G.R. No.

158802

November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS COR !S FOR RE"NA#$O $E %I##A &'e()*+e' )( (,e Ne- B*.*b*' r*/o+/, 01+(*+.12) C*(34 5!NE $E %I##A, petitioner-relator, vs. THE $IRECTOR, NEW BI#IBI$ RISONS, respondent.

DECISION

"NARES6SANTIAGO, 5.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule !" of the Rules of Court. #etitioner Re$naldo de %illa, &oined b$ his son, petitioner-relator 'une de %illa, see(s a two-fold relief) *irst, that respondent Director of #risons &ustif$ the basis for the i+prison+ent of petitioner Re$naldo de %illa, and second, that petitioner be -ranted a new trial. These reliefs are sou-ht on the basis of purportedl$ e.culpator$ evidence, -athered after perfor+in- deo.$ribonucleic acid /DN01 testin- on sa+ples alle-edl$ collected fro+ the petitioner and a child born to the victi+ of the rape. 2$ final &ud-+ent dated *ebruar$ , "!! , in #eople of the #hilippines v. Re$naldo de %illa," we found petitioner -uilt$ of the rape of 0ileen 3endo4a, his niece b$ affinit$, sentenced hi+ to suffer the penalt$ of reclusi5n perpetua, and ordered hi+ to pa$ the offended part$ civil inde+nit$, +oral da+a-es, costs of the suit, and support for 6eahl$n Corales 3endo4a, the putative child born of the rape. #etitioner is currentl$ servin- his sentence at the New 2ilibid #rison, 3untinlupa Cit$. 0s su++ari4ed in our Decision dated *ebruar$ , "!! , 0ileen 3endo4a char-ed petitioner Re$naldo de %illa with rape in an infor+ation dated 'anuar$ 7, 778, filed with the Re-ional Trial Court of #asi- Cit$. 9hen arrai-ned on 'anuar$ ":, 778, petitioner entered a plea of ;not -uilt$.;< Durin- the trial, the prosecution established that so+eti+e in the third wee( of 0pril 77=, at about !)!! in the +ornin-, 0ileen 3endo4a wo(e up in her fa+il$>s rented roo+ in Sa-ad, #asi-, 3etro 3anila, to find petitioner on top of her. 0ileen was then a-ed " $ears and ten +onths. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her +outh with a pillow and threatened to (ill her. 0ileen could not do an$thin- but cr$. #etitioner succeeded in insertin- his penis inside her va-ina. 0fter +a(in- thrustin- +otions with his bod$, petitioner e&aculated. This encounter alle-edl$ resulted in 0ileen>s pre-nanc$, which was noticed b$ her +other, 6eonila 3endo4a, so+eti+e in Nove+ber 77=. 9hen confronted b$ her +other, 0ileen revealed that petitioner raped her. 0ileen>s parents then brou-ht her to the #asi- #olice Station, where the$ lod-ed a cri+inal co+plaint a-ainst petitioner.= Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who e.a+ined 0ileen, confir+ed that she was ei-ht +onths pre-nant and found in her h$+en healed lacerations at the 8)!! and ?)!! positions. On Dece+ber 7, 77=, 0ileen -ave birth to a bab$ -irl who+ she na+ed 6eahl$n 3endo4a.8 In his defense, petitioner alle-ed that, at the ti+e of the alle-ed rape, he was alread$ :@ $ears old. Old a-e and sic(ness had rendered hi+ incapable of havin- an erection. Ae further averred that 0ileen>s fa+il$ had been holdin- a -rud-e a-ainst hi+, which accounted for the cri+inal char-es. *inall$, he interposed the defense of alibi, clai+in- that at the ti+e of the incident, he was in his ho+etown of San 6uis, 2atan-as.: The trial court found petitioner -uilt$ be$ond reasonable doubt of the cri+e of Bualified rape, and sentenced hi+ to death, to inde+nif$ the victi+ in the a+ount of #8!,!!!.!!, to pa$ the costs of the suit and to support the child, 6eahl$n 3endo4a. @ On auto+atic review,? we found that the date of birth of 0ileen>s child was +edicall$ consistent with the ti+e of the rape. Since it was never alle-ed that 0ileen -ave birth to a full-ter+ nine-+onth old bab$, we -ave credence to the prosecution>s contention that she pre+aturel$ -ave birth to an ei-ht-+onth old bab$ b$ nor+al deliver$.7 Thus, we affir+ed petitioner>s conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads) 9AERE*ORE, the &ud-+ent of the Re-ional Trial Court, findin- accused-appellant -uilt$ be$ond reasonable doubt of the cri+e of rape, is 0**IR3ED with the 3ODI*IC0TIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalt$ of reclusi5n perpetua and ordered to pa$ the offended part$ #8!,!!!.!! as civil inde+nit$, #8!,!!!.!! as +oral da+a-es, costs of the suit and to provide support for the child 6eahl$n Corales 3endo4a. SO ORDERED. ! Three $ears after the pro+ul-ation of our Decision, we are once +ore faced with the Buestion of Re$naldo de %illa>s -uilt or innocence.

#etitioner-relator in this case, 'une de %illa, is the son of Re$naldo. Ae alle-es that durin- the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could deter+ine once and for all if Re$naldo was the father of the victi+>s child, 6eahl$n. #etitioner-relator was onl$ infor+ed durin- the pendenc$ of the auto+atic review of petitioner>s case that DN0 testin- could resolve the issue of paternit$. This infor+ation was apparentl$ furnished b$ the *ree 6e-al 0ssistance Croup /*60C1 0ntiDeath #enalt$ Tas( *orce, which too( over as counsel for petitioner. Thus, petitioner>s brief in #eople v. de %illa sou-ht the conduct of a blood t$pe test and DN0 test in order to deter+ine the paternit$ of the child alle-edl$ conceived as a result of the rape. " This relief was i+plicitl$ denied in our Decision of *ebruar$ " , "!! . On 3arch :, "!! , Re$naldo de %illa filed a 3otion for #artial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once +ore pra$ed that DN0 tests be conducted. < The 3otion was denied with finalit$ in a Resolution dated Nove+ber "!, "!! . = Aence, the Decision beca+e final and e.ecutor$ on 'anuar$ :, "!!". 8 #etitioner-relator was undaunted b$ these challen-es. Aavin- been infor+ed that DN0 tests reBuired a sa+ple that could be e.tracted fro+ saliva, petitioner-relator as(ed 2ill$ 'oe de %illa, a -randson of Re$naldo de %illa and a class+ate of 6eahl$n 3endo4a, to as( 6eahl$n to spit into a new, sterile cup. : 6eahl$n readil$ a-reed and did so. 2ill$ 'oe too( the sa+ple ho+e and -ave it to the petitioner-relator, who i++ediatel$ labeled the cup as ;Container 0.; #etitioner-relator then -athered sa+ples fro+ four -randchildren of Re$naldo de %illa. These sa+ples were placed in separate containers with distin-uishin- labels and te+poraril$ stored in a refri-erator prior to transport to the DN0 0nal$sis 6aborator$ at the National Science Research Institute /NSRI1. @ Durin- transport, the containers containin- the saliva sa+ples were (ept on ice. #etitioner-relator reBuested the NSRI to conduct DN0 testin- on the sa+ple -iven b$ 6eahl$n 3endo4a, those -iven b$ the -randchildren of Re$naldo de %illa, and that -iven b$ Re$naldo de %illa hi+self. The identities of the donors of the sa+ples, save for the sa+ple -iven b$ Re$naldo de %illa, were not +ade (nown to the DN0 0nal$sis 6aborator$. ? 0fter testin-, the DN0 6aborator$ rendered a preli+inar$ report on 3arch " , "!!<, which showed that Re$naldo de %illa could not have sired an$ of the children whose sa+ples were tested, due to the absence of a +atch between the pertinent -enetic +ar(ers in petitioner>s sa+ple and those of an$ of the other sa+ples, includin- 6eahl$n>s. 7 Aence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner ar-ues as follows) DN0 0N06DSIS ON #0TERNITD SAO9S CONC6ESI%E6D TA0T #ETITIONER DE %I660 IS NOT TAE *0TAER O* 6E0A6DN 3ENDOF0, AIS CON%ICTION *OR R0#E, 20SED ON TAE *0CT TA0T 6E0A6DN 90S SIRED 0S 0 RESE6T O* TAE 066ECED R0#E, C0NNOT ST0ND 0ND 3EST 2E SET 0SIDE."! ... ... ...

0 NE9 TRI06 TO CONSIDER NE96D DISCO%ERED E%IDENCE IS #RO#ER 0ND 30D 2E ORDERED 2D TAIS COERT IN %IE9 O* TAE RESE6TS O* TAE DN0 TESTS CONDECTED." Considerin- that the issues are inter-twined, the$ shall be discussed to-ether. In brief, petitioner relies upon the DN0 evidence -athered subseBuent to the trial in order to re-liti-ate the factual issue of the paternit$ of the child 6eahl$n 3endo4a. #etitioner alle-es that this issue is crucial, considerin- that his conviction in "!! was based on the factual findin- that he sired the said child. Since this paternit$ is now conclusivel$ disproved, he ar-ues that the "!! conviction +ust be overturned. In essence, petitioner invo(es the re+ed$ of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterall$ attac( the "!! Decision. The ancillar$ re+ed$ of a +otion for new trial is resorted to solel$ to allow the presentation of what is alle-ed to be newl$-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tas(ed to deter+ine, first, the propriet$ of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual alread$ convicted and servin- sentence b$ virtue of a final and e.ecutor$ &ud-+ent, and second, the propriet$ of -rantin- a new trial under the sa+e factual scenario. The e.traordinar$ writ of habeas corpus has lon- been a haven of relief for those see(in- libert$ fro+ an$ unwarranted denial of freedo+ of +ove+ent. %er$ broadl$, the writ applies ;to all cases of ille-al confine+ent or detention b$ which a person has been deprived of his libert$, or b$ which the ri-htful custod$ of an$ person has been withheld fro+ the person entitled thereto;."" Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be ille-all$ deprived of his libert$. In the celebrated case of %illavicencio v. 6u(ban,"< we stated that ;GaHn$ restraint which will preclude freedo+ of action is sufficient.; "= The +ost basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual see(in- such relief be ille-all$ deprived of his freedo+ of +ove+ent or placed under so+e for+ of ille-al restraint. If an individual>s libert$ is restrained via so+e le-al process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailin-. Conco+itant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directl$ assail a &ud-+ent rendered b$ a co+petent court or tribunal which, havin- dul$ acBuired &urisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this &urisdiction throu-h so+e ano+al$ in the conduct of the proceedin-s.

Thus, notwithstandin- its historic function as the -reat writ of libert$, the writ of habeas corpus has ver$ li+ited availabilit$ as a post-conviction re+ed$. In the recent case of *eria v. Court of 0ppeals,"8 we ruled that review of a &ud-+ent of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus onl$ in ver$ specific instances, such as when, as a conseBuence of a &udicial proceedin-, /a1 there has been a deprivation of a constitutional ri-ht resultin- in the restraint of a person, /b1 the court had no &urisdiction to i+pose the sentence, or /c1 an e.cessive penalt$ has been i+posed, as such sentence is void as to such e.cess.": In this instance, petitioner invo(es the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final &ud-+ent of conviction, without, however, providin- a le-al -round on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alle-es neither the deprivation of a constitutional ri-ht, the absence of &urisdiction of the court i+posin- the sentence, or that an e.cessive penalt$ has been i+posed upon hi+. In fine, petitioner invo(es the re+ed$ of habeas corpus in order to see( the review of findin-s of fact lon- passed upon with finalit$. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedin-s. In the earl$ case of 0briol v. Ao+eres, "@ for e.a+ple, this Court stated the -eneral rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas per+ittin- a collateral challen-e of the &urisdiction of the court or tribunal issuin- the process or &ud-+ent b$ which an individual is deprived of his libert$, cannot be distorted b$ e.tendin- the inBuir$ to +ere errors of trial courts actin- sBuarel$ within their &urisdiction."? The reason for this is e.plained ver$ si+pl$ in the case of %elasco v. Court of 0ppeals)"7 a habeas corpus petition reaches the bod$, but not the record of the case. <! 0 record +ust be allowed to re+ain e.tant, and cannot be revised, +odified, altered or a+ended b$ the si+ple e.pedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedin-s. Clearl$, +ere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of deprivin- the trial court of its &urisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, if at all, these errors +ust be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the for+ and +anner prescribed b$ law. < In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court>s appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ.<" 0 surve$ of our decisions in habeas corpus cases de+onstrates that, in -eneral, the writ of habeas corpus is a hi-h prero-ative writ which furnishes an e.traordinar$ re+ed$, it +a$ thus be invo(ed onl$ under e.traordinar$ circu+stances.<< 9e have been cate-orical in our pronounce+ents that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, +ore proper re+ed$. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available onl$ in the li+ited instances when a &ud-+ent is rendered b$ a court or tribunal devoid of &urisdiction. If, for instance, it can be de+onstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional ri-ht, the writ can be -ranted even after an individual has been +eted a sentence b$ final &ud-+ent. Thus, in the case of Chave4 v. Court of 0ppeals,<= the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional ri-ht a-ainst self-incri+ination. 0 defect so pronounced as the denial of an accused>s constitutional ri-hts results in the absence or loss of &urisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the conseBuent conviction of the accused. That void &ud-+ent of conviction +a$ be challen-ed b$ collateral attac(, which precisel$ is the function of habeas corpus.<8 6ater, in Cu+abon v. Director of the 2ureau of #risons,<: this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional ri-ht is shown to e.ist, the court that rendered the &ud-+ent is dee+ed ousted of &urisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate re+ed$ to assail the le-alit$ of the detention.<@ 0lthou-h in *eria v. Court of 0ppeals<? this Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an e.ceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the -eneral rule, which states that the burden of provin- ille-al restraint b$ the respondent rests on the petitioner who attac(s such restraint. 9here the return is not sub&ect to e.ception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows -ood -round for the detention of the prisoner, it is incu+bent on petitioner to alle-e and prove new +atter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.<7 In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of 0ppeals,=! we su++ari4ed the scope of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. 9e ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, althou-h not desi-ned to interrupt the orderl$ ad+inistration of &ustice, can be invo(ed b$ the attendance of a special circu+stance that reBuires i++ediate action. In such situations, the inBuir$ on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors co++itted b$ a court within its &urisdiction, but to the Buestion of whether the proceedin- or &ud-+ent under which a person has been restrained is a co+plete nullit$. The probe +a$ thus proceed to chec( on the power and authorit$, itself an eBuivalent test of &urisdiction, of the court or the &ud-e to render the order that so serves as the basis of i+prison+ent or detention. = It is the nullit$ of an assailed &ud-+ent of conviction which +a(es it susceptible to collateral attac( throu-h the filin- of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Epon a perusal of the records not +erel$ of this case but of #eople v. de %illa, we find that the re+ed$ of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailin-. *irst, the denial of a constitutional ri-ht has not been alle-ed b$ petitioner. 0s such, this Court is hard-pressed to find le-al basis on which to anchor the -rant of a writ of habeas corpus. 3uch as this Court s$+pathi4es with petitioner>s plea, a careful scrutin$ of the records does not reveal an$ constitutional ri-ht of which the petitioner was undul$ deprived. 9e are aware that other &urisdictions have seen fit to -rant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test clai+s that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.=" In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors co++itted b$ counsel, and it can be alle-ed that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel. The Enited States Supre+e Court reBuires a defendant alle-in- inco+petent counsel to show that the attorne$>s perfor+ance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionall$ to show that the outco+e of the trial would have been different with co+petent counsel.=< The purpose of the ri-ht to effective assistance of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.== The E.S. Supre+e Court asserts that in &ud-in- an$ clai+ of ineffective assistance of counsel, one +ust e.a+ine whether counsel>s conduct under+ined the proper functionin- of the adversarial process to such an e.tent that the trial did not produce a

fair and &ust result.=8 The proper +easure of attorne$ perfor+ance is ;reasonable; under the prevailin- professional nor+s, and the defendant +ust show that the representation received fell below the ob&ective standard of reasonableness. =: *or the petition to succeed, the stron- presu+ption that the counsel>s conduct falls within the wide ran-e or reasonable professional assistance +ust be overco+e.=@ In the case at bar, it appears that in the +iddle of the appeal, the petitioner>s counsel of record, a certain 0tt$. 0lfonso C. Salvador, suddenl$ and ine.plicabl$ withdrew his appearance as counsel, -ivin- the sole e.planation that he was ;leavin- for the Enited States for an indefinite period of ti+e b$ virtue of a petition filed in his favor.; =? In the face of this abandon+ent, petitioner +ade an i+passioned plea that his law$er be prevented fro+ this withdrawal in a handwritten ;Er-ent 3otion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel>s 9ithdrawal of 0ppearance with 6eave of Court; received b$ this Court on Septe+ber =, 777.=7 #etitioner alle-ed that his counsel>s withdrawal is an ;unti+el$ and heartbrea(in- event;, considerinthat he had placed ;all GhisH trust and confidence on Ghis counsel>sH unBuestionable inte-rit$ and di-nit$.; 8! 9hile we are s$+pathetic to petitioner>s pli-ht, we do not, however, find that there was such ne-li-ence co++itted b$ his earlier counsel so as to a+ount to a denial of a constitutional ri-ht. There is li(ewise no showin- that the proceedin-s were tainted with an$ other &urisdictional defect. In fine, we find that petitioner invo(es the re+ed$ of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to see( a re-e.a+ination of the records of #eople v. de %illa, without assertin- an$ le-al -rounds therefor. *or all intents and purposes, petitioner see(s a reevaluation of the evidentiar$ basis for his conviction. 9e are bein- as(ed to ree.a+ine the wei-ht and sufficienc$ of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in li-ht of the new DN0 evidence that the petitioner see(s to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus +ust, therefore, fail. Coupled with the pra$er for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner see(s a new trial to re-liti-ate the issue of the paternit$ of the child 6eahl$n 3endo4a. It +ust be stressed that the issue of 6eahl$n 3endo4a>s paternit$ is not central to the issue of petitioner>s -uilt or innocence. The rape of the victi+ 0ileen 3endo4a is an entirel$ different Buestion, separate and distinct fro+ the Buestion of the father of her child. Recentl$, in the case of #eople v. 0lberio,8 we ruled that the fact or not of the victi+>s pre-nanc$ and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in deter+inin- whether or not she was raped. #re-nanc$ is not an essential ele+ent of the cri+e of rape. 9hether the child which the victi+ bore was fathered b$ the purported rapist, or b$ so+e un(nown individual, is of no +o+ent in deter+inin- an individual>s -uilt. In the instant case, however, we note that the -rant of child support to 6eahl$n 3endo4a indicates that our Decision was based, at least in s+all +easure, on the victi+>s clai+ that the petitioner fathered her child. This clai+ was -iven credence b$ the trial court, and, as a findin- of fact, was affir+ed b$ this Court on auto+atic review. The fact of the child>s paternit$ is now in issue, centrall$ relevant to the civil award of child support. It is onl$ tan-entiall$ related to the issue of petitioner>s -uilt. Aowever, if it can be conclusivel$ deter+ined that the petitioner did not sire 6eahl$n 3endo4a, this +a$ cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acBuittal of the petitioner on this basis. 2e that as it +a$, it appears that the petitioner once +ore relies upon erroneous le-al -rounds in resortin- to the re+ed$ of a +otion for new trial. 0 +otion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Cri+inal #rocedure, is available onl$ for a li+ited period of ti+e, and for ver$ li+ited -rounds. Ender Section , Rule " , of the Revised Rules of Cri+inal #rocedure, a +otion for new trial +a$ be filed at an$ ti+e before a &ud-+ent of conviction beco+es final, that is, within fifteen / 81 da$s fro+ its pro+ul-ation or notice. Epon finalit$ of the &ud-+ent, therefore, a +otion for new trial is no lon-er an available re+ed$. Section " of Rule " enu+erates the -rounds for a new trial) SEC. ". Crounds for a new trial.IThe court shall -rant a new trial on an$ of the followin- -rounds) /a1 That errors of law or irre-ularities pre&udicial to the substantial ri-hts of the accused have been co++itted durinthe trial, /b1 That new and +aterial evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable dili-ence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and ad+itted would probabl$ chan-e the &ud-+ent. In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedl$ ;newl$-discovered evidence;, i.e., the DN0 test subseBuentl$ conducted, alle-edl$ e.cludin- petitioner fro+ the child purportedl$ fathered as a result of the rape. The decision sou-ht to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has lon- attained finalit$, and entr$ of &ud-+ent was +ade as far bac( as 'anuar$ :, "!!". 3oreover, upon an e.a+ination of the evidence presented b$ the petitioner, we do not find that the DN0 evidence falls within the statutor$ or &urisprudential definition of ;newl$- discovered evidence;. 0 +otion for new trial based on newl$-discovered evidence +a$ be -ranted onl$ if the followin- reBuisites are +et) /a1 that the evidence was discovered after trial, /b1 that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the e.ercise of reasonable dili-ence, /c1 that it is +aterial, not +erel$ cu+ulative, corroborative or i+peachin-, and /d1 that the evidence is of such wei-ht that that, if ad+itted, it would probabl$ chan-e the &ud-+ent.8" It is essential that the offerin- part$ e.ercised reasonable dili-ence in see(in- to locate the evidence before or durin- trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. 8<

In this instance, althou-h the DN0 evidence was undoubtedl$ discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not +eet the criteria for ;newl$-discovered evidence; that would +erit a new trial. Such evidence disprovin- paternit$ could have been discovered and produced at trial with the e.ercise of reasonable dili-ence. #etitioner-relator>s clai+ that he was ;unaware; of the e.istence of DN0 testin- until the trial was concluded carries no wei-ht with this Court. 6ac( of (nowled-e of the e.istence of DN0 testin- spea(s of ne-li-ence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner>s counsel. In either instance, however, this ne-li-ence is bindin- upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a part$ cannot bla+e his counsel for ne-li-ence when he hi+self was -uilt$ of ne-lect. 8= 0 client is bound b$ the acts of his counsel, includin- the latter>s +ista(es and ne-li-ence.88 It is li(ewise settled that relief will not be -ranted to a part$ who see(s to be relieved fro+ the effects of the &ud-+ent when the loss of the re+ed$ at law was due to his own ne-li-ence, or to a +ista(en +ode of procedure.8: Even with all of the co+pellin- and persuasive scientific evidence presented b$ petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Re$naldo de %illa is entitled to outri-ht acBuittal. 0s correctl$ pointed out b$ the Solicitor Ceneral, even if it is conclusivel$ proven that Re$naldo de %illa is not the father of 6eahl$n 3endo4a, his conviction could, in theor$, still stand, with 0ileen 3endo4a>s testi+on$ and positive identification as its bases. 8@ The Solicitor Ceneral reiterates, and correctl$ so, that the pre-nanc$ of the victi+ has never been an ele+ent of the cri+e of rape. 8? Therefore, the DN0 evidence has failed to conclusivel$ prove to this Court that Re$naldo de %illa should be dischar-ed. 0lthou-h petitioner clai+s that conviction was based solel$ on a findin- of paternit$ of the child 6eahl$n, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincin- testi+onial evidence of the victi+, which, -iven credence b$ the trial court, was affir+ed on appeal. 9AERE*ORE, in view of the fore-oin-, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is DIS3ISSED for lac( of +erit. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, concur. "avide, r!, C! !, and Panganiban, !, #oins Carpio and Calle#o, Sr!, !, in their separate opinion. Carpio, !, please see separate concurrin- opinion. Calle#o, Sr!, !, please see separate opinion. Corona, !, on leave. !,

SE ARATE CONC!RRING O INION CAR IO, J.: I concur with the ponencia. The DN0 evidence presented b$ petitioner-relator is not +aterial and relevant to the cri+e of rape. Even assu+in- petitioner is not the father of the child that was conceived within the period of the rape, such fact does not prove that petitioner could not have co++itted the cri+e. The re+edies of habeas corpus and new trial are thus unavailin- in this case. Aowever, this case should not close the door to a convicted felon who after final &ud-+ent acBuires DN0 results e.oneratinhi+ of the cri+e for which he was convicted. 6e-al relief is still available, for instance, to a felon convicted b$ final &ud-+ent of rape who subseBuentl$ -ains access to DN0 results showin- that the se+en in the victi+>s va-ina does not +atch that of the convicted felon. 9hile final &ud-+ents en&o$ the presu+ption of correctness, the confinin- and traditional le-al procedures +ust respond to the revolutionar$ wa$ that DN0 results have been provin- the innocence of convicts. 0+erican &urisprudence has shown the wa$ in this re-ard. 2efore the enact+ent of statutes in so+e states providin- for post-conviction DN0 testin-, 0+erican courts had no precedents to wor( on to &ustif$ post-conviction DN0 testin- and the reversal of final &ud-+ents of conviction when the DN0 results turned out to be e.culpator$. 2efore the passa-e of the DN0 testin- statutes, it was unclear under what ri-ht and procedure a convict was entitled to post-conviction DN0 testin-. Even in the absence of statutes, 0+erican courts allowed post-conviction DN0 testin- b$ reBuirin- the convict to appl$ for such testin- before the verdict could be vacated. The application enables the courts to deter+ine the basis for the application and to set the standards in case the reBuest is -ranted. Once the DN0 result confir+s the innocence of the convict, 0+erican courts conduct a +otion in li+ine hearin- on ad+issibilit$ or order a new trial." The prosecution usuall$ refuses to re-tr$ the case and the convict is released. Ender 0+erican &urisprudence, post-conviction DN0 testin- is availed throu-h a petition for habeas corpus and +otion for new trial. These conventional +odes of relief, however, have built-in restrictions that pose proble+s to the -rantin- of postconviction DN0 testin-. In habeas corpus cases, relief could not be had unless a constitutional violation was co++itted durin- the convict>s trial. In a +otion for new trial, the convict +ust show that the DN0 test is a newl$ discovered evidence and +ust not be ti+e-barred to

warrant a new trial. Despite these le-al obstacles, 0+erican courts -ranted, albeit restrictivel$, the reBuest for post-conviction DN0 testin- on a case-b$-case basis. The approach to the le-al issues varied fro+ &urisdiction to &urisdiction. In Su++erville v. 9arden State #rison< the Supre+e Court of Connecticut ruled that when evidence is so stron- that innocence is hi-hl$ li(el$ and that evidence alone establishes innocence, that in itself is alread$ a basis fro habeas corpus review of convictions and i+prison+ent. Thus, habeas corpus warranted the -rantin- of a new trial based on the petitioner>s clai+ of actual innocence. In #eople v. Callace,= the New Dor( court considered post-conviction DN0 testin- as newl$ discovered evidence because the t$pe of DN0 anal$sis available at the post-conviction sta-e was not available at the ti+e of the trial. In State v. Tho+as,8 funda+ental fairness allowed the convict to post-conviction DN0 testin- even when the reBuest was alread$ stale. Aabeas corpus review and new trial proved to be narrow re+edies as 0+erican courts still adhere to the strict reBuire+ents of these two +odels of relief. Nonetheless, post-conviction DN0 testin- has been -ranted on other -rounds. 9hen the application of DN0 testin- has stron- indications that the result could potentiall$ e.onerate the convict, 0+erican courts reco-ni4ed the convict>s ri-ht to e.culpator$ evidence. In Dabbs v. %er-ari,: citin- 2rad$ v. 3ar$land,@ the court cate-oricall$ upheld the convict>s constitutional ri-ht to e.culpator$ evidence despite the absence of a law providin- a ri-ht to post-conviction discover$. DN0 results e.onerated Charles Dabbs and his conviction was eventuall$ vacated. ? On other cases,7 the e.culpator$ potential of DN0 evidence co+pelled the 0+erican courts, in the interest of &ustice, to allow access to post-conviction DN0 testin-. The rectification of a wron- is the underl$in- reason for the allowance of post-conviction DN0 testin- and the eventual reversal of the verdict based on e.clusionar$ DN0 result. Even the +ost strin-ent of rules have to -ive wa$ upon a showinthat there is a stron- probabilit$ that DN0 result could prove the convict>s actual innocence. *or ulti+atel$, it is the pri+ar$ dut$ of the court to prevent the +iscarria-e of &ustice. Ever$ person has a ri-ht to avail of a new technolo-$ that irrefutabl$ proves his innocence despite a prior final conviction, provided the new technolo-$ was not available durin- his trial. This ri-ht is part of a person>s constitutional ri-ht to due process of law. 0 person convicted b$ final &ud-+ent does not lose his constitutional ri-ht to due process, and he +a$ invo(e it whenever there is a co+pellin- and valid -round to do so. The 7?@ Constitution e.pressl$ e+powers the Court to ;GpHro+ul-ate rules concernin- the protection and enhance+ent of constitutional ri-hts.; ! Even in the absence of a law allowin- post-conviction DN0 testin-, the Court under its constitutional +andate +a$ order a new trial if the post-conviction DN0 testin- will establish that the convicted felon could not have possibl$ co++itted the cri+e. This is the case when the post-conviction DN0 testin- shows that the se+en in the victi+>s va-ina does not +atch that of the convicted felon. 0 new trial on the -round of post-conviction DN0 testin- is different fro+ a new trial under Rule " , which is available onl$ before final &ud-+ent. Enli(e a new trial under Rule " , a new trial for post-conviction DN0 testin- does not vacate the &ud-+ent of conviction, which stands until recalled b$ the court as a result of the new trial. 0 new trial after final conviction +a$ be ordered onl$ on the sole -round that DN0 testin- will establish that the convicted felon could not have co++itted the cri+e. 3oreover, DN0 testin- +ust not have been available or possible durin- the ori-inal trial. Thus, I sub+it that a felon convicted b$ final &ud-+ent who could establish throu-h DN0 testin- that he could not have co++itted the cri+e is not without re+ed$ to prove his innocence and re-ain his libert$.

SE ARATE CONC!RRING O INION CA##E5O, SR., J.: I concur with the ponencia and the separate concurrin- opinion of 'ustice 0ntonio T. Carpio that the convicted felon +ust be allowed an opportunit$ to adduce DN0 evidence. Aowever, such a re+ed$ is sui generis to -ive the convicted felon a chance to adduce DN0 evidence until Rule " of the Revised Rules of Cri+inal #rocedure is revised anew. Such a re+ed$ is a(in to a +otion for a new trial in the ori-inal case on the -round of newl$ discovered evidence under Section "/b1, Rule " of the Revised Rules of Cri+inal #rocedure, which reads) SEC. ". Grounds $or a ne% trial. J The court shall -rant a new trial on an$ of the followin- -rounds) /a1 That errors of law or irre-ularities pre&udicial to the substantial ri-hts of the accused have been co++itted durinthe trial, /b1 That new and +aterial evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable dili-ence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and ad+itted would probabl$ chan-e the &ud-+ent.