Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-200 March 28, 1946

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs.ERIBERTO MISA, a !"r#c$or o% Pr" o& , respondent. Sulpicio V. Cea for petitioner.First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr. for respondent.Arturo A. Alafriz as amicus curiae. BENG'ON, J.( Anastacio Laurel demands his release form Bilibid Prison, mainly assertin that Common!ealth Act No. "#$, creatin the People%s Court, specially section &', under !hich he is detained as a political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. (he )olicitor *eneral, meetin the issue, sustains the validity of the !hole la!. Accordin to the pleadin s, the petitioner, a +ilipino citi,en, !as arrested in Camarines )ur in May, &'-., by the /nited )tates Army, and !as interned, under a commitment order 0for his active collaboration !ith the 1apanese durin the 1apanese occupation,0 but in )eptember, &'-., he !as turned over to the Common!ealth *overnment, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent 2irector of Prisons. (he le ality of the prisoner%s arrest and detention by the military authorities of the /nited )tates is no! beyond 3uestion.&4is present incarceration, !hich is merely continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted 0more than si5 hours0 counted from his delivery to the respondent6 but section &' of Common!ealth Act No. "#$ provides in part as follo!s7 /pon delivery by the Commander8in8Chief of the Armed +orces of the /nited )tates in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Common!ealth *overnment, the 9ffice of )pecial Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, e5hibits, and such other thin s as the *overnment of the /nited

)tates may have turned over in connection !ith and:or affectin said political prisoners, e5amine the aforesaid records, documents, e5hibits, etc., and ta;e, as speedily as possible, such action as maybe proper7 Provided, o!ever, . . .. And, provided, furt er, (hat, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred t!enty8five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filin of the correspondin information !ith the People%s Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than si5 <"= months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander8in8Chief of the Armed +orces of the /nited )tates in the Philippines to the Common!ealth *overnment. >n vie! of the provision, and the statement of the )olicitor *eneral that even on the date the petition !as presented his office had, ready for filin , an information char in herein petitioner !ith treason, !e fail to see ho! petitioner%s release may no! be decreed. 4o!ever, he contends that the aforesaid section violates our Constitution, because it is <a= discriminatory in nature6 <b= unla!ful dele ation of le islative po!ers6 and <c= retroactive in operation. <a= >t is first ar ued that the suspension is not eneral in application, it bein made operative only to 0the political prisoners concerned,0 that other citi,ens are not denied the si58 hour limitation in article &$. of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is une5cusable and amounts to denial of the e3ual protection of the la!s. >t is accepted doctrine in constitutional la! that the 0e3ual protection0 clause does not prevent the Le islature from establishin classes of individuals or ob?ects upon !hich different rules shall operate @ so lon as the classification is not $ unreasonable. >nstances of valid classification are numerous. (he point to be determined then, is !hether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary.

9ne of the proclamations issued by *eneral MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte <2ecember $', &'--= referred to those +ilipino citi,ens !ho had voluntarily iven aid, comfort and sustenance to the 1apanese. >t announced his purpose to to hold them in restraint for the duration of the !ar, 0!hereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine *overnment for its ?ud ment upon their respective cases.0 Ahen active hostilities !ith 1apan terminated, *eneral MacArthur ordered the delivery of the Common!ealth of all the prisoners theretofore ta;en under his said proclamation. (here !as ",BBB in round numbers. (he problem problem !as momentous and ur ent. Criminal informations a ainst all, or a ma?ority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the si58hour period. (hey could not obviously be turned loose, considerin the conditions of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. )o the President, by virtue of his emer ency po!ers, promul ated E5ecutive 9rder No. ". suspendin article &$. of the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, !ith re ard to said detainees or internees, havin found such suspension necessary to 0enable the *overnment to fulfill its responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation !ith their custody and the investi ation, prosecution and disposal of their respective cases.0 (he 9rder added that it shall be in force and effect until the Con ress shall provide other!ise. Con ress later approved Common!ealth Act. No. "#$, establishin the People%s Court and the 9ffice of )pecial Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes a ainst national security committed durin the second Aorld Aar. >t found the thirty8day period too short compared !ith the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at si5 months. Considerin the circumstances, !e are not prepared to hold the e5tension of the period for the political detainees !as unreasonable. (he Le islature chose to ive the prosecutor%s office sufficient time to investi ate and to file the proper char e @ or to dischar e those !hom it may find innocent. >f time had not been ranted, the prosecutor !ould perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees indiscriminately6 reservin , of course, its ri ht subse3uently to re3uest the liberation of those it

may thin; not uilty. But such !holesale indictment !as obviously neither practical nor desirable. Ae !ill allo! that there may be some dispute as to the !isdom or ade3uacy of the e5tension. Cet the point is primarily for the Le islature to decide. (he only issue is the po!er to promul ate special rules for the custody and investi ation of active collaborationists, and so lon as reasons e5ist in support of the le islative action courts should be careful not to deny it. >n this connection, it must be stated there can really be no substantial round to assail the si58month e5tension, in vie! of the provisions authori,in the release under bail. Article &$. of the Revised Penal Code !as intended to prevent any abuse resultin from confinin a person !ithout informin him of his offense and !ithout permittin him to o on bail. Common!ealth Act No. "#$ ives no occasion to such abuse. (he political prisoners ;no!, or ou ht to ;no!, they are bein ;ept for crimes a ainst national security. And they are enerally permitted to furnish bail bonds. <b= (here is hardly any merit to the ar ument that as 0the duration of the suspension of article &$. is placed in the hands of the )pecial Prosecutor%s 9ffice,0 the section constitutes an invalid dele ation of le islative po!ers6 for as e5plained by the )olicitor8 *eneral, the result @ some informations filed before, others after!ards @ is merely the 0conse3uence of the fact that si5 thousand informations could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one else, necessarily the last.0 (he la!, in effect, permitted the )olicitor8*eneral to file the informations !ithin si5 months. And statutes permittin officers to perform their duties !ithin certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid dele ations of le islative po!er. <c= Nor is the position correct that section &' is retroactive in its operation. >t refers to detention after its passa e @ not before. >ncidentally, there is no constitutional ob?ection to retroactive statutes !here they relate, to remedies or procedure.D (he ar ument is advanced that !hen he !as arrested, <May, &'-.=, article &$. of the Revised Penal Code !as in force, and

petitioner could have as;ed for release after si5 hours and, therefore, Common!ealth Act No. "#$ that ta;es a!ay that ri ht is e" post facto, retroactive and fundamentally ob?ectionable. (he premises are incorrect. >n May, &'-., e could not ave as#ed for release after si5 hours. >n other !ords, he !ould not have been dischar ed from the custody. <Ra3ui,a vs. Branford, supra.= Article &$. of the Revised Penal Code !as in force, it is true6 but not as to him. (he la!s of the Common!ealth !ere revived in Camarines )ur by operation of *eneral MacArthur%s proclamation of 9ctober $D, &'--, upon its liberation from enemy control6 but sub?ect to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint 0for the duration of the !ar.0 )o, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily invo;e the benefits of article &$. of the Revised Penal Code. /ndoubtedly the Le islature could validly repeal section &$. of the Revised Penal Code. 4ad it done so, herein petitioner !ould have no round to protest on constitutional principles, as he could claim no vested ri ht to the continued enforcement of said section.- (herefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of repealin that section, our la!ma;in body merely suspended its operation for a definite period of time. )hould he counter that such repeal or suspension must be eneral to be valid, he !ill be referred to the precedin considerations re ardin classification and the e3ual protection of the la!s. Aherefore, !e perceive no irreconcilable conflict bet!een the Constitution and the challen ed portions of section &' of Common!ealth Act No. "#$. (he other features of the People%s Court Act !hich are the sub?ect of denunciation by petitioner do not, in our opinion, re3uire specific elucidation at this time, because he has not as yet been held into that court, and the issues appear to have no important or necessary connection !ith his current deprivation of liberty.. (he petition for the !rit of costs. a$eas corpus !ill be denied. Aith

%oran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, &e Joya, Pa$lo, Hilado, and 'riones, JJ., concur. S#)ara$# O)"&"o& O'AETA, *., +"$h +ho, Para , J., concurrin in the result7 > concur !ith the ma?ority in upholdin the constitutionality of section &' of the People%s Court Act. >n the vie! > held in the Ra3ui,a case the detention of the petitioner by the military authorities !as ille al for lac; of due process. But the same thin cannot be said as to his present detention by the respondent 2irector of Prisons, especially no! that an information for treason has been filed a ainst him. PER-ECTO, J., dissentin 7 9n or about May ", &'-., petitioner !as arrested by the C.>.C., /nited )tates Army, Camarines )ur. 9n )eptember ", &'-. he !as turned over to the Common!ealth *overnment by the /nited )tates Army and since that date he remained in prison under the personal custody of the respondent 2irector of Prisons, and no! he comes before us complainin that his arrest and detention are ille al and in violation of many of his constitutional ri hts, in that7 0<a= 4e !as arrested and detained !ithout a la!ful !arrant of arrest. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section D.= <b= No information or char e has been lod ed a ainst him, informin him of the nature and cause of his arrest. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &E.= <c= 4e !as not iven an opportunity to confront the !itnesses !ho caused his arrest and detention. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &E.= <d= 4e !as not accorded the benefit of compulsory process to secure the attendance of !itnesses in his behalf. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &E.= <e= 4e !as and is bein denied the ri ht to a prompt, speedy and public trial. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &E.= <f= 4is arrest and detention !as and is !ithout due process of la!. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &..= < = 4e !as not accorded the e3ual protection of the la!s. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &.= <h= 4e !as

sub?ected to cruel and unusual punishment. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &'.= <i= 4e !as committed to prison and detained by the respondent under a bill of attainder. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &&.=0 Petitioner also maintains that the People%s Court Act No. "#$, under !hich the respondent herein purports to act, violates not only the spirit but also the letter of the fundamental la! in many !ays, in that7 0<a= >t constitutes an assault upon the independence of the ?udiciary. <See (ydin s8Mc2uffie La!, section $, par. FaG.= <b= >t deprives the accused of certain ri hts already ac3uired at the time of its passa e, and therefore is e58post facto in nature <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &&.= <c= >t parta;es of the nature of a bill of attainder. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &&.= <d= >t denies the e3ual protection of the la!s. < See Constitution, Article >>>, section &.= <e= >t provides for cruel and unusual punishment. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &'.= <f= >t deprives the citi,en of his day in court. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section $&.= < = >t constitutes an unla!ful dele ation of le islative and e5ecutive functions. <See (ydin s8Mc2uffie La!, section $, par. FaG.= <h= >t covers more than one sub?ect matter. <See Constitution, Article >H, section &$, par. &.= <i= >t authori,es the char in and multifarious crimes in one complaint or information thereby ma;in it impossible to be informed to the real nature and cause of the accusation a ainst the accused. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &E.= <?= >t denies the constitutional ri ht of a person to bail before conviction. <See Constitution, Article >>>, section &".=0 Conse3uently, petitioner prays that Common!ealth Act No. "#$ be declared unconstitutional and null and void, that his detention, irrespective of the validity of said act, be declared ille al and in violation of many of his constitutional ri hts, and that an order be issued for his complete and absolute release. Respondent ans!ered that, pursuant to the authority of the proclamation issued by the Commander in Chief of the American Armed +orces, )outh!est Pacific Area, *eneral 2ou las MacArthur, dated 2ecember $', &'--, petitioner !as arrested and thereafter detained on May &B, &'-., under a security

commitment order, issued by the commandin officer of 'B-th Counter >ntelli ence Corps 2etachment, /nited )tates Army, upon the char e of 0active collaboration !ith the 1apanese durin the 1apanese occupation06 that his subse3uent detention as a political prisoner, upon the transfer of his person to the Common!ealth *overnment by the /nited )tates Army, pursuant to the terms of the proclamation issued by *eneral 2ou las MacArthur on 2ecember $', &'--, of E5ecutive 9rder No. "., issued by the President of the Philippines on )eptember D, &'-., and pursuant to the provisions of Common!ealth Act No. "#$, approved on )eptember $., &'-., !as a mere lo ical se3uence of his previous commitment and hence e3ually valid and le al. Respondent alle es also that petitioner has not as yet availed of the benefits of section &' of Common!ealth Act No. "#$, !hich confers upon political prisoners the privile e of securin their release on bail upon proper application therefor !ith the People%s Court6 that Common!ealth Act No. "#$ does not trench upon, nor contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution6 that it is not e" post facto in nature in that it suspends, in the interests of national security, the provision of article &$. of the Revised Penal Code for a period of not more than si5 months, !hich is fully ?ustified by the practical necessities of the situation, considerin the circumstances that there are more than ",BBB political prisoners char ed !ith the rave crime of treason and other offenses a ainst national security6 that said la! does not materially impair the substantial ri hts of the accused to have the 3uestion of his uilt determined accordin to the substantive la! e5istin at the time of the commission of the offense, that it is not a bill of attainder, since it does not inflict punishment !ithout a ?udicial trial6 that it neither deprives the citi,en of his day in court, nor it provides for cruel and unusual punishment6 that it applies e3ually and uniformly to all persons similarly situated6 that it complies !ith the constitutional re3uisites of due process of la! as applied in criminal procedure6 that it does not contravene the constitutional re3uirement that the accused must be informed of the nature of the accusation a ainst him6 that instead of suppressin or denyin the constitutional ri ht of an accused to bail before conviction, said act reco ni,es and concedes to all

accused in section &' the ri ht to bail, e5cept those char ed !ith capital offenses !hen evidence of uilt is stron 6 that the information a ainst the petitioner, char in him !ith treason upon ten counts !as ready for filin in the People%s Court even on the date the petition in this proceedin !as presented6 and that in due deference to this )upreme Court, the filin of the said information has been held in abeyance pendin the final disposition of this a$eas corpus proceedin . +or purposes of this discussion, the discrepancy bet!een petitioner and respondent as to the correct date !hen petitioner !as arrested, May " or May &B, cannot affect the merits of the case. (it out a la!ful !arrant of arrest. @ Ahether the arrest too; place on May ", &'-., as alle ed by petitioner or on May &B, as alle ed by respondent, there is absolutely no 3uestion that petitioner !as arrested !ithout la!ful !arrant of arrest. )ection &7D of Article >>> of the Constitution provides that 0no !arrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the ?ud e after e5amination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the !itnesses he may produce, and particularly describin the place to be searched, and the persons or thin s to be sei,ed.0 (his provision, considered in connection !ith the provision of section &7& of article >>> of the Constitution and section &7&. of the same article that no person shall be deprived of liberty or be held to ans!er for a criminal offense !ithout due process of la!, implies necessarily that one of the essential re3uisites for deprivin a person of his liberty, !hen he is accused of an offense, is the e5istence of a !arrant of arrest issued in accordance !ith the provisions of the Constitution. Ae are of opinion that the arrest of petitioner !as e5ecuted in fla rant violation of the above8mentioned constitutional provisions. )o information as to any c ar*e. @ (he Constitution provides that one of the fundamental ri hts of an accused is 0to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a ainst him.0 <)ection

&7&E, Article >>> of the Constitution.= (his constitutional uarantee appears e3ually to have been violated in petitioner%s case. Respondent%s alle ation that petitioner is detained because of his active collaboration !ith the 1apanese durin the 1apanese occupation does not inform petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation a ainst him, it appearin that there is no such offense described in any la! applicable to petitioner as 0active collaboration !ith the 1apanese durin the 1apanese re ime.0 %eetin* !itnesses face to face. @ Petitioner complains that he !as not iven an opportunity to confront his !itnesses !ho caused his arrest detention. (he complaint is e3ually !ell8ta;en. (here is nothin in the record to sho! that before, durin , or at any time after his arrest, petitioner has ever been accorded the opportunity of meetin the !itnesses 0face to face0 as provided in section &7&E of Article >>> of the Constitution. Attendance of !itnesses in is $e alf. @ Petitioner complains he !as not accorded of the benefit of compulsory process to secure the attendance of the !itnesses in his behalf as provided in section &7&E of Article >>> of the Constitution. (his alle ation has not been disputed. Ae have, therefore, here another constitutional ri ht of petitioner. fla rant violation of a

Speedy and pu$lic trial. @ Petitioner invo;es also his constitutional ri ht to 0have a speedy and public trial0 as provided in section &7&E of Article >>> of the Constitution. (here is absolutely no 3uestion that this constitutional ri ht of petitioner has been e3ually violated. +,ual protection of t e la!s. @ Petitioner complains that he !as not accorded e3ual protection of the la!s as provided in section &7& of Article >>> of the Constitution.

Petitioner%s alle ation is e3ually !ell8founded, there bein no 3uestion as to the fact that he !as and he is bein deprived of several of his fundamental ri hts under the Constitution !ithout any le al process. Cruel and unusual punis ment. @ Petitioner complains that he !as sub?ected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section &7&' of Article >>> of the Constitution. (here is no 3uestion that petitioner is bein deprived of his liberty !ithout any information or complaint char in him of any specified offense under the la!s of the land. )o it appears that he is bein , in effect, sub?ected to the punishment of deprivation of liberty for almost one year, !ithout any definite information as to !hen !ill it end. (his means that he is bein sub?ected to imprisonment for an indefinite term. >t is certainly a cruel and unusual punishment, not only because it is not authori,ed by any la! of the land, but because it is meted out to petitioner for no specific offense at all. (he violation of section &7&' of Article >>> of the Constitution is indispensable. Petitioner complains that those responsible for his detention appear to have never heard of such trifles as those contained in the Bill of Ri hts and even if they did, they contend that the Constitution !as never meant for the 0untouchables0 ;no!n in the contemporary Philippine history as a 0collaborators,0 and that no one can ima ine a more larin case for the rantin of a !rit of a$eas corpus than that of the petitioner, it appearin that the circumstances of his arrest are self8demonstrative of the most scandalous violation of the Bill of Ri hts ever perpetrated under the American fla . Petitioner, as has been sho!n, appears !ell supported in his complaint. No!, as one of the 3uestions raised in this case, let us determine the validity of that portion of section &' of Common!ealth Act No. "#$, an act creatin the People%s Court, !hich provides as follo!s7

. . . And, provided, furt er, (hat, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred t!enty8five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filin of the correspondin information !ith the People%s Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than si5 <"= months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander8in8Chief of the Armed +orces of the /nited )tates in the Philippines to the Common!ealth *overnment. (he provision of the Revised Penal Code !hich has been virtually suspended by this la! is7 AR(. &$.. &elay in t e delivery of detained persons to t e proper -udicial aut orities. @ (he penalties provided in the ne5t precedin article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee !ho shall detain any person for some le al round and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper ?udicial authorities !ithin the period of si5 hours. <As amended by Act No. D'-B.= (he pertinent provisions of our fundamental la! !hich limit the po!ers of the le islative branch of our overnment in the enactment of la!s are as follo!s7 ART. III. . BILL O- RIG/TS )EC(>9N &. <&= No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property !ithout due process of la!, nor shall any person be denied the e3ual protection of the la!s. 555 555 555

<&.= No person shall be held to ans!er for a criminal offense !ithout due process of la!. 555 555 555

<&E= >n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall en?oy the ri ht to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation a ainst him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the !itnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of !itnesses in his behalf. &evelopment of t e &octrine of &ue Process of .a!. (hou h the !ords 0due process of la!0 have not a lon history, the doctrine implied by them has a history in An lo8American la! !hich e5tends for more than seven hundred years @ bac;, indeed, to the si nin of Ma na Charta. And yet, not!ithstandin this lon period durin !hich countless opportunities have presented themselves for its application and ?udicial definition, the doctrine has not yet received a statement in such a form that its specific applications can, in all cases, be determined. (his failure has been due, not to any lac; of ?udicial effort or acumen, but to the very nature of the doctrine !hich, assertin a fundamental principle of ?ustice rather than a specific rule of la!, is not susceptible of more than eneral statement. (he result is, that the meanin of the phrase has to be sou ht in the history of its specific applications, and, as the variety of these possible applications is infinite, it !ill probably never be possible to say that the full content of that meanin has been determined. >n (!inin vs. Ne! 1ersey <$&& /.)., E#=, !e find the court sayin 7 0+e! phrases in the la! are so elusive of e5act apprehension as this. (his court has al!ays declined to ive a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that its full meanin should be radually ascertained by the process of inclusion and e5clusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise.0 )o also in 2avidson vs. Ne! 9rleans <'" /.)., 'E=, the court said7 0to define !hat it is for a state to deprive a person of life, liberty or property !ithout due process of la!, in terms !hich !ould cover every e5ercise of po!er thus forbidden to the state, and e5clude those !hich are not, no more useful construction could be furnished by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental la!.0 And, later in the same opinion7 0(here is !isdom in the ascertainin of the intent and application of such an important phrase in the +ederal Constitution by the radual process of ?udicial inclusion and e5clusion as the cases presented for decision shall re3uire, !ith the reasonin on !hich such discussions may be founded.0

>n 4olden vs. 4ardy <&"' /.)., D""= the court said7 0(his court has never attempted to define !ith precision the !ords 0due process of la!.0 >t is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of ?ustice !hich inhere in the very idea of free overnment !hich no member of the /nion may disre ard.0 >t !ould appear, then, that a complete ;no!led e of the meanin of the doctrine of due process of la! in American constitutional ?urisprudence can be obtained only by a study of every case in !hich its application has been sou ht. . . . Per .e*em /errae. (he historical antecedents of the phrase 0due process of la!0 may be clearly traced bac; to the e5pression per le em terrae as it occurs in the Charter !run by the Barons from Iin 1ohn. (he D'th chapter of that document provides that 0no freeman shall be ta;en, or imprisoned, or dissei,ed, or outla!ed, or e5iled, or in any !ay destroyed6 nor shall !e o upon him nor send upon him, but by the la!ful ?ud ment of his peers or by the la! of the land0 <per le*em terrae=. >n the later re8issues and reaffirmations of this charter by 4enry >>>, in &$&", &$&E and &$$., this provision !as repeated, !ith, ho!ever, in the issues of &$&E and &$$., the addition of the !ords after dissei,ed, 0of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,0 <de li$era tenemento suo vel li$ertati$us, vel li$eris consuetudini$us suis=. (he !ords of Ma na Charta, per le*em terrae, probably had at this time the technical meanin that no civil or criminal plea should be decided a ainst a freeman until he had been iven the opportunity to furnish the customary 0proof0 !hich the la!, as it then stood, reco ni,ed and permitted him to offer. (his proof mi ht be by battle, or ordeal, or by compur ation. Ahatever form it mi ht assume it !as technically ;no!n as a la! <le"=, that is, as a test accordin to !hich the defendant%s claim !as to be upheld or denied. <McIechnie, %a*na C arta, &B$, --&, --$6 (hayer, +vidence, $BB6 Bi elo!, History of Procedure, &... (hayer and Bi elo! are cited by McIechnie.= >n the various petitions of the Parliament in the +ourteenth

Century a ainst the arbitrary acts of the Iin %s Council, the uaranty of the la! of the land !as appealed to, and these petitions, !hen assented to by the Iin , became, of course, statutes of the realm. (hus, in &DD&, in )tat. . Ed!. >>>, C. ', it !as declared that 0no man from henceforth shall be attac;ed by any accusation, nor fore?ud ed of life or limb, nor his lands, tenements, oods nor chattels sei,ed into the Iin %s hands a ainst the form of the *reat Charter and the la! of the land.0 )o a ain, in &D.&, in )tat. $., Ed!. >>>, C. -, it !as declared that 0from henceforth none shall be ta;en by petition or su estion made to our lord the Iin or his Council, unless it be by presentment or indictment of his ood and la!ful people of the same nei hborhood, !here such deeds be done, in due manner, or by process made by !rit ori inal at the common la!, nor that none be ousted of his franchises, nor of his household, unless he be fully brou ht in to ans!er and fore?ud ed of the same by the courts of the la!.0 )till a ain, in &D.., in )tat. $#, Ed!. >>>, C. D, there !as a substantially similar provision, and there, for !hat !ould appear to be the first time, !e have the modern phrase employed. 0No man,0 it !as declared, 0of !hat state or condition so ever he be, shall be put out of his lands, or tenements, nor ta;en, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, !ithout he be brou ht in to ans!er by due process of la!.0 <Par due process de lei.= <Cf. Mc*ehee, &ue Process of .a!, Chap. >.= >t is thus apparent that in these petitions and statutes of Ed!ard >>>, the phrases 0due process of la!0 and 0the la! of the land0 had come to be synonymous, both indicatin , as the substance of the petitions sho!s, that the uaranty insisted upon !as that persons should not be imprisoned e5cept upon due indictment, or !ithout an opportunity on their parts to test the le ality of their arrest and detention, and that their property should not be ta;en e5cept in proceedin s conducted in due form in !hich fair opportunity !as offered to the one claimin o!nership or ri ht to possession to appear and sho! cause, if any, !hy the sei,ure should not be made. (he Petition of Ri ht of &"$#, approved by Charles >, recited various arbitrary acts complained of, and appealed to 0the la!s and franchises of the realm.0 Co;e, in his )econd >nstitute,

defined the phrase per le*em terrae as meanin 0the common la!, statute la! or custom of En land,0 and then declared7 0+or the true sense and e5position of these !ords, see the )tatute DE, Ed!. >>>, C. #, !here the !ords 0by the la! of the land0 are rendered 0!ithout due process of la!0, for there it is said, thou h it be contained in the *reat Charter, that no man be ta;en, imprisoned, or put out of his freehold !ithout due process of la!6 that is by indictment or presentment of ood and la!ful men !here such deeds be done or by !rit ori inal of the common la!. >t !as in this sense as employed in the statutes of Ed!ard >>> and by Co;e, and as relatin solely to matters of procedure, that the phrase due process of la! !as introduced into, American la!. <D Aillou hby on the Constitution of the /nited )tates, $d ed., sections &&&D, &&&-, pp. &"#., &"##,= +n*lis and American 0se of t e P rase 1&ue Process of .a!1 Contrasted. Comin no! to American practice !e find that the e5act phrase 0due process of la!0 !as not employed in any of the eleven )tate constitutions adopted prior to the +ederal Constitution, but that it early found e5pression in substance, if not in very !ords, in those instruments. (he very !ords do, ho!ever, appear in the 2eclaration of Ri hts of the )tate of Ne! Cor;, adopted in &EEE, and in one of the amendments proposed by that )tate to the +ederal Constitution as drafted by the convention of &E#E. (he first appearance of the e5press provision in an American instrument of overnment is in the +ifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the /nited )tates, adopted in &E'&. (hat amendment provides, inter alia, that 0nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, !ithout due process of la!.0 (he +ederal imposition of this re3uirement upon the )tates did not come until &#"# !hen the +ourteenth Amendment !as ratified. >t is a very remar;able fact that not until our !ritten Constitution !as more than half a century old did the phrase receive an interpretation and application !hich appro5imates that !hich it has today, and not, indeed, until a hundred years had passed

a!ay !as resort had to it as the usual device of those disapprovin of the acts of their le islatures. (his, ho!ever, is no doubt in a measure e5plainable by the fact that not until the increased comple5ity of social and industrial life had led, upon the one hand, to the use by the )tate and +ederal *overnments of administrative process more or less summary in character and, upon the other hand, to a mar;ed increase in the re ulative control of la! over private acts and the use of public property, did there appear the necessity for the appeal to this limitation by those !ho conceived themselves in?ured by the e5ercise of such administrative po!ers or by the enforcement of these le islative re ulations. >n t!o most important respects the application in America of the re3uirement of due process of la! has differed from that !hich it had received in En land prior to &EE", and !hich, indeed, it still receives in that country. (hese are7 <&= that, in the /nited )tates, it operates as a limitation upon the le islative as !ell as upon the e5ecutive branch of the overnment, and <$= that it relates to substantive as !ell as to procedural ri hts. (his second application is, ho!ever, one !hich, as !e shall see, !as not at first developed. Before the re3uirement could be reco ni,ed as one upon the le islature there had first to be established the doctrine that the courts, !hen called upon to apply the enactments of the la!ma;in branch of the overnment of !hich they themselves constitute the ?udiciary, may declare the invalidity of enactments !hich, in their ?ud ment, conflict !ith the provisions of the !ritten Constitution. (his doctrine, as is !ell ;no!n, !as not accepted !ithout protest, but may be said to have received final and decisive sanction as a fundamental principle of American constitutional ?urisprudence in the reat opinion of Marshall, rendered in &#BD, in the case of Marbury vs. Madison <& Cr., &DE=. (hat, as contrasted !ith En lish practice, the re3uirement of due process of la! !as a limitation upon the le islative po!er, so far, at least, as to render void an enactment authori,in a ta;in of life, liberty or property by an arbitrary or other!ise defective procedure, seems early to have been held, the ar ument bein

founded upon the obvious fact that, as contrasted !ith the En lish constitutional documents, American !ritten instruments of overnment and their accompanyin Bills of Ri hts have for their primary aim the delimitation of the po!ers of all the departments of overnment, @ of the le islative as !ell as the e5ecutive and ?udicial. <D Aillou hby, $d ed., section &&&., pp. &"#', &"'B.= (he possibility, under a popular form of overnment, of oppression in the form of la!s enacted by their o!n representatives, does not appear to have been ;eenly felt by the people. )o far, ho!ever, as it !as apprehended, the early vie! seems to have been that the restraints of natural la! !ould be operative, accordin to the doctrine that the la!8ma;in branch of every overnment is inherently !ithout the po!er arbitrarily and oppressively to invade the sphere of private ri hts of persons and property. (his natural la! doctrine, thou h it can never be said to have ained a definite establishment, even for a time, nevertheless received fre3uent obiter assertion, and its influence !as for a lon time seen in discussions of our hi her courts. (hus, for e5ample, in &#E., in Loan Association vs. (ope;a the court said7 0>t must be conceded that there are such ri hts in every free overnment beyond the control of the state, @ a overnment !hich reco ni,ed no such ri hts, !hich held the lives, the liberty and the property of its citi,ens sub?ect at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of po!er is, after all, but a despotism .. (he theory of our overnments, state and municipal, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited po!er any!here. (he e5ecutive, the le islative and the ?udicial branches of these overnments are all of limited and defined po!ers. (here are limitations on such po!er !hich ro! out of the essential nature of all free overnments @ implied reservations of individual ri hts, !ithout !hich the social compact could not e5ist, and !hich are respected by all overnments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, !ould hesitate to declare void a statute !hich enacted that A And B !ho !ere husband and !ife to each other should be no lon er, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the !ife of 2, or !hich should enact that the homestead no! o!ned by A should

henceforth be the property of B.0 D Aillou hby, /nited )tates Constitutional La!, section &&&", pp. &"'$, &"'D.= (here are certain eneral principles, !ell settled, ho!ever, !hich narro! the field of discussion, and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. (hese principles ro! out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the authority of Co;e, that the !ords 0due process of la!0 are e3uivalent in meanin to the !ords 0la! of the land,0 contained in that chapter of %a*na C arta !hich provides that 0no freeman shall be ta;en, or imprisoned, dissei,ed, or outla!ed, or e5iled, or any !ise destroyed6 nor shall !e o upon him, nor send upon him, but by la!ful ?ud ment of his peers, or by the la! of the land.0 >n 4a ar vs. Reclamation 2ist. it !as said7 0>t is sufficient to say that by due process of la! is meant one !hich, follo!in the forms of la!, is appropriate to the case and ?ust to the parties to be affected. >t must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the la!, it must be adapted to the end to be attained, and !henever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must ive them an opportunity to be heard respectin the ?ustness of the ?ud ment sou ht. (he clause, therefore, means that there can be no proceedin a ainst life, liberty, or property !hich may result in deprivation of either, !ithout the observance of those eneral rules established in our system of ?urisprudence for the security of private ri hts.0 0By the la! of the land,0 said Aebster in a much 3uoted para raph, 0is most clearly intended the eneral la! !hich hears before it condemns6 !hich proceeds upon in3uiry and renders ?ud ment only after trial. (he meanin is that every citi,en shall hold his life, liberty and property and immunities under the protection of eneral rules !hich overn society. Everythin !hich may pass under the form of an enactment is not la! of the land.0 <D Aillou hby, $d ed., pp. &EB#, &EB'.= (he fact that the re3uirement as to due process includes, to a very considerable e5tent at least, the uarantee of e3ual protection of the la!s, is especially sho!n in the opinion of the court in )myth vs. Ames !here it is said7 0(he e3ual protection of

the la!s, !hich by the +ourteenth Amendment no )tate can deny to the individual, forbids le islation, in !hatever form it may be enacted, by !hich the property of an individual is, !ithout compensation, !rested from him for the benefit of another, or of the public.0 (he possible distinction bet!een the t!o prohibitions !e find touched upon by Chief 1ustice (aft in his opinion in (rua5 vs. Corri an. 4e there said7 0>t may be that they <the t!o prohibitions= overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times the violation of the other, but the spheres of the protection they offer are not conterminous. . . . (he due process clause . . . of course tends to secure e3uality of la! in the sense that it ma;es a re3uired minimum of protection for everyone%s ri ht of life, liberty, and property, !hich the Con ress of the le islature may not !ithhold. 9ur !hole system of la! is predicated on the eneral fundamental principle of e3uality of application of the la!. . . . But the farmers and adopters of this <+ourteenth= Amendment !ere not content to depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process clause, or upon the spirit of e3uality !hich mi ht not be insisted on by local public opinion. (hey therefore embodied that spirit in a specific uaranty. (he uaranty !as aimed at undue favor and individual or class privile e, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of ine3uality, on the other. >t sou ht an e3uality of treatment of all persons, even thou h all en?oyed the protection of due process.0 (hus, in the instant case, the Chief 1ustice pointed out that the )tate statute under e5amination !hich prohibited interference by in?unctions in disputes bet!een employers and employees concernin terms or conditions of employment resulted in the reco nition of one set of actions a ainst ordinary tort feasors and another set a ainst tort feasors in labor disputes. (he contention that no one has a vested ri ht to in?unctive relief, he said, did not meet the ob?ection that the rantin of e3uitable relief to one man or set of men, and denyin it to others under li;e circumstances and in the same ?urisdiction !as a denial of the e3ual protection of the la!s. >n 4ayes vs. Missouri the court said of the +ourteenth Amendment that it 0does not prohibit le islation !hich is limited either in the

ob?ects to !hich it is directed or by the territory !ithin !hich it is to operate. >t merely re3uires that all persons sub?ect to such le islation shall be treated ali;e, under li;e circumstances and conditions both in the privile es conferred and in the liabilities imposed.0 4avin 3uoted this statement, Chief 1ustice (aft in (rua5 vs. Corri an added7 0>ndeed, protection is not protection unless it does so. >mmunity ranted to a class, ho!ever limited, havin the effect to deprive another class, ho!ever limited, of a personal or property ri ht, is ?ust clearly a denial of e3ual protection of the la!s to the latter class as if the immunity !ere in favor of, or the deprivation of ri ht permitted !or;ed a ainst, a lar er class.0 +rom !hat has been said it is clear that, in many cases, la!s !hich have been held invalid as denyin due process of la! mi ht also have been so held as denyin e3ual protection of the la!s, or vice versa, and that, in fact, in not a fe! cases the courts have referred to both prohibitions leavin it uncertain !hich prohibition !as deemed the most pertinent and potent in the premises. 09ne of the best eneral statements of the scope and intent of the provision for the e3ual protection of the la!s is that iven by 1ustice +ield in his opinion in Barbier vs. Connolly, in !hich, spea;in for the court, he said7 0(he +ourteenth Amendment in declarin that no )tate 0shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property !ithout due process of la!, nor deny to any person !ithin its ?urisdiction the e3ual protection of the la!s,0 undoubtedly intended, not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property but that e3ual protection and security should be iven to all under li;e circumstances in the en?oyment of their personal and civil ri hts6 that all persons should be e3ually entitled to pursue their happiness and ac3uire and en?oy property6 that they should have li;e access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of !ron s, and the enforcement of contracts6 that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits by anyone e5cept as applied to the same pursuits by others under li;e circumstances6 that no reater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same callin and

condition, and that in the administration of criminal ?ustice no different or hi her punishment should be imposed upon one that such as is prescribed to all for li;e offenses.0 <D Aillou hby $d ed., pp. &'$#, &'DB.= (he le islature may suspend the operation of the eneral la!s of the )tate, but !hen it does so the suspension must be eneral, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. Privile es may be ranted to particular individuals !hen by so doin the ri hts of others are not interferred !ith6 disabilities may be removed6 the le islature as parens patriae, !hen not forbidden, may rant authority to the uardians or trustees of incompetent persons to e5ercise a statutory control over their states for their assistance, comfort, or support, or for the dischar e of le al or e3uitable liens upon their property6 but every one has a ri ht to demand that he be overned by eneral rules, and a special statute !hich, !ithout his consent, sin les his case out as one to be re ulated by a different la! from that !hich is applied in all similar cases, !ould not be le itimate le islation, but !ould be such an arbitrary mandate as is not !ithin the province of free overnments. (hose ma;e the la!s 0are to overn by promul ated, established la!s, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plou h.0 (his is a ma5im in constitutional la!, and by it !e may test the authority and bindin force of le islative enactments. <Cooley%s Constitutional Limitations, Eth ed., pp. ..#, ..'.= E3uality of ri hts, privile es, and capacities un3uestionably should be the aim of the la!6 and if special privile es are ranted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the le islature desi ned to depart as little as possible from this fundamental ma5im of overnment. (he )tate, it is to be presumed, has no favors to besto!, and desi ns to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of ri hts. )pecial privile es are al!ays obno5ious, and discriminations a ainst persons or classes are still more so6 and, as a rule of construction, it is to be presumed they !ere probably not contemplated or desi ned. <Cooley%s Constitutional Limitations, Eth ed., pp. ."$,

."D.= >t is usual for state constitutions and statutes to provide for the accused a speedy and public trial. By a speedy trial is meant one that can be had as soon after indictment as the prosecution can !ith reasonable dili ence prepare for, re ard bein had to the terms of court6 a trial conducted accordin to fi5ed rules, re ulations, and proceedin s of la!, free from ve5atious, capricious, and oppressive delays. (he term 0speedy0 as thus used, bein a !ord of indeterminate meanin , permits le islative definition to some e5tent6 and the authorities uniformly hold that such statutes are enacted for the purpose of enforcin the constitutional ri ht, and that they constitute a le islative construction or definition of the constitutional provision, and must be construed fairly to the accomplishment of that end. Any act of the le islature !hich infrin es the constitutional provision is necessarily nu atory. <&" C. 1., pp. -D', --B.= 1/ e purpose of t e statute <&= is to prevent continued incarceration !ithout opportunity to the accused, !ithin a reasonable time, to meet the proofs upon !hich the char e is based.0 <)tate vs. Miller, E$ Aash., &.-, &.', &"D6 &$' P., &&-B.= <$= 0(he constitutional privile e of a speedy trial !as intended to prevent an arbitrary, indefinite imprisonment, !ithout any opportunity to the accused to face his accusers in a public trial. >t !as never intended as furnishin a technical means for escapin trial.0 <)tate vs. Miller, supra.= <D= 0(he sole ob?ect and purpose of all the la!s from first to last, !as to ensure the speedy trial to the accused, and to uard a ainst the a protracted imprisonment or harrassment by a criminal prosecution, an ob?ect but little if any less interestin to the public than to him.0 <Com. vs. Adcoc;, # *rat. F-' Ha.G, ""&, "#B.= <Juote 2enham vs. Robinson, E$ A. Ha. $-D, $..6 EE ). E., 'EB6 -. L.R.A., N.)., &&$D6 Ann. Cas. &'&.2, ''E.= <See also +" parte )antee <$ Ha. Cas. F- Ha.G, D"D, D".= <!here the court said7 that !hilst it has an eye to the solemn duty of protectin the public a ainst the !ron s of those !ho are re ardless of their obli ations to society, and to the delays !hich the Common!ealth may unavoidably encounter in prosecutin breaches of these obli ations, it is studious to shield the accused from conse3uences of the laches of those to !hom the duty of

conductin the prosecution may have been assi ned. (he public has ri hts as !ell as the accused, and one of the first of these is, that of redressin , or punishin their !ron s. >t !ould not seem reasonable that this ri ht, so necessary for the preservation of society, should be forfeited !ithout its default=. 0(his provision of our constitutions must receive a reasonable interpretation. >t can not be held to mean that in all the possible vicissitudes of human affairs, a person !ho is accused of a crime shall have a speedy and public trial in due form of la!, because there may be times !hen the civil administration !ill be suspended by the force of uncontrollable circumstances. (his constitutional provision !as adopted upon eneral considerations ro!in out of the e5perience of past times, and !as intended to prevent the overnment from oppressin the citi,en by holdin criminal prosecutions suspended over him for an indefinite time6 and it !as also intended to prevent delays in the customary administration of ?ustice, by imposin upon the ?udicial tribunals an obli ation to proceed !ith reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal accusations.0 <+" parte (urman, $" (e5., EB#, E&B6 #Am. 2., .'#.=. <&" C.1., --B, footnote.= >n any criminal case, the person accused may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property e5cept by due process of la!, even thou h he is uilty. (he la! by !hich the 3uestion of due process is determined is the la! of the ?urisdiction !here the offense !as committed and the trial is had. 2ue process of la! in a criminal case re3uires a la! creatin or definin the offense, a court of competent ?urisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend, trial before an impartial ?ud e or ?ud e and ?ury accordin to established criminal procedure, and a ri ht to be dischar ed unless found uilty. . . . Ahile the freedom of the state and federal overnments to control and re ulate the procedure of their courts for the prosecution of criminal offenses is limited by the re3uirement of the process of la!, and the procedure must not !or; a denial of fundamental ri hts of accused included !ithin the conception of due process, no particular form or method of procedure in

criminal cases is re3uired by the uaranty of due process so lon accused as accused has due and sufficient notice of the char e or accusation and an ade3uate opportunity to be heard in defense. <&" C.1.)., pp. &&E&8&&ED.= An emer*ency e"istin* does not increase constitutional po!er or diminish constitutional restrictions6 hence !hile emer ency le islation may temporarily limit available remedies, it does not contemplate the permanent denial of due process. <&" C.1. )., p. &&.E.= Althou h a la! is fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered !ith an evil eye and une3ual hand, so as to ma;e un?ust and ille al discrimination, it is !ithin the prohibition of the +ederal Constitution. <Chy Lun vs. +reeman, '$ /.)., $E.6 $D La!, ed., ..B.= (he action of a state throu h its officers char ed !ith the administration of a la! fair in appearance may be of such a character as to constitute a denial of the e3ual protection of the la!s. <Bailey vs. Alabama, $&' /.)., $&'6 D& )up. Ct. Rep., &-.6 .. La!. ed., &'&.= (he clause 0due process of la!0 means that there can be no proceedin a ainst life, liberty or property !hich may result in the deprivation of either, !ithout the observance of those eneral rules established in our system of ?urisprudence for the security of private ri hts. <(urpin vs. Lemon, &#E /.)., .&6 $D )up. Ct. Rep., $B6 -E La!. ed., EB.= CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty consist in the mode of trial !hich is secured to every person accused of crime. At the common la!, accusations of felony !ere made in the form of an indictment by a rand ?ury6 and this process is still retained in many of the )tates, !hile others have substituted in its stead an information filed by the prosecutin officer of the )tate or country. (he mode of investi atin the facts, ho!ever, is the same in all6 and this throu h a trial by ?ury,

surrounded by certain safe uards !hich are a !ell understood part of the system, and !hich the overnment cannot dispense !ith. +irst, !e may mention that the humanity of our la! al!ays presumes an accused party innocent until he is proved to be uilty. (his is a presumption !hich attends all the proceedin s a ainst him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, !hich either finds the party uilty or converts the presumption of innocence into an ad?ud ed fact. >f there !ere any mode short of confinement !hich !ould, !ith reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused to ans!er the accusation, it !ould not be ?ustifiable to inflict upon him that indi nity, !hen the effect is to sub?ect him, in a reater or less de ree, to the punishment of a uilty person, !hile as yet it is not determined that he has committed any crime. >f the punishment on conviction cannot e5ceed in severity the forfeiture of a lar e sum of money, then it is reasonable to suppose that such a sum of money, or an a reement by responsible parties to pay it to the overnment in case the accused should fail to appear, !ould be sufficient security for his attendance6 and therefore, at the common la!, it !as customary to ta;e security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor6 one or more friends of the accused underta;in for his appearance for trial, and a reein that a certain sum of money should be levied of their oods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default. . . . (he presumption of innocence is an absolute protection a ainst conviction and punishment, e5cept either, first on confession in open court6 or, second, on proof !hich places the uilt beyond any reasonable doubt. +ormerly, if a prisoner arrai ned for felony stood mute !ilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode !as resorted to for the purpose of compellin him to do so6 and this mi ht even end in his death6 but a more merciful proceedin is no! substituted6 the court enterin a plea of not uilty for a party !ho, for any reason, fails to plead for himself. A ain, it is re3uired that the trial be speedy6 and here also the in?unction is addressed to the sense of ?ustice and sound ?ud ment of the court. >n this country, !here officers are specially

appointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions, their position ives them an immense po!er for oppression6 and it is so to be feared they do not al!ays sufficiently appreciate the responsibility, and !ield the po!er !ith due re ard to the le al ri hts and privile es of the accused. Ahen a person char ed !ith crime is !illin to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the part of the prosecution is reasonable, e5cept only that !hich is necessary for proper preparation and to secure the attendance of !itnesses. Hery much, ho!ever, must be left to the ?ud ment of the prosecutin officer in these cases6 and the court !ould not compel the overnment to proceed to trial at the first term after indictment found or information filed, if the officer !ho represents it should state, under the responsibility of his official oath, that he !as not and could not be ready at that time. But further delay !ould not enerally be allo!ed !ithout a more specific sho!in of the causes !hich prevent the )tate proceedin to trial, includin the names of the !itnesses, the steps ta;en to procure them, and the facts e5pected to be proved by them, in order that the court mi ht ?ud e of the reasonableness of the application, and that the prisoner, mi ht, if he sa! fit to ta;e that course, secure an immediate trial by admittin that the !itnesses, if present, !ould testify to the facts !hich the prosecution have claimed could be proven by them. <Cooley%s Constitutional Limitations, Eth ed., pp. -D"8--&.= )ection &' of our Bill of Ri hts provides that 0no citi,en of this state shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privile es or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, e5cept by the due course of the la! of the land.0 0La! of the land0 is interpreted to mean a eneral public la!, operatin e3ually upon every member of the community. <Re 1il,, D Mo. App., $-".= 0No state shall . . . deny to any person !ithin its ?urisdiction the e3ual protection of the la!s60 0nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property !ithout due process of la!.0 . . . /.). Constitution, section &, article &-. 2ue process of la! under the &-th Amendment and the e3ual

protection of the la! are secured if the la! operates on all ali;e and does not sub?ect the individual to the arbitrary e5ercise of the po!ers of overnment. <2uncan vs. Missouri, &.$ /.)., D#$6 D# La!. ed. -#E6 &- )up. Ct. Rep., .EB6 4urtado vs. California, &&B /.)., .D.6 $# La!. ed., $D$6 - )up. Ct. Rep., &&&, $'$.= 2o la!s operate e3ually upon the citi,ens of the Common!ealth of (e5as !hich !ill imprison under li;e verdicts one man for a month and another for si5 monthsK Manifestly not. )ection D of the Bill of Ri hts to the )tate Constitution provides7 0All freemen, !hen they form a social compact, have e3ual ri hts.0 A la! !hich ma;es different punishments follo! the same identical criminal acts in the different political subdivisions of (e5as violates both our state and +ederal Constitutions. >t fails to accord e3ual ri hts and e3ual protection of the la!, and a conviction under it is not in due course of the 0la! of the land.0 Re 1il, <D Mo. App., $-"=6 Re 4.+. Millon <&" >daho, EDE6 $$ L.R.A. FN.).G, &&$D6 &B$ Pac., DE-=, and 1ac;son vs. )tate <.. (e5. Crim. Rep., ..E6 &&E ).A., #&#=, are cited in support of our vie! in their reasonin . Ae thin; the principles announced in the case of +" parte 1ones <&B" (e5. Crim. Rep., &#.6 $'B ).A., &EE=, apply in some de ree to the instant case. >t !as there held that article E'D, Code Crim. Proc., superseded and controlled an ordinance of the city of 2allas !hich allo!ed only .B cents per day to be credited upon the fine of a convict for labor performed. Provisions similar to those 3uoted in our state constitution have been a part of An lo8)a5on ?urisprudence since there !as !run from the un!illin hands of Iin 1ohn at Runnymede in &$&. the Ma na Charta, !hich itself provides that a freeman shall not be passed upon or condemned but 0by the la!ful ?ud ment of his peers and the la! of the land.0 0La! of the land0 has the same le al meanin as 0due process of la!,0 and one of its accepted meanin s is that 3uoted above. Re 1il,, D Mo. App., $-D6 D Aords L Phrases, pp. $$$E8$$D$. <+" parte )i,emore, .' A.L.R., Annotated, pp. -DB, -D$.=

And in Re 1il, <F&#EEG=, D Mo. App., $-D=, an act of the le islature of Missouri, !hich, by limitin the po!er of a court established in a certain county to assess punishments, varied the penalties for crimes committed therein from those fi5ed by the eneral la! for the !hole state, !as held to be unconstitutional in so far as it had that effect, the court sayin 7 0A la! !hich should prescribe death as the punishment of murder in one county, and imprisonment as the penalty for the same crime in other parts of the state, !ould be void, because not operatin e3ually upon all inhabitants of the state. (he eneral la! applicable to the state prescribes, as the punishment for the offense for !hich the petitioner !as convicted, imprisonment in the county ?ail not e5ceedin one year, or fine not e5ceedin M.BB, or both such fine imprisonment. . . . A la! prescribin a different punishment from this in )t. Louis county is clearly unconstitutional. >t follo!s that so much of the act referred to, establishin the court of criminal correction, as limits the punishment for this misdemeanor in )t. Louis county to imprisonment for si5 months, is void.0 )o, in )tate vs. Buchardt <Mo.= supra, !here the same le islative act !as in 3uestion, the court says7 0/nder our Constitution, it is not permissible to punish the same offense or violation of some public or eneral la! by one species of punishment in one locality, and by a different or more heavy punishment in other localities in the state. A la! inflictin such different penalties for the perpetration of any iven crime cannot bear the test of ?udicial e5amination.0 And, in )tate vs. *re ori <F&'$#G, @ Mo @ , $ ).A. F$dG, E-E=, an act of the le islature !hich made children seventeen years of a e in counties of .B,BBB population or more sub?ect to the ?uvenile court act, !hile in counties of less than .B,BBB population children seventeen years of a e !ere not sub?ect to the ?uvenile court act, but !ere sub?ect to full criminal responsibility, !as held unconstitutional as denyin e3ual protection of the la!s6 the court statin that it !as the eneral doctrine that the la! relative to those !ho mi ht be char ed !ith and convicted of crime, as !ell as to the punishment to be inflicted therefor, should operate e3ually upon every citi,en or inhabitant of the state.

And, in )tate vs. +o!ler <F&'$EG, &'D N.C., $'B6 &D" ).E., EB'=, an act of the North Carolina le islature, applicable to five counties of the state only, !hich imposed as punishment for a specified offense a fine only, !hile a statute applicable to the !hole state imposed a fine or imprisonment, !as held to be unconstitutional under both the +ederal and )tate Constitutions as a denial of the e3ual protection of the la!s. (he court says7 0But the statute under consideration cannot be sustained on the round that it !as enacted in the e5ercise of the police po!er. (he 3uestion is !hether it shall supersede 0the la! of land0 @ the eneral public la! !hich !as desi ned to operate !ithout e5ception or partiality throu hout the state. >t is needful to remember that indictment !as drafted under the eneral la!, and that the decisive 3uestion is !hether offenders in the five counties referred to may la!fully be e5empted from the punishment prescribed by the eneral la!6 !hether they shall be sub?ect only to a fine !hen the offenders in ninety8five other counties may be punished by imprisonment. >n our ?ud ment this part of section $ is neither e3ual protection of the la!s nor the protection of e3ual la!s. . . . >t is the rant of a special e5emption from punishment or an e5clusive or separate privile e !hich is forbidden by the cited provision. . . . (he principle of uniformity in the operation of a eneral la! e5tends to the punishment, and denounces as arbitrary and unreasonable the imposition in one county of any ;ind of punishment !hich is different from that !hich is prescribed under the eneral la! to all !ho may be uilty of the same offense. >t follo!s that the provision limitin the punishment for the first offense to a fine must be re arded as an arbitrary class distinction !hich cannot be sustained because forbidden by the fundamental la!, and the ?ud ment !hich !as pronounced by authority of the eneral la! must be upheld. <Annotation, .' A.L.R., Annotated, p. -D-.= Bills of attainder !ere prohibited to be passed, either by the Con ress or by the le islatures of the several )tates. Attainder, in a strict sense, means an e5tinction of civil and political ri hts and capacities6 and at the common la! it follo!ed, as of course, on conviction and sentence to death for treason6 and, in reater or less de ree, on conviction and sentence for the different classes of felony.

A bill of attainder !as le islative conviction for alle ed crime, !ith ?ud ment of death. )uch convictions have not been uncommon under other overnments, and the po!er to pass these bills has been e5ercised by the Parliament of En land at some periods in its history, under the most oppressive and un?ustifiable circumstances, reatly a ravated by an arbitrary course of procedure, !hich had fe! of the incidents of a ?udicial investi ation into alle ed crime. +or some time before the American Revolution, ho!ever, no one had attempted to defend it as a le itimate e5ercise of po!er6 and if it !ould be un?ustifiable any!here, there !ere many reasons !hy it !ould be specially obno5ious under a free overnment, and !hy conse3uently its prohibition, under the e5istin circumstances of our country, !ould be a matter of more than ordinary importance. Every one must concede that a le islative body, from its numbers and or ani,ation, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, !hich renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, it not properly constituted to try !ith coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal char e, especially in those cases in !hich the popular feelin is stron ly e5cited @ the very class of cases most li;ely to be prosecuted by this mode. And althou h it !ould be conceded that, if such bills !ere allo!able, they should properly be presented only for offenses a ainst the eneral la!s of the land, and be proceeded !ith on the same full opportunity for investi ation and defense !hich is afforded in the courts of the common la!, yet it !as remembered that in practice they !ere often resorted to because an obno5ious person !as not sub?ect to punishment under the eneral la!, or because, in proceedin a ainst him this mode, some rule of the common la! re3uirin a particular species of de ree of evidence mi ht be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that a ?ury !ould not be suffered to accept as overcomin the le al presumption of innocence. Ahether the accused should necessarily be served !ith process6 !hat the de ree or species of evidence should be re3uired6 !hether the rules of la! should be follo!ed, either in determinin !hat constituted a crime, or in dealin !ith the accused after conviction @ !ere all 3uestions !hich !ould necessarily address themselves to the le islative discretion and sense of ?ustice6 and

the very 3ualities !hich are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them a ainst popular clamor, or the hate of those in po!ers, !ere precisely those !hich !ere li;ely to prove !ea; or !antin in the le islative body at such a time. And !hat could be more obno5ious in a free overnment than the e5ercise of such a po!er by a popular body, controlled by a mere ma?ority, fresh from the contests of e5citin elections, and 3uite too apt, under the most favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversaries, and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure party endsK Nor !ere le islative punishments of this severe character the only ones ;no!n to parliamentary history6 there !ere others of a milder form, !hich !ere only less obno5ious in that the conse3uences !ere less terrible. (hese le islative convictions !hich imposed punishments less than that of death !ere called bills of pains and penalties, as distin uished from bills of attainder6 but the constitutional provisions !e have referred to !ere undoubtedly aimed at any and every species of le islative punishment for criminal or supposed criminal offenses6 and the term 0bill of attainder0 is used in a eneric sense, !hich !ould include bills of pains and penalties also. (he thou htful reader !ill not fail to discover, in the acts of the American )tates durin the Revolutionary period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if the still more monitory history of the En lish attainders had not been so freshly remembered. )ome of these acts provided for the forfeiture of the estates, !ithin the Common!ealth, of those British sub?ects !ho had !ithdra!n from the ?urisdiction because not satisfied that rievances e5isted sufficiently serious to ?ustify the last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not satisfactory to the e5istin authorities6 and the only investi ation provided for !as an in3uiry into the desertion. 9thers mentioned particular persons by name, ad?ud ed them uilty of adherin to the enemies of the )tate, and proceeded to inflict punishment upon them so far as the presence of property !ithin the Common!ealth !ould enable the overnment to do so. (hese !ere the resorts of a time of e5treme peril, and if possible to ?ustify them in a period of revolution, !hen everythin !as sta;ed

on success, and !hen the public safety !ould not permit too much !ei ht to scruples concernin the private ri hts of those !ho !ere not aidin the popular cause, the po!er to repeat such acts under any conceivable circumstances in !hich the country could be placed a ain !as felt to be too dan erous to be felt in the le islative hands. )o far as proceedin s had been completed under those acts before the treaty of &E#D, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid and effectual after!ards6 but so far as they !ere then incomplete, they !ere put an end to by that treaty. (he conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision has been so universal, that it has never been 3uestioned, either in le islative bodies or else!here. Nevertheless, cases have recently arisen, ro!in out of the attempt to brea; up and destroy the overnment of the /nited )tates, in !hich the )upreme Court of the /nited )tates has ad?ud ed certain actions of Con ress to be in violation of this provision and conse3uently void. (he action referred to !as desi ned to e5clude from practice in the /nited )tates courts all persons !ho had ta;en up arms a ainst the overnment durin the recent rebellion, or !ho had voluntarily iven aid and encoura ement to its enemies6 and the mode adopted to effect the e5clusion !as to re3uire of all persons, before they should be admitted to the bar or allo!ed to practice, an oath ne ativin any such disloyal action. (his decision !as not at first universally accepted as sound6 and the )upreme Courts of Aest Hir inia and of the 2istrict of Columbia declined to follo! it, insistin that permission to practice in the courts is not a ri ht, but a privile e, and that the !ithholdin it for any reason of )tate policy or personal unfitness could not be re arded as the infliction of criminal punishment. (he )upreme Court of the /nited )tates has also, upon the same reasonin , held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri, !hich, amon other thin s, e5cluded all priests and cler ymen from practisin or teachin unless they should first ta;e a similar oath of loyalty, to be void, overrulin in so doin a decision of the )upreme Court of that )tate. <Cooley%s Constitutional Limitations, Eth ed., pp. D"#8DE$.=

(he le al problem confrontin us is characteri,ed by the fact that !e have to avoid the misleadin effect resultin from the difference bet!een the te5t and letter of the la! and their rammatical sense and effect on one side, and as it is interpreted and applied in actual practice. Apparently, there is nothin so harmless as the provision of section &' of Act No. "#$, suspendin for a period of not more than si5 months the provision of article &$. of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Article &$. of the Revised Penal Code punishes the public officer or employee !ho 0shall detain any person for some le al round and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper ?udicial authorities !ithin the period of si5 hours.0 )aid article has nothin to sho! that it bears constitutional sanction. >t is only a part of the penal la!s !hich are !ithin the full ?urisdiction of the le islative po!er to enact or not to enact. (he Philippine Le islature !hich enacted the Revised Penal Code could have failed to do so !ithout, by that very fact, violatin any provision of the Constitution. (he succeedin le islative bodies @ the unicameral National Assembly and the Con ress @ may, !ithout 3uestion, repeal or suspend article &$. of the Revised Penal Code, as any other article of the same, or even the !hole code. (herefore, as an abstract proposition, as a matter of le al technicality, !e believe that there is absolutely no round for disputin the po!er of the le islative body to suspend or even repeal article &$. of the Revised Penal Code. But the provision is vitiated7 <&= By the fact that it is a class le islation, e5cludin the political prisoners concerned from the same benefits and protection afforded all other persons by article &$.. <$= By the fact that it is interpreted and applied, not only in a ne ative sense as a deterrent a ainst public officials or

employees bent on encroachin and tramplin upon the personal freedom of any person, but as a positive authority to said officers and employees to deprive and continue deprivin the political prisoners concerned of their personal liberty, !ithout due or any le al process of la! provided the deprivation of liberty did not e5ceed si5 months, but !ithout rec;onin the previous many months of ille al detention they had already suffered before their formal transfer to the Common!ealth *overnment. +or these t!o radical and incurable defects, section &' of Act No. "#$ runs counter to the Constitution !hen it prohibits that no person shall be deprived of his liberty !ithout due process of la! nor shall any person be denied the e3ual protection of the la!s. <Article >>>, section & F&G, Constitution of the Philippines.= No one can, !ith candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the provision. >f all discriminations are abhorrent under any re ime of la! and ?ustice, imperatively more in a democracy such as ours, tribunals must be recreant to their duties if they fail to deny validity to such an odious le al measure, conceived, adopted, and unhappily enacted by the le islative po!er in one of its blunderin moods in utter defiance of the fundamental la! of the land. Petitioner points out that in the provision there is an unconstitutional dele ation of le islative po!ers, because the po!er to suspend the provision of article &$. of the Revised Penal Code !ithin the ma5imum period of si5 months, in fact, is transferred to the )pecial Prosecutors% 9ffice, !hich may shorten or len then said suspension by filin the correspondin criminal information at any time it may deem convenient. (he )pecial Prosecutors% 9ffice may not suspend alto ether article &$. of the Revised Penal Code by filin immediately the information. >t may suspend it for &B days, by filin the information !ithin that time. >t may suspend it for one month, t!o months, or three months, by filin the information !ithin the desired time. >t may suspend it for a ma5imum period of si5 months ?ust by mere inaction, by not filin any information at all. (he result is, in fact, to place in the hands of the )pecial

Prosecutors% 9ffice the po!er to suspend article &$. for any len th of time !ithin the ma5imum period of si5 months. And !hat is !orst is that the suspension that the )pecial Prosecutors% 9ffice may decree is individuali,ed, and not of eneral effect to all the political prisoners concerned, thus ma;in the )pecial Prosecutors% 9ffice a ;ind of dictatorship !hich may dispense its favors and disfavors to individual prisoners under no other test than its convenience and !hims. Evidently, petitioner%s complaint is !ell8ta;en, ivin additional round for the nullity of the provision in 3uestion, the le islative po!er havin been reserved by the Constitution e5clusively to Con ress. Lastly, the provision in 3uestion appears to le ali,e the many months of ille al detention already endured by the political prisoners concerned. (he le islative po!er can not le ali,e ille al detention, much more if that ille al detention has been perpetrated in utter violation of the Bill of Ri hts of the Constitution. Petitioner assails the validity of the !hole Act No. "#$, aside from !hat has been already said about section &' thereof, upon the follo!in rounds7 <&= Because it is an e" post facto la!, violatin section & <&&=, Article >>>, of the Constitution, petitioner havin been deprived of his ac3uired ri ht to be freed, under penalty to his detainers, !ithin si5 hours after his detention under article &$. of the Revised Penal Code. <$= Because section $ set up a le al trap by !hich a person, accused in the information of an offense, may be convicted and sentenced for a different one, thus violatin his constitutional ri ht 0to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation a ainst him.0 <)ection & F&EG, Article >>>, Constitution of the Philippines.= <D= Because it creates a special court to try cases arisin years before its creation, transferrin a ?urisdiction belon in to courts

of first instance to the People%s Court, a blunder identical in nature and viciousness to the former practice of shufflin ?ud es of first instance, the ?udicial ri*odon resorted to before to suit certain purposes of the overnment and !hich !as stopped by 1ud e Borromeo%s coura eous defense of the independence of the ?udiciary, in a leadin case before the )upreme Court !hich made history. <-= Because the creation of the People%s Court is a ?udicial errymanderin . <.= Because the name 0People%s Court0 su ests a political entity, a popular dispenser of political ?ustice, in contrast !ith the stable, impartial, cultured nature of a ?udiciary, detached from momentary interests and influences. <"= Because the self8e5tin uishin character of the People%s Court ma;es it an a ency for special mission, more an a ency of the le islature than that of the administration of ?ustice. <E= Because it dis3ualifies members of the ?udiciary !ho served under the 1apanese re ime. Ae cannot but reco ni,e that stren th of the ob?ections, specially ob?ections <&=, <$= and <E=. But !e are not ready to support petitioner%s contention that the !hole act should be declared null and void, considerin that the unconstitutional provisions thereof may be se re ated and the remainin portions of the te5t may stand on their o!n feet. 9b?ection <&= adds only another round to sho! the unconstitutionality of the provision of section &', suspendin article &$. of the Revised Penal Code6 and ob?ection <$= only affects the correspondin provision of section $ of the act. 9b?ection <E=, upon !hich !e have already e5pressed our opinion in the case of &e la Rama vs. %isa <-$ off. *a,., &.--=, only affects the provision concernin the dis3ualification of certain ?ustices of the )upreme Court.

Re ardin ob?ections <D=, <-=, <.=, and <"=, althou h they are meritorious, !e believe that they are offset by the colle iate character of the ne!ly created court. Ae are inclined to believe that the main purpose in creatin the the People%s Court !as precisely to afford those !ho !ill be char ed and tried before it a special safe uard, in the fact that more than one ?ud e !ill have to hear and try a case, to counterbalance the prevailin pre?udice in the community a ainst the persons !ho are accused for havin alle edly collaborated !ith the enemy. +or this reason, !e are of opinion that the act creatin the People%s Court must not be invalidated. But it is our hope that its creation !ill not set a precedent that !ill sanction a !ron principle. *enerally spea;in , the creation of temporary tribunals to administer ?ustice in specifically pre8 determined e5istin cases is contrary to the nature and character of ?udicial functions and the purposes of the administration of ?ustice, !hich must be characteri,ed by the independence of ?udicial officers, independence that cannot be secured !ithout uaranteein the stability of tenure of office. 1ud es are not supposed to decide on !hat may appear ri ht or !ron in the evanescent moment !hen the voice of passion ro!s louder in the mar;et of human activities. (hey must not ma;e decisions in the spur of ne!s that ma;e screamin headlines and arouse the uncontrollable emotions of political leaders of the populace. (hey must decide bet!een ri ht and !ron by the criterion of universal conscience, by the ?ud ment, not only of the fleetin instance of evolvin history, but the unendin caravans of enerations to come. (he inherent ?ustice of their decisions must continue bein sensed as the treasured human herita e lon lon after they had rendered their inescapable tribute to death, li;e the aroma !hich continues enrichin and s!eetenin the air lon after the flo!ers have been crushed in the chemist%s retorts to ive !ay to their perfumed essence, li;e the beauty of the temples and palaces of Palmyra !hich continues charmin our memory millenniums after they have become lust dusty ruins, li;e the heavenly melodies !hich continue lin erin in our ears lon after !e have heard

those musical ems, such as the masterpieces of Bach and the symphonies of Beethoven, li;e li ht emitted by stars !hich ceased to e5ist centuries a o still travelin in the immensity of space to attract our admiration and arouse dreams of immortality. >n order that ?ud es could render ?ud ments of lastin value !hich !ould embody the !isdom of the a es and the moral sense of all time, it is necessary that they should preside over tribunals !hich must be loo;ed upon as permanent institutions of ?ustice, not temporary ma;eshifts, more appropriate to serve ephemeral purposes than to be the inviolable temples of an eternal oddess. And the ?ud es themselves, to ac3uire the olympic serenity, the a!esome and noble austerity, the hieratic aloofness, the ma?estic e3uanimity proper of their reat mission, there bein none reater that can be entrusted to a person as the ima e of *od, must feel, by the permanency, stability, and security of their tenure of office, that they o!e an undivided loyalty, not to any transient idols or to any momentary masters, no matter ho! po!erful they are, but to the inseparable t!in divinities of truth and ?ustice. 1ud e Robert N. Ail;in said that the special function of a ?udicial officer is to determine !hat is ri ht and !hat is !ron , not only for the clamorous present, but for silent enerations yet come. +rom him !e 3uote these illuminatin para raphs7 (he uidin force in social evolution is not to be found in the arbitrary !ill of roups, nor in a common purpose. >t is to be found in the la! of our nature, that imminent or inherent la! founded on the characteristics of human ;ind. 0A la! instilled and not imposed,0 as Cicero said, 0a la! in !hich !e are fashioned, not instructed.0 >t is not created by proclamation or le islative fiat. >t is discovered by patient research and spiritual insi ht. (he true ?ud e must have somethin of the vision of a prophet. 4e must be able to see the trends of his time e5tended, so that principles !hich he announces may be ad?usted to conditions yet to come. (he observation of *raham Aallas that a reat ?ud e needs a touch of the 3ualities that ma;e a poet has been 3uoted !ith approval by Professor Chafee, 1ustice Cardo,o, and others.

Poets, as has been stated, bear the same relation to society as the antennae of an insect to its body6 they are 0feelers0 of the body politic. (heir sensibilities are more acute, more advanced than those of their contemporaries, and !hat they feel and e5press today their fello!s !ill feel and understand tomorro!. Poets, prophets, ?ud es @ they are *ods elect6 !e cannot elect them. (he reat ?ud e cannot be a child of his a es. >f his ?ud ments are to be reat they must be timeless, or at least timed to the future. (he spirit of the la! should enable him to transcend the spirit of his times and he should be able to spea; su$ specie aeternitatis. Ahat a desecration of the office to choose its incumbent by any system !hich forces him to tempori,eN 1ud es in early times !ere priests, or more accurately stated, the priests performed the functions of ?ud es. (here is still much about the ?udicial office that is priestly. (his has ever seemed 3uite natural to those !ho too; seriously their first le al learnin from Blac;stone, !ho stated at the outset that all human la!s depend upon divine la!. Ahile for a time that teachin seemed out of fashion, the more recent trend is to ac;no!led e a ain our sub?ection to a la! of nature, a la! divine. Be that as it may, it !ill not disputed that a proper performance of ?udicial duties re3uires a devotion 3uite similar to the consecration of the priest. 1ud es, li;e the cler y, should be ;ept unspotted from the !orld. Any personal interest, selfish concern, or party consciousness, corrupts not only the ?ud e but the ?udicial function. Any !ant of honest detachment in the ?ud e undermines public faith in ?udicial administration. As has fre3uently been stated, it is 3uite as important to the public that ?ud es should be free from the appearance of evil as that they should be free from actual evil. (he prevalent disrespect for la! is prompted not so much by corruption in the courts, as by that system of choosin ?ud es !hich ma;es every ?ud e suspect. (he ta;in of ?udicial office should be much li;e the ta;in of holy orders @ one should not do so !ho is un!illin to suffer a ;ind of civil death. (he only !ay in !hich one can be !orthy of the office is by submer in self in the performance of the duties of the

office. A ?ud e should be only the voice of the la!. As Cicero said, 0Ahile the la! is voiceless ma istrate, the ma istrate is la! made vocal.0 >t is arro ant presumption for a ?ud e to pose as anythin more, and ross indiscretion for him to assert his o!n voice. (he only !ay in !hich he can avoid violation of the in?unction, 01ud e not, that ye be not ?ud ed,0 is by pronouncin , not his personal !ill, but the ?ud ment of the la!. 4o! other!ise could a ?ud e impose a death sentence and live in peaceK >f the ?ud ment is his o!n, the blood of the condemned is upon him. >f his ?ud ment is at the behest of popular clamor he has iven sanction to lynchin . But if his ?ud ment is the pronouncement of the la!, the ?udicial function is fulfilled and his conscience is clear. (he ?udicial robe should submer e personality and ma;e its bearer, li;e a priest in vestment, an impersonal part of a divine function. </ e Judicial Function and t e )eed of Professional Section of Jud*es by Robert N. Ail;in, 1ournal of the American 1udicature )ociety, Hol. $', No. -, 2ec., &'-..= (he facts of current e5perience sho!ed the imperative need of an intellectual overhaulin as part of the !or; of post8!ar rehabilitation in all orders of our national life. Many elemental tenets and ideals need be restated, if not rediscovered. (he !orries and psycholo ical shoc;s caused by the 1apanese initial victories and brutal oppressions concomitant !ith their occupation of our country, had the effect of !arpin the mentality and sense of moral values of not a ne li ible number of persons. (here are men !hose intellectual outloo; and vie!s of freedom and fundamental human ri hts, tethered by defective development of ideolo y, are not only outmoded, but absolutely incompatible !ith the trends of the pro ress, !hose brains appear not to be completely freed from the embryonic amnion and are in need of allantoic nutrition, !ho !ould rather !ield the blud eon of ?un le arbitrariness and ma;e a coffle of serfs of free people, than abide by the constitutional precepts and the noble doctrines of the /N9 Charter, !hose ?uridical ideas, rather than in the forum of modern democracy, have their proper place amon the fossils of aptery5, me atheria, and dinosaurs% museum and, not!ithstandin , are bein haled in apparently responsible sectors of the press as heroes of pro ressiveness. )uch nonsense

and intellectual travesty are inconceivable e5cept in a topsy8turvy !orld !hich has adopted the thyrsus as the choicest emblem of human happiness, !here the fren,ied mental processes have been inverted as if in the Corinthian order, the frie,e, cornice, and architrave are place at the foot of the column and above it the stylobate. Amon the basic concepts that must be included in the !holesale intellectual overhaulin !hich !e need under o, if !e have to follo! the mental, social, le al, and moral thread !hich !as cut at the impact of the disastrous invasion of our soil, is the one !e have on personal liberty, upon !hich the traditional democratic principles !e had been acceptin and follo!in before the enemy occupation, as part of the nature of our social and political institutions, appear to have been for otten, the present case bein one of a series of instances evidencin it, as can be seen in our opinions in Ra3ui,a vs. Bradford <E. Phil., .B=6 Reyes vs. Crisolo*o <E. Phil., $$.=6 &uran vs. A$ad Santos <E. Phil., -&B=6 Herras /ee an#ee vs. Rovira <E. Phil., "D-=6 Herras /ee an#ee vs. &irector of Prisons p. E.", post6 /a2ada vs. 3uirino <-$ 9ff. *a,., D'-=, the pronouncements in !hich !e are reiteratin here. (he moral hiatus in our national life is over, and in this hour of resumption of democratic processes, there is an imperative need, as one of the cornerstones of our national structure, to redefine and reaffirmed our pre8!ar concept of human freedom. (he petitioner is entitled to be immediately set free, and !e v