Withdraw of EDMS Notification - State V Kirk Riley Levin - Fecr012239

E-FILED 2013 MAR 11 9:28 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
E-FILED 2013 MAR 11 9:35 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, Vs. MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant,
Case No. FECR 012239
COMES NOW the defendant in the above captioned matter, and hereby requests the court for a continuance of the trial in this matter, and in support thereof states as follows: 1. The defendant is charged by way of Trial Information with Murder in the 1st Degree and Kidnapping 3rd Degree. 2. There is extensive discovery material yet to be turned over to the defendant. The defendant has requested additional time to complete depositions, and file pretrial motions by separate motion. 3. The defendant needs additional time to complete his review of the discovery material and prepare a defense in this case. 4. The attorneys for the State have been contacted and they do not resist a continuance of the trial in this matter if Speedy Trial is waived. 5. It is in the interest of justice to continue the trial in this matter. 6. The defendant has signed a waiver of his Speedy Trial rights and separately filed that document.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned respectfully requests that the trial date in the above-referenced case be continued to a date mutually agreed upon by the parties and the Court.
____________/S/_______________________ CHARLES J. KENVILLE AT0004187 State Public Defenders Office 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140; Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: ckenville@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
E-FILED 2013 MAR 13 4:16 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY ______________________________________________________________________________ STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. : : : : : : : : :
CRIMINAL NO. FECR012239
ORDER GRANTING JOINT RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY
KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________ This matter has come before the Court on the Joint Application for Reciprocal Discovery. The Court, having examined the file and being advised that both parties agree to the Joint Application for Reciprocal Discovery, hereby ORDERS that the State shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph the following: a. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State (unless the same shall have been included in the minutes of evidence); b. The substance of any oral statement made by the defendant which the State intends to offer in evidence at trial (including any voice recordings of same); c. d. The defendant's prior criminal record, as is then available to the State; Items seized by the State in connection with the alleged crime, and where appropriate, subject to scientific tests; e. Any books, papers, documents, statements, photographs or tangible objects which are within the possession, custody or control of the State, and which are material to preparation of his defense, or are intended for use by the State as evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belonged
to the defendant; f. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the State; g. Any police reports prepared by law enforcement officers which concern the investigation of the charges presently pending against the Defendant. The State is not required to disclose any document, statement, report or witness to be used in its rebuttal case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall allow the State to do the following: a. Inspect and copy books, papers, documents, statements other than those of the accused, photographs or tangible objects which are not privileged and are within the possession, custody or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at trial; b. Inspect and copy the results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant in which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when such results or reports relate to his testimony; c. Inspect and copy any reports by defense investigator(s) (excluding investigator's personal assessment of witness' credibility) which concern the investigation of the charges presently pending against the Defendant for only those witnesses the defense intends to call at trial. If the
investigator provides an oral report, then the defense will provide the State with a written summary of said oral report.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither the State nor the defense is required to disclose any tangible item to be solely used at trial as demonstrative evidence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that it is a continuing duty of both parties to disclose additional evidence that is subject to discovery under this Order.
Copies to: Charles J. Kenville Ben Smith Douglas D. Hammerand
State of Iowa Courts Type: Case Number FECR012239 OTHER ORDER Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) So Ordered
Electronically signed on 2013-03-19 13:43:42
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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. FECR012239 ) vs. ) ) KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ORDER ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ STATE OF IOWA,
The Defendant has filed a Motion to Continue the trial. He has also filed a Waiver of Speedy Trial. IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that pursuant to discussions with the Court Administrators office, the trial in this matter is rescheduled until Monday, June 3, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., in the Sac County Courthouse in Sac City, Iowa. Because the EDMS system is just commencing in Sac County, the attorneys are requested to mail a paper copy of all motions filed through the EDMS Sac County system to the undersigned judge at: Judge Tim Finn, Story County Courthouse, 1315 South B Avenue, Nevada, IA 50201.
Clerk to provide copies to: Ben Smith SAC COUNTY ATTORNEY Douglas D. Hammerand ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL Charles J. Kenville PUBLIC DEFENDER Court Administrator
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E-FILED 2013 MAY 03 8:45 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND REQUEST FOR PRE-TRIAL HEARING Case No. FECR 012239
COMES NOW the Defendant, through his attorney, Charles J. Kenville, and pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.12, the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, hereby requests that the Court enter an Order suppressing all statements of the defendant as being improperly obtained by the State. In support thereof the following is stated: 1. The defendant is charged by way of Trial Information with Murder in the 1st Degree, a Class A felony, and Kidnapping in the Third Degree, a Class C felony. Trial in this matter is currently scheduled for June 3rd, 2013, in the Iowa District Court for Sac County. 2. Any statements by the defendant to the police were given in violation of the defendants rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. 3. The defendants statements should be suppressed due to a violation of the rules set forth in Miranda and its progeny. The defendant was detained by police. The defendant was not free to leave this encounter and had his actions controlled. Miranda safeguards become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279 (1983)). [A] court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 557-58 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 298 (1994) (citations and internal quotation omitted)).
4.
The defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning was allowed to continue. The interrogating officers ignored the defendants request for counsel and proceeded to question him at length.
5.
The officers used improper interrogation techniques to induce the defendant to speak to them. The officers promised leniency to the defendant. Further, an officer cannot tell a subject what advantage is to be gained or is likely to be gained from making a confession. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d at 28 (citing State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 1982)).
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Any waiver of rights given by the defendant was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntary made.
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Any statements made by the defendant as a result of any unwarned or improper questioning should be considered tainted and excluded from trial in this matter. WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests, after hearing on this
matter, that the Court suppress and exclude from trial all statements of the defendant in the above captioned matter that were obtained in violation of the Defendants constitutionally protected rights.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, ____________/S/________________ Charles Kenville AT0004187 Office of the Public Defender 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140 Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: ckenville@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant.
STATES RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Case No. FECR012239
COMES NOW, the State of Iowa and in support of its resistance asserts the following: 1. On May 3, 2013, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress asking the Court to suppress statements he made to law enforcement following his January 3, 2013, arrest. Specifically, defendant argues questioning was allowed to continue after defendant invoked his right to counsel and the officers used improper techniques to induce the defendant to speak to them. (Def.s Mot. to Suppress pp. 1-2) 2. On January 3, 2013, defendant was arrested for kidnapping Jessica Vega. Following his arrest, before ever being interviewed, Detective Erritt read defendant his Miranda rights (Ex. 1, Video of Def.s First Interview at 11:04:30 Mins.; Ex. 2, Transcript of First Interview, pp. 1-2) 1 and defendant verbally acknowledged his understanding of the same. (Ex. 1 at 11:05:21 Mins.) After being read his Miranda rights, defendant signed the written Miranda waiver form waiving his right to counsel. (Ex. 3, Rights Waiver Form, Ex. 1 at 11:06:16 Mins.) Ten minutes into his first interview, defendant made the following ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney: I might (inaudible) myself a lawyer. (Ex. 1 at 11:18:33 Mins.; Ex. 2, p. 10). 2 3. Before beginning defendants second interview, law enforcement again read defendant his Miranda rights. After being read his Miranda rights for a second time, defendant again acknowledged he understood his Miranda rights (Ex. 4, Video of Def.s Second Interview at 02:22:23 Mins.) and responded in the affirmative when
1 The transcript of the second interview, which is identified herein as Exhibit 5, was provided in discovery as two documents (defendants second interview part one and part two); Exhibit 5 combines parts one and two. 2 The defendants first interview began at 11:04 a.m. and went to 12:41 p.m. The defendants second interview began at 2:21 p.m. and went to 5:02 p.m.
asked by Detective Koontz whether it was okay for the officers to talk to, and ask defendant questions (Ex. 4 at 02:22:49 Mins.) 3 4. "The request for counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal". State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Iowa 2009), citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1994) Further, questioning need not cease if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel." Id. 5. In State v. Morgan, the Iowa Supreme Court determined the defendants statement, I think I need an attorney, prior to an attempt to administer a polygraph examination, fell short of an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1997) 6. The undersigned does not know how any statement can be unambiguous or unequivocal when it begins with the qualifier might. (Ex. 1 at 11:18:33 Mins.; Ex. 2, p. 10) 7. The defendant also contends his statements should be suppressed because the officers used improper interrogation techniques to get defendant to talk to them; specifically, defendant argues the officers promised defendant leniency. (Def.s Mot. to Suppress p. 2) However, the officers statements to defendant did not go beyond urging defendant to tell the truth and the officers never promised defendant directly or impliedly a lesser sentence or any favorable treatment if defendant talked to the officers. In fact, more than once, the officers told defendant they could not make him any promises. (Ex. 2, p. 16; Ex. 5, pp. 45, 49) 8. There is no law that prohibits the police from establishing rapport with a
suspect. A statement to a criminal suspect that implies empathy or understanding for the suspect does not amount to improper inducement or coercion. State v. Jennett, 574 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997)
3 The second reading of defendants waiver of rights was not captured by the transcriptionist because she was provided a copy of the video recording missing the first two minutes. Exhibit 4 is a copy of the complete recording of defendants second interview, which includes the first few minutes of defendants second interview, wherein defendant is read, and waives his Miranda rights.
9. An officer can ordinarily tell a suspect that it is better to tell the truth. State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 1982) 10. [A]n offer to recommend psychiatric help or an offer to inform the prosecutor of defendant's cooperation [is not] tantamount to a promise of leniency. State v. Whitsel, 339 N.W.2d 149, 153-54 (Iowa 1983) 11. In conclusion, the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and at no time did defendant invoke his right to, or request counsel. Moreover, the officers questioning techniques were within the bounds of what is constitutionally permissible. WHEREFORE, the State requests that the Court deny the defendants Motion to Suppress for all the reasons stated above.
/s/ Benjamin John Smith Benjamin John Smith - AT0008834 Sac County Attorney Sac County Courthouse 100 NW State St., Suite 9 Sac City IA 50583 Telephone: 712-662-4791 Facsimile: 712-662-4123 Email: attorney@saccounty.org
E-FILED 2013 MAY 10 4:21 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. BRIEF SUPPORTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS No. FECR 012239
COMES NOW the Defendant, through his attorney, Charles J. Kenville, and pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.12, the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I sections 9 and 10 of the Iowa Constitution, submits to the Court the following Brief in support of the claim that the defendants statements were improperly obtained by the State: 1. The defendant is charged by way of Trial Information with Murder in the 1st Degree, a Class A felony, and Kidnapping in the Third Degree, a Class C felony. 2. A short time after the interview begins, at approximately 11:18:35 (according to the time stamp on the video) the defendant makes a statement that he might [want/need] myself a lawyer. The audio is hard to understand because of the quality of the recording and one of the officers speaks over the defendant. The officers ignore the statement and the interview continues. 3. The inquiry best framed by asking whether a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1994). 4. In the dissenting opinion in Effler, Justice Wiggins states: In determining whether the State has violated a person's federal constitutional rights, a reviewing court cannot simply analyze a few words out of context and search for ambiguity
through linguistic acrobatics. As anybody who speaks the English language knows, just about any word, or group of words, in isolation, may be made to look ambiguous. Thus, under Davis, the court must askwhether a reasonable police officer, in light of the circumstances, would believe that a suspect unequivocally requested the assistance of counsel. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 891 (Iowa 2009) 5. The defendants statement, when taken in context, is an unequivocal request for an attorney. He clearly identifies that he could be in legal jeopardy if the interview continues, there are long pauses where he does not speak to the officers or respond to their questions, and his general demeanor and body language are highly suggestive that he does not want to continue to speak to the officers. 6. The Iowa Constitution should be interpreted more strictly than the United States Constitution was in Davis. Even if the Court determined that the request was ambiguous the officers should have clarified the ambiguity rather than ignore the statement altogether. Justice Appel in his dissent in Effler points out that the Iowa Supreme Court has been willing to forge its own course on state constitutional interpretation. Justice Appel stated: A question lurking behind this case is whether this court would today follow the approach of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), in interpreting the Iowa Constitution. In Davis, a bare majority of the United States Supreme Court decided that law enforcement had no obligation to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel made by an accused in custody after he had provided a valid waiver of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d at 37172. The majority declined to adopt the
position advocated by the Department of Justice and other law enforcement authorities that when a suspect ambiguously requests a right to counsel, law enforcement must ask clarifying questions with the sole purpose of resolving the ambiguity. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d at 373. Justice Appel further questions the validity of State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1997), which relied upon Davis but was decided before the Iowa Supreme Court routinely distinguished between State and Federal Constitutional claims, stating: I question Morgan's continued vitality. Morgan is a conclusory opinion with no analysis of the underlying issue. It rests solely upon the authority of Davis, a 54 decision. Further, it was decided at a time when this court routinely adopted federal constitutional precedent as a basis for decisions under the Iowa Constitution. The officers should have clarified the defendants statement if there was any ambiguity as to whether he wanted counsel. WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests the Court suppress and exclude from trial all statements of the defendant in the above captioned matter that were obtained in violation of the Defendants constitutionally protected rights. __________/S/_______________ Charles J. Kenville AT0004187 Office of the State Public Defender 706 Central Avenue Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140 Fax: (515)576-8365 ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ) ) ) Crim. Case No. FECR012239
ORDER
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________
The State and the Defendant have filed a Joint Application for Reciprocal Discovery. The Joint Application for Reciprocal Discovery is APPROVED by the Court. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville
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ORDER
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________
The Defendant has filed a Motion for Change of Venue. The motion is not resisted. The Court has been advised that the State will not resist the motion. After being informed of the underlying facts, the Motion for Change of Venue is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that trial in this matter shall commence in Fort Dodge, Webster County, Iowa, at 9:00 a.m. on June 3, 2013.
Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville Sac County Clerk of Court Webster County Clerk of Court Court Administrator
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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL WITNESSES AND ADDITIONAL MINUTES OF TESTIMONY Case No. FECR012239
COMES NOW the undersigned Prosecuting Attorney and pursuant to the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure hereby gives Notice of Additional Witnesses and Minutes of Testimony in support of the Trial Information previously filed here in: 1. The expected testimony of the witnesses named in the List of Additional Witnesses filed herein are contained in the Additional Minutes of Testimony and Attachments A, B, and C, all of which are also filed herein, but are filed as secure attachments as required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2. Substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced by the attached Additional Minutes of Testimony. 3. A wholly new and different offense is not being charged. 4. This Addition to the Minutes of Testimony is in the interest of justice.
/s/Benjamin John Smith Sac County Attorney, Benjamin John Smith AT0008834 Sac County Courthouse 100 NW State St., Suite 9 Sac City IA 50583 Telephone: 712-662-4791 Fax: 712-662-4123 Email: attorney@saccounty.org
Original filed EDMS, copies to: Public Defender, Charles Kenville Attorney Doug Hammerand Attorney Generals Office Ben Smith, Sac County Attorney Judge Timothy Finn
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, CRIMINAL CAUSE NO. FECR012239 Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. NAMES OF ADDITIONAL WITNESSES: SABRINA SEEHAFER, Criminalist, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation MIKE TATE, Criminalist, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation KARL FRANZENBURG, Criminalist, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation RICHARD CRIVELLO, Criminalist, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation KATHLEEN KINSETH, Evidence Technician, Iowa DCI KERI DAVIS, Evidence Technician, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation JOHN KRAEMER, State Medical Examiner Investigator, Iowa Office of the SME TONY HINNERS, Funeral Director, Farber and Otteman Funeral Home SUSAN CROOKHAM, Certifying Scientist, National Medical Services EDWARD SCHMITT, Father of Marilyn Schmitt SANDRA SCHMITT, Mother of Marilyn Schmitt MOLLY HENEMAN, Sister of Marilyn Schmitt KIEL PLOEN, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt CHRISTIAN SCHRAMM, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt TERRY BRUNS, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt LIST OF ADDITIONAL WITNESSES
JIM OBRIEN, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt DON ORTNER, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt DONNA JOHNSON, Co-Worker of Marilyn Schmitt DOUG REIS, Owner / Operator Reis Brothers Service Station RICK MEYER, Employee, Alta Body Shop TAMMI NIERLING, Jail Supervisor, Buena Vista County Jail TIM SPEERS, Father of Jessica Vega MATT LEVIN, Father of Defendant JACKIE MONTANGE, Special Agent, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation LAURA MYERS, Special Agent, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation PHILLIP KENNEDY, Special Agent, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation CHET HARTWELL, Peace Officer, Storm Lake Police Department DAVE DOEBEL, Lieutenant, Storm Lake Police Department TODD ERSKINE, Assistant Chief of Police, Storm Lake Police Department MARK PROSSER, Chief of Police, Storm Lake Police Department KRISTAN ERSKINE, Deputy, Sac County Sheriffs Office GENESIS AGUILAR, Sister of Jessica Vega
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. COMES NOW the defendant, through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Iowa, the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Code of Iowa, hereby requests that this Court order the State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, to refrain from offering any argument, statement, question or reference, either directly or indirectly, any of the matters hereinafter set forth: 1. The State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, should be barred from offering evidence or testimony not properly noticed in the Minutes of Testimony. The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial that the defendant has court appointed counsel or is represented by the Public Defenders Office. The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial that the investigators from the Iowa D.C.I. investigate or assist in investigating serious or major cases or use other language that could improperly prejudice the defendant or bolster the credibility of the witness. The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial about the Defendants alleged character until that matter is placed in issue by the Defendant. The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial about any alleged prior bad acts by the Defendant. In addition to the general bar on this testimony the Court should exclude testimony of alleged prior crimes by the defendant. Further, the Defendant requests that this Court order the State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, to refrain from introducing any evidence related to allegations of uncharged or unproven criminal conduct. Such evidence is irrelevant, inherently untrustworthy, and would only be offered to inflame the passions of the jury or misled the jurors so Case No. FECR 012239 MOTION IN LIMINE
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as to prompt them to convict the defendant for reasons other than the evidence relating to the current charge. 6. The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial about any prior criminal convictions of the Defendant that are outside the scope of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.609(a)(2). In a criminal case the accused faces the acute prejudicial risk that if he is impeached with a similar prior conviction, then the jury may assume the defendant's guilt because he previously committed a similar crime. State v. Harrington, 800 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa 2011), quoting State v. Hackney, 397 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa 1986). The State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, should be barred from offering statements that would violate the defendants right to confrontation. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007). The Jury should not be told at any time by any party or witness in any form at any stage of the trial that any person in this case is a "victim". A person can be a victim only after the jury in this case makes a finding that a crime has been committed. It is an improper opinion, invades the decision making process of the jury, and unfairly prejudicial to Defendant for any person at any stage of this trial prior to the jury verdict to call or refer to any person as the "victim". The Defendant requests that this Court enter an order prohibiting the State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, from introducing excessive or cumulative copies of photographs from the scene of the alleged crime scene and from the autopsy performed in this case. The probative value of the evidence listed in paragraphs one through nine is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See Iowa Rule of Evidence 403. The State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, should be barred from offering any testimony, evidence, or exhibit, or from making any legal argument that would misstate the burden of proof in this case. The Defendant requests that this Court enter an order prohibiting the State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, from introducing any evidence regarding the
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physical or psychological effect of the alleged crime on any individual, including, but not limited to, any testimony that could be considered as victim impact or appealing to the emotion of the crime alleged. 13. The State and its counsel, witnesses, and agents, should be barred from making any statement, comment, or argument that is intended to inflame the passions of the jury or misled the jurors so as to prompt them to convict the defendant for reasons other than the evidence introduced at trial and the law as contained in the courts instructions. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876-77 (Iowa 2003); State v. Werts, 677 N.W.2d 734, 739 (Iowa 2004).
FURTHER the defendant requests a pre-trial hearing for determination of the admissibility of said evidence if tendered by the State. The defendant further asks the Court to instruct the aforesaid individuals by appropriate order to refrain from making any such motion, reference, argument, or interrogation without first approaching the Bench and obtaining a ruling from the Court. The Court should further order that any argument as to the admissibility of any of the evidence set out below should be made outside of the presence of both prospective jurors and those jurors who are sworn to hear this case.
__________/S/___________________ Charles J. Kenville, (AT0004187) 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140; Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: ckenville@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, PLAINTIFF, VS. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, DEFENDANT. Case No. FECR 012239
SECOND MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
COMES NOW the Defendant in the above captioned matter, through the undersigned attorney, and pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(10) hereby requests a Change of Venue. In support of this Motion the defendant states as follows: 1. The defendant is charged by way of Trial Information with Murder in the 1st Degree, a Class A felony, and Kidnapping in the Third Degree, a Class C felony. 2. Trial in this matter is currently scheduled for June 3rd, 2013, in the Iowa District Court for Webster County located at the Webster County Courthouse in Fort Dodge, Iowa. 3. Venue was previously moved from Sac County to Webster County by Order of the Court dated May 14th, 2013. 4. Since the date of the Order changing venue in this case, events have occurred in Webster County which make it impossible for the Defendant to be given a fair trial. Specifically, a kidnapping and possible homicide of a young woman in Dayton, Webster County, Iowa occurred and has been extensively reported by local media. 5. Given the nature and circumstances of the allegations against the defendant it is unrealistic to think the jury will not be improperly influenced by the recent events in their county of residence. 6. Some of the potential jurors that have been selected for the term covering this matter are from or live within a few miles of Dayton. 7. Venue must be changed to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial.
WHEREFORE the defendant respectfully requests this matter be set for hearing, and after fully considering the issues in this Motion, the Court grant the defendants request to have venue changed in this case. __________/S/___________________ Charles J. Kenville, (AT0004187) Attorney for the defendant 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501
Telephone: (515) 573-1140; Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: ckenville@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. STATES RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANTS SECOND MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE Case No. FECR012239
COMES NOW the State of Iowa and resists defendants second motion for change of venue. The State respectfully requests that the Court deny defendants motion in its entirety following the May 31, 2013, hearing on the same.
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. STATES RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANTS SECOND MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE Case No. FECR012239
COMES NOW the State of Iowa and resists defendants second motion for change of venue. The State respectfully requests that the Court deny defendants motion in its entirety following the May 31, 2013, hearing on the same.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK R LEVIN ,
Case No: 02811 FECR012239 EXHIBIT LIST Pretrial Motions May 31, 2013 Presiding Judge: Timothy J. Finn
Defendant.
The following exhibits were offered and admitted by the Court at the hearing as shown above: Defendant's A - Photograph B - Photograph C- Newspaper D - Newspaper E- Newspaper F- Newspaper G - Newspaper H - Newspaper I - Newspaper J- Newspaper K- Newspaper L - Newspaper
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) EXHIBIT LIST So Ordered
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ORDER
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________
The Defendant filed a Second Motion for Change of Venue which came on for hearing before the Court on May 31, 2013. Defendant offered evidence consisting of a billboard in Fort Dodge referencing a missing teen in the Fort Dodge area (Exhibit A); a notice endangered missing concerning Kathlynn Shepard which was posted at a Hy-Vee Store in Fort Dodge (Exhibit B); and exhibits consisting of the front page, Fort Dodge Messenger, on May 21, May 22, May 23, May 24, May 25, May 26, May 27, May 28, May 29, and May 30, 2013 (Exhibits C L). All of these stories were in reference to a teenage girl who is still missing and who is believed to have been kidnapped along with another teenage girl who escaped. These events occurred recently in Webster County. Defendant argues there are some similarities between that incident and the facts of this case. In view of this publicity and similarity, the Defendant argues it is impossible for him to get a fair trial in Webster County. The State resists the application. The State argues there are enough factual differences between the two cases that a jury in Webster County would not be prejudiced. The State also claims there is not any factual support for the claim that it will be impossible to select a fair jury in Webster County. After reviewing the matter, the Court determines that the Second Motion for Change of Venue should be denied. If, during the jury selection process of this case, it develops
that there are problems in fact in selecting a fair and impartial jury in Webster County, the Court will review this decision and, if necessary, change the venue in the case. However, based on the evidence presented, as well as in the exercise of its discretion, the Court at this time cannot say that it is impossible or even unlikely that the Defendant can obtain a neutral jury in Webster County. IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THE COURT as follows: 1. The Second Motion for Change of Venue is DENIED. 2. Jury trial in this matter shall commence at 9:00 a.m. on June 3, 2013, in the Webster County Courthouse in Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville Court Administrator Webster County Clerk of Court
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RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________
On May 3, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion for Change of Venue. The Court dealt with the Motion for Change of Venue in a separate order. The State filed its Resistance to the Motion to Suppress on May 8, 2013. Trial is currently scheduled in this matter for June 3, 2013. The Defendant has been charged in a Trial Information with the crimes of Murder in the First Degree and Kidnapping in the Third Degree. He has entered pleas of not guilty. This matter was submitted to the Court by way of stipulation. The parties stipulated that the Court should rule on the Motion to Suppress based on its review of the following: (1) contents of the court file, (2) two DVDSs (Exhibit 1 and 4) of the interview of the Defendant by police officers, (3) Exhibits 2, 3, and 5 which are transcripts of the contents of the two DVDs (Exhibits 1 and 4) and Exhibit 3 which is a copy of a document entitled Statement of Rights, Acknowledgment and Waiver of Rights purportedly signed by the Defendant at 11:05 a.m. on January 3, 2013. Both sides have submitted briefs. In his motion to suppress, the Defendant raises several separate issues: (1) He claims that any waiver of rights given by him was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made; (2) he claims he invoked his right to an attorney but that the police illegally continued to question him; and (3) that the police used improper interrogation techniques to induce the
Defendant to speak with them, including promises of leniency or statements about what he could gain from making a confession. Statement of Facts On January 3, 2013, Kirk Levin was arrested for kidnapping Jessica Vega. Police Detective Erritt read Defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant Levin verbally acknowledged his understanding of the same, and then Levin also signed a written Miranda waiver form waiving his right to counsel. The interview with the officer continued until the Defendant made a statement: I might (inaudible) myself a lawyer. (Exhibit 1 at 11:18:33 minutes.) At that point, Officer Koontz and Levin were talking: KOONTZ: LEVIN: KOONTZ: LEVIN: KOONTZ: LEVIN: What happened with Jessica? I dont know what happened, why it happened. Whats that? I dont know why it happened. Well, tell me what happened. I dont think it is smart for me to do that. I might (inaudible) myself a lawyer.
The questioning of the Defendant continues for a significant period of time thereafter and then is recommenced several hours later. A transcript of that interview is marked as Exhibit 5. At the beginning of the second interview, law enforcement officers again read Levin his Miranda rights. Mr. Levin again acknowledged he understood his rights and responded affirmatively when Defendant Koontz asked whether it was okay for the officers to talk to and ask him questions.
The Court has watched the videotapes of both interviews and has reviewed the transcripts which were offered. In his motion to suppress, Defendant argues that at the time of these interrogations, he was detained by the police. This is a fact which is not in dispute. He was not free to leave and his actions were controlled by the police. The critical issue for the Court to determine is the legal implication of Defendants assertion that the Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning was allowed to continue. The interrogating officers ignored the Defendants request for counsel and proceeded to question him at length. Again, there is no dispute that after the statement set forth above (I might (inaudible) myself a lawyer) that the interrogation continued. Additionally, a second interrogation was held later. That second interrogation, however, was also preceded by the police officer again reading the Defendant his Miranda rights and Defendant consenting to the interview. The Defendant made no similar statement about a lawyer at any other point during this interview. A second issue raised by the motion to suppress is the allegation that the officers used improper interrogation techniques to induce the Defendant to speak to them. The officers promised leniency to the Defendant. Further, an officer cannot tell a subject what advantage is to be gained or is likely to be gained from making a confession. See, State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2005). A final issue raised by Defendant is that any waiver of rights by Defendant was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Request for an Attorney The request for counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 886 (Iowa 2009). See, also, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1994). Questioning need not cease if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right of counsel. Id. In State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1997) the Iowa Supreme Court held that the defendants statement I think I need an attorney prior to an attempt to administer polygraph examination, fell short of an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. As stated above, there is no doubt that this interrogation took place at a time when the Defendant was arrested and when he was not free to leave the interrogation. His freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. However, the first issue before the Court is whether or not the statement made by the Defendant rises to the level of an unequivocal or unambiguous request for counsel. Based on the standards enunciated by the Iowa Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court finds that the statement I might (inaudible)1 myself a lawyer does not rise to the level of being an unambiguous and unequivocal request for a lawyer. Indeed, it is very similar to the statement in State v. Morgan where the Iowa Supreme Court specifically found that the statement I think I need an attorney fell short of an unequivocal invocation of
1 The person who transcribed the tape put (inaudible) in that transcript. The Defendant in his Brief claims the Defendant stated [want/need] a lawyer. Defendant may be correct, but what the Defendant actually said is subject to dispute.
defendants right to counsel and refused to suppress defendants statement. See, Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at 603. In State v. Effler, the Iowa Supreme Court held (by operation of law, in a split decision) that a somewhat similar statement concerning an attorney was not sufficient to suppress subsequent statements made by the Defendant in their interrogation. Defendant, however, cites Justice Wiggins dissenting opinion in Effler for the following proposition: In determining whether the State has violated a persons federal constitutional rights, a reviewing court cannot simply analyze a few words out of context and search for ambiguity through linguistic acrobatics. As anybody who speaks the English language knows, just about any word, or group of words, in isolation, may be made to look ambiguous. Thus, under Davis, the court must ask whether a reasonable police officer, in light of the circumstances, would believe that a suspect unequivocally requested the assistance of counsel.
Defendant also cites the dissent of Justice Appel in Effler in pointing out that the Iowa Supreme Court may forge its own course on state constitutional interpretation. He cites the following language: A question lurking behind this case is whether this court would today follow the approach of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), in interpreting the Iowa Constitution. In Davis, a bare majority of the United States Supreme Court decided that law enforcement had no obligation to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel made by an accused in custody after he had provided a valid waiver of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d at 371-72. The majority declined to adopt the position advocated by the Department of Justice and other law enforcement authorities that when a suspect ambiguously requests a right to counsel, law enforcement must ask clarifying questions with the sole purpose of resolving the ambiguity. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d at 373.
There has been a number of recent Iowa Supreme Court decisions which are reviewing and changing long-held criminal law standards based on an interpretation of the Iowa Constitution. See, State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 2000); State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 2008); and State v. Bolden, No. 10-0214, April 19, 2013, Iowa Supreme Court. As a result, what was formerly essentially black letter law is now less certain. The Iowa Supreme Court has not reviewed a case with this specific language while engaged on its current emphasis on reviewing constitutional criminal law in view of the Iowa Constitution. What course the Court will take in this particular case is somewhat difficult to ascertain. However, in view of the fact that language similar to the language invoked by the Defendant here has historically been held, both in federal and state courts, to be inadequate to invoke the requirement that the police stop their interrogation, this Court is of the same opinion here. Defendant does not state that he will not talk any longer without a lawyer. He does not state that he wants a lawyer. He appears to state that he might need a lawyer but does not reassert this claim at any other place in the hours of interrogation which follow. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that it is a fair interpretation of the current state of criminal law in Iowa to find that the continued interrogation of the Defendant was not violative of his Miranda warnings or constitutional rights. For that reason, this portion of the Defendants motion to suppress is denied. 2. Did the Officers Use Improper Interrogation Techniques? Defendant next asserts that the interrogating officers used improper interrogation techniques to induce Defendant to speak to them. They claim the officers promised leniency. Defendant implies that the officers suggested it would be in his advantage to make a confession.
First of all, the Court has reviewed the interrogation and finds no such improper statements. Secondly, a more accurate summation of what the officers talked to the Defendant about was simply to urge him to tell the truth. The Defendant fails to point out and the Court cannot find any specific places where the officers either directly or implicitly promised Defendant more favorable treatment or a lesser sentence in return for making a statement. In fact, the officers specifically told Defendant on several occasions they could make him no such promises. As stated in State v. Gennett, 574 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa App. 1997): There is no law that prohibits the police from establishing rapport with a suspect. A statement to a criminal suspect that implies empathy or understanding for the suspect does not amount to improper inducement or coercion. An officer can ordinarily tell a suspect that it is better to tell the truth. State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 1982). Finally, if the interrogators make an offer to recommend psychiatric help or an offer to inform the prosecutor of defendants cooperation [such is not] tantamount to a promise of leniency. State v. Witsel, 339 N.W.2d 149, 153-54 (Iowa 1983). 3. Was Defendants Waiver of his Rights Knowingly, Intelligently, or Voluntarily Made?
Here, the Defendant was read his Miranda warnings on two occasions. On one occasion he actually signed a written consent and waiver to those rights. On the second occasion, which was a relatively short period of time later, he was again read the Miranda warnings and consented to proceed with the interrogation. The Defendant has offered no evidence to support his claim that Defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waive his rights. It appears to the Court he did. Unless the Court is willing to create a presumption that all defendants lack such capacity, based on the evidence here, the Defendant has failed to establish this. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Motion to Suppress is OVERRULED. Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville
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E-FILED 2013 JUN 04 8:09 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
E-FILED 2013 JUN 04 8:09 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
E-FILED 2013 JUN 06 2:16 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
2RCR04 IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK R LEVIN , Defendant.
Case No. 02811 FECR012239
COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM AND CERTIFICATE
COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM (The court reporter shall file this memorandum with the district court clerk.) Appearances: For the State: Ben Smith and Doug Hammerand For the Defendant: Charles Kenville Other: Information required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903(3): I, Pamela J. Hayes, am providing the following information as required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903(3): 1. The type of proceeding that was reported: Pretrial Motions and Criminal Jury Trial 2. The date(s) on which the proceeding occurred: May 31, June 3, 4, 5, and 6, 2013 3. The name of the court reporter who reported the proceeding: Pamela J. Hayes 4. The name of the judge who presided over the proceeding: Timothy J. Finn 5. The reporting fee for the proceeding: $200.00 (5 Days total) 6. We, the undersigned judge before whom the above-entitled case was tried, and the official court reporter who, by order of the Court, reported the same, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is the report of the whole proceedings upon the trial and/or hearing of the above-entitled cause made and taken pursuant to the order and direction of the Court, in accordance with Iowa Code Section 624.10. /s/ Pamela J. Hayes ___________________________________ District Court Reporter
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM AND CERTIFICATE So Ordered
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IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK R LEVIN ,
Case No: 02811 FECR012239 EXHIBIT LIST Criminal Jury Trial June 3, 4, 5, and 6, 2013 Presiding Judge: Timothy J. Finn
Defendant.
The following exhibits were offered and admitted by the Court at the hearing as shown above: State's 1 - Belt 2 - Knife Handle 3 - Knife Blade 4 - Yellow Rope from Roadway 5 - Defendant's Sweatpants 6 - Defendant's Sweatshirt 7 - Defendant's Gray T-Shirt 8 - Defendant's Socks 9 - Defendant's Boxers/Briefs 10 - Defendant's Handwritten Statement 11 - Photograph 12 - Photograph 13 - Photograph 14 - Photograph 15 - Photograph 16 - Photograph 17 - Photograph 18 - Photograph 19 - Photograph 20 - Photograph 21 - Photograph 22 - Photograph 23 - Photograph
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24 - Photograph 25 - Photograph 26 - Photograph 27 - Photograph 28 - Photograph 29 - Photograph 30 - Photograph 31 - Photograph 32 - Photograph 33 - Photograph 34 - Photograph 35 - Photograph 36 - Photograph 37 - Photograph 38 - Photograph 39 - Photograph 40 - Photograph 41 - Photograph 42 - Photograph 43 - Photograph 44 - Photograph 45 - Photograph 46 - Photograph 47 - Photograph 48 - Photograph 49 - Photograph 50 - Photograph 51 - Photograph 52 - Photograph 53 - Photograph 54 - Photograph 55 - Photograph 56 - Photograph 57 - Photograph 58 - Photograph 59 - Photograph 60 - Photograph 61 - Photograph 62 - Photograph 63 - Photograph 64 - Photograph 65 - Photograph 66 - Photograph 67 - Photograph 68 - Photograph 69 - Photograph 70 - Photograph 71 - Photograph 72 - Photograph
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73 - Photograph 74 - Photograph 75 - Photograph 76 - Photograph 77 - Photograph 78 - Photograph 79 - Photograph 80 - Photograph 81 - Photograph 82 - Photograph 83 - Photograph 84 - Photograph 85 - Photograph 86 - Photograph 87 - Photograph 88 - Photograph 89 - Photograph 90 - Photograph 91 - Photograph 92 - Photograph 93 - Dr. Thompson's CV 94 - Autopsy Report 95 - Photograph 96 - Photograph 97 - Photograph 98 - Photograph 99 - Photograph 100 - Photograph 101 - Photograph 102 - Photograph 103 - Photograph 104 - Photograph 105 - Photograph 106 - Photograph 107 - Photograph 108 - Photograph 109 - Photograph 110 - Photograph 111 - Photograph 112 - Photograph 113 - Photograph 114 - Photograph 115 - Photograph 116 - Photograph 117 - Photograph 118 - Photograph 119 - DVD of Crime Scene 120 - DVD of 1st Interview 121 - DVD of 2nd Interview
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Defendant's A- Photograph
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) EXHIBIT LIST So Ordered
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2013.1111!--! M1I0--I6IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL NO. FECR012239
By Trial Information filed in this Court, the State of Iowa charges that on or about the 3
rd
day of January, 2013 in Sac County, Iowa, the Defendant, Kirk Riley Levin,
committed the crimes of: Count I - Murder in the First Degree. The offense of Murder in the First Degree
has within it the lesser included offenses of Murder in the Second Degree, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Involuntary Manslaughter. Count II - Kidnapping in the Third Degree. The offense of Kidnapping in the Third
Degree has within it the lesser included offense of False Imprisonment. The Defendant has entered pleas of not guilty to the charges contained in the Trial Information. You have been impaneled and sworn to resolve the fact issues generated by
the charge and the Defendant's denial.
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 Defendant, Kirk Riley Levin, has entered pleas of not guilty. The pleas of not guilty
are a complete denial ofthe charges and placed the burden on the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I instruct you the State must prove something, it If the State does not prove the
must be by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict must be not guilty.
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 The Trial Information is the document that formally charges the Defendant with the crimes and is merely the method by which the Defendant is brought into Court for trial. is not evidence. INSTRUCTION NO. 3 Kirk Riley Levin is presumed innocent and not guilty. This presumption of It
innocence requires you to put aside all suspicion which might arise from the arrest, charge, or the present situation ofthe Defendant. The presumption of innocence remains with
the Defendant throughout the trial unless the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 You must determine the Defendant's guilt or innocence from the evidence and the law in these instructions. You must consider all ofthe instructions together. ofthe applicable law. No one instruction includes all
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 Nothing I have said or done during the trial was intended to give any opinion as to the facts, proof, or what your verdict should be.
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 You shall base your verdict only upon the evidence and these instructions. Evidence is: 1. 2. Testimony in person or by deposition. Exhibits received by the Court. You may examine the exhibits closely, but be
careful not to alter or destroy them.
If you handle an exhibit that has been chemically
treated, or which has blood on it, outside of its plastic package, use the latex gloves I have provided. 3. Stipulations, which are agreements between the attorneys.
Facts may be proved by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. Sometimes, during a trial, references are made to pre-trial statements and reports, witnesses' depositions, or other miscellaneous items. Only those things formally offered Documents or
and received by the Court are available to you during your deliberations.
items read from or referred to, which were not offered and received into evidence, are not available to you. The following are not evidence: 1. 2. 3. 4. Statements, arguments, questions and comments by the lawyers. Objections and rulings on objections. Any testimony I told you to disregard. Anything you saw or heard about this case outside the courtroom.
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 In considering the evidence, you make deductions and reach conclusions according to reason and common sense. evidence, or both. Facts may be proved by direct evidence, circumstantial
Direct evidence is evidence from a witness who claims actual Circumstantial evidence is evidence about a The law makes no Give all the evidence
knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.
chain of facts which show a Defendant is guilty or not guilty.
distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. the weight and value you think it is entitled to receive.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 Decide the facts from the evidence. Consider the evidence using your Try to reconcile any conflicts in the
observations, common sense, and experience.
evidence; but if you cannot, accept the evidence you find more believable. In determining the facts, you may have to decide what testimony you believe. You may believe all, part or none of any witness's testimony. There are many factors which you may consider in deciding what testimony to believe, for example: 1. believe. 2. 3. of facts. 4. The witness's interest in the trial, his or her motive, candor, bias, and prejudice. Whether a witness has made inconsistent statements. The witness's appearance, conduct, age, intelligence, memory, and knowledge Whether the testimony is reasonable and consistent with other evidence you
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 During the trial, you have been allowed to take notes. you to the jury room to use in your deliberations. evidence. You may take these with
Remember, these are notes and not
Generally, they reflect the recollection or impressions of the evidence as
viewed by the person taking them, and may be inaccurate or incomplete. Upon reaching a verdict, leave the notes in the jury room, and they will be destroyed.
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 You have heard testimony from persons described as experts. Persons who have
become experts in a field because of their education and experience may give their opinion on matters in that field and the reasons for their opinion. Consider expert testimony just like any other testimony. reject it. You may accept it or
You may give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the
witness's education and experience, the reasons given for the opinion, and all the other evidence in the case.
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 In this case the Defendant has decided not to testify. The Defendant is not The burden of
required to testify, and no inference of guilt shall be drawn from that fact. proof remains upon the State to prove the guilt of the Defendant.
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 The duty ofthe jury is to determine if the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. In the event of a guilty verdict, you have nothing to do with punishment.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 If there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree ofthe crime, the Defendant shall only be convicted ofthe degree for which there is no reasonable doubt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 The Defendant has been charged with two counts. bringing each ofthe charges to trial. This is just a method for
If you find the Defendant guilty or not guilty on any
one ofthe two counts, you are not to conclude the Defendant is guilty or not guilty on the other. You must determine whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty separately on
each count.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 When two or more alternate theories are presented, or where two or more facts would produce the same result, the law does not require each juror to agree as to which theory or fact leads to his or her verdict. It is the verdict itself which must be unanimous,
not the theory or facts upon which it is based.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 Evidence has been offered to show that the Defendant made statements at an earlier time and place. If you find any of the statements were made, then you may consider them as part of the evidence, just as if they had been made at this trial.
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 The burden is on the State to prove Kirk Riley Levin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one that fairly and naturally arises from the evidence in the case, or from the lack or failure of evidence produced by the State. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense and not the mere possibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would make a Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be
reasonable person hesitate to act.
proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it. all possible doubt. If, after a full and fair consideration of all the evidence, you are firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt, then you have no reasonable doubt and you should find the Defendant guilty. But if, after a full and fair consideration of all the evidence in the case, or from the lack or failure of evidence produced by the State, you are not firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt and you should find the Defendant not guilty. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
To commit a crime a person must intend to do an act which is against the law. While it is not necessary that a person knows the act is against the law, it is necessary that the person was aware he was doing the act and he did it voluntarily, not by mistake or accident. of his acts. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 The law provides that a person commits Murder in the First Degree when that person, with the specific intent to kill another person, willfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with malice aforethought, kills another person. The definitions of certain terms used in this and following instructions are as follows: 1. "Malice" is a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act to It may be
the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an evil or unlawful purpose.
established by evidence of actual hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. It may be found from the acts and conduct ofthe Defendant and the means used Malice requires only such deliberation that
in doing the wrongful and injurious act.
would make a person appreciate and understand the nature ofthe act and its consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion. 2. "Malice aforethought" is a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to It does not have to exist for any
another which exists before the act is committed. particular length of time.
It is sufficient if it exists any time before the killing.
Malice aforethought may be inferred from the Defendant's use of a dangerous weapon. 3. 4. reflect. 5. 6. "Premeditate" is to think or ponder upon a matter before acting. "Specific intent" means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it "Willful" means intentional or by fixed design or purpose and not accidental.
I
"To deliberate" is to weigh in one's mind, to consider, to contemplate, or to
voluntarily but, in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind. Because determining the Defendant's specific intent requires you to decide what he was thinking when the act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 (Continued) should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the Defendant's specific intent. the natural results of his acts. 7. A "dangerous weapon" is any device or instrument designed primarily for use You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends
inflicting death or injury, and when used in its designed manner is capable of inflicting death. It is also any sort of instrument or device actually used in such a way as to indicate
the user intended to inflict death or serious injury, and when so used is capable of inflicting death. Deliberation and premeditation need not exist for any particular length of time before the act. If a person has the opportunity to deliberate and uses a dangerous weapon against another resulting in death, you may, but are not required to, to infer that the weapon was used with malice, premeditation and specific intent to kill.
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 Count I The State must prove all of the following elements of Murder in the First Degree: On or about the 3 day of January, 2013, the Defendant stabbed and/or strangled Marilyn Schmitt.
2. 3. 4.
rd
Marilyn Schmitt died as a result of being stabbed and/or strangled.
i
The Defendant acted with malice aforethought. The Defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with specific
intent to kill Marilyn Schmitt. If the State lias proved all of the elements, the Defendant is guilty of Murder in the First Degree. If trie State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Defendant is not
guilty of Murder in jthe First Degree, and you will then consider the charge of Murder in the Second Degree, exp ained in Instruction No.21.
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 Count I The State must prove all of the following elements of Murder in the Second Degree: 1. On or about the 3 day of January, 2013, the Defendant stabbed and/or strangled Marilyn Schmitt. 2. 3. Marilyn Schmitt died as a result of being stabbed and/or strangled. The Defendant acted with malice aforethought.
rd
If the State has proved all ofthe elements, the Defendant is guilty of Murder in the Second Degree. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Defendant is
not guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, and you will consider the charge of Voluntary Manslaughter, as explained in Instruction No. 25.
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 Murder in the Second Degree does not require a specific intent to kill another person. INSTRUCTION NO. 23 Concerning element No. 2 of Instruction Nos. 20 and 21, the wounds inflicted by the Defendant resulted in the death of Marilyn Schmitt if it caused or directly contributed to the death of Marilyn Schmitt.
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 Count I The State must prove all of the following elements of Voluntary Manslaughter: 1. On or about the 3 day of January, 2013, the defendant stabbed and/or strangled Marilyn Schmitt. 2. 3. Marilyn Schmitt died as a result of being stabbed and/or strangled. The stabbing and/or strangulation were done solely by the reason of sudden,
rd
violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. If the State^ has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter. Ifjthe State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Defendant is
not guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, and you will then consider the charge of Involuntary Manslaughter as charged in Instruction No. 26.
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 Concerning element number 3 of Instruction No. 24, a "serious provocation" is conduct that wou d cause a reasonable person to have a sudden, violent and irresistible passion. Passion is not sudden, violent, and irresistible if there is an interval of time during which a reasonable person would, under the circumstances, have time to reflect and bring his passion under control and suppress the impulse to kill. Words alone, however abusive or insulting, cannot be serious provocation.
INSTRUCTION NO. 26 Count I The State must prove all of the following elements of Involuntary Manslaughter: 1. On or about the 3 day of January, 2013, the Defendant recklessly stabbed and/or strangled Marilyn Schmitt. 2. 3. The Defendant did act in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury. By doing the act, the Defendant unintentionally caused the death of Marilyn
i
rd
Schmitt. If the State has proved all of the elements, the Defendant is guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Defendant is not guilty of Count
INSTRUCTION NO. 27
A person is "reckless" or acts "recklessly" when he willfully disregards the safety of persons or property. unintentional injury. It is more than a lack of reasonable care which may cause Recklessness is conduct which is consciously done with willful
disregard of the consequences and a person knows or should know a risk of harm to another is created. Though recklessness is willful, it is not intentional in the sense that
harm is intended to result.
INSTRUCTION NO. 28 COUNT I I The State must prove all of the following elements of Kidnapping in the Third Degree: 1. On or about the 3rd day of January, 2013, the defendant confined and/or removed Jessica Vega from one place to another. 2. The Defendant did so with the specific intent to: a) b) 3. subject Jessica Vega to sexual abuse; or secretly confine Jessica Vega
The Defendant knew he did not have the consent or authority of Jessica Vega to do so.
If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty.
If the State has
failed to prove any one ofthe elements, the Defendant is not guilty of Kidnapping in the Third Degree, and you will consider the charge of False Imprisonment, as explained in Instruction No. 32.
INSTRUCTION NO. 29 Concerning element number 1 of Instruction No. 28, confinement or removal requires more than what is included in the commission ofthe crime of sexual abuse. A person is "confined" when her freedom to move about is substantially restricted by force, threat or deception. The person may be confined either in the place where the
restriction began or in a place to which she has been removed. No minimum time of confinement or distance of removal is required. more than slight. sexual abuse. In determining whether confinement or removal exists, you may consider whether: 1. 2. 3. The risk of harm to Jessica Vega was increased, The risk of detection was reduced. Escape was made easier. It must be
The confinement or removal must have significance apart from the
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 Concerning element number 2(a) of Instruction No. 28, sexual abuse is defined as performing a sex act on another person by force or against the other person's will.
!
A "sex act" means any sexual contact: 1. 2. 3. 4. person. 5. By a person's use of an artificial sex organ or a substitute for a sexual organ in By penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus. Between the mouth of one person and the genitals or anus of another. Between the genitals of one person and the genitals or anus of another. Between the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or anus of another
contact with genitals or anus of another. You may consider the type of contact and the circumstances surrounding it in deciding whether the contact was sexual in nature. INSTRUCTION NO. 31 Concerning element number 2(b) of Instruction No. 28, an intent to secretly confine means more than restricting the movement of Jessica Vega. conceal or hide Jessica Vega or prevent her discovery. It means an intent to
INSTRUCTION NO. 32 Count II The State must prove all of the following elements of False Imprisonment: 1. On or about the 3 day of January, 2013, the defendant intentionally confined Jessica Vega. 2. 3. Jessica Vega was confined against her will. The Defendant did not have a reasonable belief that he had a right or authority to confine Jessica Vega. If the State has proved all of the elements, the Defendant is guilty of False Imprisonment,
: rd
the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Defendant is
not guilty of Count II.
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 When you begin your deliberations, you should select a foreperson. He or she
shall see that your ^deliberations are carried on in an orderly manner, that the issues are fully and freely discussed, and that every juror is given an opportunity to express his or her views. In order to return a verdict, each juror must agree to it. unanimous. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and reach an agreement, if you can do so without compromising your individual judgment. Each of you must decide the Your verdict must be
case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors. During your deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your view and change your opinion if convinced it is wrong. But do not change your opinion as to the weight or effect
of the evidence just because it is the opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. Rememberjyou are not partisans or advocates. facts. Your sole duty is to find the truth and do justice. You are judges-judges of the
INSTRUCTION NO. 34 Occasionally, after a jury retires to the jury room, the members have questions. I
have prepared the instructions after carefully considering the case with the parties and the attorneys. I have tried to use language which is generally understandable. Usually, If, however,
questions about instructions can be answered by carefully re-reading them. you feel it necessary to ask a question, you may do so in writing.
I cannot communicate
with you without first discussing your question and potential answer with the parties and attorneys. This naturally takes time and deliberation before I can reply.
The Court Attendant who has been working with us in this case is in the same position as I am. She has taken an oath not to communicate with you except to ask if you Please do not put her on the spot by asking any questions.
have agreed upon a verdict.
If you need to notify anyone about the time you will be deliberating, for example, a spouse, babysitter, or employer, please notify the Court Attendant in writing, or before you begin your deliberations, and we will make a phone available to you for that purpose. Finally, if you have any personal communication device such as a cellular or digital telephone or paging device, you should leave those with the Court Attendant and not take them into the jury room while deliberating.
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 I am submitting for your convenience with these instructions five verdict forms in Count I and three forms of verdict in Count II. count. Count I: If you find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree, use Form of Verdict No. 1; or If you find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, use Form of Verdict No. 2; or If you find the Defendant guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter, use Form of Verdict No. 3; or If you find the Defendant guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter, use Form of Verdict No. 4; or If you do not find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree, Murder in the Second Degree, Voluntary Manslaughter, or Involuntary Manslaughter, you will use Form of Verdict No. 5. Count II: If you find the Defendant guilty of Kidnapping in the Third Degree, use Form of Verdict No. 6; or If you find the Defendant False Imprisonment, use Form of Verdict No. 7; or If you do not find the Defendant guilty of Kidnapping in the Third Degree or False Imprisonment, you will use Form of Verdict No. 8. After you have reached your verdicts and prepared them as above-directed, you will inform the Court Attendant and return and render your verdicts in open court. You will use but one form of verdict in each
Dated this b ^day of June, 2013.
y\
THE HON/0 RABLE TIMOT/ffV J. FINN District Court Judge, Secivma Judicial District
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. CRIMINAL NO. FECR012239
i
zo
FORMS OF VERDICT - COUNT I
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FORM OF VERDICT NO. 1 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree.
Foreperson
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 2 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the Second Degree.
Foreperson
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 3 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter.
Foreperson
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 4 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter.
Foreperson
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 5 We, the Jury, find the Defendant not guilty of Count I.
Foreperson
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA
i
Plaintiff,
vs.
CRIMINAL NO. FECR012239
FORMS OF VERDICT-COUNT II KIRK RILEY LEVIN,
cn
Defendant.
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 6 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Kidnapping in the Third Degree.
Foreperson
FORM OF VERDICT NO. 7 We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of False Imprisonment.
Foreperson FORM OF VERDICT NO. 8 We, the Jury, find the Defendant not guilty of Count II.
Foreperson
ORDER
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ A jury trial was held in this matter on June 3, 4, 5, and 6, 2013 in Fort Dodge, Iowa. After deliberation, the jury found the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree on Count I and Kidnapping in the Third Degree on Count II. IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT as follows: 1. Due to the Courts schedule, sentencing in this matter shall take place in the Sac County Courthouse in Sac City, Iowa, on Friday, July 26, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. 2. Pursuant to Section 811.1(1) of the Iowa Code, the Defendant shall remain in custody and is not eligible for bail. 3. The Department of Correctional Services shall prepare and file a presentence investigation report at least 72 hours before the sentencing hearing, pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 901. The Clerk of Court shall furnish to the Department of Correctional Services a copy of the Trial Information and Minutes of Testimony. 4. The Court advises the Defendant of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3), to preserve his right of appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court based on any defect in the criminal trial referenced above.
Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville Sac County Sheriff Dept. of Corr. Serv. Court Administrator
page 2 of 2
ORDER
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ A jury trial was held in this matter on June 3, 4, 5, and 6, 2013 in Fort Dodge, Iowa. After deliberation, the jury found the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree on Count I and Kidnapping in the Third Degree on Count II. IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT as follows: 1. Due to the Courts schedule, sentencing in this matter shall take place in the Sac County Courthouse in Sac City, Iowa, on Friday, July 26, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. 2. Pursuant to Section 811.1(1) of the Iowa Code, the Defendant shall remain in custody and is not eligible for bail. 3. The Department of Correctional Services shall prepare and file a presentence investigation report at least 72 hours before the sentencing hearing, pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 901. The Clerk of Court shall furnish to the Department of Correctional Services a copy of the Trial Information and Minutes of Testimony. 4. The Court advises the Defendant of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3), to preserve his right of appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court based on any defect in the criminal trial referenced above.
Clerk to provide copies to: County Attorney Ben Smith Attorney General Doug Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville Sac County Sheriff Dept. of Corr. Serv. Court Administrator
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E-FILED 2013 JUL 16 7:02 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, VS. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, DEFENANT.
CASE NO. FECR 012239
MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
COMES NOW the Defendant, through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, hereby moves for a New Trial and/or to Arrest Judgment in this case. In support of said motion it is stated: 1. There was insufficient evidence presented to jury on the element of premeditation and deliberation. 2. The jurys verdict went against the weight of the evidence on the elements of premeditation and deliberation. 3. The Court allowed inadmissible evidence by refusing to suppress the Defendants illegally obtained statement. The Court should have granted the Motion to Suppress and prohibited the Defendants statement from being admitted into evidence. 4. The Court should have granted the Defendants second change of venue request. It was clear during jury selection that the jury was oversaturated with media coverage of the tragedy of a kidnapping and murder of a young girl in rural Webster County. The jury was obviously swayed by the emotions of that case and did not render a just verdict. WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this matter be set for hearing and for the reasons stated above that the Court set aside the jurys verdict in this case and dismiss this case or set aside the jurys verdict and set it for a New Trial. ___________/S/_____________ Charles J. Kenville Attorney for the Defendant ckenville@spd.state.ia.us Public Defenders Office 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, VS. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, DEFENANT.
CASE NO. FECR 012239
MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
COMES NOW the Defendant, through undersigned counsel, and pursuant to the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, hereby moves for a New Trial and/or to Arrest Judgment in this case. In support of said motion it is stated: 1. There was insufficient evidence presented to jury on the element of premeditation and deliberation. 2. The jurys verdict went against the weight of the evidence on the elements of premeditation and deliberation. 3. The Court allowed inadmissible evidence by refusing to suppress the Defendants illegally obtained statement. The Court should have granted the Motion to Suppress and prohibited the Defendants statement from being admitted into evidence. 4. The Court should have granted the Defendants second change of venue request. It was clear during jury selection that the jury was oversaturated with media coverage of the tragedy of a kidnapping and murder of a young girl in rural Webster County. The jury was obviously swayed by the emotions of that case and did not render a just verdict. WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this matter be set for hearing and for the reasons stated above that the Court set aside the jurys verdict in this case and dismiss this case or set aside the jurys verdict and set it for a New Trial. ___________/S/_____________ Charles J. Kenville Attorney for the Defendant ckenville@spd.state.ia.us Public Defenders Office 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501
E-FILED 2013 JUL 22 12:18 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. Case No. FECR012239

STATES RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
COMES NOW the State of Iowa through Sac County Attorney Ben Smith and resists Defendants combined Motion for Arrest of Judgment and Motion for a New Trial in its entirety (Motion). WHEREFORE, The State respectfully requests that following a hearing on the merits of Defendants Motion, the Court deny the Motion in its entirety and proceed to sentencing.

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. Case No. FECR012239

STATES RESISTANCE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
COMES NOW the State of Iowa through Sac County Attorney Ben Smith and resists Defendants combined Motion for Arrest of Judgment and Motion for a New Trial in its entirety (Motion). WHEREFORE, The State respectfully requests that following a hearing on the merits of Defendants Motion, the Court deny the Motion in its entirety and proceed to sentencing.

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ) ) ENROLLED JUDGMENT ENTRY ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ This is the time fixed for sentencing. In addition, the Defendant has filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and Motion for New Trial, which are resisted by the State. Present for the State were Benjamin Smith, Sac County Attorney, and Douglas Hammerand, Assistant Attorney General. The Defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney Charles Kenville. The Court heard the arguments of counsel on the Motion in Arrest of Judgment and Motion for New Trial. After listening to the same, the Court overrules both motions and proceeds to sentencing. The pre-sentence investigation is received by the Court. The Court is informed that counsel for the State, counsel for the Defendant, and the Defendant have had an opportunity to examine the report; and it is agreed during the course of the hearing that this report can be considered by the Court for sentencing purposes. Victim impact statements are presented. The Court hears the statements and recommendations by counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant. The Defendant is given an opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf. The Court fully complies with Rule 22 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Defendant states that he has no cause or reason why judgment should not now be pronounced against him. Crim. Case No. FECR012239
IT IS THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT, on Count I, on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, in violation of Iowa Code Sections 707.1 and 707.2(1), as follows: (1) That the Defendant should be and is hereby Ordered committed to the custody of the Director of the Division of Adult Corrections of the State of Iowa for the rest of his life. The Director shall determine the appropriate place of confinement for the Defendant, and to that end, the Medical and Classification Center at Oakdale has been designated as the reception center to which the Defendant shall be delivered by the Sac County Sheriff. The Defendant shall be given credit for all time served in custody immediately following her arrest, and to that end, the Sac County Sheriff shall certify that amount of time to the Director as well as the Sac County Clerk of Court. Mittimus shall issue immediately. (2) That the Defendant should be and is hereby required to make restitution of $150,000 as required by Iowa Code Section 910.3B to the heirs of Marilyn Schmitt, and that he reimburse the Crime Victim Assistance Division $8,675.42 and that the State is allowed an additional 30 days within which to file any supplemental pecuniary damage statements, that the Defendant pay costs of this action, and that he reimburse the state for the reasonable fees of his court-appointed attorney. The Defendants attorney is given 30 days within which to file a statement for the legal services he has provided to the Defendant. (3) All fines, surcharges, costs, and fees are due immediately and shall be considered delinquent if not paid within 30 days of todays date. IT IS THE FURTHER JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT, Count II, on the charge of Kidnapping in the Third Degree, in violation of Iowa Code Sections 710.1 and 710.4, as follows:
(4) That the Defendant should be and is hereby Ordered committed to the custody of the Director of the Division of Adult Corrections of the State of Iowa for a term not to exceed ten (10) years. The Director shall determine the appropriate place of confinement for the Defendant, and to that end, the Medical and Classification Center at Oakdale has been designated as the reception center to which the Defendant shall be delivered by the Sac County Sheriff. The Defendant shall be given credit for all time served in custody immediately following his arrest, and to that end, the Sac County Sheriff shall certify that amount of time to the Director as well as the Sac County Clerk of Court. Mittimus shall issue immediately. (5) No fine is imposed on Count II. (6) The Defendant shall submit to a DNA sample for DNA profiling pursuant to Section 81.4. (7) The sentence imposed in Count II shall run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count I. The reasons for the within sentences are contained in the verbatim record of proceedings taken by the official shorthand reporter and are incorporated by reference herein. The Defendant is informed of his right to appeal. As Count I is not a bondable offense, no appeal bond is fixed in this case.
Clerk to provide copies to: Benjamin Smith Sac County Attorney Assistant Attorney General Douglas Hammerand Defense Attorney Charles Kenville Dept. of Corr. Serv. Dir., Div. of Adult Corr. Sac County Sheriff Oakdale
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2RCR04 IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK R LEVIN , Defendant.
Case No. 02811 FECR012239
COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM AND CERTIFICATE
COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM (The court reporter shall file this memorandum with the district court clerk.) Appearances: For the State: Ben Smith and Douglas Hammerand For the Defendant: Charles Kenville Other: Information required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903(3): I, Pamela J. Hayes, am providing the following information as required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.903(3): 1. The type of proceeding that was reported: Post Trial Motions and Sentencing 2. The date(s) on which the proceeding occurred: July 26, 2013 3. The name of the court reporter who reported the proceeding: Pamela J. Hayes 4. The name of the judge who presided over the proceeding: Timothy J. Finn 5. The reporting fee for the proceeding: $40.00 6. We, the undersigned judge before whom the above-entitled case was tried, and the official court reporter who, by order of the Court, reported the same, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is the report of the whole proceedings upon the trial and/or hearing of the above-entitled cause made and taken pursuant to the order and direction of the Court, in accordance with Iowa Code Section 624.10. /s/ Pamela J. Hayes ___________________________________ District Court Reporter
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) COURT REPORTER MEMORANDUM AND CERTIFICATE So Ordered
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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ) ) ORDER ) Crim. Case No. FECR012239
Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ The Defendant was sentenced on July 26, 2013, following a hearing. The Enrolled Judgment Entry entered that day contained a mistake in that it was inconsistent with the sentence imposed in open court. For that reason, the Enrolled Judgment Entry entered through EDMS on July 26, 2013, is VACATED and the Enrolled Judgment Entry being filed today shall be substituted for the Order filed July 26, 2013. IT IS SO ORDERED.
page 2 of 2
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ) ) ENROLLED JUDGMENT ENTRY ) Defendant. ) ______________________________________________________________________________ This is the time fixed for sentencing. In addition, the Defendant has filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and Motion for New Trial, which are resisted by the State. Present for the State were Benjamin Smith, Sac County Attorney, and Douglas Hammerand, Assistant Attorney General. The Defendant was personally present and represented by his attorney Charles Kenville. The Court heard the arguments of counsel on the Motion in Arrest of Judgment and Motion for New Trial. After listening to the same, the Court overrules both motions and proceeds to sentencing. The pre-sentence investigation is received by the Court. The Court is informed that counsel for the State, counsel for the Defendant, and the Defendant have had an opportunity to examine the report; and it is agreed during the course of the hearing that this report can be considered by the Court for sentencing purposes. Victim impact statements are presented. The Court hears the statements and recommendations by counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant. The Defendant is given an opportunity to make a statement on his own behalf. The Court fully complies with Rule 22 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Defendant states that he has no cause or reason why judgment should not now be pronounced against him. IT IS THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT, on Count I, on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, in violation of Iowa Code Sections 707.1 and 707.2(1), as follows: Crim. Case No. FECR012239
(1) That the Defendant should be and is hereby Ordered committed to the custody of the Director of the Division of Adult Corrections of the State of Iowa for the rest of his life. The Director shall determine the appropriate place of confinement for the Defendant, and to that end, the Medical and Classification Center at Oakdale has been designated as the reception center to which the Defendant shall be delivered by the Sac County Sheriff. The Defendant shall be given credit for all time served in custody immediately following her arrest, and to that end, the Sac County Sheriff shall certify that amount of time to the Director as well as the Sac County Clerk of Court. Mittimus shall issue immediately. (2) That the Defendant should be and is hereby required to make restitution of $150,000 as required by Iowa Code Section 910.3B to the estate of Marilyn Schmitt, and that he reimburse the Crime Victim Assistance Division $8,675.42 and that the State is allowed an additional 30 days within which to file any supplemental pecuniary damage statements, that the Defendant pay costs of this action, and that he reimburse the state for the reasonable fees of his court-appointed attorney. The Defendants attorney is given 30 days within which to file a statement for the legal services he has provided to the Defendant. (3) All fines, surcharges, costs, and fees are due immediately and shall be considered delinquent if not paid within 30 days of todays date. IT IS THE FURTHER JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT, Count II, on the charge of Kidnapping in the Third Degree, in violation of Iowa Code Sections 710.1 and 710.4, as follows: (4) That the Defendant should be and is hereby Ordered committed to the custody of the Director of the Division of Adult Corrections of the State of Iowa for a term not to exceed ten (10) years. The Director shall determine the appropriate place of confinement for the Defendant,
and to that end, the Medical and Classification Center at Oakdale has been designated as the reception center to which the Defendant shall be delivered by the Sac County Sheriff. The Defendant shall be given credit for all time served in custody immediately following his arrest, and to that end, the Sac County Sheriff shall certify that amount of time to the Director as well as the Sac County Clerk of Court. Mittimus shall issue immediately. (5) No fine is imposed on Count II. (6) The Defendant shall submit to a DNA sample for DNA profiling pursuant to Section 81.4. (7) The Defendant is ordered to register on the Sex Offender Registry pursuant to Chapter 692A. (8) The sentence imposed in Count II shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed in Count I. The reasons for the within sentences are contained in the verbatim record of proceedings taken by the official shorthand reporter and are incorporated by reference herein. The Defendant is informed of his right to appeal. As Count I is not a bondable offense, no appeal bond is fixed in this case.
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IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY State of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. Kirk Riley Levin, Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) NOTICE OF APPEAL Case No. FECR012239
To:
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa; County Attorney; and Clerk of District Court
You and each of you are hereby notified that the above-named Defendant, does hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa from the final judgment entered herein on and all adverse rulings inhering therein.
/s/ Charles Kenville AT0004187 Office of the Public Defender 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140 Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: fortdodgepd@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT County Attorney Appellate Defender Office (Fax) Lucas Building, 4th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319 Pamela Hayes (mail) 1315 S B Ave Nevada, IA 50201
Original Filed cc: Criminal Appeals Division (mail) Attorney General of Iowa Hoover Building 1305 E. Walnut Des Moines, IA 50319 Supreme Court Clerk (mail) Iowa Judicial Branch Building 1111 East Court Avenue Des Moines, IA 50319
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY State of Iowa, Plaintiff, V. Kirk Riley Levin, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) APPLICATION FOR APPELLATE COUNSEL & TRANSCRIPT Case No. FECR012239
Defendant states: 1. 2. 3. 4. Judgment has been entered against the Defendant in the above-entitled matter. Defendant is filing a Notice of Appeal in this case. Defendant is indigent and cannot afford appellate counsel or the cost of any transcripts of proceedings in this case. The State Appellate Defender Office is designated for receive appointment on trial-court appeals.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Court allow the undersigned to withdraw, appoint the State Appellate Defender's Office, Fourth Floor Lucas Building, Des Moines, IA 50319, telephone (515) 281-8841, as Defendant's appellate counsel and order that a transcript of all proceedings in this case, if requested, be prepared and provided to Defendant's appellate counsel.
/s/ Charles Kenville AT0004187 Office of the Public Defender 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140 Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: fortdodgepd@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY State of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, V. Kirk Riley Levin, Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) NOTICE OF APPEAL Case No. FECR012239
To:
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of the State of Iowa; County Attorney; and Clerk of District Court
You and each of you are hereby notified that the above-named Defendant, does hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa from the final judgment entered herein on and all adverse rulings inhering therein.
/s/ Charles Kenville AT0004187 Office of the Public Defender 706 Central Avenue, Fort Dodge, IA 50501 Telephone: (515) 573-1140 Fax: (515)576-8365 E-mail: fortdodgepd@spd.state.ia.us ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT County Attorney Appellate Defender Office (Fax) Lucas Building, 4th Floor 321 East 12th Street Des Moines, IA 50319 Pamela Hayes (mail) 1315 S B Ave Nevada, IA 50201
Original Filed cc: Criminal Appeals Division (mail) Attorney General of Iowa Hoover Building 1305 E. Walnut Des Moines, IA 50319 Supreme Court Clerk (mail) Iowa Judicial Branch Building 1111 East Court Avenue Des Moines, IA 50319
State of Iowa Courts Type: Case Number FECR012239 CERTIFIED NOTICE OF APPEAL Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) So Ordered
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E-FILED 2013 AUG 05 10:33 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
2RCR12
STATE OF IOWA, PLAINTIFF, VS. KIRK R LEVIN , DEFENDANT. ORDER Case No. 02811 FECR012239
The Defendant has filed a notice of appeal in the above-captioned case and has requested the appointment of counsel and the furnishing of transcripts at public expense. IT IS, THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF THE COURT as follows: 1. The State Appellate Defender is appointed to represent the Defendant in the appellate proceedings in this case. 2. The transcripts of proceedings held in this case shall be provided at public expense. CLERK TO FURNISH COPIES TO: SAC COUNTY ATTORNEY CHARLES J KENVILLE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER'S OFFICE COURT REPORTERS
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) OTHER ORDER So Ordered
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E-FILED 2013 AUG 07 2:21 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, v. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. COMES NOW the State of Iowa and, to preserve and protect the respect, dignity, and privacy of the victim and the victims family, respectfully requests that the Court direct the Clerk not to upload to EDMS the following exhibits entered into evidence during the criminal trial, which contain gruesome images of the deceased victim: Exhibit Nos. 53, 54, 55, 58, 69, 70, 71, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, and 117. WHEREFORE the State respectfully requests that the Court enter an order consistent with the States request herein and for any additional or alternative relief the Court deems just and equitable under the circumstances. MOTION Case No. FECR012239
2RCR01
STATE OF IOWA, Case No. 02811 FECR012239 PLAINTIFF, vs. ORDER KIRK R LEVIN , DEFENDANT.
The State's Motion filed August 7, 2013, with respect to exhibits is SUSTAINED. The exhibits referred to in the motion shall not be posted through EDMS because of their personal and confidential nature but shall be maintained by the Clerk of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CLERK TO FURNISH COPIES TO: SAC COUNTY ATTORNEY CHARLES J KENVILLE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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State of Iowa Courts Case Number FECR012239 Type: Case Title STATE VS KIRK RILEY LEVIN (SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT JUDGE FINN) OTHER ORDER So Ordered
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E-FILED 2013 SEP 10 3:18 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
E-FILED 2013 SEP 18 11:38 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
In the Iowa District Court in and for SAC County
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff,
Criminal No. FECR012239
ORDER vs. Kirk R. Levin, Defendant THE COURT FINDS that an Amended Statement of Pecuniary Damages has been submitted to the Court; upon review of the aforementioned submission and the States Motion to Amend, The Court hereby ORDERS, pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 910, that:
[x ]
The defendant is ordered to pay restitution according to the amount stated on the Amended Statement of Pecuniary Damages. The State's motion to Amend Sentence to Include Restitution is granted. Restitution is to be paid to the Crime Victim Compensation Program in the amount of $9,320.68, unless the defendant notifies the Court of any objection to this order within ten days of today's date.
[ X]
cc: County Attorney Crime Victim Assistance Program Defense Attorney
Claim No.131158
E-FILED 2013 SEP 18 11:38 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
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E-FILED 2013 OCT 12 2:23 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
Rule 6.1401 Form 8: Reporters Certificate of Filing a Transcript. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Supreme Court No. __________ District Court No. FECR012239 (Sac County) Reporters Certificate of Filing A Transcript
__________________________________________________________________
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of August, 2013, State Appellate Defender Mark C. Smith ordered the following transcripts: Pretrial motions, jury trial, and sentencing before Judge Timothy J. Finn in Sac County, in the above-captioned matter by serving a copy of the Combined Certificate. I further certify that on the 14th day of October, 2013, I filed the following transcripts: Pretrial motions, jury trial, and sentencing in Sac County before Judge Timothy J. Finn, with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
___/s/ Pamela J. Hayes________________ Pamela J. Hayes, CSR, RMR Court Reporter Story County Courthouse 1315 South B Avenue Nevada, IA 50201 Pamela.hayes@iowacourts.gov
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies a copy of this reporters certificate was served on the 14th day of October, 2013, upon the following persons and upon the Clerk of the Supreme Court:
__/s/ Pamela J. Hayes_________________ Pamela J. Hayes, CSR, RMR Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender Attorney Generals Office, Criminal Appeals Division Sac County Clerk of Court
E-FILED 2013 OCT 12 2:23 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT
IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, ) ) Crim. Case No. FECR012239 Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ) KIRK RILEY LEVIN, ) ) NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT Defendant. ) REDACTION _____________________________________________________________________________________
AN ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN FILED IN THIS CASE ORDERED BY: Attorney Mark C. Smith BEFORE JUDGE: Timothy J. Finn DATE OF PROCEEDINGS: May 31, June 3, 4, 5, 6, and July 26, 2013 BECAUSE YOUR CASE IS, OR AT SOME POINT WILL BECOME, OPEN TO THE PUBLIC, YOU ARE REQUIRED TO REVIEW THIS DOCUMENT FOR PROTECTED INFORMATION. Refer to Division VI of Chapter 16 Rules Pertaining to the Use of Electronic Data Management System for a definition of personal information that is now considered protected by the court. DOWNLOAD THE DOCUMENT MARKED BELOW FROM THE IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH ELECTRONIC FILING WEBSITE AT www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/eFile. Under Rule 16.601(2), it is your responsibility to review this transcript and ensure that the appropriate information is designated as protected material. ______ COPY OF TRANSCRIPT WITH REDACTIONS DESIGNATED ___X__ COURT REPORTER TRANSCRIPT YOU HAVE TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THIS NOTICE TO REVIEW AND RESPOND. If you find protected information, either as defined in Rule 16.602 or as ordered by the court, has been included in the document, you must file a Stipulation Regarding Redaction of Transcript identifying the information that must be redacted from the transcript. If you find additional information that you wish to have designated as protected under Rule 16.604, you may file a Stipulation Regarding Redaction of Transcript identifying the additional information you wish to redact. Any disagreement about whether additional information should be designated as protected will be decided by the court. Your failure to respond within twenty-one (21) days of the filing of this notice will be deemed an agreement that the transcript has been properly redacted per Rule 16.601(2), and the transcript will become public unless otherwise designated by law or court order. Date: October 14, 2013 Pamela J. Hayes Court Reporter 1315 South B Avenue Nevada, IA 50201 515-382-7434 pamela.hayes@iowacourts.gov
E-FILED 2013 OCT 23 9:01 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Withdraw of EDMS Notification - State V Kirk Riley Levin - Fecr012239

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Withdraw of EDMS Notification - State V Kirk Riley Levin - Fecr012239

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E-FILED 2013 MAR 11 9:28 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 11 9:35 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY

Case No. FECR 012239

E-FILED 2013 MAR 13 4:16 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 13 4:16 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 13 4:16 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 1:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

CRIMINAL NO. FECR012239

ORDER GRANTING JOINT RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY

KIRK RILEY LEVIN, Defendant.

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 1:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 1:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Copies to: Charles J. Kenville Ben Smith Douglas D. Hammerand

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 1:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-03-19 13:43:42

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 2:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAR 19 2:43 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-03-19 14:43:20

E-FILED 2013 MAY 03 8:45 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 08 8:06 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Case No. FECR012239

E-FILED 2013 MAY 08 8:06 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 10 4:21 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 14 1:38 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 14 1:38 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-05-14 13:38:18

E-FILED 2013 MAY 14 1:42 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 14 1:42 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-05-14 13:42:16

E-FILED 2013 MAY 23 12:49 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 23 12:49 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 23 12:49 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 23 4:21 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 23 4:34 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 24 12:12 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

SECOND MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

E-FILED 2013 MAY 24 12:12 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 30 9:18 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

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E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 11:48 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SAC COUNTY

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. KIRK R LEVIN ,

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 11:48 AM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-05-31 11:48:10

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:23 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:23 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:23 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Electronically signed on 2013-05-31 14:23:22

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:51 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:51 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

E-FILED 2013 MAY 31 2:51 PM SAC - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT