DRAFT

OIG Review of the Visa Process/Waivers of Personal Appearance

Preliminary Findings

In response to a request from Congress, ISP/CE undertook a review of visa

issuance policies at posts abroad. Specifically, we looked at travel agent referral policies
(TARPs) and the waiver of personal appearances (PAWs). The review was expanded to \jJO
include executive oversight, officer training and orientation, the Visas Viper program and ,,.
inter-agency cooperation in the visa function. To conduct this study questionnaires were
sent to all visa issuing posts. Based on the responses and other statistical information a O offu^
number of posts were selected to be visited by inspection teams. To date, inspection \ J r
teams have visited eleven posts and anticipate visiting an additional seventeen. The f~ r,<j
teams interviewed chiefs of mission and principal officers as well as consular officers and I"
other section chiefs and agencies heads with input in the Visas Viper process.

From the work done to date we are able to offer a number of observations. Before
presenting these observations it will be useful to make some basic statements about the
visa process.

All aliens, except Canadians and citizens of the 27 visa waiver countries, require a
visa to apply for entry into the United States. A visa is a permission to apply for entry.
Actual entry into the United States can only be authorized by an INS inspector at a port
of entry. A visa is, in a sense, permission to board an aircraft and travel to a pott 01 entry.
Visas are issued in many categories depending on what the alien wishes to do in the
United States. Visas are also governed by reciprocal agreements with other countries as
to duration of validity and fees charged. The basic process for applying for a visa is the
same worldwide but is actually quite different at each visa issuing embassy or consulate.
Visa issuing posts have wide latitude in establishing visa application procedures.

Aliens begin the process by submitting a valid passport and completed visa
application to a consular visa section at an embassy or consulate abroad. They pay a non-
refundable application fee (currently $65) and submit the documents either in person,
indirectly (through one of several methods including drop boxes and the mails), or
through an intermediary, most often a travel agent. All applicants must apply in person
and be interviewed unless a consular officer deems it to be in the U.S. public interest to
waiver a personal appearance. Each application is reviewed by a consular officer who
adjudicates the application and decides whether or not to issue a visa. Part of that
adjudication process is a mandatory computerized name check against a list of aliens
potentially ineligible to receive a visa. The adjudicating officer determines whether or
not a personal appearance is necessary. Applicants who are interviewed see a consular
officer who reviews the information on the written application and questions the
applicant about his or her plans and intentions. This interview is based on the material in
the written application and rarely exceeds five minutes. The interviewing officer can
request additional documentation. In addition to the personal interview and written
documentation every applicant must be cleared through the Department's computerized
 Executive oversight: Executive oversight of the visa function by ambassadors
and DCMs is often weak, sometimes almost nonexistent. This is frequently due to a lack
of consular training and recent experience on the part of mission leadership. Some
mission leadership still fails to grasp the importance of the visa function and of the
consular function in general. In too many cases inexperienced junior consular officers
are left alone to determine visa policy and manage the visa function at very small or
remote embassies. The consular function is too often a part time responsibility and given
too little weight. Junior officers often have no experienced senior consular officer to turn
to for advice and guidance.

Personal appearance waivers: Personal appearance waivers (PAWs) are generally

well thought out and in many cases very restrictive. PAWs are generally established to
facilitate post operations and maximize the use of resources to scrutinize those cases most
likely to present problems including security risks. Some posts, however, view these
policies backwards, specifying which cases to interview and not which to exempt. Posts
with significant visa fraud and security issues and corresponding high refusal rates have
the most restrictive policies, often interviewing virtually all applicants.

Travel agent referral policies: Travel agent referral policies (TARPs) are not visa
waiver programs. Applications through TARPs are adjudicated exactly like all other
applications. TARPs allow posts to manage the workflow, decrease the number of
applicants who actually appear at the embassy or consulate (a significant concern for the
security of the mission) and in some cases, when remote data entry is used, reduces the
time spent by employees in basic data entry functions. If the travel agents do their part,
common problems with applications, passports lacking the required validity, missing
documentation and others can be addressed prior to submitting the applications and
significantly reduce the time necessary to process an application. TARPs must be
carefully established and monitored. Under no circumstances should a post consider
submission through a TARP to be to any degree a substitute for adjudication by an
officer. We found that true TARPs are very rare, especially in high fraud posts, but there
are exceptions.

Visa interviews: The visa interview is not an interrogation. The scope of the interview is
generally limited to the parameters established by the written application and expressed
purpose for travel, as well as by time limitations caused by the volume of applications.
There is little likelihood that applicants determined to commit terrorist acts will be
exposed by the interview process. The CLASS lookout system is the one place where
information on possible terrorists, as well as other undesirable applicants such as felons
and drug traffickers can be made available to the adjudicating officer. CLASS must
contain the information developed by all agencies of the USG and it must be included in
a timely fashion.

Visas Viper: The Visa Viper program can be very useful in developing information
which should be available in the CLASS system. Its application is very uneven. Not all
posts have a well-managed, aggressive program. In many missions not all agencies are
well briefed on Visas Viper and do not participate fully, if at all. To work successfully
The Department should make the importance of consular operations absolutely clear to
chiefs of mission and direct that executive oversight be a primary responsibility.

Posts must have flexibility in structuring the visa process but the Bureau of Consular
Affairs should carefully monitor the decisions and clear on any changes.

The Visas Viper program must be a truly inter-agency program and Washington agencies
must issue better guidance to the field to insure that all participants understand its
importance and have clear instructions on how to participate. Washington must also
provide better feedback to the field on submissions made.

There is a lack of consistency in the transliteration of names from several foreign

languages into English. Our CLASS and INR/Tipoff databases should be designed to
utilize some coding system for names in these languages and any system should be
adopted by all agencies.

Interviewing every applicant for a visa is not a panacea to improving the security of the
visa process. Many applicants simply do not require an interview to establish their bona
fides. Interviewing these applicants distracts from the focus on those applicants who do
merit more rigorous screening. The decisions made previously not to interview certain
categories of applicants remain valid. Better intelligence, more experienced interviewing
officers and greater inter-agency cooperation will improve the visa process and contribute
to greater security for the United States and its citizens.

The sharing, at posts, of relevant information about possible terrorists is, at some posts,
particularly in the Middle East, excellent. In these cases intelligence and law
enforcement personnel work closely and collegially with consuls, and with each other.
This not uniformly the case, however.