Constructing Ottoman Modernity in The Hamidian and Young Turk Eras

"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?
: Constructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras Author(s): Rene Worringer Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 207-230 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880032 . Accessed: 23/10/2013 16:28
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Int. J. Middle East Stud.36 (2004), 207-230. Printed in the UnitedStates of America DOI: 10.1017.S0020743804362033
Renwe Worringer
"SICK MAN OF EUROPE" OR "JAPAN OF THE OTTOMAN NEAR EAST"?: CONSTRUCTING MODERNITY IN THE HAMIDIAN AND YOUNG TURK ERAS
The [Japanese]government,adornedwith great intelligence and ideological firmness in progress, has implementedand promotedEuropean[methods]of commerce and industry in its own country,and has turnedthe whole of Japaninto a factory of progress,thanks to many [educationalinstitutions];it has attemptedto secure and develop Japan'scapacity for advancementby using means to serve the needs of the society such as benevolent institutions,railways,and in short,innumerablemodes of civilization. -Malumat, mouthpiecefor Yildiz Palace, 18971 We should take note of Japan,this nation which has become rivals with the GreatPowers in thirty to forty years. One should pay attention to that-that a nation not separating patrioticpublic spiritandthe good of the homelandfrom its life is surely such that [though] sustaining wounds, setting out against any type of dangerthat threatensits existence, it certainlypreservesits nationalindependence.The Japanesesuccesses of PortArthur... are a productof this patrioticzeal. -?ura-yz Ummet,Ottomannewspaper,Committee of Union and Progress(CUP), 19042 While the despot of Turkey and the despot of Russia tremble and hide.., .it has come to pass in the Far East among this admirable people that, like the Turks, have been treated..,.as barbarians... [that] the Japanesetended to develop in all the Far East their materialand moral influences, "to make themselves the guardians,otherwisethe masters, of the yellow world."... And that is how one has to see this vast intellectual and moral organization.... They whose civilization, achieved in half a century,has become superior to Europeancivilization which has fallen into decay; they who do not have to reproach massacres,who do not have to gag any mouths out of which a liberal word came, who do not have to exile or suppresspatriots.... Indeed,for our part,it is this "yellow"civilization that we wish to see universalizedbecause it is the fruit of a principled,faithful and highly becauseit is based on a conceptionof humandestiniesthatexcludes intelligentorganization, because, above all, it is the daughterof a constitutional holy icons andfalse sentimentalities, governmentwhich Ottomanpatriots-all theirefforts strivingfor this goal-will conclude
RenheWorringer is an Assistant Professor in the Schoolof History, Philosophy, Religion,and Classics, of Queensland, e-mail: Brisbane, 4072,Australia; Queensland University r.worringer@uq.edu.au. ? 2004 CambridgeUniversityPress 0020-7438/04 $12.00
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Renee Worringer
theabsolute forthepoorTurkish that Hamidian terrorism byunderstanding necessity people be plunged intothemire.
-Mechveret Supplement Frangais,French
of theCUP,19053 organ
These quotes, from the publications of two very opposed political viewpoints within the OttomanEmpireduringthe reign of SultanAbdiilhamidII (r. 1876-1909), sharea conceptionof Meiji Japanas a signifierof how to become modernto surviveas a nationat the turnof the 20th century.Hundredsmore of these referencesto Japancan be foundin the pages of both the OttomanTurkishand the Arabicpress of the Hamidianand Young Turkeras in which the OttomanEmpireand its shortcomingswere often comparedwith to domestic andinternational Japaneseachievements,or Japanwas put forthas a pattern follow in modernizingthe Ottomanstateandsociety. I questionhow and why individuals or groupsin the OttomanEmpirewere so vigorous in theirdesire to connect themselves to such an unlikely and alien alternativemodel for development-that is, that of Japan, a non-Muslim nation remotely tucked away in East Asia and about which little had been known or consideredin decades (centurieseven) priorto the 20th century.What purposesdid it serve to associate Ottomanwith Japanese,to refigurethe empire,labeled the "Sick Man of Europe"by Westernpowers, into what a few Young Turksboldly called the "Japan of the Near East"in 1908? How sincere and realistic was the Ottoman embraceof Pan-Asiansolidarity?Whatdid it indicate aboutthe Ottomanworldviewin the last thirtyyears of the empire?A deconstructionof this Japanesehistoricalanalogy of how various sectors of as it appearsin the literatureyields a clearer understanding Ottomansociety perceivedthemselves and theirempirein the emergingworld order,as well as how individualsand groups within the OttomanEmpire viewed their place in I argue in the following pages that the Ottoman the domestic communal arrangement. with modernJapanat the turnof the centurywas a consequenceof the selfpreoccupation preservationistdesire among several sectors of Ottomansociety to seek an alternative to Western-dictated normsof modernization, thoughthe empire ultimatelywas not able to reject Europe as the underlyingstandard by which to measureprogress.4Sustained history in and with Europeis precisely what preventedmany Ottomansfrom severing themselves from the West; this attachmentaffected the Ottomans'recognition of their marginalityin the late-19th-centuryworld and caused the conjuringup of an Ottoman self-view thatincorporated a temporaryorientationtowardJapanto exteriorizeWestern imperialand intellectualhegemony. I must present a very brief overview of modernizingefforts in the empire here as a prelude to comprehendingthe Ottoman linkage to the Japanesenation as a potential that took roadmapfor navigatinginto modernity.The process of global restructuring withinthe OttomanEmpire, place in the earlymodernperiodcreateda massivedisruption for which therewere dramaticsocial, economic, andpoliticalconsequencesthatbecame visible in later centuries. As a result of the OttomanEmpire's incorporationinto the to world economic system afterthe 16thcenturyas partof the periphery, what appeared be a breakdown of OttomanIslamic unifyingideology andinstitutionseventuallyensued that had far-reachingsocio-political effects for the OttomanMiddle East.5Startingin the 17th century,the OttomanEmpiresuffereda series of setbacksand militarydefeats at the hands of Europeanstates (I include the Russian Empire in this categorization
"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?
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Recent Ottomanhistoriography and "European"). despite its disputabilityas "Western" has re-evaluatedthis phenomenon,formerly expressed as "decline,"and replaced the of it as a transformation withinthe teleological termwith a more accurateunderstanding OttomanEmpire.6Nevertheless,there was inarguablya sense within the empire among different groups from this point onwardthat something had gone dangerouslywrong, that the formerly invincible Ottoman state was falling behind the powers of Europe, and that serious action had to be undertakento insure its survival.7The immediate problems of the empire were believed to require an overhaul of the Ottoman armed forces to reassert military prowess in the face of foreign challenges, the expansion of the school system to harness science and technology and to indoctrinateeducated patriots to serve the Empire, or to establish some Western institutionalpatternsthat would effect a redefinitionof the Ottomansubject's place vis-a-vis the state and other citizens. The Ottoman bureaucraticelite of the mid-19th century introduceddrastic political measuresthat they hoped would centralize and streamlinethe administration, unitedisparate elementsof the multi-religious,multi-ethnicsociety, andthuspreservethe reformprogram.serif Mardinpointedout in his pioneering empirethroughthe Tanzimat work of forty years ago that the resulting Young Ottomanmovement emerged with a similar goal in mind: to save the Ottoman Empire from Western encroachmentand internaldecay by demandingthatthe Sublime State instituteconstitutionalgovernment based on Islamic foundationsand contemporary science to modernizestateandsociety.8 Ideas of parliamentary government,of a shared national consciousness and a duty to one's homeland,and of secularrationalismall contributed to the 19th-century discourse on how to become "modem"in the empire.As Selim Deringilso succinctlyputit, sultans, bureaucratic elites, Young Ottomanintelligentsia, and the ulema all "beganto look for a new basis for defining what was increasinglycoming to be considered an 'Ottoman citizenry'" becausethey felt "anew social base was neededif the empirewas to survive."9 IIhad ascendedthe throneandsubsequently By the late 19thcentury,afterAbdfilhamid suspendedthe OttomanConstitutionof 1876, threatsto Ottomansovereigntycontinued. The furtheroccupationof Ottomanlandsby Europeanpowers, separatistnationalmovementsamongthose who questionedtheirties to an OttomanIslamic Empire(particularly in the Balkans), financialbankruptcy, and other internalcomplications allowed Western interventionin domestic affairs.Europehad seemingly renderedthe "Sick Man of Europe"incapableof defendingitself. The sultanand his governingapparatus produced an ideology and built an infrastructure to shore up the OttomanIslamic understanding of the empire in seeking to combat internaland externalthreats.10 Although historians dispute the degree to which AbdiilhamidII's Islamist campaign was used merely to legitimate a primarilyrational,secular modernizationagenda,"1 BenjaminFortna'srecent explanationbest defines the approachtoward modernityfor the sultan and other Islamicallyorientedreformersin the empireat the time: "[i]t was as if by combiningIslamic moralitywith a Westerneducationsystem. ... Ottomanofficialdomhopedto have discovereda formulathatwould allow the empireto vault over its many problems."'12 Those opposing the autocracyof Sultan AbdiilhamidII and his regime in the later decadesof the 19thcentury,misleadinglylumpedtogetherin one monolithiccategoryand labeled the "YoungTurks,"'3 also sought an escape routefrom the immediatedilemmas with Europeas they looked for an originalsocial foundationfor the empirefromwhich to II arosein the late 19thcenturyout of the proceed.YoungTurkoppositionto Abdiilhamid
210 Rende Worringer earlierYoung Ottomanmovement;consequently,an Ottomanistsense of patrioticduty to the homeland, resistance to Westernimperialism, and a demand for technological progress based on scientific knowledge prevailed in spite of factionalism within the movement.14 To this political opposition, the most obvious cure for the "Sick Man of Europe"was the depositionof an oppressivesultanin favorof a reinstatedOttomanconstitutionaladministration. Locked in a fierce political strugglewith AbdiilhamidII, the YoungTurkmovement,in all its ethnic,cultural,and ideological diversity,was also enandeven with one another-centered gaged in dialogue--with the sultan,his supporters, on properlydefiningnotionsof "progress" those (terakki)and "civilization" (medeniyet), of a modernnation.Whatdidthese frequentlyihvokedbuzzwordsconsideredthe markers terms mean in Ottomandiscourse on modernity?Were they universallyunderstoodin the empire? Intersectingwith the tremorsof socio-politicalupheavalin the OttomanEmpirewas the so-called rise of modernJapan,markedfirst by the Meiji Restorationof 1868 and latersymbolizedby the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance of 1902 andvictory over Russiain war in 1905. Contemporary Japanembodiedthe essence of this new languageof modernity for Sultan AbdfilhamidII and his statesmen,for some Islamic modernistreformersin the empire, and for secular,Westernizingelites. Japanfunctionedas a condensedtrope at times mappedany arrangement upon which these differentgroups almost arbitrarily of meanings,associations,or identificationsthey believed were necessaryto bringabout and "civilization." To discuss becoming modernat century'send inevitably "progress" involved questions of identity and nation-building,just as it assumed a programof social andtechnologicalmodernization. Ottomanofficials,politicalactivists,journalists, and other intellectuals almost without exception deployed their own versions of the contemporary Japanesenation as a didactic tool for arguingthe merits of a particular reformplatformin the pre- and post-1908 revolutioneras. Starting in the late 1880s, and subject to the reach and discretion of the Ottoman censor, discussions of virtuallyevery aspect of Japanesestate and society appearedin newspapers,periodicals,books, and popularliteraturein both the OttomanTurkishand Arabiclanguages,as well as in conferenceproceedingsandprivateOttomangovernment communications.It was widely believed that the example of Japancould instructthe OttomanEmpire in its quest for true enlightenment.Japan'shistory, nationalculture, heritage,and religion, as well as its political organization,military,and economy, were just a few of the topics examinedin these texts, which illustratedwhat Ottomanswriters of differentbackgroundsproposed to be successful developmentinto a modernnation and state. Japan was perceived to have accomplished these two objectives througha successful integrationof Easternculturalheritageand the appropriate Westernmaterial WhetherJapan'sachievementof this synthesis was fact or fiction, it provided attributes. an alternativeand a way out of the epithet "Sick Man of Europe." MimickingJapanese strategycould help the OttomanEmpiretruly be accepted as a memberof the Concert of Europe while promotingthe preservationof what were defined to be "Eastern" or values as a uniquecomponentof identity. "Ottoman" of a discourseon moderAlthoughtherewas disagreement amongOttomanproducers and "civilization"should consist of, in general Japanreprenity as to what "progress" sented rational science and technology, patriotism,and a fluid characteristicloosely "Easternness" was variouslyinterpreted as a religious, cultural, expressedas "Eastern."
211
or racial indicator,depending on the orientationof the individual. As an alternative to Europe for some OttomanIslamists, Japanwas a modernizednation preservingits "Easternspiritualessence."For other secular Ottomanelites, it was a distinctly Asian For religious constitunationmodernizingaccordingto a WesternEuropeantrajectory. tionalistspromotingthe establishmentof an Islamic shura commensuratewith modem thatthe OttomanEmpirecould also initiatea culture-specific times, Japandemonstrated Forthe non-religious,Japan'sconstitutional governingapparatus. monarchyprovedAsia liberaldemocracyandthatthe Ottomanparliament mustbe was capableof Western-style or "Pan-Asianism" restored.Ottoman"Easternism" was a politicallyexpedientconstruct thatlentitself to the debateovermodernityas a recognizableidentifierfor those seekingto legitimatetheirideas abouthow to reformas they struggledwith imperialistdomination by Europe. The interplaybetween notions of East andWestin this discourseon Japanandmodernity lays bare historicaland intellectualcontradictions,underscoringseveralparadoxes inherentin the Ottomanself-view that must be exposed. First,Japan'smodernconfigurationappearedto have developedout of studyingand imitatingWesternpatternswhile actuallypurging"antiquated" Japanesecustoms.The realityof excessive Westernization duringthe Meiji periodwould seem to abrogatethe validityof Japanas a "non-Western" model preservingits indigenous traditions.Second, the Ottomanswho employed this imagery still operatedwithin a frameworkof the empire's prior historical association with ChristianEurope,just as they simultaneouslytried to re-orient away from it by looking east to Japan.Third,some of those 19th-centuryOttomanelites who most enthusiasticallytouted Meiji Japanas a non-Western model of Asian progress were the in intellectualoutlook.The secular,social Darwinistfactionof the Young most European Turkmovementso thoroughlyexploredby M. StikrfiHanio'lu in his work (this faction authoredthe lattertwo epigraphs)figuresthe most prominentlyin this category. The definitivepolitical utility of the Japaneseexample contraststhe obscurenatureof motives behind Ottoman-Japanese interactionsand the mistrustthat surfacedat times betweenthe two parties.The lack of a sharedpastor commonalitybetweenthemin earlier with centuriesdid not dissuadeoptimisticjournalistsfrompromotinga new identification the Japanesein the pages of theirpress, the 19th-century forumfor instructingthe public in ideology. Ottomanand Arabic papersfueled interestin Japanese-related events with achievements. Correspondents lively exhortationsof praise for "Eastern" reportedon diplomaticattemptstakingplace or rumoredto be occurringbetween the Sublime Porte and the Japanesestate, and on unofficial visits of Japanesepolitical figures, to inspire Pan-Asianbrotherhood.'5 The Japanesestatedid courtthe OttomanEmpireenergetically in the late 19th century with gifts, visits, and proposals for treaties.16 AbdiilhamidII, his statesmen,and laterCUP officials respondedwith similarmissions and promises of friendship."A series of negotiationstook place between Japaneseand Ottomanstatesmen in Istanbuland in Europeancapitalswhere ambassadors were stationed;gifts were exchangedbetween imperialsovereigns;and visits by dignitarieswere carriedout in a feigned effort to build a political and commercialalliance.'8Yet neitherside yielded in to dictatethe most advantageous termsfor itself in anybilateralalliance.Conattempting for preservingOttomanstatecontrolover society determineddiplomaticoutcomes: cemrn the Ottomanstate refused to grantJapancapitulatoryprivileges to protectthe empire's political and economic integrity. For the Japanese, it was of paramountimportance
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to project strong, "civilized"nationhoodabroad,both to the West and to Asia, by detreatment mandingthe very preferential alreadyaccordedEuropeanpowersin Ottoman dominions.19 Both sides seem to have lost interestin the prospect of an official treaty by 1910, when Japanbecame involved in more pressing colonial enterprisesin Asia, and the Ottomanadministration, soon to be entrenchedin the Balkan wars, was more interestedin Japanesemilitary strategiesand how to integratemilitarypersonnel into the governing apparatus.20 No agreementwas reached between the two governments despite the hopeful sentimentsof those who wrote fervently about the possibilities for Ottoman-Japanese cooperation.21 Issues of state and political realities decidedly constrainedPan-Asianism and attitudes towardMeiji Japanamong the Ottomansultanand officials. At times, the risk of At other times, the fears of AbdiilhamidII affected Japaneseencroachmentwas real.22 the discourse.The sultanwas anxiousaboutthe likelihoodof Japan'semperorconverting to Islam andthe possibility of the Islamicworld's focus shiftingEast towardthe Mikado as a strongerandmorelegitimatecaliphof Muslimsthanhimself, a rumorthatwas whispered in and outside the empire by hopeful Muslims and by the Japanesethemselves.23 He expected throughpress censorshipto discouragesupportfor this line of thinkingby discussions of Japanand the emperorin Ottoman effectively squelching "dangerous" lands, althoughhe could never completely silence such voices. Enthusiasmfor Japan among the general Ottomanpopulation,however, knew few limits, as it was often generatedby the imaginationsof the writersthemselves, by the or Japanese of the readingaudience,orby the goals of influentialOttoman preconceptions citizens shapingthe discoursefor civic, international consumption.Bothcountriesshared Russia as an enemy;Japan'scolonial aspirationsin Asia largely shapedits dealingswith the Sublime Porte. Japanese self-portrayalto the Ottomans,however, was as Eastern brotherswith only the most honorableof intentionsin mind. Ottomanjournalistsconveyed these sentimentsas they interactedwith Japanesenationalsventuringto Ottoman lands to establish a friendly understanding between peoples.24 In the international environmentof the late 19th century,the image of modernJapan served as a means for the disenfranchisedof the world to make a case for increased political participationor culturalrecognition. This discourse often included a protest against the ascendancy of those exercising power or force. Japanesesuccesses represented inherentpotentialto reformsupposedlybackwardsocio-political structuresand to initiatethe process of modernizingstate and nation.In so doing, Japanhad been able to enter the ranks of the "civilized powers" (meaning Europeanstates) supposedly as an equal. According to this paradigm,the alienated sector in the global order was the all-encompassing"East"-that ambiguouscollection of peoples determinedto be lower in the racial scheme accordingto certain"scientific"rationalisttheoriesof the time. For them,the rise of Japan inspirjustifieddemandsfor independenceandself-determination, to become "modern" and"civilized" ing faithin theirown ability,if given the opportunity, as defined by the prevailingWesternmodes of thought.25 Japan'sprominenceallowed the East to claim culturalandmoralsuperiorityat times to undermineEuropean political or intellectualdomination,as the thirdepigraphat the beginningof this paperillustrates. The Ottomandomestic sphere(s)replicatedthis patternin which an excluded group used the Japaneseexampleas an ideological instrument to articulate demandsfor change or to reversean existing powerrelationship. But the local Ottomancontextdifferedfrom
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the internationalarenain that, when the sector of society believing itself to be underrepresentedin some way employed Japaneseimages in its arguments,the "dominant" other also typically referredback to Japan.Thus, the Japanmetaphorfunctioned as a defense mechanism for the authorityagainst the critical subordinatevoice. This phenomenon arose, for example, in the political contest that ensued between the Young Turksexcluded from power and SultanAbdiilhamidII. A segment of the YoungTurks, idealizingthose samuraipatriotswho had sparkedthe Meiji Restorationin 1868, insisted on a similarrebellionwithinOttomanlands.26 It was a threatening symbol:the Meiji revolutionreplaceda tyrannical shogunwith anenlightenedJapanesemonarch,the emperor, who subsequentlysurrounded himself with an able class of samurai-statesmenelites. Japan then reinventeditself before the world. The implications were unquestionably clear for Sultan AbdiilhamidII and for Asians everywhere.To deflect their vehement attacks, the sultan comparedthe shortcomingsof his empire to the idyllic conditions of the Japaneseisland nation.27 leading to successful modernization In the aftermathof the 1908 revolution and AbdfilhamidII's removal from power in 1909, there was a subtle yet noticeable shift in the self-perception of the Young Turks who became the backbone of the CUP regime. Instead of assuming the post as custodians of a Sick Man of Europe, the Unionists, their self-confidence restored, began to see themselves as the Meiji oligarchs of the Ottomanstate: as leaders who, throughtheir elite class and educationalbackgrounds,would choose policies and reform initiativescorresponding to those of Japanto guide their Ottomannation into the modernworld.28 The Ottomanmilitary officer Pertev Bey confidently asserted, "[W]e will arise shortly.., .with the same brilliance as did the Rising Sun in the Far East a few years before. In any case, let us not forget that a nation always arises from its own Whatmadethis possible?HiiseyinCahitexplainedin the Taninarticle,"The strength!"29 thatthe Unionistsobtainedthe necessaryprecondition Exampleof Japan," leadingto true Ottomanmodernity-a constitutional system to replacetyranny-and it legitimatedtheir hegemony.30 Escaping from an inferior,self-conscious status, they viewed themselves and their empire positively after 1908 as the "Japanof the Near East," with all that the Japanesetrope implied.31One diplomatrecountedthe commandingnew meaning injectedinto the Ottomanself-view duringan exchange with CUP officials Ahmed Riza and Dr. Nazim (who in 1908 approached the British to establish a treatyafter Austria's annexationof Bosnia-Herzegovina).They cited the Anglo-Japanesealliance as precedent;the Britishrefused,as Sir EdwardGreyrecalled:"[o]urhabitwas to keep ourhands free, though we made ententesand friendships.It was true that we had an alliance with Japan,but it was limited to certaindistant questions in the Far East. They replied that Turkeywas the Japanof the Near East."32 to the abstractOttomanhope to acquire"modern Previously,Japanhad corresponded of a specific Young TurkUnionist vision-that civilization."It was now representative of a modern,secular,and capitaliststatewhose institutionsandpolicies could be upheld of the Near East"meantan independent,militarilystrong, by law andby force.33 "Japan and economically viable Ottomanpolity governedby an elite determinedto realize their Unionist ideology.34Administrative reforms noted to have been practicedsuccessfully in Japan,such as staffingembassy positions with military personnel, were considered for the OttomanForeignMinistry.35 salariesfor foreign advisersin Japan Compensatory were examined as a standardfor Europeansserving in a similar capacity in Ottoman
214 Rende Worringer lands.36Others suggested that Japanplay a more direct advisory role in modernizing The Unionist governmentembarkedon certainOttomaninstitutions,such as the navy.37 a programof centralizationdesigned to recapturepast grandeurwithout losing sight of (Ottoman Turkish) character,as Tanin self-assuredly indicated the Japanese had and "civilization" The CUP assumedthe mantleof Ottoman"progress" done.38 through association with modern Japan. In so doing, it would soon find itself in yet another competition, this time with those whom the Unionists had excluded from power who would in turn deploy the Japanmetaphoras a political critique of CUP methods and ideology.
OTTOMAN SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND IDENTITY
The pursuit of modernityengaged the Ottomanruling class and its elite citizenry in mattersof state, including the socio-political foundationsof the realm, modernization have argued,the andreformschemes, andissues of identity.As Selim DeringilandFortna Hamidianstate undertooka campaignof OttomanIslamic ideological late-19th-century the empire,an endeavorcarriedout throughimperial retrenchment aimedat regenerating ritual as well as throughreform of the state educationalsystem to incorporateIslamic moralityand Westernscience.39SultanAbdiilhamidII was clearly influencedby Japan in this regard:despite angst over the Japaneseemperor'sincreasinglyelevated statusin Asia, the sultanand some of his palaceofficialsbelievedthatthe Japanesehadconducted the properassimilationof Westernknowledge with native cultureso thattheirresulting compulsory,universaleducationalprogramcreateda people groundedin theirancestralreligious heritagewho loyally served the Japaneseemperorand homelandto preserve on manuscripts sovereignty.The sultan'sinterestis reflectedin the existence of translated the most significantof which was a Frenchbook by a Japanese Japanin his privatelibrary, namedHitomi.This manuscript, JaponyaAhlakve Mii'essesatinaDair Niimune reporter (The Example of Japan's Morality and Institutions),explained Japanese institutions and culturalattributesas well as Japanese"virtues"--everythingfrom Japan'shistory, the role of the emperor,partypolitics, religious sects, arts, governmentadministration, and architecture, to marriage,women, raising children,funerarypractices,cleanliness, food, clothing, and recreation.40 In light of Fortna'sresearch on Ottoman texts used for moral instructionin Hamidian schools, the Ottoman counterpart to the Japanese assimilativeprocess was to be the fusion of OttomanIslamic ethical foundationswith principlesof rationalscience in a way thatcould be put into practiceto serve the empire, just as Japan'sindigenous traditionswere assumedto be the foundationsof its modern nationhoodand new-found status in the world. According to Hamidianstate ideology, science was not at odds with any Easternmorality,whether defined as "Japanese" or
"Islamic."41
As the first epigraph shows, the sultan and his palace officials appealed to the Ottoman public in the newspaperMalumatto acquiremodernscience using the idealized example of Japan.The empirewas to accomplishthis while preservingits Muslimcharacter, the bulwarkagainst Westernculturaland territorial imperialism.The sanctityof Ottomanlandsandpeople would thusbe protectedwithoutdrasticallyalteringtraditional OttomanIslamic political structures, the position of the sultan.Islamicmoparticularly Malumat tended to focus on rality in effect was to buttress Ottoman patriotism.42
"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the Near East'?
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Japan's technological achievements (mainly in the armed forces), its relations with Westernpowersas an equal, andthe OttomanEmpire'sneed to establisha firmpoliticaleconomic alliance with the Japanese.Rarely,however,did an authorneglect to remark culturethroughoutits exchanges with the abouthow Japanhad maintainedits "unique" its to defend West.43 sovereignty as well as its culture in the Japan'sperceived ability and attributes of Western dominatingconcepts of modernization overwhelmingpresence was and Concert of the the had meant that European respect Japan acquired progress arena.The Ottomansultanandpalace aspiredto achieve now a playerin the international the same results using a similarstrategy. The YoungTurks'searchfor unifying ideology for the empirepriorto 1908 diverged Ottomanrulingclass in thatthis opfrom the conceptionproposedby the contemporary of the Ottomansociety and state. modification a more radical movement sought position the applicationof The Young Turkspossessed a notion of modernitythat incorporated But they insisted on drasticreform Westernscience andtechnology to save the empire.44 thathinged on the overthrowof an autocraticsultan of the Ottomanpolitical arrangement of the constitutionto markthe empire'sentryinto a modernphase. andthe reinstatement The victory of Japanover Russia in 1905 served as a major impetus to this political but also assertion,for it was perceivednot just as a defeat of the "West"by the "East," as the first victory of constitutionalismand rule by law over the random excesses of absolutism. In addition,Japanesesuccess in the war symbolized the power of a modernized, independent,and fiercely patrioticnation-stateover antiquated,multinational, multi-ethnicempires. In this case, the victor had previously conducted a "bloodless" revolution-the Meiji Restoration-and subsequentlyembarkedon a vigorous program of modernizationto create a more advancedand democraticstate and society, in stark contrastto the tyrannicalRussianczar and his backwardempire.To those who opposed the despotic controlsof the sultanover the Ottomanrealm,the message conveyedby the of progresswas unmistakable.45 Perseveringand self-sacrificing,the Japanesenarrative Japanesepromulgateda constitution,revised unfairtreaties and signed new ones with Europe.They developed local industriesand became an economic power. Some of the more prominentmembers of the Young Turk movement in the Balkans, Cairo, Paris, and Geneva, such as Ahmed Riza (authorof the thirdepigraph),preachedaboutmodern Japanin the press to illustrateOttomanaptitudefor the same. The textual peculiarities with the sultan; reflecteda political confrontation of YoungTurkliteraryrepresentations a desire to be consideredequals by an imperialisticEurope,despite implicit acceptance of racial theories (to be explained shortly);and a tinge of Turkishnationalistundertone based on this ethnicunderstanding. Mincing no words,the YoungTurkoppositionpaper ?ura-yi Ommetbeseeched Ottomansto act: is do not forgetthatthe enemyof yourlife, the enemyof yourfuture Turks andall Ottomans, in this confidence thehomesof yourpatrie,yourland,putting evil thatdestroys thatcalamitous forced BecauseliketheJapanese, moreso thanin forceof arms. andintrigue deceptive duplicity we must of thehomeland," if we do notlearnwhatit is to "taste whennecessary, to takeup arms or slaves.It is by our to be servants, afterwards knowwell thatwe will be condemned captives, in ourhearts, affection preventing everlasting everydaythatmakes[patriotic] cryof "homeland" to be one of us, thatgnawsat the well thatthe enemythatpretends this captivity....Knowing andstrive let us cooperate morethanit is abroad, is inside,in thepalace, just together homeland, liketheJapanese.46 forthesakeof ourcountry,
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Young Turkideology challenged Westernhegemony and involved the removal of the sultan as the political object aroundwhich to elicit loyalty and service in the name of the empire, because he stood in the way of progress. The Eastern, modemrn, rationalscientific, constitutionalpolity that a faction of the Young Turksenvisioned, and that Japansymbolized,was itself to replacethe Ottomansultanas unifying object. Forthem, patrioticpolitical activism determinedOttomanmoralityin this moment. For the Young Turkswho gravitatedtowardEuropeanEnlightenment-era intellectualism, scientific materialismand Compteanpositivism shapedthis conceptionof nation and civilization.47 They tacitlyacceptedtheoriesof racial-cultural hierarchyespousedby such figures as the sociologist GustaveLe Bon, accordingto whose "rational," "scientific" corollaryTurks,Japanese,and Africanswere consideredincompleteor inferiorto Social Darwinianevolutionaryassumptionsof naturalselection races.48 Indo-European in which the strongestnations survivedwhile the weakest were swallowed up and colonized also influencedthis group of YoungTurks.Their applicationof Le Bon's elitism and HerbertSpencer's differentiationof species to social classes and (racial) nations translatedinto a call for linear progressiontoward a secular, capitalist Ottomanstate led by themselves, the educatedelite.49Consideringthemselves enlightenedby Western civilization, they sought inclusion into the Europeanfold, although they recognized Europe'sresistanceto theirracial and intellectualequality. In the hopeful atmosphereimmediatelyfollowing the 1908 YoungTurkRevolution, the dialogue on Ottomanprogressand civilization expandedbecause of the flourishing press in the empire. Niyazi Berkes's categorizationof these approachesto Ottoman modernizationas Westernist,Islamist, and Turkistis now considered too simplistic to addressthe complexities of late Ottomanthoughtand the tremendousoverlap of these who Nevertheless,if we examinethe literature produced by the YoungTurks ideologies.50 and Turkistideology prevailedin the CUP after 1909, we see thatsecularist(Westernist) dominatedtheirthinking.As Hanio'lu has so conclusively shown,the CUP used Islamic rhetoricas a tool to make their modernizationprogrammore palatableto the Ottoman masses while diminishingthe role of religion in society throughsecularizingpolicies.51 These discreetlyanti-religiousUnionistsoften oscillatedbetweenexpressingOttomanist sentimentsthey felt would elicit broadersupportin the empire and their more sincere Turkistor even exclusionaryTurkishnationalistvision of an enduringOttomanstate.52 DrawingfromLe Bon andSpencer,andencouraged by TurkicMuslimexiles fromRussia, of national identityeven more strongly they emphasizeda heavily racial understanding throughjournalistic exposition on the "Japaneserace" that permeatedtheir attitudes towardthe distribution of power.53 To prominent CUP members,the Ottomanpolity was to be governedby a Turkishelite class who would make decisions of state to ensurethe empire'scontinuedexistence. This grouphadthe most success in exploiting the analogy of Meiji Japanfor domestic use; in theirpublicationsthey appropriated Japaneseimages of good leadershipandpracticalgovernanceto claim complete possession of "progress" and "civilization"for themselves. The CUP disruptedthe formerOttomanpolitical orderwith theirversion of a constitutionalregime that was similar in its authoritarianism to pre-1908 rule. Many Young Turkswho had previously embraced a doctrine of Ottomanism,whether Turk,Kurd, Arab, Armenian,or Greek, quickly became disillusioned with the centralizingpolicies of the Unionist regime. Turkishnationalistclaims to the administration among some
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CUP memberscaused furtheralienation,as they were contraryto the inclusivenessof an Ottomanistidentity.After 1909, the response of some of the disfranchisedto this CUP monopoly on powerandpolicy-makingwas renewedopposition,whetheramong former activists now in rivalpolitical parties,the provincialArabmiddle class, or others. Some OttomanIslamistjournalsissued a directchallenge to the CUP's authorityto determine Ottomanmodernity;othersmore subtly suggestedanotherapproach.For some Islamists a formof "progress" and"civilization" opposingUnionistpower,MeijiJapanrepresented than racial more distinction.54 To by heritage any profoundly religious-cultural shaped of insisted on Ottoman adherence to the foundations Islamists success, Japanese parallel the Islamic religion (including the 5eriat) and respect for the diversityof the Ottoman Muslim iimmetin any modernizationof the empire. Beyaniil-Hak,the conservativeorgan of the Scientific Islamic Association, did not seem at all interestedin Japan;DervigVahdeti'snewspaperVolkan (of his Muhammadan MuhammadiCemiyeti) frequentlymentionedJapan,demandingthat Union or Ittihad-1 and Ottomanmodernitybe made subordinate to indigenous Isthe CUP administration His satisfactionwith Japan'svictoryover Russiarelatedmoredirectly lamic principles.55 to his concernfor the protectionof Muslims in the BalkansagainstRussianimperialism thanto any genuine Pan-Asianaffection,however.56 It would seem thatthe CUP had so Japanas the symbol of its statevision after 1909 thatVahdeti's thoroughlyappropriated choice to discuss Japannegatively on occasion was as a quiet critiqueof the Unionists' the CUP administration was not living policies.57At othertimes, Japanwas the standard and "civilizaup to.58Vahdetiengaged in the dialogue over the meaning of "progress" tion" with his secular political superiors and was eventually executed for his views; BedifizzamanSaid Nursi, his KurdishSufi colleague who fared betterdespite mistrust of him by the Unionists, often talked of the lofty achievementsof the Japanese,even mentioning in a speech shortly after the revolutionthat "the Ottomansshould imitate the Japanesetaking from Westerncivilization what will assist them in progress, while preservingtheirown nationalcustoms."59 Only a few Islamic modernistsin the second constitutionalperiod were able to continually deploy Japaneseimages to arguetheir views, the reasons being that they more the Unionistsin powerandless frequentlyoffendedtheircensors. readilyaccommodated Some of these Islamic modernistscontributedto Strat-tMustakim(Sebiliirregat),a periodical that regularlyprintedarticles aboutJapanand that actuallyhad correspondents in Tokyo, includingthe TatarAbdfirresid Ibrahim.The prospectof Japaneseconversion to Islam and the possibilities for Pan-Asian, Pan-Islamicsolidarityto oppose Western imperialismthat would result from this occurrencefiguredprominentlyin the pages of Strat-iMustakim,in large partbecause this myth was propagatedby Ibrahimhimself, by Japanesepolitical operativesand members of the Black Dragon Society, by a few sincere Japaneseconverts, and by other Muslim expatriateactivists such as the Indian MuhammadBarakatullah. Strat-i Mustakimdid not openly confront CUP policies; instead, it focused on two significantissues: assimilationand education.First,the Ottomansneeded to re-evaluate their modernizationstrategyto properlyadaptWesternscience to Islam the way Japan had acquiredWesterncivilization without losing its Easternessence. Mehmed Akif's 1912 poem reiteratedthe view that Japanhad rejected the superficialitiesof Western civilization while borrowingscience and technology, a feat that Muslims had not been
218 Rende Worringer able to accomplish.60 Said Halim MehmedAli's grandsonand the Ottomangrand Papa, vizier from 1913 to 1916, arguedthat religionwas neveran obstacleto progress,whether in Buddhism in Musa Christianity Europe, Japan, or Islam in Muslim civilization.61 who became Seyhtil-Islam,also suggestedthat,"bytakingthe Japanese Kazim, an 'CZlim as ourmodel, to acquire[industry, techniques,andsciences] fromEuropewith the utmost customs, morals,andmode of living"would speed while avoidingimitationof European lead to a rejuvenatedempire.62Second, Ottoman education was to be based on this properassimilationof Easternvalues and Westernscience. Islamic modernistslobbied for compulsory"national education" like thatin Japan,whichthey definedas a mixtureof and received,inculcatedindigenousJapanesetradition,a cult of sacrificefor the emperor, Westerntechnical and administrative methods to producea modernsociety of patriotic citizens.63The aim of Japanese educatorswas to exert great efforts to bring forth "a nationalspirit,a nationalidea,"a task thatrequiredcommittedteachersas well as fiscal supportfrom the government(which it got).64Japan,in "manifestingfor us, its Eastern comrades,primaryschools and compulsoryeducation,it will urge us to think [to do the same],"said one Ottomanwriter.65 Religiously minded and secular Ottomanelites presumedthat the empire would be liberatedfromanycontradiction betweenthepreservation of indigenousculture(however differently they defined it) and the implementationof Westernmodernizingpractices with theirwise guidance.66 to Sirat-iMustakim believed Islamic modernistscontributing that a nation's essential religious characterdid not have to be lost when it absorbed Westernprinciplesand would assist in the filteringout of harmfulEuropeaninfluences. This group and its ideology became politically subordinate in the second constitutional period to radical Young Turksecularists such as AbdullahCevdet, who subscribedto socio-evolutionarydeterminantsof culture above and beyond religion. Respectingthe Meiji oligarchy's choice to discard Japanesetradition,he and his cohorts hoped that Ottomansociety would be able similarly to shed superstitious(Islamic) belief as the empire modernized. ProvincialArabswith Islamistor secularistorientations towardthe prospectof modernity shareda common concernwith the Islamistsmentionedearlier.Arabjournalistsand activists in Syria and Lebanon, many of whom initially supportedthe CUP, were optimistic aboutthe prospectof a parliamentary future.But they perceivedcertainOttoman judicial and educationalpolicies as discriminatingalong ethnic lines. They felt thatthis demonstrated not only the CUP's disregard for Islamiccivilizationas an Arablegacy and what should be the special place of the Arabsin the OttomanEmpireas descendantsof Islam's pious ancestors(al-salaf al-siflih), but also the CUP's misrepresentation of the egalitarianconstitutionalprinciplesfor which the revolutionwas believed to have been originally intended.67 Japaneseimages soon resonatedin the burgeoningArabic press as subtle criticisms of OttomanCUP rule.68As a fundamentalcomponent of modern nationhood,Arab writers comparedJapanesedeference towardancestraltraditionsto the Ottomans'need to respect their Arabo-Islamicculturalheritage;Arab Muslimsand Christiansdefined Arabidentity as primarilya function of this cultureand not of racial ethnicityat this time. Viewing Unionist governingstrategiesas an assaulton Ottomanist andArabist"national" affiliations,they proceededto elucidatehow Japanhadsucceeded in acquiringmoderncivilization, whereasthe OttomanEmpirein the hands of the CUP had failed. These critiquescontinued to appearin the Arabic press as late as 1916, as
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was illustratedby the Arab Christianperiodicalal-Muqtatafin its defense of the Arab Revolt duringWorldWarI: of UnionandProgress of parliament Whenthe Ottoman Committee undertook thereinstatement without thatwe obtained whatwe hadhoped forandthata statehadarisen it appeared bloodshed, in the NearEastlike Japan in the FarEast.Thisbeliefremained firmlyaffixedto oursouls to outthe deedsof thisCommittee, in stateof egoismand the pointof blotting a being perpetual it didnotcommit acts.... TheArabs nowaroseandtheir arrogance, [believing] anyreprehensible andconstruct is to restore thegloryof theirancestors a mightyArabstate;we see that objective we arereinstituting someof whatwe mentioned about forthepurpose of guiding previously Japan themin themeans of establishing thisstateandreclaiming thatglory.69 The cycle of the alienatedversusthose commandingpolitical power,reflectedthrough deploymentof a Japanesetropeto demandrecognition,had come full circle.
THE INTERNATIONAL OF NATIONS ARENA: REVERSING THE HIERARCHY
The Japanesenation provided a patternfor cultural,social, and political advancement to many Ottomanelites who applied this prospect to the relationshipsbetween political authorityand subordinate,and between colonizer and colonized.70 In addition to suggesting modernizingstate structuresand societal mechanisms to create a patriotic, educatedcitizenry,Ottomanrepresentations of the Japanesewere intimatelyconnected to finding a place for the empire in the modernworld somewherebetween Europe and Asia. Pan-Asian solidarity was a timely response constructedto answer the temporal Westernchallenge on the ground.Japanhad seemingly reversedthe predominant racialculturalhierarchythat placed Europeansabove non-Europeansin the global order.In the 19thcentury,an overarching relationalview, both spatialandtemporal,polarizedthe world into two spheresof fictive totality that we have inaccuratelycome to call "West" and "East"(or "the West" and "the Rest").71It was a relationshipbetween Self and as EdwardSaid has described.72 The Other,OccidentandOrient,civilized andbackward, Ottomanwritersmentionedearlieracknowledgedthese non-neutral,binary categories, with their attached19th-century implications,includingMiddleEasterners'lower status on the evolutionaryladder.But to them it was a current,alterable,and even reversible At a criticalhistoricalmomentat century'send, Japanhad burston power arrangement. the scene out of what was called the FarEast (EastAsia's assumedspatialdynamicwith Europe)to supply the Ottomanswith a detouraroundtheir presentplace as inferiorsto Europeansin race, civilization,andprogressas these were definedby Westernscientific materialismand social Darwinianthought.The resultingdiscourse in OttomanTurkish andArabic(as well as in otherAsian vernaculars73) can be describedonly as a Pan-Asian Ottoman thinkers from diverse who embraceda new-found affinityamong backgrounds associationwith otherAsians, andespecially with the Japanese,as the "Easterners" who had successfully breachedthe Concertof Europe-who had modernizedand reformed while seemingly preservingnativeJapaneseheritage.Victoryin the Russo-Japanese War took on symbolic proportionsin the writings of vocal journalists, as a reversal of the racial-civilizational pecking orderappearedto be at hand: and some Ottomans who imitatewhatever [s]omeEuropeans they see withoutunderstanding, consider us a racein the lowerpartof the racialhierarchy. Let us say it in plainTurkish: they
220 Renfe Worringer theTurks classhuman as second beings.Japanese regard people,beingof thestockof theyellow in theircountry the slander nature withtheprogress andwiththeir race,areannihilating against cannons andriflesin Manchuria.74 Japanesecivilization,the best assimilationof EasternspiritwithWesternmaterialvalues, moved beyondthatof Europeto become the superiorform. As the YoungTurkexile and activist in ParisAhmed Riza pointed out in 1905 in his Frenchsupplementto the CUP political journalMevveret, There aremultiple well-merited lessonsthat thewarpermitted to givetothe"superior theJapanese of thesocialandpolitical of Japan, races." ... Onecannot doubt thepreeminence institutions a socalledinferior thepatent of superiority is conferred. The racebymostof thosepeoples uponwhom hasproved theChristian that it is notindispensable of theJapanese world splendid victory arrogant; for a peopleto embrace in orderto acquire andan aptitude civilization, Christianity morality, for progress....Likewiseeventsof the FarEasthaveput forthevidenceof the uselessness of of Europe if pernicious, themore forreforming a people.Onthecontrary, interventions, frequent withEuropean a peopleis, thebetter isolated andpreserved fromcontact invaders andplunderers is themeasure of [its]evolution toward a rational renovation.75 Set againstthe prospectof Westernimperialism,the ethnic, religious, linguistic, and class distinctionsamong membersof Ottomansociety causing variationin how certain characteristics were mappedonto the image of Japanget subsumedunderthe rubricof a broaderidentificationwith one anotheras fellow Asians connected to a larger"East." In other words, howeverOttomancitizens may have differedwith one anotheron other of and associationwith the Japanesemodel bridgedhorizontal levels, theirinterpretation and vertical societal groupings so that they could be said to have conjured a shared in this historical moment.76 identity as "Asians,"in contradistinctionto "Europeans," The list of examples is impressive in its diversity and scope: the secular,anti-religious Young Turkexile and writerAbdullahCevdet frequentlywrote in awe of the Japanese "high civilizing mission in Asia," so that Japanwas the carrier"of the sword, for the oppressors,for the insolent invaders;the torch for the oppressed,for those that shine unto themselves."77 OttomanMinistryof Warofficial and Sufi AgqIDede IbrahimHalil was "excitedby the Russo-Japanese Warof 1904-1905" to the point that "he felt called to prayfor the Japanese,andeven came to believe he was their 'spiritualcommander."'78 The YoungTurkpaperBalkan reiterated"theTurks'affectionand good will towardthe while in Cairo,the SyrianChristian6migreJurjiZaydan wrote in al-Hilal Japanese"79; of JapanesestatesmanIto Hirobumias a role model for Easterners,"with his desire to acquire principles of modern civilization, to emulate advanced [peoples'] refinement, and to attracthis fellow countrymento its acquisition."80 A writerfor the Francophile Cairo daily newspaperal-Ahram,owned by the ChristianTaqla brothers,pointed out how Japanhad advanced"untilin a shorttime it hit the apex of civilization, refinement, prosperity,might, glory and political power. It seems to me that now it has become a missionaryto nationsof the East and a preacherto us."8'FarisNimr and Ya'qubSarruf, the Christianeditors of the Arabic scientific monthly in Cairoal-Muqtataf,echoed this reverencefor Japanregularlyin articlesbetween 1886 and 1912, sharingtheir opinions of Japanwith Egyptianand Syrian Muslimjournalistsgenerally while participating in heated debates with them over other issues in the pages of their respective presses. A
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in 1911, Shukrial-'Asali SyrianArabpolitical activistelected to the OttomanParliament also confessed his solidaritywith the East in a mannerthat included not just Asia, but also Africa.82 Popularpoetryeulogizing Japanand its defeat of Russia by the noted poet Hafiz Ibrahim(and others) was memorizedand recited in public by schoolchildrenand adults.83 Political exile or memberof Ottomangoverning circles, Christianor Muslim, Turk,Syrian Arab, or Egyptian,secularistor Islamic modernist-all concurredin their affinityfor and solidaritywith Japan. The attachment to a Japan model was not without complication, however. The Ottomanelites who eventuallydominatedthe CUP consideredthemEuropean-oriented selves to be the most suitable individualsto lead the empire into a modernitydefined by Westernconcepts.They were the most keenly awareof Europe'scondescenprimarily sion, andthey most openly acknowledgedtheircurrent"lesser"statusin the worldorder. This very recognition caused them to have "turnedEastward"in their expressions of hope for the Ottomanfuture.But they had no intentionof remainingin the ranksof what Theirultimategoal was to stop the empire'spending they viewed as a backward"East." the dissolution,rewritingwhat looked to be the gloomy futurebefore them, to "reenter West"as equalsafterhavingmodernizedto the appropriate degreefollowing the Japanese blueprint. These Ottomans, connecting themselves to heroic Japan as an escape route from their own ominous future, were obligated to engage in a process of disavowal: they attemptedto momentarily turn their back on their own history, that history deeply implicated within Europe since the 15th century and containing the present circumstances, to face the "East,"the non-West in which Japanresided and that previously But the Ottomans were inheritors of more had not been known or contemplated.84 than a millennium of history between Islamic civilization and Christendom,which made their link to Europe more complex. Both entities had engaged in a symbiosis for centuriesthatdefinedthe connectionbetween, as well as the distinct spatial-cultural spheres for, the Ottoman Empire and Europe in the modem era. Each side had endured tensions and rivalries, conflicts and competitions that were integral to forming a sense of Self as determinedby its Other. This was not a recent phenomenon. Unlike a newly discovered peripheralspace, it was not a historical anomaly for the OttomanEmpireto have located itself abstractlyon Europe's"exterior"-it had already there as much as ChristianEuropehad been "outside"the Ottoman been an "outsider" Islamic sphere. It was a binarywith historicalroots. Given the changed power balance between the OttomanEmpireand Europefrom the 17th centuryonward,Ottomanfailures against Europeanchallenges set in motion the desire to repress or displace this history in favor of one that would give the empire a second chance to reclaim the triumphs of its OttomanIslamic past. At this moment in the 19th century,the Ottomans were forced ideologically to deny their own place in and history with Europe in favor In spatial terms, they atof a more appealingpopularfiction labeled "Pan-Asianism." fromEuropeto escape the presentreality,plungingthemselves temptedto migratefarther now denoted as "East"by Europeand the nondeeperinto the expanse of the "Other," Westernworld alike. Japanrepresentedthe best innovations born of this amorphous collective. A choice was madehere-a "glanceEast,"as it was literallyexpressedin Ottomanand Arabic sources-to recognize and inhabit (if only temporarily)a new space in which
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the Japanese currently resided or one in which it used to reside until it departed to
What is extraordinary is not just that the WesternizingOttomanelites join Europe."8 themselves from a familiar realigned away Europe and toward a distant and foreign but the degree to which they attachedto this "East"outside "West," and how "Orient," far they would extend that relationship-to the point of embracingvery alien Japan. For Islamists who did so, the dilemma of Japan'snon-Muslim characterwas resolved throughthe propagationof the far-fetcheddreamthatthe Japaneseemperorand people were about to convertto Islam any minute, causing Pan-Eastern, Pan-Asianaffinityto converge with Pan-Islamismand thus complete a fantasyof evolution into the ultimate "East." Nevertheless,the Ottomans'protracted history with Europewas precisely what' forbadethem from entirely submergingthemselves into the "East"and remainingthere indefinitely. Ottomanhistorical reciprocity with Christendom,and thus the Ottoman attraction to Westernsocial thought,ultimatelydid not allow them to sever themselves completely from Europe. Instead, this reciprocity obligated the Ottomansto discover and implement a modernity that, while having appearedout of an "Eastern"space, would be functional within that of the "Western" one. In this, Japanwould operateas
their tutor and mediator for involvement with Europe, for it had survived, modernized, and accomplished the most visible signs of acceptance as a Great Power. The Ottoman Empire was merely to follow in Japan's footsteps to eventually exit from Asia after having redeemed its past. The Ottomans who idealized Japan implicitly accepted the notion of an ontologically divided world of Orient and Occident. They tried to engineer an inversion of power between the two while remaining committed to certain Western definitions of "progress" and "civilization." But their faith in 19th-century Western science resulted in the Ottoman Empire's remaining a shadow of the European original because the underlying principle of inequity in the binary structure ended up recuperated. Western-oriented elites assumed that Japan had become a modern, independent, secular, capitalist nation-state through a process of self-preserving social Darwinian selectivity that allowed Japan to carefully
extractand absorbWesternscience and technology. They would replicatethis process. The lingering problematicfor them was Europe's declarationof superioritybased on having determinedmoderncivilization first, thus claiming modernityas a Westernculturalpossession. The Islamistcounter-claim demandedthattruemodernization could be
accomplished only by avoiding the adoption of harmful European cultural byproducts.
"Eastern" ethicsandmoralitywerepresumedto havebeenpreserved Japan'sfundamental

as it modernized, rendering the Ottoman potential to do the same vis-ai-vis Islam a viable possibility. For both secular Westernizers and Islamists, Japan had altered the fortunes of all of Asia by repositioning the "East" in a superior place within the hierarchy.86 The Lebanese journal al-'Irfan passionately expressed this reordering of Oriental and Occidental categories in 1910, using the oft-repeated metaphor of the rising and setting sun to favor the East: theirsun inclinedto set due to natural radiance Westerners, law, andEasterners enjoyinga perpetual in their pure lands.... Easternershave a deep-rootedpast. Civilizationdeveloped and reapedthe fruits of its harvest in their lands and in the East today remainsthis civilization and progresswhat Westerners reachedin comparisonwith it is confusing and baffling,yet most of it had been achieved more than a thousand years ago! And these priceless vestiges are sufficient alone to indicatethe complete predispositionof Easterners for progress.87
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Japanhad alreadyprovedit. The Ottomanswould, they believed, in a shorttime demonstratethe same capacity,earningthe empire a secure, respected,and sovereignplace in the global hierarchy. To answer the questions posed at the beginning of this paper, the Ottoman sultan, Ottoman statesmen, political activists, journalists, and nationalists (and at times the average citizen) found it indispensableto repress currenthistorical circumstancesregardingEuropeto create a second chance-a chance to repackagethemselves based on a Japanesemodel of modernitythatincorporated "Western" knowledgewhile preserving that ambiguousquality known as "Easternessence." The Japanesetrope was intended to mediate Ottomaninvolvement with the West to insure an eventual and successful (re-)entryinto this space. Japan'sbelieved retentionof the true self and its survivalas an Asian nation showed that it had not sacrificedany unique ancestralrites and culture as it absorbedthe latest in technology and governinginstitutions.The Ottomanattempt was thus renderedpossible. As a reflection of that process, at a similar transformation were attemptingto Ottomanscaughtup in the collapse of the empire'sformerstructures retainthe practicalaspects of OttomanIslamic administrative proceduresand received Muslim societal norms while reformingthe Ottomannation in its variously conceived forms accordingto Westernknowledge. for "Eastern" The historicalanalogyof Japanset a standard modernity, yet the analogy itself was often determinedby political expediency or by those with a specific agenda. of ideological criteJapanwas refiguredwhenevernecessaryto conformto an assortment riaconcerningmodernization by Ottomanobserverswhose religious,racial,educational, and socio-economic backgroundsvaried, as did their relationshipsto both Europe and to the Ottomangoverningcenter.Regardlessof these differences,however,they shared a perceptionof Japanas equivalentto some irreducibledefinition of modernity-that of being "Eastern," patriotic,and technologicallyadvanced-that transgressedOttoman vertical (class) distinctions as well as the horizontal (regional, ethno-linguistic, religious) ones. The relative singularity of this Japanese representationindicated that a influencedthe thoughtof peoples within the bordersof larger,Pan-Asian"Easternism" the empire at the turnof the centuryabove and beyond previousforms of identification that had dictated relationshipsin and outside it for centuries. It was a way in which to operate,to identify, and to cope in a new world perceived as irreconcilablydivided and modern,between backwardand enbetween traditional between "East"and "West," lightened. At the same time, differentcommunitiesin the OttomanEmpire and their ambitions in particularistic for a nationalfuturereally could be said to have been "imagined" ways. In seeking a new ideology to unite the empire, membersof Ottomansociety looked to to the nation of modernJapan,to better define themselves. Inevitably,they the "East," also clarified their internal differences in the process. Ottomanismretained inclusive sentimentstowardcitizens of thepolity;thepost- 1908 CUP notionof empirenecessitated more exclusive connotationsof community.The Young TurkUnionists laid claim to an of "progress" and "civilization"throughtheir usurpationof the modern understanding which they definedas the constitutional,secular,scientific,capitalist, Japanesemetaphor, nation. They, as Ottomanelites, assumed that they were and racially unified "Eastern" the most capableof initiatingthe move towardmodernity,capturedso eloquentlyin the of the Near East." motif of the "Sick Man of Europe"becoming the "Japan
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NOTES 1"Devlet-iAliye-yi Osmaniyeve JaponyaImparatorlugu," Malumat(24 August 1897): 1. 2"Hubbfil-Vatanmin uil-imanve Japonya-Rus Seferi,"Sura-yi Ommet3, 52 (1 March 1904): 3. 3AhmedRiza, "LegonsJaponaises," MechveretSuppldment Frangais 161 (1 March 1905): 3. Islamic World Report1, 3 (1996): 4SerifMardinpointsout in his "Islamin the OttomanEmpireandTurkey," 17, that the Islamic modernistsNamik Kemal and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani encounteredthis impasse when debatingWesternistswho claimed thatIslam was incompatiblewith science: "[t]heissue was the consequence of its being indissolubly linked with a sub-text,namely, the superiorityof Westerncivilization as well as the superiorityof positive science." McGill UniversityPress, 1964), 5See Niyazi Berkes, TheDevelopmentof Secularismin Turkey (Montreal: on the basic structureof the OttomanIslamic polity. See ImmanuelWallerstein,The Modem World-System The (New York:Academic Press, 1974), on the theoreticalworld-system perspective. HuriIslamoglu-Inan, OttomanEmpireand the World Economy(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1987), 1-24, outlineshow Westernorganizingprinciplesgraduallydisplacedthe Ottomanimperialsystem. FatmaMuigeGf6ek, Rise of theBourgeoisie,Demise ofEmpire:OttomanWesternization and Social Change(New York:OxfordUniversity Press, 1996), describesOttomancapitalistdevelopmentas causing the emergence of a split bourgeoisieclass that exacerbatedthe loss of state control over certainsocial mechanisms. 60n the formulationof the "paradigm of decline,"see H. A. R. Gibb and HaroldBowen, Islamic Society and the West,2 vols. (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1957); BernardLewis, The Emergenceof Modern of Ottomantransformation can be found (London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1961). A clear articulation Turkey in Rifa'at Ali Abou El-Haj, Formationof the Modern State: The OttomanEmpire, Sixteenthto Eighteenth Centuries(Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1991). In his work on the constructionandprojection of the Ottomanself-image in the late 19thcentury(TheWell-Protected Domains:Ideologyand theLegitimation of Power in the OttomanEmpire,1876-1909 [London:I. B. Taurus,1998]), Selim Deringil notes the degree to which the empire was still a power to be reckonedwith despite its apparentweaknesses at the end of the 19th century. in the OttomanState:The Reign of Abdfilhamid 7Selim Deringil, "LegitimacyStructures II (1876-1909)," InternationalJournalof Middle East Studies 23 (1991): 345. 8See Serif Mardin, The Genesis of YoungOttoman Thought:A Study in the Modernizationof Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1962), on the Tanzimatand the developmentof YoungOttomanideology. 9Selim Deringil, "The Inventionof Traditionas Public Image in the Late OttomanEmpire, 1808-1908," ComparativeStudies of Society and History 35 (1993): 4. 10Seeidem, Well-Protected Domains.CaesarE. Farah,"ReassessingSultanAbdiulhamid II's IslamicPolicy," ArchivumOttomanicum14 (1995-96): 191-92, calls it "an Islamic response" to resist WesternChristian imperialismand not "an Islamic objective." of Tradition," 3-29, for his argumentin its entirety. 1 See Deringil, "Invention 12BenjaminC. Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman 'Secular' Schools," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 380. Turks in Opposition(New York: 13Berkes, Hanioglu, The Young Developmentof Secularism,305; M. ?tikrui Oxford UniversityPress, 1995), 4. The term"YoungTurk," as HasanKayali noted in Arabsand YoungTurks: Arabism,and Islamismin the OttomanEmpire, 1908-1918 (Berkeley:Universityof California Ottomanism, Press, 1997), 4, is "an unfortunatemisnomer,because it implies that the group of liberal constitutionalists called YoungTurksconsisted exclusively of Turks,or even of Turkishnationalists.The YoungTurks,in fact, includedin theirranksmanyArabs, Albanians,Jews, and in the early stages of the movement,Armeniansand Greeks." 14Hanioglu,YoungTurksin Opposition, 17. On page 4, he explains that "[t]he CUP was an umbrella organizationuntil 1902 and was overflowing with member groups whose only common agenda was the dethronement of AbdtilhamidII." 5 See Ren6eWorringer, "Comparing Perceptions: Japanas Archetypefor OttomanModernity,1876-1918," (Ph.D. Universityof Chicago, diss., 2001), for specific citations from the Arabic and OttomanTurkishpress concerningthese rumorsand reports. 16SeeSan-eki Nakaoka,"JapaneseResearchon the Mixed Courtsof Egypt in the EarlierPartof the Meiji Periodin Connectionwith the Revision of the 1858 Treaties," JournalofSophia Asian Studies6 (1988): 11-47;
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and idem, "TheYoshidaMasaharu Mission to Persia and the OttomanEmpireduringthe Period 1880-1881," Collected Papers of OrientalStudies in Celebrationof Seventy Yearsof Age of His ImperialHighness Prince Mikasa (Shogakukan,1985), 203-35. For a more recent assessment, see SelyukEsenbel, "JapaneseInterest in the OttomanEmpire,"in The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions,ed. Bert Edstrom(Surrey: CurzonPress, JapanLibrary, 2000): 95-124. 17Thesultan'splan was to "establisha personaland strong friendship(dostluk)with the Mikadofrom afar, but in ordernot to upset the RussianCzardom,to not currentlyenterinto a political alliance with Japan.But if that friendshipinto the form required,at the precise momentwhen it seems necessary,to suddenlytransform of an immediatetreaty":Ziya Sakir (Soku), Sultan Hamit ve Mikado, 2nd ed. (Istanbul:Bogazici Yaylnlan, to Paris. 1994), 30, quoting a formerOttomanambassador 18For a clearer picture of the direct relationshipbetween the OttomanEmpire and Japan,one must draw from a variety of sources in Ottomanand modem Turkish,English, and Japanese. I have relied primarily on the Ottoman prime ministry archives that document the negotiation process from the Ottoman state's point of view. The list of individualdocumentsis very long, but the interestedreadershould look at Osmanll BBA), HR.HM;.IO 48/3, 26 October1915, doc. 36527, SublimePorteForeign BagbakanlkArgivi(hereafter, Office Legal ConsultationBureau,for an Ottomansummaryof negotiations.Thereis no shortageof literature on the ill-fated Ottomanfrigate Ertu'rul and its dispatch to Japanby Sultan AbdiilhamidII, but the most comprehensiveand accuratehistory of its disastrousvoyage is currentlybeing writtenby Michael Penn. In the meantime one must use the following studies: Stileyman Nutki, Ertu'rul FirkateyntFaciasi (Istanbul: SonrasizHattrast:Ertugrul(Tokyo:TiirkiyeCumhuriyeti Dostlug'un Bahriye, 1911); Tiirk-Nippon Matbaa-1 "Tiirk-Japon Mtinasebetlerine KisabirBakl?(1871-1945)," Takahashi, TokyoBtiytikElqiligi, 1937);Tadahisa Diinyasi AraittrmalartVakft TiUrk Dergisi 18 (June 1982): 124-48; Hee-Soo Lee, islam ve TiirkKiiltiirintin Relations: Towardsa UzakDoguya Yayilmasi(Ankara, 1988); Umut Arik, A Centuryof Turkish-Japanese Special Partnership(Istanbul:Turkish-JapaneseBusiness Council [DEIK], 1989); Arif Hikmet Fevzi and Hasane Ilgaz, ErtugrulFirkateynt:YiiziinciiYdl Armagant(Istanbul:Tiirkiye?ehitlikleri Imar Vakfi, 1990); KaoriKomatsu,Ertu rul Factast:Bir Dostlug'un Dogusu (Ankara:TurhanKitabevi, 1992); Erol Miltercimler, ErtugrulFaciast ve 21:YiizyilaDogru Tiirk-Japon ilikisi (Istanbul:AnahtarKitaplar,1993); SelpukEsenbel, "A Japanesein Istanbul:YamadaTorajiro," Bi-AnnualIstanbul (1994-95): 30-35; idem, "A Fin de Siecle Bulletin of the School of JapaneseRomanticin Istanbul:The Life of YamadaTorajiroand his TorukoGakan," Orientaland African Studies59 (1996): 237-52. demanded"favored-nation" status. Said Pasha,Hatiratim(Istanbul:SabahMatbaasi, 1912), 1:3619Japan 37. See also BBA Irade Hariciye 17599, March 1881; BBA irade Hariciye 17594, March 1881; and BBA YA.RES. 10/24, March 1881. for Ottomantreatiseson Japan'smilitary. 20See Worringer, "Comparing Perceptions," 21Thefew Japanesenationalsin Ottomanterritorywere sent home at the startof WorldWarI, when Japan declareditself on the side of the allied powers.Diplomaticrelationswere officially establishedwith the Turkish Republicin 1924, years afterthe empire had collapsed. 22TheOttomanreportmentionedearlier(BBA Ottomanskepticismtoward HR.HM;.?1O48/3) expressed Japanesepolitical motives in noting thatJapanhad obtainedcapitulatory privilegesin Siam throughthe use of in Bangkok. To preventthe same threatto Ottoman gunboatdiplomacy afterfirstestablishingan ambassador sovereignty,Ottomanofficials sought to conclude a treaty that would not grantJapan any special status or treatment. al23See "Da'awat al-YabanIla al-Islam,"al-Manar, 13 November 1905, 709; "al-Islamwa al-Yaban," 'Alam al-Islami, 6 July 1906, 1-2; ibid., 13 July 1906, 2; "Japonya'da islamiyet,"Balkan 29 (2 September 1906): 1. The Islamistpress outsideIstanbultook a stronginterestin the 1906 Conferenceof Religions hosted by Japanand speculatedon the possibility that Japanwould select Islam as its "official religion."Mehmed discussion Islam,"Dogru Siz 8 (27 June 1906): 1-2, was a particularly Ubeydullah's"Japonya'da threatening of the implicationsfor AbdiilhamidII's regime should this happen. 24Thepolitical activistandTatar Muslimexile fromRussiaAbdiirregid ibrahimescortedat least one Japanese operativeand supposedconvertto Islam, "BrotherOmer"Yamaoka,throughoutthe empire in 1910 while he was ostensibly making the pilgrimageto Mecca: see KojiroNakamura,"EarlyJapanesePilgrims to Mecca," Reportof the Societyfor Near Eastern Studies in Japan 12 (1986): 47-57. Yamaokaand Ibrahimstoppedin manyurbancentersto speakin CUP clubhouseson the expansionof the Islamic faithin Asia (includingJapan) andto promotePan-Asiansolidarity:see "al-Yaban wa al-Islam," al-Muqtabas(al-Ummah),18 February1910, Haci OmerYamaoka Mustakim 1;and"Japonyah Efendi," 4, 81 (1910): 53-56. ibrahim,a prolificwriter,
Strat-t
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edited and wrote extensively in severaljournalsof his experiencesin Japan.His travelmemoirs, The Islamic Worldand the Spread of Islam in Japan (Alem-i Islam ve Japonya'daIntigar-1 Islamiyet), 2 vols. (Istanbul: Ahmed Saki Bey Matbaasi, 1328/1910-11), vividly depict his journey through Asia. See also the modern Turkishtranslation: MehmetPaksu,ed., 20. Asrin Badlarindaislam Diinyast ve Japonya'da islamiyet, 2 vols. (Istanbul:Yeni Asya Yaymnlan, 1987). He also publishedpolitical pamphlets,including a translationof a text 1912). by a Japaneseconvertto Islam, Hatano,calledAsia in Danger (Asya Tehlikede)(Istanbul: Sebilfirregat, Formore information on ibrahim'slife andwritings,see Hisao KomatsuandKaoriKomatsu(trans.),Japonya: Bir TatarMiisliimaninseyrettifi Meiji devrinde Japonya [Esas Eser: Abdiirrelid Ibrahim,Alem-i islam ve Japonya'da intigar-i islamiyet] (Tokyo: Daisan Shokan, 1991); Nadir Ozbek, "Abdfirregid ibrahim (18571944): The Life and Thoughtof a Muslim Activist" (M.A. thesis, Bogazici University, 1994); Nadir Ozbek, Ibrahim(1),"Toplumsal Tarih ismail Tiirkoglu,SelpukEsenbel, andHayrettinKaya,"OzelDosya: Abdfirregid 4, 19(1995): 6-28; SelcukEsenbel, NadirOzbek,ismail Tiirkoglu,FrangoisGeorgeon,andAhmetUqar,"Ozel Ibrahim(2)," ToplumsalTarih4, 20 (1995): 6-23. See also "Japonya'da 'Daito' Mecellesi Dosya: Abdfirregid ve 'AsyaGi Kai' CemiyetininBeyannamesi"(The 'GreaterAsia' Journalin Japanand the Asia Defense Force Society's Mission Statement),Sirat-tMustakim6, 133 (1911): 42-44. in a local contextbecause the ascendantpowerto be 25Egyptis a clear case of the global patternreproduced resisted was a Westernoccupier who did not identify readily with the non-EuropeanJapanese,althoughthe 1902 Anglo-Japanesealliance linked the countriespolitically.The Egyptiannationalistpress thrivingin Cairo used the Japanideal to demandthe evacuationof British occupying forces and to follow what was defined as a naturalpath toward independentEgyptian nationhood, the bases of which were universal education, constitutional government, and a national identity grounded in local Egyptian heritage. Mustafa Kamil's WataniPartyandal-Liwa' newspaper,AhmadLutfial-Sayyid's UmmahPartyand mouthpieceal-Garida,and othersdifferedon the means to achieve nation-state statusbut agreedthatJapanwas the model to emulate.See Worringer, Perceptions," "Comparing chap. 7, for Muslim and Christian perspectiveson Japanas a patternfor Egyptian nationhood. 26See Ahmed Riza, "Turquieet Japon,"MechveretSupplementFrangais 149 (15 March 1904): 1-3. He encouragedhis readersto look to the Far East as an example of patriotism,imploringthem to revolt against the "treachery and depravity" inflicted on the empire by "thiscursedregime." 27SultanAbdiilhamidII issued this indictmentconcerning the misfortunesof the empire:"[t]he principal factorwhich pushesourstateinto a catastrophe is the intriguingof the greatpowers.... Wecould haverepeated the much-praisedprogressof the Japanese,if we, too, were allowed peace for only ten years, at least. They are fortunatepeople comparedto us, for they are at a distance from the claws of the Europeansand live in our tent is pitched at the crossroadsof the Europeanhyenas":Ali Vehbi Bey, Sultan security.Unfortunately, from Engin Akarli,"TheProblemsof External Abdiilhamid, Siyasi Hatiratim,(Istanbul,1974), 99, translation Pressures,Power Struggles, and BudgetaryDeficits in OttomanPolitics under AbdiilhamidII (1876-1909): the sultan's Originsand Solutions"(Ph.D. diss., PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,N.J., 1976), 75. Alternatively, multinational "Ido not know subjects,not Europe,were to blamefor Ottomanadministrative mismanagement: how appropriate it is to compareOttomanlands to Japan,to expect success from this Sultansimilarto thatof thatEmperor!Japanis a countryof islands, tuckedaway on one side of the Pacific Ocean;it is a great society, ethnically integrated,uni-religious,uni-national.If there is any region in the world that it does not resemble, it is our wretchedcountry.How could I have reconciled the Kurdand the Armenian,the Greek and the Turk, the Arab and the Bulgar?....Never at any time did [the] Mikado come up against such obstacles and never did Japanconfront such difficulties."Ismet Bozdag, Abdiilhamid'inHatira Defteri: Belgeler ve Resimlerle of this 1917 comment. (Istanbul:KervanYaymlarl,1975), 116-17. I also consulted Akarli'stranslation 28"Myeyes look aroundat the systems thathave been favoredby the nations who have accepted a constitutional administration and have adaptedall nationalendeavors,in short, the military,education,commerce, and industry,to conformto the requirements of modern-daycivilization, and far in front I see Japan.... Here we have a beautifulexample":Hiiseyin Cahit, "IslahatNereden Ba?lamall?" Tanin,14 August 1908, 1. 29PertevBey (Demirhan),Rus-JaponHarbindenAllnan Maddi ve Manevi Dersler ve Japonlarmn Esbab-t Bir Milletin Tali'i Kendi Kuvvetindedir! (Materialand Moral Lessons Takenfrom the RussoMuzafferiyeti: JapaneseWarand the Reasons for Japan'sVictory:A Nation's Good FortuneIs in Its Own Power!) (Istanbul: Kana'atKitiuphane ve Matbaasl,1911), 140. 30HiiseyinCahit, "Japonya'nnMisali," Tanin,1 September1911, 1. 31 The master of ceremonies at a CUP-sponsoredconference in Istanbul"sur la Renaissance du Japon" summedit up in 1911: "[w]e representedup to the revolutionof July 1908 the most distressingspectacle that
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history has ever recorded.Alone, the powerful voice of a handfulof patriotscame to awakenus out of our lethargy.... Since the [CUP] has restoredour humandignity, an immense longing escapes all chests toward the conquestof right, liberty,and the dignity of mind .... Thanksto the laudableinitiativeand the impulse of citizens finally conscious of theirduties .., .to strivetowarda similargoal, to reach the same ideal: elevate the homeland,heal its injuries,make war on ignorance,give citizens full possession of theirjudgment, the full exercise of their faculties, assure foreverthe freedom of thoughtand the liberty to write; broaden,in a word, the intellectualand morallevel of people and thus prepareour dearTurkeya rightrevenge, thatis to say, open for it a greater,more fertile, and moreglorious future": M. Salih Gourdji'spostscriptin Comte Leon Ostrorog, Confirence sur la Renaissancedu Japon (Istanbul:Ahmed Ihsan, 1911), 86-91. 32SirEdwardGrey to Lowther,privatecorrespondence,London, FO 800/184A and 185A, 13 November 1908 (Grey Papers),as quoted by Feroz Ahmed in MarianKent, ed., The Great Powers and the End of the OttomanEmpire(London:George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 13. At the time, Riza was an elected deputy for Istanbuland presidentof the chamber;Nazim was secretary-general of the CUP. 33Ahmeddescribes Young Turk intentions as "convertingthe Empire from the status of a semi-colony controlledand exploited by the EuropeanPowers, to a sovereign capitaliststate, exploiting its own imperial resourcesfor its own benefit":Kent, GreatPowers, 12. 341n1914, the implicationshifted to militarycapability.In "Orientfor the Orientals," Hakikat Terctiman-1 of the NearEast"as the same Ottomanexertionof strengthin the MiddleEastduringwartime described"Japan thatthe Japanesehad shown in seizing the opportunity to consolidatetheirposition in East Asia: as quotedby Ahmed in Kent, GreatPowers, 16-17. 35BBAHR.MTV23/36, 4 September1909, andMiguel to BethmannHollweg, 11 April 1910, Auswlirtiges Amt, ImperialGermanForeign MinistryPapers,Tuirkei162, vol. 7, no. 124, U.S. National Archives, T139, roll 395: "Confidential.It was broughtto my knowledge confidentiallythat, according to the GrandVezir, the Turkishgovernment intended to employ in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a much larger number of GeneralStaff Officerswith languagecapabilityat the embassies and consulates.The officersshall temporarily leave the army and will wear civilian dress. Japanhas had very good experiences with this practice. The plan, alreadyconsideredin Kamil Pasha's time has been taken up again now. After discussions between the WarMinister and Finance Minister,the following decision has been reached: 'The War Ministrywill name capable and suitable officers for the [diplomatic] missions. If there is a vacant position in an embassy or consulate,either an officer is nominatedfor this position, or as it happensin Japan,the vacantposition is left unfilled until the appropriate military personnel can be selected to do so in accordancewith the execution of this policy.' The GrandVezir has requestedan official memorandum on this from the Ministryof Foreign Affairs." 36BBA MV 169/3, 16 September1912. YeniGazete, 8 September1908; AbdullahCevdet, "Bir Mektub-uHakikatbeyan," Yeni 37"SiyasiFikirler," Tasvir-iEfkar257 (16 February1910): 1, in M. tSikriiHanioglu,Bir Siyasal DiistiniirOlarak:Doktor Cevdet ve D6nemi (Istanbul,1981), 190. See also "al-Dawlaal-'Uliyya wa al-Yaban," al-Liwa', 15 September1904, min al-Warad" 1; and "Tariq al-Liwa', 17 September1904, 1. Misali," 1. 38HiiseyinCahit, "Japonya'nin Both point out the Ottomanstate 39See Deringil, Well-Protected Domains, and Fortna,"IslamicMorality." view of foreign missionaryschools in the empire as threateningto Ottomansolidarity. 401.Hitomi, Dai-Nippon le Japon: essai sur les moeurs et les institutions(Paris: Libr. de la Societ6 du Recueil generaldes lois et des arrets,1900). Translation by Riza, ms. 6166, sultan'sprivatecollection, Istanbul were devotedto statisticson Japanese UniversityManuscript Library,1901. The finalpages of the manuscript naval and army forces in 1897 and on Japan'sschools in 1896. Asker 1324 41Forexample, the militaryofficerAli Fu'ad wrote in "Aksa-yl?ark Harbinden Dersler," Alihnan (1908-09): 168, thatthe Japanese"resembleOttomanswith regardto theiruntempered virtues, characteristics, and warlikeinclinations." 42The Ottomanarmy officer Pertev Bey (Demirhan)comparedthe Japanese samuraicode of honor, the Confucian-basedBushid6, to the Ottoman soldier's gaza in the name of Islam, noting that Japaneseritual suicide (harakiri) to serve a master and Muslim martyrdom(sehadat) for a cause defined Japanese and Ottomanmorality,respectively.The modernexpressionsof these actions were in service to the nation. See his Rus-JaponHarbinden, 100-101. Malumat, 12 July 1900, 3. 43See, for example, JaponyalllarnTa'lim ve Terbiyesi," 44See Hanioglu, YoungTurksin Opposition,7-23, on the YoungTurks'ideological roots.
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45Abdtilhamid II was aware of it, too. "I have heard on good authoritythat when the Sultan's officers congratulatedhim on the defeat of his old enemy Russia, he replied that he did not by any means consider the result of the war a matterof congratulation, because he and the Czar were the only autocraticmonarchs in Europe,and the defeat of the Czarmeant a blow to the principleof autocracy": in Sir CharlesEliot, Turkey Europe(London:EdwardArnold, 1908), 426. 46"Hubb 3 (1 March 1904): 3. min til-Imanve Japonya-Rus Seferi,"Sura-ytiUmmet fil-Vatan in Opposition,32, describestheirphilosophyas "originally'scientific,'materialist, Turks 47Hanioglu,Young See also Social Darwinist,elitist, and vehemently anti-religious;it did not favorrepresentative government." for a Revolution(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 2000). Hanioglu's more recentPreparation 48"Thehumanraces may be divided into four groups: 1) the primitiveraces; 2) the inferiorraces; 3) the averageraces;4) the superiorraces .... Among the averageraces, we shall place the Chinese,the Japanese,the peoples can be classed among the superior Mongolians, and the Semitic peoples.... Only the Indo-European races.... It is to them that is due the high level reachedby civilisation at the present day":Gustave Le Bon, ThePsychology of Peoples, repr.ed. (New York:G. E. Stechert, 1924), 26-27. 49The Young Turksextracteda class argumentfrom Le Bon's writingsin which elite membersof society made decisions for the ignorantmasses. Parliamentwas a dangerousprospect, as it deliveredpower to the uneducated. 50Berkes, Development ofSecularism337-46. He identifiedIslamistsas: (1) Cemiyetiilmiye-i islamiye, who published Beyaniil-Hak,including Mustafa Sabri (Seyhtil-islam c.1918-23); (2) the MuhammadenUnion's Dervi? Vahdeti(who published Volkan)and BediiizzamanSaid Nursi; and (3) the Islamic modernistswhose ideas were expressed in Strat-iMustakim(Sebiliirresat),including Mehmed Akif (Ersoy) and Musa Kazim. Turkistswere those who published articles in journals such as GenCKalemler, including Ziya Gokalp and Turkicexiles from Russia. Berkes points out on page 345 that "[t]he pan-Turkists[emigrantsfrom Russia] or even Islamists.On the understanding therewas a substantial could be Westernists of nationalityparticularly, andGokalp'sTurkism.Forthe first,nationalitymeantrace;for the second, differencebetween the pan-Turkists it meant culture." 51Islamwas useful for mobilizing the populace against a despotic Sultan AbdiilhamidII or an imperialist West: see Hanioglu, Preparationfor a Revolution,289-311 (esp. 308), for thoroughanalysis of the Young Turks'political ideas. He shows the differencebetween propaganda producedfor public consumptionand the real ideological positions of membersin the movement. 52Ibid.,295-302. See Hanioglu's earlier article, "The Young Turksand the Arabs before the Revolution of 1908," in The Origins of Arab Nationalism,ed. Rashid Khalidi,Lisa Anderson,MuhammadMuslih, and Reeva S. Simon (New York:Columbia University Press, 1991), 31-49, for several CUP members' private views of the Arabspriorto 1908. 53Some Young Turks emphasized the challenge of the "yellow race" to Europeansbefore 1908; mention of a distinctly Turkishrace in comparisonto the Japaneserace became more frequentafter 1910. See the CUP-sponsoredConfirence sur la Renaissance du Japon (1911), cited earlier;Kaya Alp, ed., "Japonya Yeni Hayat,"GenVKalemler2 (2 July 1911): 93-95; ibid., 2 (9 August 1911): 123-24; ibid, Imparatorlugu: 2 (23 August 1911): 143; C. Tahsin, "JaponSanaatiAvrupa'yaIstila Edecek Mi?" Resimli Kitap 39 (April 1912): 216. 54Berkes,Developmentof Secularism,361: "TheJapanesecase of borrowingEuropeansciences and techniques was the Islamists' favoriteexample. All believed that the Japaneseknew what to imitate and borrow and what to reject and retain. The view that JapaneseBuddhism was almost identical with the 'real' Islam was even echoed in a myth currentamong the people."Berkes cites Halil Halit's article"Avrupa TalebeIzami Sirat-tMustakim89 (1910). Hakkinda," 55Vahdeti's version of Ottomanmodernitycombined patrioticlove of homelandwith strongfaith in Islam. In "(Ote, beri,"Volkan1 (17 April 1909): 2, he writes, "Come heroes!Let us unite. Let us assume the strength of characterof early Islam, let us be a noble people like the Japanese." Ne Olacak?"Volkan1 Volkan1 (23 February1909): 4; "StizilleStiziile Bakahim Haziramiz," 56"Siyasiyat-i (28 February1909): 5; and "YagmaYok,"Volkan1 (26 March 1909): 1. Volkan1 (19 February1909): 1. 57See his "Seyhtil-islamHazretlerine," Volkan1 (13 February1909): 2. 58See "Sura-yliUmmet," Vahide,BediiizzamanSaid Nursi: TheAuthorof the Risale-i Nur (Istanbul:Siozler 59Quotedfrom Sitikran The Case of Publications, 1992), 58. See also Serif Mardin,Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: BediiizzamanSaid Nursi (New York:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1989), 85-86.
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fromMehmed 60Berkes, Developmentof Secularism,342-43, cites "Sermonfrom the StileymaniyePulpit," Akif Ersoy,Asim, vol. 4, of collected poems Safahatwrittenin 1919 (Istanbul,n.d). Supposedly,the reciterof the poem, AbdfirrelidIbrahim,was to have hurriedfrom Indiaback to Turkeyupon news of the reinstatement of the constitution,only to find Ottomanpoliticians squabblingover the place of Islam in society. See also a translation,"The Secret of Progress,"in Fahir Iz and Nermin Menemencioglu, ed., The Penguin Book of Turkish Verse(Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1978), 177. Bir Tecriibe-i 61Muhammad islam Hakkinda (Said Halim), Kalemiye(Istanbul,1918), 10, as quoted inhitat-t349. in Berkes,Developmentof Secularism, 62MusaKazim, Sirat-tMustakim,vol. 7, 1908, as quoted in Berkes, Developmentof Secularism,360. 63EdhemNejat, "Japonya'da Sirat-iMustakim6 (April 1327/1911): 107: "[w]henthe Japanese Mektepler," to takea step towardprogress,they paid attentionfirstlyto schools andto nationaleducation.... Japan's started schools give serious considerationto ethics and national morality more than anything else. In the schools, national education, adopted as a basis and mixed with the preferredpractices of the West, is given with regardto childrenwho will take the futureinto theirhands." extraordinary Otuzuncu Sene-yi Devriye Merasimi," Sebiliirregat 11 (November 64Ahmed Miinir, "Dartil-Fiinunun celebrationof WasedaUniversity,where he attendedschool. Miinir 1329/1913): 219-20, on the anniversary was the son of Abdiirrelidibrahim whose education was paid for by the Japanese Black Dragon Society (Kokuryukai). 107. 65Nejat,"Japonya'da Mektepler," 66They would follow Japan, which "endeavoredto imitate Europeancivilization and its administrative Mecmuaprocedures,butaccording to theirnational character"(emphasisadded):EbtizziyaTevfik,"Japon," yi Ebiizziya,vol. 6, October-November1881, 181; emphasis added. rela67See Kayall,Arabs and YoungTurks,on "Turkification" policies and the circumstancessurrounding tions between the provincialArabpopulationand the CUP regime. 68A more thorough exploration of Japanese images in the Arabic political press of the provinces after the 1908 revolutionwill appearin my article, "Japan'sProgressReified: Modernityand Arab Dissent in the OttomanEmpire," Princeton PapersInterdisciplinary Journal of MiddleEastern Studies (forthcoming). al-Muqtataf49 (October 1916): 369. The closing remarksjustify a national 69"KayfQamat al-Yaban," mission: "[t]heTurksdisappointedour faith in them althoughwe consideredthem nearerthanthe Japaneseto progressingalong the lines of a constitutionalstate, so will the Arabscultivate[it] more thanthem if complete independenceis achieved?Thatis to say, can a mighty constitutionalArabstatearise in the ArabianPeninsula, Syria, and Iraq,and does this state include the lands of Egypt? The glory of the Arabs must be reclaimedby it; withoutthat,there will be political and social obstacles and we will not be empoweredto surmountthem." in the societal position of the woman and her relationshipto the nation's welfare was flourishing 70Interest worldwidewhen some writerspropagatedthe idea of a "superior" Japanesemoralityembodiedin the female gender.Articles appearedin Ottoman(Turkishand Arabic) and Egyptianjournalsand newspapersportraying the Japanesewoman as patriotand educatorof the next generationof Japanesecitizens, suggesting a possible course of action for women in Islamic society. Ironically,the very discourse used to supportthe claims of a subordinate group (the East, YoungTurkexiles, OttomanArabs, or Egyptians)against controlby a dominant one (Europe,SultanAbdiilhamidII, the Unionist regime, or the British) ultimatelylegitimatedthe continued that would maintainthe woman's status as managerof the household existence of an overarchingpatriarchy and teacherof children.Claimingthese tasks to be her patrioticduties to the nation,the woman's societal role was thus defined as outside of the public, political sphere.Elites' use of Japaneseimages in these discussions retainedthe subordination of women within the largerOttomanor Egyptian social frameworkseven as they statusby lifting the "veil of ignorance."See Renee Worringer, arguedto liberatethem from underprivileged as Archetype:ArabNationalistConsiderationsas Reflectedin the Press, 1887-1920," paperpresented "Japan at the Middle EasternStudies Association, 1995. This gender-related phenomenondeserves furtherstudy. 71See HarryHarootunian, History's Disquiet: Modernity,CulturalPractice, and the Questionof Everyday Life (New York:Columbia University Press, 2000), on the false classification of societies as if "East"and "West" containedcomplete uniformitiesof nations.Dipesh Chakrabarty's ProvincializingEurope(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), suggests how historians might proceed to revise the resultantassumptionsof linear development. and 72SeeEdwardSaid, Orientalism(New York:VintageBooks, 1978). Sadiq Jalal al-'Azm, "Orientalism Orientalismin Reverse,"Khamsin8 (1981): 366-67, expandedon Said's work to describea "persistent belief that there is a radical ontological difference between the natures of the Orient and the Occident--that is,
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Rende Worringer
between the essential naturesof EasternandWesternsocieties, cultures,and peoples involving ... emanations from a certain enduringOriental(or Islamic) cultural,psychic, or racial essence, as the case may be, bearHe called it a-historical,anti-human,anti-historical ing identifiablefundamentaland unchangingattributes." ontological Orientalism. 73See Roxane Haag-Higuchi,"A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japanin Some 20th CenturyIranianTexts," IranianStudies29 (1996): 71-83; AnjaPistor-Hatam, andCivilizationin Nineteenth-Century "Progress Japan: The FarEasternStateas a Model for Modernization," IranianStudies29 (1996): 111-26; R. P.Dua, TheImpact of theRusso-Japanese(1905) Waron IndianPolitics (New Delhi: S. Chand,1966);M. Krdsa,"TheIdeaof PanAsianism and the NationalistMovement in India," Archiv Orientdlni40 (1972): 238-60; T. A. Keenleyside, "NationalistIndian AttitudesTowardsAsia: A TroublesomeLegacy for Post-IndependenceIndian Foreign andNegeri:MustafaKamil's 'Rising Sun' Policy,"PacificAffairs55 (1982): 210-30; MichaelLaffan,"Watan in the Malay World,"Indonesia Circle 69 (1996): 157-75; Akira Iriye, ed., The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and CulturalInteractions(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1980); David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism(Berkeley:Centerfor South Asian Studies, 1971). 74"Me'yusOlmah Miyiz (?)"$ura-yi immet62 (24 October 1904): 1, as quotedin Hanioglu, YoungTurks in Opposition,210. 75AhmedRiza, "Lalepon d'une guerre," MechveretSupplementFrangais 169 (1 November 1905): 2. 76Theexceptions to this Pan-Eastern identificationare the BalkanChristians,who, identifyingthemselves more stronglyas Europeans,sympathizedwith Slavic, OrthodoxRussia duringthe war. 77"LeJaponporteurde flambeau," ictihad 5 (April 1905): 77. AbdullahCevdet regularlyprintedarticles aboutJapanin Iqtihad. Ahval-i ACti Dede-i Nakfi-Mevlevi, Terciime-iHali III, 78Agi Dede IbrahimHalil, Risale-i Terciime-i IstanbulUniversity Library,852 foll., mss. TY80 (3511-12), 348, 360. From CarterFindley, OttomanCivil A Social History (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1989), 184. Officialdom: Balkan 30 (4 September1906): 2. The article is translatedfrom the Russianpaper Tiirkler," 79"Japonlarla Videmstand reprinted from Vakit. 80"Al-Imbaraturani al-Mutaharibani," al-Hilal, 1 March 1904, 334. al-Ahram,5 October 1904, 1. 81'AtaHusni, "al-Nahdaal-Sharqiyya," al-'Asali, "Nazrafi al-Sharq," 82Shukri al-Muqtabas,25 July 1910. 83See Hideaki Sugita, "Japanand the Japaneseas Depicted in ModernArabic Literature," Studies of Comparative Culture27 (1989): 21-40; and Worringer, "ComparingPerceptions,"for more informationabout Japan'simage in popularliterature. 84Thisis reminiscentof Chinese nationalistswho found themselves spatiallyshiftedto a "periphery" in the late 19th centuryafter discovering that their notion of China's primacyin the world as the Middle Kingdom had been destabilized, the political-economiccenter having now become Europe. See Rebecca Karl, Secret Sharers: Chinese Nationalismand the Non-Western Worldat the Turnof the Twentieth Century(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, Durham,N.C., 1995), and idem "CreatingAsia: China in the Worldat the Beginning of the TwentiethCentury," American Historical Review 103 (1998): 1096-1118. China found this a crowded periphery,misnamed"Asia"(non-Asians were to be found there, as well). In this space Chinese nationalists came to a new understanding of themselvesandthe modernworldin associationwith othersof the "non-West." Chinachose to stay in the non-Westernsphere. 85See Stefan Tanaka,Japan's Orient: RenderingPasts into History (Berkeley: University of California reformulationof Asia as Toyoshi,a new configurationin which Press, 1993), for Japan'slate-19th-century Japanwas separatedfrom a now-backwardChina, or Shina. The journalistand educatorFukuzawaYukichi coined phrasesdescribingJapanas having "left Asia" to "enterthe West." 368-69, characterizesthis as ontological Orientalismin reverse in that "the 86Al-'Azm, "Orientalism," Orientalistessentialisticontology has been reversedto favourone specific people of the Orient... provingthe of the Orientalmindoverthe Occidentalone."Partha describesthe attempt as ontologicalsuperiority Chatterjee is imitativein thatit acceptsthe value of the standards set by the alien culture.But it deeply contradictory: "[li]t also involvesrejection... of the alien intruder anddominator who is neverthelessto be imitated... andrejection of ancestralways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marksof identity":see ParthaChatterjee, Nationalist Thoughtand the Colonial World(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1986), 2. 'Ali, "Mustaqbal al-Sharq," 87Muhammad al-'Irfan, 5 October 1910, 401.

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"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the near East"?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"Eastern" ethicsandmoralitywerepresumedto havebeenpreserved Japan'sfundamental

"Sick Man of Europe" or "Japan of the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

228 Rene~e Worringer

"SickMan of Europe"or "Japanof the Near East'?

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