T5 B59 DOS Misc 2 of 2 FDR - Entire Contents - Memos - Cables - 7 Withdrawal Notices - Visa Law Info (1st Pgs For Ref)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51630 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008
BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0005 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31199439
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 14
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2]
DOCUMENT DATE: 09/05/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum
FROM:
TO: Daniel Marcus
SUBJECT: Transmittal memo and index of documents responsive to document requests
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE VISA PROCESS
Beginning with the influx of post-World War n refugees and peoples into the United
States, visa processing has become the largest function of most American consular sections
abroad, one that requires significant resources, both human and material. The focus of concern
was consistently on illegal immigration; that is, on screening applicants to determine whether
they intended to work or reside illegally in the United States Pressures to emigrate to the United
States have been depicted as the "push" factors of economic hardship and political and social
unrest abroad coupled with the "pull" factor of American prosperity. Consequently, staffing,
training and procedures have all been directed at determining whether visitor visa applicants
were intending immigrants, a determination specifically required by the law. It should also be
apparent that promoting travel and the free movement of people of all nationalities to America
serves our interests culturally, socially, and economically; foreign tourists annually provide
billions of dollars to our economy ($82 billion in 2000).
Numerous factors impacted on the Department of State's (Department) visa process and
policies in effect during the period leading to the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. That
period extended from November 1997 to June 2001 when 21 visitor visas were issued to the 19
hijackers.
• Visa demand rose significantly more sharply than did the number of trained staff
available to perform the function. This shortfall was exacerbated during the 1990s when budget
cuis for Foreign Service personnel compelled the Department to "do more with less,"' Ai the
same time, applications for visas increased worldwide from about seven and a half million in
1998 to about ten and a half million in 2001. In 1998 GAO reported that serious staffing
shortages resulted in visa processing backlogs.' Consular sections also experienced "extended
personnel shortages," particularly during summer months, when few qualified officers were
available to adjudicate visas. Resource shortfalls for adequate officer staffing extended to the
Foreign Service national staff that supports visa operations with basic data processing. Missions
were obliged to work existing staff long hours, which led to adjudicator fatigue and morale
problems. In short, sufficient resources to permit thorough personal interviews of every visa
applicant were never obtained.
• Inadequate funding also resulted in unsuitable workspace at most missions that was
neither secure nor conducive to carry out interviews, and insufficient to store all visa files. A
desire to establish uniform consular file maintenance procedures as well as a lack of space at
many missions prompted the Department to establish visa documentation destruction schedules.
This meant that all supporting documents for visitor visas were returned to the applicants and
virtually all applications were routinely destroyed annually.2
• CA gave all visa issuing missions broad discretion in processing visas and
streamlining their visa operations, encouraging them to promote travel to the United States by
1 General Accounting Office, State Department: Tourist Visa Processing Backlogs Persist at United States
Consulates, GAO/NSIAD-98-69, March 1998.
2 Except in cases involving permanent ineligibility such as criminal convictions.
giving their applicants every reasonable opportunity to establish eligibility for visas. Adding to
the complexity of managing visa operations worldwide are the vast resource disparities among
those missions which range from one part-time consular officer to more than 30 full-time
officers, and from missions with very low visa refusal rates to those with very high rates.
• Inadequate resources prompted CA to advocate introducing every efficiency possible.

Consular sections were constantly exhorted to "do more with less," to employ "best practices," ~
innovations that had proven successful at other missions, and to "work around" U. S. staff who
had inadequate or no language or interview techniques training by the Department or were
simply unavailable. Consular section chiefs constantly faced hard decisions about where to put
their limited resources.
• Many visa officers maintained that they regularly faced pressures from host country
officials, other sections and agencies, and senior management at their missions, and from
interested parties in the United States, including Congress, to issue visas — but rarely, if ever, to
refuse applicants.
• Beginning in 1994, in response to a congressional mandate, CA deployed modern

computer-based processing designed to improve the security of the visa system. While providing
tools that enhanced the security of visas and their adjudication, these developments both slowed
the process and required more human resources.
• Earlier, in 1986, Congress authorized the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, allowing
citizens of participant countries to visit the United States for up to 90 days without obtaining a
visitor visa, completing a visa application, or being subject to an interview by a consular officer.
The criteria for a country's participation in the program include a very low rate of visitor visa
refusals and reciprocal treatment of U. S. citizens. Twenty-eight countries currently participate
and, in 2000,17.6 million of their citizens visited the United States.4
• Rapidly increasing volume of applications coupled with staffing shortages led to CA

policy decisions designed to lessen officer involvement in much of the visa process. These pre-
September 11, 2001, workload and staffing realities prompted visa managers to "work smarter"
and seek any efficiency possible in the visa process. Consequently, many missions followed
Department guidance by routinely waiving personal appearances and interviews for large
categories of visa applicants perceived to be "low risk." Low risk meant that the possibility of
visa applicants overstaying the duration of their permitted visit or working in the United States
was very unlikely. All of these steps occurred in an environment that sought to maximize
legitimate travel to the United States while identifying intending immigrants and preventing
them from entering the United States.
3 Although the two countries met the Visa Waiver Pilot Program requirement for very low refusal rates
prior to September 11,2001, both failed a second criterion of declaring their willingness to provide
reciprocal visa treatment for U. S. citizens visiting their countries.
4 General Accounting Office Report on Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program, No. GAO-03-38, November 2002.
• Despite the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993, terrorism and
security were perceived primarily as threats against U. S. missions abroad. The 1998 bombings
of the U. S. embassies in East Africa convinced diplomatic security officers that large crowds of
visa applicants were a major problem. Crowds were perceived as both a threat from terrorists in
their midst and a magnet attracting bombers. Security and consular officers worked together to
limit and control access to consular sections. Their focus was on protecting Department
personnel and property rather than screening out terrorist visa applicants.
• Some missions found travel agents useful in assisting visa applicants to fill out their
applications and verifying their financial ability to pay for a tour to the United States. Consular
officers must adjudicate these applications, interview the applicants as appropriate, and must
always check them in CLASS before issuing visas. Incidentally, with the Department's full
endorsement, the so-called Visas Express program was established for the two Saudi missions in
May 2001. Under the program, visa applicants were required to submit their applications
through any often designated in-country travel agencies for subsequent adjudication by consular
officers. Although four of the Saudi hijackers received their visas through the program after
May 2001, Visas Express did not affect whether or not they were issued visas or subjected to an
interview.
• The primary tool for terrorist screening available to consular officers is CLASS. All
visa applicants must be checked against this database before a visa can be issued. In determining
whether visa applicants were suspected of being terrorists or posed security risks, consular
officers relied essentially on CLASS. Absent a negative entry in CLASS or an actual admission
of ineligibility, it is possible for a terrorist applicant to obtain a visa. None of the names of any
of the September 11,2001 terrorists were in CLASS at the time they applied for visas.
Procedurally, an era of inadequate staffing and support resources prompted the Bureau of
Consular Affairs (CA) to encourage consular sections to carry out every possible efficiency, such
as limiting consular officer participation in the visa process to those cases considered most
difficult to adjudicate. The missions in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. responded to these resource
pressures by routinely waiving personal interviews for so-called good visa cases, that is, those of
their host country nationals. Berlin was similarly strapped for staff. There were simply not
enough visa officers available to interview more than a handful of applicants at any of the five
consular sections.
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 1
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1986JERUSA00330 Channel: n/a
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 JERUSA 00330 240701Z

ACTION VOE-06
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 NEA-07 NSAE-00 ANJAD-Ol INSE-01

FBIE-00 /015 W
354054 240701Z /38
R 240659Z JAN 86
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4221
UNCLAS JERUSALEM 00330
VISAS FOR CA/VO/F/S
E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIS,. CLOK
SUBJECT: CLOK
THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE SUBMITTED FOR DELETION FROM THE

AVLOS:
1. KARAKRA, ADEL BADER JORD 41
2. AJAJ, MOHAMMAD AHMAD JORD 41
3. MALUL, GIORA ISRL 41
4. GOLA, YITZHAK ISRL 41

9/11 Personal Privacy
5. HUMAID, ANWAR SALEH JORD 41
6. HALABI, NASIR ELDIN AZMI JORD 41
7. DAJANI, IMAD JORD 41
8. ABU SIAM, HUSEIN MAKHLOUF JORD 41

AKA ABU SIYAM, HUSEIN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 JERUSA 00330 240701Z
9. ABU AMSHA, MAHER JORD 41

9/11 Personal Privacy
10. ABED RABO, MOHAMMAD MARZOUK JORD 41

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2
RESTRICTED|_|
DOCUMENT DATE: 10/18/2002 DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Visa's Viper Submission

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 5
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Homeland Security

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: I
Current Handling: SBU
Document Number: 2002TOKYO05427 Channel: n/a\E 01
UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0222
TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

ACTION DS-00
INFO LOG- 00 MFA-00 NP-00 CIAE-00 EAP-00 UTED-00 CSEP-00

TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 MMP-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 PER- 00
IRM-00 TEST-00 VO-03 ASDS-01 CRYE-00 DSCC-00 CCR-01
SAS-00 /006W
, _ncnt;9 •* nonKAA 7 /7P
P 090635Z AUG 02
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO HQ USINS WASHDC//HQDRO// PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 1770
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005427
USINS PASS TO INS WASHINGTON FOR TAET D. JOHNSON; BANGKOK

FOR INS; SINGAPORE FOR INS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CR/CIL
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, CVIS^
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR INS ESCORTS
REF: 54180808 HQ USINS WASHDC CABLE OF 090256Z AUG 02

(NOTAL)
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
1.(U) EMBASSY GRANTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE AND WELCOMES THE

VISIT OF RICHARD MORGAN AND TAB JOHNSON TO TOKYO ON AUGUST
17, 2002. JAPANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
DETAILS OF THE USINS ESCORT OF ALIEN AGUS BUDIMAN. NOTE
THAT AIRPORT POLICE DETECTIVE(S) AT NAGOYA MAY MEET
DEPORTATION TRANSITS; IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RECOGNITION OF
THE INS DETAIL, EMBASSY ADVISES THAT AGENTS SHOULD REQUEST
AIRLINE GROUND SERVICE ASSISTANCE AT NAGOYA TO MEET THE
POLICE, AND, AGENTS SHOULD DISPLAY DISTINCTIVE PHOTO ID OR
PIN ON DEPARTURE FROM THE PLANE AT JAPAN. JAPANESE
AUTHORITIES DO NOT REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION OF THEIR RETURN
TRAVEL, AS THEY ARE NOT ESCORTING THE ALIEN ON THEIR WAY

Document Number: 2002TOKYO05427 Channel: n/a
BACK. ANY CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS IN THE ESCORT

MANIFEST OR ALIEN ESCORTED MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE EMBASSY
FOR COMMUNICATION TO JAPANESE AUTHORITIES. TWO WORKING DAYS
ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY CHANGE TO BE COMMUNICATED. OTHERWISE,
AN OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE FIVE WORKING
DAYS AND ANY CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS IN THE
ESCORT MANIFEST OR ALIEN ESCORTED MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE
EMBASSY FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES.
2. (U) HOTEL INFORMATION: THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE

HAS NOT MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THE TRAVELERS.
3. (U) PLEASE NOTE THAT TRAVELERS TO JAPAN ON OFFICIAL

BUSINESS WILL NEED A VISA. THEY SHOULD HAVE A COPY OF
THEIR ORDERS AND OFFICIAL ID CARD WITH THEM AT THE TIME
OF ENTRY. POST DOES NOT PROVIDE OFFICIAL TRANSPORTATION
TO VISITORS ARRIVING AT NARITA. HOWEVER, AIRPORT
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

LIMOUSINE BUS SERVICE IS AVAILABLE DIRECTLY FROM THE
TERMINAL TO THE ANA HOTEL. UPON EXITING CUSTOMS, LOOK
FOR THE AIRPORT LIMOUSINE BUS COUNTER. THE ATTENDANTS
SPEAK ENGLISH AND WILL ASSIST YOU WITH A BUS DIRECTLY TO
THE ANA HOTEL. THE FARE IS 3,000 YEN. YOU CAN CHANGE
MONEY DIRECTLY OUTSIDE CUSTOMS.
4.(U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AT

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, THE PENTAGON AND SOMERSET,
PENNSYLVANIA, SERVE AS A CRUEL REMINDER OF THE
CONTINUING THREAT FROM TERRORISTS AND EXTREMIST GROUPS
TO AMERICANS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS WORLDWIDE. THIS
SITUATION REMAINS FLUID AND AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD BE
AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL RISKS AND TAKE THESE INTO
CONSIDERATION WHEN MAKING TRAVEL PLANS. THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ABOUT
POTENTIAL THREATS TO AMERICANS OVERSEAS AND TO SHARE
CREDIBLE THREAT INFORMATION THROUGH ITS CONSULAR
INFORMATION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET
AT THE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS HOME PAGE
HTTP://WWW.TRAVEL.STATE.GOV.
5. (SBU) THE GENERAL THREAT FROM CRIME IN TOKYO AND

THROUGHOUT JAPAN IS LOW. CRIME IS AT LEVELS WELL BELOW THE
U.S. NATIONAL AVERAGE. VIOLENT CRIME IS RARE, BUT DOES
EXIST. THE JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE REPORT CONTINUING
PROBLEMS WITH PICK POCKETING OF FOREIGNERS IN CROWDED
SHOPPING AREAS OF TOKYO. ALTHOUGH STREET CRIME IS LOW/ '•
COMMON SENSE SECURITY MEASURES ARE ADVISED FOR ALL AMERICAN - -.

Document Number: 2002TOKY005427 Channel: n/a
CITIZENS TRAVELING IN JAPAN.
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

6. (U) AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTED IN PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENTS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, U.S. CITIZENS
AND INTERESTS ABROAD MAY BE AT INCREASED RISK OF TERRORIST
ACTIONS FROM EXTREMIST GROUPS. MOST RECENTLY, WE ADVISED
THAT WE HAD UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS
MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES AND/OR
ESTABLISHMENTS FREQUENTED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN
KOREA AND JAPAN.
7. (U) IN ADDITION, WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT

INFORMATION WE RECEIVED IN MAY 2001 THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS
MAY BE THE TARGET OF A TERRORIST THREAT FROM EXTREMIST
GROUPS WITH LINKS TO USAMA BIN LADIN'S AL-QAIDA
ORGANIZATION. IN THE PAST, SUCH INDIVIDUALS HAVE NOT
DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. IN
LIGHT OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, U.S. GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
WORLDWIDE REMAIN AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF ALERT. THE
EMBASSY TAKES ALL THREATS SERIOUSLY. THE U.S. EMBASSY TOKYO
CAN BE CONTACTED 24 HOURS A DAY AT 03-3224-5000 (LOCALLY) OR
81-3-3224-5000 (INTERNATIONALLY).
8.(SBU) VISITORS ARE URGED TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 TOKYO 05427 02 OF 02 090644Z

ACTION DS-00
INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 NP-00 CIAE-00 EAP-00 OIGO-00 UTED-00

CSEP-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 MMP-00 NSAE-00 PER-00
IRM-00 TEST-00 VO-03 ASDS-01 CRYE-00 DSCC-00 CCR-01
SAS-00 /005W •-""""
D6D529 090644Z /38
P 090635Z AUG 02
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO HQ USINS WASHDC//HQDRO// PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 1771
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
UNCLAS SECTION--02- OF 02 TOKYO 005427 T ,£ ' ' " "'

Document Number: 2002TOKYO05427 Channel: n/a
US INS PASS TO INS WASHINGTON FOR TAET D. JOHNSON; BANGKOK

FOR INS; SINGAPORE FOR INS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CR/CIL
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ASEC, CVIS
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR INS ESCORTS
VIGILANCE AND TO INCREASE THEIR SECURITY AWARENESS.

AMERICANS SHOULD MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE, VARY ROUTES AND
TIMES FOR ALL REQUIRED TRAVEL, AND TREAT MAIL AND PACKAGES
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 TOKYO 05427 02 OF 02 090644Z

FROM UNFAMILIAR SOURCES WITH SUSPICION. VISITORS ARE ALSO
URGED TO AVOID CONTACT WITH ANY SUSPICIOUS, UNFAMILIAR
OBJECTS, AND TO REPORT THE PRESENCE OF SUCH OBJECTS TO LOCAL
AUTHORITIES. VEHICLES SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNATTENDED AND
SHOULD BE KEPT LOCKED AT ALL TIMES.
9. (SBU) ALL TOY TRAVELERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S SECURITY OVERSEAS SEMINAR SPONSORED BY
THE OVERSEAS BRIEFING CENTER (OBC) AT NFATC. TO REGISTER,
EMPLOYEES SHOULD ASK THEIR TRAINING OFFICER, ASSIGNMENTS
OFFICER OR OFFICE DIRECTOR TO SEND A REQUEST FOR TRAINING
FORM (DS-755) TO FSI. FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASES CONTACT
OBC'S INFORMATION CENTER, 4000 ARLINGTON BOULEVARD, ROOM
E2126, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22204 OR BY PHONE AT 733-302-
7277.
10. (U) POINT OF CONTACT IS INVESTIGATOR KEN WADA;

OFFICE NUMBER IS 81-3-3224-5592, FAX 81-3-5572-8411 OR
INTERNET E-MAIL WADAKX@STATE.GOV. THE RSO OFFICE MAY BE
CONTACTED AT ANY TIME THROUGH TELEPHONE 81-3-3224-5000,
FROM OUTSIDE JAPAN, OR 03-3224-5000 FROM WITHIN JAPAN.
CHRISTENSON
UNCLASSIFIED
« END OF DOCUMENT »

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Request for Evaluation fo Security Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Document Number: 1993STATE167180 Channel: n/a
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 STATE 167180 030551Z

ORIGIN L-03
INFO LOG-00 CA-02 COME-00 OASY-00 TEDE-00 JUSE-00 ADS-00

NEA-01 OCS-06 PPT-01 VO-06 CORE-00 /019R
DRAFTED BY: L/LEI:MKBASSLE/DAWILSON

APPROVED BY: L/LEI:RAKUSHEN
DOJ/OIA:KJHARRIS (SUBS) NEA/ARN:HENSHER (SUBS)
NEA/NGA:STINSLEY (INFO) NEA/NGA:MBERNIER-TOTH (SUBS)
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
CA/VO/F/SL
•C6A1D8 030552Z /38
0 030551Z JUN 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
INFO FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7260
UNCLAS STATE 167180
FOR DCM AND CON

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CJAN. CVIS. JO, SY, IR, IZ (RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF)
SUBJECT: RETURN OF ALIEN FUGITIVE RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF
1. AT THE INSTANCE OF THE U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EMBASSIES

ARE ASKED TO REQUEST THE EXTRADITION, EXPULSION OR
DEPORTATION OF RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF. BASED UPON HIS PAST
MOVEMENTS, U.S. PROSECUTORS BELIEVE THAT YOUSEF MAY TRAVEL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 STATE 167180 030551Z

TO JORDAN. SYRIA, IRAN OR IRAQ. IN THE CASES OF IRAN AND
IRAQ, A DIPLOMATIC NOTE WILL BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO
THEIR RESPECTIVE INTEREST SECTIONS IN WASHINGTON D.C.
2. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY CURRENTLY

IN FORCE WITH JORDAN OR SYRIA. ACCORDINGLY, THE USG
REQUESTS THAT RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS DO WHATEVER POSSIBLE
UNDER ITS LAWS TO EXPEL OR EXTRADITE YOUSEF TO THE U.S.
3. EMBASSIES ARE ALSO ASKED TO REQUEST THE SEIZURE OF ALL

ARTICLES IN THE POSSESSION OF YOUSEF AT THE TIME OF HIS
ARREST WHICH MAY BE CONNECTED TO THE CRIMINAL CHARGES

AGAINST HIM IF/WHEN HE IS EXTRADITED/EXPELLED TO THE

UNITED STATES.
4. YOUSEF IS CHARGED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK) WITH
UNLAWFULLY1 WILLFULLY, KNOWINGLY AND MALICIOUSLY DAMAGING
AND DESTROYING BY MEANS OF FIRE AND EXPLOSIVE. A BUILDING
USED IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE. CAUSING DEATH BY
MEANS OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, CONSPIRACY, RACKETEERING
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES AND ILLEGAL USE OF
EXPLOSIVES, IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 2, 33. 34, 371. 844
924 AND 952. THESE ARE FELONY OFFENSES AND THE MAXIMUM
PUNISHMENT IS IMPRISONMENT. A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE
ARREST WARRANT AND INDICTMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.
5. THE FACTS OF THE CASE INDICATE THAT YOUSEF

PARTICIPATED IN THE BOMBING O*F THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON
FEBRUARY 26, 1993, IN WHICH SIX PEOPLE WERE KILLED.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 STATE 167180 030551Z

HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE WERE INJURED, AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE
TOTALLED SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS. SPECIFICALLY,
THESE FACTS SHOW THAT YOUSEF TRAVELED FROM PAKISTAN TO NEW
YORK TOGETHER WITH DEFENDANT MOHAMMAD AHMAD AJAJ, THAT
AJAJ WAS TRANSPORTING MANUALS CONTAINING, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF BOMBS, THE ONE
WHICH EXPLODED IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, AND THAT
YOUSEF'S FINGERPRINTS WERE FOUND ON TWO OF THE MANUALS.
MOREOVER. ON NOVEMBER 30, 1992 WITNESSES SAW YOUSEF ORDER
CHEMICALS OF THE TYPE THEY USED IN THE BOMBING AND HAVE
THEM DELIVERED TO A STORAGE SHED RENTED BY. ANOTHER
CO-DEFENDANT. MOHAMMAD SALAMEH. OTHER WITNESSES OBSERVED
SALAMEH SUBSEQUENTLY RENT THE VAN IN WHICH THE BOMB WAS
DETONATED INSIDE THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, AND STILL OTHER
WITNESSES SAW YOUSEF RIDING WITH SALAMEH INSIDE THE VAN
THE DAY OF THE BOMBING. PROSECUTORS BELIEVE THAT YOUSEF
FLED THE UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER THE BOMBING ON
FEBRUARY 26, 1993.
6. RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF IS BELIEVED TO BE AN IRAQI

NATIONAL. BORN ON MAY 20' 1967, IN THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES. HE IS DESCRIBED AS 6. TALL, 180 LBS IN WEIGHT.
WITH BROWN HAIR AND BROWN EYES. YOUSEF HOLDS ALIEN
REGISTRATION NUMBER A72-054-519. A PHOTO OF YOUSE^ IS
BEING SENT TO EMBASSIES BY DIPLOMATIC POUCH.

7. IN MAKING ABOVE APPROACH ABOUT POSSIBLE YOUSEF

TRANSFER, EMBASSIES.SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE
UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE HOST COUNTRY'S ASSISTANCE,
BECAUSE OF LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY U.S. LAW. WE WOULD NOT
BE IN A POSITION TO GUARANTEE RECIPROCITY IN THE EVENT OF
UNCLASSIFIED
: UNCLASSIFIED ;
PAGE 04 STATE 167180 030551Z
HOST COUNTRY'S INTEREST IN OUR DEPORTING SOMEONE TO IT.
8. PLEASE ADVISE RESULTS OF ABOVE APPROACH SOONEST BY

CABLE CAPTIONED L/LEI. CHRISTOPHER
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 2
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Fighting Terrorism

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
S/S 200400123
United States Department of State
AC 2K20
January 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DANIEL MARCUS

GENERAL COUNSEL
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES
SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States Request for Documents (Document
Request for 1C Components)
This is in response to the National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States' request for
Department of State documents.
This memorandum and the attached documents convey

information related to the Intelligence Community, as
requested in a series of questions in a December 19, 2003
Justice Department memorandum on behalf of the Commission.
We hope this information is useful to you. As always,

please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further
questions.
I(^fftrJL'T^il^^-^
a -
Karl Hofmarfn
Hofmai
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
Tab 1 December 19, 2003 memorandum from Department
of Justice.
Tab 2 Answers to the questions posed in the
December 19, 2003 Department of Justice
memorandum .

J.IMK
December 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM
sar
Jx-c- I I . Hamilton
VICKOIMR To: Daniel Levin, Department of Justice
Richard Bcn-Venistc
From: Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
Fred !•'. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorclick Subj: Questions for 1C components

Sladc Gorton
As we have discussed, the Commission is requesting written answers to
Bob Kerrey the following questions from a variety of intelligence organizations that
provide support to the nation's counterterrorist (CT) efforts. The
John ].chman
Commission requests written answers to the following questions, no later
'1'imothyJ. Rocmer than January 20, 2004, from DOE (INI), State (INK), Treasury (IS), DHS
(IAIP), NRO, Army/INSCOM, Navy/NSGA, Air Force/AIA, all
James R. Thompson
Combatant Commands/J2. Thank you for agreeing to coordinate this
request on behalf of the Executive Branch.
Philip D. Zelikow
Kxr-:<:uTivE DIRECTOR
For the following questions, please provide answers based on the most
current information available. Where resources are involved, please
provide those estimates included in the President's FY 2003 Budget. The
term counterterrorism in these questions refers to both force protection
and other CT activities; please differentiate between the two in the
answers.
1 . Please describe your organization's role in supporting

counterterrorism activities prior to September 11, 2001, and your
agency's CT role today.
2. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high

priority intelligence collection and analysis activities? Who
makes these decisions? How do you allocate resources in
accordance with these priorities?
3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to

reallocate resources to CT efforts over the past five years?
4. How are your organization's priorities linked to guidance from

the Secretary of Defense and/or the Director of Central
Intelligence? Are your priorities solely directed by the cabinet
secretary or agency head that leads your department or agency?
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-11 commission.gov
Memo to Daniel Levin
December 19, 2003
Page 2
5. What is your office's strategy to meet its responsibilities

regarding counterterrorism?
6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities:

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist
Center (CTC); DIA Joint Task Force for Counterterrorism; FBI
Counterterrorism Division; DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).
7. Please characterize relations on counterterrorism issues within the

Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, and today.
How has information sharing on CT issues changed, if at all?
8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the

Intelligence Community from whom you take direction and
guidance.
0/4 57V ^
Answers to December 19,2003 Questions
1. Please describe your organization's role in supporting counter terrorism activities prior
to September 11,2001, and your agency's CT role today.
A. INR played an active CT role before September 11 and continues to do so. Working both
independently and in cooperation with our colleagues in the rest of the 1C, ENR analysts
track, monitor, and analyze all-source reporting on terrorism. Our primary customer is
the Secretary of State. INR officers work with the 1C to ensure that State's counter -
terrorism needs are reflected in collection plans, future architecture and resource
decisions, and that intelligence operations support U.S. diplomacy and combat terrorism.
Our reporting and analysis for the Secretary and other Department officials supports the
counterterrorism goals embodied in the DCI's Intelligence Imperatives for our Nation's
Security: to win the war on terrorism, warn of impending threats, and protect America.
Win the War on Terrorism - INR analysis seeks to improve the USG's understanding of
foreign terrorist operations. Our focus is on areas of critical concern including terrorist
support networks, access to weapons of mass destruction, terrorist financing and terrorist
links to local groups in all regions. Our work directly contributes to the USG's efforts to
identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorist infrastructures and activities.
Warn of impending threats - Using all-source intelligence, INR continuously monitors
issues, situations, and countries that could pose a threat to the national security of the
U.S. and alerts policymakers so that threats can be mitigated through diplomacy. To
reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United States and our allies, INR
supports the prevention or interdiction of transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons related goods, as well as missiles and advanced conventional weapons to
countries of concern. INR is a key player in the policy community's efforts to prepare
and vet demarche language based on intelligence to combat proliferation of WMD,
technologies, and arms.
Protect America - INR regularly advises, drafts, and/or coordinates with the rest of the 1C
on terrorist-related threat warnings. In addition, from 1987 through FY 2003, INR served
as home to the TIPOFF program - an electronic database that tracks known or suspected
terrorists and helps prevent their entry into the United States. In FY 2004, the majority of
the TIPOFF staff and its activities were integrated with the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in accordance with Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 6. The TIPOFF database is helping provide the
foundation for a comprehensive national system for screening terrorists. These changes
will consolidate the U.S. Government watchlist function and strengthen our national
counter terrorism effort.

-2-
2. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high priority intelligence
collection and analysis activities? Who makes these decisions? How do you allocate
resources in accordance with these priorities?
A. The Assistant Secretary of State for INR establishes our reporting and analysis priorities
in order to best meet the intelligence needs of the Secretary of State. In addition, the
bureau obtains general guidance from the following two US foreign policy documents:
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America - Published in September
2002, Goal 3 of this document calls for the United States to strengthen alliances to defeat
global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
The FY 2004-2009 Strategic Plan of the US Department of State and US Agency for
International Development - This plan includes the strategic counterterrorism goal of
preventing attacks against the United States, our allies, and our friends, and strengthening
alliances and international arrangements to defeat global terrorism. Counterterrorism
goals are also reflected in strategic goals concerning homeland security, weapons of mass
destruction, and the welfare of American citizens overseas.
In allocating resources to meet our counterterrorism reporting and analysis priorities, INR
draws upon the full range of its analytical resources. While the Office of Terrorism,
Narcotics, and Crime Analysis (TNC) has INR's counterterrorism lead, TNC regularly
consults with and draws upon the expertise of fellow analysts in INR's regional and
functional offices.
3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to reallocate resources to CT

efforts over the past five years?
A. None. INR's reporting and analysis must address political, economic, military, and
terrorism developments in 193 countries in order to support the Secretary of State who
bears responsibilities in all of them. INR has addressed the increased requirements for
terrorism analysis through increased information and sharing of expertise among our
various analytical offices; regional analysts increasingly engage in our reporting of
terrorism developments. However, no non-terrorism reporting activities have been
terminated.
4. How are your organizations' priorities linked to guidance from the Secretary of Defense
and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? Are your priorities solely directed by the
cabinet secretary or agency head that leads your department or agency?
A. hi addition to priorities dictated by the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of State,
INR takes general guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Direction
regarding our reporting and analysis priorities is derived from the DCI's Intelligence
Imperatives for Our Nation's Security, published in 2002. Also guiding INR's priorities
is the state of priorities for the intelligence community embodied in National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 26, issued in February 2003.
5. What is your office's strategy to meet its responsibilities regarding counterterrorism?

A. INR analysis seeks to improve the USG's understanding of foreign terrorist operations.
Our focus is on areas of critical concern including terrorist support networks, access to

-3-
weapons of mass destruction, terrorist financing, and terrorist links to local groups in all
regions. Our work directly contributes to the USG's efforts to identify, disrupt, and
destroy terrorist infrastructures and activities.
INR's overall strategy to meet its counterterrorism responsibilities is embodied in the
Bureau Program Plan (BPP). A primary element in our strategy is the recognition that
trained, experienced, and motivated officers and support staff are key to evaluating
terrorism threats and supporting the Department's counterterrorism activities. INR seeks
to provide an effective level of trained and motivated officers and staff for counter-
terrorism analysis. INR encourages officers and staff to take advantage of "in-service"
training opportunities whenever possible.
Also key to the strategy to meet INR's counterterrorism responsibilities is the ability to
quickly access and disseminate counterterrorism reporting and analysis. Toward that
end, INR also supports the E-Govemment initiative of the President's Management
Agenda (PMA). This has included expanding the use of SIPIRNET in Washington and at
overseas posts, launching a fourth website on Intelink, allowing Department officers in
Washington and overseas to instantly access critical intelligence material.
6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities: Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTQ; DIA Joint Task Force
for Counterterrorism; FBI Counterterrorism Division; DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).
A. Officers in INR's Office of Analysis for Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime (INR/TNC)
maintain working relationships with their counterparts in the above-mentioned entities.
INR/TNC officers regularly consult with their counterparts. INR is also an active
participant in the National Terrorism Threat Warning System and is part of the core
group of seven Intelligence Community (1C) entities that drafts and/or clears on 1C
warnings and threat assessments.
7. Please characterize relations on counterterrorism issues within the Intelligence

Community prior to September 11,2001, and today. How has information sharing on
CT issues changed, if at all?
A. Both prior to and after September 11, there have always been extensive working level
contacts within the 1C. Such contact ran the gamut from general information sharing to
analytical collaboration and healthy debate. Particularly since September 11, there has
been a general acknowledgement of the value of such contact, with the result that the
frequency and substance of 1C interaction is constantly improving.
8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the Intelligence
Community from whom you take direction and guidance.
A. INR takes its primary direction and guidance for CT reporting and analysis from the
Secretary of State. With regard to coordination and activities as a member of the 1C, INR
also takes guidance on priorities from and consults with the DCI.

.02/19/04 THU 10:41 FAX l£]002
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
Response to the 9/11 Commission's Questions for Intelligence Community

Components
1. Please describe your organization's role in supporting counterterrorism

activities prior to September 11,2001, and your agency's CT role today.
The Department of Homeland Security was established on March 1,2003, and in

it, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAD?) was
set up to receive information and intelligence regarding terrorist threats to the
homeland, map those threats against the nation's physical and cyber critical
infrastructure and key assets, and issue timely warnings and preventive and
protective measures to protect American lives and property.
The IAIP combined the legacy capabilities of the Department of Energy's Office
of Energy Assurance, the General Services Administration's Federal Computer
Incident Reporting Center (FedCIRC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Department of Commerce's Critical
Infrastructure Assurance Office, and the Department of Defense's National
Communications System, with the mission requirement to leverage these existing
capabilities, and to broaden and enhance them to provide information and services
to the federal government, state and local officials, and the private sector. As an
example of this broadening of legacy missions, IAIP maintains continual
situational awareness of the nation and its borders through the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC). HSOC currently houses 26 federal (both Intelligence
and law enforcement) and local agencies, which provide a continual stream of
information which is further analyzed or transmitted to the appropriate federal or
local law enforcement agency for action.
Today, IAIP is providing the full range of intelligence support to DHS leadership,
mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against assessed vulnerabilities in order
to protect against terrorist attacks, conducting independent analysis of terrorist
threats to the homeland in the form of tailored, competitive and red team analysis,
developing requirements for collection of intelligence and threat-related
information, and coordinating information exchanges between the Department
and state and local governments and the private sector. Please see attached Fact
Sheet on IAIP, and its relationship to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
2. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high priority

intelligence collection and analysis activities? Who makes these decisions?
How do you allocate resources in accordance with these priorities?
As outlined in the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security,

THU 10:42 FAI 1^)004
vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States,
to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order
to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other
agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies and
authorities, the private sector, and other entities.
IA3P disseminates, as appropriate, information collected and analyzed by elements

of the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal
Government with responsibilities relating to homeland security, and to agencies of
State and local governments and private sector entities with such responsibilities
in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, and response to,
terrorist attacks against the United States. Through its analysts assigned to TTIC,
the IA Directorate ensures that information gathered by DHS reaches TTIC and
informs its work and that TTlC's work directly supports DHS' unique mission to
protect the Homeland.
IAIP consults with State and local governments and private sector entities to
ensure appropriate exchanges of information, including law enforcement-related
information, relating to threats of terrorism against the United States. To the
extent that this question seeks information about non-terrorism-related
intelligence collection and analysis and the relative priority of such activities vis-a-
vis counterterrorism activities, given lAIP's overriding statutory mission, the
question is largely inapplicable to IAIP.
IAIP has allocated the resources it received from the passage of the Homeland
Security Act after extensive consultation by the leadership team, though some
flexibility will be required as DHS continues to mature and develop an operational
history of its own in order to determine how best to allocate resources to better
meet mission requirements.
3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to reallocate resources

to CT efforts over the past five years?
The Department of Homeland Security was established on March 1,2003. lAIP's

resources were reallocated from the legacy agencies identified above. There has
been no further reallocation to date.
4, How are your organization's priorities linked to guidance from the Secretary
of Defense and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? Are your priorities
solely directed by the cabinet secretary or agency head that leads your
department or agency?
The priorities for IAIP are set forth in the Homeland Security Act and by applicable
Presidential Directives, and are administered by the Secretary for Homeland Security,
Tom Ridge, and the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
THU 10:43 FAX 1^006
6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities: Terrorist

Threat Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC); DIA
Joint Task Force for Counterterrorism; FBI Counterterrorism Division;
DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).
As noted above, IAIP is a full partner in - in effect a "part owner of — TTIC; our
officers work day-in-day-out at TTIC, participating in processing and analyzing
terrorist threat-related information, shaping and disseminating TTIC products,
assessing gaps in available information, and ensuring that TTIC products reach
appropriate DHS Headquarters elements, as well as appropriate state, local and
private sector officials. The CIA, DOD, and FBI, as well as others, also are full
partners in the TTIC joint venture, and, as a result, IAIP is closely linked to them
through its work at TTIC.
Additionally, lAJP, as a full member of the Intelligence Community, shares

intelligence information not only with its component entities, but with other 1C
members, including, but not limited to, those listed in the question above. This
sharing of information involves regular meetings and exchanges of information.
For example, the Office of Information Analysis and the FBI Counterterrorism
Division meet weekly, and the Homeland Security Information Summary (HSIS)
is briefed and distributed electronically by IA daily to selected members of the
intelligence community.
7. Please characterize relations on Counterterrorism issues within the

Intelligence Community prior to September 11,2001, and today. How has
information sharing on CT issues changed; if at all?
IAIP, of course, did not exist until March 2003. From our perspective, however,
information sharing on Counterterrorism issues has increased greatly even since
IAIP came into being. Not only are members of the 1C communicating well,
including through frequent face-to-face and electronic meetings, vastly enhanced
dissemination of information throughout not just the traditional "1C," but with the
broader law enforcement and homeland security communities. New ways of
doing business, including IAP itself, as well as, of course, the TTIC, and the
Terrorist Screening Center, are improving every day our ability not onlyto better
develop a better threat picture but to act rapidly to reduce our vulnerabilities and
to prevent threatened attacks against us. IAIP is currently assessing and analyzing
threat information from all sources, including the 1C, and sharing the results at an
unprecedented rate, at appropriate levels, with state and local homeland security
officials and the private sector.
8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the Intelligence
Community from whom you take direction and guidance.
Direction and guidance to IAIP are provided by the Secretary of Homeland

Security, Tom Ridge, and the Under Secretary for IAIP, Frank Libutti, themselves
THII 10:44 FAI 0008
FACT SHEET:
DHS Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Summary
The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastmcture Protection ('TAIP") of

the Department of Homeland Security* (DHS) is firmly committed to carrying out each of
the 19 responsibilities assigned to it in Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act. As
indicated in the Reorganization Plan, submitted to Congress on November 22,2002, and
graphically represented in the attached table,; the Office of Information Analysis ('TA")
will carry out 16 of the 19 responsibilities (working together with the Office of
Infrastructure Protection ("IP") on sevlen of these). IP itself will carry out three of the 19.
IA will carry out one of the 19 responsibilities ~ identifying, detecting, and assessing
terrorist threats to the homeland - both through analysts at DHS Headquarters and
through operating as one of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center ("TTIC") partners in
collaboration with analysts from other-key agencies. Although only a few months old,
IAIP is moving forward to increase its] staff to carry out these statutory responsibilities,
and will have 86 full time analysts by September 2003, and 113 by March 2004, lAlP's
first anniversary. Among the key missions o;f IA, which it is now carrying out and for
which IA will continue to increase its Capability, are:
Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership, as do

intelligence components of other departments and agencies;
i
I-
With IP, mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against our assessed vulnerabilities
in order to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attacks;
• Conducting independent analysis of terrorist threats to the homeland based on DHS'

robust access to information and intelligence, including competitive analysis, tailored
analysis, and "red teaming;"
• Supporting the work of all of DHS' components, including the Directorates of Border
and Transportation Security, Science and Technology, and Emergency Preparedness
and Response. This analytic support will also be provided to DHS' decisionmakers
under pending Bioshield legislatioin, if enacted;
• Analyzing terrorist threats to the homeland, both at DHS Headquarters, and through
IA analysts physically located at TfTIC;
i
• Developing requirements for the collection of intelligence and other information
related to terrorist threats to the homeland for use by the Intelligence Community and
U.S. law enforcement agencies; |
• Coordinating exchanges of terrorist threat-related information with state and local

governments and the private sector; and
THU 10:44 FAX @010
I i
: i
intelligence gaps and communications failures. This linkage of information access and
analysis on the one hand and vulnerabilities analysis and protective measures on the other
is what is entirely new, and unduplicated elsewhere, about the President's vision for
DHS. i h i
Partnership with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector.
Unlike other members of the Intelligence Community, including others represented at the
TTIC, IA has both the authority and responsibility for providing Federally-collected and
analyzed homeland security information to drst respbnders and other state and local
officials and, as appropriate, security managers and other key private sector contacts.
Likewise, only IA, in coordination with IP, is in the position effectively to manage the
collection from state and local governments, jand private sector officials, of the crucial
homeland security-related information that maybe, in the first instance, available only to
those officials. DHS will work closely with pther U.S. Government agencies to
coordinate relations with state, local, and private sector officials, including coordinating
with FBI on contacts with state and local law enforcement.
; ! I
I ' !
Beyond the unique IA-IP partnership] IA is al|so the central information nerve
center of DHS' efforts to coordinate the protection of U.S. homeland security. IA will:
|j ;
i | j
• Facilitate the creation of requirements; on behalf of the Secretary and DHS
leadership, to other DHS components, and to the intelligence Community, and law
enforcement, informed by the integration! of homeland-security-related intelligence
from all sources with vulnerability and risk assessments for critical infrastructure
prepared by IP; ,j
• ' j i
• Provide the full-range of intelligence support - briefings, analytic products,

including tailored analysis responding tp jspecific; inquiries, and other support - to the
Secretary, DHS leadership, the Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS3 operational
components, as well as the rest of DHS; j •
! ! i :
• Serve as the collection, processing, integration,! analytic, and dissemination

manager for DHS' information cdllectioin and operational components (Coast Guard,
Secret Service, Transportation SecjuritylAdministration, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Customs and Border; Protection), turning the voluminous threat
information collected every day at lour borders, ports, and airports, into usable and, in
many cases, actionable intelligence; : :
i !j •
• Ensure (in coordination with FBI &nd others) that homeland security-related
intelligence information is shared with 'pthers who need it, in the Federal, state, and
local governments, as well as the private jsector; and
I : ! ;
! ' i '
• Support the Homeland Security Advispry System. lA's activities also will be in
support of the Secretary's responsibility to administer the Homeland Security
Advisory System, including independently analyzing information supporting
decisions to raise or lower the national warning level.
THU 10:45 FAX i!012
To carry out portions of its mission performed by IA analysts physically located at

TTIC and those at DHS Headquarters, IA will have robust, comprehensive, and
independent access, mandated by the President and in the law, to information relevant to
homeland security, whether raw or processed. IA's access is not an "either" IA at TTIC
"or" IA at DHS Headquarters issue. IA will have the;mandated access to, and the
physical electronic means to receive information, independent of its participation in the
TTIC. DHS' robust access to homeland security infobnation -- provided by the
President, by Congress, and by written agreement between the Secretary, Director of
Central Intelligence, and Attorney General — is in no way limited to those IA officers
physically working at TTIC. A copy of the JMemoraridum of Understanding between the
Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of
Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing,! dated March 4,2003 ("the MOU")
is attached hereto. ; !
Leveraging Federal, State and Local Irifortdation, andDHS/IP
hi carrying out their analysis, IA analysts at DfHS Headquarters not only will have
access to all relevant information from U.S^ intelligence and law enforcement agencies
and from officials in state and local governments and! the private sector, but they will be
able to reach out, via the IA analysts located at TTICJ to leverage then1 expertise and
direct contacts to the overall U.S. counterterrorism operational and analytic efforts co-
located there. DHS/D? will rely upon the analysis produced by IA, to help determine
priorities for protective and support measures apd provide them to federal, state, and local
government agencies and authorities, and to private sjector entities. In support of its
mission, DHS/IP will drive, through and with IA, requirements to the Intelligence
Community, law enforcement, and other parts of DHS, to ensure that vulnerabilities and
threats are correlated and appropriate protective actions are defined and implemented.
IA 's Independent Analytic Work
In addition to the critical role, outlined above of mapping infrastructure

vulnerabilities against threats to the homeland, IA. also will conduct other analysis distinct
from that hi which IA analysts participate at TTIC, including:
• Tailored Analysis. IA Headquarters-based analysts will routinely be tasked to take a

different "cut" at a similar universe of information as that analyzed at TTIC. For
example, TTIC may reach a conclusion, about a g jneral terrorist threat to the United
States, while DHS Headquarters may want a moi s targeted and specific analysis
directed at how such a threat might affect ajparticfular sector of the U.S. infrastructure,
Such threat analysis would be differentthan that jerformed at TTIC, but crucial to the
overall DHS mission and to our homeland security, Similar tailored analytic products
are systematically used by the leaders of other Imellig<;ence Community member
Departments and Agencies based on each agency s individual mission.
• Competitive Analysis. IAIP analysts located at Headquarters will also conduct

competitive terrorism threat analysis to that takir place at TTIC. For example, the
THU 10:46 FAX i!014
i ':
Statutory Function" • ; ;' • Component Performed, in

Part, at TTIC?
Vulnerabilities Assessment :. .: '.' IP NO
National Plan to Secure Infrastructure : :' IP NO
Recommend Infrastructure Protective Measures ' IP NO
"Map" threats against vulnerabilities : ; IA/IP NO
Ensure timely and efficient access to DHS of all : IA NO
homeland security information j • \'- \r the Homeland Security Advisory System
IA NO
Make recommendations for homeland siecurity : • . IA NO
information sharing policies I ' ••• i i •
Disseminate information analyzed by DHS to other \, state, IA NO entities! and :the:
and local government
private sector ,j ; j i;. i

Consult with appropriate federal Intelligence : IA NO
Community and law enforcement officials to establis 1
collection priorities and strategies and represent DH* in
"requirements" processes ;; | • ' : • .; '.
Consult with state and local governments and the; IA NO
private sector to ensure appropriate exchanges of ,
terrorist threat-related information '! '.-. :• ' •
Ensure that information received is protected from IA/IP NO
unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only i >r
the performance of official duties 1 1 . • .'•.
Request additional information from other federal, s rte, IAIP NO
local govemroent agencies and the private sector :
Establish and use secure information technology ] IA/IP NO
inftastructure ! .i ;;
Ensure that information systems/databaises lire ; ; IA/IP NO
compatible with one another and other federal Stgenfc es
and treat information in accordance with applicable!
Federal privacy law j i: • •.
Coordinate training and other support to D&S and 6 rer IA/IP NO
agencies to identify and share information ! '• ,.' : ,
Coordinate with 1C elements and federal, sjjiatej- arid IA NO
local law enforcement agencies "as appropriate" ;
Provide intelligence analysis and other support to tit IA NO
rest of DHS j. ; ; i i
Perfonn such other duties as the Secretary may pK>V de IAAP NO
Identify, Detect, and Assess Terrorist T|hre&ts to ; : IA YES
Homeland 1 . j i '•: \ ';!. i . :
' This chart is intended only to describe in general terms LMP' wiivision of ikl OT witti regard to functions assigned DHS by the
Homeland Security Act. Other parts of DHS, as well as participants in|TTKt nd all other federal Departments and Agencies, remain
responsible, with regard to their own work and informationfa)t&eir pojsessijn for many of these same functions, e.g., protecting
informarion agninst unauthorized disclosure. :| : '. • \ '!; - j - i .
:!v |= i - i |
• -|.-7i\J!
:i'- I !iH .
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 11
ACCESS
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Visas Viper Activities: 8/1993 through 12/2001

9/11 Closed by Statute
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
*
PTQ7091
PAGE 01 STATE 113143 012023Z

ORIGIN CA-02
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TEDE-00 10-00 ADS-00 NBA- 01 VO-03 SA-01 DSCC-00
/OUR
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APPROVED BY: CA:MARYAN, DS:EBOSWELL
CA: RADAVIS DS:GBUJAC
CA : DHAMILTON DS/CR/VF :; CDECAMPLI
CA/VO : DOPPER DS/ICI/CR :: GSJUE (
CA/EX : MBARNES DS/PI/I : PBERGEN
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3 F6B7D 012024Z /20
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM
ASMARA POUCH
BANGUI POUCH
MONROVIA POUCH
SARAJEVO POUCH
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 STATE 113143 012023Z

UNCLAS STATE 113143
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: KFRD, CMGT, CVIS, ASEC
SUBJECT: CONSULAR MANAGEMENT (INTERNAL CONTROLS) --
REVIEW OF CY 94/95 MALFEASANCE/MISFEASANCE CASES
FOR AMBASSADORS, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, RSO'S AND CONSULAR

MANAGERS FROM CA ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY A RYAN AND DS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ERIC BOSWELL __
1 - THIS IS A JOINT CA AND DS CABLE.
2. SUMMARY: THE BUREAUS OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS AND

DIPLOMATIC SECURITY HAVE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY TO
PREVENT MALFEASANCE, MISFEASANCE AND FRAUD. THIS
RESPONSIBILITY EXTENDS TO, AND IS EXERCISED BY PRINCIPAL
OFFICERS, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS, CONSULAR
MANAGEMENT AND STAFF. WE RECOGNIZE THAT EFFORTS TO MEET
INCREASING DEMANDS IN AN ERA OF DECLINING MEANS SEVERELY
CHALLENGES POSTS' RESOURCES, AND THAT THE VAST MAJORITY
OF FSO'S AND FSN'S LIVE UP TO THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL
AND ETHICAL STANDARDS. NEVERTHELESS, CONSULAR MANAGERS
MUST NOT DECREASE THEIR VIGILANCE AGAINST FRAUD
PERPETRATORS, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, UNSCRUPULOUS VISA
BROKERS, ETC., AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT EMBASSY/
CONSULATE EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME INVOLVED WITH THEM.
END SUMMARY.
3. WORLDWIDE TURMOIL, STRIFE, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION AND

OTHER PUSH FACTORS HAVE SWOLLEN THE NUMBERS OF MALA FIDE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 STATE 113143 012023Z

TRAVELLERS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS OBSERVED AN INCREASE IN
ORGANIZED ALIEN SMUGGLING AND ITS CORROSIVE EFFECT ON
IMMIGRATION, POLICE AND OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AROUND
THE WORLD. INCREASINGLY, ALIEN SMUGGLING HAS EITHER
ADOPTED THE METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZED
CRIME, OR HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER BY PREVIOUSLY-EXISTING
ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS AS THEY RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL
FOR RELATIVELY LOW-RISK PROFITS - - I N MANY COUNTRIES
TRAFFICKING IN UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS IS NOT ILLEGAL.
ORGANIZED ALIEN SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED
NEW AND OFTEN INGENIOUS ROUTES AND METHODS FOR PLYING
THEIR TRADE. MANY ILLEGAL MIGRANTS BYPASS U.S. VISA
LINES ALTOGETHER, WHILE OTHERS ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN
LEGITIMATE TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION BY FRAUD AND DECEIT.
4. CONSEQUENTLY, EVER-INCREASING PRESSURES ARE BROUGHT

TO BEAR ON EMBASSY AND CONSULATE EMPLOYEES TO BECOME
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SCHEMES TO ASSIST
MALA FIDE ALIENS TO REACH THE U.S. BY CIRCUMVENTING U.S.
IMMIGRATION LAWS. THESE ATTEMPTS USUALLY ARE THWARTED.
HOWEVER, LACK OF PROPER DILIGENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page-: 2

STRICT INTERNAL CONTROLS, INATTENTIVENESS BY CONSULAR

EMPLOYEES, AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES HAVE RESULTED IN, AT "*
LEAST, THE APPEARANCE OF MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE. AS
RECORDED IN THE CASE SUMMARIES PROVIDED BELOW, THERE
HAVE BEEN, REGRETTABLY, DELIBERATE EFFORTS BY EMBASSY
AND CONSULAR EMPLOYEES TO SUBVERT THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
TO AID AND ABET CERTAIN ALIENS TO OBTAIN VISAS BY
AVOIDING NORMAL VISA APPLICATION PROCEDURES.
5. ALL CONSULAR SUPERVISORS MUST EXERCISE SCRUPULOUS

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 STATE 113143 012023Z

OVERSIGHT OF CONSULAR ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE STRICT
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNAL CONTROLS. IN ORDER TO AVOID..
EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE,
MANAGERS SHOULD ENSURE:
-- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF CONSULAR CASH RECEIPTS;

-- CAREFUL CONTROL OF BLANK PPT AND ROB FORMS;
-- CAREFUL CONTROL OF IMMIGRANT VISA FORMS;
-- CAREFUL MONITORING OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS;
-- PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS NEEDED TO ACCESS DATA
PROCESSING SYSTEMS;
-- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF MRV VISA FOILS;
-- FREQUENT REVIEW OF IVACS AND NIVCAPS SYSTEMS TO

IDENTIFY ANY UNAUTHORIZED ALTERATIONS OF COMPUTERIZED
VISA RECORDS;
-- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF THE NUMBER ON NIV MACHINES
AND PLATES WITH NIV APPLICATION FORMS;
-- WITH THE RSO, SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN
ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE VISA REFERRAL SYSTEM.
6. WHENEVER FRAUD IS SUSPECTED THE DEPARTMENT EXPECTS

SECURITY OFFICERS TO WORK PROMPTLY AND ENERGETICALLY
WITH CONSULAR OFFICERS TO THWART ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER
ACTIVITIES.
7. A REVIEW OF CASES INVESTIGATED BY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

IN THE YEARS 1994 AND 1995 REVEALS THAT CORRUPTED
PERSONNEL TOOK ADVANTAGE OF WEAK INTERNAL CONTROLS IN
ENGAGING IN THEIR FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES. THE CONTROL OF
APPROVED MRV "BATCHES" APPEARS TO BE A PARTICULAR
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 113143 012023Z

VULNERABILITY AT HIGH-VOLUME MRV POSTS. IN AT LEAST ONE
CASE? THE WEAK APPLICATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS BY A
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER WAS THE SUBJECT OF A REPORT TO
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL.
1994 CASES
8. IN 1994 FOURTEEN FSN'S WERE TERMINATED FOR COMMITTING

VISA FRAUD. TWO OF THE FSN'S WERE PROSECUTED LOCALLY.
IN ADDITION, ONE FSN RECEIVED A LETTER OF REPRIMAND.
A) AT AN NBA POST A CONSULAR FSN WITH 31 YEARS OF

EXPERIENCE FAILED TO REPORT HIS CONTACTS WITH A KNOWN
VISA FIXER WHO HAD SPENT TIME IN PRISON IN THE U.S. THE
FSN AGREED TO TRY TO EXPEDITE THREE IMMIGRANT VISAS FOR
CLIENTS OF THE VISA FIXER. ANOTHER, ALERT FSN REPORTED
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRACY AND THE FSN WAS TERMINATED
FROM EMPLOYMENT.
B) AT ANOTHER NEA POST A CONSULAR FSN RECEPTIONIST

EXTORTED MONEY FROM VISA APPLICANTS BY MAKING THEM
BELIEVE THAT FURTHER VISA SERVICES WERE CONTINGENT ON
THIS PAYMENT. WHEN DISCOVERED, SHE WAS TERMINATED,
PROSECUTED LOCALLY AND RECEIVED A THREE-MONTH SENTENCE.
C) IN AN AF POST A CONSULAR FSN ACCEPTED MONEY FROM A

LOCAL BUSINESSMAN IN RETURN FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THE
ISSUANCE OF AN IV FOR A CLIENT OF THE BUSINESSMAN. WHEN

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 06 STATE 113143 012023Z

THE VISA WAS REFUSED, THE BUSINESSMAN VISITED THE
CONSULAR SECTION AND COMPLAINED THAT HE WANTED HIS MONEY
BACK. ALERT FSN'S REPORTED THE INCIDENT AND THE FIRST
FSN WAS TERMINATED.
D) IN AN ARA POST A PIT AMERICAN FAMILY MEMBER (AFM)

EMPLOYEE WORKING IN THE CONSULAR SECTION CONDUCTED CLASS
RECORDS CHECKS ON SEVERAL ROUTINE VISA CASES AND
OBTAINED HITS. SHE REFERRED THE CASES TO A CONSULAR
OFFICER WHO OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT ADJUDICATED THESE
PARTICULAR CASES AND THAT HIS INITIALS ON THE VISA
APPLICATIONS WERE FORGED. THE RESPONSIBLE FSN WAS
CONFRONTED AND DISMISSED. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE
FSN HAD PLACED THE COMPLETED, FORGED APPLICATIONS AND

PASSPORTS INTO A REGULAR BATCH OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS

TO BE ENTERED INTO THE MRV. AFTER THE VISAS WERE "*
PRINTED, HE INTENDED TO RETRIEVE THE PASSPORTS AND
DISTRIBUTE THEM TO HIS "CLIENTS.
E) IN AN AF POST, AN FSN INVESTIGATOR WAS TERMINATED

AFTER INVESTIGATION DETERMINED HE HAD FALSIFIED THE
RESULTS OF FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS IN RETURN FOR PAYMENT.
F) IN AN EUR POST A CONSULAR FSN ACCEPTED USD 5000 FROM

VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR HIS CLAIMED INFLUENCE OVER
THE ISSUANCE PROCESS. THE FSN WAS TERMINATED, AND FLED
TO THE US BEFORE HIS NIV COULD BE CANCELLED. THE CASE
WAS REFERRED TO THE INS.
G) IN AN ARA POST, THE RSO CONDUCTED A JOINT

INVESTIGATIVE OPERATION WITH LOCAL POLICE TARGETING -.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 07 STATE 113143 012023Z

THREE LOCAL VISA BROKERS AND AN FSN CONSULAR EMPLOYEE.
THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FSN FORGED CONSULAR
OFFICERS' INITIALS ON VISA APPLICATIONS AND PLACED THEM
INTO BATCHES OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS TO BE ENTERED INTO
THE MRV. AFTER MRV PRINTING SHE RETRIEVED THE PASSPORTS
WITH THEIR PRINTED VISAS AND RETURNED THEM TO HER
CLIENTS. SHE CONFESSED TO HAVE FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED
EIGHT NIVS FOR A TOTAL OF USD 9600. SHE AND THE THREE
BROKERS WERE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY.
H) IN AN AF POST, A CONSULAR FSN EMPLOYEE ACCEPTED

PAYMENT FROM AT LEAST TWELVE APPLICANTS IN EXCHANGE FOR
HIS HELP IN OBTAINING VISAS. THE FSN SOLD HIS INFLUENCE
AS A CONSULAR SECTION EMPLOYEE, AND WAS TERMINATED.
I) IN AN ARA POST, A CONSULAR SECTION FSN CREATED A

BOGUS IV FILE FOR HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW SO THAT THE INS
WOULD ACCEPT THE PETITION AND FORWARD IT DIRECTLY TO THE
CONSULATE, BYPASSING THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER. THE
BROTHER-IN-LAW'S EMPLOYER CONTACTED THE CONSULATE TO
VERIFY HIS STORY THAT HE HAD MISSED A DAY'S WORK TO
APPLY FOR A VISA. ALERT CONSULAR STAFF EXPOSED THE SCAM
AND THE FSN WAS TERMINATED.
J) IN ANOTHER ARA POST, TWO FSN CONSULAR EMPLOYEES

OFFERED TO EXPEDITE AN APPLICANT'S IMMIGRANT VISA IN
RETURN FOR USD 10,000. AN INFORMANT NOTIFIED EMBASSY

Current Class::UNCLASSIFIED Page: 6
Current'Handling: n/a
PERSONNEL AND THE FSN'S WERE TERMINATED. IN ADDITION,

THE FSN SUPERVISOR OF THE PAIR WAS TERMINATED FOR *
KNOWING ABOUT THE SCHEME AND NOT REPORTING IT TO EMBASSY
OFFICIALS.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 08 STATE 113143 012023Z
K) IN AN ARA POST, A GSO MOTORPOOL DRIVER WAS TERMINATED

FOR FALSIFYING TWO VISA REFERRALS FOR PAYMENT. INS
STOPPED ONE OF THE VISA RECIPIENTS AT A U.S. PORT OF
ENTRY; THE RECIPIENT ADMITTED HE PAID THE FSN USD 1500
FOR THE REFERRAL.
L) IN AN AF POST, A CONSULAR FSN ENTERED INFORMATION .ON

UNQUALIFIED, UNINTERVIEWED VISA APPLICANTS INTO MRV
BATCHES WITHOUT A CONSULAR OFFICER'S APPROVAL, AND
PRODUCED TWELVE NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. THE FSN ALLEGEDLY
ACCEPTED USD 3000 PER VISA FROM HER CLIENTS. THE FSN,
WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF A TDY CONSULAR OFFICER DURING THE
ONE-MONTH PERIOD IN WHICH THE FRAUD OCCURRED, WAS
TERMINATED.
M) BACK IN ARA, A CONSULAR FSN HELPED A KNOWN ALIEN

SMUGGLER PLACE MALA FIDE CLIENTS AT THE HEAD OF THE NIV
LINE OVER A FOUR MONTH PERIOD. WHEN CONFRONTED, THE FSN
DENIED ACCEPTING PAYMENT FOR THIS SERVICE. POST
COUNSELLED THE FSN AND ISSUED A LETTER OF REPRIMAND.
1995 CASES
9. IN CY 1995 15 FSN AND 2 AMERICAN EMPLOYEES WERE

TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. 5 FSN'S WERE PROSECUTED
LOCALLY, WHILE ONE FSN AND ONE AMERICAN WERE PROSECUTED
IN THE UNITED STATES.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 09 STATE 113143 012023Z

A) IN AN EAP POST, AN FSN VISA CLERK HELPED A VISA
APPLICANT OBTAIN A FRAUDULENT BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND
HELPED HER COMPLETE A FRAUDULENT VISA APPLICATION IN
RETURN FOR USD 300. THE FSN WAS TERMINATED.
B) IN AN ARA POST, TWO CONSULAR FSN'S WERE TERMINATED

AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY FOR ASSISTING APPLICANTS IN THE

PREPARATION OF DOCUMENT PACKAGES, INCLUDING STOLEN """
PASSPORTS.
C) IN AN EAP POST, AN FSN ATTEMPTED TO RESIGN FROM

EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEARNING SHE WAS A SUSPECT IN AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE MRV.
FOILS. RSO AND LOCAL POLICE INTERVIEWS DID NOT RESULT
IN AN ADMISSION OF GUILT; POST SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED
THE FSN'S EMPLOYMENT.
D) IN AN ARA POST THE AMBASSADOR'S FSN DRIVER ACCEPTED

USD 1000 IN RETURN FOR SUBMITTING A VISA REFERRAL FOR A
WOMAN UNDER DEA INVESTIGATION FOR NARCOTICS SMUGGLING.
THE FSN ADMITTED INVOLVEMENT AND WAS TERMINATED.
E) IN ANOTHER ARA POST, A CONSULAR FSN FRAUDULENTLY ..

ISSUED AT LEAST 100 NON IMMIGRANT VISAS TO A SYRIAN
NATIONAL VISA BROKER AND WAS PAID USD 2000 FOR EACH
VISA. HE WAS ARRESTED IN THE U.S. AND WAS CONVICTED OF
VISA FRAUD AND BRIBERY. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HE WAS
TERMINATED.
F) IN AN AF POST A CONSULAR FSN EXTORTED USD 120 FROM

VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR PROCESSING THEIR VISA
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 10 STATE 113143 012023Z

APPLICATIONS. HE WAS TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY.
G) IN AN EUR POST A CONSULAR FSN EXTORTED USD 1000 FROM

TWO E VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR PROCESSING THE
VISAS. UPON ENTERING THE U.S. THE APPLICANTS FILED A
COMPLAINT. AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION RESULTED IN DIRECT
EVIDENCE OF THE FSN1S INVOLVEMENT. THE FSN WAS
TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY.
H) IN AN AF POST, AN AID FSN DRIVER FORGED AN "A VISA

REFERRAL FORM AND SUBMITTED IT TO THE CONSULAR SECTION.
ALTHOUGH THE VISA WAS REFUSED HE CHARGED USD 600 FOR THE
SERVICE. HE WAS TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY.
I) IN ANOTHER AF POST AN FSN GSO EMPLOYEE AGREED TO

ACCEPT USD 2000 FROM A POLICE UNDERCOVER OFFICER IN
EXCHANGE FOR A VISA. THE OPERATION WAS BASED ON AN

INFORMANT'S ALLEGATION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S PARTICIPATION

IN VISA FRAUD. THE FSN NEVER DELIVERED THE VISA AND THE
POLICE OPERATION WAS TERMINATED, THOUGH THE EVIDENCE WAS ""
SUFFICIENT TO TERMINATE THE FSN.
J) IN AN ARA POST, A CONSULAR FSN WAS FOUND TO BE TAKING

USD 40 FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING AN IMMIGRANT VISA AND
USD FIFTEEN FOR NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. HE WAS TERMINATED
FROM EMPLOYMENT.
K) IN AN EAP POST, A U.S. CITIZEN PIT EMPLOYEE OF THE

CONSULAR SECTION FORGED VISA APPLICATIONS AND CONSULAR
OFFICERS' NOTES AND INITIALS THAT RESULTED IN THE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 11 STATE 113143 012023Z

ISSUING OF OVER 200 NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. THE EMPLOYEE
WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT; THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION CONTINUES.
L) IN AN ARA POST AN EMBASSY FSN DRIVER AGREED TO ACCEPT

MONEY FROM A POLICE UNDERCOVER OFFICER IN A JOINT
DS/LOCAL POLICE UNDERCOVER OPERATION. THE OPERATION WAS
BASED ON AN INFORMANT'S INFORMATION THAT THE DRIVER
ASSEMBLED FALSE DOCUMENT PACKAGES FOR USD 3000-4000.
THE DRIVER NEVER COMPLETED THE PACKAGE AND THE OPERATION
WAS TERMINATED; AGAIN, THE EVIDENCE WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO
TERMINATE THE EMPLOYEE.
M) IN AN NBA POST, A CONSULAR FSN EXPLOITED WEAK

INTERNAL CONTROLS AND CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF AT LEAST 65
NONIMMIGRANT VISAS TO THE NATION'S LARGE THIRD-COUNTRY
NATIONAL POPULATION. HE ACCEPTED USD 2000 FOR EACH
VISA. HIS EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED AND HE WAS DEPORTED
TO HIS HOME COUNTRY.
N) IN AN EUR POST AN EMBASSY CONTRACT GUARD SOLD HIS

PASSPORT WITH A VALID NONIMMIGRANT VISA FOR USD 2000 TO
A LOCAL NATIONAL WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETAINED AT A U.S.
PORT OF ENTRY FOR ATTEMPTING ENTRY WITH THE PASSPORT.
THE GUARD WAS TERMINATED.
O) AT THE SAME EUR POST, AN FSN VISA SUPERVISOR CREATED

BOGUS NAME CHECK CABLES AND SCHEDULED FRAUDULENT MEDICAL
APPOINTMENTS FOR F-3 VISA APPLICANTS SO THEY COULD APPLY
AS F-I'S IN ORDER TO AVOID THE WAITING PERIOD OF AN F-3
CANDIDATE. SHE ALSO HELPED OBTAIN A VISA FOR HER
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 12 STATE 113143 012023Z

SISTER'S BOYFRIEND BY PRESENTING HIM AS HER HUSBAND. IN
ADDITION, SHE WAS INVOLVED IN CASHIER IRREGULARITIES.
SHE WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT.
P) IN AN ARA POST, A GS-10 VISA EXAMINER WAS ARRESTED IN

THE U.S. AND CONVICTED OF ACCEPTING A BRIBE BY A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL AFTER ACCEPTING MONEY FROM A LOCAL VISA BROKER
IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. SHE
CONFESSED TO THE CRIME WHEN CONFRONTED.
10. ALL CONSULAR MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY CONSULAR

OFFICERS SHOULD DISCUSS THIS CABLE WITH THEIR STAFFS.
THE CONSULAR MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (PARTICULARLY CHAPTERS
SIX AND SEVEN WHICH COVER INTERNAL CONTROLS IN DEPTH),
AND ALL OTHER INTERNAL CONTROLS GUIDANCE AVAILABLE AT
POST SHOULD BE REFERRED TO IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. AT
HIGH FRAUD POSTS RSO'S SHOULD BE INVOLVED. THIS
MATERIAL SHOULD BE REVIEWED WITH EVERY NEWLY ASSIGNED
FSO (AND FSN AS APPROPRIATE) TO ENSURE FAMILIARITY WITH
THE PROCEDURES AND THE PITFALLS S/HE SHOULD AVOID.
11. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES RYAN AND BOSWELL TAKE THIS

OPPORTUNITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE CONSULAR OFFICERS AND
FSN'S, IN CONJUNCTION WITH POST RSO'S, WHO SUCCEEDED IN
FRUSTRATING VISA FRAUD AND ALIEN SMUGGLING AROUND THE
WORLD, WHILE THIS "LESSONS LEARNED" CABLE NECESSARILY
DEALS WITH AN UNPLEASANT REALITY THAT COMES WITH THE
PROVISION OF A SERVICE FOR WHICH DEMAND FAR OUTSTRIPS
SUPPLY, AND THAT BY ITS NATURE IS UNAVAILABLE TO MANY
WHO DESIRE ITS BENEFITS, THE DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES THE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 13 STATE 113143 012023Z

HARD WORK AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS DEMONSTRATED BY CA AND DS
EMPLOYEES IN 1994 AND 1995. FINALLY, ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES RYAN AND BOSWELL RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE
THE DEDICATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF
FSO'S AND FSN'S WHO LIVE UP TO THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM AND HONESTY.
12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

CHRISTOPHER
Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 9.

UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 5
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Response to OIG Request for Information on Non-Immigrant Visa Issuance Policies

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
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Immigration • Nonimmigrant Visa Categories
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• I rn mjg [a n t Vj s a C a tego r i e s
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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0005 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31199439

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 09/05/2003 DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

TO: Daniel Marcus

SUBJECT: Transmittal memo and index of documents responsive to document requests

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE VISA PROCESS

• Inadequate resources prompted CA to advocate introducing every efficiency possible.

• Beginning in 1994, in response to a congressional mandate, CA deployed modern

• Rapidly increasing volume of applications coupled with staffing shortages led to CA

PAGE 01 JERUSA 00330 240701Z

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 CIAE-00 NEA-07 NSAE-00 ANJAD-Ol INSE-01

UNCLAS JERUSALEM 00330

VISAS FOR CA/VO/F/S

E.O. 12356: N/A

THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE SUBMITTED FOR DELETION FROM THE

1. KARAKRA, ADEL BADER JORD 41

2. AJAJ, MOHAMMAD AHMAD JORD 41

3. MALUL, GIORA ISRL 41

4. GOLA, YITZHAK ISRL 41

6. HALABI, NASIR ELDIN AZMI JORD 41

7. DAJANI, IMAD JORD 41

8. ABU SIAM, HUSEIN MAKHLOUF JORD 41

PAGE 02 JERUSA 00330 240701Z

9. ABU AMSHA, MAHER JORD 41

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 1

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0005 TAB: 3 DOC ID: 31199441

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 10/18/2002 DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

SUBJECT: Visa's Viper Submission

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025 FOLDER: 0005 TAB: 4 DOC ID: 31199442

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2]

DOCUMENT DATE: 10/02/2001 DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

SUBJECT: Homeland Security

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

INFO LOG- 00 MFA-00 NP-00 CIAE-00 EAP-00 UTED-00 CSEP-00

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005427

USINS PASS TO INS WASHINGTON FOR TAET D. JOHNSON; BANGKOK

STATE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CR/CIL

E.O. 12958: N/A

REF: 54180808 HQ USINS WASHDC CABLE OF 090256Z AUG 02

PAGE 02 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

1.(U) EMBASSY GRANTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE AND WELCOMES THE

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 1

BACK. ANY CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS IN THE ESCORT

2. (U) HOTEL INFORMATION: THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE

3. (U) PLEASE NOTE THAT TRAVELERS TO JAPAN ON OFFICIAL

PAGE 03 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z

4.(U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AT

5. (SBU) THE GENERAL THREAT FROM CRIME IN TOKYO AND

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Page: 2

CITIZENS TRAVELING IN JAPAN.

PAGE 04 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z