Case - Power Games in Adriatic - Case Part I PDF

Power games in the adriatic Mussolini and the League of Nations
By Jacques N. Couvas1
Introduction
At the end of World War I, Europe experienced profound restructuring both in its politicogeographical configuration and in the way nations were required to behave in their international relations. Following the Treaty of Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and the formation of the League of Nations (LoN)2, a number of new states saw the day and a new spirit of justice and equilibrium prevailed; it was inspired3 by President Woodrow Wilson4 of the United States and the willingness of the main Great Powers, England and France, exhausted by the four-year conflict, to put order in the Old Continent and preserve peace. This was, unfortunately, to have a short life, as new Great Powers emerged and the equilibrium among nations changed within less than two decades. The incident, which is the object of this Case, certainly contributed to the weakening of the LoN in its role of guarantor of a peaceful Europe. The main merit of the League is, however, that it provided for the first time in history a basis of international law and a forum for nations to debate, but not necessarily to resolve, their differences. These differences grew over time, fuelled by new ideologiesCommunism, Fascism, and Nazismjockeying for supremacy in the region and other parts of the world. Before WWI, disputes among states were handled by diplomats from directly-concerned and neutral countries in so-called conferences, aiming at finding non-violent solutions. This process was often a protracted one. The advantage of this was that, as long as negotiations were going on, the heat of the crisis at hand might fade out. However, on several occasions one of the parties in the dispute would lose patience and take unilateral aggressive action, forcing alliance members from both sides to get involved.
Jacques N. Couvas, Senior Lecturer, Bilkent University, Ankara, and director of EAGLELabs, prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a political or administrative situation. Copyright 2009 Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved. . ___________________________________________________________ 2 The constitution of the League was adopted by the Paris Peace Conference in April 1919. The LoN had its first meeting on January 16, 1920, six days after the Treaty of Versailles became effective. 3 Wilsons idea was that "A general association of nations should be formed on the basis of covenants designed to create mutual guarantees of the political independence and territorial integrity of States, large and small equally." (Presidents address to the joint session of the Two Houses of the Congress, January 8, 1918, Point 14). 4 The principle of coexistence of a peaceful community had already been formulated by Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795).
Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.
One characteristic of the pre-WWI period was that powers had asserted their right to conduct punitive actions against other nations in order to seek repair of material or moral damage they deemed they had been subjected to. 5 The goal of the LoN was to prevent such deliberate vigilante attitudes among its members. This case examines a diplomatic incident in 1923, which began with the murder of three Italian delegates to an international mission on Greek territory and quickly escalated to power-game between Italy and the LoN. In the epilogue, we shall discuss whether the European community of states and its newly declared principles came out of this crisis in a better position than before, and the implicit and explicit roles the Great Powers of the time played, separately and collectively. Emphasis will, of course, be on the negotiating techniques used at the most crucial moments of the events.
Structure of the League of Nations

The League of Nations had four main organs: The Assembly, the Secretariat, the Council, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The League also had numerous agencies and commissions, responsible for a variety of activities, from health to disarmament to slavery. It was not, however, responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which ended the War. Authorization for any action required both a unanimous vote by the Council and a majority vote in the Assembly. The Assembly was initially composed of 42 members and grew to 58 by 1934. Each member state had three representatives and one vote. It met once a year, in September in Geneva As it represented predominantly small European countries and former colonies in Africa and Latin America it was generally keen to see that the charter of its constitution, the Covenant, be observed by the Great Powers and be used as the source of international law. The Council was the executive, composed of initially four permanent6 and four non-permanent members7. The latter were appointed for three years. The representatives of such members were seasoned diplomats, who had served in the major European and Commonwealth capitals, as well as in Washington DC, prior to WWI. The Council met five times a year, but also had extraordinary sessions to address urgent issues. Having not ratified the Versailles Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union8 were not members of the LoN, while Germany had not yet been admitted at the foundation of the organization9. The US, however, had observer status in sessions of the Council and the Assembly. The headquarters of the LoN were at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, where the United Nations (UN) are currently headquartered.
Such cases included occupation of other states territories in order to extract financial reparation in trade disputes, harm made to their citizens living in, or travelling to the country punished, acts considered as humiliating, etc. 6 England, France, Italy, and Japan. 7 More non-permanent members were added over the years, reaching a total of nine in the 1930s. At the time of the present case, there were six non-permanent members. 8 The Soviet Union joined in 1934 in order to snub Germany, which had withdrawn a year earlier. She was expelled in 1939 after invading Finland. 9 She joined on September 8, 1926.
A Secretariat was acting as the civil service for the Council and the Assembly, preparing meeting agendas, writing the procs verbaux (minutes) of such meetings, translating and disseminating documents in the three official languages of the League10, and handling all administrative tasks related to its work. Its first Secretary General was Sir Eric Drummond, an Englishman. He was in that position during the events in this case.
The Conference of Ambassadors

The Conference of Ambassadors was first established in the 19th century by the Great Powers of that time, following the Congress of Vienna, in 1815. Its first meeting also dates from that period. Its members, professional diplomats, were empowered by their respective governments to find solutions and sign agreements aiming at resolving critical situations and conflict among states in Europe. The signatories to the Treaty of Versailles appointed in January 1920 la Confrence des Ambassadeurs, (CoA) to implement the details of the Treaty. It was meant to be a technical body, assisted in its task by several Commissions. It ceased its activities in 1935, following violation of Part 5 or the Versailles Treaty by Germany. The CoA was composed of representatives from France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. Smaller powers with common borders with Germany, such as Belgium, were asked from to time to participate to its sessions in order to help resolving practical issues. The US, not having ratified the Treaty, had observer status, attending sessions as needed. As it was the custom even before WWI, the CoA was hosted by one of its members. As of 1920, its permanent seat was established in Paris, at the Quai dOrsay11. The French government provided excellent facilities and secretariat support, making the CoA the most efficient international organization of the time. Consistent with diplomatic tradition, the hosting country appointed the chairman of the Conference, generally the countrys president, prime minister or minister of foreign affairs. Right after its creation, the CoA undertook, among other mandates, the final drawing of the frontiers between Albania on the one hand and Greece and Yugoslavia on the other hand. These border lines, made necessary after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, had been left undefined at the break out of WWI and were sources of claims and counter claims by the referenced states. Albania had been seeking support from Italy for its own claims, while Yugoslavia and Greece were sympathetic to each other and believed they would be supported by England and France. At the same time, Italy and Yugoslavia were disputing a free state in northern Adriatic, Fiume12, so the latter was not interested to further enrage the former over Albania, the poorest and most underdeveloped country of Europe of that era, which did not possess any enviable resources. Greece had claims on the southern part of Albania, extending from about 60 km north of the Greek city of Janina13 to approximately 100 km within Albania, where the population was ethnic Greek and spoke the Greek language. The government in Athens was, however, aware that, after its defeat in 1922 in Anatolia by the Kemalist Turks, England and France would not allow Greek expansionism to
10 11
French, English and Spanish. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 Present day Rijeka, in Croatia. 13 Today, Ioannina
the detriment of Albania. It had, therefore, conceded to participate in the drawing exercise led by the Delimitations Commission of the CoA and to limit its claims.
The actors of the incident

England
The British Empire was one of the victors of the First World War, which claimed 10 million lives on all sides. Britain was also the major beneficiary of the repartition of the spoils of the former Ottoman Empire, ending up to control practically all of the Middle East, Egypt and the Sudan. She also received some of the former German colonies in Africa 14. Not having common borders or territorial disputes with Germany, she believed the latter would not be a threat to peace in post-war Europe, and favoured the LoN as the forum for intra-European settlements. Her approach was pragmatic, as she had depleted her financial resources and military assets. In 1923, her navy was overstretched patrolling the Turkish coast in view of implementing the Lausanne Treaty.
France
France, also a victor of WWI, received part of the African colonies of the German Empire, territories in Europe previously belonging to Germany, and mandates in the Middle East, particularly Syria15. She was financially and militarily exhausted, but remained obsessed with Germany as a potential aggressor. When Germany delayed reparation payments imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, the French army occupied the valley of Ruhr. As a result, France was sceptical about the use of the LoN in resolving bilateral disputes and advocated sotto voce the pre-war system of direct, rather than collective, diplomacy, and defended her freedom of action.
Greece
After the loss in 1922 of Smyrna 16, a traditionally Greek city in terms of history and culture, and the territories in Asia Minor and eastern Thrace, except Constantinople, ceded to Greece by the Treaty of Svres17 because of their predominantly Greek population, Greece was constrained by the Allied Powers to negotiate within the frame of the Treaty of Lausanne18 a peace agreement with the Kemalist Forces, fighting a war of independence in Turkey. The Lausanne Treaty annulled the Treaty of Svres19. The consequence for Greece was an exchange of populations 1.5 million ethnic Greeks living in Turkey against 500,000 ethnic Turks living in Greece20. The economic impact of this two-
Belgium, France and Portugal also benefitted from this repartition. Including the territory that was to become in 1942 Lebanon. 16 Izmir in Turkish. It is the current official name of the city. 17 In 1920. 18 In July 1923. 19 England, France, Italy, and Armenia also lost territories and zones of influence in Turkey accorded to them by the Treaty of Svres. 20 The official figures for the respective exchanges governed by the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, signed on July 30, 1923 between Greece and Turkey, are 400,000 and 87,000 respectively. The difference in the totals is due to the massive expulsions of, and fleeing by local populations, further to the conditions created by the war and to persecution by the country of residence. The persons exchanged were native and nationals of the country that expelled them. As a result of the exchange, they were deprived of their nationality. In addition, they were not readily accepted in the country of destination and, for at least a generation, they were suspected by the locals as not being
15
14
way exodus was felt in both countries for at least two decades. Moreover, for Greece the defeat and the new demographics in the country seriously affected her internal politics and international policy until the early 1980s. The Asia Minor Catastrophe21 had immediate implications for Greeces governance. Her troops were evacuated from Anatolia to northern Greece and in late September 1922 revolted against the King and the Athens government. Within a week, the revolutionaries, led by colonels Plastiras and Gonatas, took power, forced King Constantine to abdicate in favour of Prince George, and proclaimed their intention to abolish the monarchy and restore the republic. The international community did not recognize the new government until much later. However, Greece remained in the LoN and was a nonpermanent member of the Council at the time of our case.
Italy
Italy was on the side of the Allied Powers during WWI and also benefitted from the spoils of the Ottoman and German Empires. Her main strategic interests lie in the Mediterranean and particularly the Adriatic Sea and in some territories formerly under control by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with which she had common borders. In the Fall of 1922, the young Fascist Party won the legislative elections and its leader, Benito Mussolini, became prime minister. Italy was a constitutional monarchy at that time. The Kings powers and authority were progressively eroded under the fascist regime. Mussolini instilled a reborn spirit of pride in the Italians and quickly unveiled his vision of Italy as a world-class power, with aims of dominating the Mediterranean, which was designated during his rule as Mare Nostrum22, alluding to the dominance of the region by the Romans. In fact, he viewed modern Italy as the rightful and sole successor to the Roman Empire and dreamed of leading her to the reconquest of the lands and glory lost.
Benito Mussolini
Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini was born on July 29, 1883 of an anarchist blacksmith. He got involved in street politics early on and by 1921 he had formed the National Fascist Party, a coalition of formerly independent groups, fasci23, which came to power during the elections a year later. The partys program was anti-clerical and pro-republican, but Mussolini quickly formed alliances with the King and the Catholic Church in order to secure their support. The party also said it was following a line in the middle between Capitalism and Socialism, labelled Corporatism, which was supposed to enable harmonious relations between the business and the unions. This policy weakened over time as Mussolini needed funds and outputs from the industry in order to implement its imperialistic plans, and the unions were tempted by communism.
one of us. See also Clarke, Bruce (2006). Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey. London: Granta. 21 Term used by the Greek press and historians to describe the loss of Smyrna. Its use persists to date. 22 Literally, Our Sea. Although present-day Italians have no territorial aspirations of the kind, Italian businessmen often act with contempt over local populations in Mediterranean and expect that they will be perceived as the landlords when it comes to granting favourable terms to Italian companies. This seems to have been exacerbated by the style and policies of prime minster Berlusconi, which has influenced Italian diplomacy and trade relations. 23 Literally, faggots or bundles of branches. The term was already used in 1870 to indicate radical political groups, particularly in Sicily. It dates back to the Roman Empire, where fasces lictoriae were a symbol of superior state power and authority.
Mussolinis pronounced narcissistic24 personality, his obsession with national prestige and honour, ignorance of international politics and diplomacy in the early years of his rule, made of him a feared opponent by those who had to negotiate with Italy. These traits also made life of Italian civil servants and, particularly, diplomats miserable. Even his inner circle of collaborators, including his own brother in law, Galeazzo Ciano, who served as foreign minister, would not dare contradict him. This led to a series of international incidents and disputes, which culminated with a sudden attack against Greece in October 1940, precipitating southern Europe and the Balkans to World War II.25 After 1936, he established that he wanted to be officially addressed as "His Excellency Benito Mussolini, Head of Government, Duce of Fascism, and Founder of the Empire". He had also become by then First Marshall of the Empire, at par with King Vittorio Emmanuele III. Following a series of military debacles, he was replaced in 1943 when the Germans occupied Italy in order to resist the Allied advances. He was hanged on April 28, 1945, together with his companion Chiara Petazzi, by the people in dramatic circumstances. His grand-daughter, Alessandra Mussolini, is the leader of extreme right party Social Action, and has been elected a member of the Italian Parliament and the European Parliament.
The Assassination
The Commission of Delimitations of the CoA, with the agreement of the governments concerned, had planned a series of on-site visits at the borders of Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia in order to progress with the drawing of the maps. The Commission was composed of representatives from England, France, Italy, and Japan, and from the countries whose frontiers were to be drawn: Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia. The representatives had their own staff of experts and assistants. President of the Commission was Italian General Enrico Tellini. The Italians, contrary to the Greeks, did not want to consider any changes in the borders of Albania, and in an Ambassadorial Declaration to the LoN had insisted that any modification in the frontiers of Albania constitutes a danger for the strategic safety of Italy26. This had created a climate of mistrust between Tellini and the Greek delegate, which often led to frictions. On August 24, 1923, Tellini informed the Greek and Albanian governments of his intention for the Commission members to have on August 27 a reconnaissance tour in the Drin valley, shared between the two states. He fixed the departure time at 9:00 AM at the Greek frontier post of Kakavia. All delegates and their teams were lodged at Janina during their stay in the region. 27 On August 27, the Albanian delegation left Janina at 5:30 AM. It was followed by the Greek delegation, composed of Colonel Dimitrios Botzaris and another officer. Last came the Italians General Tellini, Major Corti, Lt. Bonaccini, the Italian chauffeur Farnetti, and a Greek interpreter speaking Albanian, Thanassi. 28 About 45 minutes after leaving Janina, Botzaris Ford broke down. A few minutes later, the Italians Lancia appeared. Tellini sent Bonaccini to enquire whether the Greeks needed assistance with the
24 25
See Freunds personality types in Couvas, J., Leadership for International Executives, vol. II, Bilkent University, 2009. Ciano, G., Diario 1937-1943, Mondadori, 1990, passim. 26 L.N., Official Journal, 2nd year, 1921, at 1195. 27 A map of the region can be found at the end of this case. 28 Barros, J., The Corfu Incident of 1923, Princeton University Press, 1965, at 22.
repair, but Botzaris reassured the latter that his driver could handle the problem. Tellini proceeded to Kakavia, taking the second position in the convoy, in lieu of the Greeks. Once the repair was completed, the Ford resumed its trip. At the first village encountered, Botzaris telephoned the border post asking the commanding officer to update the rest of the Commission of his delay. At about 10:00 AM29, the Ford arrived at Zepi, a spot on the Janina-Kakavia road. At this point the road turned and crossed a very thick woods. There he found himself before a horrifying spectacle: All members of the Italian delegation had been slain. The assassins had skilfully trapped them, blocking the road with large tree branches in the turn, from which the Lancia could not have withdrawn. Botzaris immediately drove back to the nearest village, Han Delvinaki, 5 km in arrear, where an army battalion was encamped. Orders were hastily issued to pursue the criminals and to block all the roads to and from the Albanian border.30 He then informed by telegram the local authorities and Athens of the tragic event. The Greek government was shocked. Prime Minister Stylianos Gonatas ordered the chief of the Gendarmerie for the whole country and the general public prosecutor to take control of the affair and dispatched them to Janina.31 Meanwhile, the governor, prosecutor, and military commander of Epirus led the investigations. It should be noted at this point, that during the preceding months a wave of attacks by Albanian bands against Greek villages in the area had alarmed the Greek government, which had repeatedly protested to Tirana and warned that, unless the Albanian Gendarmerie controlled efficiently the borders, there might be dramatic consequences32
Reactions
The news of the outrage were telegraphed to Palazzo Chigi33 the same afternoon by the Italian consul at Janina, who had been officially informed by the Epirus military commander. Mussolini was informed at 6:15 PM. At about the same time, the secretary of the Commission of Delimitations cabled the CoA in Paris to announce the deaths. 34 As soon as he read the cable, Mussolini became violent, intransigent. 35 In the early morning hours of August 28 he instructed Giulio Cesare Montagna, Italian Minister in Athens, to formulate the most energetic protests to the Greek authorities and demand exemplary punishment of the culprits. He also wanted him to make clear that Italy was reserving the right to reparations. Simultaneously, he asked his ambassadors in Paris and London to inform the governments of the respective countries of the event and convince them that the crime was committed not only against Italy but equally against the Great Powers, since the Italian victims were on an official international mission. His wish was that both England and France vigorously protest against the Greek government.
29 30
The road conditions at that part of Greece were appauling. Cars moved at the speed of 15 to 20 km per hour. Barros (1965) at 23-25. 31 Because of the road conditions, the journey was made on a navy destroyer to Preveza, then by car to Janina. This took two days to accomplish. 32 DDDDIG, at 5. 33 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 34 Barros (1965) at 33. 35 Guariglia, R., Ricordi 1922-1946, Scientifiche Italiane, 1950, at 28.
Montagna, who disliked the Greeks and particularly their government because of its revolutionary origins, was to fuel in the coming hours and days Mussolinis paroxysm. Exceeding in zeal his ambassadorial mission, he antagonized right away the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and misled Rome, by insisting that the assassins were well known bands subsidized by the (Greek) Government. 36 Mussolini did not need much more convincing. During the night he crystallized his thoughts as to who should be punished. In a handwritten note to himself, he decided that the crime was political because Tellini, as the Italian representative in the Commission, was, in the eyes of Greece, suspect of favouring Albania, so he had to be eliminated. He then jotted down the conditions he would ask in order to satisfy his countrys need for justice. The Duce spent a good part of August 28 refining the measures he would take to punish Greece. Later in the afternoon he dispatched instructions to the Prefects of Bari and Lecce to make preparations to stop all telegraphic communications to Greece by midnight August 30. 37 Meanwhile, a battery of instructions was catapulted towards the Italian embassies in Athens, Paris and London. The objective was to increase pressure on Greece to admit her culpability and recognize her obligation for reparations, and to ensure that France and England would fully back the Italian claims. This strategy was, however, doubted by the professional diplomats at Palazzo Chigi, who knew that, in the post-WWI New World Order it had slim chances of success. They were, however, powerless, as their Minister of Foreign Affairs Salvatore Contarini was on vacation. It should also be noted that the career diplomats, although they embraced Mussolinis ambitions for a great and respected New Roman Empire, did not agree with him and the generals as to the means for achieving them. Aware of Italys financial and military weaknesses, they were keener to cultivate a stronger friendship with England than to pursue a solo Superpower chimera. 38 As the night of August 28 fell, Mussolini cabled to Montagna Italys demands for reparations, formulated in seven points. They were received at the Italian Embassy in Athens on August 29:
1. An apology in the fullest and most official manner to be presented to the Italian Government via the Italian Legation by the highest Greek military authority; A solemn funeral for the victims of the murder at the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Athens to be attended by all members of the Government; Honours to be rendered to the Italian flag on the very day of the funeral ceremony by units of the Greek fleet in the presence of the Italian navy in Phalerum Bay outside Athens; An investigation by the Greek authorities with the assistance of the Italian military attach39; Capital punishment for the culprits;
2.
3.
4. 5.
36
Telegram, Montana to Mussolini, August 27, 1923, DDI at 126. It was transmitted before he received Mussolinis instructions. In subsequent communications with Rome he intensified his recriminations against the Greeks to the point he alienated his American, English and French counterparts in Athens. He also kept silence on the information given to him by the Greek officials on their correspondence with the Albanian legation in Athens and the possibility that the culprits might be Albanian bandits. 37 DDI, at 128 38 Craig, G. And Gilbert, F., The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Princeton University Press, 1953. 39 Colonel Perrone. Montagna was instructed to warn the Greek Government that it would be fully responsible for Perrones safety and the investigation should be concluded within five days after delivery of the Italian demands herein.
6. 7.
An indemnity of 50 million Italian lire ($2, 270,000 in 1923; $28,632,000 in 2008 money40). Military honours to be paid to the corpses on the occasion of their transferral to an Italian vessel at the Greek port of Preveza.
The Greek government was given, through Montagna, 24 hours to accept all the demands. Not knowing what the Greeks reply would be, Mussolini ordered the Italian fleet occupying the Dodecanese to send the same night a naval division to the island of Leros in order to be closer to Athens. Montagna delivered at 8 PM to Greek Foreign Minister Apostolos Alexandris a note verbale41 with his governments demands. As the local press had already found out that an important Italian communication had been given to Greece, Gonatas called for an immediate cabinet meeting, at the end of which he told journalists that his government was willing to accept those among Italys requests that would help her satisfy her amour propre and award the victims families a reasonable indemnity. But it could not allow Colonel Perrone assist in the investigation, thus intervening in internal affairs. He also denied that the Italian communication was an ultimatum42. Once the ultimatum delivered, Mussolini decided that the pressure on Athens would be stronger if the Great Powers were backing the Italian demands. He instructed his ambassadors in London and Paris to work in that direction. His rationale for the demands and the financial compensation was that, based on Vattels thesis, the crime perpetrated against Italian citizens was also an offense against Italy, the latter was therefore entitled to reparations.43 Moreover, the offense extended to the CoA, whom Tellini and his colleagues were representing. The British and French foreign ministers reacted differently to this demand. For London, an official protest by its ambassador in Athens was sufficient. Paris, however, was more concerned with Mussolinis personality and was afraid of a serious incident. Raymond Poincar, French Prime Minister, was favouring a collective action rather a unilateral one by Rome and quickly convinced 10 Downing Street to let the CoA handle the matter. Mussolini had won another point in this affair. But the Foreign Office was not happy with the 24-hour deadline for Greece to comply with Italys demands and it put pressure on Poincar, who, in a desperate move, wrote to Mussolini asking for withdrawal of the ultimatum altogether, since a CoA note was on its way to Athens. His letter was received in Rome too late to stop the events.
40 41
Using CPI method, or $379 mn. using nominal GDP method. Source: http://www.measuringworth.com/index.html a diplomatic communication prepared in the third person and unsigned: less formal than a note but more formal than an aide-mmoire. 42 A statement, especially in diplomatic negotiations, that expresses or implies the threat of serious penalties if the terms are not accepted. It does not necessarily imply force or war, but, rather, break down of negotiations. There are several definitions. Some are more complete and complex. For instance, in Oppenheim, L. , International Law, ed., 7th ed., London: Longman Green, 1952, II, at 295, ultimatum can be simple or qualified. Simple does not include any measures envisaged by its issuer, while a qualified ultimatum stipulates measures envisaged in case of non observance of demands. The Italian note could, therefore, be considered as a simple ultimatum. The fact that it had a deadline is determinant from this point of view, even in the absence of specific threat of penalties. 43 Vattel, E.de., Le Droit des Gens, ou les Principes de la loi naturelle Neuchtel, 1758, Book 2, Chapter 6, 71-78. The thesis, however, is subject to the conditions that either the nation of the citizens who perpetrated the crime has not sought to punish them, or has participated directly or through encouragement in its making.
Meanwhile, in Athens an official of the Greek Foreign Ministry presented on August 30 at 8 PM, just before the ultimatum expired, a note verbale to Montagna with the Greek reply. The Greeks protested against the allegation that their country was guilty of an offense against Italy [... intentionally or though negligence.44 They also rejected any suspicion that Tellini and his team had not been adequately protected throughout their stay in Greece. Greece, however, accepted to render the honours to the corpses and have a guards detachment salute the Italian flag in front of the Italian Legation, and to grant an equitable indemnity to the families of the victims, since the crime had taken place on its soil. 45 The note concluded that the Greek government hoped that Italy would accept its counterproposal as satisfactory. If that were not the case, Greece would, in accordance with LoNs Covenant, appeal to the League, whose decision she would comply with. She had, in fact, accepted two demands only, modified two other, and rejected the rest.
Duces Fury
News from Montagna that the Greeks had refused his ultimatum reached the Duce after 10:30 PM on August 30. Within fifty minutes Admiral Emilio Solari, Commander of the Italian Navy, received orders to proceed at once with the occupation of Corfu.46 Simultaneously, Mussolini prepared a message to be transmitted at 6:30 AM on August 31 to all Italian missions abroad for their own communications with the local governments:
"To the just demands formulated by Italy following the barbarous massacre of the Italian Military Mission committed in Greek territory, the Hellenic Government has replied in terms that correspond in essence to the complete rejection of the same. [...] "I have therefore communicated the order for the landing on the island of Corfu of a contingent of Italian troops. "With this measure of a temporary character Italy does not intend an act of war but only to defend its own prestige [...]. "The Italian Government hopes that Greece does not commit any act that may modify the pacific nature of the measures. "The above does not exclude any sanctions that the Conference of Ambassadors will be taking [...]."
The message was presented to the Foreign Office and the Quai dOrsay later on August 31, while the CoAs collective protest was on its way to Athens and Poincars letter asking the Duce to withdraw
44
Montagna to Mussolini, August 30, 1923, DDI, at 141. Ibid. 46 Solari had received at 4 :35 PM on the same day orders to advance his fleet towards the south of Italy. See Foschini, A., La Verit sulle Cannonate di Corf, Roma: Giacimaniello, 1953, at 37. This leads to believe that Mussolini had expected, perhaps even hoped, the Greek reaction. This is corroborated by the fact that on July 24, 1924, day of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Italian Minister Grand Admiral Thaon di Revel had recalled the fleet to Taranto and had conversations with Solari and other officers, during which he explained that the relationship with Greece was tense over the Dodecanese and a clash was not impossible. See Foschini (1953) at 26.
45
his ultimatum en route to Rome. Mussolini had consummated his first act of aggression in post-WWI Europe. It was to become a model for his foreign policy in the coming years. As the ministries of foreign affairs and the press in Europe were being informed of Italys move, the Italian fleet was sailing 407 nautical miles47 south of Rome in the Ionian Sea. Because of extreme, and unjustified, precautions by Solari, the warships took a detour that delayed their arrival to Corfu (Kerkira) by several hours. The initial plan was to arrive at Corfu at 10:00 AM, meet the local authorities and take over the administration, and complete the landing before sunset, for security and psychological reasons. Instead, they arrived in early afternoon. The plan was revised to commence disembarkation by 4:00 PM. A young officer, Captain Foschini, was sent to meet the Prefect of the island. He arrived there by 3:00 PM. He had orders to give a 2-hour ultimatum to the local officials to surrender, and to the foreigners to join their respective consulates. As he was running late, he took the initiative to change the deadline to 30 minutes. This was to be heavily criticized later by foreign states and the international press. Corfu and the surrounding islands, known as Ionian Islands, enjoyed perpetual neutrality under the successive Treaties of London of 1863 and 1864, signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, AustriaHungary, Prussia, and Greece. Italy was not part of the treaties and, consequently, not bound by them48. Corfu was, as a result, not fortified and had no troops or a naval force only a small guard for ceremonial purposes. The Prefect asked Foschini to grant him a short delay so that he could receive orders from Athens. He also asked for the conditions of the occupation, but Foschini refused to give him any. The Prefect, Petros Euripos, protested and brought to the Italians attention that there were more than 7,000 refugees from Asia Minor in the city. After a brief meeting with other local officials, the Prefect declared that he would not surrender and, not having appropriate means, would resort to passive resistence. The military commander, on the other hand, declared that, having no instructions from his higher command, he would oppose the occupation with the few men at his disposal. At this point, and before leaving the Prefecture, Foschini handed to Euripos a proclamation written by Vice-Admiral Bellini, who was to become the Governor of the Island:
Proclamation " To the Royal Government of Corfu. To the inhabitants of Corfu. By order of His Majesty, the King of Italy, I have taken charge of the civil and military rule of this land with the fullest powers. His Excellency, the Chief Commander of the Italian Navy and Army, already has notified you of the object of this peaceful occupation. The customary routine of public and private life here will continue to proceed peacefully under the aegis of Italy, direct heiress of the great Latin civilizations, with only such limitations as may hereafter be imposed by circumstances. I have the utmost confidence that his order will be wisely observed by all, thus avoiding the necessity of using force.49 "Governor Aurelio Bellini, Vice Admiral."
47 48
Approximately 755 km.
It can, however, be argued that by entering the LoN, Italy had tacitly accepted treaties still in force, as this one, particularly since they had been signed by her WWI allies. Under the circumstances, both Britain and France, as guarantors, had the obligation to enforce the application of the London treaties and protect Corfu. 49 The Time (Magazine), September 17, 1923.
Foschini said that at 4:00 PM Italian ships, now facing the harbour, would fire three blank shots. If no white flag were raised, they would start shelling the city.50 And this is what they did. Within seven minutes, Solari fired 35 shells, hitting houses, public offices, refugee camps, and hospitals. 51 Sixteen adults and twenty children were killed and eighty were wounded, most being Anatolian refugees. 52
The League of Nations gets involved

In Athens, Plastiras rushed to cable to the Prefect in Corfu to oppose the invasion, but his message was withheld at the very last minute by Gonatas, who thought this would escalate the conflict to unpredictable dimensions. Greece was in no position to go to war against Italy at that time. So the best alternative at hand was the LoN. Greek Ambassador Politis in Geneva was instructed to bring the matter before the Council without delay. Nikolaos Politis, who coincidentally was from Corfu but was also a cool-headed diplomat, immediately visited Lord Robert Cecil at his hotel suite and informed him that he was going to seize the Council on the basis of Article 15 of the Covenant.53 He did not, however, make any mention to Article 16, which was favourable to Greeces case. 54 Greece filed a complaint the following day, September 1. In the days that followed, the scene of action was transferred from Athens and Rome to Geneva. The Council, and particularly Lord Robert, were very keen to take charge of the claim. It would be the first incident of the kind in which the LoN would be able to try the solidity of its foundation. England was a strong supporter of the League, and so were the non-permanent members and Japan. France had until then aligned its stand at the Council with that of Britain. It was only Italy that could not be counted for, as she was the defendant. Unknown to Cecil and the head of the British diplomacy, Lord Curzon, was the fact that Italy had managed to get Poincars favors, not because of any views that Italy was right in occupying Corfu, even peacefully, but because the Quai dOrsay wanted to avoid at any cost a precedent in the LoN whereby a member state would be prevented from taking direct action to defend its interests. For the French, letting the Council deal with the matter meant potential trouble for her occupation of the Ruhr. It was, therefore, preferable to divert the file from Geneva to Paris, at the CoA, whose deliberations were confidential and composition kept to four Powers, allowing for wheeling and dealing as necessary. But Cecil, not having received any red light from home, was determined to push the Council fulfil its duty to the international community. In the deliberations that followed, he regularly countered the Italian representative, whose arguments, dictated by Mussalini in person, were becoming increasingly
Foschini, at 42. Barros (1965), at 77-78. 52 Italian Foreign minister Contarini later confessed to the British Ambassador in Rome that the bombardment was contrary to Mussolinis instructions. This conflicts with the Duces telegram on September 2 expressing to Solari his complete satisfaction for the outcome of the operation. Ibid., at 79. 53 Art. 15 of the Covenant : If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof [...]. See the full text of the Covenant in the Appendices at the end of the case. 54 Art. 16 : Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League [...].
51
50
ludicrous. Meanwhile, the smaller states of Scandinavia, Belgium and Latin America were becoming more assertive for the Council to take control of the crisis. Rome was alarmed and Paris was stuck in an uneasy situation. Mussolinis stance was that the LoN was not qualified to solve the disagreement with Greece and, since the victims were members of the CoA Delimitations Commission, the CoA was the only body that had legitimate jurisdiction over the affair. Greece, against Politis advice, had agreed to comply with the CoAs decision as to the latters request for damages, had she been found guilty of negligence in the security of the Tellini and his party, accepting dual jurisdiction the CoA and LoN, a rather confusing position, that was playing well in the hands of both Italy and France. France was conscious that Italys rationale was untenable before the Council, and, worse, before the Assembly of the Leagues members, which was about to begin its annual meeting and would be in session until the end of September. The Council, in the terms of Art. 15, had the right to bring the matter before the Assembly, prompting condemnation of Italy by the international community, which was weary of past caprices of the Great Powers. Moreover, Italys ambassadors in Paris and London had told the local officials that their country would withdraw from the League rather than seat at the accusation bank in Geneva. This meant to England weakening of the LoN and to France a threat to European balance, as Mussolini could become a loose cannon in the Mediterranean. So, after an exchange of communications, directly and through their ambassadors, Poincar and Curzon agreed that transferring responsibility to the CoA was the best approach for a quick, albeit potentially unjust, resolution of the crisis55. England was, nevertheless, irritated by Italys move, as Corfu was a strategically important island, between Italy and the Balkans and separating the Adriatic from the Ionian Seas. Corfu had also been a British colony until late 19th century and was the home of many English who had taken residence there. This intolerance for Italy showed in the subsequent negotiations within the CoA.
The Conference takes control

On September 2, Greece accepted the Ambassadorial note sent by the CoA to protest for the murders, and proposed the formation of an international commission to investigate the case. This did not satisfy Rome, which wanted total and unconditional acceptance of the demands in the ultimatum. If the demands were not accepted, Italy would remain in possession of Corfu indefinitely until justice had been rendered56. Its ambassador in Geneva insisted that Greeces responsibility was proven, since the murders were made on Greek territory. He refuted any arguments by other Council members that, until the culprits were arrested, there might be reasonable doubt as to their nationality and motives. Italy insisted throughout the crisis that they were Greeks and that the assassination was a political act. The CoA, in its hurry to get concessions from Rome, had adopted the same view, with the exception of the English ambassador.
55
Curzon on September 2, on his return from a vacation in France, where he had briefly met with Poincar, had instructed Cecil to go full steam ahead with the putting the machinery of the League in motion. Curzons point of view was that Greece had in essence accepted in its reply of August 31 the substantive demands made by the Italian ultimatum, it was therefore for Italy to pull out of Corfu. However, the Foreign Office was split between those who were in favour of a showdown on any aggressor, on the backing of the LoN, and those who wanted to avoid trouble and let the League be a loose debate club. See Barros (1965) at 107-109. 56 Salandra (1951), at 106.
On September 4, the Greek proposals to settle the Italo-Greek dispute were presented to the Council by Politis. They included a reasonable compensation to the families of the victims and the acceptance for an international team of investigators to work together with the Greek authorities in order to find the culprits of the assassination. On September 5, the Italian representative at the LoN, on instructions from Mussolini, denied competence of the Council to handle the dispute. The same day, the CoA, meeting in Paris assumed Greek responsibility for the Tellini murder and communicated its decision to the Council. On September 6, the Council, in an effort to contribute to a quick resolution of the crisis, submitted to the CoA for the latters consideration, an 8-point proposal for satisfying the CoAs claims against Greece. These were prepared during a private meeting at the Japanese representatives hotel suite in Geneva the previous night, and were influenced by the Brazilian representative to the LoN, who was in favour of a compromise favouring Italys demands without jeopardizing the Councils authority. 57 This text was partially used by the CoA to its second note to Greece, on September 8, covering its demands, which Greece accepted on September 9. These reiterated the Italian exigencies for receiving apologies, rendering honours to the corpses and the Italian Navy, the obligation by Greece to find and punish the assassins, as well the deposit by her of the sum of 50 million Italian lire to the National Bank of Switzerland, to be disposed per instructions by the Permanent Court of International Justice,The Hague. These demands, and the completion of the criminal investigation by Athens, were to be complied with by September 27. Athens transferred the money immediately. The Duce was, however, still unhappy with the situation. At the meetings of the CoA between September 10 and 13, his ambassador to the Conference, Baron Camillo Romano Avezzana, was put under enormous pressure by Rome to stepping up Italys demands for expedient action against Greece. This gave the opportunity to the British representative, Lord Crewe, to demand, in his turn, a firm deadline for Italys withdrawal from Corfu. The Italians were not prepared to face such request at the CoA. A bitter match of words and negotiating tricks ensued between Crewe and Avezzana. While the former was sufficiently empowered by Lord Curzon in handling the situation, the latter needed constant approval from Mussolini for any text amendments discussed. Adjournments of the meetings for several hours, in order for Avezzana to get instructions, became a routine. Jules Cambon, chairman of the CoA, acting on behalf of the French President, and Jules Laroche, representative of France at the CoA, had difficulty keeping the meetings within the limits of diplomatic courtesy. It was clear that Crewe hated the guts of the Italian, because of the ideas the latter represented, and Avezzana was desperately impotent. The French diplomats, following Poncars instructions, managed in the end to calm the spirits and advance Italys cause, without dropping fro the agenda the British request for a commitment by Rome to evacuate Corfu at a specified date.
57
Ambassador Dr. Alfranio de Mello Franco had been instructed by his government to support the Italian position because i t was at the suggestion of Italy that Dr. Epitacio Pessoa was proposed for the vacant position of judgeship in the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. Cable from the US ambassador at Rio de Janeiro to the State Department, September 13, 1923, File 500.20001/223, record group 59. An additional reason for the Brazilian decision was her efforts at that time to secure permanent membership to the Council, with help of Italy, and the increasing influx of Italian immigrants to Brazil, particularly the Sao Paolo area.
Being cornered of the potential course of events, in spite of French support, Avezzana convinced Mussolini to accept committing to the withdrawal. This was not an easy task, as the Duces overriding preoccupation was loss of prestige. In the end, however, he agreed to the date of September 27. At the following CoA meeting, Lord Crewe insisted to have put in the minutes and the decision document that the evacuation would be completed by that date. The Italian ambassador could not commit to the clause without the Duces consent, which meant a 24-hour postponement of the talks. The French managed, again, to talk their British colleague out of that position. To the surprise of the members of the CoA, on September 13 Avezzana, after a painful exchange of messages with Mussolini the night before, came with a declaration, which he wanted to be included in the procs verbal of the meeting. Crewe was opposed, but eventually gave in. The declaration was as follows: I desire to make known to the Conference that, in its desire to show its attachment to peace, the Italian Government, according to its reiterated declarations, is resolved to evacuate Corfu and it has decided to do so September 27, the date fixed by the Conference for the end of the Greek investigation. But, if on this date, the culprits are not discovered, and if it is not established that the Greek Government has not committed 58 any negligence in their pursuit and their search, the Italian Government estimates that it would be contrary to morality and to justice, as well as to the dignity of Italy, that the latter renounce the pledges which it seized59 in order to obtain satisfaction, without satisfaction having been accorded to it. It asks, therefore, that the Conference, taking note of the spontaneous decision of the Italian Government relative to the evacuation of Corfu on September 27, decide from now, that in the aforesaid stated eventuality, the Conference will inflict on Greece, as penalty of a sum of 50 million lire to Italy, who will waive consequently all requests to the Permanent Court of [International] Justice at The Hague [pursuant] to the terms of paragraph 7 of the note of September 8, excluding recourse of the Italian Government before the Permanent Court for the costs of the occupation.60
Having obtained consensus from all parties on the adoption of the Italian declaration, Cambon proceeded to the next point on the CoAs agenda: The formation of an Commission of Inquiry to work with the Greek authorities in order to capture the murders of Tellini and his party. It was decided that the Commission should be presided by the Japanese Military Attach in Athens, Colonel Shibuya, and composed of officers from Italy, France and England61. Proposals by Crewe to exclude an Italian
58 59
Italics added. i.e., Corfu. 60 DDI, at 234-235 61 Major R.E. Herenc, Britain, Colonel Lacombe, France, and Colonel Eugenio Beaud, Italy. Subsequent reports and correspondence between the delegates and their respective embassies in Athens portray Shibuya as unprepared for the job and easy for the Italian representative to manipulate and dominate. Source: State Department file 765.68/125, record group 50.
member, as Italy was the plaintiff and therefore biased, and to include a representative of a non CoA member from a neutral state, such as Belgium, were flatly rejected by Avezzana. The Commission of Inquiry was ordered to be at Janina and begin its work by September 17. It should send to the Conference a preliminary report on the results by September 22. This should enable the CoA to determine the degree of collaboration and diligence by the Greek Government. Lord Crewe proposed that the investigation include field inspection in Albania, as the culprits might be Albanian or have found refuge in Albania. This was opposed by Avezzana and dropped, on the recommendation of Cambon, from the mandate to the Commission. The Commission of Inquiry arrived in Epirus per schedule and immediately started its work. The Greek delegation included Botzaris, who had discovered the corpses of Tellini and his men. This gave the opportunity to the Italian member to pester the rest of the Commission with his accusations and mood explosions. On September 22, the Commission submitted its first report, as requested. It was inconclusive. Little progress had been made, as there was little information and evidence available on the field, and the mountainous and unfriendly country side was difficult to explore. Some delegates remarked that the local population was probably withholding information, in order either to protect the assassins or in fear of reprisals by the bands that might have been behind them. The Greek authorities and military units put at its disposal had been cooperative, but it was difficult to say whether they had acted diligently in pursuing the murders after the discovery of the victims, or they had not been trained for such operations, thus ineffective62. The reading and discussion of the report led to a new round of punches between Lord Crew and Avezzana. After exhausting the arguments of the two parties, Cambon proposed for himself, as president of the CoA, to summarize the Inquiry Commissions findings and the overall situation, and for the Conference to proceed to the crucial decision: Was Greece guilty of negligence, or even complicity, in the escape so far of the assassins? In the affirmative, should she be liable for a penalty in the form of seizure of the 50 million lire deposited at the National Bank of Switzerland to be paid to the Italian Government? Meanwhile, on September 17 and 18 at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, a heated debate was going on among the members of the Council: Should the crisis be brought before the Council, or even the Assembly, with or without Italys consent; or should it be left in the hands of the CoA?
62
Barros (1965), at 258-279.
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
This section will be included in the complete text of the Case, which will be available after its debrief in class.
12/07/2009
greece - Google Maps

Address Greece
2009 Google - Map data 2009 Tele Atlas - Terms of Use
maps.google.com/maps
1/1
Corfu, Ancien Fort
Jules Cambon
Raymond Poincar
Lord Cecil
Eric Drummond
Lord Curzon
Stanley Baldwin, British PM
King Zorg of Albania
Stylianos Gonatas
Prof. Amb. Nicolaos Politis
Kihujiro Ishii
Nicolaos Plastiras
Lancia Lamda 1923. The Tellini party was travelling in a similar car.
A Ford 1923. The Greek delegation was riding a similar car the day of the crime.
Il Duce
Benito Mussolilini
Alessandra Mussolini
League of Nations, 1923
Quai dOrsay, 1923, seat of the CoA
Palazzo Chigi, 1923
Primary Documents: Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919-24

Updated - Sunday, 19 May, 2002
Reproduced below are the 26 articles comprising the covenant of the League of Nations. The covenant was originally drafted by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and submitted on 14 February 1919. While the League was accepted by many nations the U.S. Congress refused to accept American membership of the League. Wilson found his political nemesis in the Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, the Senate Majority Leader who worked to ensure both public (and consequently political) rejection of the League. Wilson himself unwittingly helped in blocking passage of the League in Congress by refusing to compromise with his Republican political opponents.
The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924) THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 1 The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. Article 2
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat. Article 3 The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the League. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three Representatives. Article 4 The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council, with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one Representative. Article 5 Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting.
The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America. Article 6 The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may be required. The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council. The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council. The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly. Article 7 The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be established elsewhere. All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. Article 8 The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. Article 9 A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally. Article 10 The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. Article 11 Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. Article 12 The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. Article 13 The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. Article 14 The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. Article 15 If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the
Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. Article 16 Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon. Article 17 In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of
membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute. Article 18 Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. Article 19 The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. Article 20 The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. Article 21 Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. Article 22 To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates. Article 23 Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League: will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations;
undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; will entrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest; will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be borne in mind; will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease. Article 24 There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general convention but which are not placed under the control of international bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League. Article 25 The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. Article 26 Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Assembly. No such amendments shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League. Annex
I. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY OF PEACE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, BRITISH EMPIRE, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, SOUTH AFRICA, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, CHINA, CUBA, ECUADOR, FRANCE, GREECE, GUATEMALA, HAITI, HEJAZ, HONDURAS, ITALY, JAPAN, LIBERIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PERU, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROUMANIA, SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE, SIAM, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, URUGUAY STATES INVITED TO ACCEDE TO THE COVENANT: ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, CHILE, COLOMBIA, DENMARK, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PARAGUAY, PERSIA, SALVADOR, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, VENEZUELA II. FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.
"Drum Fire" was an artillery barrage fired not in salvo but by each gun in succession. Original Material Michael Duffy 2000-09, SafeSurf Rated

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Power games in the adriatic Mussolini and the League of Nations

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Structure of the League of Nations

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The Conference of Ambassadors

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The actors of the incident

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Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Approximately 755 km.

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The League of Nations gets involved

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The Conference takes control

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Copyright 2009 by Jacques N. Couvas. All rights reserved.

Barros (1965), at 258-279.

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REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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greece - Google Maps

2009 Google - Map data 2009 Tele Atlas - Terms of Use

Corfu, Ancien Fort

Stanley Baldwin, British PM

King Zorg of Albania

Prof. Amb. Nicolaos Politis

League of Nations, 1923

Quai dOrsay, 1923, seat of the CoA

Palazzo Chigi, 1923

Primary Documents: Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919-24

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