d

FOliTYMfXVk

FEARS

OF

Mti51TARY

BEEVICE

{ R. s. Milne

Federationof Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Better COmlllUniCatiOnS

Soviet Choices Soviet Views of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Walter . . . .

3 11 16 23 35 40
50 60

J. Bodmcm, Jr., USA . .. John P. Hardt

US Bases . . . . . . . . . . . Alvin J. Coffrell

. . H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . War . . . . . II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M Co/ . . . .

Spirit of NATO Staff To Gain the Profession SwiaBa y . . l)elegatiOn Britains Rear .

Ro/f Elble, Wesf German

. . . . William

Army

PCJUI Ha;f=r

of Arms, . . . . .

. Lt Gen Slr J. W. Hackett, . . . . . . . . . . . . Col . . ..5.

Brifish Army
L. A. Ma=4all

Richard K Hufsan, USA

. . . . . D. C. wcr~f

69 74
al

(laribbean . .

Interests . .

Group Therapy Soviet Version Military Notes

Lf Col . . . . . . . . .

Chadwick
. . . . .

P. Simmons,

USA

of World . . . . . .

. Alexander . . . . . . . . . .

B=gMan . . . . . . . .

86 97 107

MilitaryB oaks .

The Military Review, a pub~ication of the UNITED STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command. The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff college.

Editor in Chief Col Iiennetlt .!7.Lau

Assistant Editor
Lt Col Albert N. Garland Layout Editor 2d Lt Robert K. Lindgren Spanish-American Editor

U Col Juan R. Me14ndez Asst Spanish.American Maj Joai E. Tizol Brazilian Editor Editor

Lt Col Jmio H. Facci Associate Editor COI Daniel E. Halpin Arm# War College Executive Officer

Maj James N. Hale

Production OfAcer
Maj Norman C. Murrag Staff Artist Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIF.W-Fublished monthly by U. S. Army command and G.neml Staff college, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas, i. English, Spanish. end Port.g.ew Use of funds for Drint ing of this publication hbeen .Pr!roved by He%dwartws. Department of the Army, 3 J.IY 1962. fiecond-cl.ss Postaw Datd at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription re.tea: $8.60 (US cummw ) 8 Year in *he United States, United State? miktam wwt offices. and those countries which W. members of the Pan.Arnerma. Postal Union (includmh. Spain): $4.60 a year in .11 other cmmtries. AddTess wbscrw iion mail t. the Book Department, U. a. Army command ..d General Swff C.lkge, FOfi Le.,enw.rth, Ksnsim 66027.

R. S. Milne

The views expressed in this article are the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. ArrmI Command and Genera2 Staff College.Editor.

N 16 September 1963 the Federation of Malaya, the etate of Singapore, and the British coloniee of North Nniember 1963

Borneo and Sarawak joined to form the Federation of Malaysia. In some respects the new Federation is unusual, for it ie composed of four widely differing territories. As an example of how the territories differ, consider the legal status held by each prior to federation. Malaya wae fully independent. Singapore was independent as regards her internal
3

fiMi.AYSIA

policy, but Great Britain was responsible for Singapores defense and external affairs. North Borneo and Sarawak, on the other hand, still had some distance to go along the road to self; government. While the local government councils were directly elected, the elections to the legislature of each were indirect.
Economy

Economically, there are wide differences. Both Malaya and Singapore have begun industrialization programs, although economically the former depends largely on her exports of rubber and tin, and the latter on her position as a free port with a large entrep6t trade. The Borneo territories are hardly industrialized. Even from the point of view of agricultural production, Sarawak, the more densely populated of the two, is badly off. Borneo has better economic prospects with almost inexhaustible supplies of timber and some newly planted rubber. Racially, each of the four territories is mixed in the extreme. In MaIaya, the Malays constitute almost half the population, and slightly outnumber the Chinese. The remainder are chiefly Indian. In Singapore, on the other hand, three-fourths of the population is Chinese, the rest being Malay or Indian. The majority of the population in North Borneo and Sarawak consists of local tribes, but there are several of
R. S. Milne is. Professor of Political Scivnce at the University of Singawor-e. He holds dearees from Oxford University, and ha; taug~t at the University of Bristol, England; Ohio State University.; Victoria Urzivemity of Wellington, Neto Zealand; the University of the Philippines; axd the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. He served in the British Ro#al Artillery from 1940 to 1946.

these with different customs and religione. There is a Chinese population in both coloniesit is higher in Sarawak where it constitute about 30 per. cent of the total population. The natural increase is so, rapid that in a few years the figure will rise to 50 percent. Racially, then, each of the territories is already a patchwork and the new Federation will make the racial issues even more complex.
The Constitution

The Constitution of the new Federation will be based on that of the previoue Federation of Malaya. Becauee of the existence of native rulers in the statee and the need to safeguard their statue, the federal-form govern. ment was chosen. The new Federation will be a peculiar one, becauee its states will not have similar powers. A comparison, in United States terms, would be that the powers of the State of Pennsylvania would differ from those of, say, Arizona or Hawaii. There are good reasons, however, for making distinctions between the powers of the states. For example, Singapore is to retain control over her own education policy (unlike the other three states ) because the high concentration of Chinese there would make it politically difficult to introduce quickly the pro-Malay education pro. gram of the Federation of Malaya. In the case of the Borneo territories, their economic development is so far behind that of Malaya and Singapore that there are to be restrictions on the movement of labor to these territories, even from the rest of the new Federation Some of the reasons behind the formation of the new Federation are economic. There is a need to develop the

RevicW Military

Borneo territories by attracting investment. New industries in Singapore and Malaya will also be helped by being given a wider internal market. It is proposed that industry shall be built UP by the judicious use of tariffs. This will alter Singapores free port status, but the Singapore Government believes that any Ioes it may suffer through a restriction of trade will he more than compensated by the rewards of increased industrialization. Earlier this year a commission, headed by the French economist Jacques Ruetf, indicated how a common market could be set UP and how the change in Singapores free port etatus could take place with leaet dislocation. The commissions report was not published in Kuala Lumpur until the end of July 1963. But its main provisions had already been accepted in London earlier in the month by the four territories when they met to discuss tbe final conditions for the formation of Malaysia.
Main Ressons

The main reasons which produced the new Federation were political. For some years, successive leaders of the government of Singapore had desired to merge with the Federation of Malaya. But the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra, had resisted on the grounds that admitting so many Chinese would upset the racial balance in Malaya. In May 1961 there came a dramatic change: Abdul Rahman announced proposals, not just for a merger with Singapore, but for a union of all four territories and the Sultanate of Brunei which is adjacent to Sarawak. There appears to have been two
, Mihw, .. Ms.laysia: the Making,)- Ada,, ,%,wg, 2, February 1963.

principal reasons for Abdul Rahmans changed stand: The Singapore Government was having trouble with its leftwing supporters, some of whommembers of Parliamentbroke away and formed a new party. If at any time the British gave Singapore complete independence, and if this Ieftwing party won power, Malaya would be faced with the possibility of a Cuba just across the narrow Johore Strait which separates Malsya from Singapore. The Prime Minister of Malaya, therefore, copcluded that it would be more dangerous to have Singapore outside the Federation than inside. . The second consideration was the future of the Borneo territories. Although these territories were politically backward, the tempo at which independence had been achieved had recently quickened all over the world. Already there were signs of Communist subversion in Sarawak. If the British continued to hold these territories as colonies, accusations of colonialism would grow stronger. If the territories were granted independence, then, even if they joined together, their total population would be only just over, one million and they might not be an economically viable unit. The Malaysian solution would have two advantages. It would prevent the setting up of independent, but weak, political units, while ending colonialism. It would also restore some of tbe racial balance, which would have been upset if Malaya bad joined only with Singapore and her large Chinese population. Welcome Proposals Abdnl Rahmans proposal was welcomed by the governments of the other three territories. A commission was set up which visited North Borneo and 5

R. 5.

A New Federation in Volume 111+ Nnmper

November 196a

MALAYSIA Sarawak, heard the views of the local on the scheme, and drew up recommendations for an agreement. The task was continued by an intergovernmental working committee. At the same time negotiations went on between the governments of Malaya ~. and Singapore, and agreement was reached on a number of points. The Singapore Government followed this with a referendum to decide what tbe form of merger should be. Tbe mergpr proposals put forward by the government were accepted by a large majority. Abdul Rahman bad hoped that Brunei would join Malaysia. This small state with a population of under 100,000 is ruled by a Sultan and is independent, but bas a defense agreement with Britain. Superficially it is prosperous, because of the oil deposits in the territory which give it a yearly revenue three times as great as its expenditure. In the Brunei Legislature all the elected seats in 1962 were held by tbe Rakyat Party, led by A. M. Azabari. Azahari opposed Malaysia, and suggested, instead, the creation, under the Sultan of Brunei, of a state to consist of Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak. This would have restored the boundaries of Brunei to what they had been over a hundred years ago, before the existence of North Borneo and Sarawak. But Azahari was blocked in the legislature by the opposition of the nonelected members, who outnumbered the elected ones. He left the country, and in his absence a revolt broke out in December 1962 which extended to adjacent areas of Sarawak. Simultaneously, Azahari issued anti-Malaysia proclamations from Manila. He later went to, Indonesia.
inhabitant

the revolt achieved some but it failed in ita main objectiv~the capture of the Sultan. If he had been taken, th.n pronouncements could have been issued in his name which could not easily have been contradicted. As it was, British troops were flown in and the revolt was quickly put down. Subsequently, it appeared that Brunei would join Malaysia, but difficulties arose over the allocation of Bruneis oil revenues and other issues. Consequently, Brunei has not yet agreed to join.
tactical success,

InitiaRy,

Military Implications The military implications of the Federation of Malaysia depend on the answers to two distinct questions: What will be tbe military consequences of the legal changes involved in the formation of Malaysia? What will be the military consequences of the international reactions to the creation of the new state ? The latter are by far the more important. Tbe British, Australian, and New Zealand troops in MaIaya depend on the Singapore base, which is one of the few survivors of what wae once an extensive, round-the-world chain of British bases. The chief purposes of the troops in Malaya have been to serve as a source of support for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO ) ; to provide mi~itary sup- port when required to the civil authorities in the remaining British territories, such as Borneo and Hong Kong; and, until now, to provide internal security in Singapore. Until Malaysia was formed, the legal basis for these troops being stationed in Malaya was an agreement drawn up between the British and MaIayan Governments in September 1957, just after Malaya beeame independent. Miliiry ,Review

As a result of talks in London in November 1961, it was decided that the 1957 defense agreement would be extended to ~PPIY to Malaysia on her formation. The future position of the Singapore base was not quite so clear. Ma-

pore could continue to be deployed without restriction, and that they could be used for SEATO purposes. However, Abdul Rahman maintained that, after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, Britain would no longer be entitled to use the Singa-

A typical scene in North laya was not a member of SEATO, and neither is Malaysia. Although aligned with the West and strongly anti-Communist, Malaya never actually joined SEATO. Possibly she was influenced by the hostility of both India and Indonesia to SEATO. Consequently, the British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya, under the 1957 agreement, could not be sent directly on a SEATO missionfor instance, to Laos or Thailand. But British troops in Singapore were not under any such restriction before Malaysia, because Singapore was not yet independent with regard to defense. After the Malayan-British talks in November 1961, it seemed, at first sight, as if British troops in SingaNovemher 1963

Borneo

pore base as she pleased, but only after consultations with the Malaysian Government. In practice, it is unlikely that any difficulties will arise, as the alignment of the two governments on foreign policy and defense is very close.
Local Troops

With the coming of Malaysia, British forces are no longer available to provide internal security in Singapore. When required, this task will now be carried out by Malaysian troops recruited e i t h e r locally in Singapore or Malaya. A necessary consequence of Malaysia was, at leaet initially, a moderate expansion of the existing armed forces of Malaya to defend the substantially 1

MALAYSIA

larger territories of the new state: Malayas forces were slight at the end of 1962. She had an army of roughly 10,000 regulara and 6,000 reservists; an air force of some 30 aircraft and 400 personnel; and a navy of 10 old vessele. Additional equipment was on order, but it was possible to restrict the armed forces to such a small scale only because of the absence of any immediate military threat and because of the presence of British and Commonwealth troops in the country. Even in December 1962, after the Brunei revolt, tbe defense estimates (soon to he proved invalid) for the coming year totaled about 31.3 million dollars, only four percent more than the previous year ~nd rather less than 10 percent of the total budget. more violent and less expected, arose from external reactions to Malaysia, nioetly by Indonesia. The initial Indonesian responses to the Malaysian proposal were not warm; neither were they downright hostile. In September 1962, however, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, stated that if the United States were to establish a military base in Borneo, Indonesia would ask the Soviets to set up a base in their part of Kalimantan (Borneo). And when the Brunei revoIt broke out, various Indonesian spokesmen declared their support for it. This was most vociferous from the Communist Party, but it was echoed by nationalist leaders, from President Achmed Sukarno down. It is hard to state exactly the reasons for Indonesian opposition. Among
z The combined wak <. roughly MnlaYa. area of North Bomyw and Semone and . half times that of

Opposition Other changes,

other thinge, the Indonesians stated that they thought Malaysia wae a colonialist plot, deeigned to enable the British to continue their control over the area. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that they supported Azahari. Hia revolt and a number of later incidents on the Sarawak border appear to have been aided by the Indonesians through their support of the !le?ctera Nasionat Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo Na. tional Army). Early in March a shortwave radio station, The Voice of Freedom Fighters of Kalimantan Utara, broadcast revolutionary prop. aganda to Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. A S a r a w a k Government spokesman said it did not operate from any of the three territories, but was approximately 500 miles from Kuthing. In 1963 Indonesian hostility to Malaysia expressed itself in the form of a confrontation policy. This stopped short of war, but included demonstrations of strength, such aa naval patrolling near Malayan waters.
Previous Claim

There was a temporary switch in the Indonesian line in June and July 1963. Soon after Abdul Rahman first proposed Malaysia in May 1961, the Philippine Government revived a previous claim to North Borneo, The Philippine Government argued that it was entitled to the territory as the successor of the Sultan of Sulu-, who had merely leased: not ceded, the territory in 1878. The British denied this claim, arguing that the territory had been, in fact, ceded and that it had passed to the British Crown via the British North Borneo Company. The Philippine claim, however, unlike the Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, was pureued merely by debate I Military Review 1

and not by confrontation. An informal meeting took place in Tokyo between President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines, Dr. Sukarno, and Abdul Rahman at the beginning of June 1963. This was followed by a Conference of Ministers from the three countries in Manila which discussed the future of the Borneo territories, and a proposal by President Macapagal for a Confederation of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This Confederation would not in. volve a federal union, but a grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony, but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. The ministers agreed that a new threeMaphilindo, nation organization, should be formed; that the support of the people of the Borneo territories should be ascertained by an independent and impartial. authority, the Sec. retary-General of the United Nations or his representative, and that there should be a summit meeting of the three states at the end of July 1963.
the confrontation policy was quickly resumed. Toward the end of July, Indonesia announced that she would hold combined naval and air force exercises in the South China Sea and the Strait of .Malacca, off the Malay Peninsula. The Indonesians claimed that the Malayan Government had gone ahead with its arrangements to bring Malaysia into existence by a target date of 31 August 1963 without waiting until the wishes of the people of Borneo had been consulted. They also urged that this con,.Report and Recommendations of the confer. awe of the Fomiz. ?. f,ni.tem of the Federation of Malaya, the Rep.b]ic of fndomsia and the ReDublic of the Philippines to tbe,r Remective Heads f G.,ernmer, t,,+ CMF/68 /FM-1, reprod.,@d by the G.vm.m..t of the PbibvPine$. 11 June 1963.

Referendum However,

sultation must be throngh the medium of a referendum, although this had not been explicitly stated in the published report of the Conference of Ministers in Manila. Another meeting of the heads of the governments of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia was held in Manila from 30 July to 5 Augtwt 1963. The principle of Maphilindo was reaffirmed. At the same time, Abdul Rahman agreed that the Secretary General of the United Nations, or his representative, should visit North Borneo and Sarawak to verify that the recent elections there had been free and properly held, and that Malaysia bad been a major issue at these elections. This amounted to a concession by Malayathe UN visit would mean a delay of at least a few days in the formation of Malaysia. On the other hand, Indonesia dropped her demand for a plebiscite. The proclamation of Malaysia was postponed until 16 September to give the UN team time to report, The team reported in favor of Malaysia. But Indonesia and the Philippines refused to recognize the new Federation, and, on 17 September, Malaysia severed diplomatic relations with those two nations. Indonesia retaliated by cutting off trade relations with the new country.
Defense Plans

The confrontation policy and the continuation of border incidents in Borneoparticularly in Sarawak have produced some changes in Malaysian defense plans. In a supplementary 1963 budget, a further 25 million dollars was voted for defense, roughly an 80 percent increase on the previous figure. Over a five-year period, it is proposed that defense ex. 9

Nsvember 1963

.
MALAYSIA penditure will be about double what hrid been planned previously. At the same time, special military measures have been taken in the Borneo territories. A new defense force, the Border Scouts, is being raised in Sarawak. The Scouts will be full time tmd paid, but will operate in their borne areasalong the border between the let and 2d Divisions of Sarawak and Indoneeia. They will be trained in guerrilla warfare by Britieh Army instructors. Apart from the Scouts, it is likely that local forces of approximately a brigade strength wilI be raised and stationed in the Borneo territories. These locally raised Borneo troops will also be British trained, Unavoidably, this might reinforce Indonesian suspicions that colonialism is still in being in the northern part of Borneo. It will be impossible for the existing Malayan Army to train the recruits; that army itself is still partly dependent on the Britieh for its training. If Brunei remains outside Malaysia, Britaine military obligations to her will continue.

mal treaty obligations on the part of these two countries. Malaysia will also be protected to some extent by Indonesias deeire to continue receiving US aid and by thelatters desire that her international reputation should not be that of an aggressor.
possible to explain Indonesias actione in terms of intense nationalism and violent hatred of any form of colonialism witbout attributing aggressive intentions to her. On any broad perspective, the main problem of Malaysian defense does not stem from Indonesia, even tboughlndonesian policiee are eometimes hard to predict by Western etandards. Ma. laya has already suffered from aggression by communism during the Emergency. Even at present, Chinese Communists in Sarawak are caueing more concern than the North Kalimantan National Army. They have taken ad. vantage of the Azahari revolt and th! Indonesian border incidents to etef up their revolutionary activity. Tht recent drive to call in guns and am. munition in Sarawak applied, eigniii c Iy, to nonnatives-in effect la P gely the Chinese. Indeed, it would seem that, in th[ long run, a Maphilindo Confederation] would make sense from the defensiw point of view. But it would he sad i such an alliance were aimed at innoc uous Chinese inside the three coun tries, It would be intelligent if it wer directed against the long-range am bitione of Chinese communism. Intentions It is quite

Military Hardware Of course, unmilitary hardware the Malaysian response to confrontation is pitifully inadequate. In army personnel, for instance, the Indonesian forces are more than 20 times as large. Against even a moderats-scale Indonesian attack, Malaysia would be dependent on British aid and on prospectsof help from Australia and New Zealand. There are, however, no for-

10

Military Reviw

Amu

NeuJo .%rvtce

A WAY TO BETTER COMMUNICATIONS

Major Walter J. Bodman, Jr., United States Armu HOW maw times have you heard It was a fine exercise except for the communications ? Probably, all too often. Similar statement have been made after innumerable combat-readiness exercises conducted by the Armys di-+ visions since the end of World War II. Analysis of the final reports on these exercises reveals, with discouraging regularity, some common deficiencies: Communications equipment 0perators inadequately trained. Commanders and staff officers unNovember 1963 familiar with organic communication equipment. Users unaware of standing operating procedures, signal operating instructions, prearranged codee, and proper format for field meseages common procedures designed to facilitate efficient communications Operat ions. To overcome these problems, we need a comprehensive training program in communications operations before a division takes the field for any kind of readiness test. In my
11

.
BEllER COMMUNICATIONS
mind, the best operate certain way to do this is to port.ione of the divi.

sions tactical communications nets in garrison. Today, the Armys combat divisions ire habitually quartered at perma-

systems while in garrison, and by ro. tating pereonnei and equipment, each division can establish a continuous communications operations and pro. cedures training program. that the use of organic tactical equipment in garrison is meant to augment, not re. place, commercial facilities. The primary use of the tactical system in garrison is its employment as a continuous training vehicle. Messages employed on the tactical system should be of the type which would normally be employed over these systems in combat. Such messages can be actual or simulated, but the bulk of normal garrison traffic should be sent on the existing commercial systems. A typical garrison communications system under the ROAD division con. cept is indicated in Figurel. This system employs the three primary media of communications available to the division. Once the system has been estab. Iished, commander and staff odicers should utilize it to generate traffic and to work the operators who would otherwise be handling little communications traffic. The type of traffic that might be generated by etaff sections is shown on Figure 2. Operating tactical systeme in garrison should give the commanders and the staff officers an opportunity to study equipment capabilities and limitations. More frequent association with communications will give the commanders and the staff officers some idea of which communications means will give the most speed under certain conditions. As an example, one report of a field exercise indicated that staff pereonnel of a division headquarters and its maMilitary Review
Primary Use I would like to emphasize

VS Armu The telegraph terminal ANtMSC-29, a teletypewriter system which provides communication from division to the hri. gades. The system can he connected by wire or by very high frequency radio. nent posts, camps, or stations. A ma-

jor portion of the training year finds a division accomplishing both basic and advanced individual training, and basic unit training. Only a small portion of the training year is. spent on advanced unit training. The division rarely has the opportunity to train in the fieId as a complete unit. But by establishing a portion of a communications net in each of the net
Major Walter J. Bodman, Jr., is with the Department of Command Commurdcafiofis, Utiited States Armg Signal Center and School, Fort MoTzmouth, New Jerseg. His assignments include duty w{th the 8th Infantry Division and with the 8.2d and 10lst Airborne Divisions. This article is -based on a staff study w7itten by ikfajor Bodman while attend{ng the 1962 Rtrgtdar Course of the V. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

12

RAD1O HEl

wRGlo lel BRmAnEAN/VK!.3

OMSION MMILERY

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I
~ RJO1O SiTS SHC.WI
lJi/YRM2 IBIJ ABOW WLL BE REFUCEO W M RADIO 3ElS #.$TMEV ME WOE AVNL.

DIVISION COMMANDVOICE NE7-FM I E&l OIVISION WN(NS31

. PERWNE

mulPMmI sTAmc+l

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. PERS041KI MD EWIPMm SIGNN @MTAuoN OICN NET CONTROL STMION PRWIDIO BY DIVISION

i% PROPOSEO Mn (MID TKMPEWRIIERI Nn IS TC.IL4MEFOR ~lCIENT OPER.4 10N,HLI%WM, FOR MRPOSE3 Or A TRAINING VIHICLE IT 3H0U10 BE EWECTIVE$410IIG S MIC OVER IIU NET 1S CONTROLLED

TELETYPEWRITER SYSTEM

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20BRIGALW

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b AN/MGG17 SUPPORT COMMANO ,

+ PER3QMZ MD SIW wwrw EQUIPMLW PROVIOEO W OMSICil

NE3 ceimi 4 w

Figure 1. November 1963 43

BETTER COMMUNICATIONS

SU6GESTE0 COMMUNICATIONS Message

TRAFFIC Frequency

G1 Casualty reports Announcement of commander meetings G2 Daily weather forecast Storm warnings Intelligence summary Patrol plan report Enemy contact report Enemy use of chemical, biological, and radiological agents Radiological surveys Observer chemical, biological, and radiological report Artillery counterfire information ActualDaily ActualAs necessary DrillWeekly DrillBimonthly, one per each unit Test one unit each week by giving a message to a soldier and timing the units timelag in reporting the information to divieion headquarters 1 G3 ActualAs necessary ActualWhen feasible ActualAs necessary ActualAs ActualAs they occur necessary

Changes to training directives Operation ordereParade orders Training ammunition requests Tactical air eupport requests Tactical air reccmnaissance requests Radio jamming and interference reports \ G4 Daily vehicle etatus report Combat loss report Petroleum, oils, and lubricant etatus report Aerial supply requeets Air resupply followup report

DrillBimonthly,

one per eich unit

ActualWeekly, DrillWeekly,

one per each unit one per each unit

ActualWeekly, one per each unit DrilIBimonthly, one per each unit DrillBimonthly, one per each unit Miscellaneous ActualAs ActualAs necessary necessary

Disaster or emergency-type messages Command post exerciee in garrison

u,- ... . e 14 . Military Review

jor subordinate headquarters insisted on using telephones, even though the telephone lines were overloaded. At the same time, records show that the teletypewriters had little traffic to pass. The point here is that the teletypewriter had cryptographic capability which adds security with no delay in transmission time. Transmitting some messages over teletypewriter or radio teletypewriter means would have delivered the meesages more quickly and more accurately and would have produced a copy of the transmitted message for reference or file purposes. Associated with the lack of familiarity with the equipment is the poorly written message and the lack of communications security. Writing field messages and practicing communications security can be practiced realistically in garrison. Included in this training should be the writers responsibility for clarity, brevity, and conciseness; selection of precedence in keeping with the urgency of the message; assignment of a security classification, if necessary; and determination of whether a message should he encoded or sent in the clear. It should be kept in mind that the writing of messages is a commanders and a staff officers responsibility, either for accomplishing this task personally or supervising their assistants. Confidence The generation of traffic by commanders and staff officers automatically benefits the communications operating personnel. By working at their assigned duties, the operators gain ~onfidence, both in themselves and in their equipment. ~ Transmitting actual or training messages in garrison places the same

requirements on an operator as do tkid operations, This means that the operator is working against a time factor. More importantly, he ie also striving for accuracy. Each meseage is, presumably, being read and acted upon. Knowing this, the operator realizes he is being tested at all times; thie alone adds realism to his duties and makes the transmission of messages more meaningful and important. In addition, by working in garrieon, operators become familiar with the operators at all echelons within the di~ision.
Disadvantages I realize that there may be some arguments against establishing tactical communications systems in garrison. A garrison tactical communications system is not feasible unless the

communications personnel strength is maintained at a minimum of 75 percent full strength. Not only must the equipment be operated efficiently, but associated equipment has to be properly maintained. Certainly, additional signal supplies and maintenance will be required. But this should become a problem only if expendable suppliee or repair parts are classified as critical items. Considering the priority of repair that these items normally receive, however, there should be no problem in keeping the sets working.
Conclusions Communications can make or break a divisions effectiveness in combat.

The establishment of tactical communications nete in garrison can help to ensure that the division will have effective communications when it takes the field. It will provide a viable and efficient communications system within the division at all times. 15

~Nwemhsr 1963

Economics and Strategy: Soviet Choices

John P. Hardt

ATIONAL strategy and economN ic analysis are becoming closely related in US defense programing and planning. The Soviet Union, for her part, may be said to have closely related strategy and economics throughout the period of her five-year plans, from 1928 to datq albeit without the current emphasis on economic models and computer assistance, Greater reliance on economic models and electronic equipment, in recent Soviet planning, tends to draw the United States and the USSR closer to. gether in the techniques of national security planning. The strategies, however, are etill essentially different: our
preparation is basicaliy defensive and retaliatory, theirs potentially offensive. The potentiality of Soviet aggression

is the major reason for our assuming their preparedness is a threat for which we must prepare. While estimates of Soviet capability are primarily the province of our in. telligence community, an analysis of Soviet resource allocation trends may provide useful collateral information for evaluating their future national sscurity policy. Specifically, this analysis of Soviet resource allocation pOlicy may furnish guidelines on the scope and direction of their preparation for future augmentation of SOviet power. A reordering of Soviet military planning into systems that are analogous to our own Department of Defense programs can provide useful insights. The first three of the major Military Review

16

goals of the programing system are particularly reflected: planning is oriented around major missions; re. source inputs are related to military

augmenting analyzed in missions that partment of

military power can be terms of specific SQviet are analogaus to US DeDefense programs. Only

US NATIONAL DEFENSE BUOGET PATTERNS-1963 (1964 Estimates) Total Programs (Bitliorz Dollars)* Percentage Distribution

Programs

1. Strategic

Retaliatory

Forces

7.3
2.0

13
4

II. Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces 111. General IV. Sealift v. General

Purpose

Forces

19.1 1.4 14.6

35 3 27
P.PIX ri.tio.s, Hearings, Department of l%.? aaj Office, Wasbkwton, D. C., 1968.

and Airlift Support

1964,

Forces Forces

Defense

Ua congressSubcommittee
.Dprmmiatmm

on Department of Defense Part 11, D 77, US Government

outputz; and long-range planning iz coordinated with budgeting, The analysis herein is not intended to provide force structure estimates and their costs for the Soviet Union. It merely identifies major relevant trends in resource allocations which are deemed likely to bring about significant changes in programing to meet the Soviet requirements, as the 3oviets view their commitments. Programs The constraints and options operating on future Soviet outlays for
Dr. John P. Hardt is with the Research Anal@s Corpora flon. He holds B. A. and M. A. degrees from the University of Washington and a Ph. D. from Columbia University. He served in the Army during World War II and since has held varioue poeitione, specializing in econom{cs attd Soviet affairs. Since 1956 Dr. Hardt has been a lecturer in economice at the University of Maryland. November1963

five of he pragrams are discussed here. Th omitted programs either are too diffi~ult (research and development) ; do not relate to programs of direct Army budgeting interest (civil defense and military assistance) ; or have no Soviet equivalent (Reserve and National Guard). The chart above shows tbe current US budgeting prggram, indicating the relative size of each program, thus providing some guide as to the importance of the Soviet counterpart. Unfortunately, a comparable chart for the Soviet national defense budget pattern cannot be constructed with available information from Soviet open sources. However, it may be safely generalized that their outlays for general purpose forces are greater than ours bnt fall ae a relative share of the total budget, whereas strategic forces and research and development are probably smaller but rise absolutely and relatively. 17

,,.
ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY Programa I and 11

The cost and limitations on the construction of necessary hardware for strategic retaliatory forces and continental air and miesile defense forces, assuming success in the relevant r es e a r c h and development phases, will be largely limited by alternative within the Soviet military space programs. In the military space programe the conversion from military to civilian production is for reasonably short p e r i o ds of time (three to five years) no longer an open option. The military space eupport industries can be expanded only at a pace permitted by the supply of highly skilled labor and relatively unique productive capacity. To be sure, conversion possibilities still exist, and products for civilian and national, security projects, other . than military space, may be common for wide ranges of requirements; for example, cement and basic building materials are neceesary for construction of missile-launching sites. Still, the high-grade scientific and technical manpower, special alloys, chemicals and equipment, and handmade components for these military space activities are largely unique to those fields. Thus each of the priority areag in military s p a c e-offensive missiles (land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles ), miseile defense, and space flight-must draw largely on the same supporting industries. The cost of each program in this eense must be calculated in terms of the alternative programs. Thus it is more relevant to ask how many intercontinental ballistic missilee a miseile defense system for MOSCOW is worth to the Soviet leadere 18

than it is to inquire about the total cost of any of these activities. This is not to eay that the Soviets muet emphasize one or the other of the areas in military epace at the ex. penee or exclusion of the others. A great deal depends on how large an effort the United States is willing to support and how efficiently we use our reeources. It is clear that tbe Soviet problem of choice would be greatly eased if the United States were to substantially r e d u c e her military space programe across the hoard.
Program 111

General purpose forces are the forces on which we will rely to fight local or limited wars or theater engagements in a general war. This is the largest program and includes the largest share of US Army personnel and dol[ar resources. Soviet bloc land forces are primarily designed for employment in the central European theater. The pressure for reduction in the size of the Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forcee is largely economic. It results from adveree demographic trends in the critical military age groups. Maintenance of current levels in the future will have continuing retarding effects on industrial and agricultural production within the Soviet Union and her East European satellite. Increased NATO strength, both from European NATO countries and the United States, raises the possibility of future Eaet-Weet parity in central Europe. Increased military and foreign aid burden sharing by European NATO countries would not only strengthen NATO, and possibly release US forces, but would also r~ Iieve the current US balance of payments problem, More manpower and larger European military budgeta can MilitsryReview

be significant in increasing the Weetern capabilities of general purpose forcee. Intercoordinated European defense production projects likewiee hold a promise of potential future

ments for which military action is not well Suited, for example, limiting use of access routes to Berlin from West Germany. The combination of increased Eu-

The Soviet bloc land forces are primarily designed European theater

for employment

US A-w in the central

independence of the US military commitment based in Europe. That is, there ie a possibility that both the manpower coming to garrison the NATO forces and the production to arm these forces will come largely from European sources. Strengthening of NATO conventional capabilities is likely to militate against a diminution of Soviet investment in conventional forces in central Europe. Moreover, coordination of potential eeonomic leverage of the West on the Soviet bloc could effectively counter Soviet bloc encroachNmember 1963

ropean military and economic commitments for NATO and greater political unity in NATO could substantially increase tbe requirements of the Soviets to meet the combined United States-European NATO forces or release US forces from their central European commitments. In short, if there is an increasing likelihood that the Soviet conventional capability in central Europe ie to be relatively diminished by strengthening NATO capabilities, this istomilitate against reduction in their forces. This is true in spite of the fact that, 19

.,
ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY

as Mr. McNamara observed, the West do~s not now have the conventional option in central Europe. Ihe level of Wareaw Psct conventional forces in Program III-type units also provides the most flexible military option open to the Soviet Union in the short run and the least costly alternative for the long run. The flexibility of conventional forces is a common advantage for each of the major powers, as increased conscription, reserve retention, and mobilization of conventional military manpower are rapid and efficient means for increasing power at any given time. Moreover, the conversion of industrial capacity to the production of conventional military hardware can be accomplished in a reasonably short - time compared with that required for the nuclear missile-type weapon systems. The cost of this conventionaltype force is measured in alternatives in industrial growth and improvement of consumer living conditions, rather than in the higher priority areas of national security preparednessfor example, alternate weapon systems. This choice of which type of guns rather than guns, or butter is a matter of degree, but is, nonetheless, significant. An increase in conventional forces is still largely the choice of guns or butter, whereas, as noted above, the missile support industries are largely unique in their production for military space programs.
Programs To IV and V

counter US development of a conventional option in the non-NATO areas, the Soviets appear to need, but apparently do not propose to have, forces with counterinsurgency capability such as those we plan forsea20

lift, airIift, and general support. The Soviets policy in the non-NATO areas, ae i n d i c a t e d by Premier Khrushchev in January 1961, is for reliance on native revolutions. : The type of preparation for conventional miIitary actions on tbe periph. ery of the Soviet Union, not only in central Europe, but also in Iran and other areas contiguous to Soviet soil, does not appear to be carried over to capability in eoutheast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. R e 1i a n c e is largely placed, instead, on the political action of Soviet representatives and supply of military equipmemt to COm munist-directed or influenced native forces. If the Soviete decided to de. velop a highly mobile force similar to that of the United States Strategic Army Forces, then substantial improvement in mobility, supply, and communications would presumably be necessary, The garrison of ground troops stationed in Cuba, presumably intended originally to maintain Soviet control over the Soviet-installed missile sites, may have represented the extent of Soviet capabilities in this worldwide role of conventional forces at the time of its commitment. In the apparent absence of Soviet mobile conventional forces for use outside European and Soviet border areas, Soviet foreign aid to these more distant countries takes on new importance as a response to the increasing US influence, derived from our planned counterinsurgency military capability, Soviet military and economic aid may be the primary basic of intluence without the potentialities inherent in tbe Soviet military ground presence in force. The course of political action in Asia, Africa, and the Middle Eaet may be strongly influenced by

Military Revie

this point in future years. Moreover, if weapon systems and forces are located outside the Soviet Union, substantial increases in the costs of military maintenance will be incurred abroad and within the supporting facilities in the USSR. Without any detailed costing of tbe Cuban base effort, it is clear that manpower and, material outlays were made at considerable expense to the Soviet Union.
Soviet Trends

Internal s t r a ins and pressures created bfj other programs likewise should force Russia to hold down any big new arms spending. McNamara said that the Soviets can greatl]l expand their ICBM or submarine missile force, build a miesile defense, aid carry on a big space program, othe< countries or improve living conditions at homebut thev cannot do them all at the same time. Requirements for Modernization

Soviet leadership is currently faced with a proliferation of priority claimants for scarce resources. Until recently, modernization of the Soviet economy and improvement of consumer living levels were not serious resource claimants, compared with the priority programs related to the augmentation of Soviet powertheir equivalent to our national security budget. Upgrading these claimants limits the total share available for power augmentation programs and poses a problem, even in a rapidly growing Soviet economy. If Soviet leaders choose to continue development and production of military and space iteMs at the rate. of the past three years, they will have to settle for a slower rate of economic growth. But if they feel compelled to reorganize the unfilled demands of the consumer sectors, then military and space demands will have to be restrained. * Mr. McNamara, in his presentation of tbe Nations defense posture before a meeting of tbe House Armed Forces Committee, struck a similar note. The Washington Post, 31 January 1963, thus reported his remarks:
Rush Green%l.de and Phyllis Wallace. US Con. mess Joint E...omm Cmnrmttee, .. Dimensions Swwt E.cmomfe Power.. Government %intmu D. C., 1!762, P 130. Office,

Longtime economic growth, even in the critical sectors supporting the Soviet power position, may be re-

in the Soviet Union, longtime economic growth may be retarded if more resources are not directed to investment in modernization

of

Wa.hi.m.n,

tarded if more resources are not directed to investment in the modernization of tbe Soviet economy. The need for modernization in industry, agriculture, and transportation is the result of the concentration, in the past, on increasing total production without a commensurate emphasis on improving the efficiency of the producing units. Soviet leaders indicated their concern about modernization by making basic changes in economic 21

November 1963

EMNOMICS

ANO STRATEGY
,

policy, announced in a seven-year pbm in 1958. For example, the Soviets are modernizing their rail transport network on a diesel-electric power base, increasing the use of petroleum and natural gas, and attempting to increase labor productivity. The need for improved efficiency in the Soviet economy was graphically illustrated by the slowing down of industrial growth which apparently resulted from increased Soviet military outlays in 1961. Although agricultural deterioration wae widely reported as being related to this military step-up (a response to increased US preparedness), what wae most significant in terms of Soviet alternatives in priority programs wae the impact on the preferred industrial sectors. We have learned that the Soviet growth rate for gross national product, which has been running at about seven percent per annum, fell during the 1958-61 time period to about five percent. The tightnees thus revealed in the combined eupply of scarce resources for either investment or military programs may have been as much of a surprise to Soviet planners as it was to some Western analyete.
Pre88ure for Higher Living Levels

ability of more coneumer goods as in. centives. An apparent termination of the policy of reducing the industrial workweek further illustrates how production standarde must be sub. stantially improved if current Soviet plans are to be fulfilled.
Inadeqnacie8 of Souiet Planning Sg8tem

A new and pressing need for improving living conditions may limit tbe fntu re capabiIit y of the Soviets to concentrate resourcee in sectors primarily designed to augment power. Soviet citizene apparently will no longer consent to, or tolerate, the low living condition of the past. Significantly, when meat and butter prices were raised in June 1962, Soviet citizens demonstrated and sbme were killed by Soviet military forces. Moreover, improvements in labor productivity and management of resourcee depend, in part, on the avail22

The higher cost and complexity of Soviet priority programs raise the possibility of increasing inefficiency, The old system of physical output planning and balanced estimates is not euitable for the missile age in the modern Soviet Union. Econometric techniquesusing economic models and electronic equipmentand improved management are essential for rational use of the scarce reeources according to the preferences determined by top Soviet leadership. The reluctance of Soviet leaders to adopt new p]anning techniques may be at-. tributed to a fear of loss of control or direction of plans resulting from the use of more sophisticated models and equipment in planning. With new planning techniques, not only are the old Stalinist-style controls no longer adequate, but many of the old party leaders are no longer attuned to the requirements of the present day. The rapidly growing economy provides an ever-expanding pool of resources to meet Soviet needs; thie may well prove adequ~te for substantial and continuous increases in the national secnrity budget. However, the constraints, stemming from the need to modernize the economy and provide better living conditions for Soviet citizens, have a new urgency and are officially recognized. As a result, the national %ecurity budget may not in. m-ease in tbe future az fast as the over-all expansion of goods and services. MilitaryRaview

SOVIET VIEWS

of US
Alvin J. Cottrell.

Overseas

Bases

T HE Soviets have consistently made the liquidation of US foreign military bases a major item in their propaganda and in nearly all of thsir proposals for disarmament. It has been frequently suggested that the Soviets might be prepared to make important concessions in return for the dismantling of a few US overseas bases or the missile bases in Italy or Turkey. Interest in such a trade revived during the October 1962 Cuban crisis when the Soviets proposed to dismantle their missile bases in Cuba in return for the removal of US missiles from Turkey. There can be little doubt that, from the beginning of tbe establishment of the US overseas base system, Soviet November 1963

political and military leaders genuinely feared its operational military, implications. It is obvious, too, that the Soviets seized on our bases around the periphery of tbe Communist bloc as convenient targets of propaganda. The evidence ia sufficiently clear that, whatever tbe over-all motivation for their statements, the Soviets are senThis article was digested from the original which appeared in ORBIS, Nr. 1 Spring 1963, published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. Copyrighted ~ 196S by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Cottrell is with the Institute for Defense Analyses.

I I

23

US OVERSEAS BASES

sitive to the threat posed by our foreign bases, and would like to bring about a general US withdrawal. The fact that Soviet propaganda has sought to exploit US overseas deployments does not negate the sincerity of their endeavor to hasten their liquidation. Indeed, the Soviets consider US airborne alert activities as a clinching argument for the liquidation of overseas bases. At the same time, they have shown little interest in our proposals to end such flights as a quid pro quo for even limited aerial inspection of Soviet territory.
Delivery Systems

Soviet political and military leaders have heen cognizant of the fact that it was the overseas airbases that gave the United States her early superiority in strategic delivery eystems. Not until after Soviet missile progress bad been dramatically demonstrated to the world did the Soviets begin to emphasize the superiority of missiles over bombers. Their post-Sfmtnik campaign reflected the fact that the neutralization of US nuclear delivery systems, still geared to strategic airpower, was now underway. Thus Marshal Vershinin, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Force, said .in 1957:
In present conditions, bombers are naturally still being built. The U.S. especially emphasizes this kind of weapon. But miseiles now call hcto question the expediency of further developing bomber aircraft, since the former are more reliable and dependable. Some Western students of military

Soviet military experte have clung to the traditional concepts of war much longer than their Western counterparts. Soviet military leaders apparently were enjoined from discussing the impact of nuclear weapons on traditional Soviet military doctrine until Stalins death in 1953. Almost immediately thereafter, a number of controversial articles by leading Soviet military thinkers began to appear in Soviet military journals. It was not until 1956 that the literary debate was concluded victory apparently having gone to those who argued that the advent of nuclear weapons required revision of traditional Soviet military doctrine, particularly with regard to the significance of eurprise attack. As a result of this debate, surprise attack, while not considered decisive in the unfolding strategic situation, was accorded greater importance in Soviet military doctrine. If the Soviete had not concluded, until 1955, that the advent of nuclear weapone required some revision in their traditional strategic outlook, we may assume that they do lag behind in their evaluation of some aspecte of military strategy. This gap may extend to other military questions--+ne of which may be the importance of US bases. It is poseible that the Soviet military is still divided on this issue.
Psychological-ideological Consideration

affairs have suggested that a considerable gap separates the United States and tbe USSR in the assessment of the current strategic situation. Soviet views on war, insofar as we can ascertain them, indicate that 24

The traditional Soviet fear of Capitalist encirclement undoubtedly is still responsible, in part, for the Soviets ostensible diemay at US overseas bases. While the purely ideological motivation of their fear might have diminished, we muet assume that a residue of so deeply ingrained a doctrinal view still influences Soviet pOlicy, just as isolationism still influMilitary Review

some popular American atti. tudes toward foreign policy. Hence our bases probably continue to symbolize Capitalist encirclement to smue aeg. mente of the Soviet hierarchy. In the context of Capitalist encircle. ment, the Soviets probably view these bases as one of several components of the total US military presence overseas. Indeed, when the Soviets call for the elimination of foreign bases, they employ the general term foreign ~ilitary basesj and rarely refer to any specific type of base. ences Military Consideration

The Soviets may believe, as do many of our own analyste, that the high vulnerability of our overseas bases to missile and ground attack has greatly reduced their military utility for deterrence. Since the Soviets launched their first earth satellite, they have felt free to utter veiled missile threats. Apparently, they believe that US strategic nuclear power haa been neutralizedat least in situations where the continental United States is not directly threatened. The Soviets appear to feel increasingly confident that they can safely risk less ambiguous conflict operations. intervention in the Congo, CU. ba, and Laos supplies evidence of the Soviets new willingness to associate themselves more directly with political and military conflicts in which US prestige is directly involved. In this respect, Soviet missile capabilities are invoked to deter Western interference with the historical process while, at the same time, serving to underwrite Soviet efforts to accelerate world revolutionary developments. US nuclear delivery capabilities, poised on fixed bases at home and abroad, do not deter the Soviets from supporting forces hostile to Western Novsmber 1963

interest. In this sense, the Soviets have already achieved counterdeterrence against our strategic nu~]ear power in situations which fall below the threshold of an obvious issue of the survival of the United States. As early as 1953, Marshal Zhukov staked: The closer [US] military basea are to the objective of attack, the more vulnerable these bases be. come. In 1957 Marshal Vershinin said: One can only wonder at the shortsightedness of those whO do not consider that if these bases are close to us, then they are aleo not far from us. Also, in 1957 Chairman Khrushchev wrote: Can itbe supposed that militarg
bases are known only to thoee who established them ? But if their location ~ is known, then, given the present level of missile and other technology, they can speedily be rendered ineffective.

Even more recently, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Andrei I. Yeremenko aeserted that US overseas bases have been rendered militarily obsolete by the development of long-range ballistic miseiles. On first glance, such an evaluation of tbe utility of overseas bases seems to contradict the Soviets determination to eliminate them. Indeed, the Soviets, since the development of their intercontinental ballistic missile, have stepped up their offensive against our foreign bases.
Politico-Military Implications

The above statement are not, of course, proof posit ive that the Soviets really fear US overseas bases from a military standpoint. It is quite possible that the Soviet political leaders preoccupation with these bases is explainable largely in terms of Soviet political objectives, At the same time, however, we may assume that military 25

U& OVERSEAS BASES

motives still loom large in the Soviet dlilitary leaders attitude toward our bases. Given the position of the Soviet military in the power structure of the Soviet Union, the militarys concern over the basee could account, to some extent, for the Soviets ceaseless peIitical offensive against them. This

ropean countriee to rocket attack for playing hoet to US nuclear striking powerhave been interpreted as mere psychological gambits. It is entirely poeeible. however. that the Soviets have ax ulterior politico-military ob. jective in mind: They wieh to avoid a nuclear conflict, and the accompanying contamination, so that, in the event of

The Soviets assert that US overseas bases have been rendered militarily obsolete by tbe development of long-range ballistic missiles

does not imply that Soviet political leadership is unconcerned about their politico-military implication. Soviet military doctrine cannot but be influenced by the expansionist drive of Soviet imperialism. In Europe we must allow for the possibility that tbe Soviets are perpIexed by the problem of how, in the event of war, they can take over a relatively undamaged Western Europe, given the ubiquity of US basing arrangements in the NATO area. Numerous Soviet statements express the belief that Western Europe would be devastated in a future war. Soviet threatsto subject some Eu26 -.

war, the industry am! resources of the advanced West European nations might be pressed into the domestic restoration of the Soviet Union.
Considerable Threat Despite Soviet statements to the effect that US overseas bases are obso-

lete, we may be sure that there is at least one purely military consideration underlying Soviet fears of our bases. The Soviets know that their statements concerning the vulnerability of US bases are valid only if they strike first. These bases still represent a considerable threat to the Soviets if the

MilitsryReview

United Statee should employ them in a preemptive at$ack. The Soviets may doubt that we would unleash strategic nuclear forces in a premeditated surprise attack, but they may be quite fearful that we would not be so constrained during a protracted political crisis, or in the midst of a limited military engagement. Tbe Soviets may well believe that, for the next eeveral years, the United Statee will still be able to deliver more megatonnage by airplane than by her missile systems. Furthermore, the Soviete still maintain substantial antiaircraft defense systems around Moscow and their other principal administrative and control centere. While this is not conelusive evidence that they etill fear our overseas basee, ae euch, it doee show that they do not believe that I bomber delivery systems are as obsolete as they frequently suggeet. The fact that our bases are soft, and, as the Soviets themeelvee have suggested, their exact location generally known, tends to increase Soviet apprehension about them. In fact, the Soviete apparently believe that the high vulnerability of US overseas bases, particularly those in Europe and the Middle East, makes them valuable to the United States mainly in a surprise attack.
limited War While US military thinkere have frequently pointed to the importance

ited warfaTe ofte?e refer to the expemence of past ages when most wars weve relatively limited in character. however, cannOt Such arguments, withstand seriows criticism. Limited wars were possible under entirelg different economic, political and strategic conditiotis. As a rwle, the restricted scale of these wars was due to the lack of sufficient strength and means to wage them. Genersl War

of US overseae bases for meeting limited Communist military challenges, there is considerable evidence that the Soviets do not believe that limited ware involving both of the superpowers are possible. Major General N. Talensky, one of the Soviets foremoet military theoreticians, wrote:
The proponents November 1963 of the theory of lirn -

In January 1961 Chairman Khrushchev stated, in the most widely publicized doctrinal statement by a Communist leader since Staline last thesis, that only national liberation warsthat ie, civil wars between pro-Western and neutralist or antiWestern forcesare feasible and thus juet ware. The Soviet diepute with the Chinese Communists may be sparked, to a large extent, by Soviet leaders fear that the aggressiveness of their Chineee ally in Asia might embroil first the Chinese and ultimately the Soviet Union in a conflict with the United Statesa conflict which could escalate into general war. Probably the Soviets have concluded that the US military presence overeeas enhances the risk of a general conflagration. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet political leadership-and this may mean primarily Khrushchev believes that military conflict between communism and capitalism may no longer be neceseary in order to bring abeut the final defeat of capitalism. But even if Khrushchev believes this, we do not know how far such views extend down into the Soviet power structure. In any case it eeems unlikely that, confident though the Soviets might be, they could ever completely eliminate the fear that 27

US 0VERSE4S BASES

I
States. There can be little doubt that the Soviete are aware of some of the offensive and defensive problems posed by our base system. With regard to the offensive prob. Iem Df coordinating a Soviet attack on US strategic nuclear forces, there is not much evidence on which to base an answer. The Soviets would logically conclude, however, that any attack on the US overseas strategic striking force would, at least, raise the risk

moribund capitalism might strike out at them as a last resort. Simultaneous Attack A principal claim, frequently considered by US strategists for the con. tinued validity of US foreign bases, is that these bases complicate Soviet offensive and defensive problems. It is . often suggested that, in order to coordinate a surprise attack on all US strategic delivery systems, the Soviets would have to attack US foreign

us

AI% Fore,

The Soviets viewed the U-$ flights with great concern and continental bases simultaneously. Moreover, even a ground advance into Western Europe, which threatened to overrun US bases, would confront the Soviets with tbe risk of general nuclear war, to the extent that it would lead to some degradation of our strategic posture, and thus might provoke a preemptive blow by the United 2a of a general retaliatory response. They know they would have to coordinate an attack on all US basesat borne and abroad-simultaneously. Vital link It is clear that the Soviets are also concerned with the military implications of US bases in ways other than as an integral part of our delivery sysMilitary Raview

terns. For example, there can be little doubt that the Soviets considered the bases used for the U-2 flights as a highly provocative threat. Certainly, they viewed the U-2 flights as a vital link between our nuclear delivery SYS. terns and Our overseas bases. We may also assume that the Soviets have the same concern for other US air activities designed to gain intelligence which will improve our capabilities for penetrating to targets inside the USSR. It seems likely that Khrushchevs presummit rage in Paris in 1960 was inspired, in part, by Soviet fears that the U-2 flights, if continued, might be capable of reducing the present Soviet military advantage inherent in the concealment afforded them by their closed system. They probably believed that such flights were an indication of large-scale efforts on the part of the United States to enhance her counterforce capabilities and thus to increase the danger to the Soviets of a US surprise attack.
Fears Reinforced We may infer the great concern with which the Soviets viewed the U-2

edly worried them nreciaelv because th~y feared that tecfiology ~as wresting a problem from their control which they had heretofore considered primaril y one of political choice-name] y, whether the Soviet system would be open or closed. For the same reason, the Soviets have shown concern over orbiting US satellite systems. Political Consideration A major Soviet foreign policy ebjective has been to neutralize as much of the Free World as possible and thus to disengage the United States from her ties with foreign countries. The Soviets consider the neutrality of a country as a step in the right direction, even though their ultimate goal may be to bring the country under Communist control. Khrushchev said: Those who are not against us are for us. The Soviets know that neutrality is impossible so long as a country is granting base rights to the United States, A prime politico-military objective of Soviet strategy has been the dissolution of the US system of alliances, particularly NATO. In most instances, the base and alliance systems are inextricably interwoven. For example, the principal contribution of Portugal to the NATO alliance is that it offers the United States a base for support of Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations. Even Spain, who is not a member of NATO, is intimately related to the alliance, since she provides facilities to the United States for the deployment of tha NATO sword. In other words, the system of alliances and the baae structure may appear synonymous to the Soviets. If so, the Soviets probably believe that our entire aRiance system will disintegrate if our physical military presence ie removed. 29

flights if we add to our considerations the high probability that they still rely on a relatively soft system of fixed launching sites. Whatever fears they may have entertained in the past regarding a surprise attack by the United States on the USSR, such fears were reinforced by the U-2 incident. The Soviets probably have been under the impression that the first generationthat is, fixed and relatively softdelivery systems would meet their needs for some time to come, since any decieion to open up the Soviet system to inspection is a political one which they were free to make or not to make. The U-.2 flights undoubtNovember 1963

,.
US OVERSEAS BASES

In this respect, it maybe possible that the Soviets main concern over US bases is more political than military. The Soviets may exaggerate the political effects of the dismantling of the US overseas base system in the NATO area-where the United States has such an ohviouely etrong military commitment. However, in some countries outeide the NATO area where US military personnel are presentas in Iran or Libya where we have base rightsthe Soviets may believe that the hoet nation would opt for neutrality if the US military preeence were withdrawn. We must also note the strong possibility that not all NATO countries are entirely immune to the temptations of neutrality.
Neutralism

the United States will try to outbid the Soviet Union with economic as. sistsnce, and Iran will thus have the best of both vmrlds. If the Soviets have made such an equationthat is, that our military miesions and our baaes are synony. mousthen their imiietence upon the liquidation of foreign bases aims at nothing less than the complete withdrawal of the US military presence from foreign countries. Satellites

Khrushchevs greateet innovation in Soviet strategy seems to have been the legitimization of neutralism as a strategic tool. One specialist on Soviet affairs bas analyzed Khrushchevs policy as follows:
This new theorg says to the uncommitted nations: You dont have to be for us; we dont intend to Sovietize YOU; all we want is to be on friendl~ terme with you: to obta~n thie you simpl~ have to withdraw, or keep swag from alliances which we feel are directed against us. If you dont accept American arms and American bases, , uou belong to the camp of peace.

It is quite possible that, in their own minds, the Soviets equate US military miseions with bases, and neutrality with the withdrawal of these missione. Indeed, in Iran the Soviet approach has been to tell the Iranian Government that if it terminates the I-M military mission, Iran will receive economic assistance from the USSR. The Soviets argne that Iran will then benefit even more than now becanse 30

Another Soviet consideration possibly beara npon her satellites. US basee in Europe, for example, have their counterpart in Soviet bases and forces located throughout eaetern and central Europe, and Soviet logistic linee run through many East Euro. pean countries. Premier Gomulka has said that Soviet forces are in Poland because US forces are in Germany, Then, too, t h e r e is undoubtedly much concern among the East Europeans over what a war in Europe would mean for the people of that area. Such considerations may have prompted Polands Foreign Minieter, Adam Rapacki, to propoee a denuclearized zone in central Europe which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two Germanys. Poland stands geographically athwart the most important logistic lines leading to Soviet forces in East Germany. We may assume that the Poles fear that, if war were to break out in Europe over the Berlin question, US tactical nuclear power based in Germany would devastate Poland in the process of striking at Soviet logistic lines and bases in that country. We may conclude that the peeple of the satellite countriee are as concerned as the people living in the NATO countries over the possibility of being victims of a
Military Ravisw

United States-Soviet limited war in central Europe. , The Soviets have been desperately trying to eep%rate the United States from her NATO allies, and hence separate US nuclear power from Europe. If they could succeed in this endeavor, Europe might be forced to bow to Soviet wishee. They probably believe that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve such an objective so long as the United States maintains base righte in Europe. This is undoubtedly the motive behind the numeroue Soviet threats to nations who are playing heat to US baees. In short, the Soviete would like to remove the threat of war which our overseas military presence still poses to their policy of competitive coexistence. In this sense, our baees, linked as they are to our nuclear power, are making the march of hietory a risky businese for the Soviets. The Soviets real concern over nuclear weapons may be prompted in some measure by the fact that the inevitability of a Communist world victory has been greatly complicated by the advent of nnclear firepower, even though they have been fully aware of the role their nuclear capabilities can play in underwriting their progrees toward that goal.
Ensure Protection There ie a strong possibility that some budgetary concerns are also at

placed in the uncomfortable position of having to defend the adequacy of Soviet defenses only eeveral months after he and Marshal Malinovsky had assured the nation that Soviet defenses were in excellent shape. It ie important to recall what Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960:
into account that our by foreign military bases. This is why we are locating our rockets in such a wag as to insure double and triple protection; we can disperse rocket installations akd camouflage them well, We are taking

country is surrounded

.Marshal Malinovsky, in a epeech supporting the Soviet Premier, spoke as follows: The launching sites of miseilee are easy to camouflage and even to conceal completely.
Secrecy Gaps

the root of the Soviet attitude toward US bases. It eeems quite likely that . the motivation behind Khrushchevs outburst against the U-2 tlights was the fact that, after the U-2 fell into Soviet hands, and after the widespread disclosure of the purpose of its flight, the Soviet political leadere became embroiled with the military in a dispute over the adequacy of Soviet defenses. It ie possible that Khrushchev wae November 1963

The Soviets are able to maintain a high degree of strategic invulnerability at much lese cost than that required of an open society such as the United States. It may have been quite embarraeeing for Khrushchev when the U-2S photographic equipment was captured, in view of its obvious implications ae to gape in that secrecy which is an integral part of the Soviet political system and defense policy. Any further expenditures on military items might greatly jeopardize Khrushcheve plane for the development of the Sovi$t economy, and, ostensibly, his pobtical objectives of seeking to gain w o r 1d hegemony through demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet system in terme of socioeconomic development. It is obvious that Khrushchev is intent on using Soviet economic growth as a means to woo the underdeveloped world and as a key element in his domestic policya policy aimed at mak31

..
US OVERSEAS BASES ing hlm popular w i, t h the Soviet masses by increasing the production of consumer goods. Multiple Functions No matter how obsolete some of our overseas base systems may appear to -us, the Soviets still face the problem of striking all of our bases in tbe event

of war. Even though the United States

able to cope with our entire offensive weapons mix. This mix includes even those baees on which aircraft are not actually deployed, but which add to our over-all capabilities. In other worde, a rollback of our military PO sition may be a sine qua non of any substantial reduction in Soviet def enee expenditures, or possibly even in a

Reduction in Soviet ground forces may be prevented by the presence of US oversea bases may be able to distinguish between the function of the various types of US bases, it is conceivable that the specific uses aseigned to these bases are not too clear to the Soviete. Many of these bases have multiple functions. We cannot assume that the Soviets know exactly what role we have allocated to a given base-especially since it need not be the same role in war as in peace. Thus the base itself, as a symbol of its potential multiple utility, may trouble the Soviets. The Soviet military undoubtedly argues, that the Soviet Union must be 32

restructuring of the Soviet defense establishment. Our overseas base system may tig ure prominently in the argumente ad duced by the Soviet military to justify the tremendous expenditure inherent in the maintenance of large ground forces. While it is widely believed that a missile attack would be the easiest way for the Soviets to eliminate US overseas bases, there is evidence that some Soviet military leaders view th problem differently. S o m e highly placed Soviet military thinkera argue that the only sure way to deal with the b.

fJilitarf Revie

:.

problem of US overseas delivery capabilities is through a swift ground assault. They apparently reason that while miesiles would be quite effective against stationary US overseas bases, the newer generations of mobile delivery systems would require destruction through ground attack. Looking at the problem in this way, the Soviets would consider all countries with which we have military arrangements as bases, and thus conclude that the only way to deal with such bases is to overrun the entire country. They almost certainly view Western Europe in this manner. As has been suggested, the Soviets seem to view our bases abroad as evidence that we are planning some form of eurprise strategic attack, aud, further, that our posture is primarily geared to waging general war. Given this premise, it would be difficult for Soviet political leaders to sell the idea to tbe Soviet military that they could afford further to reduce their grouud forces, inasmuch as Soviet military doctrine still envisages a major role for all branches of the services in a general war. Sim?e an important economic objective of the Soviet Government seems to be a further reduction in Soviet ground forces and increased reliance on missile nuclear power, our military presence abroad may be the source of some disagreement between Soviet political and military leaders.
Conclusions

Soviet concern over US bases flows both from pelitical and military considerationsmilitary, in this context, meaning the strategic uses which these bases supposedly serve. As the Soviets ]wn nuclear delivery capabilities have grown, political considerations have :ome increasingly to the fore as a !ovember 1963

principal source of Soviet concern over our overseas base posture. The Soviets have focused their political offensive more on bases which either house, or are intimately related to, US nuclear striking power; Their apprehensions appear to explain, tO some extent, their advocacy of such schemee as the Rapackl Plan for a nuclear free zone in Europe. But even this primarily military objective is tinged with strong political considerations, including the desire to assuage the fears, on the part of their East European satellites, of potential devastation in a nuclear holocaust. There is probably some relationship between our military presence abroad and the cuh-ent size of the Soviet defense, budget, as well as the structure and posture of Soviet forces. Thus our forward military presence may figure in the debates between Soviet military and political leaders over force reductions in the interest of economy and the demands of the Soviet labo~ market. It is worth noting that the Soviets never seem to vary the order of area priority when calling for the dismantling of US overseas bases. The areas of closest proximity to the Soviet UnionEurope and the Near and Middle Eastalways appear ahead of North Africa, despite the fact that some components of SAC are located in the latter area. This suggests that the proximity of our forces exerts some weight in Soviet thinking. It may suggest, also, that they might be more apprehensive of tactical bases abroad than they are of SAC overseas installations. This military concern must be viewed in the context of Soviet polit. ical strategy. So long as US military power is physically present at the 33

US OVERSEAS BASES

frontiers of the East-West confronts. tion, Soviet crisis strategy runs the conetant rick of detonating a general nuclear war. More importantly, however, the Soviets see the US military preeence ae a principal link in their polittcal relationship with Europe. Political motives appear to take precedence over military eonsidera. tione. This becomes clear in any assessment of the relative emphaaie placed by the Soviets on the withdrawal of US bases from specific areas. The Soviete attach firet priority to the liquidation of basee in tbe NATO operational areanamely Europe, the Near and Middle East, and North Africa. That a principal objective of Soviet policy is the dissolution of the NATO alliance cannot be questioned. The Soviets apparently believe and perhaps not withont justificationthat if NATO dieintegrates, the major obstacle to the march of history (beyond the United States herself) will have been removed. The Soviet campaign to dismantle NATO may be animated by an increasing sense of urgency. The Soviets must calculate that, to the extent that tbe march of history, spurred by Soviet strategy in other continents, gains in momentum, the

NATO countries are likely to close ranke more resolutely. Hence the So. viets would like to see tbe organiza. tion dissolved before they undertake major operations in other parts of the world. An intermediate, but no Iese impor. tant, goal of Soviet strategy is the stabilization of their position in East. ern Europe. The military preeence of the United States, despite her inaction at the time of the uprisinge in Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956, still contribute to the instability of the Soviet East European empire. It holds out hope of eventual independence tc the people of Eastern Europe. In Soviet eyes, it will continue to do so as long as the United States fails officially to recognize the status gw in Eaetern Europe. The Soviets prob. ably believe that greater etability fox the East European Communist re gimes would almoet automatically fol low the withdrawal of our forward military presence. In sum, when the Soviets epeak oi the liquidation of US bases, they reall} speak of disengagementthat is, thf withdrawal or thinning out of LK forces in Europe. Disengagement if the essence of tbe Soviet scheme fo] disarmament.

We are arrayed in force but only to defend peace. We seek to deter aggression by eur presence and our readiness. but we are prepared to defeat it no matter where or how or when it occurs.
Secretary of the Army

Cyrus R. Vance

34 \

Military Review

THE SPIRIT OF THE

I
NATO STAFF
Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Elble, West German Armg

military a]~immes are concluded during a war or in the face of I an open threat of military conquest. The North Atlantic alliance, and the ) treaty organization etemming from it, is unique. It was created in peacetime to meet an anticipated threat. In NATO, a joint supreme command with some restrictionsis operational, and its integrated etaffs include representatives of all signatory states. I Cooperation is exercised without the external pressure of a direct threat of war; neither is pressure e-ted by a single power within the alliance. Rather, the alliance is baaed on complete equality, and its partners work out problems in free discussion, governed by an awareness of their responsibility to the common task. There were three decisive reasons why the nations of the West chose this form of alliance: Modern technology facilitate decisive action by mass destruction
! I November 1963

~ M~~~

weapons in the initial phase of an armed conflict. Full striking power no longer depends upon time-consuming mobilization. Thue an aggressor has an advantage in the element of surprise, It follows that the defender must strive to neutralize this advantage as much as possible. A requieite for the success of such an effort is the existence of operating staffs prior to an attack. Unlike most periods in the past there is only one potential aggressor in sight. NATO was designed as an instrument of defense. Neither its principles nor ite provisions permit it to launch an attack. If war were to
This article was translated and digested from the original, published in WEHRKUNDE (Federal Republ{c of Germany} March 196.$, under the title, Zusammenarbeit und Geist in einem &ttegr-ierten NATO-Stab. 35

THE NATO STAFF

come, the aggression would have to come from the other great bloc whose drive for domination, based on ideolOgYand forced by dynamics, cannot be denied, The principles and structure of this bloc are inherently offensive. . The concepts of war and peace,

and sovereign states must join a time. ly defense alliance if they degire to safeguard their sovereignty and freedom. Naturally, there were many difficult problems that had to be overcome. Allowancea had to be made for the dif.

NATO headquarters

in Paris, home of a unique organization: a military created in peacetime rather than during ~ war meanings,

alliamw

applied in their historical are no longer valid.

Political War

Thd Wests aggressor sees a policy of conquest as the basis for accomplishing bis ideological missiona mission to be pursued with all means, including, if neceseary, force. Thus we are already in a atate of war, because tbe offensive-minded aggressor has presented us with a political war in one form or another for the past 15 years. If one does not realize this, he cannot understand the times. The nations which founded NATO understood tbe timee. They proceeded from tbe correct, basic idea that free 36

ferent concepts of freedom and sovereignty of the then 12 member nations. Despite these different concepts, miIitary staffs were expected to operate wth a unity of purpose. Too, there was an identity of defense interests, but by no means congruity in all other political interesta. There was also a divergency of political power among the member nations. With all due recognition of the sovereignty of each individual state, circumstances were bound to determine their influence in each case. One of the many problems which spring from this basic complexity is: How doee an officer assign~d to an inMiliiary fferlaw

tegrated staff work together with fellow officers of other nations?

Solution

The NATO solution is to draw the personnel for the exercise of staff functions proportionately from all the NATO countries. A staff agency in a NATO headquarters may have an Amerirdn general in charge, and directly under him a French, a British, and a Dutch colonel. These officers, in turn, have other staff officers from a diversity of nations at their disposal. Each of these officers can be recognized as a representative of his homeland by hie national uniform. So far as his functions are concerned, however, this is immaterial. Every officer is dutyhound to advocate his ideae in the interest of the over-all cause and to present them as he would in his own army, Ultimately, he acdepts the decision of his superior. In this respect, the purely military practices differ little from country to country. In carrying out these practices, however, many probleme arise. There is, for example, tbe language problem. English and French are the official languages. This means that the Americans, Belgians, Canadians, British, and French work in their mother tongue. Too, members of these nations who do not speak the second official language, or who do not try to master the second language, are rare exception< It is far more difficult for the ones who must nse a foreign language in performing their work. The latter are also expected to have a degree of tluency in both NATO languages to enable them to follow conferences without an interpreter and to read direc. tives and documente. The fundamental military professional ideas of the officers of different November 1963

nationalities are not always the same. There are divergent ideas on particular points. Strictly speaking, this matters little because difficulties rarely develop from these differences. It is not the task of the integrated stiffs to lose themselves in the details of tactics, training, or logistice. These fields are reserved for national discretion. The major concern of the staffs is planning, and, wherever necessary, recommendations are made to national military and governmental authorities. Joint leadership on operational aqd strategic matters is exercised through guidance, recommendations, and coordination rather than through the iseuance of orders. Primary Task It followe, then, that the primary task of the integrated staff is to reconcile the interests of all member nations, or a portion of those natione, with the military potential of each and the tasks assigned to national corrtingents within the framework of the collective defense. It is not a question of dictating a good solution but, rather, to consider the various opinione of the different nstionalitiea and to arrive at the best solution by working in barmen y. A soldier who eerves in an integrated NATO staff meets with the traditions of the other armies. The Napoleon eagle appears as the symbol of French military units; the Pruesian eagle is worn by a British unit. The British, particularly, have a wealth of tradition in insignia, parade uniforms, pattern of behavior, customs, and unit names. The officers of the relatively young United States Army, too, preserve with pride the tradition which it has developed. On festive occasions, they
37

THE NATO STAFF

US Arm

The primary task of the integrated staff is to reconcile the interests of all member nations, or a portion of these nations, with the military potential of each uniforms which in eoIor and adornment date back more than a century, The spirit which has molded the officer corps of these armies has the same roots. It is derived from a sense of honor, devotion to duty, chivalry, and moral strength. Whether or not we are aware of it, Western culture has created a type of officer which distinctly bears the characteristics of the Greek and Roman Stoics, the Christian orders of knighthood, of humanism, even the Jesuit order, and Calvinism. All had in common the idea of serving a community. With this background, it is not dif ticult to ap~ly the ethics of service beyond the national level to the larger field of international responsibility. display CtaauaIon Heritage

Basically, it ie not only the common taskto prevent a hot war throngh a high degree of sustained Western defense readinesswhich is a binding force between the officers and soldiers in the integrated staffs, There is also a great common heritage of culture and history and of religious and pbh sophical conceptions of life. To some degree, all participants feel it. This feeling is the basis of great Mutual trust, There are differences of opinion in integrated staffs; these differences cannot always be reconciled. Neither can unpleasant friction be completely avoided. But this is not what counts. If we recognize the problems which are inherent in a coalition and realize Witary Raqiaw

38

that friction is not unusual even within national contingents, then we can only be pleased by the unity in action and cooperation which is amply demonstrated by the representatives of the sovereign nations. There is a spirit which not only facilitates common military activity, but one that may be applied in the pursuance of common political tasks. The striking power of armed formations is not jeopardized by this form of cooperation on the highest

level. History has often proved that coalitions can strike hard and effectively even under unfavorable condi. tions. The potential foe is as awkre of this as we are. It is NATOs task to keep this knowledge alive during this peaceful phase of the political war. By constantly increasing its inner stability and striking power, NATO is decisively useful until the aggressors program of world revolution is abandoned as infeasible.

. . . all fiftesn countries [NATO] have one thing in common; they alI share the same conception of the essent%d value of life: the right of the individual to decide his own fate. They all share the same loathing of compulsion and subversion.
From Vigilance-The NA TOs Fifteen Price of Liberty. Nations Supplement

November 1963

39

UERRILLA activity has always G been regarded as a natural byproduct of conventional warfare. The Old Testament tells of Samson releasing several hundred fire-touched foxes in the corn and wheattlelds of his Philistine enemiee in a self-proclaimed act of revenge and sabotage. Wherever there are conquerors and conquered, you are sure to find the bee stilngs of guerrilla activity, a series of unrelated acte of violence and sabotage, which to the , occupying powers are rationalized as more inconvenience than threat to their continued occupation of a country. By counting the bee stings one is able to gauge the temperament of the hive, and so it has always been, In recent years, however, the nature of this bee sting warfare hag changed enough for us to consider it as an entity, rather than as a byproduct of conventional warfare. In fact, the latter seems now to be a byproduct of guerrilla warfare.

We have witnessed the successful guerrilla campaigns of Mao Tse-tung which netted him all of China; the campaign of Ho-Chi-Minh which gave him half of French Indochina, and ~ stranglehold on the other; tbe winning campaign of Fidel Castro which put all of Cuba in the Communist bag; and the succese of the Front of National Liberation (F.LN) which terminated French rule in Algeria, Until recently, the United States has never been involved in such guerrilla wars deeply enough to empIoy American military forces or to give military suppliee in sufficient quanti. ties to prevent guerri~la takeovers, Our aid has always been token. The prevailing United States political sentiment has been that the insurgents had some merit in their revolt, and

TO GAIN THE REAR

William PSUI Ha]ber
.

M#$m:

*
r 40
.,3 -.- -

.*...

Military Review

that these insurtients were notsince they had denied the nam&-Communists. In one WaY or another we had been propagandized or talked into Positions of nonintervention, or halfhearted assistance, when we did decide to do something. The United States, long a spectator, has now been called upon to take part in the game, and much of what we finally do depends on a correct knowledge of the concepts and practices of guerrilla warfare. ~ For the first time we are beginning to realize that guerrilla warfare is the actual form of the war we are fighting in South Vietnam, and that it never sprang from conventional warfare. S1OWIY and surely we are beginning to realize that guerrilla warfare can be of and by itself both the tactics and

strategies of conquest. S1OW1Yand surely we are corning to realize that our enemies shun battle as formal, conventional confrontations, preferring, instead, to wage a far more subtle, economic, and less bloody (for them ) conflict-a conflict they feel certain of winning,
First Guerrilla Wars

That guerrilla warfare goes much deeper than an annoying series of seemingly disconnected acts of violence and sabotage can best be seen if we go back in time to Lawrence of Arabia, whom Llddell Hart credits with winning the first of the modern guerrilla wars. Lawrences campaign, fought againet the Turks between 1916 and 1918, was based on self-formulated principles of guerrilla warfare. The validity of Lawrences prin-

Nmember 1963

41

,)

TO GAIN THE REAR

ciples rested in their applicability to the time, tea-rain, and temperament of the combatants. T h e conventional fo~ms employed sIavishly by thb Turks were valid if, and only if, their opponents chose to play by the same rules; this was Lawrences purpose-to play by rules his enemies could not follow, . Lawrence analyzed, among others, the war philosophies of Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Foch, only to find them strangely inapplicable to the war prob. lems facing the Hejaz Arabs then in revolt against Turkey. He went on to formutate hie own theories of strategic guerrilla warfare, which makes his book.Severz Pillar-s of Wisdowr a still usable manual of principles and techniques for nonconventional forms. Liddell Hart, writing in 1936, cited Lawrence as a genius because he bad created an entirely new form of warfare out of the elements of the old. Hart suggested that Lawrences war was but the handwriting on the wall; that guerrilla wars would eliminate most of the senseless violence and brute force usually engendered in the conventional; and that they would be fought with greater economy. HOW did Lawrence wage his unconventional war against the Turks ? Gain the Rear Simply stated, Lawrence felt that the aim of all military activity is to gain the rear behind ones enemies, since it represents all that is tender, vulnerable, and open to both exploitation and domination at minimum cOst to the aggressor. Guerrilla warfare beWilliam Paul Haiber, a technical writer with International Business Machines, has served i% both the Vnited States Navg and Air Force. A student of militarv history, Mr. Haiber received his B. A. degvee from Bv-ookltin College. 42

occupied rear area. This activity is character. ized by a subtle multiplication of force, by being, as Lawrence theorized, an influence, a thing invisible, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas. Guerrilla warfare does away with the concept of fronts en. t irely. The conditions Lawrer+e considered necessary for a guerrilla, campaign in the Middle East were: ., The Turks would operate on long easily accessible lines of communica. tion. The Turks would be bound by the rules of conventional warfare. The Turks would remain igno. rant of the predictability of their own defeat. Shortly before the beginning of World War I, the Turks threw in their lot with the Germans. The British, realizing the threat to their Suez lifeline, tried to take them out by their ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign. The failure at Gallipoli permitted the Turks to strengthen their hold and confirm their leadership over the Ottoman Empire, then in a state of collapse, administratively, but still the strong. hold of Islam and all that implied.
Religious Strife

gins &nd ends in an already

The great boil on the back of the Ankara Moslems embodied iteelf in the austerely orthodox Hejaz Arabs who never ceased to sing the song of successorship to the Prophet and to proclaim spiritual leadership over Islam. The Ankara Government could not hold its loyalty by either pm-eua sion or by force. And so it came about that, after the Turks hanged several aherifs and imprisoned others, the Arabs went into open revolt, rallying around the green banners of King Husein. The time was June 1916.

Military Review

November 1963 1

43

Td

6AIN THE REAR

With little effort the Arabs captured the twin holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. The Turks, true believers in the value of properly applied force, responded promptly by sending an army

high hopes of exploiting the Arab revolt, and they eventually chose Law. rence as their agent to bring this about. Lawrence was at that time a rather unconventional young staff officer at general headquarters in Cairo, with a well-known background of trzvel among the Arabs and a deep understanding of their language and customs. In 1916 Lawrence chose to spend his leave visiting Arabia, where his contacts quickly gained him access to Prince Faisal, who led the Arab Army. Much impressed with Faisal, he re: turned to Cairo to advise that the revolt could succeed without the aid of British troops, who could ill be spared. The general staff, delighted with this economy, dispatched Lawrence as liaison officer to Faisal in order to put hie ideas into practice. Within two years, Lawrence generated the legend and the facts that after 45 years are still subject to both controversy and admiration.
Situation

.,-

>.-..

...

Nmttm,nlA,c1,2u0.

T. E. Lawrence corps down the rails to Medina, which the Arabs relinquished almost ae easily as they had acquired it. The second phase of Turkish operation? was to push a corps out of Medina to capture Mecca which lay 250 miles beyond their reach, across a railless desert. Taking that city was another story, and in it lies the story of Lawremce, the first of the modern guerrilla campaigns, and the birth of communications warfare. The English were not idle. They had
44

The situation Lawrence confronted had no pleasing orientations. The Turks were spread ont akmg the Hejaz Railroad, 800 miles in length, which ran parallel to the Red Sea, acrose the high tableland of Arabia, connecting Damascus in the north with Medina in the south. The Hejaz line was a single track affair, having been built by German engineers from monies collected throughout Islam. Its construction was religious, in that it was built to make the pilgrimage to Mecca possible for much of the Islamic population. The line had been completed in 1908 as far as Medina; its const uction to Mecca had been halted < by the advent of the war. In the north, in what is called the Fertile Crescent, a Britieh army faced
Militsry Review

a Turko-German force determined to fight for every yayd of ground. Both sides used the effusion of blood principle developed by Foch; this led to a stalemate. The Germans realized that the Turks were dissipating their forces along the length of the Hejaz line, forces that might, well swing the balauce of attrition their way. Medina had absolutely no military value, but the Turks insisted on holding the town for religious considerations, com~ pletely ignoring that a military victory in the north would give them Medina forever. The defeat of German and Turkish arms lay in the rails between Damas-

1-

however, t 00 k the initiative and pushed a whole army corps out of that city on a broad front moving toward Mecca. One wing reached for Rabigh on the Red Sea, at which seaport the Arab regular army was in training. Lawrence realized that the Arab irregulars could neither hold a line nor defend one. T h e i r strength, he thought, lay in depth rather than in front, and that it had been the threat of an attack by Faisals men against the northern Turkish flank that hid actually inhibited for so many precious w e e ks the latters attempt against Mecca. Developing this flank threat, Lawrence and Faisal quit Rabigh, moved north to Wejh, another

. . .

,.
-..?.: L .. :,.-. ,... .,-.. .J ,_-, .. :.

....
.-,

US

Anw

Lawrence realized that the Arab irregulars could neither hold a line nor defend one. Their strength lay in depth rather than in front.. cus and Medina; Lawrence saw it there, and he made it happen. Conventional thinking on the part of the Arabs was vague and nebulous, calling for some unspecified movement against the Medina Turks. The Turks,

Red Sea port, occupied it in January 1917, and set up a new base.
Turning Point

The Arab movement northward threw the Turks into confusion. They canceled their drive against Mecca, 45

November 1963

. .
TO GAIN THE REAR returned to Medina, and sprinkled half m their strength along the railroad, reinforcing station garrisons. Although it was not apparent at the time, the movement to Wejh was the actual turning point in the war. It forced the Turks to create a front almost 800 milee in length. To the Turkish leedera the front gave the appearance of one solid black line, impenetrable and strong; but to the Arabs the front wae composed of black dots representing rail garrisons, with the interstices more apparent and meaningful than the dots. As Lawrence saw it: For the rest of the war the Turks stood on the defensive and the Arab tribesmen won advautage after advantage till, when peace came, they had taken 85,000 prisoners, killed and wounded and wore out as mang, and occupied more than 100 thousand square miles of enemy ground, at little loss to themselves.

demonstrate the capacity of blood to flow without coming to any real deci. sion. Lawrence was againet it, and as persuasively as he could he presentei his analyeis of war and how that anal. ysis meshed with Arab aims.
Three Elements

Lawrence saw alI warfare as a three-element affair: one algebraical; one biological; and one psychological,
Algebraic

The algebraic element dealt with known variables like time, space, ge. ography, climate, transportation, and men in type-masses. In this element Lawrence saw 140,000 square miles of Turkish-occnpied ground. He esti. mated that it would require a minimum of 20 soldiers to hold four square milee, or a total of 600,000 men. The Turks had available 100,000 men. As Lawrence conceived it, this conspired to give the Arabs dominance.
Biological

By not fighting the Turks, the Ilejaz Arabs bad been able to gain the initiative and prevent movement against Mecca; the Turks, having little forage for their transport animala, were forced to eat them. Without animale, a foot movement to Mecca was impossible. Lawrence had seen the essence of Arabian aims as geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands. Killing Turka was not one of the aims. If the Turks would go quietly, the war wouId be over; if they refused, they would be driven out, but at the cheapest possible price. Initially, Arab thinking had been along conventional linesbegin some sort of movement against the rails, preferably behind Medina, there to bring on a battle that would merely

The biological element dealt with wear and tear, with the one element of unpredictable variabilitymen and the commanders of men. Lawrence observed that the greateat commander -Pas: . . . one whose intuitions most nearly
happen. Nine-tenths tain, and taught in rational ten t h is flashing across the the test of generals, of tactics are cerbooks: but the irlike a kingfisher pool and that is

Lawrence extended his wear and tear theory to include materials. He knew that the Turks were not strong in them, so that the death of a Turkish rail, train, depot, gun, or cannon was more important than the death of a Turk. Depriving an enemy of his weapons and sustenance rendered him as useless as if he were, indeed, dead. The Arabs,, who could not endure
Military Review

losses in men, were always able to arrange for material superiority in all of their attacks. Lawrences theory called for the negation of contact with the enemy. The Arabe were to fight a war of detachment, to contain the enemy by: . . . the silent threat of a vast unknown, not disclo~ing ourselves until This atthe moment of the attack. tack need only be nominal, directed not against his men but agahtst his materials: as it should not seek for his main strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material.

Ae a working tactic the enemy was to be denied his targets, and thousands of Turkieh soldiers in the desert never fired a shot as a result. To avoid being targets, tbe AraiA developed and maintained a very effective intelligence net. They were always aware of what the enemy was planning and, con. sequentiy, were always able to disperse, to evaporate before the Turks arrived. Nonproductive marches and countermarches a 1w a ys subtracted from enemy morale.
Psychological

themselves in great numbers in every harmless pla~e, including Medina. They felt disposed to concentrate in areas they could etfec$ively dominate. Their confidence was restored by a reduction in Arab guerrilla operations. As it developed, the Arab etrategy was not to destroy the Hejaz Railroad, but to keep it operating at a minimum, with maximum discomfort to the enemy. In short, the Arab attacks on the line were designed to fix the maximum number of Turkish soldiers all along the rails, making it possibld for the Arabe to provide an overwhelming force at any single point on the line. Arab strategy called for a distribution of attacks along tbe entire Turkish line to lend the appearance of Arab superiority and to force the Turks to build up their rail garrisons beyond a minimum number of men. As Lawrence stated:
The ratio between area determined the character By huving five times the the Turks, the Arabs could with them, with one fifth ber. and number of the war. mobility of be on terms their nunt-

The psychological element dealt with the adjustment of tbe minds of the troops; of the minds of ones enemies; and, wherever possible, of the minds of neutrals and noncombatant populations. Lawrence wrote: The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander . . . a province was won when the civilians in ithad been
?augh t to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence of the enemy was of secondary importance. According to Plan

To Lawrence, battles were impositions on the side which considered itself to be the weaker. The Arabs were to defend nothing, shoot nothing. Their cards were speed and time, not hitting pomer, and these gave them strategic rather than tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force: the invention of bully beef did more to modify land warfare than the invention of gunpowder.

And so it came about, quite intentionally and according to plan, that the Turks were allow;d to- maintain November 1963

By putting these theories to work, Lawrences guerrilla forces captured Aqaba, Tafila, Azraq, Dera, and finally Damascus. By using the widest distribution of force with the maximum 47

iO GAIN THE REAR

number of raids going at once, the Arabs achieved maximum disorder; it was this that supplied equilibrium to their campaign. The accomplishments of Lawrence and his guerril!a forces were masked by General Edmufid Allenbys conventional breakthrough in the north. Yet for all of Allenbys closeness to the final objective-Damascus-it was Lawrence and his men who met him at the gates of the city, having come a much greater distance and overcoming greater obstacles. As Allenbys mobile right wing, it was Lawrence who had made the conventional victory in the north possible by tying down thousands of Turks to the Hejaz rails.
The Thesis

enemies

organized

communications,

for irregcdar warfare is fairlv Wilt{. sens definition of stvategg, the etud~ of com?aunicat{on in its extteme de. gree of attack where the enemy is not, In fifty words: granted mobilitg, securit~ (in the form of @enging the en emu targets), time and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victor~ wilt rest with the ineurgen ts, for the algebraical fat. tors are in the end decisive, and against them perfection of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

Out of this protracted and grueling warfare, Lawrence developed his theeis by which a successful guerrilla war could be waged:
Rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded sot merely from attack, but from fear of it: such a base as the Arabs had in the Red Sea ports, th~ deserts, or in the minds of men converted to.its creeds. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined avmy of accusation too fe,w to fullfill tize doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole effectively fvorn fortified posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of riot betraying rebel movements to the enemw Re&ellione can be made by 2% active in a striking f ovce, and 98% positively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of eupplg. They must have the technical equipment todestroy or puralyze the

Even a brief inspection of the tat. tical and strategic theories and prac. tices used in all of the guerrilla campaigns fought since 1916 shpws them to be duplicates of those developed by Lawrence. Where most of the guerrilla wars have failed, namely in the Philippines, Malaya, Greece, and Kenya, the basic conditions for success, if initially present, were absent in the end as the result of aggressive countermeasure, some luck, and bad practice or misapplication. To control, and then defeat, the Viet Cong in South Viet~am maybe a long and costly proposition. That the struggle should be continued to its planned endings cannot be successfully disputed. On moral grounds alone we cannot simply turn over country after country to a handful of rebels whose will does not reflect the will of the people. In South Vietnam the border between the rebels and North Vietnam and Laos is their gateway to safety, their unassailable base. We can never hope with present policy what it is to penetrate that base, We must operate on the minds of the people in South Vietnam. We must ensure that they are 98 percent sympathetic to our aims. Then the rebels will be deprived

48

Military Review

of their supplies, mobility, and, lastly, their morale. 3 In handling future threats of guerrilla wars in South America, a possible battleground of the future, it would stand us in good stead to adjust our thinking to this form of warfare so that we are as skillful and wary as our enemies. We have only to look at the start that has already been made in Cuba to know what might happen elsewhere in Latin America. Today, the rebels are in the hills preaching

and propagandizing, winning converts; tomorrow they will sit in the parliaments of man, where they do not belong, with a death grip on half the world, and with only half a world
to go.

Our salvation lies in understanding the nature of these wars, fought on the cheap, hy stealth, by terror, by intrigue, with skill and resolution. We must develop countertechniques that will change the balance sheet of our failures into victories.

The short-term objective of tbe gnerrilla is to harass and destroy, to bit and run. His long-term objective is to become a regular soldier. But he cannot become a regu!ar until be has captured enongh of the institutions of power to support a regular army. A counterinsurgency program, therefore, operates both by strengthening the institutions of civil soriety against infiltration and direct attack, and by weakening the guerrilla force, isokiting it from local snpport, starving it, systematically- pursuing it, and eventually captnring or destroying it. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gtlpatric

November 1963

49

,.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

PART1!: TODAYAND TOMORROW
Lieutenant General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, British Armu

This art{cle is a condensation of a lecture which the author presented at Trinitv College, Cambridge, in 1962. These lectures k a v e been printed in a booklet under the title

The Profession of Arms, Iohich may be obtained from The Times, Printing House Square, London, E. C. 4, or The Times, London, ?ne., 25 East
5hth Street, New York 22.Editor.

IT~A~,in..rtime. to think of war and peace as though one must be at war if one is not at peace and vice versa. This is nearly always wrong, and certainly so at any time when war is not total, as it was 50

beenc.st.mar~

not in the mid-18th century. Then, when nations were in a state of war, most people continued to be unaffected, and many never heard about it at all. All that changed with tbe French Revolution and Napoleons unmanner. ly intrusion into a world of limited war. Throughout tbe 19th century, even in times of deceptive peace, forms of political thought and professional military practice continued to develop along lines leading straight toward total national war. Here, we owe a great deal to the Germans. Tbe responee to tbe Nape. leonic challenge, which led to the CO1. lapse at Jena, was the overhaul of Ger.

Reviem Military

man military institutions ,pnd the development of a national frame in which to house them. The movement toward national unity and sovereignty gathered , strength as the Pruesian Army became more formidable. A militsry philosophy, that of Clausewitz, amreared just when it was most .. wanted. The Germany of our time waa founded in w,ar in the 19tb century and tested in war as the century progressed. The two great world catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century revolved around Germany as the central figure. Just as the last of these two World Wars ended, the missing piece dropped into place, and the pattern waa complete; the concept of total war between sovereign natiOnaI a t a t es was now matched with the technique of total destruction. As a result, if by war we still mean total war, as Clausewitz did, war can no longer be what Clauaewitz called it the continuation of policy by other means. It is difficult to argue, for example, that unrestricted war between powers of high and roughly equal nuclear capability c a n possibly be brought about by a rational act of deliberate policy. General war can result, it seems to me, from miscalculation, aberration, or mischance. It might possibly come back into play as a rational act of policy, in the unlikely event of a radical technical advance which gives one power an overwhelming, if temporary, superiority over the rest, However, war in the sense of general unrestricted war can no longer be regarded as a normal continuation of foreign pelicy or as an alternative to peace, What is requiredin addition to preparations necessary for total war is the ability to deploy that degree November 1963

of warlike effort which the circumstances demand, in gentle gradation from something very small to something which, though large, is still short of general mobilization. War, total war, we have to avoid. Warfarc+acts of organized violence between groups of men which amount to less than total warwe muet do something about.
The Military Agent

How do we avoid total war? One widely supperted suggestion is that general war could not take place if we all agreed to do away with the means to wage it. General and complete disarmament is, therefore, put forward as the answer, perhaps with nuclear disarmament first. Others argue that, so long as sovereign states exist, no such agreements, even with far better guarantees than the great powers, are, at present, likely to agree upon, can be foolproof. The argument goes as follows: there is now a high degree of transferability between civil and military skills. Since techniques cannot be abolished, an attempt to lock up the weapons ia not a very sensible way of trying to prevent conflict. An agreement for general and complete disarmament would probably raise more problems than it would solve. The prevention of total war, therefore, can best be approached through arms control. I mention these arguments not to take sides, but to make a rather obvious point. In the prevention of total war, whatever meana are chosen, the state will rely heavily upon professional agencies in the military ephere. Neither a working system of arms control nor an effective state of genera] disarmament is possible without the military agent. Still less can you dispense with the
51

PROFESSION OF ARMS military nuclear if some discriminate form of The search warfare emerges. may be in the next few years, or the

for it, the study of it, and its conduct, if it were to take place, would make heavy demands on the capacity of military professionals. that warfare of some kind is quite inevitable, No one can say in advance when or how armed conflict between groups of men will emerge. Who could have predicted the course of current events a few years ago ? Then there was already fighting
Pattern of Violence It must be admitted

next half century ? The mathematical resourcee of the social scientist may be of help here in the long run, but they are not yet sufficiently reliable to furnish much guidance to makera of policy. It is difficult to say how conflict will emerge or what form it will take, Ali we can say with confidence is that it will occur. Edward Gibbon in the late 18th ten. tury predicted the early disappearance of warfare between nations. He was wrong. World War I was the war to

Total war is now mstchad with the technique of total destruction in the Trucial Oman etates, in Aigeria, Cyprus, Malaya, and Kenya. Prior to that, there was already fighting, or soon would be, in Hungary, in Eastern Germany, and in the Suez Canal zone, - and COUPSrlitat had taken place, or were about to, in Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, the Sudan, and Burma. Who will predict with any confidence what the pattern of violence 52 end war. It was followed by World War II. World war HI cannot be allowed, but its prevention will make little if any difference to the tendency to minor outbreaks of violence, except perhaps to ihcrease their frequency. If you can take a club to your neighbor witbout bringing down ,a thunderbolt, you will club him the more readily. Now, since fighting is bound to take
Militaw Review

place, situations are easily conceivable in which the oniy hope of avoiding something worse may lie in takhg a hand in it. We may well he working toward a pOsition in which the main purpose of the profession of arms is not to win wars but to avoid them that is, by timely warfare to lessen the risk of general war. In my opinion, we are there already. If this is so, the chief function of the armed forces now becomes the containment of violence. We may thus be moving toward what Janowitz calls a eonstabtdary concept. Within such a concept, the function and duty of the military professional remain the same. His function is the orderly application of armed force. His duty is to develop hk skill in the management of violence to the utmost and to act as the true subordinate of the properly constituted authoritywhatever this may turn out to be. Changing Pattern The pattern of society in Great Britain is evolving, and the pattern of her armed forces will evolve in conformity with it. Those in responsible positions in our armed forces today must see to it that modification to correspond to a changing pattern in society is facilitated, while paying careful attention to the preservation of that which is worth preserving. Where does the gentleman stand in the officer establishment today? A view in an official US publication of 1950 seems reasonable: the military officer is considered a gentleman . . . because nothing less . . . is truly suited for his particular set of responsibilities. In relations between young officers and men, when consistency, firmnees, and sincerity are important and warmth of personal feeling must be November 19a3

tempered with some degree of detachment, the implications of what is said here are just. They are above all important where disciplinary questions arise, as happene inevitably under the terms of the military contract. These make heavy demands cm the young officer who has to be made to remember that only a person of liberal mind is entitled to exercise coercion over oth. ers in a society of free men. As an officer rises higher in his profession, the demands made upon-him in the administration of justici increase. The machine is efficient but must be jealously watched. A senior officer who confirms punishments often has the power to modify or lessen them. He will not do so without careful inquiry, to which he will also bring compassion and commonsense. This can tax a whole mind, and it brings its own rewards.
Nine-to-Five Types

Whatever may be thought about officers and gentlemen, a change of critical importance in our time is in the rejection of the assumption that the qualities required of anoficer are to be found only inone stratum of society. The vestiges of the 18th-century distinction between gentle and simple-as reflected in relationships between officers and nonofficers-are vanishing. An article in a popular weekly paper pointed out recently that the disappearance of what it calls the old feudal relationship, typical of the prewar professional, is not without disadvantages. Many officers today: says The People, are nine-to-five types. The problem is to retain group coherences and a rational pattern of discipline and command without relying on moribund features in the social %tructure. J 53

PiOFESSION

OF ARMS as well as of patterns and discipline. Back to School A distinction is worth of promotion

The distinction between officer and noncoprmissioned officer is unlikely to disappear. There is, however, much to be said for a reexamination of the distribution of responsibilities between officers and noncommissioned officers. The better and more mature minde requ ired among officere in armed service today, moreover, will not be so readily attracted to it if the demands made upon the junior officer are too low. A consequent tendency bas been evident to increase the reeponsibilitiee

pointing

out

here between professional education in the profeeaion of arms and that in come others, such as medicine or law, In these, emphaeie is placed on a sin. gle, long and concentrated dose, after which the practitioner, though he has much to learn, is recognized as qualified. In armies, and to a Ieeser degree in naviee and air forces, the initial pro-

One-fifth of the officers professional

lif@is spent in school

of the noncommissioned officer and to liberate the junior oficei from come of the duties which make few demande on the mental qualities expected in him. This tendency is likely to continue. If it ,results in further eignificant adjustment of areae of reeponsibility, it could bring about a modification of the numericaI relationship of officers to noncommissioned officers 54

fessional educational doee is only enough for the earlieet etages. Thereafter, the officer who gets on in the service frequently goes back to school specialist courses, etaff and cummarrd schoole, and advanced courees. He spends not leee than one-fifth of his pmfessi~nal life on etudies intended to prepare him for an exten sion of hie experience or for greater
Military Raview

PM is vast] y greater than the amount, of time spent in a similar manner in the law and medical professions. The pattern of professional edncation in the armed services is progressive. There is consequently no intolerable waste of preparatory effort. Those who are unlikely to rise high in their profession, or are unwilling to stay in it Iong, may leave while they are still young enough to do so. responsibili~les. Chsnge in

can destroy mankind. The penalty of inadequacy was high before. It could now be final,
Two Positions We struggle to escape from this situation. Opinion tends to move between two absolutist extremes. At one end

Pattern

The military profession is changing in pattern as the parent society changes, Officer qualities are now sought in a deeper section of society than they once were. Educational staudards at entry and at various stages thereafter are rising. Command by domination has, in significant degree, given way to command by management. Professionalism is more respected. In the armythe least technical, in a nonmilitary sense, of the three services in Britainthe requirements for technical awareness in ambitious officers have risen steeply in the last few years and are still rising. Material rewards are satisfactory during an officers service, and he can look forw>rd to a pension when he retires, which compares very favorably with what he could come by in other professions. Career prospects in terms of promotions are rational, and the criteria for advancement are sensible. Improvements such as these have long been urgent. I hope, and believe, they have been made in time. Others must follow. The social results of inadequacy in the management of violence in two World Wars have already been enormous and remain incalculable. Since war became total, we have acquired weapons wtrich in total war
Navemher 1963

are thoee who are convinced that total war must come; that it should be prepared for as a matter of the highest priority; and that a favorable opportunity for it should be welcomed and even sought. Such unlikely companions as the pure Marxist-Leninist and the champion of unrestricted Capitalist free enterprise (both rather old-fashioned types ) can easily find themselves together here. At the other extreme are all those who see no hope for mankind except in the rejection and suppression of all means of war, starting with the most destructive and making a brave and desperate gesture of voluntary surrender, if need be, in the hope that others will follow. Somewhere between these two positions You will find most of the more intelligent professional officers. They are more pessimist than optimist in that they see little cause to suppose that man has advanced so far morally as to be able to refrain from violence. They tend to be more pragmatist than absolutist in that they reject the inevitability of total war at one end as totally intolerable, while they regard the notions of the total disarmers at the other as scarcely practicable. The professional officers do not, in sum, see why man, in spite of his ineradicable tendency toward violence, should be unable to manage the affairs of the world without blowing it up, even though he now kuows how to do it and cannot be forced to forget; but they realize that the solution to these 55

, PrOfeSSiOn problems

OF ARMS demands

I
areas~ They claimed the expertness of the initiate and were accorded, ae well, a discretionary right of judgment in spherea other than their own. In mid-20th century Germany, the area of activity within which the roil. itary establishment is encouraged to operate has heen sharply curtailed. Conversely, in other states, of which all too many instances will come to mind, the effectiveness of the military iri maintaining an orderly structure when civil political constitutions prove too frail to do so has resulted in assumption by the military of civil functions. Praetorianism is widespread; ~ its growth must be watched with deep misgiving. It is worth saying here that the dsgree of recognition of what might be called purely military factors seems to vary roughly as the degree of freedom Of the military from ciVilian COntrO1.. It remained high in Germany until World War II. It was higher in France in 1912 than it is now 50 years later, It is higher now in the United States than it was in 1912. It has never been high in Britain.
Reintegration

more good minds in the profession of arms than have been found there in the past.

Sharply Oistinct Areas

The regularization of the profession was accompanied by a marked rise in the threshold between the military and civilian areas of activity. Barracks li,fe, uniforms, increased spectilization in military skills, and the growth in extent and complexity of formal military administration were among the factors contributing to set the soldier more apart from the civilian. The distinction between the specialist in warfare on larid and at sea also grew more marked. As the profession grew more professional, first at sea and then on land, the sailor and the soldier moved further apart from each other. The functional area in which both operated grew ever more sharply distinct from the nonmilitary. The development of aerial warfare in the early 20th century led to the specialization of a third type of armed service whose reIation to the other two has varied from, time to time and from country to country and whose future 10CUS and fnnction are, at present, obscure. All that can be said is that they are likely to be largely determined by technical developments, As professionalization proceeded, the professional was allowed more of a prescriptive right to authoritative judgment in his own sphere, Naturally, this was most noticeable where the rate of advance in professionalism was highestthat is, in 19th century Germany. Here, the success of the military in ordering their own affairs, and the obvious national advantages which resulted, led to a widespread beIief in a capacity in the military for successful organization in nonmilitary 56

The movement of the military away from the civil has, in general, been reversed. They have come closer together. Military skills are less exclusively specialist. The military community lives less apart. Uniforms are worn less in civilian society. The working clothes of a general in the field are like those of a machine minder, thongh he still has something rather more grand put by for special occasions. How far will this tendency to reintegration go? Not, I am sure, as far as a complete merger. The special nature of the military calling will persist, and, although the gap between
Military Review

civil and military has been reduced in recent years, it is unlikely, in my opinion, to disappear. It is the task of those in charge to determine bow close the military can be brought to the civilian without destroying the value of the soldier to society. One thing is recognized as to minimize particularly important: the difficulty of reintegration when I the soldier wishes to cross the threshold and become a civilian. I A civilian qualification for every military professional, or at least skills salable in civiI life, is the ideal. We have, at least, made a start in Britain. Currently, more than 200 young officers out of a small army are reading for university degrees on the armys time and on the armys payroll, and the other services are, in other ways, doing no less. calling look to one who has, all his adult life, followed it? It is one of the fundamental pursuits. There are occupations in which what is demanded of those who pursue them cannot be entirely regulated hy contracts between men. The compulsions exerted in these occupations arise mainly from the nature of the task itself. They include those of tbe priest, the healer, the lawgive~, the craftsman, the teacher, the scholar, the seaman, and the farmer. They are not merely mechanical pursuits. The profession of arms is prominent among them. The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraees this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves, he will never be a civilian. November 1963
Fundamental Pursuit How, then, does the military

Unfortunate

Results

There are many ways of looking at a soldier. It is a mistake if he is regarded as no more than a military mechanic; a military operation cannot be considered as just another engineering project. This can lead to unfortunate results when the unlimited liability clause in the unwritten contract is invoked as the operation unfolds. He can be regarded, rather emotionally and too simply, as a hired assassin. Only those who do not know mapy soldiers can maintain this view with confidence. If soldiers were only paid killers, their calling would have done something to them which you can look for in vain. The soldier can be thought of as one of Alfred de Vignys great shaggy dogs of grenadiersmournful, sweet tempered, and doomed. He has been romanticized, reviled, esteemed, and derided. He has been the target of some of tbe best invectiveVoltaires, for example, or Shaws. I particularly recommend the preface to John Ehdfs

other Island

(DoIun with

the soldier)

as sane and refreshing reading for the regular officer. To see how far Sham, is wrong today is as important as to see how far he is still right, and to make sure we continue to steer the profession of arms away from his picture of it. The man-at-arms is different things at different times to the same people. Our God and soldiers we alike adore evn at the brink of danger; not before. He can be looked at in a thousand different ways, for be is an inevitable phenomenon in human society. More poetry has heen written about him and his doings than about anything else on earth. In his professional environment he 57

PROFESSION OF ARMS

lives an ordered life. Its orderliness is liberating rather than oppressive. It is far from incompatible with Christianity. The Gospels show Jesue as forbearing to soldiers, even kind. He was rough with politicians, lawyers, financiers, professors, and divines. There is a satisfaction in service; tfiere is a satisfaction in an ordered

AmIJ

Neu,a

.SLTtt Ce

The soldier, an inevitable phenomenon in human .mciety life; there is satisfaction in the progressive mastery of complex skills; and there is satisfaction in professional association with men of a high level of integrity. But the service has to be service to what is worthwhile, and the ordered life has to lead somewhere. The professional skills must be interesting and around them must be a wide area of choice in other pursuits. It is upon these points that the young man considering armed service must sajiefy himself. I do not think he will be disappointed. The primary function of an armed force is to fight in battle. This is now58

adays impossible without a highly ~ complex system of supporting activi. ~, ties. Among these, a man may find the ~ chance of self-fulfillment in a closely ~ coherent group of human beings, ~ where confidence is generally high and ~ everyone receives from others what he is prepared to give. He will also be ~ offered an opportunity for nearly ~ ever y pursuit that appeals to the ra.1 tional man. I only know one general now serv, ing on the army council who has hads , picture hung in tbe academy, but there , are many generals who paint. I do not know any generals who are first-claes : interpreter in Russian, Arabic, or , classical Cantonese, but almost any young officer able and ~illin~ to do so may study a language for two or three years and will often spend some of this time abroad at his employers expense. If he is of unusual capacity as a scientist, he might dad himself, after a first at Cambridge or London, reading for a doctorate. The young officer can paint, sail boats, play a musical instrument, join an expedition, learn mathematics, or bundle down the Crests. In short, he can help himself to a variety of pursuits, active or reflective-not things he has to struggle to do, but things which the system in which he has made his life encourages and sometimes even helps to pay for.
Essential Institution

.,

Make no mistake about it: the military establishment is not a phikmthropic body. It has good reason to encourage these things. First, there are skills (and a very wide range of them) whose availabiltiy in armed forces is deemed important. Second, there are activities which develop the mental, moral, and physical qualities required in the efficient fighting man. 1
Military Review I

Third, the life mwt be attractive to the right yOung men if the function of armed forces is to be efficiently discharged. The things I speak of as examples fall under one or more of these heads, most under all three. Some men are dissatisfied if they are too far separated from the earth upon which they live and what happens on and around it. I realized myself as a young officer that I should not have heen content doing anything for a living in which it was never important to me what time the sun rose. Dawn, dusk, moonrise, and moonset, what the wind does, the shape and size of woodland, marsh, and hill, currents and tides, the flow of rivers and the form of clouds, whether the leaf is on the tree or the hranchee nre bare, the aeasous, the weather, and the stars these are matl ers of compelling importance in the lives of sailors, soldiers, and airmen, some of more importance to one, some to another; and so, too, at all times and above all, are people. In measuring the worth of any way

of life, a study of its average products will not tell you what you want to know. Those who display its essential characteristics in exceptional degree are more informative. Perhaps even more misleading than to regard the average is to look only at the worst. To see how had men can be in any profession is to learn little about it worth knowing. Ask, instead, what opportunities it gives. The profession of arms is an essential social institution offering an orderly way of life, set a little apart, not without elegance. The performance of public duty is not the whole of what makes a good life, said Bertrand Russell, in language that would have pleased Cicero; there is also the pursuit of private excellence. Both are to be found in the military life. It gives much and takes more, enriching freely anyone prepared to give more than he gets. It will remain with us for aa long as man continues to be what he is, too clever and not good enough. This looks like a long time yet.

Americans are made uneasy by the responsibilities

of military Ieaderahip.

Aa a nation we are still the prey of clicbea about men on horseback and of the
dangers of the military to democracy. We afill have trouble distinguishing het ween what is military and what is militaristic; between what is peaceful and what is nacitistic. We must perhaps progress further toward maturity before there will be wholehearted acceptance at home of the continuing need for a large and respected military profession in the United Statea in tbe same way aa there is a need for a class of bueineasmen, profeaaional men, scientists, clergymen, and stbolars. UncIe Sam has become a world renowned soldier in spite of himself. 1 Getterat Mrxrwett D. Tavtor

November 1963

59

SIJV1.A BAY
Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, United States Armg Re.rerve, Retired

rs1 HROUGH one of the quirks of history, Suvla Bay has become counted one of the great and decisive battles of the ages. To question whether it merits that evaluation is but one approach by which to view it in perspect ive. We know why it is so identified. Prior to Suvla Bay, the Gallipoli Campaign, for all of its frustrations, remained a shining hope. Then came what was supposed to be the crowning effort, with the maximum call of troops available to energize an elaborate plan aimed, at last, to secure an ample and dominant beachhead. But when this mighty effo~t fell apart among the subridges just beyond Suvla Bay, the Gallipoli hope turned to ashes. The inevitable sequel was the liquidation of the campaign to end World War I quickly by eliminating Turkey and giving a full-armed embrace to Russia.

.,

Still, within this same thesis, there are reasOns to question whether Suvla Bay deserves its hallowed niche. Toward the Galiipoli adventure, soldiers and scholars may be of different mind as to its prospect and promise. But none is indifferent to the argumsnt. Gallipoli has an irresistible allure. It commands the imagination and grips the emotions. More worthy books have been written of it than of the Marne, Gettysburg, or Waterloo. Again we know why. We are hit by anguish when that which is so nobly tried, dis. really fails. ., else-the vain brooding over the thought that the Galiipoli Campaign was time and again at the threshold of momentous success. The feeling of being almost there persisted from the dark hour when the fleet was turned back from the Narrows. Is there any way of knowing ? Two fluke hits, killing two capital ships in the first five minutes, might have stopped the fleet again in a second try. The same is true of the land battle. We see mainly the glow of Opportunity. We discount the vagaries, the slings and arrows, of misfortune. There is no way of knowing what might have happened had that which happened not happened. To count Suvla Bay a decisive battle, one would have to assume that Gallipoli failed only by the narrowest of margins, that snceeeding, it would have beached the Central Powers, and
Brigadier General S. L. A. M~rska[l, United States Army Reserve, Retired, is an editorial writer and military critic for The Detroit News. He was Theater Historian in the European theater of operations during World War 11, arsd served with the 8th Army in Korea drtr{ng the fighting there. Threshold of Success But there is something

that the brightest and best chance was the last great effort. For reasons other than those already outlined, these are challengeable assumptions. The reasons are to be found in the enterprise at Suvla Bay and the joined fight at Sari Bair, how these operations were conceived, and some of the personalities responsible for their execution. What we know of the batt16s coneequehce is that after Suvla Bay, the hearts of oak in England, who had been for Gallipo]i to the bitter end, in the main said: This is it ! Qut if the operation was wrong at its taproots, destined only to be a wasting effort with no chance of winning through because of insuperable builtin handicaps, that changes the light wholly. That which is wishfully conceived or grotesquely mismanaged hae no claim on Heavens help or on redemption due to enemy stupidity.
Unique Distinction Suvla Bay has one distinction. No other amphibious operation was ever floated from such an inordinately com-

plex and unnecessarily ramified plan. Yet simplicity is a first requirement. Every landing by troops in the face of the enemy is chaotic by nature, rife with disorder, and plagued by unanticipated problems. Nothing but firsthand command management may restore balance and energize the flow of force toward the object. Suvla Bay iteelf was the heart of overelaborate undertaking. this Troops had to succeed there. The commanding ridges inland had to be secured so that a perimeter with depth of position behind it could be maintained-or the explosion out of Anzac
Cove and the demonstrations else-

where would never deliver the expedition into the Promised Land (Figure 1).
61

November 1963

sUVLA BAY
I

But one would never guese that from the plan which, by its very diverification, thinned high command att.m+tion to the breakpoint. Why the staff thought that the landing at Suvla

suited to this terrible burden. General Sir Ian Hami]tons attention shculd have been riveted on the ridge mass around Tekke Tepe and Anafarta Sagir inland from SuvIa which, If not

Figure 1. Bay, the breakout from Anzac Cove, and the attack from Cape Helles all had to be synerouized, or rather, timed to one another over several hours of one night, baffles common understanding. The motive for eo doing was to get the Turk off balauce. But coveriug feints in war eucceed more rarely than bluffs in draw poker. Further, when one attacks everywhere, the enemy resists everywhere, and his command is constrained to sit back and await positive information shout where the real threat is developing. One negative consequence of the plans ramification was to overload the man at the top who by nature was unquickly won and held, doomed hi! whole enterprise. He might have sus tained a defeat of the forcee wh{ strove so heroically to gain the higl ridges dominating Anzac Cove am still have claimed a shining victory. Other Leader The plan, to succeed, would haw needed some other general. The bes and bravest of men have mortal limi tations. Fortunate are the few whosl weaknesses are never laid bare by th( demands of a particular field. Sir Ial was a leader of vast courage, soldierl~ imagination, and scholarly depths. H{ is still revered; few other leaders cam, through the Gallipoli fire unsinged. A 62, greatly traveled, and a keen ob Military Ilevia

server of armies over the world, he wae a celebrated author. The great commander and the gifted writer are not necesearil y two different fellows. But Sir Ian had the habit of essaying faultless prose amid the conduct of operations, instead of paying single-minded attention to the battle. He was more interested in analyzing and recording his own reactions than in writing faultless orders based upon fullest possible knowledge of the developing situation. There is never time for both; no proper commander has that much genius, that much energy. Sir Ian used his staff too littIe; his personal interventions in the battle tended to come too late. But what is more striking is that throughout the Gallipoli Campaign, the plans of his headquarters were never based on a realistic appreciation of mens powers under stress. By aiming too high on paper, they sowed the seed of battle disarrangement. 3ituation So it was at Suvla Bay, and we come now to tbe situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula in August 1915, the first anniversary of wars beginning. By then Sir Ian bad either on base or in transit 13 divisions, approximately 125,000 men, to expand his holdings ashore. Although the expedition stayed chins up, it had now to break out or eventually perish. Its forces hardly more than fingerheld the harsh edges of the shore. At Anzac Cove tbe beachhead was a shallow crescent about 2,000 yards long, just off the shore, its entrenched perimeter enclosing less than 400 acres. The Turkish line was literally on top of these trenches, much of the way within easy grenade-lob distance from above. Any bodily exposure drew instant fire. Yet within this shallow crater-andNovember 1963

diggings-pocked warren, 17,000 Anzac soldiers survived by struggle, or died in fighting back the immediate Turkish enemy, threefold as numerous. At Cape Helles there were eix divisions, or 35,000 soldiers, also just barely asbore. The beachhead on the snoutshaped end of the peninsula had more than double the area of Anzac Cove, but was little less desperately placed. Greater tenacity than was displayed by these men in clinging for months to graveyard ground is not to be found in the annals of war. Both positions were intrinsically hopel&s and their succor depended on staging a major diversion which would lift the pressure. these forces garrisoning tbe peninsula were 13 Turkish divisions, three containing Anzac Cove, five against Cape He!les, three at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore, three at Bulair, and two south of Gaba Tepe. They were ably directed by German General Otto Liman von Sanders. Among the Turkish commanders, Colonel Mustapha Kemal Atatiirk, a star SIOWIY rising, was the catalyst of inspired action. At Suvla Bay vicinity was only a minor troop body, called the Anafarta Detachment, embodying three rifle battalions, a squadron of cavalry, a labor battalion, and 19 artillery pieces. That is more than enough weapon power to instill the shock fear which paralyzes unseasoned troops.
The Choice Weaponry Opposite

There were better reasons than the light manning which made Suvla Bay the chosen spot for landing. Besides affording secure anchorage for the invasion fleet, it was to the eye the one fair target on tbe peninsulasteep . 63

SUVLA BAY

ridges did not directly command the shore. A salt lake more than one mile wide lay straight inland from the Suvla beaches, but it was known to be dry in summer. Sir Ian intended that the assault waves would ewing round the edges of the parched flat. There was room to deploy at Suvle; the very

manding ridge of Chunuk Bair. The landing at Suvla from smalI boats was sehednled for one hour later, or 2230, just in time to beat the rise of a wau. ing moon. BY midnight the Allied front would be in full eruption. Wonders were accomplished in the safeguarding of this multiple-cham-

deny the enemy any concentrated target. Before June ended, planning was weli along. On the appointed night the six divisions at Cape Helles were to make a limited attack againet the near village of Krithia. The Anzac force, augmented by one and one-half divisions freeh from Britain, were to feint toward the knob calle~~ Pine, then under cover of dark drwe for the com64

Anzac Cove-men, animals, and vehicleshad to be smuggled ashore at night by the navy in et.ealth and silence, then kept hidden by day so that the Turks would not become alert to tbe buildup. Somehow it was done, although the beautifully contrived de ception deserved a better return by the army. With hardly more trouble, the sea service, given Sir Ians bleseing, might MilitsryReview

. ,,
have shifted placee between the Anzac force and the 25,000 untried soldiers shipped from Britain. That would have delivered dependable etrength againet the decisive target; the attidck out of Anzac Cove could have been given more moderate limits, or restrained to await opportunity. These are not new suggestions.
Command Power

To command the corps going in at Suvla Bay, there waa sent from England Lieutenant General Sir Frederick ~Stopford, old for his 61 yeara, kindly, complacent, and remote from troops. He had never commanded in combat. Kitchener picked him because he was senior; there couldnt have been a sorrier choice. By comparison, tbe men he would command had at least youth in their favor. They had never felt fire. Their junior leaders were equally ignorant of the very special tactical problems of the venture-ebore organization, preserving identity, and collection by night. Where lies the plans unique complexity ? Even tbe tactical schools barely skim the surface and staff colleges ignore it. So to spell it out-command power derives only from recognition of authority. In daylight, the face, manner, gesture, and spoken word convey it. Men see and know their chief; any good junior leader may memorize the faces and names of 200 men within 40 days. But in that same period he will not be able to identify more than 10 to 12 of them by .~oice. We all have this low ceiling and there is no help for it. Yet in the dark all is dependent on voice recognition. Let troops become scrambled and authority evaporates. Leaders hesitate to give orders, not knowing whom they address. Men will not obey, not knowing who speaks. November 1963

Worse swiftly ensues, for it ia etarlit truth that m~n endure battle and mature unity of action only out of interpersonal faith and confidence. Where there is no recognition, the current dies. No more wretched ecene may be imagined than euch a breakdown by night on a strange beach under fire. Each man feels lost in the crowd and his personal panic is exacerbated by tbe hedlamic confusion of the milling masa. There is no b r a k e against mounting terror and the physical depletjon it superinduces. We can pass by the other excessive pressures earlier in the ordealthe enervating heat during the mountup, the churning approach by the small boats, the vomiting of frightened men, and the awful sweat of anticipating the unknown. Dropped to the nadir of demoralization, the troop body loses its will, its energy, its legs. Fundamentals Ignored This is what Hamilton, Stopford, Hammereley, and others delivered 25,000 soldiers into at Suvla Bay shortly before midnight on 6 August 1915. We have learned much about these motpr forces since, which was not known at the time of Gallipoli. So in justice to them, it must be said that they probably did not understand what they were attempting (the impossible) or one commanding voice would have cried: Stop it ! No, I cannot agree with my great friend, J. F. C. Fuller, that it was an ingenious plan. It was a nightmare. At the decisive point, it ignored the <fundamentals. I am reminded of John Masefields quote as he closed his powerful essay on this whole campaign: SO courage failed, so strength was chpined. Tragic is the only word for it. In the end, all things failed. It need not have 65

SUVLA BAY

happened. At least insofar as the SuvIa landing is concernedas to its pee. sibilities of giving the great effort a future-it was beaten before the start (Figure z). inertia There was relatively little Turkish fire against the landing melee, but it \vas enough. Such was the inertia that settled on the troops from their night of shock that a score or more of Freybergq and Unwins were needed next morning to spark tbe determining number and boot them along from the shingle and the flats to the not distant high ground. (It only took about 47 to generate action out of stagnation at Omaha Beach. ) But at the working level there were too few of these stalwarts whose drive was as prodigious as their instinct for doing the right thing. A few brave parties struck out eastward; the mass stayed inert not far from blue water. They were still scrambled, still inert, worrying about getting properly assembled. And some were probably a Iittle euphoric, what with the cuming of day and the knowledge that they were safely ashore; but that condition also induces lassitude. The tactical details pale into significance beside the appalling fact that, given two days as a gift, the Turks closed first in strength on the nearby ridges above Anafarta Sagir which all along beckoned to this stranded corps. Incredible ? Not at all, when we get the picture of Stopford, dawdling on his command ship, distant from the wrought confusion, messaging Major General F. Hammersley congratulations for getting his division ashore, seemingly unconcerned about what he does with it after. Here is a general definitely not commanding. But when Hamilton belatedly gets up to him, 66

he neither takes over this sector of the battle nor relieves the man who is toy: ing with it. Its the old chain-of-corn. mand hesitation waltz, a gentlemans glide when the going is gobd, but s burlesque turn when the life of an army is at stake. Results Out of Cape Helles the. corps commander did not carry out the limited holding attack toward Krithia as or. dered. Overreaching, be tried to cap. ture both the village and Achi Baba. So doing, he paid for his failure with the loss of half of the force of 4,000. There are no braver tales in war than that of the gallant try for breakout by the forces of Anzac Cqve. Ashmead-Bartlett wrote: It was launched against positions the like of which had never been attacked before under mod. ern conditions of warfare. John Masefield, Alan Moorehead, and others have paid eloquent tribute to the superhuman valor attending this i~tricate, overdemanding operation. Deathless courage was abundant. But more so was death. And glorious failure is failure still. The strike for the tom. manding ridges missed, partly because men lost their way in the dark, baffled by the twisted ridge folds. There and at Suvla the frgbting continued for about one week. When the fire sputtered and died, Anzac Cove was just a little roomierextending eastward to enclose Lone Pine and northward to tie in, near Azmak Dere, with the Suvla beachhead which ringed the salt lake and anchored on Kiretch Tepe. The British clung to Chocolate Hill. The Turks had Scimitar Hill. More than 40,000 Allied soldiers fell during the August battles, the greater number of them cut down in the fighting around Anzac Cove. It was the
Military Reviaw

November 1963

61

SUVIA BAY

price paid, as one general put it, for five hundred acres of bad grazing ground. St@ford was sent home. Hamilton remained, not to muddle through, but to muck it up at least one more time. What followed for the Gallipoli expedition were months of misery and tedium, hsrd duty, and the grinding gamble to stay alive against odds. All of it was anticlimactic. It is infinitely

trying on soldiers when the idea set. ties that aIthough the game is not over, there are no hmger prizes to be won. Failure at Suvla made inevitable the ultimate evacuation. Pride postponet it for a little while. Fate, and good staff work, made possible the evacua. tions astonishing success. But ever that deliverance could not write z happy ending.

. . . moral courage and openmindedness are essential for our Army to progress through the future. Do not hesitate to think and bring your ideas to bear--whether they conform to the majority or nut. Do not hesitate to seek the counseI of otherswhether they complicate the issue or not. Consider all views; analyze all ideas. Shop all around You for information; but be decisive a~d courageous in accepting valid counsel and discarding invalid
counsel.
General James F. Collins

Military ftevie

DELEGATION
GREEN LIGHT TO COMMAND CilNTROL
Colonel Richard K. Hutson, United States Armg

~AILROADS .f the W-M ,mp~oy two basic systems for controlling trains. One might be termed the green light system and the other the red light system. In the case of the former, all control jacks are green and the conductor has a license to keep going until someone in control authority turns the light red. This is tbe system in use by united States railroads. European railroads ose the opposite ~pprOach in which all lights are turned :ed and a conductor may not proceed .Intil someone in cent rol authority urns the light green. Both systems apparently work quite Tell for running a railroad, but when Lpplied to the operation of a military nganization, one has definite advanages over tbe other. In one instance, he conductor can go all the time until he man in control tlashes the red light. u the other, he cannot go at al] L}ntil ,omeone tells him now is the time. hwember 1963

The advantages of one system over the other for military operations are quite obvious. The green light system provides for the delegation of authority which is essential to the success of military organizations. The red light system, on the other band, completely centralizes control and is the antithesis of sound military operations. Delegation of authority, coupled with a widespread willingness by indi. vidual US soldiers to assume responsibility, results in the development of leadership qualities at both the highest and the lowest levels of ~rganization.
Basic Doctrine

The Armys doctrine of command is found in Field Manual 101-5, Sfafl Officers Field Manual, Staff Organiza. tion and Procedure. Itis stated quite succinctly. Command, says the man. Ual, ;is tbe authority which a commander in the military service law69

ftEiEGATION

fully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.. Thus if one is to command, someone must first give him the authority to do so, and it must be lawfui and given from top to bottom. Authority cannot be assumed; it must be delegated by a superior. Until this is done, there is po license to operate. The field manual states further that The commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility. An excellent example of correct usage of tbe term responsibility was this statement by President Kennedy in a State of the Union message: One year ago, the President said, I as. sumed the responsibilities of President. The President, in effect, was acknowledging the receipt of authority delegated to him by the people of the United States. At the same time, he was stating his willingness to assume the responsibilities entailed in exercising this authority. Actually, the people had delegated to the members of tbe Adn3inistration and to Congress tile authority to make their decisions for them, but they had not, delegated their inherent responsibility for the decisione made. Mr. Kennedy assumed . Colone~ Rickrard K. Hutso?z, Depaty
Chief of Transportation, served wftk the 7tk Infantry Division in the Asiatic Pacific tkeater during World War II. A graduate of the United States Army War College, his assignments include duty with tke Ofice of tke Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; Chief of tke Proccwement Division, Ojfice of the Army Chief of Transportation; Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, 2d Logistical Cotnmand; and Port Commander, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, Germany.

these responsibilities tion.

Key to Success

of his own vo)i.

The Army doctrine of command, then, involves lawfully exercised au. thority delegated from top to btttom and an understanding that a commander can delegate authority, but cannot delegate his responsibility. The green light system of operation is really nothing more than the proper exercise of this doctrine, The key to its success is a willingness to delegate authority f reeIy to the }owest possible levels at which sound decisions can bs made. And the authority delegated at each command ievel must be sufficient in each case to permit acceptance of responsibility for the decisions which will be required. Delegation of authority is sometimes difficult to get started when people are not accustomed to it. It can be done with little change in basic organization, but it calla for a major change in concept of operations and organization. A good commander will utilize his staff to the fullest. The more he gives them to do, tbe more work the unit is able to perform, and the more the men can grow to the benefit of themselves and the organization. What better training is there in peacetime than permitting subordinates to exercise authority and make independent decisions ? Independent deeisions may not be easy to make. If an error is made, it may cause the commander some em. barrassment. Some good does come from it, however. If a man makes a mistake, and is corrected, and the man is honest and is trvirm. -, he wi}l neve~ make the same mistake again. Also, the man who is permitted to take on decision-making duties during peaceMilitary Ilsview

70

time is going to be ready to make the comparable or mbre difficult decisions required in time of war. A senior who will not delegate authority either deesnt have confidence in the people below him or he thinks

should be centrally ietained. 14 ~om. mander also wishes to know how he can be sure that a junior will do a good job in exercising tbe authority he delegates to him. There is no simple +answer to either problem. There are,

he is the only person capable of doing tbe job. But one thing is certainunIess a person has a distinct understanding with his superior as to what he is to be permitted to do, and unless that superior hae delegated to him the authority to do it, he has no license to do anything. He cannot do a thing because authority cannot be assumed. Authority has to be given by a superior. The dilemma faced by leaders at all levels is to know how much authority it is safe to delegate, and how much November 1963

however, a number of ways in which a commander can protect his interests: Delegations of authority should first be accomplished in writing from the commander down so that each control level will understand clearly tbe limitations of its green light to operate independently. . Authority is not sufficient in it. self. The subordinate must also have access to the guidance which he will require for making decisions. This guidance must be sufficiently broad to permit the subordinate some latitude 71

,,
llELE6AT10N

for the exercise of initiative. Therefore, the commander must publish his policies. Policies might be defined as the amalgamated expressions of the commanders personal traits, his experi. ence, and his intellect on mattera of management and procedure. The commander is the only pe~son who can make policy. His policies must fall within the framework of those of his next higher commander, and must be restricted to matters affecting solely his own particular element of the organization. The bigger an organization, and the more it is spread out, the more eesential it becomes for the commander to establish and publish definitive policies. Policy Deviations Policies serve as guides in standardizing operations normel to the times and circumstances. Since it is impossible for anyone to write a policy which has meaning and is good for all circumstances and conditions; it may be necessary in certain times and circumstances for a subordinate to deviate from policy. The person who is really worth his weight is th,e one who says, I know the regulations, I know the po~icy, but I should deviate from them nowat this time and under these circumstances. Perhaps ha will make a mistake; maybe he will trip up the commander. All right, thats the chance a commander must take. But this person is assuming the responsibilities of his job and should not be criticized if he has made an honest effort. Everyone is going to make a mistake at some time or another, and the person who accomplishes the most is likely the one who will make the most mistakes. 12

Aa one commander advised his subor. dinatee, Dont be afraid to go out on a limb; thats where the fruit:is. No one has a license to disregard the regulation and the policies indis. criminately. All must follow them un. less time and circumstances determine they should not. Not much will happen to anyone, of course, who follows them always. , Standards Closely allied to the issuance of poli. ties is the necessity for establishing standards against which day-to-dsy performance can he weighed. The word standards is just another term for yardsticks. A commander who will accept anything less than superior has a warped senee of values. Every objective at every echelon should be to do the best and nothing less witbin the capability of ita men, money, materials, and facilities. If objectives are not high, standards will not be high. Many people fail to recognize and evaluate standards. Standards are really relative matters. High standards for one might be considered mediocre in another. They are going to change with the individuals involved, A man making an inspection helps set standards. Basically, this ie the rea. son for inspections. They are a meane for checking prevailing standards against those desired by the corn. mander.
Central Control

In recent years the deajgn of mili. tary organizations has been directed at centralized control and decentralized operations. The advent of automatic data processing systems which permit the rapid collection and assimilation of information, the effect of fiscal and budgetary controls, and the vertical nature of the management Military Review

control exercised over major Army systems have the inherent tendency to centralize more and more of the decision making at progressively higher levels in the organization. As in the red light syetem for running a railroad, this centralization denies commanders at lower levels the freedom of action to act independently and is incompatible with the requirements for the conduct of successful military operations. Too much centralized control can cause serious inroads upon command authority. It seriously restricts flexibility and slows reaction time to changing situations. Giving a man all the authority which he is capable of exercising and for which he will assume responsibility is good business. Done properly, authority is delegated and redelegate

in writing to the lowest levels at which sound decisions can be made. Delegation is followed by the publication of policies and establishment of stand. ards which leave no doubt as to the commanders desires. When delegation has been properly accomplished, individuals are less confused about their duties, take renewed pride in their own and the commands accomplishments, and acquire valnable training in making the progressively bigher and higher level decfsions which are the substance of true military leaderSb.ip. Commanders who have the courage to initiate the green light system will find that it is not only an excellent way to run a railroad, it is also a good method for running a military organization.

1 wish to exploit to the fulIest the capability for imaginative then.qbt and moral Leadership that is inherent in the quality of tbe men and women in the service today, and in onr civilian colIeagnez. These qnalities have no fiscal limitations. They tlonrish when encouraged; they die when ignored. General Eark G. Wheeler

November 1963

73

,.

=?4

BRITAINs

CARIBBEAN

INTERESTS D. c. watt

IN ~~~ p.ttm~ o, United States strategy today the Caribbean Sea is obviously of first importance, not only for its geographical position, but also because of the major challenge to the US defense posture represented by the Soviet Unions support of Castros Cuba. But the Caribbean is not a purely American, or even Central American, sea. It is shut in by the West Indies, from the outei barrier of the Bahamas in the north to the chain of the Lesser Antillesthe Windward and Leeward Islands, Trinidad, and Tobag%in the south. The inner entrances to the Caribbean are commanded by islands that are neither Latin American nor United States in sovereignty, but newer, embryo members of the British Commonwealth. Jamaica, the largest, forms a final doorstop to the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti. These islands are a barrier and a gate to the inland sea formed by the 74

I Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; their control is of considerable importance in the control of that sea. Together w i t h British Honduras, British Guiana, and Bermuda, the islands form a group whose members have recently achieved independence within the Commonwealth, or are about to achieve it. The defense posture they intend to adopt, the forces available to them, and the problems they have to face are not without importance to the United States.
Political Position

The political position in the West Indies is dominated by the breakup in 1962 of the British-sponsored scheme for a West Indies Federation of all the British-owned islands. Jamaica on one hand and the twin islands of Trinidad and Tobago on the other declared their unwillinatness to continue to participate in a similar Federation, and their complete independence within the Commonwealth was recognized the
Military Review

same year. The rernaini~g West Indian islands, the Little EightBarbados, Antigua, Saint Kitts-NevisAnguilla, Montserrat, Grenada, Saint Vincent, Saint Lucia, and Dominica -decided to federate on their own. In the north, Bermuda and the Bahamas remain as British colonies, but are in an advanced stage of their development toward independence. British Honduras also remains a British colony. In British Guiana, tbe government of the leftwing Dr. Cheddi Jagan exercises all the powers necessary for internal self-government, except for defense, the maintenance of public order, and all external problems. In 1962, and again in 1963, he was forced to call for British military aid to suppress serious internal disorders.
Naval Strength

World Ware these duties employed a cruiser squadron whose responsibilities have now devolved, here as elsewhere, on the large frigatee of the contemporary Royal Navy. These duties now are limited to cooperation with US antisubmarine forces, and to the maintenance of local security. Today, the available forces consist of two large frigates and a battalion and a half of British infantry with supporting arms. In timee of etress these latter can be reinforced from Britain by air. In the riots of February 1962 in British Guiana, elements of the British strategic reserve were flown from Britain in a matter of hours to reinforce local forces.
Garrisons

The advance of the British West Indies toward independence within the Commonwealth has not relieved Great Britain of all her military obligations or genuine military interests in the area. She has been driven by her commitments elsewhere to rely largely on the United States for protection of the islands. This bas been particularly true ever since tbe end of the 19th century when the rising threat of Germany caused the withdrawal of the British battleships from the West Indies station. From that time the naval station maintained by Britain in West Indian waters served the purpose of maintaining internal security in peace and the protection of maritime trade in the event of war. Between the two
D. C. Watt is with the London School of Economics and Political Scjence at the University of London. A British subject, Professor Watt hae written on the Near East and West Asia for numerous publications. November 1963

The main bases in the area used to be Britishat Kingston in Jamaica, Port of Spain in Trinidad, Nassau in the Bahamas, and on Bermuda. But sincetbe deetroyer-bases deal of 1940, by which the United States leased bases in the British West Indies in retnrn for the transfer of 50 overage destroyers to Britain, the maifi bases in the area have been American. Most of the baees leased during the. war were deactivated in the late 1940s and handed back, ona temporary basis, to the local colonial governments. Chaguaramas on Trinidad was an except ion. Innegotiations in 1960-61 with the West Indian territories, all of these were permanently handed back to the local governments with the exception of small space-tracking stations on Saint Lucia, Antigua, and Jarnuica, and the Chaguaramas base on Trinidad for which a new lease was negotiated. Thelatter issubject to review in 1968 and 1973, and will be evacuated by 1977 if no further agreement can be reached. The main British military 75

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garrisons now are at Belize in British Honduras, at Hyde Park in British Guiana, and in the Bahamas. The offi. cer commanding the West Indies naval station, a commodore (second class), flies his flag afloat. There are no British air forces in the area, although it is visited regularly by long-range aircraft of the Royal Air Forces antisubmarine Coastal Command.
Defense Problems

Defeuse problems of the Britieh West Indies and Caribbean territories themselves are best discussed under two heads, those connected with tbe maintenance of internal security and those connected with external defense.
Little Eight

The internal and external positions of the Little Eight seem peaceful and undetermined.
Jamaica

I : 1 ,

In Jamaica there are two internal problems connected with her tangled historythe maroons and the Ras Taffari movement. The former, deseendants of a group of runaway slaves who founded a political community in the most inaccessible part of Jamaicas interior, are quiescent today; there is no reason why they should break out again. But the Ras Taffari movement, an offshoot of the Negro Ethiopianism which originated in the 1900s, is potentially a very dangerous movement. In 1960, British and Jamaican troops collaborated to round up its ringleaders. Two British soldiers were killed and four wounded during a shooting incident at a roadblock. Four of the Ras Taffari leaders were hanged for this, and for the murder of three rivals within the leadership, and 15 more were jailed, At the same time, the US District Attorney in New York announced the
Novembsr 1963

arrest of a Negro policeman of Jamaican origin and two others for training some 50 Negroes as part of the First Africa Corpsfounded in New York in 1958 as a type of paramilitary organization. The Ras Taffari movement was believed to number at least 15,000 adult males among its supporters. Its leaders preached a return to Africa-to the Ethiopia of Haile Selassie whom they have made their patron saint demanding government subvention of their passage back to the Africa from w,hich their forefathers were shipped as slaves. Despite the arrest and imprisonment of their Ieadere, the movement is still dangerous and minor dkorders still take place. In 1960 it was revealed to command some arms, and to have attempted to get in touch with the Castro regime in Cuba. Externally, the Bustamente regime in power in Jamaica is thoroughly pro-American. Jamaica has applied to enter the Organization of American States, and is getting American aid under the Alliance for Progress. In 1962 Bustamente offered the United States all the has e facilities o she wauted in Jamaica free of patient. It was Eric Williams, a Trinidadian, not a Jamaican, who replied to an American in 1961: Madam, we are not Cubans. We are members of the British Commonwealth and we play cricket. But it could well have been a Jamaican. Jamaican opinion is capable of neutralism, but not of cooperation with Castro.
Trinidad

The principal source of danger to international security in Trinidad is from the high racial tensions between citizens of African and Indian origins. Thus far, major outbreaks on the Gui71

CARIBBEAN INTERESTS anan model have been avoided, but the danger is always present, the more so as the political parties divide essentially on racial Iinee. Externally, Eric Williams, the present Prime Minister, has shown himself consistently hostile to the US naval base at Chaguaramas, despite the undisputed contribution it makes to the economy of the island. Although Williams would like to see the base removed, his remarks suggest a ]onging to assume the leadership of the Caribbean areaindependent both of Castro and the United States. In 1961 he was reported as saying that the major question was whether Castro Or the Prime Minister of an independent West Indies would speak for the Caribbean. Generally, his attitude seems to be neutral rather than neutralist. He has - denounced the Chaguaramas base agreement since Trinidad was given her independence, but so far no new negotiations have taken place on this. . British Guiana

they subsequently were not needed, At the moment, Britain retains responq. bility fur defense and externaI affairs.
Briti.rk Honduras

Internally, the only dangers of Eritish Honduras are those which accorn. pany any major public dieaster as, far example, the hurricane disaster of No. vember 1962 at Belize. Externally, there is a long-standing Guatemala claim to Hondurae. The Guatemala Government renewed this claim in March 1963 at the meeting of Presidents of the Central American States called at San Jos& Costa Rica, in the presence of President Kennedy. In January 1962 there was a minor border raid from Guatemala into British territory, and a ceremonial cremation of a captured Union Jack.
The Bahamas

Internally, British Guiana, like Trinidad, suffers from bitter racial tensions between her Negro and Indian citizens. In 1962 these tensions erupted into bitter riots, and Dr. Jagan was forced to call on British aid. In all, five frigates, three companies of the East Anglia Regiment, one of the Duke of Edinburghs Royal Regiment, and two of tbe Royal Hampshires were necessary to reestablish public order. There were further outbreaks of violence in May 1963 arising from a three-week general strike. The garrison was reinforced by a Royal Marine detachment from the frigate HMS Whirlwind which sailed from Jamaica. Elements of the strategic reserve in Britain were again alerted, although 18

Ther6 are occasional disorders in the Bahamas In 1958 troops were flown in to Nassau to guard against possible local disturbances. Externally, the main threat comes from the ease with which the individual islands can be used by agencies wishing to subvert either American or Cuban interests. In late 1962 there were several Cuban protests and one gun battle between Cuban patrol vessels and anti-Castro elements within Bahamian territorial waters. In April 1963 the Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, arranged naval patrols of the Bahamian bays in consultation with the United States Coast Guard Service. The patrol paid off: HMS Londonderry from Bermuda cooperated with Bahamian police to arrest 17 Cuban exiles operating from a bay in the Exuma Isles. A further nine exiles were arrested by an unarmed British colonel who swam ashore at Andros Island from a seaplane. On 13 August 1963 two of Castros

MilitaryReview

torpedo boats and a helicopter seized 19 Cuban refugees from AnguilIa Cay, an islet in the Cay Sal Bank halfway between Florida and Cuba. Ten other refugees escaped capture after a British destroyer arrived on the scene. This action followed by two months a Castro speech in which the Cuban leader said that his country had tbe means to attack any bases on British and French islets in the Caribbean which were being used for raids on Cuba. The British Foreign Office lodged a strong protest with the Cuban Embassy in London against Cuban violation of British territory. Britain demanded an apology, an assurance that such incidents will not be repeated, and the return of tbe persons seized to the British authorities in the Bahamas.
Local Security ,

forces do not, as yet, seem to have gotten even that far. Thus the two large islands, Jamaica and Trinidad, have their own defense forcee, each of about one battalion in strength with supporting arms. The Jamaican battalion has been augmented by the volunteer force raised on a territorial baeis in 1961 to counter the Ras Taffari threat. The British garrison in Jamaica has been withdrawn. In the rest of the area, only Barbados of the Little Eight has its own territorial force-about 100 officers and men with a handful of Britiih officers. The British garrison in Bermuda was evacuated in 1954 handing over its tasks to a local defense force of some 400 men.
Economies

With the achievement of independence, much of Britains responsibility for the maintenance of local security naturally passes into the hands of the local governments. It was originally envisaged that the projected West Indies Federation would have ite own army and navy. The locally recruited Jamaican Regiment was renamed the West Indian Regiment in 1958 in preparation for this; its strength was raised to two battalions consisting of about 800 officers and men. The cost of its maintenance, about $720,000 a year, was transferred to the Federal Government. On the breakup of the Federation, the regiment was divided into Jamaican and Trinidadian contingents all non-Jamaicans being taken into the Trinidadian contingent. Plans for a Federal navy had not advanced much beyond the blueprint stage, and plans for Jamaican and Trinidadian naval
November 1963

The prospect of the various governments ever being able to afford larger forces than those existing at present seems remote in view of the weak economic position of the area. Jhe leader of the opposition party in th~ Federal House of Representatives, Mr. Albert Gomes of Trinidad, said in 1961:
Whether we like it or not, ws shall haue to face the fact that we simpl~ do not have the money to provide for our own de fence and that, geograph{tally placed as we are, we shall have to look to the U. S. in the future for our defencethat is unless we wish to gamble with the Covnm:mists as Castro is doing at the present time.

There is no desire to gamble like Castro, excc@ possibly on the part of Dr. Jagan of British Guiana, who had a hard lesson in the unwisdom of this in 1953 when his activism caused British intervention, the suspension of 79

CARIBBEAN INTERESTS

his government, and the postponement of his achievement of power for eight years. By contrast with the massive power deployable by the United States in the Caribbean, these islands, their forces, and their problems must seem miniscule-Lilliputians in a world of Brobdingnagian power politics. But to see the attitude of Britain to the question of Cuba, and the strategic problems of the Caribbean as entirely governed by these minutiae, would be in error. Whether or not they have their own iuterests in the Caribbeanas, for

~xarnple, France and the Netherlands do-neither Britain nor any of her NATO allies has any interest in seeing the United Statee weakened or dis. tracted by anxieties in the Caribbean area. Equally, US opinion would be greatly mistaken if it were tempted to imagine that ordy American in. terests and only American responsi. bilities are involved in the present un. easy balance there. In this, the United States acts as the overwhelmingly predominant part. ner in the Atlantic alliance. But ehe acts on behalf of the entire Free World.

We will bnlld a wall around Cubanot a wall of mortar or brick or barbed wire, but a wall of dedicated men determined to protect their freedom and sovereignty. And in this effort, as in all tbe other necessary efforts, I can assure You tbe United States will play its full part mrd carry its fnIl burden. President John F. Kennedy

80

MilitaryReview

Lieutenant

Colonel Chadwick P. Simmons, United States

Arm~

GROUP THERAPY

M~~ i. mt ,cm with . mpwt for authority. Antagonism toward authority is a natural reaction in all individuals. It is a constant factor in our culture and is manifested through recognized and accepted forms: expressed resentment of taxes, governmental actions at all levels, ridicule of elected and appointed authorities, humorous jibes at figures of authority, and infractions of minor ordinances. This open expression permits the average individual to adjust to authority comfortably. The individual chows his greatest antagonism to authority in early life. This antagonism gradually lessens in the average individual and, by the time he reaches adulthood, the antagonism is no longer a motive force. It is reasonable to #&} that the point at which this antagonism fades until it is no longer a motive force in the behavior of the individual marks the point at which the individual reaches emotional maturity. Some carry this antagonism into their adulthood and reach emotional maturity at a later stage of life; some never reach emotional maturity. The fading of this antagonism is influenced largely by the individuals homelife and schooling. If a child does not gain from his parents some understanding of authority and a respect for authority, he may not gain it at all during his adolescent years. The Army receives its soldiers at
81

Novsmbei1963

e.

.,

GROUP THERAPY

the time when they ehould be arriving at emotional maturity. The ,variance between individuals and their environmental backgrounds means that many already have reached a comparatively

immaturRy

Those individuals who have not seen the reasone or necessity for the accept. ante of authority show by their be. havior that they have not relinquished

us Amw The Army receives its soldiers nt the time when they should he arriving at emotional maturity, but there is a variance between individuals and their backgrounds

high level Sf emotional maturity. Others will need further seaeoning before they gain emq$ional maturity; stilI others will fail, to gain it from their military experience. It is the individuals in the latter category who are repeated subjects for punishment for minor infractions and eventual reparation through board action. The very nature of our military forces, with the requirement for unquestioned acceptance of authority and the almost unequivocal maintenance of dk3cipIine, brings immaturity into sharper focus much sooner than in civilian life. 82

their infantile relationship. These immature offenders regard their inaccessibility to authority as a virtue. Intolerance toward anthority is considered a triumph of their individuality. It is these viewpoints that make difficult cmr job of giving them ineight and modifying their attitudes or behavior patterns. Virtue, their virtue, is not to be violated; they resist vioIation by all means. Restriction, confinement, hard labor, and other forms of punishment, when imposed too often, have an effect juet the opposite of that desired. Military Review

The immature offender feels that the military has already tried to exercise outside control of his feelings and thoughts to an intolerable degree. He feels that any further suppression is more than he can stand. The end result is a stronger antagonism toward the very things the discipline is intended to cause him to accept. This is evident in repeated infractions, escapes, further absences without leave, and the obvious intent in many to escape military service through establishing themselves as candidates for CC209,208, or even 89 boards, despite the onus that separation through these boards places on their future lives. Environment Psychologists and sociologists, as a consequence of studies and research into the causes which bring about the personality of an individual, are continually giving more credit to environment. The majority of our young people undsl stand the necessity and have a respect for constituted authority by the time they attain an age making them eligible for entry into military service. It is the comparatively few who do not have this, and who cause more than 50 percent of the personality problems, with which the military must contend. The majority have acceptable attiLieutenant Colonel Chadwiok P. Simmons is assigned to Headquarters, United States Army Pusan Area Command. He received his Bachelor of Business Administration degree from the University of Minnesota, is a graduate of the Advanced Of.7icers Course of the Adjutant Generals School, and until recently headed a Consolidated Coufts and Boards Section at Fort

tudes because there was something in their environment during the infant and adolescent years which gave it to them. We may aesume, then, that the comparatively few do not have it because something was missing from their environment. This comparatively few in most instances fit a pattern: they come from homes where the father and mother have been separated, one or both of the parents are alcoholics, both of the parents are working, or for similar reasons did not exercise the authority thht the average child receives in the normal home. They demonstrated the same antagonism toward authority in their schooling that they demonstrate in military service. Most of them dropped out of school in the 9th or 10th grade because they could not tolerate the discipline and the authority which is neceseary in a secondary echool. Of those who had civilian employment prior to military service, m a n y changed jobs frequently, running from job to job, and, in many instances, running into the military service to escape the discipline and respect for authority which the jobs required. Although respect for constituted authority is made the major issue here, I must say it is not the only attitude in which these individuals are deficient. But it is ihe major one.
Aggravation

Gordon, Georgia. November 1963

By running into the military service, the individual puts himself into a situation requiring far more discipline and subjecting him to far more authority than he was trying to escape-from the frying pan into the fire. His problems find no solution, only further aggravation. The next step almost invariably is a failure to repair or an absence without leave. 83

.,.

1,

GRfruP THERAPY He is stilI frying to escape discipline and authority. This violation normally results in nonjudicial punishment under Article If+, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and subjects him to still more discipline and authority, He then goes into a summary court where the discipline is increased from two hours of extra duty per day for a limited period to hard labor without confinement and a forfeiture of two-thirds of his pay for 30 days. Next comes another courtmartial, probably, with a more severe discipline and a more strict authority for an extended period. For punishment to have a corrective effect, tbe recipient must be able to accept it as being corrective. This, these individuals are unable to do. The history of punishment as a corrective influence has shown that brutal punishment, be it physical or psychological, results only in producing a more confirmed criminal with a stronger antagonism toward society, . . . Texts and artietes in great number on penology, probation, a~d parole support these conclusions. The actiona of these individuals occur as a result of their basic attitudes. Punishment or h a rs h treatment, whether physical or psychological, when not accepted as corrective, does not change attitudes. There may be some slight and temporary change in the outward behavior, but the basic attitude with its resentment and antagonism remains. Attitudes are seldom changed by a direct approach or by direct action; changes in attitudes are better accomplished by indirect action, Course of Action

population in stockades and disciplinary barracks at the end of World War 11, a method wae used which #ad positive results and showed even more promise. Based on the results attained, penologists, psychologists, and psychi. atrists in civilian correctional institutions adopted this program and experimented with it further. A review of tbe publication Federal Prohztiotc for recent years discloses a considerable number of articles attesting to the efficacy of the method.
Group Corasrrltatiorr

In searching for a course of action with more possibility of beneficial results, we find that among the Armys
64

This correctional program is known variously as group therapy, grou~ counseling, group consultations, or psychotherapy. Basically, the program involves assembling eight to 12 subjects with diverse backgrounds, if feasible, for a group consultation or discussion and having them discuss pertinent subjects (for example, constituted authority) under the guidance of a trained and experienced moderator. The moderator introduces the topics and stimulates and guides the discussion in such a manner that the members of the group have their faulty attitudes discussed and corrected by other membere of the group. The method has been demonstrated many times to be more effective in situations of this character than where corrective counseling is attempted by an individual in authority. parents can point to instances in the development of their own children where parental authority had little or no effect, but where the fault in tbe child was changed or corrected by fellow playmates. This is an illustration of the development or change of attitudes by indirect action. Competent mode~atora are of the first importance in this type of therMilitary tl.wisw

auv. The moderator should have a p~~chologists understanding of lm-man nature and its subtleties, coupled with the skills and techniques practiced by a discussion moderator. The rank of the moderator is of minor importance and enlisted personnel with proper backgrounds and an adequate orientation should be able to conduct these programs successfully. Group sessions held three times a week for one and one-half to two hours each session, continued for a minimum of six weeks, are recommended. One moderator should carry one group through the entire six-week period. Civilian institutions reporting SUCcess with this program are receiving their subjects after their antagonisms have become well hardened. Our stockades receive their subjects, in most instances, after they have beeu subjected to one or more punishments under Article 15 or by lower courts adjudging restriction or hard labor without confinement. Treating these men at this stage is trying to salvage them after they have become confirmed in their resentments and antagonisms. More success should result if we can detect these conditions before they are

confirmed. Trainees and others should be considered candidates for this type therapy as early as their attitude deficiencies can be detected. Men being disciplin@d for their first absence without leave, failure to repair, or other minor infraction, unless the circumstances definitely point to the contrary, should have included in their discipline the participation in group therapy. Almost every installation has a program whereby a man who commits a traffic violation is required to attend remedial driver training several times a week for a period of weeks. Tbe Army spends millions of dollars to train individuals in minor techniques and to make them minor technicians. Certainly, some effort is in order to provide a catalyst to assist these emotionally ihmature individuals to reach emotional maturity, or at least a more advanced state of emotional maturity, within a short period. Why not a group therapy program for the individual at every installation ? The profit can be large. Salvaging only a few men would, in the recovery of the training costs and other investment, pay for the effort.

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November 1963

85

T HE writing of history in the USSR has not changed mneh since the death of Stalin. While the great tyrant himself no longer figures as a hero in the history books, their authors still reproduce most of the old falsehoods and distortions. The history of the Second World War is still a phantas. magoria of Soviet successes and Western perfidy, so much so that two recent histories, both written since the 1956 20th Party Congress which denounced FAalin, portray the Western
86

Allies as virtually in league with Nazi Germany to destroy the Soviet Union,
This article was digested from the original, published in EAST EUROPE,April 1963, under the title, The Soviet Version of World War Two. Copyrighted Q 1968 by the Free Europe Committee, Inc., New York. Mr. Bregman is the author of several books, and contributes regularly to leading flnited States and British periodicals. MilitaryReview

urinciDal editor: Major General N. Pavle~ko; and CoIonei I. Parotkin. What is extraordinary in these books is the total lack of scruple, both in inventing or completely distorting historical events and in falsifying quotations. The authors were evidently afraid that even a very simple-minded Soviet reader might balk at some oi their statements, and so they have studded their pages with quotations from well-known Western statesmen, generals, and historians. Citations of memoirs, books, and articles are suppli&d wholesale. On checking, it often turns out that the quoted statements simply do not ,exist, More frequently, sentences are quoted out of context to prove exactly the opposite of what the authors really meant. Much use is made of books and articles by obscure Communist writers in the West, who are quoted as authorities on Allied policy.
The Anti-Soviet Conspiracy

The authors of these two scholarly studies are prominent men. T}ie Secmirouayu ond World War ( Vtoraya vo~na) is the work of Professor G. Deborin of the Institute of MarxismLeninism, considered the primary spe. cialist and historian of World War II. The other book, published under an almost identical title, The Second Workf by a War, 1939-1945, was written group of historians, generals, and colonels, and edited by three of them: Lieutenant General S. Platonov, the November 1963

The events preceding the war are portrayed as one long series of imperialist plots designed to make Hitler attack the Soviet Union.. Every step taken by the Western Powers is interpreted in this way. Thus President Roosevelts attempt in January 1938 to convene a conference to agree on the essential principles to be observed in the conduct of international affairs in order to restrain the dictators becomes in Deborins book a plan for an anti-Soviet plot by the United States, Britain and France with Germany and Italy. Next comes Munich. Nothing is easier than to denounce this act of appeasement, but Deborin is not content to charge Britain and France with buying a few months of peace at the cost of Czechoslovakia; he prefers to attribute their concessions to sinister
87

THE WWET anti-Soviet

VEf13tON znachinstions, He sees two

main elements ment:

in the Munich agree-

Western comztries endeavors to direct German aggression toward the East and their decisiovt to give Cmmho-

against Qerman y in 1939< Here, too, the Soviet historians go even furthsr than dld Communist propaganda. Thus write General PIatonov and his fsllow military historians:
The onlg aim of the visit of British in MOSCOW and French ~epresefitatives was to exert pressure on the German and to force it, bg the government threat of a possible agreement of Eng. land, France and the Soviet Union, to the path of ag. take more decisively gression against the USSR.

Professor Deborin, with even great. er contempt both for historical truth and for logic, writes: By threaten~ng Hitler with the prospect of forming an Anglo-French-So. v{et coalition and accentuating the iso. lation of the Soviet Union in the fats of Ffscist aggression, the talks [between Britain, France and ths Soviet Union] were intended to push Germany fo attack the USSR.

Itmuet not have occurred to him that even a simpleton would wonder how an alliance with Britain and France conld accentuate the isolation of the USSR.
NonsxiHent fluotes and People In support of his accusations, Deborin quotes passages he claims to have taken from Professor Lewis NaPrelude and from miers Diplomatic Les Derniers Jours de lEurope, by the former Romanian Foreign Minister Gafencu. Both those quotations are pure invention. Nor does he stop there; he also invents nonexistent personalities. To prove that in the summer of 1939 the Western Powers were preparing for war with the Soviet Union, he quotee the inspector gen: eral of the Britieh Army, Walter Carck~ as expressing satisfaction with Finnish preparations for war
MilitaryReview

Lmd Halifax and Hitler at Munich. The Soviets depict prewar events as imperialist plots to make Hitler attack the Soviet Union.
slovakia for her stead of increase to Gwmany as compensation pledge to fight the USSR inEngland and France and to German militarv potentiat.

No attempt is made to substantiate this. The same motives are attributed to the British and French Governments in their negotiations with the Soviet Union gn a pact of mutual assistance 88

with the USSR during a visit to Finland. No such geriera-ever existed. Having charged Britain and France with sinister designs in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, Deborin goes on to accuse them of having decided in advance to break up those negotiations. The two Western Powers brought the talks with the Soviet Union to a standstill, hoping for an agreement with Germany. And it was only after they had renounced any attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union that the Kremlin accepted the German offer of a nonaggression pact. The military historians, too, affirm that Hitler made his offer: . . . at a time when the ArcgloFrench-Soviet negotiations, as a result of the attitude taken by the Westerw Powers, became deadlocked and it was obviously useless to continue them.

ruling circles had been willing to stop the w-ar and to conclude an anti-Sov;et agreement with Fascist Germang.
Wishing to exploit such tendencies, in May 1941 the Nazis sent to Britain Hitlers Deputg Rudolf Hess, who was to make peace toith England on the following conditions: Germany would guarantee the integrity of the British Empire in exchange for B~h!a<n giving her a free hand in Eastevn Europe and with regard to the Soviet Union. Hess mission, however, dig not have the desired effects for Germany. Taking into consideration the feelings of the English people who wanted to coniinue the mar agaiwst Fascist Gsrwtany, and seeing in the proposed conditions a strengthening of their rival, German imperialism, and the weakenitig of their own position, the English ruling circles decided to go on with the war.

After this. the reader is not surprised to be told that the pact with Hitler was a great success for the Soviet Union. It was a far-sighted and wise step of Soviet foreign policy, says Deborin, while the military historians state that Soviet diplomacy destroyed all the provocative plans of the West European warmongers. Not once is there any mention of Stalin or Molotov, although they alone negotiated the pact. A British Guest The next extraordinary episode is the Hess incident. Stalins suspicions are well known, but once more the imagination of Soviet historians seems limitless. As they present it, Hess came almost as a guest of the British Government. According to General Platonov and his colleagues, after the French campaign ended: . . . some people among the English
Novsmber 1963

Professor Deborin, as usual, can invent a more impressive story: The destination of Hess flight was Lord Hamiltons property in DangaWW12Castle, Northern England where everything was ready for his recrption. The English Gozmrtmemt ordered their anti-aircraft defenses to let the . plane through and sent two fighters to protect it. . . . The British Government started ojficial talks with Hess. . . . Hess proposals became the object of a sharp struggle. Part of the governing circles of England and the United States advocated the acce@was the ance of those proposals. . . . It protest of the English working class which became the decisive factor. in ths rejection of Hess proposals. His mission f righ terwd the Ertglish people. Everywhere meetings were held to protest against ang attempt to cOnspire with Nazis.

89

.,,

THE SOVIET VERSIOt/ A Forced Alliance One would think

that the German attack on the USSR, the Grand alliance, and the massive help of the Western Powers for the Soviet Union would arouee more sympathy f mm the Soviet historians. The United States and Britain are presented as reluctant alIies, in fact, hostile, still plotting with the Germana. The help they gave to the USSR is pictured aa both insignificant and seifish, while some Allied offers of assistance are described as sinister attempts to grab Soviet territory. The military historian explain that the West was forced into the alliance with the Soviet Union againet its will, not vice versa. General Platonovs team says: ,Ths United States and England
were forced ivzto the arzti-EWerite coalition by their ditlieult mluatlon. Gevman militarlem, which their monopolies had bred, refused to obey them. In the struggle for world domination, the German uggressore became a great danger to their former pvotectove. For this reason, the trovernmente of Ersgland and the United States wer-e forced, against their ill, to agree with the Soviet Unio to a common greseors. fight against the Hitler . . . Tkeft were forced to talc into ac5 count the wiehes of their p oples and their svmpathiee for the Soviet Union.

But this is not alL When the Soviet Union wae bleeding, the Western A1Iies wanted to exploit her weakneas in order to dismember her. Discussing the sitnation in 1942, Deborin writes: Whenever the problem of the zsav
againet

American

discueeed, the Staff denxwtded that the Soviet Union siwuld be drawn into this war. Its aim was not only to weaken the Soviet Union and Japan, but also, in the interest of the monopoIiee, to estab{ieh iteelf in Soviet East. ern Siberia and in the Soviet Fav East, . . . The US government and higher militarg circles prepared plans for American air baees in Soviet Siberia. The authors of the plan had two aime: to use those baeee for the {niroduction of American capital to this region and for the etruggle to detack Siberia from the Soviet Union, and to bring about a war betsoeen Japan and the USSR.

Japan

was

General

Presidents

Offer

According to Professor Deborin: . . . it seemed to the American and

English imperialist that with the help of t h e i r deliveries they would strengthen the Soviet troops resistance to the German offensive and that thts would lead to the mutual extermin@ion of the USSR and Germany while at the same time they would make the Soviet Union dependent upon them. 90

To prove the existence of such a plan, Professor Deborin mentions President Roosevelts offer, in a telegram to Stalin of 17 June 1942, to send to Siberia, in the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, 100 bombers provided that suitable operational facilities were prepared in advance. In the summer of 1942, the danger from Japan seemed rather remote, and this could explain Stalina reluctance to consider the offer Roosevelt had made. But, at the same time, the German threat to the Caucasus was a very real one. The Western Allies had been as much interested in stopping the German Army before the Baku oilfields as had the Soviets, and both Roosevelt and Churchill had been ready to send considerable air support MOitsry Review

for the defense of the Caucasus. for Deborin this ie too simple: conquer Soviet

But

Not only did Nazi Germany want to oil, Americrmr and English i?nperialists wanted the same and tried to exploit the dificult sitv.atton of the Soviet Union. The US and English gove?wments elaborated a phzn to introduce troops from the Near East The govinto Soviet Trans-Caucasia. ernment circles of those countries tried to forestall each other is the invasion of the Caucasus, and this wae also one of the signs of imperialist contradictions. . . . Churchill expected to be able to exploit the enormous difficulties of the Soviet state during the battle of Stalingrad. He demanded USSR agreemerrt to the occupation of Soviet Trans-Caucasia by English troops. . . . The United States on their side attempted to exploit the tense sitnation on the Soviet-German front in order to present the Soviet Union with its annexationist demands. . . . The US government wanted to estab. lish American war bases in the most cenimportant economic and strategic ters of the USSR from Trans-Caucasia to the Maritime Province and Kamchutka. Stalins Recommendations It should be added that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill had ever suggested sending troops to any part of the USSR; only air forces had been

to the West the kind of motives which would guide Soviet leaders in similar circumstances. to the perfidy and bad faith which the Soviet historians impute to the Western Powers. The West is even accused of sacrificing ita own eoldiers for anti-Soviet ende. One example is tbe treatment of the Dieppe commando raid in 1942, which took place at a time when the Soviets were clamoring for a second front. To.prevent Frenchmen mistaking the commandos for the first stage of liberation and taking to arms at the grave risk of savage German reprisals, the British Broadcasting Corporation warned them to wait for events. But for Deborin this warning is the proof of Allied bad faitb: The raids organizers had perfidious
aime: First, to prove to the Germans that they should not fear the landing of any larger forces in Western Europe; second, the failure of the raids, made by insignificant forces, was to be the proof of the impossibility of opening a second front. This is why before the landing of the Allied troops in Dieppe, London broadcast a corn. that the action had muniqui stating limited a~ms. Formally, the commun{qut was addressed to the French patriots to prevent them from a premature action. In fact, it ?oas addressed to the Germans and its aim was to make it possible for them to repulse of Cathe landing force consisting The Canadian offi. rtadian divisions. cers and men, jighting with great devotion, wers condemned in advance to annihilation. Bad Faith There is no limit

offered. There had been a plan to send a huge Western army to the Soviet Union, but it was Stalin who suggested it. In September 1941, at the time of the USSRs greatest peril, Stalin asked Churchill to send by sea to Archangel, or through Iran to the southern part of the Soviet Union, 25 to 30 British divisions. But the Soviet historians do uot mention this. It may be that they feel compelled to ascribe
November 1963

Needlese to say, the warning to French civilians had been broadcast only after the attack started.
91

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.
TflE SWET YERSIUtJ wwet to weaken their resistmws to the victorfows advance of the Soviet A~m~ The slow advance of American and E?tglirh troops made it po88ible for ih~ Germa?s CQm?nand to move troops

- This is not the only such acctteation. t2n the next page of Deborins book we find this statement on the tragic stcwy of the PQ-I7 convoy: % order to stop deliveries to the USSR, s con-

Not even the invasion of Norm Andy was straightforward according to Soviet historians voy of ships going to Archangel was exposed to a German attack. It seems never to, have occurred to the Soviet historian that had the Western Powers not wanted to heIp the USSR, they simply would not have done so. Not even the invasion of Normandy, hailed by Stalin himself as a great feat of arms, seemed straightforward to the Soviet historians. The re~der m i g h t be excused for wondering whether the invasions aim was not to help the Germans. Indeed, Deborin affirms: True to their ant<people policy, the rtd%g cimles of the United States and
Ev@and were not in a hurry to depley at once an attack on a broad front against the Germans, as they did not 92 . freely from the Western German front. to the Soviet.

It was not only against the Soviets that the West plotted with the Nazis, but also against tbe French Resistance. Professor Deborins imagination stops at nothing:
The g6verning circles of the United States and England not only did not accelerate the annihilation of the Ger. man occupiers on the French soil but, on the contrary, planned to use Nazi help in order to fight the popular masses which had intens%jied their liberation struggle. The Ang[o-AmeT$can Command had secret talks w{th the German Command in France oti the common fight against French patriots, Military Review

,.

of Soviet historians is to ascribe to the Western Powers motives which, in fact, guided Soviet policy. When there is something ditlcult to explain in the Soviet conduct of war, Professor Deborin finds it easier to say that they did not do it but tbe Allies did. The treatment of the Warsaw uprising and of the liberation of Parie and Prague are cases in point. Warsaw The world knows that the Soviets refused to help the Warsaw insurgents and even rejected Western demands to let Allied planes land on Sovietcontrolled airfields after dropping supplies to the Polee; the Red Army looked on while the Germane exterminated 200,000 people in Warsaw. According to Deborin, however, the opposite was true: The governments of the United States and England refra{ned from their giving help to the insurgents; assistance consisted only, accordhcg to Churchill, in two planes appearing
rrrethod during the night of August 4 and three planes four ccights later. Those planee dropped arms, almost all of which, however, fell on ground occupied by German troops. The Soviet Command did give the insurgents help, dropping arms and munitions by parachute in the parts of the town occupied by the in,wzrgen ts. Paris

Roles Switched One favorite

the city which staged an uprising asked for help. Immediately, it decided to liberate Paris, and Gen. Leclercs famous French Zd Division Wae selected for the honor of first entry. Let us examine the Soviet version of this event. After a vivid description of how the French patriots had risen against the Germans rmd how the Americans and British, by stop. ping their troops 50 miles from the city, gave the Nazis the chance of entering the French capital and how thdy started negotiations with the German Command about the entry of their troops, Deborin continues: The German troops encircling Paris let the French police division of Leclere, specially formed to fight the democratic forces of France, enter the
French capital jfrst. Following it,

side and was eral

American and Englfsh troops aleo entered Park A 11 the time the German troops, in agreement with the AngloAmerican Command, blockade of Paris. maintained the

The Free French division, whose veterans had started at Lake Chad three years earlier, had made what Eisenhower described as an almost impossible march across the Sahara Deeert to join the 8th Army and had dletinguished itself in campaigns from Africa to Normandy. Now it becomes a police division fighting the underground.
Prague

The Allied armies approached the French capital in the third week of August, which was also the third week of the Warsaw uprising, and Eisenhower wanted to spare Paris the fate of Wareaw. He hoped to encircle the city and thus avoid a battle for it. His hand was forced, however, by the action of the Free French forces inNovember 1963

When Deborin comes to the liberation of Prague in the last days of the war, he really surpasses himself. To savor his story, one must recall what really happened. When Eisenhower ad. ~, vised Moscow that he would advance to Prague, the Soviets reacted vioIently, and Stalin demanded that Eisenhowers forces should not advance 93

,.,, , ., --THE SOVIET VERSION

beyond the Karlovy Vary-Pbae~-~esk6 Bud&jovice line. Patton could have reached Prague with ease, but Eisenhower ordered him to stop on the line Stalin had laid down. On 5 May, as the Americans poured across the border, the Czech underground rose in revolt and broadcast from Prague an appeal for Allied aid. In view of his agreement with Stalin, Eisenhower felt he could not go to their assistance and the liberation of Prague was left to the Soviets. It was, undoubtedly, one of the Allies most tragic mistakes. This attempt to please fie Soviets now becomes another example of Al-

When the German armie88tarted to storm P~ague, Arrzericara troops csased their advance toward ths citg. The United States rwiing circles wanted to with the destrow tke Prague patriots hatads of the Nazie and then, in agreti. ment with the German Command, take over Pbague from it. The Sovist Uedon came to the assistance of the Czech patriots. 1. Who Defeated Japaaa?

After the Soviet Union won the war in Europe virtual~y against the wishee of her Allies, there remained the task of defeating Japan. The Soviet historians must be aware that to credit this to the USSR is asking a Iot from

US Amv As

Photos

the Soviets choose ta eee it, the Americans allowed the destruction Forces of the Interior before entering Paris

of the French

lied treachery, After describing how the Czech patriots rose against the Germans and, under attack, broadcast an appeal for immediate help, Deborin goes on:
94

the reader, even if he knows little about the war in the Far East. They resort once more to statements by Western leaders. Since there is no. body in the West who will testify tlfat
MilitaryReview

Japan was defeated by the Soviet Union rather tlian by the United States, quotations had to be doctored and distorted to serve this purpose. False Witnesses In general, the military historians have been much more careful than Professor Debof$r and have avoided crude falsifications, but now they abandon all restraint and do not hesitate to call in false witnesses. This is how they explain Japans capitulation:
The use of arms of mass extermimzthe defenseless population of those cities [Hirosh{ma and Nagasaki] was an unjustifiable act of barbaritg aimed at blackmail and terror. But this act of barbarity had no decisive influence on the shortening of the war. Military lsaders and commen tutors of the United States and England such as Ge?zeral ~,rnold, Admiral Nimitz, Bevnard Bvodie, General Fuller and twelve members of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and many other soldiers and writers, came, in their postwar reports and studies, to the conclusion that atomic bombs were not the decisive factor in bringing about the capitulation of Japan. The Surveg just mentioned states that even in the target cities the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when compared with other Japanese cities, were not more defeatist than the average. . . . The smashing of Nazi Germany by the Soviet armed forces and her subsequent capitulation contributed much more than the atomic bombs to spreading vwong the Japanese the feeling that

change iw the polic~ of those circles taok place ontg after the Sov{et Unio% intervened in the fight to liquidate the hearth of the Second World War in the Far East.

tion against

As the source of the quotation from the US Strategic Bombing Survey, the authors give General Fullers book The Second World War 19S9-19.$5. The quotation is correct, but broken up conveniently. The Soviet historiana omit the next sentence which reads: In Japan as a whole, for example, military losses and failures, such as those of Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, were twice as important as
this atomic bomb in inducing certainty of defeat. Other raids over Japan as a whole were more than three times as importantin this respec% Condeprivations, such sumer

shortages
tion,

avtd the attendant $n~~~! also more important in people to the point where they felt they could not go on with the war. were

bringing

Also omitted is the conclusion of the survey, quoted by General Fuller, that: . . . certaivdg prior to 31st December;
1945, and in all probability prior to Ist November, 1945, Japan would have surrendereti even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if Ru.reta had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. Indirectly Quoted W h e n referring to well-known Western leaders or commentators as denying a decisive role to the atomic

It must also iefeat was unavoidable. be take% into consideration that the first atomic bomb dropped on August 9 . . . had provoked no rsaction in the Iaparcese ruling circles. . . . A radical November 1963

bomb, the Soviet military historians are careful not to quote them directly. Yet Fullers book, which was their source, explains why they hold such views: Even before one of our B-29s dropped ite atomic bomb on Hiro95

.. ... . ... ..
THE SOVIET VERSION

,.

shims, writes General Arnold, Japans military situation was hopeless. Admiral Nimitz attributes Japans surrender directly to the lees of shipping. Mr. Bernard Brodie states: Japan was completely defeated strategically before the atomic bombs were used against her. . . .

nificance, he quotes from Churchills memoirs: It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled hy. the ~atomic bomb. But the next sentence is omitted, and for good reason, becauae it reade: Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell, and was brought about by overwhelm. jng maritime power. Sources Not Available Deborin goes on to quote one senSoviet historians probably feel quite tence from Admiral Leahys book, I ssfe in using such methods, since the Was There: It is my opinion that the books they quote are not available to use of this barbarous weapon at Hire. their readers. But when the Polish ~ shims and Nagasaki was of no ma. edition was being prepared, some care terial assistance in our war against should have been taken to make sure Jauan. Again the auotation is cor. that these misquotations would not be rect, but the authors thought is comdiscovered. Did nobody in the Minispletely distorted by omitting the next try of Defense in Warsaw, which pubsentence which reads: The Japanese lished this book, remember that Genwere already defeated and ready to eral Fullers book had been published surrender because of the effective sea by tbe same Ministry, and in tbe same blockade and the successful bombing series on military science, only three with conventional weapons. years earlier ? Dozens of similar examples could Professor Deborin is luckier: The be drawn from these Soviet histories books he quotes are generally not of the last war, especially from Deboavailable to readers behind the Iron rins book. It appears that history is Curtain. He also has less scruple in falsified under Nikita Khrushchev quoting out of context. To prove that just as brazenly as it was under the atomic bomb had no strategic sigJoseph Stalin.

COMMENTS INVITED
rial The Military Review welcomes your comments on any matepublished. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought us and~may lead to publication subject, why ? If you have you in developing of your ideas. query If you us; peron a certain not write an article

will assist

are an authority haps we can assist

for our consideration

only an idea, an acceptable

article. EDITOR

96

Military Review

UNITED STATES
Jet Transport A new jet transport aircraft, the c-I.41A Startifter, has been unveiled

recently. This strategic aircraft will greatly increase the ability of the US Army forces by providing the means to move men and equipment to distant points rapidly. The high-speed cargo and troop carrier is scheduled to be operational in 1965. It is expected to be able to carry 60,000 pounds for a distance of more than 3,400 miles at speeds up to 600 miles per hour. Maximum range is about 5,000 miles. The aircraft will be capable of much slower speede, however, to aIlow paratroop drops. Tbe new jet, loaded via a rear ramp,

riage, with crew, This S0,000-pound load can be transported about 2,800 miles. Twelve %-ton trucks; three 106 m;llimeter recoilless rifles; three 1~~ton trailers; one Mechanical Mule; and one rocket launcher. This 49,000 pound load can be transported 4,500 miles.News item.
Hasty Storage Tank A 420,000-gallon hasty storage tank

Lockheed

A ivwaft

Cornomtton

The new C-141A Starlifter

is designed to accommodate the following type loads: o Two Ml 13 armored personnel carriers; one 21~-ton truck, loaded; and one 105-miHimeter howitzer and car-

the worlds largest of its type--is being tested by Army Engineers to help boost Army mobility. Made of synthetic rubber coated on nylon, the 2,300-pound tank requires an average of only 200 man-hours to install. The hasty storage tank is rlesigned to replace the bolted steel tank for field use. A 420,000-gallon bolted steel tank weighs 85,000 pounds and requires z,000 man-hours to erect, The new tank can be folded and rolled on a pipe mandrel, making a compact package only three feet in diameter and 13 feet long. When in use, the hasty storage tank is placed in a pit prepared by conventional earthmoving equipment. The sides of the pit support the tank which, when filled to capacity, has a depth of 12 feet,US Army release.

The r$1,\1TAf2Y REVIEW a?d the U. S. Army Cornmsnd and General Staff f%lleg$ mmume, no re. srmnstbdaty for accur~cY of mformntmn c.ntained m the M1.LITARY NOTES sect,.. of thm pub. of tbe views. .Dinioms, ffmtio.. Items are Brt?tecl .s . . .erytce t. the. r?aders. No .!%.,.1 edmsement .r fact..! statements M t. be nmD1w3 .-The Edtt.r.

November 1963

97

,.,-. .

,.,

MILITARY NOTES Stoner 63

The unveiling of a weapon system described as A significant breakthrough in tactical small arms was recently held at Quantico, Virginia. CalIed the Sfoner 6.S, the system has one basic component group of 16 in.terchangeable assemblies from which

six separate arms are built. The LaIi. ber is 5.64 millimeters (.223 caliber, the same as the AR15, MR, Jun 63,1 103). Full and semiautomatic fire ca pabilities are additional improvement~ featured on the rifle and carbine mod els.News item.

Basic component gronp

C.dzll.c Gape Conmanv Photat

..

I
Fixed machinegun
r

Y
Light machinegun, belt-fed

I Light machinegun, magazine-fed .

MeiUum macbinegun

t
Assmdt rifle Carbine

98

MilitaryReview

r
StructuralFood Mine Detector

EdibIe structtial material is being developed for possl%le use in future space vehicles and light aircraft. The material, used in secondary structure such as packaging, compartmenting, and control knobs, could serve as survival food for downed aircrews. Harder than tempered Masonite, the experimental material consists of white wheat flour, cornstarch, Powdered milk, powdered banana, and hominy grite. The product, after being baked in a hydraulic press, has a [ compressive strength of 7,230 pounds per square inch and a 100-per-ounce caloric density. The material is capable of being machined, sawed, drilled, tapped, or molded. Reconstitution requires soaking in water at room temperature for four and a half hemrs, or at 180 degrees Fahrenheit for two and a half hours. For quicker use, the material can be flaked with a knife and tbe fragments consumed dry.News item. More Secure Communications? Scientists are studying an underground radio communication syetem that would be practically impossible to tap and very difficult to jam. Transmi ssionof radio waves through rocke of the earths crust would link underground c o m m a n d posts, miesile sites, and, in times of emergency, Government and military control centers. Transmitting antennas would be buried at least a mile in rock. The crystal rock would then be covered with an electrically conductive overburden, soil, and gravel. Radio signals from the buried antennas travel along the insulating rock without escaping into the air.New~ item.

Army Engineers have developed a lightweight universal mine detector capable of locating nonmetallic as well as metaI1ic objects. The new detector features transistors and etched cir-

<-

,, ::
US AmII

cuitry in place of conventional electron tubes and wiring. The microwave device locates an object by detecting differences in response between the object and the soil. DOD release.
Fuel Tank For M113

! ~ ; ~

The versatility of the Armys MI1.9 armored pereonnel carriers will be enhanced by the installation of rugged urethane rubber and nylon fuel tanks. Tbe air-transportable MII.9 ie designed to operate over the roughest terrain in a wide variety of climates. The new fuel tanks are able to withstand shock and vibration forces of at least 10 Gs at temperatures as low as minus 65 degrees Fahrenheit. News item. 99

November 1963

. <.
MILITARY NOTES Navy Missiles

I
Tatos test misfrom forward, guided missile This was the personic and are designed for ranges greater than 10 miles. The Navy has recently announced the award of two contracts, one for

One !lartcm and two siles streak skyward aft, and one side of the cruiser USS Albany.

I
us first such launching by any navy in the world. The Albany was on her maiden voyage after four and one-half years of conversion from a conventional heavy cruiser. The Tales missiles, carried forward and aft, are driven by ramjet engines to stratospheric altitudea and ranges exceeding 65 miles. The Tartar missiles, carried on both sides of the cruiser, are smaller, but are also SU. 100
,%.

the continued production of the Tales missile, the other for the continued production of the Tartar and Ad(MR, May vanced !lerrier missiles 1962, p 103). The Advanced Terrier is a surface-to-air guided missile that already arms 20 ships. Work under the Tales contract will be coordinated with the development of the new TI@hon long-range missile. News release. Military Reuiew

.
Rockets And Missiles Renamed designated XM-15, is currently designating,

A uniform

sys~em

for

.edesiznatinx.-. and namirm militarv rockets and. guided missiles has recently been announced. Army Regulations 705-36, dated 27.June 1963, Win. tain the details. The new system covers all current ,and newly designed military rockets and guided missiles with a combat or combat-related mission, but it does not cover space vehicles or space boosters. Tbe new policy applies to all of the military services. As an example, in the new system the ArmYs .Serxreanj miseile, formerly

designated the XMGM-29A. Followirm in like sequence are the symbols r~presented and specific meaning of each: X (etatns) experitnental. M (launch environment) ground vehicle or movable platform. G(primary mission) surface attack. M (type) guided missile. 29 (design number) indicates vehicles of same basic design. A (eeries) first major modificatioh.

Voice Scrambler Now available is an improved, selfconventional telephone mouthpiece. contained telephone accessory that Only an identically coded instrument scrambles transmitted voice signals, can convert the scrambled language which are then unscrambled by a into its original form. Each device ie :

.$

\ ~(j

Voice scrambler portable component (left) can be readily assembled for use (right) similar device on the receiving end of the line (MR. Mar 1961, p 98). A 26-ounce, transistorized, selfpowered instrument electronically distorts each spoken syllable. The distortions are then rebroadcast into the
November 1963

capable of two-way operation with one or more similarly coded accessories. Thie improved accessory can be ueed on country or open-line phone systems and any foreign or private system. News release.

101

MILITARYNOTES
Smoke Clouds

US Ar!w

The Chemical Corps Thermal Radiation Attenuation Cloud, which shows promise of reducing heat casuakies caused by nuclear weapons

In an attempt to reduce the effect of heat radiation of the nuolear bomb, the Chemical Corps has been experimenting for i number of years with
TRAC (Thermal Radiation A ttenuation C[oud) because burns of all types

were responsible for more than half of the fatalities and probably three-

fourths of all casualties at Hiroshima According to test results, the use of this protective shadowing principle shows promise of considerably reducing these figures, with as much as 90 percent of the heat-radiated energy blocked by the cloud.US Army release.

Automatic Map Compilation

Tbe Army has awarded a contract for the delivery of two automatic map compilation systems. This equipment wi[l effect aconsiderable reduction in th,e time required tq produce large-scale topographic maps from ,, aerial photography.
102

The system will be aMe to process almost any type of aerial photography over a wide range of format sizee, camera focal lengths, and camera orientations. This data is corrected bya digital computer, a part of the system. US Army release.

MilitsryRevie

GREAT BRITAIN
Defenses To Reorganize Submarines

EGYPT
Egypt ha$ conducted sea trials on the first purportedly Egyptian-built submarine. The displacement and capabilities of this craft have not been disclosed. Egypt has on hand eight W class Soviet-built long-range submarines and one smaller coastal-type undersea boat. W class submarines, equipped with enorkel-type devices, poseess a mine-laying capability and are further capable of being equipped with deckmounted guided missile tanks and launchers.News item.
Jet Fighter Scheduled

The planned reorganization of Britaine defenses was recently announced by a white paper presented to the British Parliament. Under the proposed plan, the three Service Minister,s-the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the War Office (re. sponsible for the army) are to be abolished and a unified Ministry of Defense created. The present Minister of Defense becomes the Secretary of State for Defense. A Defense Council will be established of which he will be the Chairman. This council will exercise the powers of command and administrative control exercised now by the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council, and the Air Council, all of which are to be abolished. Under the reorganization, the Chiefs of Staff will be known as the Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, Chief of the General Staff (presently Chief of the Imperial General Staff), and Chief of the Air Staff. They will continue to be the professional heads of their own services. The Naval, General, and Air Staffs, with the Joint Services Staffs of the present Defense Ministry, will constitute the Defense Staff. They will be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee through its Chairman, the Chief of Defense Staff, to the Secretary of State. Their principal duty will be solving defense probleme. Necessary legislation for these changes will be introduced in the near future. Subject to its passage, the new Ministry of Defense will be established on 1 April 1964.British Information Services.
November 1963

A new Egyptian supersonic jet fighter is scheduled to be flight teated in late 1963. Called the HA-900, the new aircraft will probably not be in production for at least two years. It ie said to be a modification of a Weet German-designed airframe.News item.

WEST GERMANY
Shelter West Germanys first nuclear shelter in Dortmund. was recently completed

A converted World War II tower ebelter, the structure is equipped with

Sol&t Nuclesr

wtd

Teclmik

shelter for West Germany

a powerplant and can provide fresh water and fresh air, as well as protection, for 1,500 people.News item. 103


, -

,.-:

MILITARY NOTES New VTOL *#% ~ .. -,

I*tercl,.

The VJ.101-C verticaI takeoff and landing aircraft

West Germany has begun testing a prototype vertical takeoff and landing interceptor aircraft, the VJ-101-C. The unique aircraft features six engines. Two engines mounted in a swiveling pod at each wingtip provide

lift and forward propulsion while two engines mounted in the fuselage furnish power for takeoff and landing, This aircraft is designed to perform level flight at a maximum speed of Mach 2.News item.

INDIA
Armed Forces India is proceeding with preparations to bolster her military estab.

lishment. The strength of the army is being increased from 560,000 to 980,000 men. Concurrently, a one milliOnman militia is being organized. The US and Great Britain will furnish small arms, antiaircraft gune, vehic}es, and engineer equipment to the army. Six mountain divisions are to be activated and furnished with materiel provided by the US, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union will furnish, at least 12 ilftG-zl jet fighters, and an unspecified number of Antonov (AvzI2) transport aircraft. India has accepted a USSR offer to construct two factories for the production of MIG aircraft (M,R, Aug 1963, P 106).
104

France will contribute Alouette 111 helicopters and will grant India a license to manufacture these eraft. News item.

AUSTRALIA
Carrberra Replacement Sought

Australia- is consideri~g five possibilities as replacement aircraft for her Canberra jet bomber squadron (MR, Sep 1963, p 106). The air force ie seeking a high. speed, multipurpose, long-range aircraft with sophisticated navigational and weapon de~ivery systems. Aircraft being considered are the French Mirage IV, the British TSR-2, and three US typesthe F-4C Phantom, the A-5C Vigilante, and the TFX. News release. . Military Review

.1

[f

USSR
the reserves or may reenlist for another two-year term. During their service, they may continue their education through the 10th-year level. Women can attain noncommissioned officer rank and are given certain spe-cial consideration in matters of leave, pay, and the disciplinary action to which they may be subjected,News item.

Women In The Services

Soviet women can enlist in the army, navy,or air force for a two-year tonr. Qualification for enlistment include i at least seven years of education and Ian attained age of at 1east 19 years P and not more than 25 years, Women i with children are not accepted. prefer. ence is given to women who have specialist training in a military skill. After two years they are placed in

1
}

Engineer Bridge

The Soviet ponton-supported TPP floating bridge of World War H may be replac&d by a new bridge composed of a series of pontons butted together to form a continuous floating plat-

four sections which are folded together in an accordion fashion for transport. A single truck can carry a complete 22foot unit. Major disadvantages . of the new

! form. The eliminaticmof a auperstruc! ture and multipiece assembly should ~ greatly decrease installation time. The new ponton sections provide their own decking and structural strength as wellas flotation. Each unit consists. of
1-

bridge seem to be the inherent instability of the design and the fact that it completely dams the surface of the stream and, therefore, is vulnerable to floating debris and enemy mines. News item.

Nmvmber 1963 * b

105

.. .. ~. . .
~lLITARY NOTES

VIETNAM
Junk Force Research

THAILAND
A new national research organiza. tion will operate under the direction of an Australian scientific administra. tor. Called the Applied Scientific Re. search Corporation, the organization will operate on a yearly budget of $2,240,000. It will concentrate prin. cipally on agricultural and industrial research.News release.

The last of 500 junks built under US contract was delivered recently rat a Saigon shipyard. The junk force became operational in 1960, employing 80 sail junks as off. shore counterinfiltration patrols. ~ With the completion of its construction program, the junk force has 28 units to patrol and defend Vietnams 1,200-mile coastIine.News item.

FRANCE
STOL

Flight teete continue on the proto. type of the Bregwet 9.41 ehort takeoff and landing transport. r%e version of this versatile aircraft can lift a 16,530-pound payload

ing distance of 310 feet on an unim. proved runway. The maximum speed of the Breguet 941 is 281 miles per hour; minimum speed is 56 miles per ho r. A long-range version 1 of this air-

L-.

Inter@ u,.

The Breguet 941 short takeoff and landing transport from an unimproved runway at a takeoff distance of 460 feet. Carrying the same payload, the aircraft has a landcraft has a payload of 53,3oO pounds. Takeoff and landing dietances for this model are unknown .News item.

106

MilitaryReview

.: r
[
~ CITY ON LEAVE. A History of Berlin 1945. 1962. BY Philip Windsor. 27B Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 19B3. $6.50. BY LT COL ARCHERL. LERCH, JR., Arty INDIAN WARS OF THE U. S. ARMY, 17761865. By Fairfax Oowney. 248 Pages. Dorrbleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1963. $4.75.

BY LT COL SAMUELL. CROOK,SR~,

MSC

; ; k

The most important political knot of the cold war is the problem of Berlin. How did the knot get tied in the first place ? Why does every attempt to untie it pull it tighter? Why did Premier Khrushchev point out on 26 July 1963, eighteen years after World War II and immediately after he had agreed to a test ban treaty, that the question of a peaceful German settlement remains the basic issue in settling international tensions ? Philip Windsor, a Research Analyst with Londons Institute for Strategic Studies, givee a well-written account of the Berlin story. Following with great clarity the never-simple Soviet machinations, the author skillfully demonstrate the close connection between the Berlin problem and its possible solutions and the problems and probable fate of all of Gerrnany~ His analysis of the key personalities and political parties involved is factual, unemotional, and clear. Anyone who has known and forgotten, m. whO hag let some Of the

I detaile of the German story since World War II slip by him, will, through this book, get a fine feel for how Berlin and Germany came to be the important puzzles they are today in the cold war.
Now?mber 1963

Fourteen of the campaign streamers on the United States Army flag were earned in wars on the frontier against the Indian tribes. This book, a vivid narration of these wars and campaigns from 1776 to 1865, traces the Indian conflicts from the scalping of .Jane McCrae-who was killed so that her slayer could collect a British bounty although she was the intended bride of a Tory officer-to Klt Carsons action at Adobe Walls. Of particular interest is the influence of the Indian wars upon the development of the US Army and upon the courses of the concurrent declared ware in which the United States engaged. In every war through the Civil War, each non-Indian belligerent vied with the other for support from tbe Indians. Neither aide hesitated to looee them upon the settlers and regular forces of the other until the Civil ar, In that conflict, Confederate # isoners were enlisted in the Union Army to fight only on the frontier against the Indians. This is not a detailed study to increase knowledge of tactics, strategy, or political history. The author makes no moral judgments. It ia the general story of forgotten and neglected campaigne.
107

. ..
MILITARY BOOKS COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. from the League of Nations to NATO. Bv Roland N. Strombere. 301 Pages. Fredefick A. Praeger, Inc., Nefi York, 1963.$6.00. BY LT
COL WILLIAM N. MARTASIN,

scrutiny

the nuclear age is worthy of careful by the military reader in. terested in international organiza. tions devoted to the queet for peace and security.
THE SOUTHERN CHEYENNES. By Donald 1, Berthrong. 446 Pages. University of OkIs. Iroma Press, Norman, Okla., 1963. $5.95, BY LT COL ROBERTG. MATTE, AL!+

AGC

From Theodore Roosevelts proposal for a league of nations with international police powerin 1900to the conception and evolution of the United Nations and NATO, the author digs deeply into the myth of collective security, its periIs, its delusions, and its effects on international politics and war. Professor Stromberg, a member of the Department of Hietory at the University of Maryland, and the author of several texts on United States and European history, claims that collective security has never been precisely defined, and that the term means different things to its proponents and oppOnents. He points out the difficulties inherent in collective security schemes among sovereign nations each jeaiously guarding its national righte and unwilling, in the case of the major powers, to entrust their security to attempted definitions of aggression, and to commit military forces to halting aggression. According to the author, economic warfare bas not proved to be a substitute for military warfare in deterring an aggressor and the failure of embargoes and quarantines to prevent war was demonstrated prior to World Wars I and II. He claims that a clear show of force and demonstrated intent to use that force would have been more effective in preventing or deterring both wars. This book has an excellent bibliography and the concluding analysis in encompass~ng collective security
108

Mr. Berthrongs authoritative, w!elldocumented study is one of a series on the CIVILIZATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN inaugurated by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1932. The series, as a whole, has been widely acclaimed as one of the finest collections of books on historical and contemporary Indian life. This particular book does not purport to be a complete history of the Cheyenne people, but, rather, is limited chronologically and topically to the period before their resettlement on reservations in 1875, and to those Cheyennes who occupied the Central and Southern Plains. The Cheyenne fought well to preserve a way of life doomed by its very simplicity. Their eventual pacification and final confinement on reservations as wards of the Government followed the familiar patternthe forced migration ever farther west, the loss of the sustaining buffalo herds which were methodically slaughtered by white hunters, the treaties made and broken, and the often gallant, but always futile, resistance before succumbing to disease and attrition. The author is commendably objective in relating an unattractive story. From a military standpoint, the prime value of the book rests in the detailed account of the military campaigns between 1850 and 1875 and the reconstruction of specific engagements.
Military

Review

HtlMANHISTORY:A Race Between Educe. tion and Catastrophe. EdNed by John J. Foley. 119 Pages. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1963.$2.95. BY COL WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER,Arty

This book contains a series of seven lectures given at the 1963 meeting of the Community College, an annuaI seminar conducted at Duquesne University. The central theme of this series is an exploration of the proper role education should play in enabling man not only to survive, but to progress in the nuclear age. In general, all seven lectures are written with a persuasiveness and clarity which is both attractive and thOught-provOking. Of more than moderate interest to the military professional is the third lecture, with a timely thesis designed to set at ease the many undergraduates who pose the inevitable question, Will ROTC training interfere with mu education?
TRENCHARD. By Andrew Boyle. 766 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1962. $8.5D.

Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Force. Because he was one of the early prophets of airpower, Trenehard has been the subject of much controversy. It is difficnlt to say whether this biog. raphy will serve to calm any troubled waters, but certainly the p o i n ts brought out in this well-produced publication will have to be considered in any future appraisal of the patron saint of modern air power. This is a highly readable account of a man who lived through and. greatly influenced tremendous times. I WAS AN NKVD AGENT. A Soviet Spy Tells
His Story. By Anatoli Grsnovsky. 343 Pages. The Devirr-Adair Co., New York, 1962.$4.75.

This volume is the official biography of Hugh Montague Trenchard, the man who created the Royal Air Force and who has gone down in history as the leading exponent of airpower. Trenchard did not become a pilot until 1912 when he was 39 years of age and had 19 years of British Army service behind him. But from 1912, his rise was meteoric: he eventually commanded the Royal Flying Corps in France during World War I and became the first Chief of Air Staff when the RAF was established in 1918. He held the latter position until his retirement in December 1929. This was followed by a four-year tenure as
November 1963

To those who are convinced that Soviet Communists are 10 feet tall, this book will supply added ammunition. Any reader will find that it is an absorbing tale, told with skill and obvious dedication. The author, son of one of the victims of the Stalin purges, served as an agent of the NKVD from 1939 untiI he jumped ship in Sweden in 1946. He describes in considerable detail the secretive manner of operations, the thoroughness of training, and the deviousness of planning. If the author was ever aware of effective cOunterefforts, he does not relate it. Thoughtful readers may wonder, however, how he himself succeeded, not once but twice, in deserting from his assignment, only to be placed in positions of nearly equal responsibility elsewhere. In other respects, too, the author allows us to see that the Soviet colossus bas its weaknesses. But these insights are overshadowed hy the sharply etched picture of secret police activitiesa gruesome picture, indeed,
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, MILITARY ifooi(s THE ROYAL ARSENAL. Its Background, Origin, and Subsequent History. Volume 1. By Brigadier O. F, G. Hogg. 722 Pages. Oxford University Press, New York and London, Eng,, 1963.$40.35 for Volumes 1 and Il. THE ROYAL ARSENAL. its Background, Origin, and Subsequent History. Volume Ii. By Brigadier O. F. 6. ffogg. 1,542 Pages. Oxford University Press, New York and London, Eng., 1963.$40.35 for Volumes I aod Il. TffE FIRST VOLUNTEERS. History of the Firs! Mimmsota Volunteer Regiment 1B61.?865. By John Iluinn Imholte. 238 Pages. Ross.! ifaines, inc., Minneapolis, Mbsn., 1963. [ $5.75.

The colorful, detailed, and definitive history of a 400-year-old institution which today finds its workshops but a small part of a huge organization. The author held a number of important posts in the Royal Arsenal and his two-volume work gives a valuable insight into early industrial organiza. tion.
VICTORY IN THE WEST. Volume 1. The Bat. tle of Normandy. By Major L. F. Ellis with Captain G. R. G. Allen, lieutenant Colonel A. E. Warhurst, and Ab Chief Marshal Sir James Robb. 595 Pages. Her Majestys Stationery Office, London (British Information Services, New York), 1962.$12.60. BY LT COL ALBERT N. GARLAND, Inf

The author, Assistant Professor and Chairman of the Social Science Divi. sion of the University of Minnesota at Morris, has produced a lively and ac. curate account of the First Minnesota Regiment in tbe Civil War. Present at every principal battle in the east from the start of the war until 1864 (except the Second Battle of Bull Run ), the regiment played an important role in six. In addition to the well-written accounts of the battles in tyhicb the Minnesota regiment participated, the author has included as an appendix a full roster of the regimenta Iieting of some 1,200 names.
INSIGNIA AMERiCAN MiLiTARY 1800-1851. By J. Doncan Campireii and Edgar M. Howeii. 124 Pages. Smithsonian institution, Washington, D. C., 1963.$2.00.

The first of two volumes in the official British hietory of World War II to record the Allied carnpaigh in northwest Europe, this volume concludes on 1 September 1944 when General Eisenhower took personal command in the field. Of Particular interest to the US roil. itary reader is the account of Field Marshal Montgomerys leadership, the thread of which runs throughout the volume. Of considerable intereet are the 10 appendices which include details of the principal army, navy, and air forces engaged on both sides, together with information on their organization, weapons, and equipment. .,

A descriptive and interpretive catalog of the insignia of the Army of the United States-other than buttons, epaulets, and horse furniture-that were prescribed or worn from 1800 to 1851, which are found in the national collections today. Not intended to be a definitive study, this volume is a well-done, developmental history of American military insignia.
ESCAPE: From tbe Ah and from the Sea. By Eioise Engie. 256 Pages. The John Oay Co., New York, 1963.$4.95.

The development of escape systems for aircraft, spacecraft, and submarines, told from the creation of the first crude parachutes to the ejection seats of todays aircraft and the escape capsules for use in space flight.
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SUN TZU: THE ART OF WAR. Translated and with an introduction lay Samuel B. Griffith. With a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. 197 Pages. Oxford University Press, New York,

.,AMERICAS FAILURE IN CHINA 1941-50. BY Twrg TSOU. 614 Pages. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1963.$12.50. BY MAJ WILLIAM W. WHITSON, Inf

An American citizen and a resident of the United States for more than 20 years, Profeseor TSOUis an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. In this book, he makes a study of American policy toward China between the time of Pearl Harbor and the collapse of General MacArthurs home-before-Christmas offensive in the Korean War. He asks, What happened ? and Why ? Thue the book is a stimulating combination of history and political theory. Professor Tsou has chosen to write about a decade of epic struggle. For most readers, the key figures have long been household words. Because they and hundreds of thousands of lesser figures poured th~ir energies into the struggles of which he writes, Professor Tsous evidence and his judgments will revive bitter memories, Some will object, Thats not the way it happened ! Some will agree with Professor Hans Morgenthau who has wrritten the foreword: . . it is the great and unique merit
of this book to have laid bare the strands of American policy u,h ich led to the communization of China and its entevgence as a great power. The book . . . does in the realm of scholarship what great statesmen have done in the sphere of action; if resfores fruth to its iigh t fzd place.

1963.$5.60. BY LT COL J. W. MACNAUGHTON,

Canadian While ArmII

Throughout, the authors tone is judicious. He is not witch hunting. HIS object is not to place the blame. On balance, he cmmes remarkably close to that elusive goal of every historian: objectivity,

there ie considerable doubt as to the authorship of the military classic commonly aacribed to Sun Tzu and of the exact date of writing, which is generally accepted to have been sometime in the third century B.C., these details are of no consequence to the military student. it is sufficient to assum~and there is reasonable evidence to eupport such an assumptionthat the original 13 chapters were the work of one individual who had considerable practical experience in war, probably during the latter part of the Warring States period of ancient China (453-221 B.C.). Mr. Griffith has provided in this volume the most acceptable translation Of Sun Tzu yet produced in English. Prior to the appearance of this book, the best known translation waa that of Lionel Giles, published in 1910. A large part of the value of this volume, however, lies not so much in the translation of the 13 chapters, as in the background material and correlation with the works of other writers, botb ancient and modern. In this, the translator is attempting to focus attention on the fact that the writinge of Sun Tzu, while over 2,000 years old, are considered to have application to modern warfare by certain military leaders today. Because of this, and the fact that the approach to warfare of Sun Tzu is still the basic approach of the oriental, TAe Art of Wan is worthwhile study material for professional soldiers.
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November 1963,

- MILITARY BOOKS

ANNAPOLIS TODAY. By Kendall Banning. Revised by A. Stuart Pitt. 329 Pages. United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md,, 1963.$6.00.

The sixth edition of the popular story of the US Naval Academy. The text has been extensively revised and . two chapters have been added.
LAW, MORALITY AND WAR IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, By Richard A. Falk. 120 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, t 963.$4.00. BY MAJ FRANCIS H. HELLER, USAR

JOHN RANSOMS DIARY. BY John 1. Ransom, Introduction by Bruce Catton. 282 Pages, Paul S. Eriksson, Inc., New York, t9$3, $5.95. BY COL WILLIAM D. BEARD, Inf John Ransoms Diary is a tale rich in the human interest details of the life of Union prisoners of war in Con. federate prison camps during the Civil War. Bruce Catton, in his introduc. tion, writes: It is one of the best of the marq fine, firmt hand accounts to come down to us from the Civil War-a tale 0/ adventure, of suspense, of fierce hate and great love.

In this closely reasoned essay, the author, an aesociate professor at Princeton University, argues for what he calls a moral policy toward the use Of international force. Hia exacrrina.
tion of the alternatives leads him to

the conclusion that increased conventional armaments and restrained nuclear sharing meet his criteria of moral responses that will increase international stability. Professor Falk rejects preventive war as well as nuclear pacifism and unilateral disarmament. He recognizes further that international law is far from being an operative force on the world scene, His main point is that the choices before tbe world are, at bottom, moral ones and that conscience must be given its place. To preserve stability is, in his view, morally best and hence should be a touchstone of strategic thinking.
ATOMIC SUBMARINES. By Norman Polmar. 288 Pages. O. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N. J., 1963.$6.95. A story of the men and events that produced the atomic submarine. Numerous photographs and detailed appendices enhance the books value.

John L. Ransom was Brigade Quartermaster of the $lth Michigan Cavalry. His diary was written in several Confederate prison camps during the period after his capture in east Ten. nessee in 1863, until he escaped and joined General Shermans army in Georgia near the end of the war. This interesting, factual, and un. biased book of the horrors and suffer. ing of Civil War prison life is a worthwhile reading experience for those interested in Civil War history, It provides valuable background msterial and refutes many popular legends.
WORLD WAR II IN THE AIR: Europe. Edited by Major James F. Sunderman, United States Air Force. 345 Pages, Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1963. $5.9%

A collection of the writings of the men who flew and watched the aerial operations in Europe from 1939 to 1945. Numerous photographs, tbe authors introduction and notes, and an appendix of the principai Allied and Axis aircraft in nse during World War 11 in Europe enhance the volumes informative and detailed presentation.
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