OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Project Proposal for FY 2002/2003

Office: OIG/ISP/CE

Project Title: Inspection of Overseas Visa Operations: Waivers of Personal Appearance

Policies and Inter-agency Coordination

Project Manager: Robert Mustain

Priority: High

Request or Mandated: Requested in response to Congressional interest

Project type: Program Review

Standard: Blue Book

Survey Days: 20

Total Project Days: 84

Number of FT staff from office needed (including WAEs): 7

Number of PT staff from office needed (including WAEs): 0

Total staff hours: 2320

Hours calculation:
Washington survey: 3 inspectors for 4 weeks 480
Embassy Brussels validation trial survey: 2 inspectors for 1 week 80
On-site inspections of selected posts: 3 x two-inspector teams for 6 trips
of three weeks each 1440
Questionnaire processing and analysis: 2 inspectors, 1 FAO, 3 weeks 360
Report preparation: 1 inspector, 1 FAO for 16 weeks 640
Total staff hours 3000
Hours calculation WAE employees only:
Washington survey: 3 inspectors for 4 weeks 480
Embassy Brussels validation trail survey: 1 inspector for 1 week 40
On-site inspections for six 3-week trips: 3 inspectors 720
Report preparation: 1 inspector, 1 FAO for 16 weeks 640 .-
Total WAE hours =1880
WAE cost estimate: 1880 hours x $52.34 = $ 98,399

Staffing expertise needed from other OIG office: 4 inspectors from CIO

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Contractor expertise/assistance needed: none

Travel costs: RT Brussels, and 6 trips of 3 weeks each (including per diem) $104,616
Total cost of project: $203,015

Background

Congress is critical of the Department and Consular Affairs Bureau (CA) policies and
procedures regarding the waiver of personal appearance (PAW) for non-immigrant visa
applicants and the submission of visa applications through travel agents and other
sources. These practices are set forth in standard operating procedures and "Consular
Best Practices" published by the bureau. Congress is also critical of the bureau's
"customer service first" orientation that is alleged to make national security concerns a
secondary priority.

C A has allowed consular managers in the field broad discretion in adopting or rejecting
various types of programs for the submission of visa applications including the mails,
drop boxes, travel agents, and business organizations. Congress is currently focused
specifically on travel agent referral programs (TARPs) that encourage applicants to apply
through a travel agent who then checks the application for correctness and enters the
basic data remotely to begin the procedure. Consular managers are allowed to design
programs to fit local conditions.

Consular managers also determine policy governing which applicants will be required to
appear for a personal interview as part of the process. CA has relatively little input into
these decisions beyond establishing basic guidelines and does not monitor the
performance of the programs nor their impact on visa issuance. The decision to issue or
refuse a visa rests with the adjudicating officer subject only to review by his or her
supervisor. The grounds for refusing a visa are set forth in the Immigration and
Nationality Act.

Congress is concerned that in its efforts to expedite the visa process CA has put a
premium on customer service and volume at the expense of careful scrutiny of visa
applicants to prevent the entry of persons who are a threat to the security of the United
States. Congress has also heard allegations that consular officers have been pressured to
issue visas to specific applicants who they considered unqualified and to reduce the
overall rate of refusals. It is in this atmosphere that Congress is debating whether or not
the visa function should be taken from the Department of State and relocated to the new
Department of Homeland Security.
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waivers have been viewed as a mean of limiting crowds in visa sections, regulating
workflow, conserving scare resources and improving customer service.

In the wake of 9/11 questions have been raised concerning the security implications of
these policies and even the ability of State to safe guard national security interests in the
visa process. The issue was raised in the context of debate on the recently passed
legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security. The OIG needs to review these
policies and procedures.

Benefits/Outcomes

This program review will give the OIG the opportunity to participate directly in the
government-wide effort to improve homeland security while at the same time providing
the first ever complete review of CA's policies concerning personal appearance waivers
and cooperation with travel agencies. It provides the OIG a look at a critical element of
the post 9/11 post mortem, interagency cooperation in sharing vital information on
potential terrorists. It is very likely that the IG will be asked to appear at a House
committee hearing to testify about the results of this inspection. State has been criticized
for issuing the visas but there is evidence to suggest that vital information was not
available to the officers who adjudicated the visa applications. This report may set to rest
some very misinformed judgments regarding the Department's management of this
function.

Customer Needs/Interests Met

The Secretary is fighting to keep the visa function in State's mandate. A serious review
will provide not only an accurate picture of how the visa function is administered abroad,
but also of the weaknesses both at State and in inter-Agency cooperation which need to
be addressed to make the system better. Congress is also interested in this review and has
requested that the IG examine the visa function and particularly the conditions under
which personal appearances are waived.
SCOPE OF WORK

We intend to visit 28 high-threat embassies and consulates to review anti-terrorist

controls on visa issuance. As part of this process the OIG will investigate management of
both immigrant and non-immigrant visa operations, paying special attention to personal
appearance waivers and travel agency referral programs (TARP). We will determine
why these programs were established, how travel agents are selected for TARPs and what
management controls are hi place. Inspectors will examine personal appearance rates as
well as rates of issuance and denial to determine if either TARPs or waivers of personal
appearance contain security vulnerabilities.

We will also pay special attention to consular management controls. We will check to
see if consular managers are reviewing all visa denials as well as a broad sample of
issuances. We will examine the visa referral program at these high-threat posts to
determine if it is well supervised and consistent with regulations. Inspectors will also
review post management's oversight of the visa process and determine if inappropriate
influence from any source has affected the visa adjudication process. •

In addition, we will examine interactions among all agencies at post to determine if they
are cooperating to provide all available information on visa applicants to the consular
section. We want to determine if visas are being adjudicated in light of all information
available anywhere in the mission. Details of this portion of the inspection will be
provided in a separate classified annex.
 DRAFT ITINERARIES
LEGEND 1 2 3 4 5 6
HIGH CAIRO ISLAMABAD RIYADH TORONTO DUBAI JAKARTA
MEDIUM AMMAN DUBAI KUWAIT MONTREAL ALGIERS KUALA
LUMPUR
LOW BEIRUIT ANKARA ABU DHABI NAIROBI CASABLANCA SINGAPORE
JERUSALEM ISTANBUL PARIS TUNIS SURABAYA
TEL AVIV FRANKFURT MUSCAT • VALETTA TOKYO
LONDON DAMASCUS SANAA