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African and Greek philosophy: a pristine dialogue in search of contemporary relevance

J Obi Oguejiofor Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

Key words/phrases Dialogue; dialogue in Greek philosophy; hermeneutics; African identity; ancient Egyptian philosophy; Augustines Neoplatonism; cultural alienation; Afrocentrism.

ABSTRACT
Departing from the perspective that relevant philosophising today should both be contextual and open to a globalising humanity; this paper argues that dialogue is the best way of achieving these aims. It traces the pristine link between African and Greek philosophies to prove that contextualisation and openness were hallmarks of ancient Greek philosophy. African philosophy, while also attempting to be contextual, has excelled in being open to other philosophies through its long history. From this point of view both Greek and African philosophies are very well placed to be models to other regional philosophies. This dual characterisation makes dialogue possible and practicable, even though in many respects the dialogue has lacked balance and has been marked by colonial superiority and inferiority tendencies, which being historical have been surreptitiously ingrained in our psyche. It is in so far as we are able to rise above such complexes that our dialogue will be able to confront shared dilemmas. Doing so will sing an ode to philosophy both Greek and African.

1. INTRODUCTION

Philosophical engagement in Africa is still dominated by two very distinct trends. According to one of these trends, real and meaningful philosophy must in some way be contextual in the sense of being seriously engaged with the problems and concerns of its ambience. Even

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though this trend has become dominant in some respects in the continent, there is also the opposed practice which is still very much lashed to the erstwhile idea of philosophia perennis, according to which philosophy is reflection unencumbered by mundane matters. According to this conception of philosophy, one can do philosophy without taking account of ones context. In Africa thinkers of this ilk largely work on themes drawn from and determined by Western philosophy. Such philosophic isolationism contradicts the rich history of the dialogic relationship between African and Greek philosophies. Our effort here will bring this dialogic relationship to the limelight by examining briefly the concept of dialogue and its place in the history of philosophy. It will also see how both Greek and African philosophies have been in dialogic relationship in ancient times as well as in medieval and contemporary periods of Western philosophy. While recognising that historic events have conspired to taint the inroad of Greek philosophy into contemporary Africa, we argue that dialogue in a very broad sense should indeed be an integral part of contemporary philosophising in order to remain relevant in our globalising world.

2. THE MEANING OF DIALOGUE

Etymologically dialogue is derived from dia and logos . In this sense it means a conversation between two people and is clearly distinguished from monologue. But dialogue has become generally used in a broader sense where discussants are not limited to two people. Almost all the dialogues of Plato, for instance, have more than two interlocutors. Thus in the academic realm, the word is often used to designate a literary work in the conversational form. But more critical understanding takes dialogue to go beyond mere conversation or discussion. For William Isaacs dialogue is described as the art of thinking together and is defined as a living experience of inquiry within and between people (Isaacs 1999: 9). For the Co-Intelligence Institute dialogue is shared exploration towards greater understanding, connection or possibility. It means that dialogue fully understood, entails more than verbal interlocution. The broader meaning wants to embrace the purpose and the end of dialogue and to see it in terms of other possibilities of interaction. Thus the communication, exchange of ideas, mutual 56 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

influence and mutual enrichment that take place in the relationship between human beings, and between them and their world, is dialogic in a broader and deeper sense. Dialogue in such a broad sense is a very pivotal plank in the relations of humans with themselves and with the world, and in their quest for collective synergy towards the improvement of life in general. Paulo Freire says that dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world (cf Smith 2001). Viewed from this broad perspective, dialogue according to Burbules is a kind of social relationship that engages its participants (Burbules 1993: 19). On account of this engagement, certain conditions are necessary for its fruitful evolution. The physicist David Bohm names three of these. First, those involved must suspend their assumptions. Second, they must view each other as colleagues or peers, and then there must be a facilitator to hold the context of dialogue (Bohm 2012). It is clear from this that Bohm is concentrating more on the technical process of dialoguing in a set situation and for determined ends that he has worked so hard to foster. Burbules (1993: 36-46) discourses other conditions which he calls the virtues or emotions of dialogue and they include concern, trust, respect, appreciation, affection and hope. In line with the virtues and emotions of dialogue as discussed by Burbules (1993), we can outline the following as necessary conditions for genuine and fruitful dialogue. In the first place there must be recognition of the humanity of the human agents in the dialogic situation. The necessity for this recognition is axed on the realisation that without it the give and take process that is an essential result of dialogue is truncated. Recognition of humanity entails certain equality as humans, since fruitful dialogue is atrophied once one party assumes the position of superiority or inferiority. With a sense of humanity and equality, there arises respect for the other persons, for the context of their lives and the world within which and with which dialogue must take place. These requirements then make possible openness to the views of the other. In this regard, Plato and Socratic dialogues may not be the best examples of dialogues since in them Socrates invariably ends up as the victor in the verbal conversation that is very often structured in such a way as to exhibit how untenable or impracticable the opposing views are. But respect for and openness to the views of the other does not preclude 57 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

conviction about ones own view or positions sometimes fertilised by the past or tradition as well as the current context of ones life and its development. That is why the common quest for truth should be the underlying motivation in dialogue, but truth here is understood as embracing much more than narrow personal perspectives or that of history or tradition of ones context. These conditions are akin to HG Gadamers horizon of discourse in which the German philosopher sees the fusion of the hermeneutical past and present in ones own prejudgement. For Gadamer one must continually test ones prejudices. Central here is the role of the past which leaves behind an accretion of certain view or tradition the individual encounters. The process of fusion between the present and the past continues unceasingly to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other (Gadamer 1979: 273).

3. DIALOGUE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL ENTERPRISE

It is evident that seen from this broad perspective, dialogue is the kernel of the philosophical engagement. It also entails that dialogue in philosophy is not only to be seen in reflections couched in conversational forms. Discourses that are not expressly conversational can still be viewed as dialogic, especially when the elaboration of its proper context would include silent audience or when the intention of the speaker is to elicit reactions from the ones addressed. It is thus not essential that such response be expressed concretely in the specific text under consideration. For instance the section of the Egyptian Book of the dead titled Declaration of innocence is presented as testimonies of the dead that are intended to facilitate ones admittance into the eternal realm. However, the declarations effectively define a set of standards for moral conduct in the community (Hord & Lee 1995: 17) presenting the concept of Maat in concrete form. In the Declaration Ani praises the divinity in varied hyperboles after which he declares himself to be free of the infringement of one moral principle after another:

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Hail, thou Flame, which comest and goest, I have not spoken lies Hail, Crushe of bones, who comest forth from Suten-henen, I have not snatched away food Hail, thou who shootest forth the Flame, who comest forth from Het-Ptah-ka, I have not caused pain. Hail, thou who comest from Amentet, I have not committed fornicatio (Hord & Lee 1995: 21).

The dialogic intent of the declaration is seen in its effort to convince the celestial audience of the standard of morality which the declarant has tried to live by. In a sense it is an appeal to the divinity to fulfil its part of the bargain since the human agent has, in his own assertion, fulfilled his own part. The awaited reaction is admittance of Ani, the innocent, into the abode of the righteous. But in a real sense the declaration is addressed to living human beings. In outlining different aspects of social morality, Maat, it is both an argument and an affirmation. The declaration argues about the authenticity of these ethical standards and underlies the necessity of embracing them for the fulfilment of the demands of Maat. As argumentation and affirmation, it is to be expected that in the real context of the declaration, the human audience is also expected to elicit a reaction, perhaps a presentation of an opposed view or acquiescence with the standard announced. Thus the declaration becomes just one side of a dialogue comprehensively viewed has many parts. It is clear that in this case the other side is not expressed and needs some interpretation before being made more explicit. While dialogic and dialectical implications could be read in other genres, it is in the dialogues of Plato that the literary philosophic style assumes a prominent place in Western philosophy. Gilbert Ryle (1967: 315) asserts that the usual way of publishing compositions be they verses or prose was oral delivery, and thus the dialogues of Plato, like others of its kind, were also meant to be recited to the public by the author. The dialogues were therefore dramatic in form and were meant to be recited to a drama-loving audience. That explains why dialogues had to be short in order to capture and retain the attention of the audience. Thus only the Republic and the uncompleted Laws were the exception and must have been intended for special academic audience that would reassemble many times to follow up the conversation. Through Platos dialogue the discussions of Socrates with his Athenian

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interlocutors are outlined. In the opinion of Francoise Armengaud (1989: 364), through these dialogues philosophy attains its plenitude and also manifests for the first time its creativedestructive power. Thus the Socratic dialogue traces what for Armengaud is the essence of philosophy, the shared research where the master forms the students and is at the same time formed by them. Therefore, philosophic dialogue is really dialectical, generated by necessity and movement and aimed at being and plenitude. The presentation of philosophic reflections in the form of dialogue was also a strong trade mark of the Roman writer Cicero, whose De amititia (On Friendship) and the Tusculan Disputations over the question of death and immortality were presented in dialogic forms. Also in the medieval times, scholastic philosophy tried to imitate the dialectical form of philosophic dialogue. Its dialogic method starts by identifying the question for discussion and stating to the full the points opposed to the conviction the author was going to argue for, and then stating a sed contra, which is usually a statement that puts into question the major objection of the supposed opponent. It then goes on to outline as many points as possible against the opposing view before taking a final position. For Armengaud, scholastic dialogue is not a shared research and concern but a rhetorical form of intellectual dogmatism (une forme rhethorique de la dogmatique intellectuele) (Armengaud 1989: 364). It is important to note the dialogic character of scholasticism that first recognised the presence of contrary and opposing views, and was able to develop a method that afforded the possibility of listening and taking due consideration of the opponents views. It remains true, however, that the strict structuring of dialogue procedure among the scholastics aided what Armengaud calls intellectual dogmatism. This is evident in the disputes between the Franciscan and Dominican scholars at the University of Paris, for example, in which there is a surprising consistency among lines of scholars determined strictly by whether they were Franciscan or Dominican. For Armengaud though, scholastic dogmatism is believed to have strongly influenced subsequent dialogues in the history of Western philosophy. Among them Nicholas Malebranches Entretiens sur la metaphysique et la religion (1688); Bishop Berkeleys Two Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus (1713); as well as Denis Diderots Le reve de dAlembert (1769). JG. Fichtes The Destination of man; Spinozas Short treatise; as 60 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

well as Aelread of Rivaulxs Spiritual friendship are among the works that tried to imitate the written conversational model of presentation (Armengaud 1989). Also of major importance is the tradition of philosophic correspondence in the modern period of Western philosophy. Its importance is axed on the increased openness of the interlocutors in these letters much more than in the written works of the authors. Some of the famous correspondences include that of Descartes with Princess Elizabeth; the

correspondence of Spinoza; Malebranches correspondence with JJ Dortous de Mairan on the doctrines of Spinoza; and the correspondence on liberty between Leibniz and Arnauld. Another form of dialogue in the art of philosophising is debate on important issues in philosophy. One remembers the famous debate between Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell on the existence of God (1948), and between AJ Ayer and Frederick Copleston on logical positivism (1949). These forms of verbalised dialogue have certainly marked the history of philosophy in a special manner. But there are aspects of dialogic interaction not spoken in the form of words. Philosophys engagement with its context, with the problems of ethics, with the socio-economy, and politics of its time, is a way of bringing the principles of its reflection to an encounter with its actual context. Philosophical hermeneutics brings this aspect of the philosophic engagement to the foremost level. It zeroes into the historical, cultural, educational, religious and more background of the society and the individual philosopher. The relationship which exists between these non-philosophical raw-materials or symbols of reflection and the outcome of individual reflection is the foundation on which philosophy is actually based (Okere 1983). Real and relevant philosophising must at the end of the day be in some very real way hermeneutical. Two examples elucidate this assertion: the quest for identity in much of contemporary African philosophy, and the results of John Rawls (1971) in his famous book, A theory of justice. The issue of identity is a central issue in much of contemporary African philosophy. The main reason behind the emergence of the question of identity is the historical racism of the European society against Africans and the creation of Africa in Western libraries (Mudimbe 1988). This attitude finds most prominent expression among the philosophers of the Enlightenment. It is oblique in some, and open in others like David Hume, Immanuel Kant and 61 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

Michelle de Montesquieu, but it was a much generalised sentiment underlying the whole of the colonial enterprise. The fall-out of this on the psyche of contemporary African philosophic thinkers is the issue of identity, that of who and what we are. On the positive note it is sort of unconscious self-assertion in the face of a barrage of historical denigration. On the negative side, its strangle hold gives rise to what Kwasi Wiredu (1985: 222) describes as the fallacy of uniqueness, which is the supposition that for Africans to have an authentic identity, they need to be unique in their social and political forms and in many other things besides. The book of John Rawls, A theory of justice, is another example of the way in which the context can strongly influence if not predetermine the outcome of philosophic reflections. There is no gainsaying that justice is always a central issue in human communal existence. It is in fact the reason for the existence of social and political institutions, and thus for Augustine (1952), a human community turns into a band of robbers once justice is removed from its operations. Still, be justice as general and as fundamental as it wants, Rawlss theory has as its fulcrum the liberal Western society. That is why in spite of the ingeniously crafted original position and the veil of ignorance, what comes out in the form of his two principles of justice, is very much biased in favour of the liberal society where the freedom of the individual is the most basic desideratum. It is interesting to remark that under Rawlss background, the groups quest for identity can hardly arise. These examples indicate that hermeneutics which take account of the total life experience and circumstances that surround the results of human thinking is like a palimpsest that underlies much of the results of philosophic engagement, irrespective of the tradition in question. This act of proper weighing, this taking into account of the total influence on philosophy is in a very deep sense dialogical, since dialogue as we have seen is much broader than mere verbal conversation but includes total reflexive interaction with the agents humanity, that of his interlocutors and the total context of his philosophising.

4. ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE WITH AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

From the above viewpoint, Greek philosophy and African philosophy have been in deep dialogue since antiquity. More specifically, Ionian philosophy and ancient Egyptian philosophic 62 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

traditions were in mutual interaction and influence with each other. We do not need to be distracted by the debate over the colour of ancient Greek thinkers or the different ethnic groups that built up the Egyptian civilization. Suffice it to note that modern researches, especially by Egyptologists, have unfolded the philosophical profundity of this ancient culture. The philosophical patrimony of Egyptian civilization has been documented by such researchers as M Bilolo, Theophile Obenga, JP Allen, and JH Breasted. It is possible that the reception of these works has been prejudiced by such titles as Onyewuenyis African origin of Greek philosophy (1993) which is in turn a milder form of George G James title, Stolen legacy (1992). Our point here is that ancient Egypt at its zenith scratched the limits of both civilization and philosophy within its epoch. On the philosophic terrain, for instance, a passage from the Papyrus of Leiden I 350 on the nature of the divinity contains the following statement:

Secret of development but glittering of forms, Wonderful god of many developments, All gods boast in him, In order to magnify themselves in his perfection, like his divinity. .. No god knows his appearance, No processional image of him is unfolded through inscription, No one testifies to him accurately. He is too secret to uncover his awesomeness, He is too great to investigate, too powerful to know. Instantaneously falling face to face into death Is for the one who expresses his secret identity, unknowingly or knowingly. There is no god who knows how to invoke him with it. Manifest God whose identity is hidden, inasmuch as it is inaccessible.

JP Allen (1988: 53) describes this passage as perhaps the clearest surviving expression of the Egyptian concepts of immanent and transcendent divinity, and of the acceptance of both in Egyptian thought. The first sentence of the passage expresses the presence of the two 63 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

opposed attributes, describing the divinity as secret of development but glittering of form. In a similar style, the closing line describes it as a being that is both manifest and has hidden identity. Here we see what the scholastics will much later call Concordia oppositorum, and it is interesting to see how much Thales of Miletus with his simple assertion that all is water, pales before such level of philosophic reflection. The relationship between ancient Greek and ancient Egyptian philosophy is seen clearly in the acknowledgement of Aristotle in his Metaphysics of the Egyptian origin of mathematical arts on account of the leisure of its priests. This acknowledgement is like a harbinger of more doctrinal connection between the two ancient philosophical traditions. In an article published by the eminent Egyptologist James Henry Breasted, more than one century ago, there is a thorough study of what he described as the oldest known formulation of a philosophical Weltanschauung (Breasted 1901: 39). Titled The philosophy of a Memphite priest, the study highlights the role of the Egyptian deity Ptah as inscribed in an old and badly damaged ancient Egyptian stone. The kernel of the finding is that the inscription presents a philosophical understanding of the function of Ptah as the mind and speech of the Gods (Breasted 1901: 46). The priestly thinker chants of Ptah as the source of the power by which heart and tongue carry out the plans and ideas which he furnishes (Breasted 1901: 48). Ptah both suggests every plan and idea and at the same time furnishes the power of its execution. He is the divine source of all things:

Everything comes forth form him, whether offering, or food, or divine oblation, or any good thing . Since he formed the gods in their adyta, he made the towns, he equipped the nomes, he placed the gods in the adyta, he made their offerings flourish, he equipped their adyta, he made the likeness of their bodies to the satisfaction of their hearts (Breasted 1901: 48).

In spite of the paradoxes involved in Ptahs creation of the gods, Breasted presents a clear picture of the philosophy of the Memphite priest in terms very close to Greek concepts of nous and logos. Assuming the existence of matter, it affirms that all things first existed in the mind.

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Speech or tongue is the channel through which they translate into objective reality. In the ensuing world, the thought impulses of all living creatures are owed to the same mind that created them. The outcome of their thought is therefore primarily due to the all pervasive mind, and only in a secondary manner to the creatures in question. Their work is therefore a further affirmation of the statement that all things exist first in the mind of the god (Breasted 1901: 51). Breasteds study of the ancient Egyptian inscription arrives at the following conclusions:

First: that the early Egyptian did much more and much better thinking on abstract subjects than we have hitherto believed, having formed a philosophical conception of the world of men and things, of which no people need be ashamed. Second: it is obvious that the above conception of the world forms quite a sufficient basis for suggesting the later notions of nous and logos hitherto supposed to have been introduced into Egypt from abroad at a much later date. Thus the Greek tradition of the origin of their philosophy in Egypt undoubtedly contains more of truth than has in recent years been conceded (Breasted 1901: 54).

These conclusions pinpoint the acknowledgment of ancient Greek thinkers of Egypt as the source of their philosophy, but the study went on to prove by a deep archaeology of the concept of logos that in fact it originated from ancient Egypt. JP Allen reached the same conclusion and referred to Breasteds study in a book Genesis in Egypt (Allen 1988). What is important for our purpose is that there was clear traffic between the two regions and that the philosophical minds were in dialogue, leading to mutual influence. From the inscription of the Memphite priest this influence appears to have had more impact on later development of Greek philosophy but it is reasonable that following the natural order of things, there could have been some mutuality of influence even at this early time.

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5. AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: FERTILE TERRAIN FOR GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE

The interface between Greek and African philosophy experienced a boost with North African patristic thinkers. These include Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Lactantius, Cyprian of Carthage, and so forth. But by far the greatest among them, and also the greatest non-biblical theologian of the Christian world, was Aurelius Augustine of Hippo. Augustines philosophy and theology were suffused by the structure of Platos philosophy. Augustine is widely known to have Christianised Plato mainly by making use of the pivotal role of the transcendence in the explanation of being and its varied operations in terrestrial existence. Augustines philosophy is thus a thinly veiled dialectic of Platos theory of Ideas. After a tour of all the available philosophical schemes of his time in the City of God (Augustine 1958: 150), Augustine proclaimed Plato most suitable for the interpretation and understanding of Christianity. One obvious idea that is endemically Platonic is the conviction that the material and worldly are always of lower value than the transcendent and immaterial, which are the archetypical origin and explanation of the material, its susceptibility to change and inconstancy as well as its inability to be a lasting explanation for accepted standards and values. Thus in general the material or the worldly is always lower than the transcendent and the other worldly. For Plato the other worldly is encapsulated in the world of Ideas and ultimately in the Idea of the good, while for Augustine, the heavenly, God himself becomes in some way the real value of the mundane and the changeable. A clear illustration of this thought structure is Augustines thought on Friendship in the Confessions (Augustine 1952). Augustine praises friendship almost in hyperboles and is known to have tried on several occasions to form a community of friends in order to enjoy the full advantages of friendship relationship. In book 4 of the Confessions (4:8), Augustine recounts the different acts that show the joy of a friendship relationship: talking, laughing, giving and receiving kindness, reading good books, disagreeing as one with himself, teaching and learning from one another, missing the absent and welcoming them on their return:

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these and such-like things proceeding from our hearts as we give affection and receive it back, and shown by face, by voice, by the eyes, and a thousand other pleasing ways, kindled a flame which fused our very souls and of many made us one (Augustine 1952: 4:8).

Yet this moving experience of friendship does not grant it any lasting value in the Neoplatonic scheme of Augustine. He goes on in the next section to recount the pain felt at the death of a friend which makes the living friend to feel as though he himself were dead. Augustine then zeroes in on the transcendent friendship: blessed is the man that loves Thee, O God, and his friend in Thee, and his enemy for Thee. For he alone loses no one that is dear to him (Augustine 1952: 4:9). It means that, given the pains of the loss of a friend, the mundane friendship has no lasting value, but is rather like a pointer to the true friendship in God, in the same way that sensible realities point us to the world of forms in Plato. Still it is in the twentieth century, in what we can call the contemporary period in African philosophy, that we encounter even more overwhelming influence of ancient Greek philosophy. This came as a consequence of colonial history. Western academic philosophy reached most of Africa in the company of modern Western education after colonisation. The first departments of philosophy were established at the time new universities were built first in South Africa. They were built under the background of rejection and denigration of the context of their insertion. They were meant to serve Africans but also structured as instruments of assimilation into the Western culture, history, and civilization of the superior colonisers. The consequence of this policy was that the study of all branches of the arts and humanities meant European studies. When philosophy was introduced it came with the weight of this prejudice. The study of philosophy became the study of Western philosophy and so history of philosophy for instance, became synonymous with history of Western philosophy. In most of African philosophy departments and faculties, ancient philosophy is simply the study of ancient Greek philosophy, usually starting from Thales, and for several reasons this practice has come to stick. Being schooled in the different periods of Western philosophy, African historians of philosophy have now been unconsciously borrowing the standard

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periodization of the history of Western philosophy. Abanukas (2011) recent book, A history of African philosophy, has exactly four periods: ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary as though there is standard periodization which the history of every regional philosophy must follow. The implication is that philosophical studies turn to be veritable instruments for cultural alienation. There are two points to note about this development. Philosophic alienation generated the debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s. It was an almost inevitable debate since most of the participants are those schooled in programmes in which philosophy was taken to be so exotic that it started only in ancient Greece and developed further in the West. Hence to speak of African philosophy and in fact any other regional philosophy was an aberration. While this not very useful debate (Oguejiofor 2003: 484) was going on, and while since then a consensus of thinkers has come to accept African philosophy both in its normative and prescriptive senses, there has been virtually no serious reversal in the colonial philosophy curriculum in the Africa continent. It means that students of philosophy in much of Africa today still go through a curriculum in which ancient philosophy still means ancient Greek philosophy. Most of these on graduation remain completely ignorant of ancient Egyptian philosophy. The project of Afrocentrism has not succeeded in changing the alienating content of philosophical studies in Africa. In summary, the Afrocentric movement tried to prove that in fact ancient Greek philosophy owed its existence to a stolen legacy , to borrow the title of James (1992). Onyewuenyi (1993) followed James project in his African origin of Greek philosophy. Granted that these works contain a lot of polemics, their aim was to puncture the pride of the absolute origin of philosophy in ancient Greece. Still the polemical content of the works, as well as ingrained prejudice in Western philosophy, appears to have precluded favourable reception and in a sense appreciation of other more academic researches on ancient Egyptian philosophy such as those of Molefi Kete Asante, Theophile Obenga, M Bilolo and Jacob Carouthers. The thesis of Afrocentrists was given a boost by Martine Bernals controversial Black Athena. Bernal (1987) presents two models of Greek history, the Aryan and Ancient models. While the Aryan speaks of an invasion from the north and the resultant mixture of 68 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

Indo-European speaking Hellenes and their indigenous subjects, the ancient model suggests ancient Egyptian dominance which civilized the native inhabitants, creating a channel for the influence of ancient Egyptian thought. The controversy attendant on Bernals Black Athena is more an indication of the strength of academic prejudice than any other factor. Bernals thesis and the reaction to it expose what can be called the colour of otherwise presumed neutrality of philosophic reflections. On this Bernal writes:

If a Black were to say what I am now putting in my books, their reception would be very different. They would be assumed to be one-sided and partisan, pushing a Black Nationalist line, and therefore dismissed (cf Mudimbe 1988: 103)

6. HISTORICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS

The attitude that Bernal describes in the above statement represents one of the strongest obstacles to fruitful dialogue between different traditions of philosophy. It is in one guise historical, but its historicity predates colonial denigration and consequent complexes generated both on the side of the colonised and colonisers. It can be traced back to the period of the Enlightenment. Its focal point is the erection of philosophy to the status of being the determinant of humanity. Tsenay Serequeberhan (1996: 3) points out that this was done without the benefit of an argument. Almost half a century ago, this assumption generated the debate on whether Africa had a philosophy or not. Precisely because it was based on uncritically accepted presuppositions, it neglected the historicity of African philosophy. Placides Tempels project was like a contradiction of this assumption which somehow tailored the development of contemporary African philosophy. For Tempels (1948: 15), the importance of Bantu philosophy lies in the fact that if the so called primitive people had no system of thought (philosophy), they would not be human (Celui quie pretend que les primitifs ne possedent point de systeme de pensee, les rejette doffice de la class des home). This is also the point of debate on the existence of African philosophy. In the whole of contemporary African philosophy, there is hardly any serious questioning of this latent assumption. What instead was

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generated was the effort to give the lie to the assumption by proving the existence of African philosophy. In some way this is an unconscious or surreptitious reaction, since the events of history had already created what Nyasanyi calls superiority in inferiority. Thus the effort of African thinkers who opposed the existence of African philosophy was equally exerted in the name of philosophy in the real sense as opposed to the debased sense (Oruka 1975: 45) as though philosophers have ever agreed on the definition and nature of their engagement. But the debate itself is meta-philosophical. Objectively speaking it called attention to the almost chimeric nature of a discipline in which, for instance, Nicholo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are graded on the same pedestal; a discipline in which GW Hegel is foisted into the hall of fame even though his knowledge of Greek philosophy, of human nature and of history is very minimal. Debate on the existence and nature of African philosophy could have been an opportunity for self-questioning by all traditions of philosophy. But this was not to be. Till today it is hardly surprising how little is known of African philosophy in Western departments of philosophy. In this regard, Western philosophy still remains covered by hallows of superiority and arrogance, thinly veiled in the guise of specialisation. It is the same thin veil that tends to influence philosophical interest in many parts of Africa and it represents a throwback to the colonial era when dialogue in the sense of engagement with total humanity of the other was not prominent in the philosophical terrain. It is why some philosophy workers still think it is possible to live and work in Africa and have almost nothing to do with the African philosophic community and the shared problems of the continent. The result of such philosophy will certainly not be meaningful or relevant to its context.

7. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

The central point of our essay is that broadly understood dialogue is a pivotal feature of the philosophical engagement and that African and Greek philosophies have been in dialogue starting from the ancient times. The result of this dialogue is evident in the long history of mutual influence which is marked by the interplay of the basic features of philosophic dialogue, such as respect and openness. In contemporary times, the inroad of ancient Greek philosophy 70 Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012

into the African cultural world through colonialism ensured that instead of being mutually enriching, the study of Greek philosophy in many ways turned to be one additional factor in African cultural alienation. The reaction to this historic legacy has been a spur to further creativity in the contemporary African philosophy. That the situation of philosophic alienation still remains a dominant feature of philosophy in the African continent, is a pointer to the ambivalence of the African cultural reality which is replicated in contemporary African philosophy. Given the reality of our fast globalising world, the legacy of the historic dialogue between Greek and African philosophy should be seen beyond the factor of intellectual colonialism in view of imbibing the best attitudes of mutually enriching dialogue freed from both superiority and inferiority complexes. It is in so far as the different regional philosophies are able to engage with one another in that manner that the much needed inter-cultural and philosophic dialogue will answer to the real needs of our contemporary world. It is a world in which such needs are no longer exclusive to specific people, cultures, countries or continents. The world which is gravitating very fast to a pan-human community is realising that most of its major dilemmas are now common to humanity as a whole. Genuine dialogue in philosophy is one of the most fruitful ways of confronting these dilemmas, and the long history of the relationship between African and Greek philosophy is a useful guide to this all important project.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abanuka, B. 2011. A history of African philosophy. Onitsha: Spiritan Publications. Allen, JP. 1988. Genesis in Egypt: The philosophy of ancient Egyptian creation account. New Haven: Yale Egyptological Seminar, New Haven. Armengaud, F. 1989. Dialogue. In Encyclopedia Universalis , vol. 7, Paris, pp. 363-366. Breasted, JH. 1901. The philosophy of a Memphite priest. Zeitschrift feur Aegyptologische Studien, 39: 39-54. Augustine. 1958. City of God, transl GG Walsh. New York: Image Books. Augustine. 1952. The Confessions, transl EB Pusey. Chicago: William Benton, Chicago.

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Bernal, M. 1987. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization, vol. 1: The fabrication of ancient Greece 1785-1985, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Bohm, D. On meaning, purpose and exploration in dialogue, www.davidbohm.net/dialogue_exploration.html (Accessed on 8/4/2012). Burbules, N. 1993.Dialogue in teaching. Theory and practice. New York: Teachers College Press. Gadamer, HG. 1979. Truth and method, London: Sheed & Ward. Hord, FL & Lee JS (eds). 1995. I am because we are: readings in Black philosophy, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Isaacs, W. 1999.Dialogue: the art of thinking together. New York: Doubleday. James, G. 1992.Stolen legacy: Greek philosophy is stolen Egyptian philosophy. Trenton: First Africa World Press. Mudimbe, VY. 1988. The invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy and the order of knowledge. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Oguejiofor, JO. 2003. Problems and prospects of a history of African philosophy. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77: 477-498. Okere, T. 1983. African philosophy: a historico-hermeneutical investigation into the conditions of its possibility, Lanham: University Press of America. Onyewuenyi, I. 1993, African origin of Greek philosophy: an exercise in Afrocentrism. Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press. Oruka, OH. 1975. Fundamental principles to the question of African philosophy. Vol IV, No. 2, Ife: Nigeria. Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice (transl 1975 & 1999). Harvard University Press. Ryle G. 1967. Plato. In The encyclopedia of philosophy. Paul Edwards (ed). New York: Macmillan: 314 -333. Serequeberhan, T. 1996. The hermeneutics of African philosophy: horizon and discourse. London: Routledge. Smith, MK. 2001. Dialogue and conversation. The encyclopedia of informal education. www.infed.org/biblio/b-dialog.htm (Accessed on 8/4/2012). Tempels, P. 1948. La philosophie bantoue, Paris: Presence Africaine. Wiredu, K. 1985. Problems in African self-identification in the contemporary world. In Alwin Diemer (ed), Africa and the problems of its identity. Frankfurt : Peter Lang: 213 -222.

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