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama.
Military RlYlew 18
MANAGERS
The older Armed Forces group re
quires short courses or orientation
briefings pertaining to contemporary
management techniques. Neither time
nor investment of funds is economi
cally feasible to change this older gen
eration's perceptual set. Dr. Herzberg
describes this dilemma as, "It is easier
to give birth (teach young managers
new ideas) than provide resurrection
(convince older type managers that
new ideas have merit)." However,
these elder managers should not be
written off entirely. They require a
broad orientation in contemporary
management in order to understand'
the managerial attitude and actions of
younger generation subordinates.
The third group, the younger gen
eration, is different. This group is
academically better qualified in mod
ern management methods than its
predecessors. This group will become
the leaders and policymakers of to
morrow. The new management theory
is currently taught in universities
throughout the Nation. These younger
managers, after joining the Armed
Forces, come face to face with an au
thoritarian style of management. They
have a diftlcult time understanding it
in actual practice. This lack of under
standing may be another reason for
the high turnover in qualified younger
personnel.
Behavioral science research applica
tion to management is continuing to
evolve into a more scientific form.
Through the adoption of behavioral
science findings by the military serv
ices, it may be possible for employees
to become more productive and, at the
same time, find a more satisfying and
humane environment in the Armed
Forces.
Historically, man has constantly
searched for a more productive way to
utilize human energy. The most pro
ductive managerial method at any
given period is usually the one that
produces the best competitive advan
tage, highest production, profit, or
service. Today, that state of the man
agerial art may well be the behavioral
science approach to management.
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71
COMMUNICATION
as a
MILITARY ART
AKermit Roosevelt Lecture
Lieuteuant General Sir John Mogg, British Arml/
The Kermit Roo8evelt Lecture ill part of an exchange lecture8hip
'JY1'ogram aponsored by the Kermit Ro086'/Jelt Fund. Thill fund was estab
lillhed by a joint resolutitm "'of the Congre8s on 2 July 191,5 with monies
'JY1'O'/Jided by the widow of Major Kermit Roosevelt. In part, the re8olution
'JY1'ovide8 for f08tenng a better understanding and a' closer relationship
between the military force8 of the United States and those of the United
Kingdom, by aponsoring lecture8 and courses of instruction to be delivered
by officerB of the BritiBh and United State8 Armie8 at each other'8 military
educational wtitutions. The exchange of BritiBh and American Army
lecturer8 has taken place each year since 191,7.
This article is based on the lecture given by General Sir John Mogg on
21 April 1969 to US Army Command and General Staff College 8iud'ents,
Fort Leavenworth. General Mogg served for two years in the ranks of the
Coldstream Guarde before attending SO/TIdJiurBt. He 8erved in France during
World War II, as Commander of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade Group in
Malaya, as Commandant of the Royal Military Academy, SandkurBt, and as
Commander of the 18t BritiBh Corps, BritiBh Army of the Rhine. He i8
'JY1'esently Commander of the Army Strategic Command.-Editor.
MIlItaIJ Review 80
C
OMMUNICATION is not a new
process. Since the time when
men wore skins and fought with sticks
hardened in fire, it has been the func
tion of the leader to work out the
strategy or the tactics his force will
adopt and to have the ability to pass
on those ideas to his fighting men. The
communication of the plan is a pre
requisite of success.
A more difficult task is to devise and
pass on successive ideas after the bat
tle has been joined, in circumstances
of confusion and apprehension. In my
experience, it was proved that, what
ever plans are made, the most unfore
seen is the most likely to happen.
Compr.....sl Factor
Karl von Clausewitz said, "No plan
survives the first contact of war."
From the moment the fighting begins,
the commander must seek a chance to
gain an advantage. When he sees it,
he must make a judgment which is
criticel because it relatea to time. In
terwoven into all of this is the im
portant factor of comprehension. Are
ideas, when communicated, under
stood? The commander's idea has to
pass through a series of subordinate
headquarters or command posts until
an individual soldier puts that idea
into effect. But does he put into effect
what the commander had in mind 7
In 1937, when I was a subaltern, my
company took part in an exercise to
practice the passing of messsges and
orders. The company was lined up in
single file, and the company com
mander whispered a sentence to the
first man. He was, in turn, to pass it
in a whisper to the second, and so on
down the line. The initial whisper was,
"Send reinforcements, we're going to
advance," but, at the far end, it came
out, "Send three and fourpence, we're
going to a dance."
COMMUNICATION
This is an example of how ideas,
even simple ideas, are often altered
unwittingly by each agency through
which they pass. To avoid the mishaps
or even the disasters that these altera
tions sometimes produce, there is no
better method to deliver orders than
by personal contact.
Personal Contact
Good commanders, of course, have
always cherished this practice of per
sonal command as much as they have
cherished their ability to fight. Per
sonal contact between the commander
and his command is, in my opinion,
vital, and it becomes more difficult
the higher the rank. The commander
of a big formation cannot know more
than a small number of his men, but
every man in the command, whatever
its size, should at least know his com
mandet by sight.
There were times in history when
this was more easily done than it is
now. For example, in August 1704, the
Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eu
gene found themselves in command of
an army of 62,000 facing the French
on the Danube. The troops were con
centrated on a front only four miles
wide near the 1(iIlage of Blenheim.
Marlborough could see all his regi
ments from his command post. He
could pick out the individual units by
the distinctive color of their uniforms.
If news came that one or another
was in trOUble, Marlborough could ride
personally in a few minutea to that
section of the firing line. He could give
fresh orders to the regimental colonel
and, at the ssme time, talk to the
soldiers to reassure or exhort them. A
century later, we find that the Duke
of Wellington commanded in exactly
the same way at Waterloo, riding a
number of times into the regimental
ranks to talk to his infantrymen.
II
COMMUNICATION
But 55 years later, in the Franco
Prussian war of 1870, conditions had
changed. Then, 200,000 German troops
began a struggle against the two large
armies of Louis Napoleon. As they
deployed, the German chief com
mander, Count Helmuth von Moltke,
could be found in his headquarters far
away, reclining peacefully on a sofa
reading a novel. From time to time,
battle intelligence was brought to him,
and he rapped out a few orders. He
made simple changes in grouping and
tasks, and the French were totally
defeated.
Remote Control
I believe this victory and this
method misled the Germans. They con
cluded that if, with the destructive
power of modern weapons, one put a
great number of men into the battle
field, the chief commander simply
stayed at a more or less central point
to which reports were sent. The com
mander then played a game of military
chess; his victory was achieved by re
mote control.
In July and August 1914, Von
Moltke's nephew committed seven
armies--roughly two million men
against France, using the same
method. The French lost 250,000 men
in two weeks. Yet they recovered at the
11th hour. They held firm on the right
and in the center and reinforced their
left. But the complex German strategy,
planned in detail by Field Marshal
Alfred von Schlielfen over many years,
foundered. Why?
I believe the prime reason is that,
being victorious in 1870, the Germans
forgot that they came, in that war,
as near to losing as winning it. Be
cause they had won, the method of
remote control seemed efficient. So,
with infinitely greater numbers over
the expanse of northeastern FranCe,
12
they tried it again. Thus, in error, by
9 September 1914, the campaign was
lost. Each side then tried to achieve
victory by outflanking the other, but
succeeded only in extending the trench
line to stalemate. The high command-
The narrow front and compact forma
tions at Waterloo enabled the Duke of
Wellington to inlIuence personally the
course of battle
ploit their opportunities because they
could not communicate their ideas
with sufficient speed or accuracy to the
fighting men.
One could probably pick out two il
luminating examples in the field of
communications from the generally
somber record of World War I. In
Belgium, in the autumn of 191,4, Gen
eral Sir Douglas Haig learned that,
under pressure of overwhelming num
bers, the weakest point of the British
line in front of Ypres was breaking.
The moment he received this report,
he rode into the firing line, followed
IIl1itIIJ 1m..
by his aide and two cavalrymen fiying
his personal pennant on their lances.
SIIow Confidence
By his appearance-dressed in a
smart peaked cap, tunic, breeches,
highly polished boots, and burnished
spurs-General Haig reduced the pres
sure, lessened the anxiety, and re
newed the strength of the small num
ber of survivors in the shell-eroded
trenches. Without saying a word, Haig
communicated several ideas to those
men:
You Me not alone on the battlefield;
the rest of the Army ill aU MOUnd
you and behind you. Things Me bad
but not aB bad aB you think because 1
am riding u1l8cathed in your midBt;
you will remain here because you are
part of a diBeipli1Uld body and I, aB
your com1ll4nder, order it. But aB your
com1ll4nder I, alBo, krww how things
are from what 1 perscm.aUy see and 1
will do something quickly to relieve
you.
Haig received ideas from the sol
diers too without any exchange of
words. They were filthy and ragged;
the trench areas were littered with
dead and dying; and his men's faces
were gaunt with moral, as well as
physical, exhaustion. They needed re
lief urgently.
In another example, at Verdun in
1916, a few words spoken by General
Henri P. Petain were enough to convey
two simple but important ideas to
soldiers in a similar condition. After
a drenching by several million shells
interspersed with mass German as
saults, the French defense was in a
critical state. Uncertainty as to what
was happening infected every unit.
Men felt isolated in their companies,
many of which were down to only 30
strong. Rumors of imminent collapse
grew more common every day as Pe-
COIIONIClnON
tain arrived to take command. By
nightfall, he had seen only a small
section of the zone, but enough to
realize the crisis.
He did not compose a long, pompous
introductory order, but he sent out a
brief message which, at his insistence,
was read to every soldier on the battIe
field: "Hang on. I've got confidence in
you." Not profound words when we
read them now, but they told the de
moralized men forward that a man
had taken command who knew how
desperate the situation was, and his
expression of confidence in them ap
pealed to that last hidden reserve of
strength which every man has some
where, but is sometimes left untapped
by his commanders.
Jud.e tile OpportuniIJ
In World War II, we see in Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel what personal
intervention can do on the battlefield
to retrieve a victory from a reverse.
He knew how to read a battle; he
knew how to judge the capability of
his troops to exploit an opportunity;
and he knew how to communicate his
revised ideas without the loss of their
confidence. It is no coincidence that
he spent the greater part of his time
among his units, drawing extensively
on their impressions and inspiring
them by his presence.
There were two or three Allied com
manders who demonstrated this ability
to judge the opportunity and to com
municate quickly and accurately their
ideas to units at hand. One of them
was General George S. Patton.
General Patton had that personal
ability to communicate with soldiers
by his presence and through his sin
cere interest in their condition and
their ideas about the battle.
General of the Army Douglas Mac
Arthur was another commander who
s_
In World War J, it was enough that their eountry ealled them to arms for men to eome
forward to fight
achieved so much in the Pacific by
personal contact and personal com
munication. He lcarned how to use his
staff and his headquarters to the ut
most so as to permit him to visit his
units in battle.
MacArthur possessed another qual
ity in the communication of ideas-the
ability to instill confidence. Of all the
risks that General MacArthur took as
a senior commander, perhaps none was
more hazardous than his concept and
execution of the Inchon landing in
Korea in late summer of 1951. From
his local commanders through the
Joint Chiefs in Washington to the
President, all believed the venture im
possible. Yet because he was doing it,
it was
o
accepted. He communicated to
them the confidence in his own judg
ment.
From these examples, I believe that
we can see the need for:
Communication of plans and
ideas at the outset 80 that they are
understood.
Flexibility of mind to be able to
seize the opportunity when things go
wrong, communication of fresh ideas
and plans that are understood, and the
instillation of confidence.
Personal contact.
I do not want to suggest that it is
a requirement or even desirable for
an army commander or, indeed, a bat
talion commander to spend his whole
time dashing about the battlefield per
petually involved in minor tactics. This
he should not doo Certainly, an army
group commander or theater com
mander is drawn even more to other
occupations. But even at this level,
personal contact, and hence consider
able personal communication, are pos
sible and essential.
Today, mechanical and aeronautical
It Militaly Rn'ew
COMMUlllCAnoN
engineering have completely restored
mobility to the high commander.
Through the medium of television, he
can view any section of the battlefield
he selects. The helicopter permits a
commander in chief to visit, see, and
communicate in person with subordi
nate commanders almost as readily as
the Duke of Marlborough at Blenheim.
Does not the equipment now on the
threshold of service suggest to us that
military chess has become feasible?
, I do not believe so. If commanders
become remote from their units, they
will not only lose the ability to com
municate their' ideas personally to
those who do the fighting, but also
they will deny themselves the return
1I0w of ideas from their troops. They
will forget that, in the end, however
brilliant the plan, however competent
the stair, and however excellent the
weapons and equipment, a battle is
decided by the individual fighting man.
Qroup uJlIty
A special form of communication
which deserves more study is the prob
lem of relating what can be called the
cause, sense of purpose, or faith.
Sociologists say that men fight in
close combat because of group loyalty.
This does not necessarily mean loyalty
to the commander in chief, to the na
tion and its cause, to the general, or
even to the company commander. It
means loyalty within the platoon or
more often the squad. In his book on
the US soldier, Morris Janowitz re
marks that, in World War II, this
, single motivation activated wea!T men
to fight like tigers when attacked.
In the recorded history of war, it
is plain that, even in the bloodiest
campaigns of the past, there were long
periods when men were facing an en
emy, but not physically fighting. There
were long periods when men were to-
MIHllller 1819
tally out of contact, perhaps with
drawn to reserve or for refresher
training. What kept those men con
tent to be separated from their fam
ilies? What infiuenced them to go on
with whatever hazardous task came
next?
In World War I, it was enough for
the men involved that their country
called them to arms. In World War II,
the evidence of aggression was so
plain that, whatever the cost, men
came forward unhesitatingly to fight.
Ne. Era
Now, perhaps, we have entered a
new era. Apart from a fragment in our
Western society, men are literate. The
great majority of young men have
received a complete basic education
which increasingly teaches them, and
rightly, to question the policies of
government, including involvement in
wars distant from the homeland. In
Malaya, for instance, our men found
they were fighting men who were pre
pared to live hard and with great
deprivation for 10 years in the jungle
because they were imbued with the
Communist faith or the Communist
cause.
In Korea, our soldiers found that
they were fighting an enemy who was
dedicated to the view that the United
Nations was an instrument of inter
national capitalism and that all those
fighting for the United Nations were,
therefore, war criminals. Crude prop.
aganda was directed unsuccessfully at
our men in the fighting line and some
what more intensively, but without too
much result, at the prisoners who fell
into Communist hands.
The fact is that there were periods
during the Malayan insurrection and
Korean War when men wondered what
on earth it was that had brought them
thousands of miles to a land they had
85
COMMUNICAlIOII
VS A""II
General pf the Army DongJas MacArthur
aehieved mueh by perllOlUll contaet and
communication in the Paei1Ic in World
War n
never heard of, to fight in extremes of
climate, among people who did not
seem particularly to care whether they
were there or not. It took leaders of
imagination and commanders of abil
ity 'in the business of communication
to put matters right.
I believe that General Matthew B.
Ridgway saw what was happening
when he took command in Korea. For
tunately, he knew how to remedy the
problem and quickly communicated to
all concerned the answers to the ques
tion of, ''Why are we here and what
are we fighting for?" To him, the
issues were crystal clear. This is part
of his message which he issued to
every individual:
The 1'lIUl is81U8 lIII'e whether the
power of Western ci1Jilkation IJIt God
has penn,itted it to jfqwer in. our be
1o1Ied. lGruts 8luJU defy GM defeGt
Commun.iBm; whether the rule of men.
I.
who shoot their priII_s, _lIwe
their eitUsna GfI.d. tleride the dignWg &f
men. sluJU displa,ee the rule &/ th&se
to whom the i1UU'IIidIuU GM his indio
WWal rights Gre euered.. In. the
fiMl Mialyais the iBBue MW i&ined,
right here in. KorBG, is whether C_
muniBm or WU'IIidIuU freerlhm- sluJU
pre_il, GfI.d. whether the flight of feOll'
dri1llJfl. pet)'J1le sluJU be checked. or 81uJll
Gt some distant future, lw.wB1J8r dis
tant, engulf our Io1Ied. _ itt GU its
miB8r1J GM de/lflfir. These Gf'8 the
thi.ngIJ for which we fight.
'llcetime """.m
If this problem exists in war, the
problem in peace is even more com
plex. We have this paradox. We have
governments, at least in the Western
democracies, which are well aware
that war does not settle international
problems-it only reshuffles them. Yet
they are sometimes left with no alter
native but to make war, and all the
time they are obliged to be prepared
for it. At the same time, there is a
daily clamor which directly or in
directly attacks the concept of na
tional defense-a clamor which is
broadcast to every part of the nation.
Now, our servicemen can scarcely
be immune to these pressures. There
is a need to communicate to them that,
irrespective of public clamor, what
they are doing is worthwhile. Ideas
may differ on how to put this point
across. But however much those ideas
may vary, one principle is firm-the
environment must be true and honest.
It must not be equivocal; it must not
be ambiguous.
If we are to make the point in our
own military society that our member
ship is an honorable form of service to
the nation and one which is dedicated
to protecting our own ideas of justice,
humanity, and integrity, the environ
IIIIIf1rJ Int..
ment in which we communicate must
be one in which there is sincere prac
tice in these ideals. Every officer must
have those qualities which are based
on honesty and simple integrity. In
peace, this same requirement for high
principles must prevail if we are to
communicate the moral reasons for
retaining fighting men and for being
a fighting man.
RI&IItnlU of Causl
The armed forces in democratic
countries are under the direction and
control of civilian political leaders of
the government. They are used to en
force political aims when diplomatic
efforts fail. Sometimes the rightness
of the cause for which soldiers are
required to fight is self-evident such
as in World Wars I and II. But there
are occasions when the rightness of
the cause is far less evident, and, when
this happens, commanders have a se
rious problem.
In the British Army, we have been
faced with such situations on several
occasions. One might say that, in the
American War of Independence, Gen
eral George Washington and his sol
diers had a burning faith in the jus
tice of their cause. I suspect that the
British Army in that war fought with
much less of its usual skill, courage,
and devotion because it had little faith
in the cause for which it was ftghting.
The problem today is accentuated
because of the infiuence of mass cir
CUlation mediums which have an enor
mous effect on public opinion. It would
be stupid to think that we, as members
of that public, are not influenced. With
conflicts such a8 that in Vietnam to
day or Suez which so badly split Brit
ish public opinion, how does the com
mander convince his soldiers that their
cause is right?
I can only suggest that commanders
H,....r 1818
CDMIIUMlCAlIOM
be guided by two principles: loyalty
to the government and honesty in what
is aaid to the soldiers. I also believe
that, whatever his convictions and re
ligion, it is part of the officer's duty
to encourage and reflect sound spirit
ual values. We should never under
estimate the power of example.
Finally, there is the problem of com
municating with the civilian public.
There is a case for saying that, in a
democracy, the armed forces may not
seek to influence the public by com
munication of' their principles and
ideas. The basis for this view is that
such activity might encroach on gov
ernment preserves. But the armed
forces, I believe, have a duty to the
people from whom they obtsin their
recruits and their funds, to demon
strate that the armed forces are men
of principle. as well as men of pro
fessional skill. But how is it to be
done?
General Matthew B. mclpay elfeetlvely
eommanlcated the parpoae of the Korean
War to the men of the 8th Army
17
COMMUNICADON
The, service agencies which are in
the best JIO$ition to communicate with
the public are, I believe, units in per
manent bases scattered throughout the
homeland. I believe all of us have
many opportunities to involve our
selves with local community work. In
my own country, we are trying to
develop our communication with the
public, informing them and broaden
ing their understanding of what we
are trying toao for the nation. There
are many oppOrtunities to contact and
communicate with the civilian com
munity through industry, research and
development, and through the univer
sities.
I am not saying that we should enter
the civil community under the guise
of doing good works while actually
engaged as secret agents of services
propaganda. I am suggesting that we
should not il!olate ourselves from the
civil communities from which we
spring or'among whom we live. If the
armed forces hope for the suPpOrt of
the public in time of pesce, ,the indi
vidual members of the forces must
identify themselves as a part of the
public. A development of this 88socia
tion will be that those areaS of society
we enter must, in time, become better
informed about our reasons for being
in the profession of arms and, per
haps, be infiuenced by the principles
we insist on in our behavior.
I cannot, of course, claim that what
I am proposing in this context is ap
, plicable in the United States. But I
should expect to find that we do have
in common in our services the need to
maintsin a close communication of
ideas through all ranks, not less 88
time goes on, but more so as education
advances and the general level of in
telligence is enhanced.
Communication is only one of the
important factors in leadership and
man-management. It is one of the
factors in establishing the right rela
tionship between the commander and
commanded, between the military man
and the civilian. In my command, the
tssk of man-management is given a
higher priority than skill at arms or
professional ability. Management is
the officer's job. Someone has said, "In
any army, there are no good regiments
and no bad regiments. There are onlY
good and bad officers." I suggest that
we all see to it that we are all good
officers.
At the man-to-man leve), our leaders must be able to handle the personal
and often very emotional problems found in every generation-indeed in
society itself.
General William C. Westmoreland
.. MIlItIIy "
A . l l r t ) ~
From NATO's Fifteen Nations
O
N THE last day of 1968, the So
viet Union became the first na
tion in the world to fly a supersonic
airliner. In itself, this was but a
minor achievement. Even a cursory
glance at the TU-l.U is sufficient to
reveal how much it owes to the Con
corde, and particularly to the British
engineers whose pioneer work on nar
row delta ogival wings made both
designs possible. Also, like the Con
cortle, it still has to prove its capabili
ties in supersonic flight and as a
practical commercial transport air
craft for everyday service.
Far more significant is this further
evidence of the ability of the Soviet
aircraft industry to meet promptly
and efficiently every demand made
upon it by the USSR's civil airline,
Aeroflot, and the nation's armed serv
ices. The end products are not always
so economical or sophisticated as their
Nlvellbar 1869
SOVIET
AIRP8WfR
John W. R. Taylor
89
SOVIET A1RPOWER
The An-II Cock long-raDge, heavy transport aircraft has lifted a payload of nearly
99 tons
Western counterparts, but they seem
to evolve from drawing board to op
erational use remarkably quickly and
then to function reliably in the job
they were designed to do.
AeToftot is the largest airline in the
world. Last year, it carried 62 million
passengers, provide!l air ambulance
services throughout the whole vast
territorY of the Soviet Union, hauled
more than one and one-half million
tons of cargo to remote aress of Sibe
ria and the Far North, and sprayed
and dusted with chemicals immense
areas of crops and forests. This year,
80 new services are being opened, and
the total passengers carried will ex
ceed 68 million. The increase of six
million in one year is equivalent to
the total of passengers carried an
nually by the Royal Dutch Airlines
This ankle was condensed
tTmn the origiMl, published in
NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS (The
Neth8f'laflds) April-Mil/II 1969,
und8f' the title, "An Industry to
En'll1/." ClYP1Jf'ight @ 1969 by
NATO's FIFTEEN NATIONS.
8e
(KLM) the British Overseas Airways
Corporation (BOAC), and Iberia
added together.
The Soviets, with their planned
economy, never put into simultaneous
production two aircraft to do the same
job. All fit nicely into a pattern of
types, each aircraft, from largest to
smallest, having its importsnt part to
play in the over-all pictUre of com
mercial air transport and militsrY air
power.
They are not greatly concerned
The MI-l' Barite fty)ng crane haa a pay
load capacity of over 15 tons. A new ver
sion designated the Mi-12 is reported to
have lifted more than 30 ton&
IlIIb" .Ill
about the limited success achieved to
date in the export market outside the
circle of the Warsaw Pact countries
and the Soviet Union's other political
friends and allies. The primary task
of the Soviet aircraft industry is to
satisfy domestic requirements; if its
products also prove attractive to other
air forces and airlines, this is good.
If they do not, so what?
Du.I-Parpose Aircraft )
Some of the Soviet commercial air
craft also serve as military transports,
and, in this respect, it is interesting
to note that the Soviet Air Force has,
up to now, tended to prefer turboprop
to turbojet aircraft in this role. Stand
ard troop and freight transport for
many years has been the An-II Cub, a.
rear-loading development of the civil
An-tO Cat airliner. Some An-U's are
used by Aerofiot and foreign airlines
for cargo carrying in areas where air
fields are rough or nonexistent, and
the success of these aircraft undoubt
edly inspired design of the gargan
tuan An-II Cock.
First 1I0wn on 27 February 1965,
the An-II spans 211 feet four inches
and has a takeoff weight of nearly 250
tons. Ita capabilities have been dem
onstrated by a series of record fiights
in which it has lifted a payload of
nearly 99 tons. It is so big that one en
ters the main cabin through a door in
the undercarriage fairing.
At the moment, there is no indica
tion of whether Aerofiot can find em
ployment for such a huge machine on
a regular basis. Military An-SI's have
been displayed disembarking batteries
of Frog-8 surface-to-Burface and Ga
nef surface-to-air missiles on tracked
launchers. It seems, therefore, that
the An-Ii is destined to be the Soviet's
counterpart to the even bigger US jet
powered C-5A military transport.
SOVIET AlRPOWER
The USSR has, of course, always
specialized in building giant airplanes.
The first big four-engined airplane, in
1913, was Igor I. Sikorsky's La Grand
built at Kiev. In the 1930's, the
eight-engined ANT-SO Marim Gorky
spanned 206 feet and carried even a.
printing press on which propaganda
leafiets could be produced as it lIew
from city to city.
Today, in addition to the An-S!, the
Soviet aircraft industry is building
the world's biggest helicopters-so
large, in fact, that they could carry as
payload the biggest helicopters built
in the West.
Largest of those in service are the
Mi-6 Hook passenger and freight
transport (66 passengers or 12 tons of
cargo) and its fiying-crane counter
part, the Mi-IO Harke. Powered by
two 6,600-shaft-horsepower D-16V
turboshafts. these aircraft are in both
commercial and military service in the
Soviet Union and overseas. One Mi-l0
has even been bought by a US com
pany, as it has no competitor any
where-at least, it had not until now.
WelptLlftlnl Record
News has recently come from Mos
cow of a remarkable weight-lifting
record set by a new helicopter desig
nated the V-I! (Mi-1!). Said to have
several turboshaft engines of 6,500
shaft horsepower each; this hitherto
unknown machine is reported to have
lifted a payload of more than SO tons.
It is clearly one of the most remark
able aircraft of the present era, and
further details will be awaited with
interest.
Soviet designers can offer a com
plete range of other helicopters for
civil and military use, including the
28-seat, twin-turbine MiaS Hip, the
eight-aeat, twin-turbine Mi-!, and the
Ka-!6 Hoodlum, powered by two 325
81
lntmlvia
SOVIET AlRPOWER
horsepower piston engines and able to
a variety of different pods for
passenger and freight transport, agri.
cultui'al spraying eqUipment, survey
ing gear or slung loads in a flying
crane role.
So far, there has
Tupolev twinjet, all-weather, long-range
intereeptors (the FUltlkr) earrying Ash
air-to-air missiles
viet helicopters. Piston-engined Mi-J,
Hounda often carry a turret-mounted
under their nose to keep
down the hcads of the opposition as
they put down their assault troop pas
sengers, but the only true military
"chopper" seen so far is the Kamov
helicopter known to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization as Harp. This is
carried by the antisubmarine Ship
MOBkua and other vessels and is also
in service as a 12-seat troop transport.
It is interesting to note that the
Mi-' is being built in Poland rather
than in the Soviet Union. In this way,
the Soviets can give useful eJIlploy.
ment to the aircraft industries of
their friends and allies and get as
many aircraft as needed for their own
use I without tying up factories and
skilled personnel on types of relatively
minor importance. For the same res
. son, the USSR meets its requirements
for military jet basic and advanced
trainers by buying L-BS Delfim de
signed and built in Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovakian and Polish in
dustries; in particular, have also sup
plemented Soviet production of MiG
fighters for many years to meet their
own requirements and those of for
eign air forces to which combat air
craft have been supplied. This has
often been done free of charge in
strategic areas such as Cuba, the
Middle East, Africa, Indonesia, and
Vietnam.
"Pllofs Airplane"
The principal type exported in re
cent years has been the MiG-'l Fish
bed single-seat fighter. In its initial
form, as the MiG-'lF Fishbed-C clear
weather fighter, it was a "pilot's air
plane," pleasant to fly, comparatively
simple to maintain, and with a speed
approaching Mach 2. It was, however,
rather short of radar, weapons, and
range by Western standards. Some of
the shortcomings are eliminated in the
current MiG-'lPF FishbecJ,..D which
has a larger radar and extra fuel, but
armament is still light, consisting nor
mally of two AtoU air-to-air missiles
in the class of the US Sidewinder.
In simultaneous production for the
Soviet Air Force and export through
out the 1960's has been the Su-rB Fit
ter single-seat, close support fighter
bomber. This is a formidable aircraft,
with an engine in the 22,OOO-pound
thrust class, a speed of Mach 1.6, and
MDltary RIVIDW
III
SOVIET AlRPOWER
NATO'. FittHrl Natiotu
Yakovlev VTOL fighter (the Freehamf) has demonstrated a hover and tarn at a 160
foot altitude
Ju..... All u.. World'. AircnJft
MiG.II F01&1HIt twin-jet, aU-weather fighter is reportedly equal to or better than
anything eomparable In the West
83
SOVIET AlRPOWER
an armament eomprising two 30-milli
meter guns in the wings and under
wing rocket pods or up to six bombs.
It has replaced earlier trPes such as
the [l-18 twin-jet light bomber and
has limited all-weather capability.
Furthermore, the Soviet aircraft in
dustry is investigating ways of in
pair of lift jets; the others were more
thought provoking.
Another unidentified Single-seat,
single-engined STOL tighter (the
Faithless) appears to be an extremely
businesslike msehine of typical MiG
delta-wing layout with conventionsl
tail surfaces. Of particular interest is
creasing ita versatiHty still further by ita tail which appear
This Sukhoi twin-Jet tstical lighter (the Flgon-B) has two tift jets that give a STOL
capablnt,
giving it a short takeo/f and landing
(STOL) capability.
The 1967 airahow included a proto
type "swing-wing" aircraft, built by
the extremely simple method of pivot
ing the outer 13 feet of each wing of
an Su,.7B and fitting larger fences and
leading-edge slats to sort out the air
flow. With typical Soviet ingenuity,
the fences are made to serve a double
purpose by carrying attachments for
external equipment.
There is no evidence that this vari
able geometry Su,.7 will be anything
but a one-time experiment, but it un
derlines the importance that the So
viet Union attaches to o/f-runway,
close support airpower. So did the
surprise appearance of three proto
types fltted with vertically mounted
lift jets to provide STOL performance.
One was a standard MiG-.1PF, with
an additional 4-foot fuselage section,
inserted aft of the cockpit to house a
to be almost identical with those of
Mlkoyan's single-seat, swing-wing
fighter (the Flogger) which was also
seen for the first time in 1967.
This is typical of Soviet ingenuity
and economy of e/fort. It was seen be
fore in the Sw-7B and Su-9 Fiakpot
all-weather interceptors which are
swept-wing and delta-wing versions of
the same basic airframe. Both are
good aircraft although the Su-9 seems
to have been reserved mainly for home
defense as a longer range partner for
the MiG-.1PF, possibly with more ef
fective radar and certainly with more
formidable Anab missiles.
Each Su-9 appears to carry one
Anab with an infrared-homing head
and an Anab with a radar-homing
head for flexibility in attack. Such a
mix,ture seems standard on Soviet in
terceptol'll.
There is no reason to doubt that the
swing-wing Flogger will become the
B4
SOVIET A1RPOWER
next generation, close-support aircraft
of the Soviet Air Foree if it can be
produced and put into service without
too many problems. In its favor, it is
simpler than the US F-ll1A, with air
intakes similar to those of the F-4
Phantom 11 and only one engine.
The Soviet industry owes much of
its success to such emphasis on sim
plicity which reduces problems and
promotes reliability at some cost in
operational effectiveness. On balance,
this is probably wise, as 100 aircraft
that work, in the air, are more of an
asset than 100 better aircraft that
were too expensive to build or too com
plex to stay serviceable for long.
AddltiDnal Flabters
The 1967 airshow produced two
other surprises in the form of new
single-seat, twin-jet fighters by Miko
yan and Sukhoi which are clearly in
tended as follow-ons to the MiG-!l
and to the Su-7 and S'iWI family. Both
appeared in small formations, imply
ing that they were then at the pre
prodUction stage, and both were de
scribed as high-altitude interceptors
although the MiG-!8 Fo:x:bat appears
to offer great potential as a multirole
fighter.
Sukhoi's new twin-jet, probably des
ignated Su-ll FlagOfl,oA, is yet an
other extrapolation of an existing
design. The wings and tail unit of the
S'iWI seem to have been put on a new
fuselage with twin afterburning tur
bojets in the tail and a powerful new
radar in the nose, necessitating a
switch to side air intakes. The result
is probably in the Mach 2.5 category,
and its high potential was underlined
further by the appearance of FlagOfl,o
B, a similar aircraft with lift jets in
stalled in the center fuselage to give
it STOL performance.
It is likely that Flagon will become
a standard weapon in the Soviet air
armory, but the aircraft that should
cause even more concern in the West
is the MiG-!8. This is probably the
finest combat aircraft the Soviet
Union has yet produced and is equal
to or better than anything comparable
in Western air forees.
Powered by two 24,25O-pound
thrust afterburning turbojets, the
The Mikoyan variable geometry fighter
(the Phlgger) with wings fully spread.
Similar to the US P-Ill, this aircraft
Is ezpeeted to become the Soviet's next
generation, close support fighter.
MiG-!8 can also be expected to offer a
ground attack capability. This is sig
nificant, as one of the types the Soviet
Air Force most needs .for the mid
1970's is a close support fighter with
a combat radius of 350 to 500 miles to
eliminate enemy frontline tactical air
power in the opening hours of any
future war.
The MiG-!8 appears to be just such
an aircraft, and its performance has
been revealed dramatically by a series
of officially recognized records in
which it has covered closed circuita of
500 and 1,000 kilometers at speeds of
1,852.61 miles per hour and 1,814.81
miles per hour respectively, the latter
with a two-ton payload at a height of
72,000 feet. Clearly, it is a Mach 3
aircraft, and its unique twin-fin tail
85
som AlRPOWER
assembly has already inlluenced the
design of the US Navy's F-14, one of
the most important new Western com
bat aircraft projects.
The other major new combat type
that the Soviet Union can be expected
to t1roduce by the mid-1970's is a
bomber destroyer that is able to cruise
above 20,000 feet and use pulse-Dop
pler radar and "snap-down" missiles
to 100000te and attack tactical combat
aircraft penetrating its airspace at
high speed. at ground level. Tupolev's
big twin-jet interceptor (the Fiddler)
and its ABh missiles appear to be well
on the way toward such an aircraft.
This would be a great challenge to
Western air forces, compelling even
greater emphasis on advanced elec
tronic countermeasures equipment,
terrain-following radar for llight at
200 feet, and "snap-up" defensive mis
siles.
Add to these superb new aircraft
the already established types such as
the M-lI (Be-1S) Mail twin-turbo
prop maritime reconnaissance amphib
ian, the latest maritime reconnais
sance-attack versions of the big Tu-SO
Bear, the early warning version of
the Tu-114 with overfuselage saucer
radome, the Tu-II Blinder twin-jet
supersonic strategic and maritime re
connaissance bomber with standoff
missile, and the Yak-Sa Brewer, Fire
bar, and Maestro family of supersonic
tactical fighter bombers and all
weather interceptors, and the result is
a superior lineup of modern war
planes. Furthermore, the two Yakov
lev vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) prototypes (the Freehand)
shown at the airshow prove that the
Soviets are aware of the potential of
Britain's Harrier although not able
to match it at this time.
In sum, therefore, the Soviet air
craft industry is weD able to meet
domestic demands and those of its
friends and allies. Its aeroengines still
lack the service life of those in the
W e s ~ , high ratings being preferred to
long periods between overhaul. It also
trails the West in equipment, instru
mentation, and electronics. It is, how
ever, getting better every year, and,
before long, Britain, the United
States, and France can expect tougher
competition in the export field, even
with nations that have until now been
traditional customers.
MllituJ RIYI.w
98
NOTES
UNITED STATES
'Air Pickup System
A high-speed, air-ground pickup
system of "snatching" casualties from
isolated, denied, or inaccessible areas
is being tested by the Army.
The system includes a container, in
which the casualty is placed, and a
tether which is held in the sky by a
helium-ftlled balloon. Pickup is then
accomplished by an aircraft which
engages the tether with a skyhook
anchor system mounted in its nose.
The container, with the casualty, is
pulled up into the air and eventually
retrieved into the aircraft. The sys
tem is delivered to the recovery area
by parachute.-US Army release.
Ribbon Brld,e Proposed
A "ribbon" bridge to provide a con
tinuous floating roadway for .water
crossing in assault operations has been
proposed by the US Army Combat
Developments Command.
This new and improved bridge will
allow construction five times faster
with approximately one-half the per
sonnel presently required for float
bridging. Used for tactical vehicles
weighing up to 60 tons, the bridge
will inCOrPOrate lifting points and
slings to facilitate movement and
placement by helicopters.
Normally, the assault bridge will be
moved and launched by vehicle trans
porters, then emplaced and held in
position by bridge erection boats. A
bridge set capable of spanning ap
proximately 400 feet will consist of
ArM" ,Loj;Mtieia.II
New n"bbon bridge holds lORds up to 60
tous
eight ramp elements and 16 interior
bays. The design requirement also calls
for the capability of multiple bays to
be used as rafts to ferry loads weigh
ing up to 60 tons.
Ease of construction will permit
crews to form the bridge at about 22
feet per minute.
Tentative issue is planned as one
set per engineer float bridge company.
-Army LogiBtici4n.
87
MILITARY NOTES
Fort Lemaw/IrtIJ HIli of Flme
A Hall ot Fame is to be established
at the ,US Army Command and Gen
eral Staff College to recognize out
standing US Army members of all
ranks and grades who have been sta
tioned at Fort Leavenworth, and who
have made a significant contribution to
US Army achievement, tradition, or
history.
No person will be eligible until a
minimum of five years after death or
retirement. At least 15 but not more
than 80 m ~ m b e r s will be selected ini
tially to the Hall of Fame, with sub
sequent annual selections of not more
than three additional members.
The Selection Committee will consist
of nationally recognized civilian or
military leaders.
The Hall of Fame is sponsored and
financed by the Henry Leavenworth
Chapter, Association of the US Army.
Test for 'C-S' Cargo Capability
A year-long series of testa of the
C-S Gcdawg aircraft's capability to
deliver troops and cargo began in -Oc
tober.
A major portion of the test program
conducted jointly by the Air Force and
Army will be devoted to air drop of
equipment and men. Drops will begin
with dummy troop and cargo loads and
progress to a composite drop of 75
paratroopers and full-capacity cargo
load next summer.
The C-s is designed to airlift
200,000 pounds of outsize equipment,
including Army tanks, trucks, and
their operators. Paratroopers will rep
resent the 75 drivers and support per
sonnel who normally would fly on the
second deck of the airfreighter.
Near the end of the program, tests
will also be made to demonstrate the
emergency cargo-jettison capability of
the aircraft.-US Air Force release.
New Breed of Ship Is In Service
A new type of vessel, designed and
built to fill specific demands, is now in
operation in the Caribbean, according
to a recent announcement.
The Paflltmerica is considered the
most sophisticated vessel ever de
signed and built for the Caribbean
trade, and its appearance is attracting
tremendous interest.
Roll-on and ):oll-off is the basic prin r
ciple ot the ship; however, its ramp is
longer and than in
A_Ii. LI..... Ltd.
PtlIIIItlmalk. sister ship of the PlUUlJlleJ'ka
ships. Without augmentation of its
equipment, it can handle weights in
excess of 70 tons, loaded and dis
charged through the huge bow door.
A large elevator is installed which can
lift weights of 35 tons. Every trailer
station-and presently there are 30
is equipped with electric refrigeration
plug-ins.
The Paflltmerica is designed to
beach and retract without assistance.
Its draft can be radically changed in a
few minutes by means of the ballast
ing system. With a full load, it can be
ballasted to a draft ot nine feet. Its
twin screws and controllable-pitch
propellers facilitate easy maneuvera
bility, 80 that its 260-foot length can
be asfely navigated under conditions
that would restrict much smaller ves
sels.-News item.
, MilltaJJ R.....
88
SAC Dispersal Plan
The Air Force, to improve the sur
vivability of the strategic aircraft
fleet, plans to disperse a portion of its
bomber and tanker force away from
Strategic Air Command (SAC) home
bases to other military airfields.
Known as "satellite basing," the
plan will also reduce the time required
to launch the strategic alert force.
Plans call for dispersing even more
alert aircraft over the next two years.
The aircraft, crews, and some sup
port personnel will rotate periodically
from their main operating base. Air
craft and crews at the dispersal bases
will be on alert as part of SAC's global
strike force.-Armed Forces loorML
Units Honored
Eight stained-glass windows have
been installed in the interwing gal
leries of the J. Franklin Bell Hall at
the US Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. The
windows depict the C ~ t s of Arms of
eight Army regiments that are linked
historically with Fort Leavenworth:
3d Infantry
6th Infantry
17th Infantry
20th Infantry
4th Artillery
1st Cavalry
7th Cavalry
10th Cavalry
Installation of the windows is a
project of the Bell Hall Memorial As
sociation, a nonprofit organization or
ganized to perpetuate the history and
tradition of old Army line units. Plans
are being made to install eight addi
tional windows with the Coats of Arms
of units with historic significance. Al
though consideration is given to the
oldest units, the unique achievements
as representative of the arm of service
are major factors in selection.
MIUTARY NOTES
The ,700 cost of each window is
provided solely by voluntary contribu
tions, and the total number of units to
be displayed will depend on the amount
of funds received. The association wel
comes all contributions and corre
spondence regarding units which
should be considered for selection.
Elmatla, Macblne
A revolutionary p i ~ of equipment
undergoing prototype testing by the
Army is Repetitive Explosive Device
for Soil Disaggregation and Displace
ment (REDSOD).
Presently, earth is excavated by
bulldozer, front-end loader, crane
shovel, or ditching machine. Maximum
capacity for any piece of this equip
ment, at best, on large excavating
projects is about 126 cubic yards per
hour. Theoretically, REDSOD has the
potential to excavate as much as
160,000 cubic yards in an hour.
The device, which weighs less thsn
26 tons, uses a controlled explosion to
move earth. The machine consists of
a dozer blade with multiple chambers
mounted on it. Into these chambers a
mixture of compressed air and fuel is
fed. When sufficient pressure has been
built up, spark plugs ignite the mix
ture. It is then released by valves and
expended through slots at the base of
the blade which has been pushed into
the earth. The force of this controlled
explosion literally blasts the earth out.
The chambers would each fire six to
eight times a minute making for a
continuous eruption of the earth.
. The machine would be able to op
erate in soil and soft rock. Require
ments for REDSOD call for it to con
trol the direction of the earth being
excavated 80 that it would fall in
windrows five to 20 feet from the
worksite.-US Army release.
II
IIILlTARY NOlES
Coast 8m Tests ACY
The Coast Guard is testing an air
cushion vehicle (ACV) as a possible
alternative to present Coast Guard
vessels and aircraft; The craft is be
ing tested for multimissions of search
and rescue, logistics, aids to naviga
tion service, and law enforcement.
The ACV can enter areas inacces
sible to small boats, and can operate
under weather conditions which pre
clude use of a helicopter. The vessel
travels over water, ice, snow, marsh
land, and dry terrain, and is able
. to m'lve easily from one surface to
another.
The ACV cruises at 50 knots and
can carry up to 20 passenge17s. The
38-foot hovercraft carries a three-man
crew, but also can be operated by one
man if necessary.-Armed FO,TeeB
Journal.
Freedrop Containers
The Army is developing freedrop
disposable containers to deliver drink
ing water and possibly other beverages
and dry food items to units operating
with minimum support and equipment
in'remote areas.
, The three-gallon containers will
withstand freedrop impacts from heli
copters or fixed-wing aircraft flying at
speeds of 180 knots at altitudes be
tween 50 to 250 feet.-US Army re
lease.
Army to Test 'Omega' System
The Army has awarded a contract
to make dry-land tests of the Omega
navigation system developed by the
Navy for shipboard and airborne use
(MR, Apr 1969, p 101).
The Omega system, now partially
operational, eventually will use only
eight very low frequency radio trans
mitters to blanket the globe. A ship
with an Omega receiver is able to fix
its position with an accuracy of one or
two miles, under any weather condi
tions, day or night.
The Army system, using a differen
tial technique, is expected to provide
accuracies at least 10 times greater
than the basic Omega positions.
Omega is the first worldwide naviga
tion system which can be used by all
types of vehicles.-News item.
Defense Spending Cut
The Department of Defense has ap
proved an additional expenditure re
duction that brings the total cutback
in defense spending to 4.1 billion dol
lars in Fiscal Year 1970.
The new cutback will mean a reduc
tion in civilian and military manpower
by more than 150,000; lay up about
100 ships; reduce flying operations by
800,000 hours; and cause some bases
to be closed.-DOD release.
Army Eliminates SRF Mission
The Department of Army has elim
inated the Selected Reserve Force mis
sion (SRF).
The SRF Program was uudertaken
in July 1965 with the mission of in
creasing the readiness of certain se
lected Reserve component units. These
units were authorized additional train
ing assemblies, 100-percent strength,
and higher equipment priorities than
other Reserve units.
According to the announcement, im
provements in the readiness of both
active forces and the Reserve com
ponents eliminated the need for an
SRF as a separate entity.
Two divisions, four brigades, an ar
mored cavalry regiment, and numerous
combat support and combat service
support units have been relieved of the
SRF mission.-DOD release.
MIlIta/J Review
100
BRAZIL
Brazlliu-Bullt Aircraft
The first of, four prototype Bandei-o
ronte (Ezplorer) turboprop trans
ports is currently being flight tested.
The twin-enginej eight-passenger air
craft, built in Brazil, is the first
The Ban4eirtmfe
South American-designed gas turbine
engine aircraft.
The Brazilian Air Force will ftll its
transport, training, aerial photogra
phy, and aeromedical rescue require
ments with the Bandeirome which
cruises at 232 knots at 10,000 feet
and has a range of 1,120 miles.
Although no definite export plans
have been announced, it is expected
that the Brazilian Government will
seek military and civil markets for the
aircraft in Latin America.-Armed
Forces Managemem, 1969.
TURKEY
CENTO War Game Held in Ankara
The combined Military Planning
Staff of the Central Treaty Organiza
tion (CENTO) has conducted a war
game as part of its annual militsry
training program.
The exercise, called Zanieer IV, was
designed to exchange views on CEN
TO problems and to practice senior
officers of the participating countries
in working together on an interna
tional and interservice basis.-CEN
TO release.
MIUTARY NOTES
WARSAW PACT
N a ' ~ 1 Maneuvers '8 Metllterraneu
Bulgaria has recently announced
participation with the Soviet Union in
a Mediterranean naval exercise. The
number and type of Bulgarian naval
ships was not disclosed. The Bulgarian
NavY is believed to have two destroyer
escorts, eight coastal escorts, and two
submarines as its total warships. It is
clear their contribution in joint exer
,cises with Soviet naval forces could
have been only nominal with little
military significance.
On the other hand, the political im
pact may be more significant. By in
troducing Bulgarian warships into the
Mediterranean in exercises with So
viet naval units, the USSR is now in a
position to claim that the North Atlan
tic Treaty Organization naval forces
in the Mediterranean are now opposed
not by the USSR alone but by ''War
saw Pact" forces.-Radio Liberty Re
search.
REPUBUC OF 'CHINA
Reorpnlzatlon of Armed Forces
The Republic of China is planning a
major reorganization of its 600,000
man armed forces in an effort to mod
ernize into a somewhat smaller, better
armed, and more mobile &trike force.
Savings are to be applied toward rais
ing military pay scales.
The basic idea of the new program
is to compensate for the smaller size
force with increased firepower and
mobility. UH-IH helicopters, which
have proved useful in Vietnam, will be
added to the force. With a five million
dollar loan from the United States, the
Chinese Nationalists are to build a
helicopter factory in central Taiwan.
The Chinese have also acquired sev
eral squadrons of F-5 fighters and
several hundred tam.-News item.
101
MILnOY,NOlES
IRAN
Second 'Mk 5' Frltlte Launched
Artist's concept of the M1c S
A second Mk 5 frigate for the Iranian Navy, the Zool, has been launched.
Built by a British shipyard, the vessel will join a sister ship, the 800m, which
was delivered last year. Two more of the warships have been ordered and are
under construction.
The frigates have a displacement of 1,290 tons, with a speed of 39 knots.
Armament consists of the 8eaca,t missile system: antisubmarine weapons, in
cluding a light helicopter; plus a conventional gun turret forward and aft.-La,
Revue J(aritime.
USSR
Chinese Border Region Commander
A change in command has recently
taken place in the strategic Far East
ern Military District, headquartered
in Khabarovsk, Siberia, and bordering
on China.
Colonel General Vladimir F. To
lubko, a former deputy commander in
chief of the Soviet missile forces, has
replaced Colonel General Oleg A. Lo
sik, a mechanized force-armor special
ist who has held the post since 1967.
The shift occurred sometime after the
US8Uri River incidents in March 1969.
The new commander is senior to his
predecessor which could indicate an
upgrading of the command's forces
and importance. General Tolubko's
missile experience could also mean
that Soviet missile bases are being ex
tended along the border with China.
Radio Free Europe.
'Y' Class Submarine Cruises
Two of the Soviet Union's new Y
class nuclear-powered, missile-firing
submarines have been detected under
going shakedown cruises in the North
Atlantic oil Norway. The Soviets have
a total of five operational Y class
submarines in their northern fieet.
Each can carry 16 88-6 nuclear mis
siles of 1,500-mile range.-News item.
CANADA
Defense Farces Cut
In order to maintain defense spend
ing at the one billion-dollsr level over
the next three years, the Canadian
armed forces will be trimmed from
98,000 to 80,000 men.
Most of the personnel cuts will be
made in headquarters stalls. Several
bases will also be closed and the re
serve force reduced.-Armed Force8
Management, 1969.
MllituJ .,",.
102
Helicopter Hauldown System
A Canadian manufacturer has de
veloped a helicopter hauldown and
rapid-securing system for maritime
aviation designated the Boorlrap. It
c_em.,.;.,.
Beartrap hauls helicopter down to a
ship's flight dee!<
enables a shipborne helicopter to re
turn to its flight deck despite heavy
seas.
The aircraft is fitted with a retract
able probe through which a messenger
cable is lowered for attachment to the
hauldown cable. This cable comes up
through the center of the B6IIrlrcIf
securing device from the winch anll
powerpack unit located below the ftlght
deck.
While the system compensates for
pitch and roll of the ship, the aircraft
is winched down until the probe enters
the Bea,rtrap which snaps shut and
MILITARY NOTES
holds the helicopter firmly in place.
The system also provides the means
for traversing the helicopter into the
ship's hangar.
The device has been adopted by the
navies of Canada, the United States,
Japan, and West Germany. Twin sys
tems will be fitted to Canada's new
Tribal class helicopter-equipped de
stroyers.-Ca,1U!da Courier.
World's Fastest Warship
Canada's new fast hydrofoil escort
vessel bas reached a record 70 miles
per hour
N_A-.._
d'Or is a 151-foot prototype hydrofoil
designed to provide a long-range anti
submarine warfare cruising capa
bility.-News release.
IRAQ
Syria Bolsters Iraq
Syria has sent a force of 2,000
troops to Iraq as a gesture of support
in the conftict between Iraq and Iran
over the controversial Shatt-al-Arab
River frontier.
The new altercation with Iran places
Iraq in a difficult military position
since some 10,000 troops are stationed
In Jordan facing Israel and another
6,000 are bolstering Syrian forces on
the eastern front against Israel. Most
other Iraqi troops are committed to
fight the insurgent Kurdish forces in
the north of the country.-Armed
Forces Management, 1969.
103
MILITARY NOlES
sam AFRICA
Defense Buildup
South Africa is planning a big
buildup of its militsry datense, aecord
ing to a series of announcements by
the Defense Minister. Protection from
sea and air attacks will be enhanced by
the acquisition of a surface-to-air mis
sile system and air-to-air missiles, the
purchase of a 1Ieet of fast coastsl pa
trol craft and the possibility of equip
ping warships with missiles, and the
establishlnent of a radio communica
tion n e t w ~ r k that will stretch over the
South Atlantic and Indian Oceans to
the South Pole.
The establishment of special train
ing camps for antiguerrilla combat
forces - and military training for
women will be started in 1970 for
added pefense against guerrilla incur
sions.
The missile system, named CaelluB,
is designed to counter low-level attacks
by supersonic aircraft. Partly devel
oped by a French electronics firm, it
is ''the most advanced and effective
weapon of its kind in existence," ac
cording to the announcement.
The air-to-air missile is a purely
South African venture. It was recently
tested at the Saint Lucia rocket range
where South Africa's first guided mis
sile was launched in December of last
year.-News item.
CREAT BRITAIN
Ear.protector Headset
A British manufacturer has pro
duced a new battery-operated, esr-pro
tector headset which has a peak-limit
ing characteristic. It allows normal
speech and hearing in conditions such
as weapon testing and jet engine op
eration where damage to eardrums
might otherwise occur.
The headset has a hearing protector
at each ear fitted with a self-con
tained, sound-transmission channel
consisting of a microphone, amplifier,
and earphone. The combination pro
vides a channel at
N,.""
Combination microphone-amplifier-ear
phone headset
normal speech levels, but limits loud
noises to a safe level. The batteries,
which power the amplifiers, are
mounted on the hesdband, and the on
off switch has a visual indicator.
Nav1!.
REPUBLIC -OF KOREA
Air Force Sets 'F-4D' Jets
The first of a squadron of F-I,D
Phantom tactical fighters, to be pro
vided the Republic of Korea by the
United States, will be delivered before
the end of this year. Six of the 18 air
craft arrived in August.
The PkantomB will bolster the Re
public of Kores Air Force which con
sists primarily of F-88 and F-s fight
ers.-US Air Force release.
MllitaIJ RIIII.
104
SOCIAL SCINTlSTS AND INIERNAnONAL
AFFAIRS: AClse for I Soclollg of Social
ScIence. Edited b, EIlsabetll T. Crawford
and Albert D. Blderman, Burelu of Social
Science Rese., Inc., Wl$hlnllon, D. C.
333 Paps. John Wile, r. Sons, Inc., N. Y.,
1969. $11.95.
By LTC Roy D. WELLS, USA
Using the anthology format, the edi
tors admit that they are attempting
to "fit writings from different time
periods and with different orientations
into the broad framework of the so
ciology of social science."
The book includes selections from
such pioneers as Leonard S. Cottrell,
Jr. (one of the authors of the classic
World War II study, The Americ4n
Soldier), Leonard W. Doob, Harold D.
Lasswell, Charles E. Osgood, Edward
A. Shils, Florian Znanieeki, Morris
Janowitz, and other social scientists.
Particularly interesting is an essay
by Professor Irving L. Horowitz en
titled "The Life and Death of Project
Camelot!' This US Army-sponsored
research project attempted to define
scientifically the causes of revolutions
and insurgencies in underdeveloped
countries.
Conceived in 1963, it was killed in
July 1965 by the Secretary of Defense
after the study became a Latin-Ameri
can political issue.
Professor Horowitz viewed the Proj
ect Camelot cancellation as Govern
ment censorship and "an expression of
the contempt for social science so prev
alent among those who need it most."
Nivellller 1889
MILITARY
BOOKS
THE AMERICAN FIGHnNG MAN. By Victor
Hicken. 498 Paps. The Macmillan Co., N. Y.,
1969. $8.95.
By LTC ANTHONY"P. DE LUCA, USA
The history of America consists,
in large measure, of the story of its
armies and its wars. It follows, then,
that the American fighting man is an
essential part of that history. The
author has recognized this fact in
compiling a work whose stated and
achieved intent is a "tribute; simple,
direct and truthful."
Through an analysis of official his
tory, correspondent writings, ob
server reports, and personal letters,
Professor Hicken identifies the char
acteristics of the American fighting
man-his griping, pride, patriotism,
sense of comradeship, hravery, pa
tience, and love of adventure to name
a few. This is a far-reaching study
that touches on many sensitive areas
that include the eternal conflicts be
tween the professional and citizen
soldier, the problems encountered hy
the minority groups and their place in
and contributions to the services, the
conduct of our fighting men as con
querors and captives, and the long and
sometimes painful return home from
the wars.
The American Fighting Man is
highly recommended both for profes
sional reading and for personal enjoy
ment.
The illustrations, extensive footnot
ing, and bibliography add to its value
as a reference work.
105
MlUTAIY BOOKS
j!fO' lIIe AnII-Israell COD' .
11_ SafraI. 484
Y., 1_ $10.00 cloth
IilUdt$1.:,.,....d.
, By ltICJL\BD E. WILSON
This is really two excellent books
in one volume. The first half of the
volume, written before the six-cfay
war of June 1967, is a study of the
con1lict between the Arab nations
and Israel since the 'creation of the
state of IlI1'ael in 1948. It is a well
researched,resume of the Arab-Israeli
struggle and an analysis of the forces
attempting to achieve a viable Pan
Arabism. The author also depicts the
impact of big power involvement and
the events which led to Soviet involve
ment as a replacement for the' with
drawing French and British.
Over 100 pages are to an
analysis of the defense expenditures
of the Middle East nations, including
the . relation to their respective gross
national products. Detailed appen
dixes, tables, and figures support the
analysis and contribute to the reader's
underBtanding of the Middle East
arms race. The second half of the
book was written during the year fol
lowing the 1967 war.
'The events leading to the May-June
crisis and the war itself are described
oU a day-by-day basis. There lire good
maps of the three fronts and descrip
tions of many of the engagements.
The author summarizes the forces
currently at work and shows how the
elements of inter-Arab relations and
big power involvement have changed.
He describes the alternatives for the
future and stresses the importance of
United States-Soviet cooperation if a
final peace settlement is ever to be
come a reality.
This book is well worth the atten.
tion of the military reader.
THE AMPHIBIOUS CAMPAIGN FOR WEST
FLORIDA AND LdUJSllU, 1814-1815. A
Critic.. Review at lid at
New Orleans. ., Wilbiat S. BrllWll;' 233
P"IS. UnlnrsitJ at AIIlIama Press, UnI
versity, Ala., 1989. $10.00.
By LTC DAVID W. BLACKLEDGE, USA
The author has combined the care
ful research of a scholar with the mili
tary experience of a retired Marine
general in presenting this interesting
study. While many historians place
little importance on the results of the
Creek War and treat it separately
from'the "unnecessary" Battle of New
Orleans, Professor Brown sees An
drew Jackson's Indian campaign, the
invasion of Spanish West Florida, and
the subsequent defense against the
British amphibious force as an inte
grated series of brilliant counter
thrusts to thwart British plans for
securing the Gulf Coast.
The author points out that, although
the Treaty of Ghent was signed two
weeks before the final battle, the out
come at New Orleans assured its rati
fication and the subsequent relinquish
ment, in 1818, of British navigation
rights on the Mississippi River.
Admitting to an initial skepticism
toward Jackson's military reputation,
Professor Brown's research has con
vinced him of the general's sound
strategic instincts and superb tactical
leadership. General Edward M. Paken
ham is given sympathetic treatment
for assuming command of an already
unfavorable situation. The impact of
terrain and logistics upon esch com
mander's decisions are thoroughly re
vi4!f.ed through the critical eye of a
combat veteran.
The book is well supplemented with
sketch maps and an ample bibliogra
phy. It will appeal to historians and
general military readers alike.
MllItarJ lewl..
THE CHAMPAINE CAMPAIIN. a, Robert H.
AdItInI ami Co"'e' I... Waltoa. 298
PIps. UtUt. Brown .. Co., Boston, Mass.,
1. $7.95.
By LTC MILTON B. HALsEY, JR., USA
One of the Jesser known, or little
remembered, combat actions of World
War II was the airborne 888Bult into
the French Riviera by the American
1st Airborne Task Foree on 15 August
1944. Although somewhat eclipsed by
the earlier assaults of the American
82d and 10lst Airborne Divisions in
Normandy on D-Day. the "Champagne
Campaign" in Southern France was
successful in drawing Germans from
their defensive positions on the Medi
terranean Sea. disrupting their com
munications. It also protected the US
7th Army right flank on the northern
drive out of Southern France.
The authors have put together a
variety of narratives by actual par
ticipants in an informative account of
one of the most successful airborne
operations of the war.
TO LOSE ABATTLE: frlllCl1940. By Alistair
Home. 647 1'1111. UtUt. Brown .. Co.,
Boston, Mass., 1. $12.50.
By LTC FRANcIS A. IANNI. USA
To LOBe a. Ba.ttle is an account of
the critical lo-day period from 10 to
20 May 1940 when the German ar
mored columns slashed around the Ma
ginot Line to crush the armies of
France, Belgium, and Britain.
In setting the scene for the battle,
the author reviews the interwar period
and the distressing divisiveness and
erosion in French social, political, and
military life. Particularly poignant is
the contrast in military thought be
tween the major
on the German side and bankrupt on
the French.
BOOKS
Much of the ID8terial on the actual
battles comes from German sources
because their ftIes were captured after
the war while most French official doc
uments still have not been released.
The narration' is brought to life by
eyewitness accounts and reports from
both sides, including letters and dia
ries of privates and peasants, as well
as generals and important politicians.
Highly readable, "the account unfolds
like a novel while reID8ining honest
and true to the historical events.
THE ARABS AND ISRAEL: ABacQrouad Book.
a, Cllarles DDUJIaH!olle. 121h1'1. DuflIur
Editions, Inc., CII.ster Sprlnp, Pl., 1968.
$3.50.
By COL IRVING HEYMONT, USA,
Retired
The central theme of this book is
that Israel has ID8de a mistake in be
lieving Arab propaganda and conclud
ing that the Arabs prisent a mortal
threAt to the existence of Isrsel.
The author, a British journalist,
asserts that the Arabs are not a real
threat and that the Israelis need not
have started the war in June 1967. He
envisages a possible solution to the
political conftict in a binational state
in Israel in its postwar area "where
the Jewish community could preserve
its dynamism without being engulfed
by the Arabs, even by an Arab major
ity ." This solution, the author
claims, must come about through the
efforts of the Iuaelis and Arabs with
out outside inftuence.
The book suffers from oversimpli
fications and unsupported assertions.
It contributes little to understanding
the basic conftict between Arab and
Israeli nationalisms and the implica
tions for other countries with interests
in the area.
107
MILITARY. BOOIS
BIRO. JIll Cbrlstallstldl Bawe. By BrI,.
dleraln,,?1 S. L A., ...... ~ US Army
Reservl, .If' Operatius ,Analyst, US
ArnIJ'; bI, VletllllD.' ~ I I . IIJ Ueutenant
Colon.II.,D.,JI. HackWOrtII, ,US Arm,. In
cludlnl:$kltcbes IIJ the Author,'"IS.
Cowles EduCatlDn corp., N. Y., 11188: $3.15.
By LTC HENRy H. HARPER, USA
The author's uncanny ability to
portray the events as they transpired
in a logical yet personal and dynamic
manner-focused on the men involved
and what they did and what was done
to them-is never better demon
strated.
Bird is actually two books in one.
The first portion is devoted to re
creating the attempt of the 22d North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment
to overrun a fire base "Landing Zone
Bird" manned by elements of an in
fantry company and two artillery bat
teries of the 1st Cavalry Division. The
total force involved approximately 160
US soldiers. The attack was initiated
at 0105 on 26 December 1966. The
actions of the enemy leading up to
the attack have been re-created by the
author through interrogation of the
operations officer of the attacking
NVA regiment who was captured five
days after the attaCk.
The vivid re-creation of the action
within the fire base can be read and
re-read. As the author reports, news
paper accounts call1'ied the action as a
US defeat, although there were no
newsmen present. In reality, a dif
ferent story existed. The fire base was
not overrun, US casualties were 30
killed in action (KIA) while the NVA
lost over 300 KIA, and the equipment
loss ratio was equally favorable for
the US soldiers.
The second part of the book chron
ologically occurred first, transpiring
approximately four weeks before the
attack on Bird. It is the account of a
"typical" search operation; typical
only in the sense that its purpose was
to find or disprove the presence of the
enemy in the vicinity of a village.
Again, the accounts of individuals in
a collective, yet often singular, effort
while under fire are truly outstanding.
The author does not attempt to
evaluate the right and wrong of how
men were employed in the battles, but,
rather, to report in detail what tran
spired. However, the military reader
will, undoubtedly, find himself making
judgments on the tsctics involved.
BRITISH MILITARY BAYONETS: From 1700 to
1945. By R. J. Wilkinson Latham. 94 ' ..,s.
Arco 'ubllshlnl Co., Inc., N.Y., 1967. $8.50.
By COL PHILIP S. NEWTON,
British, Army
To one who has lived with the bayo
net for the last 30 years, it came as a
surprise that this was the first his
tory to be written about British bayo
nets. Now that it is here, it will be
welcomed by any military historian
not only for the factual descriptions,
but for the correspondence released
from the Wilkinson Sword Company
archives, presumably due to the fam
ily connections of the author.
It is well illustrated, but it would
have been much better if the author
had provided cross-references be
tween the descriptive passages and
the excellent photographs.
At a moment in time when the
theorists are saying that the bayonet
is obsolete--just as some were saying
nearly 100 years ago tbat the day of
hand-to-hand fighting was of the past
-this book is a refreshing reminder
of the development of this weapon
which has played a crucial part in so
many battles in the past and is likely
to do so in the future.
IlIIbl'J .nI..
108
MILITARY BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
THE ETHIOPIAN WAR, 1935-1941. By Anplo
Del BOeL Translated From tile italian IIJ
P. D. CUmmins. 287 Pales. TIle UnIYenity of
Chicago Press, CbICIIO, III., 1869. $7.95.
CHE: lbe Malclnl' of a Lllend. By Martin
Ebon. 218 Paps. Universe Books, N. Y.,
1969. $5.95.
BLOOD ON THE BORDER: TIle UnRed States
ArmJ and tile Mexican Border. By Clarence
C. Clendenen. 390 Plies. lbe Macmillan Co.,
N. Y., 1969. $12.50.
ARMOR-CAVALRY: Part I: Regular Army and
Army Reserve. By M8IJ Lee Stubbs and
, Stanley Russell Connor. 477 Pages. Superln
tendent of Documents, Wasblngton, D. C.
$8.95.
THE DAWN WARRIORS: Man's Evolution To
ward Peace. By Robert Bilelow. 277 Pages.
little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1969.
$&.95.
THE UNREYOLUTIONARY SOCIETY: TIle Power
of latin American Conservatism In a Chang
Inl World. By John Mander. 331 Pages. AI
fred A. Knopf, Inc., N. Y., 1969. $8.95.
WHY ABM? Policy Issues In tile Missile De
fense Controversy. Edited by Johan J. Holst
and William Scllnelder, Jr. 321 Pales. Perga
mon Press, Inc., N. Y., 1969. $8.95.
TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUAlTY: TIle Gulf of
Tonkin Affair-lllusion and Reality. By Jo
seph C. Goulden. 285 Pages. Rand MacNal1y
& Co., Cllicalo, III., 1969. $8.95.
THE RivER AND THE ROCK: TIle History of
Fortress West Point, 1775-1783. By lieu
tenant Colonel Dave Rlcllard Palmer, US
Army. 395 Paps. Greenwood Publishing
Corp., N. Y., 1869. $23.50.
THE PHANTOM RAIDER. By Edwin P. Hoyt.
185 Paps. TIIomas Y. Crowell Co., N. Y.,
1969. $&.95.
DE DULLE. A BIOJI'IIIIIJ IIJ Aida CmrIeJ.
510 Paps. TIl. BolIlIs-MerrID Co., lee., N. Y.,
1969. $10.00.
THE BATTlE FOR ROME. By W. G. F. JaCkson.
224 Plies. Cllarles ScrIbner's Sons, N. Y.,
1969. $7.95.
THE BAmE FOR GERMANY. By H. same.
228 Plies. Chari" ScrIbner's Sons, N. Y.,
1969. $7.95.
THE REALM OF THE SUBMARINE. By Paul
Collen. 274 Plies. TIle Macmillan Co., N. Y.,
1969. $5.95.
THE TRAGEDY OF NAZI GERMANY. By Peter
Ph""ps. 241 Pales. Frederick A. Praller,
N. Y., 1969. $&.95.
THE POLmCAL THOUGHT OF MAO TS.ITUNG.
Revised and Enlarged Edition. By Stuart R.
Schram. 479 Paps. Frederick A. Preeger,
N. Y., 1969. $9.50.
MACARTHUR AS MILITARY COMMANDER, By
Gavin Lonl- 243 Pages. D. Van Nostrand Co.,
Inc., Princeton, N. J., 1969. $8.95.
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN NA
TO: Processes 01 lllianca Cobesln and Pros
pects for Atiantic Community. By Francis A.
Beer. 330 Pages. Ohio State University
Press, Columbus, Oblo, 1969. $10.00.
THE NEW DICTIONARY & HANDBOOK OF
AEROSPACE: WItb Special Sections on tile
Moon and Lunar flipt. Edited IIJ Robert W.
Marks. 531 Plies. Frederick A. Praeger,
N. Y., 1969. $10.00.
SEEKING WORLD ORDER: lbe UnHed States
and Intemational OrIanlzation to 1920. By
Warren F. KuehL 385 Pages. YanderblH UnI
versity Press, Nasbvllle, Tlnn., 1869. $8.95.
ADVISE AND OBSTRUCT: lbl Role of tile
UnRed States Senate ill Foreiln Policy Dlcl
slons. By HIfIII Grqory GallaPer. 338
Plies. Delacorte Press, N. Y., 1869. $&.95.
NIlmber 1869
109
TIl, PraIIlem .f Okinawa
I fouJid Professor Hilsman's article,
, "The Problem of Okinawa," [July is
sue] most interesting with the ad
vantages and disadvantages of courses
of action 4;arefully outlined and their
attendant risks clearly discussed. I
personally agree with his analysis and
conclusion that we should not only
maintain a military presence in Asia
after the Vietnam war but that we
should endeavor to retain close ties
with Japan, even if it means returning
Okinawa to Japanese control.
However, there was one discordant
note in this article to which I take
strong eicception. It is contained in
the portion dealing with the Vietnam
war where he states "The original
attack came from the Viet Cong rather
than, the North Vietnamese armies
which entered only alter the struggle
had 1IlU1tl,l esca.la.ted. " [Emphasis
added.]
, The inference here is that the "vast
escaIation" of US combat unita
occurred ftrst--and the North Viet
namese regular army came in only in
response to 1:I1ese US combat units.
This, of course, is not true. Initially,
we came to the Republic of Vietnam's
a88istance with logistic support and
advisors who, incidentally, were au
thorized to fire only in defense of their
lives during this advisory phase of
the war. During 1964 and early 1965,
the first North Vietnamese troops in
filtrated into the Republic of Vietnam
and then launched a series of attacks
on Republic of Vietnam and United
States installations. It is Hanoi that
''vastly escalated" the war during this
period by pouring North Vietnamese
regular army battalions and regiments
into the Republic of Vietnam seeking a
quick knockout blow before we could
react with our ground troops.
At this period of time (1964-66).
the Communists' propaganda mill was
in full ery trying to obscure this entry
of the North Vietnamese regular army
into the conllict. Their efforts ranged
from full-page advertisements in The
New York Times, which many dupes
signed, stating that the Viet Cong
was "Only a group of ragged farmers
armed with rusty rilles" to articles and
books . designed to obscure the
facts at the time. I believe even those
who were duped into signing adver
tisements in The New York Times, by
this time, realize that the regular
army of North Vietnam is fighting in
the Republic of Vietnam.
MIIHIrJ a,II,. 110
I feel it is most important to
clarify this point, which the Commu
nist propagandists have been trying so
hard to obscure, that it was the ''vast
escalation" of North Vietnamese
troops and their attacks on Republic
of Vietnam units and United States
installations such as the advisory in
stallations at Pleiku which triggered
the US response of bombing to the
north and deployment of US combat
forces in the spring of 1965.
In fact, in his "Report on Vietnam,"
General William C. Westmoreland
noted that "The first North Viet
namese Army regiment, the 95th, ar
rived in Kontum Province (II Corps)
in December 1964 and was joined dur
ing the first two months of 1965 by
the 82nd and 101st regiments." These
troops, soon after their arrival, en
gaged in a campaign to cut the Re
public of Vietnam in half along High
way 19 in the Central Highlands. It
was this invasion of the Republic of
Vietnam by the ,North Vietnamese
which caused the deployment of US
combat troops to assist the hard
pressed South Vietnamese and counter
Hanoi's escalation.
.. I ... [was] the Senior Ad
visor to the Army Republic of Vietnam
2d Corps at Pleiku during 1964 and
1965, and we had proof from docu
ments and prisoners of war that the
North Vietnamese regulars had in
vaded the Republic of Vietnam during
the winter of 1964 and had launched
a series of attacks in 2d Corps, start
ing February 1965, in Kontum, Pleiku,
and Binh Dinh Provinces..
While admittedly a minor point in
an otherwise excellent article . . .
[this statement] displays an unfortu
nate lack of factual knowledge on this
vital phase of the Vietnamese war.
Further, if items like this go unchal-
N....ber 1&
READER FORUM
lenged in your magazine, they could
then be used to advantage by leftist
propagandists to challenge our Gov
ernment's account of this key period
of the war in Vietnam, using as their
authority this quotation from the
MilitaT'l/ Review. For this reason, I
believe that errors such as this should
be clarified as rapidly as possible
whenever they are discovered.
BG Theo. C. Matuis, USA
The Pueblo Atfalr
I am 'unsble to restrain myself from
accepting your invitation to comment
on "The Pueblo Affair" in the July
1969 issue of MilitaT'l/ Review. The
article constitutes a supine apology for
our national "yellow dog" policy. As
a man who has spent nearly 80 years
in the US Navy, I am sick. For years
I have told my men that our job is to
defend our country and its honor. We
must be prepared to lay down our lives
for this at any time. For this "service"
we are not paid. (Who could afford
such a price?) We receive "expense"
money instead. Now we are told that
this is not the case. We "defend" our
country's honor only to the point
where somebody might get hurt, es
pecially the serviceman involved ..
The value and importance of the in
dividual human being is, indeed, great
-but it is not paramount. When we
regard our hides as of prime impor
tsnce, we are over half way to oblivion.
The Pueblo had every right to be
where it was. It is not necessary, ac
cording to international rules, to de
fend any ship on the high S8&8 unless
at war. When we allowed this outrage,
with no more reaction than a yelp to
the Soviet Union for help, we sold our
right to be called men and invited
every other pip-squeak outfit to join
North Vietnam, North Korea, and
111
READER FORUM
Cambodia in treating us Americans
with
Why not? Can you picture the
United States going to war (-that is,
taking positive action to convince the
perpetrators, and all or any observers,
that use of force against the United
States is a loser) anything?
CPT W. W. Strong, USN
Another Vietnam In Latin America?
I read'i with interest Daniel 'James'
article, ",Another Vietnam in Latin
America ?", which appeared in the
June 1969 MilitlllrY Re'lliew. His ability
to examine and explain concisely the
insurgent scene in Latin America has
always pleased me. This' particular
article was no less pleasing.
The article, originally published in
InterpUJ/1I in December 1968, contained
some information, which, because of
a lime interlude, is not correct.
For example, Mr. James stated that
Marco Antonio Yon Sosa is the leader
of the Movement of 13 November and
the Armed Forces Rebels (FAR). In
December 1968, indeed, that was the
case. However, in June 1969, Yon had
already been disassociated with the
FAR for five months. At this time, the
two groups remain separated from
each other...
lLT Frank C. Gromling, USAF
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