2013-Constitutional Law-Reminders-090213

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The POLICE POWER The police power may use both the power of taxation and the power of eminent domain as implements for the attainment of a legitimate police objective. Subsequent law prohibiting gambling upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. [ Stone v. Mississippi, 1 1 !S "1#$ %n the context of municipal law, a law ta&es precedence as against a treaty obligation, for a treaty may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power. [ Ichong v. Hernandez, 1 1 'hil. 1(($ note ) *s has been observed by !S constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater +dignity, than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the 'resident, the Senate, and the people- a ratified treaty, unli&e an executive agreement, ta&es precedence over any prior statutory enactment. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo ) ../. 0o. 1(121", 3ebruary 1, 4 11$ Exercise of the Police Power 5 primarily exercised by the legislature- may be delegated to the 'resident and administrative boards as well as the lawma&ing bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangays 5 vested in local government units under the general welfare clause of the 6ocal .overnment 7ode. NOTE ) The integration of the 'hilippine 8ar under the 7onstitution does not ma&e a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member . Such compulsion is justified s n exercise of the police power of the St te.! [In re Edillon, "# S7/* ((#$ THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT BE COMPELLED [by mandamus$ to exercise the police power. Tests for " lid Exercise of the Police Power ) [1$ L wful Su#ject ) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power, and [4$ L wful $e ns ) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the individual. $ tters which h %e #een reco&ni'ed #( the Supreme Court s l wful su#jects 5 8illboards [Churchill & ait v. Ra!!erty, 94 'hil. (" $ 5 prices of prime commodities ["a#us v. $hite, 941 !S #1#$ 5 six)year)old cabs [ a%icab &perators o! Metro Manila v. Board o! ransportation , 111 S7/* (1:$ 5 barber shops and massages services ['elasco v. 'illegas, 14 S7/* (2"$ 5 heavy vehicles and public streets [Bautista v. (uinio, 14: S7/* 941$ 5 video piracy [ io v. 'ideogram Regulatory Board, 1(1 S7/* 4 "$ 5 bouncing chec&s [)ozano v. Martinez, 1#2 S7/* 949$ 5 private roads inside subdivisions [ Sangalang v. I*C, 1:2 S7/* :11$ ) 0ational ;edical *dmission Test 5 9)test limitation rule [ +ept. o! Education v. San +iego, 1" S7/* (99$ 5 free air time for 7<;=6=7 [ elecommunications and Broadcast *ttorneys o! the ,hilippines v. C&ME)EC , 4"1 S7/* 99:$ 5 .enerics *ct [ +el Rosario v.
Bengzon, 1" S7/* (41$ 5 boo&s of account [ "u Cong Eng v. rinidad, 4:1 !S ( $ 5 =< #4 requiring government agencies and .<77s to streamline their identification card systems 5 [-M. v. +irector /eneral01E+*, *pril 11, 4 2$ 8!T 0<T= &ple v. orres [419 S7/* 1#1$, where the Supreme 7ourt rejected a 0ational %> System on the basis of the people?s right to privacy 5 the regulation of rates imposed by a public utility such as S!/0=7< [Surigao del 1orte Electric Cooperative2 Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, ../. 0o. 1"9242, <ctober #, 4 1 $ban against the importation of used motor vehicles to protect the domestic industry [../. 0o. 12#1:4 @=xecutive Secretary v. Subic %ntegrated ;acro Aentures 7orp.B and ../. 0o. 12":#1 @ E%ecutive Secretary v. Motor 'ehicle Importers *ssociation o! Subic Bay 3reeport2 Inc.B, cited in E%ecutive Secretary v. 3orerunner Multi Resources , %nc. ) ../. 0o. 11194#, Canuary :, 4 19$- a law removing the remedy or right of redemption in cases of foreclosures of real estate mortgages already in place upon the effectivity of said new law [/olden4ay Merchandising Corporation v. E5uitable ,CI Ban# 5../. 0o. 11((# , ;arch 19, 4 19$ Re&ul tions which h %e #een c)nowled&ed #( the Supreme Court s l wful me ns for tt inin& police power o#jecti%es ) Leprosariums for lepers [)orenzo v. +irector o! Health, ( 'hil. (1($ 5 reasona le !or"in# $ours an% minimum w &es 6Ramos v. ,oblete2 78 ,hil. 9:;< 0 !ull0time pharmacist in drug stores 6Roschen v. $ard, 4:: !S 99:$ 5 loo% &es&s efore issuan'e of a marria#e li'ense [/ould v. /ould, 21 *tl. 2 #$ 5 limi&in# &$e 'apa'i&( of 'ommon 'arriers) or &$ea&ers [,eople v. Chan, 2( 'hil. 211$ 5 s&erili*a&ion of im e'iles [Buc# v. Bell, 4:# !S 11($ Inst nces when the me ns for the tt inment of n pp rentl( le&itim te police o#jecti%e rejected for #ein& unl wful 5 =< prohibiting the inter)provincial transport of carabaos to prevent their indiscriminate slaughter ["not v. I*C, 1#" S7/* 2(1 ) 0oteD S7 commented on the absurdity of the method$ 5 prohibition against the use of a material &nown as shoddy for the ma&ing of mattresses annulled, there being no basis for fear that it was inimical to the health of the user [$eaver v. ,almer Bros. Co., 4: !S # 4$ 5 prohibition against distribution of handbills in public places @annulled on the ground of freedom of expressionB [(amison v. e%as, 91" !S #19$ 5 prohibition against wash room rates and renting out rooms more than twice a day, to minimiEe if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and ali&e. 5 you cannot legislate moralityF [$hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila ) ../. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4 , 4 1$ 5 regulation of par&ing fees in malls ) The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate [&S/ v. *yala )and2 Inc. ) ../. 0o. 1:: (2, September 1", 4 1$ 5 ordinance regulating the construction of fences and walls [requiring setbac&s and see through fences$ [3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ../. 0o. 1211 :, ;arch 14, 4 19$
C*R)& ). CR.>=S REMI1+ERS &1 HE BI)) &3 RI/H S2 CI I>E1SHI, *1+ S.33R*/E 2
St nd rds for *udici l Re%iew +for the % lidit( of ordin nces, ) s&ri'& s'ru&in( for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the ra&ional asis s&an%ar% of review for economic legislation- $ei#$&ene% or imme%ia&e s'ru&in(, for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. The o%er#re dth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. [$hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila ) ../. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4 , 4 1$ The POWER O- E$I.E.T /O$0I. The power of eminent domain ma( e e+er'ise% by the Le&isl ture, the President, various loc l le&isl ti%e #odies, certain pu#lic corpor tions li&e the 6and *uthority and even 1u si2pu#lic corpor tions, li&e the '6>T and the '0/. @Gater districts may be given the power to expropriate. [Metropolitan Cebu $ater +istrict v. (. -ing and Sons Company2 Inc.2 ../. 0o. 1:(1"9, *pril 12, 4 1$ .ecessit( of Exercise2 The power of eminent domain should be construed liberally in favor of the property owner- courts can loo& into whether the expropriation by the delegate is necessary or wise, unless there is a specific, as opposed to a general, grant of authority to expropriate. [ City o! Manila v. Chinese Community, # 'hil. 9#1- Republic o! the ,hilippines v. )a &rden de ,,. Benedictinos de 3ilipinas, 1 S7/* 2#2$ Pri% te Propert( 5 anything that can come under the dominion of man 5 MUST BE ,HOLESOME ) real, personal, tangible and intangible properties, franchises, churches and other religious properties, cemeteries E-CEPT money and choses in action because just compensation is usually paid also in money. SER.ICES are considered embraced in the concept of property subject to ta&ing. The subject of this case was the interconnection between the .overnment Telephone System and the '6>T, so that the former can use the lines and facilities of the '6>T. [/' v. '6>T, 42 S7/* 24 $ %n PL/T %. .TC [11 S7/* :1:$, '6>T was required to interconnect with a private communications company T )in& 5 imports a physical dispossession of the owner, deprivation of all beneficial use and enjoyment of his property. Re1uisites of T )in& in Eminent /om in 2 [1$ expropriator must enter a private property [4$ entry must be for more than a momentary period [9$ entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority [#$ property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected [($ utiliEation of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive the owner of beneficial enjoyment of the property. [ Republic v. Castelvi, (" S7/* 992$ Inst nces of T )in&3 s reco&ni'ed #( the Courts 5 'ermanent inundation of a farmland because of the construction of a dam nearby [ .S
v. )ynch, 1" !S ##($ 5 government planes constantly flying over private property at very low altitudes [.S v. Causby, 94" !S 4(2$ 5 easement over a three)meter strip of private property [ *yala de Ro%as v. City o! Manila , 1 'hil. 41($ 5 ordinance prohibiting the construction of any building which would obstruct the view of a plaEa from a highway [,eople v. 3a?ardo, 1 # 'hil. ##9$ 5 7<;=6=7 /esolution requiring newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than H page for the common use of political parties and candidates [ ,hilippine ,ress Institute v. C&ME)EC, 4## S7/* 4:4$ ) right)of)way [aerial$ easements, resulting in the restriction on property rights over land traversed by transmission lines [1,C v. *guirre0,aderanga, #2# S7/* #"1- 1ational ,o4er Corporation v. ,ure!oods Corporation2 ../. 0o. 12 :4(, September 14, 4 "- 1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Co, ../. 0o. 1221:9, 3ebruary 1 , 4 11ational ,o4er Corporation v. Ileto ) ../. 0o. 1211(:, Culy 11, 4 14, Second >ivision, 8rion$ ) exhaust fan in a tunnel directly blowing smo&e into a house [Richards v. $ashington erminal, 499 !S (#2$ 5 agrarian reform [*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm , 1:( S7/* 9#9$ 5 construction of a tunnel under the land [1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Heirs o! Sang#ay ) ../. 0o. 12("4", *ugust 4#, 4 11$ ) ordinance requiring private cemeteries to reserve 2I of their total areas to paupers [City /overnment o! @uezon City v. Ericta , 144 S7/* :(1$ 5 effort to prohibit malls from collecting par&ing fees ) he po4er to regulate2 ho4ever2 does not include the po4er to prohibit. he po4er to regulate does not include the po4er to con!iscate. [&S/ v. *yala )and2 Inc.2 ../. 0o. 1:: (2, September 1", 4 1$ 5 agrarian reform 5 stoc# distribution [Section 91 of /*22(: @7*/6B$ or collective o4nership, provided control of the corporation or cooperative is vested in farmers) beneficiaries [Hacienda )uisita Incorporated v. ,residential *grarian Re!orm Council ) ../. 0o. 1:11 1, *pril 4#, 4 14$ 5 ordinance requiring setbac& requirement for walls [to ma&e available more par&ing space for free for the general public$ [3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ../. 0o. 1211 :, ;arch 14, 4 19, En Banc, ;endoEa$ AN ORDINANCE requiring private cemeteries to reserve 2I of their total areas to paupers is not a valid exercise of the police power but an exercise of the power of eminent domain, which requires the payment of just compensation. [ City /overnment o! @uezon City v. Ericta , 144 S7/* :(1$ A COMELEC RESOLUTION requiring newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than H page for the common use of political parties and candidates constitutes t )in& of private property without payment of just compensation. [ ,hilippine ,ress Institute v. C&ME)EC, 4## S7/* 4:4$ Mere in&en&ion &o e+propria&e does not bind the owner, who may still sell the property before actual expropriation. [,eople v. 3a?ardo, 1 # 'hil. ##9$ Pu#lic 4se 5 any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely forbearance or accommodation. Ex mples 5 par"s which are res communes- a#rarian reform [*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o!
*grarian Re!orm, 1:( S7/* 9#9$- proper&( %e/o&e% &o pu li' ser/i'es a%minis&ere% ( pri/a&el(0o!ne% pu li' u&ili&ies, li&e telephone or light companies @demandable as a matter of right by anyone prepared to pay for said servicesB [+enieter )and Co. v. 3lorida ,ublic Service Co ., 14" S . # 4$ ) pilo& %e/elopmen& 'en&er [,rovince o! Camarines Sur v. C* , 444 S7/* 1:9$- e+propria&ion for slum 'learan'e an% ur an %e/elopmen& is for a pu li' purpose e/en if &$e %e/elope% area is la&er sol% &o pri/a&e $omeo!ners) 'ommer'ial firms) en&er&ainmen& an% ser/i'e 'ompanies an% o&$er pri/a&e 'on'erns [/eyes v. 0J*, 91( S7/* #1#12 ur an lan% reform an% $ousin#) or so'iali*e% $ousin# pro#ram in/ol/in# onl( a one0$alf $e'&are area [Manapat v. Court o! *ppeals , ../. 0o. 11 #:", <ctober 1(, 4 :$- so'iali*e% $ousin#, whereby housing units are distributed andKor sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of +public use or purpose, in the context of the State?s exercise of the power of eminent domain. [Sumulong v. /uerrero2 0o. 6) #"2"(, September 9 , 11":, 1(# S7/* #21, citing the earlier case of Heirs o! (uancho *rdona v. Reyes2 0os. 6)2 (#1, 2 ((9)2 (((, <ctober 42, 11"9, 14( S7/* 44 , cited in [City o! Manila v. e 5 ../. 0o. 121429, September 41, 4 11, Third >ivision, 'eralta$ ) Propert( already devoted to public use can still be expropriated. [ City o! Manila v. Chinese Community, # 'hil. 9#1$ T$ere is 'olle'&i/e o!ners$ip as long as there is a concerted group wor& by the farmers on the land, regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers. Jowever, this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform, which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common people. Gorth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying +the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people., [*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners in the ,hilippines2 Inc. v. Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm, ../. 0o. :":#4, Culy 1#, 11"1, 1:( S7/* 9#9, 9(4$ *ccordingly, J6%?s insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shac&les with sheer lip service to loo& forward to. [Hacienda )uisita Incorporated v. ,residential *grarian Re!orm Council ) ../. 0o. 1:11 1, *pril 4#, 4 14$ %n expropriation proceedings, the % lue of the l nd nd its ch r cter t the time it w s t )en #( the &o%ernment re the criteri for determinin& just compens tion. [,hilipine 1ational &il Company v. Maglasang2 ../. 0o. 1((# :, 0ovember 11, 4 "$ Propert( t )en should be assessed as of the time of the ta&ing, which usually coincides with the commencement of expropriation proceedings. [Republic v. Castelvi, (" S7/* 992$ *ust Compens tion 5 full and fair equivalent of he property ta&en- must be fair to both parties. THE
DETERMINATION O3 4UST COMPENSATION is a judicial function [)and Ban# o! the ,hilippines v. Escandor, ../. 0o. 1:12"(, <ctober 11, 4 1 $ 'ayment of just compensation in #onds is allowed. [*ssociation o! Small )ando4ners v. Secretary o! *grarian Re!orm, 1:( S7/* 9#9$ THE PRESENCE O3 TRANSMISSION LINES undoubtedly restricts respondent?s use of his property. 'etitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full m r)et % lue. [1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Co, ../. 0o. 1221:9, 3ebruary 1 , 4 1$ P (ment of just compens tion shall be made to the owner, which refers to all those who have lawful interest in the property, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee. [ -necht v. C*, 4 : S7/* :(#$ BUT see L nd 6 n) of the Philippines %. 0$S - rmin& Corpor tion [../. 0o. 1:#1:1, <ctober 1(, 4 "$ ) Since *;S was not a landowner, but a mere lessee of the agricultural land owned by T<T7<, it had no right under the 7*/6 to demand from 68' just compensation for its standing crops and improvements. *s a lessee, the rights of *;S over its standing crops and improvements on the leased property are defined, conferred, as well as limited by the provisions of the ;<* it executed with T<T7<. *ust compens tion was determined in 11:9 as of the time of the ta&ing of the property in 114#. Jowever, the Supreme 7ourt did not apply *rticle 14( of the 7ivil 7ode calling for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because, in eminent domain cases. +The obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract., [Commissioner o! ,ublic High4ays v. Burgos, 12 S7/* "91$ *dministrative agencies have no jurisdiction over just compensation cases. Thus, as a rule, the >*/*8?s decision setting the amount of just compensation is merely preliminary and not executory if challenged before the S*7. xxx. The determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by administrative agencies. [)and Ban# v. Heirs o! )istana3 ../. 0o. 1"4:(", ;ay 9 , 4 11$ The owner is entitled to p (ment of interest from the time of ta&ing until actual payment of just compensation- interest must be claimed or is deemed waived. [.rtula v. Republic, 44 S7/* #::$ Interest of 14I per annum on the just compensation is due the landowner in case of delay in payment, which will, in effect, ma&e the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. [)and Ban# o! the ,hilippines v. Chico, ../. 0o. 12"#(9, ;arch 19, 4 1$ Ta+es paid by the owner from the time of the ta&ing until actual transfer of title are reimbursable by the expropriator. [City o! Manila v. Ro%as , 2 'hil. 41($ Ti&le to the property shall not be transferred until after actual payment of just compensation. ['isayan Re!ining Co. v. Camus , # 'hil. (( $
The failure for a long time of the owner to question the lac& of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had ta&en constitutes a waiver of his right to gain bac& possession. The ;endoEas? remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. [ Republic v. Mendoza2 ../. 0o. 1"( 11, *ugust ", 4 1 , 4nd >ivision, 0# d$ 6.!s may expropriate but ordinances, and not mere resolutions, would be needed for them to do so. ["usay v. Court o! *ppeals , ../. 0o. 1(22"#, *pril 2, 4 11$ T$e a'&ion &o re'o/er 5us& 'ompensa&ion from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also &nown as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property ta&en in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the ta&ing agency. [ *ccording to 9A* C(S2 Eminent +omain2 B8C;D E In%erse condemn tion is c use of ction & inst &o%ernment l defend nt to reco%er the % lue of propert( which h s #een t )en in f ct #( the &o%ernment l defend nt3 e%en thou&h no form l exercise of the power of eminent dom in h s #een ttempted #( the t )in& &enc(. $hile the typical ta#ing occurs 4hen the government acts to condemn property in the e%ercise o! its po4er o! eminent domain2 the entire doctrine o! inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a ta#ing may occur 4ithout such !ormal proceedings. he phrase Einverse condemnation2F as a common understanding o! that phrase 4ould suggest2 simply describes an action that is the EinverseF or EreverseF o! a condemnation proceeding.F$ [1ational ,o4er Corporation v. Heirs o! Sang#ay ) ../. 0o. 12("4", *ugust 4#, 4 11, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$ The POWER O- T070TIO. Dis&in#uis$ from licenses [for regulatory purposes- exercise of the police power$. Taxes are for purposes of r isin& re%enues. ) In'lu%es all properties, whether tangible or intangible, found in the territory of the taxing jurisdiction ) even shares of stoc& issued by a foreign corporation, but +in action, in the local state may be taxed by it 6$ells 3argo v. CIR, # <. 1(1$- also insurance proceeds from a policy issued abroad [ Manila Electric Co. v. "atco, 21 'hil. "1$ Ta+ on "no!le%#e not allowed ) a tax based on circulation was annulled for being violative of due process and freedom of expression. [ /ros?ean v. *merican ,ress Co., 41: !S 499$ Dou le &a+a&ion 5 when additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose. There is no specific prohibition in the 7onstitution against double taxation. 0o Supreme 7ourt decision also. +>ouble taxation is no more prohibited than doubled taxation., +The power to tax twice is as ample as to tax once., *n additional '4( tax on professionals who were already paying the '( occupation tax under the /evised %nternal
/evenue 7ode would be valid ) different taxing jurisdictions 5 local and national. [ ,unzalan v. Municipal Board o! Manila, 1( 'hil. #2$ 'ossible remedy 5 if the second tax constitutes a violation of the e1u l protection cl use. %n the Pun' l n case, the S7 said there was no violation of the equal protection clause because there was a substantial distinction between practitioners in ;anila as opposed to practitioners elsewhere, who earned less. Pu li' Purpose 5 a tax must be for a public purpose 5 the mere fact that a tax will be directly enjoyed only by a private individual will not ma&e it invalid so long as some lin& to the public welfare is established. =xamples 5 cash incentives for athletes- pensions paid to veterans- unemployment relief- support for the handicapped, etc. * tax levy [6<% 0o. 121($ on sale of fertiliEers for purposes of benefiting a private corporation, 'hilippine 'lanters, %nc. is invalid. 0ot even a valid exercise of the police power. [,lanters ,roducts Inc. v. 3ertiphil Corporation, ../. 0o. 122 2, ;arch 1#, 4 "$ The imposition of a %ehicle re&istr tion fee is not an exercise by the State of its police power, but of its taxation power ) mainly to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the operating expenses of the administering agency. x x x 3ees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of regulation. [,hilippine *irlines2 Inc. v. Edu2 ../. 0o. 6)#19"9, *ugust 1(, 11"", 12# S7/* 94 $ The term LtaxL frequently applies to all &inds of exactions of monies which become public funds. %t is often loosely used to include levies for revenue as well as levies for regulatory purposes such that license fees are frequently called taxes although license !ee is a legal concept distinguishable from ta%D the former is imposed in the exercise of police power primarily for purposes of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the taxing power primarily for purposes of raising revenues. [Compania /eneral de abacos de 3ilipinas v. City o! Manila, 11" 'hil. 9"9- " S7/* 9: @1129B,aci!ic Commercial Co. v. Romualdez, #1 'hil, 11: @114:B$ Thus, if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax- but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not ma&e the imposition a tax. [Manila Electric Company v. El *uditor /eneral y )a Comision de Servicios ,ublicos, :9 'hil. 199 @11#1B- Republic v. ,hilippine Rabbit Bus )ines, 94 S7/* 41( @11: B$ xxx. *s a general rule, there must be a statutory grant for a local government unit to impose lawfully a gross receipts tax, that unit not having the inherent power of taxation. The rule, however, finds no application in the instant case where what is involved is an exercise of, principally, the regulatory power of the respondent 7ity and where that regulatory power is expressly accompanied by the taxing power. [,rogressive +evelopment Corporation v. @uezon City2 ../. 0o. 92 "1, *pril 4#, 11"1, 1:4 S7/* 241, 292, citing SaldaGa v. City o! Iloilo2 1 # 'hil. 4", 99 @11("B$ [S== *ngeles
.niversity 3oundation v. City o! *ngeles , ../. 0o. 1"1111, Cune 4:, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama 5 4here the issue pertained to the validity o! building permit !ees.$ T$e 'o'onu& le/( was imposed in the exercise of the State?s inherent power of taxation. [See Republic v. C&C&3E+2 ../. 0o. 1#: 24)2#, >ecember 1#, 4 1, 9:4 S7/* #24, #"4)"#$ Ta+ E+emp&ions 5 may be constitutional [*rticle A%, Section 4"[9$ 5 churches, etc. 5 [)ladoc v. CIR, 1# S7/* 414$ or statutory [*rticle A%, Section 4"[#$ ) concurrence of a majority of all the members of congress required for laws granting tax exemptions$. ) Ghere the tax exemption is granted &r tuitousl(, it may be validly revo&ed at will, with or without cause BUT if the exemption is granted for a valuable consideration, it parta&es of the nature of a contract and the obligation is protected against impairment [Casanova v. Hord, " 'hil. 14($ T$e BILL O3 RIGHTS /ue Process nd E1u l Protection Person 5 ll persons, n tur l as well as rtifici l, are covered- including liens ['illegas v. Hiu Chong sai ,ao Ho, "2 S7/* 4: $ 5 *rtificial persons are covered but only insofar as their property is concerned. [Smith Bell & Co. v. 1atividad, # 'hil. 192$ /epri% tion 5 to ta&e away forcibly- to prevent from possessing, enjoying or using something. Depri/a&ion per se is not necessarily unconstitutional- what is prohibited is deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of l w. Life connotes in the first place the integrity of the physical person. %t can be validly claimed by law, as in the imposition of the death penalty [for a heinous offense, not for a petty offense$ or when a person is required to render personal military service. The compulsory steriliEation of incurable hereditary imbeciles was considered all right since the operation only involved +a minimum of pain, or none at all., [Buc# v. Bell, 4:# !S 4 $ ) The S7 considered as confisc tor( a municipal ordinance prohibiting the construction on residential land of any building that might obstruct the view of the public plaEa from the highway. [,eople v. 3a?ardo, 1 # S7/* ##9$ Su#st nti%e /ue Process 5 requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person with respect to his life, liberty and property. Re6uiremen&s 5 [1$ the law must have a valid governmental objective, i.e., the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the intervention of the State- and [4$ the objective must be pursued in a lawful manner- the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive.
* law prohibiting the sale of mil& for less than the specified minimum or floor price, to prevent the lowering of the quality of mil& sold in the mar&et, upheld as valid. [1ebbia v. State o! 1e4 "or#, 411 !S ( 4$ * law was annulled as violative of substantive due process where it was shown that the rates prescribed by it for railroad companies, while allowing them some profit, did not permit them a reasonable return of their investments. [Chicago2 Mil4au#ee & St. ,aul Rail4ay v. Minnesotta, 19# !S 11"$ * municipal ordinance required all laundry establishments to issue their receipts in =nglish or Spanish. " lid, as the measure see&s to protect the public from deceptions and misunderstandings. [ -4ong Sing v. City o! Manila, #1 'hil. 1 9$ * law prohibited merchants from maintaining its boo&s of accounts in any language other than =nglish, Spanish or any other local dialect. In% lid because it prevented merchants from using other languages, including their own. ["u Cong Eng v. rinidad , 4:1 !S ( $ ) * criminal investigation underta&en by an agency which, under the law, is li&ewise responsible for the conduct of a preliminary investigation leading to a criminal prosecution would not be violative of due process. [Concio v. +&(, ../. 0o. 1:( (:, Canuary 41, 4 "$ ) 0o violation of due process when an investigating prosecutor files an information or dismisses a complaint cogniEable by the ;T77 without first requiring the submission of counter)affidavits. [Borlongan v. ,ena, ../. 0o. 1#9(11, 0ovember 49, 4 :$ ) * reevaluation does not necessitate the introduction of new materials for review nor does it require a full hearing for new arguments. %n this light, the respondent has been given the opportunity to be heard by the ><6= Secretary. [1*SEC& /uards *ssociation v. 1ational Service Corporation, ../. 0o. 12(##4, *ugust 4(, 4 1 $ * law which imposes a 9)month cap on the claim of <3Gs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other <3Gs or local wor&ers with fixed)term employment, is violative of substantive due process. @*lso violative o! the e5ual protection clause H suspect classi!ication.B [Serrano v. /allant Maritime Services2 Inc., ../. 0o. 12:21#, ;arch 4#, 4 1$ The concept of +vested right, is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action- it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. /ights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. [ Heirs o! *rcadio Castro Sr. v. )ozada ) ../. 0o. 129 42, *ugust 41, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$ Ghile one may not be deprived of his +vested right,, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. [@uiao v. @uiao ) ../. 0o 1:2((2, Culy #, 4 14, Second >ivision, /eyes$
Procedur l /ue Process ) The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. ) *udici l /ue Process 5 [1$ impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the case[4$ jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person and the property subject of the proceeding proper service of summons- [9$ defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard- [#$ judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. TJ= *G*/> <3 (I ;<0TJ6M %0T=/=ST /*T= is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. xxx %t violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the /T7 may award (I monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was see&ing for what she merely stated in her 7omplaint. [+iona v. Balangue ) ../. 0o. 1:9((1, Canuary :, 4 19, Second >ivision, del 7astillo$ Ri#$& &o appeal lost through neglect- no denial of due process. [)obete v. Sundiam, 149 S7/* 1($ Ri#$& &o Appeal is not essential to a right to a hearing- may be deprived except for *rt. A%%%,[($,[4$, on the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 7ourt. ) The ri&ht to cross2ex mine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 7learly, the right to cross)examine a witness, although a fundamental right of a party, may be waived. [E5uitable ,CIBan#ing Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, ../. 0o. 1"44#", >ecember 1", 4 "$ Counsel as&ed for reinvestigation and as&ed to defer proceedings until reinvestigation was concluded- judge said trial should proceed- counsel did not participate- on appeal, trial was set aside+serious irregularity, 5 violative of due process [,eople v. Beriales, : S7/* 921$ Instances 4hen notice o! hearing may be validly omitted 4ithout violating due process 5 cancellation of a passport of a fugitive from justicepreventive suspension of a civil servant- distraint of property for tax delinquency- padloc&ing of unsanitary restaurant or movie theaters showing obscene movies- nuisances per se. ) Nuisan'e per se 5 objectionable under any circumstance because it presents an immediate danger to the welfare of the community 5 mad dog 5 may be abated without necessity of judicial authoriEation. ) Nuisan'e per ccidens 5 objectionable only under some but not all circumstances. * nuisance per accidens may be summarily abated if authoriEed by law, provided the nuisance per accidens is of trifling value only. [ )a4ton v. Steele, 1(4 !S 199$ Onl( nuisances per se may be summarily abated. [Civil Code2 *rticle 7I:$ *n industrial waste processing plant is not a nuisance per se. *ccordingly, its operations may be ordered stopped only after judicial proceedings. [ ,arayno v. (ovellanos2 #1( S7/* "($ * mar&et stall not affected by a recent fire is not a public nuisance and may not be abated without
judicial proceedings [*silo v. ,eople, 1(1 1:)1", ;arch 1 4 11$
./ 0o.
7learly, when Custice .ancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the ;;>* against summarily demolishing the structure. Nei&$er %oes &$e MMDA $a/e &$e po!er &o %e'lare a &$in# a nuisan'e7 Onl( 'our&s of la! $a/e &$e po!er &o %e&ermine !$e&$er a &$in# is a nuisan'e . [*C Enterprises v. 3rabelle ,roperties Corp ., [../. 0o. 122:##, 4 0ovember 4 2, ( 2 S7/* 24(, 22 ) 221$ [/ancayco v. City /overnment o! @uezon City ) ../. 0o. 1::" :, <ctober 11, 4 11, En Banc, Sereno$ /espondents? fence is not a nuisance per se. 8y its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. %t was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. *nd as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewal& still exists. %f petitioner believes that respondents? fence indeed encroaches on the sidewal&, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. 0ot being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted. [)ucena /rand Central erminal2 Inc. v. (*C )iner2 Inc ., ../. 0o. 1#"991, 3ebruary 49, 4 (, #(4 S7/* 1:#, 111, cited in ,erez v. Spouses Madrona and ,ante 0 ../. 0o. 1"##:", ;arch 41, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$ Aiolation of due process is a personal de!ense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have been allegedly violated. [1apere v. Barbarona, ../. 0o. 12 #42, Canuary 91, 4 "Carandang v. Heirs o! @uirino *. +e /uzman , ../. 0o. 12 9#:, 0ovember 41, 4 2, ( " S7/* #21, #" $ E1u l Protection 5 * flight attendant is dismissed for being fat. 'rivate actions cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. The equal protection clause does not apply to private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. ["rasuegui v. ,hilippine *ir )ines, ../. 0o. 12" "1, <ctober 1:, 4 "$ Re1uirements for " lid Cl ssific tion ) [1$ substantial distinctions [4$ germane to the purpose of the law [9$ must not be limited to existing conditions only [#$ must apply equally to all members of the class. 891 Su s&an&ial Dis&in'&ions ) cannot be based on color of attire or of vehicles, emotions, shape or color of eyesKcan be based on height, weight, health [lepers$, age, allegiance or citiEenship. ) :; (ear ol%s not allowed to run for same office from which they have retired. Aalid. [ +umlao v. C&ME)EC, 1( S7/* 914$ ) The classification of cities as $i#$l( ur ani*e% 'i&ies if they had an annual revenue of '# ;illion and all others as component cities is valid. use. [ Ceniza v. C&ME)EC, 12 S7/* :29$ RA :<<=, which
authoriEes the <mbudsman to impose a six)month preventive suspension, instead of the civil service provisions of the *dministrative 7ode, which limits the disciplining authority?s prerogative to only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 1 days, does not violate the equal protection guarantee. Substantial distinctions exist. [/obenciong v. Court o! *ppeals , ../. 0o. 1(1""9, ;arch 91, 4 "$ There is a substantial distinction between appointive and elective officials. [@uinto v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 1"121", >ecember 1, 4 1, [;/$ 3ebruary 44, 4 1 , 'uno$ E+e'u&i/e Or%er No7 9 should be struc& down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth +concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administrationF only. [Biraogo v. he ,hilippine ruth Commission o! 9I;I , ../. 0o. 11419(, >ecember 1 , 4 1 $ * substantial distinction exists between municipalities with pending 7ityhood bills prior to the subsequent passage of a law increasing the revenue requirement of cities [to '1 T$ and those which see& 7ityhood on the basis of the new law. [)eague o! Cities o! the ,hilippines v. C&ME)EC , ../. 0o. 1:21(1, *pril 14, 4 11$ The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in li&e circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification. 3or a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that @1B it rests on substantial distinctions- @4B it is germane to the purpose of the law- @9B it is not limited to existing conditions only- and @#B it applies equally to all members of the same class. [ ,hilippine Rural Electric Cooperatives *ssociation2 Inc. v. +I)/ , #(1 'hil. 2"9 @4 9B$ !nfortunately, 7;< 4:)4 9 does not meet these requirements. Ge do not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from 7;< 4:)4 9 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to :I tariff. <n the other hand, even if the importers listed under 7;< 4:)4 9 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 9I tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state. [Commissioner o! Customs v. Hypermi% 3eeds Corporation ) ../. 0o. 1:1(:1, 3ebruary 1, 4 14, Second >ivision, Sereno$ The subject clause contains a suspect classi!ication in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed)term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 9)month cap on the claim of <3Gs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other <3Gs or local wor&ers with fixed)term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of <3Gs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. [ Serrano v. /allant
Maritime Services2 Inc., ../. 0o. 12:21#, ;arch 4#, 4 1$ /epublic *ct 0o. 1424 has been upheld by the Supreme 7ourt as against a challenge as to its constitutionality on the ground of its purported violation of the equal protection clause, as it applies only to women, and not to men. The 7ourt cited +the unequal power relationship between women and men, and +the fact that women are more li&ely than men to be victims of violence,, not to mention +the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women, as basic distinctions between women and men which justify the +classification under the law., [/arcia v. +rilon, ../. 0o. 1:142:, Cune 4(, 4 19$ 8>1 Germane &o &$e Purpose of &$e La! 0 E+amples 5 there are substantial distinctions between men %. women with respect to the performance of hard labor as against passing grades in examinations, or between forei&n %. loc l c rs with respect to taxes, but not in the context of traffic violations. 8?1 Mus& no& e limi&e% &o e+is&in# 'on%i&ions onl( 0 The classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected exists. ) * law prohibited members of non)7hristian tribes form drin&ing liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and their unfamiliarity with this &ind of drin& rendered them more susceptible to its effects as compared to more civiliEed countrymen who were not affected by it. 6aw S!ST*%0=>. [ ,eople v. Cayat, 2" 'hil. 14$ ) * tax was limited only to <rmoc Sugar 7ompany [specifically named in the ordinance$, which was then the only sugar company in the area. 7lassification not limited to existing conditions, as the tax measure would not be applicable to similar companies which may be established in the same taxing jurisdiction in the future. [&rmoc Sugar Co.2 Inc. v. reasurer o! &rmoc City, 44 S7/* 2 9$ 8@1 Mus& appl( e6uall( &o all mem ers of &$e 'lass7 0 The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. The law can treat # r n& ( offici ls differently from other local elective officials because the 7onstitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. [C&ME)EC v. Cruz, ../. 0o. 1"2212, 0ovember 4 , 4 1$ SE0RC8ES nd SEI94RES * search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. %t is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. %t resembles in some respect with what is commonly &nown as Cohn >oe proceedings. Ghile an application for a search warrant is entitled li&e a
criminal action, it does not ma&e it such an action. * search warrant is a legal process which has been li&ened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. %t is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. * search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. * search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the 'eople of the 'hilippines. * search warrant has no relation to a civil process. %t is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. %t concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. %t may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. [.nited )aboratories2 Inc. v. Isip @( 'hil. 9#4 @4 (BB, at 9(:)9("$ The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. %t would thus categoriEe what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in speci!ic courts of indicated competence. %t ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. 3or, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. * search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the 'eople of the 'hilippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. * search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process a&in to a writ of discovery. %t is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. [Malaloan v. Court o! *ppeals ) ../. 0o. 1 #":1, ;ay 2, 111#, 494 S7/* 4#1, cited in ,)+ v. H,S So!t4are and Communication Corporation ) ../. 0o. 1: 21#, >ecember 1 , 4 14, 3irst >ivision, 6eonardo)de 7astro$ Since a search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, it necessarily follows that the requirement set forth in Section (, /ule 11 of the /ules on 7riminal 'rocedure which states that Lall criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutorL does not apply. [,)+ v. H,S So!t4are and Communication Corporation ) ../. 0o. 1: 21#, >ecember 1 , 4 14, 3irst >ivision, 6eonardo)de 7astro$ * private individual or a private corporation complaining to the 08% or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the 83*>, may appear2 participate and !ile pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to m int in2 inter alia2 the validity o! the search 4arrant issued by the court and the dmissi#ilit( o! the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed- such private party may do so in collaboration with the 08% or such government agency. The party may
!ile an opposition to a motion to 5uash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion !or the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash. [.nited )aboratories2 Inc. v. Isip ../. 0o. 1211(2, 3ebruary 1(, 4 :, (12 S7/* 24, at 2")21, cited in ,)+ v. H,S So!t4are and Communication Corporation ) ../. 0o. 1: 21#, >ecember 1 , 4 14, 3irst >ivision, 6eonardo)de 7astro$ A.AILABE to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not [Moncado v. ,eople=s Court, " 'hil. 1$, and even corporations [Stonehill v. +io#no, 4 S7/* 9"9$, although they may be required to open their boo&s of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of the police power or the power of taxation. The guaranty may be invo&ed by a person inside a phone booth @eavesdropping on an accused in a public phone booth 5 unless with a warrant 5 is illegalB [-atz v. .S, 9"1 !S 9#:$, or even by &nown criminals or fugitives 5 one cannot just force his way into any man?s house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his ran&. [*lih v. Castro, 1(1 S7/* 4:1$ RE:4ISITES for % lid Se rch W rr nt or W rr nt of 0rrest 5 [1$ %t must be based on probable cause. [4$ 'robable cause must be determined personally by the judge. [9$ The determination must be made after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. [#$ The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seiEed. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under *rticle %%%, Section 4 of the 11": 7onstitution. [Secretary o! 1ational +e!ense v. Manalo2 ../. 0o. 1" 1 2, <ctober :, 4 "$ * # n) in1uir( order, under Section 11 of the AMLA, is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seiEure of persons or property. [ Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Eugenio, ../. 0o. 1:#241, 3ebruary 1#, 4 "$ [1$ Pro# #le c use ) There is a distinction between the prelimin r( in1uir(, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the prelimin r( in%esti& tion proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper 5 whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged 5 is the function of the investigating prosecutor. [,eople v. /abo2 ../. 0o. 121 "9, *ugust 9, 4 1 $ Rules of Cour&) Rule 9>:) Se'&ion ? 5 each warrant should refer only to one specific offense. Ex mples of in% lid w rr nts 2 * warrant which alleges violations of 78 circulars, Tariff and 7ustoms laws, the %nternal /evenue 7ode and the /evised 'enal 7ode [Stonehill v. +io#no, 4 S7/* 9"9$, or for four separate and distinct offenses
[*sian Surety & Insurance v. Herrera , (# S7/* 914$, or for +illegal traffic in narcotics and contraband, [Castro v. ,abalan, : S7/* #::$, or a sc tter2shot w rr nt, for robbery, theft, qualified theft or =stafa [,eople v. C*, 412 S7/* 1 1$ ) +ho rdin&, of used bottles is not a crime or offense. [Coca0Cola Bottlers ,hils.2 Inc. v. /omez, ../. 0o. 1(##11, 0ovember 1#, 4 "$ ) %t is quite obvious then that their cause of action arose out of the intrusion into their est #lished &oodwill involving the two motorcycle models and not patent infringement. 0o offense specified. Search warrant %0A*6%>. [Hon 1e Chan v. Honda Motor Co.2 )td., ../. 0o. 1:4::(, >ecember 11, 4 :$ [4$ Pro# #le c use must #e determined person ll( #( the jud&e. ) Garrants of arrest may be issued by dministr ti%e uthorities only for the purpose of carrying out a fin l findin& of %iol tion of l w, li&e an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. [Board o! Commissioners v. de la Rosa, 11: S7/* "(9$ [9$ T$e %e&ermina&ion mus& e ma%e af&er e+amina&ion un%er oa&$ or affirma&ion of &$e 'omplainan& an% &$e !i&nesses $e ma( pro%u'e7 0 @/egional Trial 7ourt$ judges need not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses for purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest [Soliven v. Ma#asiar, 12: S7/* 919$ =valuation of the documents relevant to probable cause must be done personally by the [/T7$ judge. [ Enrile v. Salazar, 1"2 S7/* 41:$ *ffidavit based on +reliable information, 5 +correct to the best of his &nowledge and belief, 5 cannot be used as basis for a search warrant [ *lvarez v. C3I, 2# 'hil. 99$ ) ;ere affidavits not enough to issue a se rch w rr nt- judge must ta&e depositions in writing and attach them to the record as these are necessary to determine the existence of probable cause. [Mata v. Bayona, 14" S7/* 9""$ [#$ The !arran& mus& par&i'ularl( %es'ri e &$e pla'e &o e sear'$e% an% &$e persons or &$in#s &o e sei*e%7 0 *ohn /oe warrants are generally not valid [Common4ealth v. Crotty, 1 *llen @;ass.B # 9$ but a warrant against a (ohn +oe described in the same as the +person occupying and in control of a building at a specified address, was considered valid. [,eople v. 'eloso, #" 'hil. 121$ ) * description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. [,eople v. 'eloso, #" 'hil. 121$ ) * search warrant need not identify with particularity the person against whom it is directed- it suffices that the place to be searched and things to be seiEed are described. [,eople v. )agman, ../. 0o. 12"21(, >ecember ", 4 "$ T$e CA $el% &$a& &$e pro'ee%in#s before the ;a&ati /T7 and the ;untinlupa /T7 are separate and distinct. The object of the motion to quash search warrant, here filed by respondents 'astrana and *bad with the ;a&ati /T7, the issuing court, was to test the validity of its issuance, given that
the warrant was made to cover several offenses rather than just one as the rules provide. <n the other hand, the object of the ;untinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seiEed articles in any criminal proceeding against ;endoEa, et al. considering the S=7 and the 08%?s failure to immediately turn over the seiEed articles to the court that issued the warrant as the rules require. 8ut Section 1# of /ule 142 is clear. :uestions concernin& #oth ;< the issu nce of the se rch w rr nt nd =< the suppression of e%idence sei'ed under it re m tters th t c n #e r ised onl( with the issuin& court if3 s in the present c se3 no crimin l ction h s in the me ntime #een filed in court . [Securities and E%change Commission v. Mendoza ) ../. 0o. 1: #4(, *pril 49, 4 14, Third >ivision, *bad$ >ener l w rr nts not allowed 5 +records pertaining to all business transactions., [ Stonehill v. +io#no, 4 S7/* 9"9$ ) +equipment used as means for committing offenses, ) no& allo!e% 5 general warrant. [Burgos v. Chie! o! Sta!! , 199 S7/* " $ ) +boo&s, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money)lender, charging a usurious interest, in violation of law, 5 /ali% description. [*lvarez v. C3I2 2# 'hil.99$ ) +documents, papers and other records of the 7''K0'*K0>3, such as minutes of the party meetings, plans of these groups, programs, list of possible supporters, subversive boo&s and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign or local sources. 5 NOT .ALID 5 vaguely described and not particulariEed. >oes not specify, among others, what subversive boo&s and instructions, etc. [1olasco v. ,ano, 191 S7/* 1(4$ Anen& &$e se'on% ar#umen&, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 4 meters away from his house is no longer within the +permissible area, that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The <S., on the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seiEure is applicable only against government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing pac&s of shabu inside the nipa hut. xxx. Javing been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. 8y virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. [+el Castillo v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 1"(14", Canuary 9 , 4 14, Third >ivision, 'eralta$ Section ", /ule 142 of the /ules of 7ourt allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two witnesses are present.
Section ". Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. N 0o search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. xxx. /esultantly, the seiEed items cannot, therefore, be considered as Lfruits of the poisonous tree.L ['alleno v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 114 ( , Canuary 1, 4 19$ W rr ntless 0rrests3 Se rches nd Sei'ures 2 /ules of 7ourt, /ule 119, Section ( 5 a peace officer or even a private person may, !i&$ou& a !arran&, arres& a person [1$ when such person has in fact just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence- [4$ when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal &nowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it- or [9$ when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [@1B rrest in fl &r nte delicto, @4B rrest effected in hot pursuit, and @9B rrest of esc ped prisoners$ An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authoriEing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, lthou&h t dist nce +in this c se3 two meters or ?@ meters,, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. @ ..S. v. 3ortaleza, 14 'hil. #:4 [11 1$- and ..S. v. Samonte, 12 'hil. (12 [111 $B %n essence, Section (, par. @aB, /ule 119, requires that the accused be caught in !lagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a crime. [,eople v. Sucro, ../. 0o. 19491, ;arch 1", 1111$ Se'&ion ;) Rule 99? of &$e 9AB; Rules on Criminal Pro'e%ure %oes no& re6uire &$e arres&in# offi'ers &o personall( !i&ness &$e 'ommission of &$e offense !i&$ &$eir o!n e(es . [*belita III v. +oria2 ../. 0o. 1: 2:4, 1# *ugust 4 1, (12 S7/* 44 , 442)44:$ %t is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay)off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the &idnapper. This is equivalent to personal &nowledge based on probable cause. [,eople v. .yboco, ../. 0o. 1:" 91, Canuary 11, 4 11$ Tipped inform tion is sufficient pro# #le c use to effect a warrantless search only in cases involving either a buy)bust operation or drugs in transit. [,eople v. Martinez, ../. 0o. 111922, >ecember 19, 4 1 $
%n a #u(2#ust operation, the violator in fl &r nte delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authoriEed but duty)bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. [,eople v. Macatingag, Canuary 11, 4 1, Canuary 11, 4 1$ The absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy)bust operation, especially when the buy)bust team members 4ere accompanied to the scene by their in!ormant. [,eople v. de la Rosa, ../. 0o. 1"(122, Canuary 42, 4 11$ * buy)bust operation is not invalidated by mere non)coordination with the '>=*. [,eople v. *bedin ) ../. 0o. 1:1192, *pril 11, 4 14- ,eople v. 3undales ) ../. 0o. 1"#2 2, September (, 4 14$ * '<6%7= <33%7=/?S *7T <3 S<6%7%T%0. >/!.S from appellant during the buy)bust operation, or what is &nown as the L deco( solicit tion,L is not prohibited by law and does not invalidate the buy)bust operation. [ ,eople v. Espiritu ) ../. 0o. 1" 111, Canuary 1, 4 19$ The military arrested, without warrants, among others, [1$ a suspected rebel, bedridden because of a bullet wound for subversion, which was considered by the military as a continuing offense [4$ a sleeping man, who was hog)tied and bodily dumped into a police jeep for allegedly subversive remar&s made by him the day before [another continuing offense$ [9$ a suspected murderer for a murder supposedly committed y him 1# days earlier. 5 *rrests held valid by the S7. [ .mil v. Ramos, 1" S7/* 911$ T$ere mus& firs& e a la!ful arres& efore a !arran&less sear'$ 'an e ma%e ) +the process cannot be reversed., [,eople v2 Chua Ho San , 9 " S7/* #94$ 0evertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to ma&e the arrest at the outset of the search. [,eople v. Racho, ../. 0o. 1"2(41, *ugust 9, 4 1 $ Se'&ion B= of &$e 3ores&r( Co%e authoriEes the forestry officer to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the 3orestry 7ode and to seiEe and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or ta&en by the offender. [Revaldo v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 1: ("1, *pril 12, 4 1$ There was constructi%e possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the master?s bedroom of his house. [,eople v. orres, ../. 0o. 1: "9:, September 14, 4 2$ The wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs? existence as she had full access to the room, including the space under the bed. [,eople v. ira, ../. 0o. 19121(, ;ay 4", 4 #, #9 S7/* 19#$ The accused was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her bedroom. [*buan v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 12"::9, <ctober 4:, 4 2$
There are xxx instances when a !arran&less sear'$ an% sei*ure is valid, to witD @1B consented se rches- @4B s n incident to l wful rrest @9B se rches of %essels nd ircr ft for %iol tion of immi&r tion3 customs3 nd dru& l ws- @#B se rches of mo%in& %ehicles- @(B se rches of utomo#iles t #orders or constructi%e #orders- @2B where the prohi#ited rticles re in pl in %iewA! @:B se rches of #uildin&s nd premises to enforce fire3 s nit r(3 nd #uildin& re&ul tions- and @"B +stop nd fris)! oper tions @Terr( sear'$B. [,eople v. )opez, ../. 0o. 1"1:#:, September 42, 4 "see also Epie2 (r. v. .lat0Marredo, ../. 0o. 1#"11:, ;arch 44, 4 :, (1" S7/* 2#1, 2#2.$ *6S< customs se rches and exi&ent nd emer&enc( circumst nces. [,eople v. /onzales, #1: 'hil. 9#4, 9(: @4 1B$ [,eople v. +e5uina, ../. 0o. 1::(: , Canuary 11, 4 11- see also ,eople v. Racho, ../. 0o. 1"2(41, *ugust 9, 4 1 and Malacat v. C*, 4"9 S7/* 1(1$ ,arran&less sear'$es an% sei*ures a& mili&ar( '$e'"poin&s valid 5 justified on the basis of the right of the State to protect itself. >issentD the bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the 8ill of /ights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. ['almonte v. de 'illa, 1: S7/* 4(2$ Tippe% informa&ion in u(0 us& opera&ions or 'ases in/ol/in# %ru#s in &ransi& . [,eople v. Martinez, ../. 0o. 111922, >ecember 19, 4 1 $ Mo/in# .e$i'les 0 such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. @0 tip from n inform nt constitutes pro# #le c use.B [,eople v. uazon, ../. 0o. 1:(:"9, September 9, 4 :$ ) Tip was given one wee& before the warrantless search of a vehicle. The Supreme 7ourt said the warrantless search was valid. eehan#ee dissented saying there 4as enough time to obtain a 4arrant. [,eople v. C3I o! Rizal 5 (esse Hope, 1 1 S7/* "2$ ) BICYCLE ) Curisprudence defines +transport, as +to carry or convey from one place to another., %n the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. Je admitted that he was about to convey the pac&age, which contained marijuana, to a certain Cimmy .onEales. Garrantless arrest justified. [,eople v. ,ena!lorida, ../. 0o. 1:(2 #, *pril 1 , 4 "$ ) The search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. '<4 'allayoc had to ma&e a quic& decision and act fast. %t would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. %ndeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. [,eople v. Mariacos, ../. 0o. 1""211, Cune 2, 4 1 $ In la!ful arres&s, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
w rr ntless se rch not onl( on the person of the suspect3 #ut lso in the permissi#le re within the l tterBs re ch. <therwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seiEure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase Lwithin the area of his immediate controlL means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. ['aleroso v. Court o! *ppeals, ../. 0o. 12#"1(, 9 September 4 1, (1" S7/* #1, (()(2 citing ,eople v. Cueno, 9(1 'hil. 1(1, 129 @111"B- ,eople v. Cubcubin2 (r., id. at 4:1- ,eople v. Estella, ##9 'hil. 221, 2"9 @4 9B$Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested. [,eople v. .yboco, ../. 0o. 1:" 91, Canuary 11, 4 11$ -irst) &$ere !as no /ali% arres& of pe&i&ioner7 Ghen he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso !acto and solely for this reason, arrested. xxx Second, &$ere ein# no /ali% arres&) &$e !arran&less sear'$ &$a& resul&e% from i& !as li"e!ise ille#al7 +++ %t must be noted that the evidence seiEed, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in +plain view., %t was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner?s poc&et. 7learly, the evidence was not immediately apparent. [See ,eople v. Macalaba, ##9 'hil. (2( @4 9B$ 0either was there a consented warrantless search. 7onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. [Caballes v. Court o! *ppeals, #4# 'hil. 429 @4 4B$ xxx 0either does the search qualify under the +stop and fris&, rule. Ghile the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and fris& is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. [,eople v. Sy Chua, ### 'hil. :(: @4 9B$ xxx The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. Ghile he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seiEed during the illegal warrantless arrest. [,eople v. )apita?e, ##( 'hil. :41 @4 9B$ The subject items seiEed during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. [,eople v. Martinez, ../. 0o. 111922, 19 >ecember 4 1 $ The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. [Id.$ [)uz v. ,eople ) .. /. 0o. 11::"", 3ebruary 41, 4 14, Second >ivision, Sereno$ 8elocura was caught in !lagrante delicto violating Section 91 of /epublic *ct 0o. #191 @The 6and Transportation and Traffic 7ode 5 spurious government plateB. %n !lagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in !lagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it Lproves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption.L [/o v. )eyte II Electric Cooperative2 Inc., ../. 0o. 1:21 1, 3ebruary 1", 4 ", (#2 S7/* 1":, 11($ Chie! Insp. +ivina signaled !or Belocura to stop !or veri!ication but the latter ignored the signal and sped o!! to4ards Balut2 ondo. he team pursued Belocura=s ?eep until they bloc#ed its path 4ith their amara4 3J vehicle2 !orcing Belocura to stop. *t this point2 Chie! Insp. +ivina and the rest o! the team approached the ?eep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chie! Insp. +ivina 5ueried Belocura on the government plate. S,&; Ro?as con!iscated Belocura=s Berreta A mm. pistol KSerial 1umber M;8ICL>M that 4as tuc#ed in his 4aist and its !ully loaded magazine 4hen he could not produce the appropriate documents !or the pistol and the government plate. hey arrested him. =ven by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which 8elocura was apprehended fell under the first category in Section (, /ule 119 of the /ules of 7ourt. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloa&ed with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seiEe from him and the area within his reach or under his control, li&e the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. *ccordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal. [ 'aldez v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 1: 1" , 0ovember 49, 4 :, (9" S7/* 211$ [NOTE 5 accused was *7O!%TT=> because of inadequate testimonial evidence 5 the arresting officer who seiEed the marijuana bric&s was not presented to testify.$ [,eople v. Belocura ) ../. 0o. 1:9#:#, *ugust 41, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$ .essels an% Air'raf& 0 Searches and seiEures without warrant of vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws are valid. [ Roldan v. *rca, 2( S7/* 992$ The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. %n this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for >avao 7ity with a substantial amount or 112.29 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversiEed Spice rubber shoes. Ghile it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another. [,eople v. )aba 5 ../. 0o. 11119", Canuary 4", 4 19$ Plain .ie! 0 The Cplain /ie!D %o'&rine applies when the following requisites concurD @aB the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area- @bB the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent- @cB it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seiEure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully ma&e an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. %n the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. [Revaldo v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 1: ("1, *pril 12, 4 1$ ) Jowever, if the pac&age proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seiEed. %n other words, if the pac&age is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. %t must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seiEure. [,eople v. +oria2 ./. 1(411, Canuary 44, 1111$ The drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open bac& of the van, hence, open to the e(e nd h nd of the 08% agents. The liquid)filled drum was thus within the plain view of the 08% agents, hence, a product of a legal search. [ ,eople v. )agman, ../. 0o. 12"21(, >ecember ", 4 "$ Terr( Sear'$EIn'i%en& &o a La!ful Arres& 0 ,arran&less sear'$ e/en efore arres& is valid when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is presently dangerous to the officer or to others. [ erry v. &hio, 914 !S 1$ In a le#i&ima&e !arran&less arres& , the arresting police officers are authoriEed to search and seiEe from the offender @1B any dangerous weapons and @4B the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. @'eople v. *yangao, ../. 0o. 1#49(2, *pril 1#, 4 #, #4: S7/* #4", #99.B [,eople v. Bohol , ../. 0o. 1:1:41, Culy 4", 4 "$ Sear'$ [for concealed weapons and all unlawful articles$ in the course of a valid arrest is valid. [*dams v. $illiams, #: !S 1#9- see also ,eople v. 3igueroa, 4#" S7/* 2:1 and ,eople v. Salazar, 422 S7/* 2 :$ %n this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper stic&s during the final security chec& at the airport?s pre)departure area. 'etitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants poc&et to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the Lslightly bulgingL item while fris&ing petitioner. %n [,eople v. (ohnson # 1 'hil. :9# @4 B$, which also involved seiEure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine fris& at the airport, this 7ourt ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures xxx Ge find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was as&ed to empty the contents of his poc&ets upon the fris&er?s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while fris&ing petitioner?s short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance. Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 1 of /.*. 0o. 249(. [ Sales v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 111 49, 3ebruary 2, 4 19$ A''or%in# &o &$e Rules of Court, personal property may be seiEed in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. %f the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seiEed may be that which is the subject of the offense- or that which has been stolen or embeEEled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense- or that which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. [Section 9, /ule 142, Rules o! Court$ %f the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seiEure may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense. [Section 19, /ule 142, Rules o! Court$ [,hillipine +rug En!orcement *gency v. Brodett ) ../. 0o. 11291 , September 4", 4 11, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$ The search of the contents of petitioner?s short pants poc&ets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance @marijuanaB seiEed from him was therefore admissible in evidence. 'etitioner?s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants poc&et after the fris&er?s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. [Sales v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 111 49, 3ebruary 2, 4 19, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$ W i%er ) An arres& may be made without a warrant where the right thereto is w i%ed by the person arrested, provided he &new of such right and &nowingly decided not to invo&e it. [,eople v. abar, 444 S7/* 1##$ ) *n accused cannot question her arrest for the first time on appeal. [,eople v. Marcelino2 ../. 0o. 1"14:", Culy 42, 4 1 $ The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before arraignment. Jowever, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. * 4aiver o! an illegal 4arrantless arrest does not carry 4ith it a 4aiver o! the inadmissibility o! evidence seized during the illegal 4arrantless arrest. [,eople v. Martinez, ../. 0o. 111922, >ecember 19, 4 1 $ Rules o! Court2 Rule ;;:2 Section 9L 5 postin& of # il will not result in w i%er of ri&ht to 1uestion l wfulness of the rrest.
,$a& 'ons&i&u&es a reasona le or unreasona le !arran&less sear'$ or seiEure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seiEure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seiEure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. [,eople v. 1uevas, ../. 0o. 1: 499, 3ebruary 44, 4 :, (12 S7/* #29, #:2, cited in Sy. '. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 1"41:", *ugust 1(, 4 11, Third >ivision, 'eralta$ 3urthermore, this 7ourt has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to ta&e a photograph of the seiEed drugs as required under Section 41 of /.*. 0o. 112(, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seiEed inadmissible in evidence. [,eople v. &ctavio ) ../. 0o. 111411, *pril 9, 4 19, Second >ivision, 'ereE$ The Ri&ht to Pri% c( 9ones of Pri% c( ) Cons&i&u&ion 5 8ill of /ights 5 Section 1 )due process, equal protection, Section 4 )searches and seiEures, Section 2 ) liberty of abode- Section " ) freedom of association and Section 1: ) right against self)incrimination ) Ci/il Co%e 5 0rt. =C 5 every person shall respect the dignity, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. ) 0rt. D= 5 holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person ) 0rt. E=D 5 recogniEes the privacy of letters and other private communications. ) Re/ise% Penal Co%e 5 Ar&7 >>A 5 ma&es a crime the violation of secrets by an officer ) *rt. 4" 5 trespass to dwelling ) Ar&7 >A=0 >A> 5 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets ) Spe'ial La!s 5 /* #4 *nti)Giretapping 6aw ) /* 1# ( 5 Secrecy of 8an& >eposits *ct ) /* "419 5 %ntellectual 'roperty 7ode ) Rules of Cour& 5 /ule 19 , Sec. 4# 5 privileged communication This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authoriEing an inquiry upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA [in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to &idnapping for ransom, certain violations of the 7omprehensive >angerous >rugs *ct of 4 4, hijac&ing and other violations under /.*. 0o. 249(, destructive arson and murder$ [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Eugenio , ../. 0o. 1:#241, 3ebruary 1#, 4 "$ The provisions of /* 112( requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. %ndeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Emplo(ees have a reduced expectation of privacy. Gith respect to persons ch r&ed before the public prosecutor?s office with criminal offenses punishable with six @2B years and one @1B day imprisonment, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of /* 112(. >rug testing in this case would violate a persons? right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 4, *rt. %%% of the 7onstitution. Gorse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incrimin te themsel%es. [Social (ustice Society v. +angerous +rugs Board 5 ../. 0o. 1(:": , 0ovember 9, 4 "$ Section 92 of /.*. 0o. 112( provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authoriEed drug testing centers. [1acague v. Sulpicio )ines , ../. 0o. 1:4("1, *ugust ", 4 1 $ 'etitioner?s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. Jis other argument invo&ing the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 9@1B, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government wor&place under the aforecited authorities. xxx. *s already mentioned, the search of petitioner?s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by 7S7 as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in <?7onnor. [,ollo v. Chairperson -arina Constantino0+avid ) ../. 0o. 1"1""1, <ctober 1", 4 11, =n 8anc, Aillarama$ 7ompelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. %t also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see)thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the 8enedictine nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the 7onstitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone [ /amboa v. Chan, ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14, 2:: S7/* 9"(, 912, citing Mor!e v. Mutuc, 19 'hil. #1( @112"B$, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citiEens. [$hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila , ../. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4 , 4 1, (:2 S7/* #12, at ##1, citing City o! Manila v. )aguio, #1( 'hil. 4"1 @4 (B$ %t is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the 8ill of /ights @*rticle %%%B in Sections 1, 4, 9@1B, 2, ", and 1:, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution. [/amboa v. Chan, ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14, 2:: S7/* 9"(, at 91:)91", citing &ple v. orres, 9(# 'hil. 1#" @111"B$ [3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ../. 0o. 1211 :, ;arch 14, 4 19, En Banc, ;endoEa$ Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. %n these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling. [/amboa v. Chan 0 ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14$ Gith respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated [ 4ith the collection and !or4arding o! in!ormation by the ,1, vis0N0vis the interest o! the state to dismantle private armies$, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. Ghile it is true that Section 41, *rticle A% of the 7onstitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. %n Sabio v. /ordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. %n that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. =mploying the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Mor!e v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual?s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating ban&ing transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation. [/amboa v. Chan 0 ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14$ 7ompelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. %t also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see)thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the 8enedictine nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the 7onstitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be let alone [ /amboa v. Chan, ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14, 2:: S7/* 9"(, 912, citing Mor!e v. Mutuc, 19 'hil. #1( @112"B$, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citiEens. [$hite )ight Corporation v. City o! Manila , ../. 0o. 144"#2, Canuary 4 , 4 1, (:2 S7/* #12, at ##1, citing City o! Manila v. )aguio, #1( 'hil. 4"1 @4 (B$ %t is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the 8ill of /ights @*rticle %%%B in Sections 1, 4, 9@1B, 2, ", and 1:, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution. [/amboa v. Chan, ../. 0o. 119292, Culy 4#, 4 14, 2:: S7/* 9"(, at 91:)91", citing &ple v. orres, 9(# 'hil. 1#" @111"B$ [3ernando v. St. Scholastica=s College ) ../. 0o. 1211 :, ;arch 14, 4 19, En Banc, ;endoEa$ 0rticle III3 Section D F=< ) An( e/i%en'e o &aine% in /iola&ion of &$is or &$e pre'e%in# se'&ion s$all e ina%missi le for an( purpose in an(
pro'ee%in#7 0 The so)called =xclusionary /ule teaches that evidence illegally obtained shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. -reedom of Expression -reedom from Censorship ) * radio station was denied a permit to operate pursuant to a new ordinance converting its location into a commercial area. %t was, however, shown that said ordinance was passed to suppress said station?s criticisms against the local government. Curisprudence distinguishes between a content2 neutr l re&ul tion, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards- and a content2# sed restr int or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. 7ontent) based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content)neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. 7ontent)neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny. <rdinance held as content)based restraint. %0A*6%>. [1e4 Sounds Broadcasting 1et4or#2 Inc. v. +y, ../. 0os. 1: 4: P 1:1#11, *pril 4, 4 1$ ;innesota shut down a paper for being a +public nuisance., !S S7D =ven +miscreant purveyors of scandal,, such as Cay ;. 0ear?s blatantly anti) Semitic Saturday 'ress, are protected from prior restraint. Thus, a law which provides for the suppression of any periodical found, after hearing, on the basis of its past issues, to be obscene, is %0A*6%>. [1ear v. Minnesota, 4"9 !S 21: @1191B$ !S S7 upheld a law which authoriEed the suppression of any issue of any periodical if and as such issue was found to be objectionable fter judici l he rin&, but without affecting the right of the periodical to continue publication. The statute was aimed against issues already published, not against future issues. [-ingsley Boo#s v. Bro4n, 9(# !S #92$ ) 0o political campaigns allowed except during the election period. [ /onzales v. C&ME)EC, 4: S7/* "9($ -reedom from Punishment ) 3reedom of expression does not cover ideas offensive to public order or decency or the reputation of persons, which are all entitled to protection by the State. Thus, the lewd word, the obscene word, the seditious word, the slanderous word, cannot be considered a +step to the truth, and therefore will not enjoy immunity from prohibition and punishment. [ hornhill v. *labama, 91 !S ""$ T$e Clear an% Presen& Dan#er Rule 0 Custice 3ernando 5 the term cle r seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. %t used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very li&ely inevitable. [ /onzales v. C&ME)EC, 4: S7/* "9($ The cle r nd present d n&er rule is founded on the s me principles s
Content2# sed Restr int. [Chavez v. /onzales, ../. 0o. 12"99", 3ebruary 1(, 4 "$ * 19)year old girl showed up in class with a blac& arm band to protest !S policy in Aietnam and was suspended. Suspension set aside by the !S S7 ) +%t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights Qat the schoolhouse gate., [ in#er v. +es Moines Independent School +istrict @1121B, adopted in Malabanan v. Ramento, 141 S7/* 9(1 ) Students barred from re)enrollment because they had participated in demonstrations. $ l # n n affirmed, although some students were not accepted for re)enrollment, not for participating in a rally but because of academic deficiencies. [ 'illar v. echnological Institute o! the ,hilippines, 19( S7/* : 2- see also 1on v. +ames, 1"( S7/* (49$$ A pri/a&e in%i/i%ual may be the subject of public comment even if he is not a public official or at least a public figure, as long as he is involved in a public issue. 5 the public?s primary interest is in the event. [Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, # 9 !S 41$ Ne!spaper pu li'a&ions tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. This rule is otherwise after the case is ended. [ ,eople v. *larcon, 21 'hil. 42($ *ccused delivered inside an auditorium before less than a thousand persons a speech attac&ing various political and racial groups while an angry crowd of about one thousand gathered outside to protest the meeting and a number of disturbances occurred, created by the people outside not by the defendant. 7onvicted under an ordinance punishing +any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to the breach of the peace., 7onviction annulled. 5 a function of free speech is to provide dispute. [ erminiello v. City o! Chicago, 99: !S 1$ BUT in -einer %. .ew Gor), [9# !S 91($, the !S Supreme 7ourt upheld a statute forbidding spea&ing on public streets +with intent to provo&e a breach of peace. %t found the accused to be guilty of a +genuine attempt to arouse the 0egro people against the whites., 7hief Custice 7harles =vans writes for a unanimous 7ourt to overturn the conviction of a 7ommunist, who had been arrested at a meeting to protest the police shooting of stri&ing longshoremen. +'eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime., [ .S v. +ir# +e (onge @119:B$ [0ote ) * $e'"lerFs /e&o occurs when an acting partyRs right to freedom of speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting partyOs behavior. The common example is that of demonstrators @reacting partyB causing a speech @given by the acting partyB to be terminated in order to preserve the peace. The best &nown case involving the hec&lerRs veto is probably 3einer v. 1e4 "or# [9# !.S. 91($, handed down by the Supreme 7ourt in 11(1. 7hief Custice 3red ;. Ainson, writing for the majority, held that police officers acted within their power in arresting a spea&er if the arrest was
Lmotivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order and protection of the general welfare.L %n /regory v. Chicago [91# !S 111$, Custice Jugo 8lac&, in a concurring opinion, argued that arresting demonstrators as a consequence of unruly behavior of by)standers would amount to a hec&lerRs veto. %t was rejected in Hill v. Colorado [(9 !S : 9$2 where the Supreme 7ourt rejected the LJec&lerRs Aeto,L finding Lgovernmental grants of power to private actorsL to be Lconstitutionally problematicL in cases where Lthe regulations allowed a single, private actor to unilaterally silence a spea&erL$ Tests of o#scenit( 5 [1$ whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find the wor&, ta&en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest- [4$ whether the wor& depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law- [9$ whether the wor&, ta&en as a whole, lac&s serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. [Miller v. Cali!ornia, 9: 6. ed. #11$ ) O#scene magaEines cannot be summarily confiscated- a warrant must be issued. [ ,ita v. C*, 1:" S7/* 924$ ) Ghere a language is categoriEed as indecent, as in petitioner?s utterances on a general)patronage rated TA program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech. [Soriano v. )aguardia, ../. 0o. 12#:"(, *pril 41, 4 1$ !nprotected speech or low2% lue expression, refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or +fighting words,, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. The 7ourt finds that petitioner?s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. =ven if we concede that petitioner?s remar&s are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the 7ourt rules that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. Gith respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech. [Soriano v. )aguardia, ../. 0o. 12#:"(, *pril 41, 4 1$ -reedom of 0ssem#l( 2 The use of public places for public meetings or rallies can only be re son #l( re&ul ted, and not #solutel( prohi#ited. Clear an% presen& %an#er rule applie%. [,rimicias v. 3ugoso, " 'hil. :1P Reyes v. Bagatsing, 14( S7/* ((9$ BP Bl#7 BB= 0 T$e Pu li' Assem l( A'& of 9AB; ) * written permit shall be required for a public assembly in a public place. Jowever, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done in a freedom p r) dul( est #lished #( l w or ordin nce [centrally located within the poblacion 5 Section 1($ or in pri% te propert(, in which case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the c mpus of &o%ernment2owned nd oper ted educ tion l institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Poli&i'al mee&in#s or
rallies $el% %urin# an( ele'&ion 'ampai#n perio% as pro/i%e% for ( la! are no& 'o/ere% ( &$is A'&. [Section #$ The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application !i&$in &!o G>H !or"in# %a(s from &$e %a&e &$e appli'a&ion !as file%) failin# !$i'$) &$e permi& s$all e %eeme% #ran&e%. 8.'. 0o. "" is a +content2neutr l, regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. 0either is the law overbroad. %t regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils 7ongress has the right to prevent. There is, li&ewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. The so)called c li#r ted preempti%e response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struc& down as a dar&ness that shrouds freedom. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally +permits, is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally)sound +clear and present danger, standard. [ Bayan v. Ermita, #"" S7/* 442$ TESTS 0 Purpose Test ) The test of a lawful assembly should be the purposes for which it is held, regardless of the auspices under which it is organiEed. +'eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime., %n this case, the conviction of a 7ommunist, who had been arrested at a meeting to protest the police shooting of stri&ing longshoremen, was reversed by the !S Supreme 7ourt. [+e (onge v. &regon, 441 !S 9(9 @119:B$ 0uspices Test applied 5 a rally of the 7ommunist 'arty of the 'hilippines was prohibited, because a fiscal had determined the 7'' to be an illegal association. [Evangelista v. Earnsha4, (: 'hil. 4(($ 5 not yet formally abrogated in this jurisdiction. /espondent was holding the position of Social %nsurance Specialist of the 7laims >epartment of .overnment Service %nsurance System @.S%SB when she was administratively charged with .rave ;isconduct andKor 7onduct 'rejudicial to the 8est %nterest of the Service for the following actsD 1. Gearing red shirt and marching to or appearing at the office of the %nvestigation !nit in protest and to support *tty. ;ario ;olina @*tty. ;olinaB and *tty. *lbert Aelasco @*tty. AelascoB- 4. 7onspiring with other employees and temporarily leaving her wor&place, and abandoning her post and duties- 9. 8admouthing the security guards and the .S%S management and defiantly raising clenched fistsand #. 7ausing alarm, frightening some employees, and disrupting the wor& at the %nvestigation !nit during office hours. %n this case, 7S7 found that the acts of respondents in going to the .S%S)%! office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. 7S7 even added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The 7* found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
.overnment wor&ers, whatever their ran&s, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. 7ivil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. %t would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be ta&en away. %n the recent case of /SIS v. -apisanan ng mga Manggaga4a sa /SIS [.S%S, ../. 0o. 1: 194, >ecember 2, 4 2, (1 S7/* 244$, the 7ourt upheld the position of petitioner .S%S because its employees, numbering between 9 and " each day, staged a wal&out and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the .S%S for four straight days. Ge cannot say the same for the 4 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the .S%S)%! office for just over an hour with that four)day mass action in -apisanan ng mga Manggaga4a sa /SIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust. /ecent analogous decisions in the !nited States, while recogniEing the governmentRs right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of Lpublic concern speechL which is protected by their 3irst *mendment. <ne such case is that of Scott v. Meters. [111 3.9d "4 @4d 7ir. 1111B$ %n said case, the 0ew Mor& Transit *uthority @0MT*B, responsible for operation of 0ew Mor& 7ityRs mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. * number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. 7onsequently, the 0MT* tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recogniEing the governmentRs right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the 0MT*Rs rule was Lunconstitutionally overboard.L Thus, respondentsR freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and 7S7Rs /esolution 0o. 4)1912 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. ;easured against that definition, respondentsR actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The 7S7 and the 7* were both correct in arriving at said conclusion. [.S%S v. AillaviEa ) ../. 0o. 1" 411, Culy 4:, 4 1 $ %n said 0ovember 1(, 4 1 >ecision, this 7ourt ruled that complainants? concerted mass action was actually a stri&e and not a legitimate exercise of their right to freedom of expression- that complainants violated the Canuary 1", 4 <rder of Secretary 6aguesma- that the union officers? dismissal was valid- and that petitioners therein failed to present proof that the union members participated in the commission of an illegal act during the said stri&e- hence, their dismissal was unjustified. [Solid Ban# .nion v. Metropolitan Ban#
and rust Company ) ../. 0o. 1(9:11, September 1:, 4 14, Second >ivision, del 7astillo$ -reedom of Reli&ion Rela&e% Pro/isions in &$e Cons&i&u&ion 0 'reambleK*rticle %%, Sec. 2Kestablishment clause [*rticle %%%, Section ($ 5 *rticle A%, Section 41@4B ) state cannot set up a church [ Everson v. Board o! Education, 99 !S 1$- no part of the business of government to compose official prayers [ Engel v. 'itale, 9: !S #41$- state may not require reading of bible verses [+istrict o! *bington o4nship v. Schempp, 9:# !S 4 9$- may not provide for the distribution of bibles through public teachers using government time [ udor v. Board o! Education , 1# 0C 91$- BUT may allow religious instruction on released)time arrangement @with obligation to ma&e up for lost timeB [ >orach v. Clauson, 9#9 !S 9 2$ 5 *rticle S%A, Section 9 @9B, on optional religious instruction- or lend textboo&s to both public and parochial schools @ownership of the boo&s remains with the stateB [ Board o! Education v. *llen, 914 !S 492$- and even provide transportation to students of both public and parochial schools [Everson v. Board o! Education , 99 !S 1- +/ecl r tion of Pled&in& - ithfulness, ) #ene%olent neutr lit( ppro ch ) gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the 3ree =xercise 7lause ) benevolent neutrality could allo4 !or accommodation o! morality based on religion2 provided it does not o!!end compelling state interests ) the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the !ree e%ercise is not in!ringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal o! the state2 i.e.2 it has chosen a 4ay to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Escritor=s con?ugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case !or e%emption !rom the la4 based on her !undamental right to !reedom o! religion. [Estrada v. Escritor, *.;. 0o. ') 4)12(1, Cune 44, 4 2- see also Estrada v. Escritor, *.;. 0o. ') 4) 12(1, *ugust #, 4 9$. SEE ALSO *rticle SA, Section 9[1$ 5 The State shall defend the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood. ) E3or a Christian nation li#e ours2 such bestial act should never be tolerated.F 6,eople v. Bosi 0 /.R. 1o. ;A8LLQ2 (une 9Q2 9I;92 Second +ivision2 Reyes< The est #lishment cl use does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general, as in religious processions along public streets. [ ,eople v. 3ernandez, 7* .. /. 0o. 6)114" @11#(B$ 0othing objectionable with respect to the use of private contributions for the purchase of a religious image. [/arces v. Estenzo, 1 # S7/* (1 $ Reli#ious Profession an% ,ors$ip 0 /eligious profession and worship has a twofold aspect 5 freedom to #elie%e and freedom to ct on oneHs #eliefs. T$e firs& is a solu&e as lon# as &$e elief is 'onfine% !i&$in &$e realm of &$ou#$&7 T$e se'on% is su 5e'& &o reli#ion !$ere &$e
elief is &ransla&e% in&o e+&ernal a'&s &$a& affe'& &$e pu li' !elfare. [Cant4ell v. Connecticut, 91 !S 412$ 0o license needed to sell 8ibles because to subject said activity to a license fee would be to impair the free exercise of religious profession and worship, which includes the right to disseminate religious beliefs [*merican Bible Society v. City o! Manila, 1 1 'hil. 9"2$ BUT a '1, A*T registration fee would not constitute an impairment of religious freedom, because said registration fee is a mere administrative fee, not one imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. [ olentino v. Secretary o! 3inance, 49( S7/* 29 $ Ebralinag v. +ivision Superintendent o! Schools o! Cebu [411 S7/* 4(2 @1119B$ upheld the religious freedom of Cehovah?s Gitnesses and ruled that they could, if they so wished, refuse to salute the 'hilippine flag because of their religious belief that it is an +image., Reli#ious Tes&s 0 * conscientious o#jector who refused, on religious grounds, to ta&e an oath which contained a provision requiring service in the militia in times of war was considered morally unfit to practice law. [In re Summers, 94( !S (21$ * conscientious o#jector may not refuse, by reason of his religious beliefs, to render personal military or civil service, as required under *rticle %%, Section # of the 7onstitution. [,eople v. >osa, 9" <. 12:2$ Li#ert( of 0#ode * housemaid may transfer residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced by an employment agency. [Caunca v. Salazar, "4 'hil."(1$ To require non)7hristian tribes to reside in a reservation, for their better education, advancement and protection, would be a valid exercise of the police power. [ Rubi v. ,rovincial Board o! Mindoro, ( 'hil. (1($ * mayor deports women of ill0repute to >avao. There is no showing that he was authoriEed to do so under any law. +<urs is a government of laws, and not of men., ['illavicencio v. )u#ban, 91S7/* ::"$ The Supreme 7ourt has sustained an administrative regulation, enacted pursuant to legislative authority, temporarily suspending the deployment of 3ilipina domestics abroad on the ground of public safety. [,hil. *ssociation o! Service E%porters v. +rilon, 129 S7/* 9"2$ 0ational security invo&ed for limiting a person?s right to return to the country. [Marcos v. Manglapus, 1:: S7/* 221$ ,$ile &$e ri#$& &o &ra/el is a constitutional right that may be impaired only +in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law,, there are recogniEed exceptions other than those created by law. 3oremost is the restriction on the right to travel of persons charged of crimes before the courts. *nother is the restriction on persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Senate or Jouse of /epresentatives pursuant to their power of legislative inquiry. There are also restrictions on the right to travel imposed on government officials and employees. 3or example, <ffice of the 7ourt
*dministrator 7ircular 0o. #1)4 9@8B requires judges and court personnel +to secure a travel authority from the <ffice of the 7ourt *dministrator, before they can travel abroad even during their approved leave of absence or free time. This restriction to travel abroad is imposed even in the absence of a law. %n the present case, petitioners are already undergoing preliminary investigation in several criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the courts while petitioners are abroad. %n fairness to the .overnment which is tas&ed with the prosecution of crimes, this 7ourt must hear first the .overnment in oral argument before deciding on the temporary restraining order which if issued could frustrate the .overnment?s right to prosecute. The .overnment must be heard on how the charges against petitioners could proceed while petitioners are abroad. [*rroyo v. +e )ima ) ../. 0o. 111 9#, 0ovember 1(, 4 11, En Banc, 7arpio, Dissen&in# Opinion$ I& $as een ar#ue% &$a& OCA Cir'ular No7 @A0 >==? GBH on vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a citiEen?s right to travel guaranteed by Section 2, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution. 6et there be no doubt that the 7ourt recogniEes a citiEen?s constitutional right to travel. %t is, however, not the issue in this case . The only issue in this case is the non)compliance with the 7ourt?s rules and regulations. %t should be noted that respondent, in her 7omment, did not raise any constitutional concerns. %n fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad without the required travel authority. Jence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out issues on one?s constitutional right to travel. 0onetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of one?s right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, [Mirasol v. +epartment o! ,ublic $or#s and High4ays2 ../. 0o. 1(":19, Cune ", 4 2, #1 S7/* 91", 9(9$ as assured by the 7onstitution, is no& a solu&e. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 2 itself provides that +neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law., Some of these statutory limitations are the followingD 1$ he Human Security *ct o! 9I;I or Republic *ct KR.*.M 1o. A879. The law restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with the crime of terrorism even though such person is out on bail. 4$ he ,hilippine ,assport *ct o! ;AAL or R.*. 1o. C98A. 'ursuant to said law, the Secretary of 3oreign *ffairs or his authoriEed consular officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a 3ilipino citiEen. 9$ he E*nti0 ra!!ic#ing in ,ersons *ct o! 9II8F or R.*. 1o. A9IC. 'ursuant to the provisions thereof, the 8ureau of %mmigration, in order to manage
migration and curb traffic&ing in persons, issued ;emorandum <rder /adjr 0o. 4 11) 11, allowing its Travel 7ontrol and =nforcement !nit to +offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of human traffic&ing, from our ports. #$ he Migrant $or#ers and &verseas 3ilipinos *ct o! ;AAQ or R. *. 1o. CI:92 as amended by R.*. 1o. ;II99. %n enforcement of said law, the 'hilippine <verseas =mployment *dministration K,&E*M may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific country that effectively prevents our migrant wor&ers to enter such country. ($ he *ct on 'iolence against $omen and Children or R.*. 1o. A9L9. The law restricts movement of an individual against whom the protection order is intended. 2$ Inter0Country *doption *ct o! ;AAQ or R.*. 1o. CI:8. 'ursuant thereto, the %nter)7ountry *doption 8oard may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee?s right to travel +to protect the 3ilipino child from abuse, exploitation, traffic&ing andKor sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child., %nherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from the source. These are very basic and are built)in with the power. *n example of such inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the country. [Silverio v. Court o! *ppeals, ../. 0o. 1#4"#, *pril ", 1111, 11( S7/* :2 , :2($ %n such a case, permission of the court is necessary. *nother is the inherent power of the legislative department to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. %n the exercise of legislative inquiry, 7ongress has the power to issue a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Spea&er or acting Spea&er of the Jouse- [Jouse /ules and 'rocedure .overning %nquiries in *id of 6egislation, adopted on *ugust 4", 4 1, Section :$ or in the case of the Senate, signed by its 7hairman or in his absence by the *cting 7hairman, and approved by the Senate 'resident. [Senate /ules of 'rocedure .overning %nquiries in *id of 6egislation, adopted on *ugust 41, 111(, Section 1:$ xxx. *s earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of the Cudiciary, the 7ourt issued <7* 7ircular 0o. #1)4 9 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. %f judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could
be a disruption in the administration of justice. * situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. 3or said reason, members and employees of the Cudiciary cannot just invo&e and demand their right to travel. [)eave +ivision v. Heusdens ) *.;. 0o. ')11)414:, >ecember 19, 4 11, En Banc, ;endoEa$ The Ri&ht to Inform tion T$ere are 'lear %is&in'&ions between the right of 7ongress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. 3or one, the demand of a citiEen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by 7ongress. 0either does the right to information grant a citiEen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to 7ongress and not to an individual citiEen. [Senate v. Ermita, ../. 0o. 121:::, *pril 4 , 4 2$ The right of 7ongress or any of its 7ommittees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people?s right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people?s right to information. [ 1eri v. Senate Committee on *ccountability o! ,ublic &!!icers, ../. 0o. 1" 2#9, ;arch 4(, 4 "$ The 7<;=6=7 may be compelled to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party)list groups named in the petitions. [Bantay Republic *ct v. C&ME)EC , ../. 0o. 1::4:1, ;ay #, 4 :$ Splendid S(mmetr() The right of access to public documents, has been recogniEed as a self) executory constitutional right. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above)quoted Section 4" complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the 8ill of /ights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 4" recogniEes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. [ he ,rovince o! 1orth Cotabato v. he /overnment o! the Republic o! the ,hilippines ,eace ,anel on *ncestral +omain , ./ 0o. 1"9(11, <ctober 1#, 4 "$ Ghile national board examinations, such as the 7'* 8oard =xams are matters of public concern, there may be valid reasons to limit access to the =xamination 'apers in order to properly administer the exam. [*ntolin v. +omondon2 ./ 0o. 12( 92, Culy (, 4 1 $ 4urispru%en'e [Chavez v. ,C//, 92 'hil. 199, 12 )124 @111"B$ has provided the following limitations to that rightD @1B national security matters and intelligence information- @4B trade secrets and ban&ing transactions- @9B criminal matters- and @#B other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially &nown to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door 7abinet meetings and executive sessions of either
house of 7ongress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme 7ourt. This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the S*60, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. [RED RE@.ES 3&R C&," &3 9IIC S * EME1 &3 *SSE S2 )I*BI)I IES *1+ 1E $&R H 6S*)1< *1+ ,ERS&1*) +* * SHEE &R C.RRIC.).M 'I *E &3 HE (.S ICES &3 HE S.,REME C&.R *1+ &33ICERS *1+ EM,)&"EES &3 HE (.+ICI*R" ) *.;. 0o. 1)")2)S7, Cune 19, 4 14, En Banc, ;endoEa$ Jere, petitioners? second letter dated ;ay 1#, 4 1 specifically requested for [sic$ detailed information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or responsible officer, office address and 'hilippine registration. 8ut before 'S*6; could respond to the said letter, petitioners filed the present suit on ;ay 11, 4 1 . 'S*6;?s letter)reply dated ;ay 41, 4 1 advised petitioners that their letter)re quest was referred to the counsel of T)Gater. Ge find such action insufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the policy under ='%/* to implement the privatiEation of 0'7 assets in an Lopen and transparentL manner. 'S*6;?s evasive response to the request for information was unjustified because all bidders were required to deliver documents such as company profile, names of authoriEed officersKrepresentatives, financial and technical experience. 7onsequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing 'S*6; to allow petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder. [Initiatives !or +ialogue and Empo4erment through *lternative )egal Services2 Inc. v. ,o4er Sector *ssets and )iabilities Management Corporation ) ../. 0o. 114 "", <ctober 1, 4 14, En Banc, Aillarama$ The Ri&ht of 0ssoci tion RELATE T< 0RT. 7III3 Sec. ;? ) The State shall respect the role of independent peopleRs organiEations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framewor&, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means. 'eopleRs organiEations are bona fide associations of citiEens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. ;embers of the civil service may not declare a stri&e to enforce their economic demands. [ *lliance o! /overnment $or#ers v. Ministry o! )abor and Employment, 14# S7/* 1$ The *nti)Subversion *ct, which outlawed the 7ommunist 'arty of the 'hilippines, was held not violative of the right of association on the ground that the government has a right to protect itself against subversion. [ ,eople v. 3errer, #" S7/* 9"4$ * law providing that closed)shop agreements in 78*s should not include members of religious sects which prohibit them from joining labor unions is valid. /ight to associate includes the right not to associate on the basis of religious beliefs. ['ictoriano v. Elizalde Rope $or#ers= .nion, (1 S7/* (#$
0rticle III3 Section ;@7 No la! impairin# &$e o li#a&ion of 'on&ra'&s s$all e passe%7 Con&ra'& 5 civil law concept 5 any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible. %ncludes fran'$ises or '$ar&ers granted to persons or entities, li&e an au&$ori*a&ion &o uil% a pu li' u&ili&( [+artmouth College v. $ood4ard, # Gheat. (1"$- does not cover li'enses [,edro v. ,rovincial Board o! Rizal, (9 'hil. 149- an v. +irector o! 3orestry, 14( S7/* 9 4 5 a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and is not a contract with the government$ NOTE 0rticle 7II3 Section ;; 5 franchises to operate public utilities shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the 7ongress when the common good so requires ) does not cover marria#e 'on&ra'&, marriage being a social institution subject at all times to regulation by the legislature and to change of the original conditions [Maryland v. Hill, 14( !S 141$ 5 does not cover pu li' offi'e or salaries, except those already earned. [Mississippi v. Miller, 4:2 !S 1:#$ LICENSE AGREEMENTS are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the non) impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the 7onstitution. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. ,agadian City imber Co.2 Inc., ../. 0o. 1(19 ", September 12, 4 "$ La!s 5 statutes, executive orders and administrative regulations, municipal ordinances [)im v. Register o! +eeds , #2 <. 922($ BUT does not include judicial decisions [but see /anzon v. Inserto, 149 S7/* :19 5 4here it 4as held that the clause 4ould be violated by the substitution o! a mortgage 4ith a surety bond as security !or the payment o! a loan as this 4ould change the terms and conditions o! the original mortgage contract over the mortgagee=s ob?ection. H his change 4as e!!ected by a decision o! a court2 not by a la4 .$ To impair, the law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before its enactmentno impairment if the law is to be applied prospectively. Impairmen& is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract as when the principal of the loan is reduced or the period for payment is either lengthened or shortened Reme%ies 5 there will be impairment only if all remedies are withdrawn, even if the only remedy left is the most difficult [Manila rading Co. v. Reyes, 24 'hil. #21$ The imp irment cl use m ( #e limited #( the St teHs fund ment l powers. Gol% Clause Cases 5 contracts stipulated payment should be made in gold despite a change in currency. Subsequent law converting currency to silver was considered valid. [ 1orman v. Baltimore, 41# !S 4# $ AN E-ECUTI.E ORDER and a law declared a moratorium on the payment of pre)war debts until after eight years from the settlement of the war damage claims of the debtors. The law was
considered invalid 5 no more emergency by reason of the war 5 period was oppressively long. [ Rutter v. Esteban, 19 'hil. 2"$ * law converted all pre) existing share tenancy contracts to leasehold tenancy arrangements. Aalid 5 police power. [Illusorio v. Court o! *grarian Re!orm , 1: S7/* 4($ 6ots sold for residential purposes used for construction of commercial buildings based on new Eoning ordinance. Aalid 5 police power. [ &rtigas & Co. v. 3eati Ban#, 1# S7/* (99$ BP >> 5 valid exercise of the police power. [)ozano v. Martinez, 1#2 S7/* 949$ * government directive which discontinued assignment of salaries of teachers to creditors is not offensive to the impairment clause because the latter could still collect loans after salaries had been withdrawn by the employees themselves. [ iro v. Hontanosas, 14( S7/* 21:$ Substitution of mortgage with security bond as security for payment of loans violative of impairment clause @0oteD it 4as a court 4hich made this change.B [/anzon v. Inserto, 149 S7/* :19$ * private company had a contract with a town to supply water. Ghen the town became a city, the latter expropriated the properties and franchises of the water company. Aalid. [6ong %sland Gater Supply 7o., %nc. v. 8roo&lyn, 122 !S 2"($ Section #: [of /.*. 0o. ":11$ did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one)year period originally provided in *ct 0o. 919(. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is li&ewise no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section #: exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under *ct 0o. 919(. [ /olden4ay Merchandising Corporation v. E5uitable ,CI Ban# 5../. 0o. 11((# , ;arch 19, 4 19, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$ Custodi l In%esti& tion I any questioning by law enforcement officers after a person has been ta&en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [ Miranda v. *rizona, 9"# !S #92$ The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to as& questions to elicit information andKor confessions or admissions from the accused. [/amboa v. Cruz, ../. 0o. 6)(2411, 4: Cune 11"", 124 S7/* 2#4, 2(9$ RA <@?B also provides that +custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an Uinvitation? to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the Uinviting? officer for any violation of law., ) The accused was, upon his arrest in OueEon where he had fled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory investigation that continued during their trip to ;anila, where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station. Je was not assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. Jis confession during the trip from OueEon was held inadmissible. [,eople v. Compil, 4## S7/* 19($ I& !as %urin# &$e preliminar( in/es&i#a&ion that 8o&ingco
mentioned his and 7ol?s plan to &ill 'asion. 8o&ingco?s confession was admittedly ta&en without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 14, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution. %n ,eople v. Sunga, [##: 'hil. ::2 @4 9B$we held that +the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed Ucritical stages? in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in)custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who ta&es part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the StateRs processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution., [,eople v. Bo#ingo 5 ../. 0o. 1":(92, *ugust 1 , 4 11$ The guarantees of Sec. 14 @1B, *rt. %%% of the 11": 7onstitution, or the so)called ;iranda rights, may be invo&ed only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. 7ustodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ta&en into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. [,eople v. )ara 0../. 0o. 111"::, *ugust 19, 4 14$ Line0ups 5 *fter the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line)up is inadmissible. ['eople v. ;acam, 49" S7/* 9 2$ BUT, citing > m#o %. Cru' [124 S7/* 2#4 @11""B$, the Supreme 7ourt, in People %. L msin& [4#" S7/* #:1$ and 'eople v. Salvatierra [4:2 S7/* (($, declared that the right to counsel is NOT available during a police line)up as this is not considered part of the custodial investigation. [+e la orre v. Court o! *ppeals, 41# S7/* 112- recently affirmed in ,eople v. )ara 0../. 0o. 111"::, *ugust 19, 4 14$ RE0ENACTMENT of the crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible evidence against the accused. [,eople v. Suarez, 42: S7/* 111$ T$e ri#$& &o 'ounsel is no& essen&ial in administrative proceedings. [*mpong v CSC, ../. 0o. 12:112, *ugust 42, 4 "$ .o torture3 force3 %iolence3 thre t3 intimid tion3 or n( other me ns which %iti te the free will sh ll #e used & inst him. Secret detention pl ces3 solit r(3 incommunic do3 or other simil r forms of detention re prohi#ited. 2 S,EARING O33ICERS should have confessants physically examined by independent doctors before administering the path. [,eople v. Barros, 144 S7/* 9#$ 0n( confession or dmission o#t ined in %iol tion of this or Section ;E hereof sh ll #e in dmissi#le in e%idence & inst him. 2 !ncounselled confession made during custodial investigation [made before the accused was advised of his custodial rights$, as well as evidence obtained from house of the accused, inadmissible. !ncounselled confession made to a m (or, whom the accused treated as a con!idante, and who did not even question the accused, dmissi#le.
Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed %olunt r( and are dmissi#le in evidence. [,eople v. *ndan, ../. 0o. 112#9:, ;arch 9, 111:, 421 S7/* 1(, 1 1)11 .$ !ncounselled extrajudicial statement given to # r n& ( t nods, including the 6 r n& ( Ch irm n, inside a barangay hall %0*>;%SS%86=. 8ut uncounselled admission [of crime of arson$ made to a neighbor *>;%SS%86=. [,eople v. Mayo, ../. 0o. 1: #: , September 42, 4 2$ !ncounselled but voluntary written admissions made to &agawads ADMISSIBLE. 0ot under custodial investigation at the time. [ ,eople v. /il, ../. 0o. 1:4#2", <ctober 1(, 4 "$ In People %. Won& Chuen $in& [942 'hil. 114 @1112B$, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of *lpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The 7ourt construed the accused?s act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime charged. *nd, since the accused were not informed of their ;iranda rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. [Ho $ai ,ang v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 1:2441, <ctober 11, 4 11, 3irst >ivision, >el 7astillo$ The Ri&ht to 6 il 2 one who is not detained may not post bail. ) *ny person in custody who is not yet charged in court +may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held., >espite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to ;elgaEo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 1: of /ule 11#. *s regards the insistence of Cudge 7anoy that such may be considered as +constructive bail,, there is no such species of bail under the /ules. [ ,antilo v. Canoy, *.;. 0o. /TC)11)4424, 3ebruary 1, 4 11$ ) 4urispru%en'e is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. [+ericto v. Bautista2 *.;. 0o. ;TC)11)14 (, 0ovember 41, 4 , 9#2 S7/* 449, 44:$ ) 8ail may be granted even if evidence of guilt is strong where the accused is ill and requires hospitaliEation. [ +e la Rama v. ,eople=s Court, :: 'hil. #21$ Relian'e on a pre/ious or%er granting bail does not justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail. [Basco v. Rapatalo2 supra note 42- citing Baylon v. Sison2 919 'hil. 11 @111(B- ucay v. +omangas2 914 'hil. 19( @111(B$ =ven if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the StateRs evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. ['illanueva v. Buaya, *.;. 0o. /TC) ")4191, 0ovember 44, 4 1 $ =ven where there is no petition for bail in a case li&e 7riminal 7ase 0o. 119") 9, a hearing should still be held. his hearing is separate and distinct !rom the initial hearing to determine the
e%istence o! probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well)founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The 'rosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence- otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. [+irecto v. Bautista, *.;. 0o. ;TC)11) 14 (, 0ovember 41, 4 , 9#2 S7/* 449$ The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for *ncheta did not warrant dispensing with the hearing. xxx [Marzan0/elacio v. 3lores, *.;. 0o. /TC)11)1#"", Cune 4 , 4 , 99# S7/* 1, 1$ in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested. Ghatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was non)binding. 0or did such recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong. %f it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably controlled by the 'rosecution. [/acal v. In!ante ) *.;. 0o. /TC) #)1"#(, <ctober (, 4 11, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$ SEPARATE HEARING for bail not indispensable 5 hearing on petition for bail may be summary in nature or held in the course of the trial. [ /erardo v. C3%, "2 'hil. ( #$ The earlier ruling of this 7ourt that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 42, /ule 11# of the /evised /ules of 7riminal 'rocedure. 3urthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invo&ing his objections thereto. [Borlongan v. ,ena, ../. 0o. 1#9(11, 0ovember 49, 4 :$ Crimin l /ue Process ) >enial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due process, even if the right to a preliminary investigation is just a statutory right. [,atanao v. Enage, 141 S7/* 44"$ ) !pon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to cases cogniEable by the ;T77, the prosecutor shall ta#e the appropriate action based on the a!!idavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. %t means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not m nd ted to re1uire the su#mission of counter2 ffid %its. Petitioners could not % lidl( cl im the ri&ht to prelimin r( in%esti& tion. They were not denied due process. [Borlongan v. ,ena3 ../. 0o. 1#9(11, 0ovember 49, 4 :$ ) * judge, who is also the mayor, should not have a share in the fines he imposes against the accused who appear before him. [ umey v. &hio, 4:9 !S (1 $ ) 'olice authorities forced an emetic solution through a tube into the stomach of a suspect to eject two narcotic pills he had swallowed to prevent their use as evidence against him. Aiolative of due process 5 [Rochin v. Cali!ornia, 9#4 !S 12($ Small amount of blood extracted from an unconscious person suspected of being drun& was not considered violative of due process. [ Breithanpat v. *bram, 9(4 !S #94$ ) the determination of probable cause,
for purposes of preliminary investigation, is an executive function. [)im ,o v. +epartment o! (ustice ) ../. 0o. 11(11", 3ebruary 11, 4 19, 3irst >ivision, /eyes$ 'enal provisions of an =< which became effective on Cune 41, 11"4 were sought to be enforced against the accused for acts they committed on *pril 4, 11"4. Aiolative of due process. [ ,esigan v. *ngeles, 141 S7/* 1:#$ Said =< was declared unconstitutional in "not v. I*C [1#" S7/* 2(1$. >ate of publication of penal laws is the date of the release for circulation of the <.. [ ,eople v. 'eridiano, 194 S7/* (4#$ !nder the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the /T7 of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. [See /ule 11#, Section (, /ules of 7ourt$ The 7ourt heldD Indeed2 pursuant to the Rtough on bail pending appealR policy2 the presence o! bail0negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation o! bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court !or an o!!ense punishable by death2 reclusion perpetua or li!e imprisonment 4here bail is prohibited. [)eviste v. Court o! *ppeals , ../. 0o. 1"1144, ;arch 1:, 4 1 , 21( S7/* 211, 2#", cited in @ui v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 112121, September 42, 4 14, Third >ivision, Aelasco$
refusal of the accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case against him. [,eople v. Resano, 194 S7/* :1$ The constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails until a promulgation of final conviction is made. [ rillanes v. ,imentel , ../. 0o. 1:1"1:, Cune 4:, 4 "$ >enial of right to preliminary investigation is a denial of due process, even if the right to a preliminary investigation is just a statutory right. [,atanao v. Enage, 141 S7/* 44"$ >enial of this right, in the absence of a waiver, will violate due process. [Bunye v. Sandiganbayan, 4 ( S7/* 14$ 'reliminary investigation is a component part of due process in criminal justice. [ Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 921 S7/* 419$ T$e Om u%sman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. %ndeed, we have said in -necht v. +esierto [9(9 'hil. #1# @111"B$ and later in Mamburao2 Inc. v. &!!ice o! the &mbudsman [91" 'hil. :24 @4 B$ and -araan v. &!!ice o! the &mbudsman [#:2 'hil. (92 @4 #B$ that should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. ;oreover, i& is also !i&$in &$eir %is're&ion &o %e&ermine !$e&$er or no& preliminar( in/es&i#a&ion s$oul% e 'on%u'&e%7 The 7ourt has undoubtedly ac&nowledged the powers of the <mbudsman to %ismiss a 'omplain& ou&ri#$& !i&$ou& a preliminar( in/es&i#a&ion in he ,residential *d Hoc 3act0 3inding Committee on Behest )oans v. +esierto . [#9: 'hil. : 4 @4 4B$ Ge reiterate that the <mbudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The 7ourt therefore gives due deference to the <mbudsman?s decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Aelasco. [(udge *ngeles v. /utierrez 0 ../. 0os. 1"1121 P 1"11:9, ;arch 41, 4 14$ The ri&ht to #e ssisted #( counsel is indispens #le only in judici l crimin l proceedin&s. 2 The right to counsel begins from the time a person is ta&en into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime. [,eople v. )ino, 112 S7/* " 1$ The right to counsel does not cease after trial- 'on&inues on appeal. [,eople v. Rio, 4 1 S7/* : 4$ >eaf)mute could not defend himself at the trial because of lac& of sign language expert. 7onviction reversed. [,eople v. ,arazo, 91 S7/* 1#2$ The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling. =ven if there is an erroneous designation [e.g., Section 9b of the *nti) .raft 6aw$, an accused may still be convicted of bribery if the information properly +describes, the offense. [Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 191 S7/* 1"#$ * person charged with rape, of which he was absolved, cannot be convicted of qualified seduction, which was not included in the
The Ri&hts of the 0ccused ACCUSATION is not synonymous with guilt. [,eople v. +ramayo, #4 S7/* (1$ T$e 'ons&i&u&ional presump&ion of inno'en'e may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct, such as +the wic&ed flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion., [,eople v. )abara, *pril 4 , 11(#$ Es'ape from detention during the pendency of the case before the trial court is in itself an indication of his guilt. [ ,eople v. Isang, ../. 0o. 1"9 ":, >ecember #, 4 "$ Possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it. [.S v. Espia, 12 'hil. ( 2$ +*ny person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the StateQprovided that the filing of the charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.L 5 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence. [+umlao v. C&ME)EC, 1( S7/* 914$ No inferen'e of #uil& may be drawn against an accused for his failure to ma&e a statement of any sort. [,eople v. *rciaga, 11 S7/* 1$ Ghile the accused has a right to be silent, they run the ris& of an inference from the non)production of evidence. [,eople v. Solis, 14" S7/* 41:$ 3ailure or
information. [,eople v. Ramirez, 21 S7/* 1##$ 7onviction of the accused of rape by intimidation under an information charging him with raping his daughter while she was asleep and unconscious would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [,eople v. *bino, 9:4 S7/* ( $ * person charged with homicide by drowning cannot be convicted of homicide by stabbing. [ ,eople v. &rtega, 4:2 S7/* 122$ The use of the words +aggravatingKqualifying circumstances, will not add any essential element to the crime. 0either will the use of such words further apprise the accused of the nature of the charge. The specific allegation of the attendant circumstance in the %nformation, coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections " and 1 of /ule 11 , is sufficient to warn the accused. ['eople v. de la 7ruE, ../. 0o. 1:#9:1, >ecember 11, 4 "$ 'etitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed +in relation to their office., 'etitioners were thus not placed in danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0os. 11122 )21, 3ebruary 19, 4 1, 4 1- /uy v. ,eople, ../. 0os. 122:1#)12, ;arch 4 , 4 1$ T$e amen%men& entails the deletion of the phrase +gross neglect of duty, from the %nformation. *lthough this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. *s a replacement, +gross inexcusable negligence, would be included in the %nformation as a modality in the commission of the offense. This 7ourt believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. [*lbert v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0o. 12# 1(, 3ebruary 42, 4 1$ Pe&i&ioner 'laims that the information filed against him charged him with violation of *rt. 1:1 of the /'7 in his capacity as 8oard ;ember of the Sangguniang ,anlala4igan, but the Sandiganbayan convicted him of violation of *rt. 1:4 as a private individual. Thus, he avers, he had not been given a chance to defend himself from a criminal charge of which he had been convicted, claiming a violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and his right to due process of law. The last paragraph of *rt. 1:4 does not specify that the offending person is a public or private individual as does its par. 1. The crime in *rt. 1:1 is absorbed by the last paragraph of *rt. 1:4. The headings in italics of the two articles are not controlling. Ghat is controlling is not the title of the complaint, or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. [,actolin v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0o. 121#((, ;ay 4 , 4 ", Aelasco$ *dmittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of committing a violation of Section 9@eB of /* 0o. 9 11 with technical
precision by using the disjunctive term LorL instead of the conjunctive term Land.L 0onetheless, in the early case of /allego2 et al. v. Sandiganbayan [4 1 'hil. 9:1 @11"4B$, the 7ourt already clarified that the phrases Lmanifest partiality,L Levident bad faithL and Lgross inexcusable negligenceL are merely descriptive of the different modes by which the offense penaliEed in Section 9@eB of /* 0o. 9 11 may be committed, and that the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses. [(aca v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 12212:, Canuary 4", 4 19$ The 7* further ratiocinated that the variance in the two crimes is not fatal to 'ielago?s conviction. %ndeed, in order to obtain a conviction for rape by sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish the elements that constitute such crime. *rticle 422)*@4B of the /evised 'enal 7ode explicitly provides that the gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis into another person?s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person?s genital or anal orifice. %n the instant case, this element is clearly present when *** straightforwardly testified in court that 'ielago inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus. Curisprudence has it that testimonies of child) victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl)child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Thus, ***?s unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of 'ielago as the malefactor, established the case for the prosecution. [,ielago v. ,eople ) ../. 0o. 4 4 4 , ;arch 19, 4 19$ The 7* correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was +a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with., The right of ;anansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 1#@4B, *rticle %%% of the 11": 7onstitution was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less :( grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less :( grams of dried marijuana leaves. *s )acerna and similar rulings have explained, the Vcrime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section # of /epublic *ct 0o. 2#4(, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. *s such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. [Section #, /ule 14 , /ules of 7ourt @11""B$ *ccording to Section (, /ule 14 , /ules of 7ourt @11"(B, the rule then applicable, an offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. [,eople v. Manansala ) ../. 0o. 1:(191, *pril 9, 4 19, 3irst >ivision, 8ersamin$ E+'ep&ion to the right to meet witnesses face to face 5 dying declarations. The ri&ht to cross2ex mine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 7learly, the right to cross)examine a witness, although a fundamental right of a party, may be waived. [E5uitable ,CIBan#ing Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation, ../. 0o. 1"44#", >ecember 1", 4 "$ %f a witness dies before his cross) examination, his direct testimony can be stric&en off the record- may be retained if the material points of his direct testimony had been covered on cross. [,eople v. Seneres, 11 S7/* 14- ,eople v. /orospe, 141 S7/* 499$ 3ailure to invo&e right to compulsory process constitutes a waiver that cannot be rectified or undone on appeal. [.S v. /arcia, 1 'hil. 9"#$ %t is the court?s duty to compel the attendance of persons subject of subpoenas. [ ,eople v. Barda?e, 11 S7/* 9""$ ) The rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution to cross examine the witness against him and to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf does not lie. 7T* 7ase 0o. :12 is not a criminal prosecution, and even granting that it is related to %.S. 0o. 4 ()4 9, the respondents in the latter proceeding are the officers and accountant of petitioner)corporation, not petitioner. [3itness +esign2 Inc. v. Commissioner o! Internal Revenue , ../. 0o. 1::1"4, <ctober 1:, 4 "$ There can be no valid conviction before a valid arraignment. [Bor?a v. Mendoza, :: S7/* #44$ The right to be present at trial is a personal right that may be waived, BUT his presence may be required if it is necessary for purposes of identification [,eople v. ,residing (udge , 14( S7/* 421 and ,eople v. Macaraeg, 1#1 S7/* 9:$ and also for arraignment. [ *5uino v. Military Commission 1o. 92 29 S7/* (#2$ * trial in absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the /ules of 7ourt regarding forfeiture of the bail bond if the accused fails to appear. [/ule 11#, Section 41$ [,eople v. ,rieto, "# S7/* 11"$ The Writ of 8 #e s Corpus ) The liberty of a person may be restored by habeas corpus where he is subjected to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention, or even by moral restraint, as when a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her. [Caunca v. Salazar, "4 'hil. "(1$ * prisoner convicted by a court without jurisdiction or where his sentence has become invalid, as in the case of a person convicted of a crime of a political complexion during the Capanese <ccupation after restoration of the legitimate government, may avail himself of the writ. [*lcantara v. +irector o! ,risons , :( 'hil. :#1$ 8 #e s corpus is also available to a person sentence to a longer penalty than that subsequently meted out to another person
convicted of the same offense [/umabon v. +irector o! ,risions, 9: S7/* #4 $ or in cases of unlawful denial of bail [>a!ra v. City $arden, 1: S7/* ::1$ * restricti%e custod( and monitorin& of mo%ements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. [ Manalo v. Calderon, ../. 0o. 1:"14 , <ctober 1(, 4 :$ A A@0(ear0ol% !i%o! had been living with her nephew, who acted as her guardian. Jer other relatives too& her, and said nephew filed a petition for habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instancesD @1B deprivation of a person?s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and @4B withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. %f the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 'etition dismissed because of finding that the widow was not being detained and restrained of her liberty. [ In the Matter o! the petition o! Habeas Corpus o! Eu!emia E. Rodriguez2 !iled by Edgardo E. 'eluz, ../. 0o. 121#"4, Canuary 41, 4 "$ The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal &illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. [Section 1$ ;ere substantial evidence is required. [Section 1:$ 5 a writ of amparo should not be issued when the petition merely states that he is +under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely Uin custody.? [ Salcedo v. Bollozos3 *.;. 0<. /TC)1 )4492, Culy (, 4 1 $- or to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial, as in this forcible entry case, where enforcement of the judgment had resulted in violence. [ apuz v. del Rosario, ../. 0o. 1"4#"#, Cune 1:, 4 "$- excludes the protection of property rights. [Ro%as v. Macapagal0*rroyo, ../. 0o. 1"11((, September :, 4 1 $, such as the threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court. [Canlas v. 1apico Homeo4ners= *ssociation, ../. 0o. 1"4:1(, Cune (, 4 "$ A pe&i&ion for a Writ of 0mp ro may be filed by any concerned citiEen, organiEation, association or institution only if there is no &nown member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. [Section 4 of the /ule on the $rit o! *mparo ) *.;. 0o. :)1)14)S7, <ctober 4#, 4 :$ BUT a petition for a $rit o! Habeas Corpus may be filed by any person on behalf of the aggrieved party. [Boac v. Cadapan, ./ 0o. 1"##21, ;ay 91, 4 11$ The Grit of Jabeas >ata requires concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. [Section 2 [a$ and should not issue for purposes of +fishing expeditions., [ apuz v. del Rosario, ../. 0o. 1"4#"#, Cune 1:, 4 "$ The Grit of Jabeas >ata may not be granted on the basis of labor)related issues. [Manila Electric Company v. )im, ../. 0o. 1"#:21, <ctober (, 4 1 $ The Ri&ht & inst Self2Incrimin tion ) A.AILABLE not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations. ;ay be claimed not only by an accused, but also by any witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed. ,$en a/aila le 5 an accused may altogether refuse to testify 5 as to an ordinary witness, including witnesses in legislative inquiries, the right may be invo&ed only as and when the incriminating question is as&ed. [Senate v. Ermita, ../. 0o. 121:::, *pril 4 , 4 2- Sabio v. /ordon, ../. 0o. 1:#9# , <ctober 1:, 4 2- Standard Chartered Ban# v. Senate Committee on Ban#s2 3inancial Institutions and Currencies , ../. 0o. 12:1:9, >ecember 4:, 4 :$ * person charged with rape may be examined for gonorrhea, which would be the same as fingerprinting or examining other parts or features of the body for identification purposes. [ .S v. an eng , 49 'hil. 1#($ * woman accused of adultery may be examined to determine if she is pregnant. ['illa!lor v. Summers, #1 'hil. 24$ The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. [ Holt v. .S, 41" !S 4#(- *lih v. Castro, 1(1 S7/* 4:1$ BUT NOTE Soci l *ustice Societ( %. / n&erous /ru&s 6o rd 5[../. 0o. 1(:": , 0ovember 9, 4 "$, where the Supreme 7ourt invalidated mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes for being a violation of their right to privacy. The prohibition applies to compulsion for the production of documents, papers and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the state has a right to inspect the same, such as the boo&s of accounts of corporations, under the police power. [# $igmore, Sec. 42#$ The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecution for falsification. [Beltran v. Samson, (9 'hil. (: $ 0rticle III3 Section ;I7 G9H No person s$all e %e&aine% solel( ( reason of $is poli&i'al eliefs an% aspira&ions7 G>H No in/olun&ar( ser/i&u%e in an( form s$all e+is& e+'ep& as a punis$men& for a 'rime !$ereof &$e par&( s$all $a/e een %ul( 'on/i'&e%7 CO.ERS slavery and peonage. [/evised 'enal 7ode 5 penalties are imposed upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to wor& for him, against his will, as household servant or farm) laborer. @*rticle 4#:B$
E-CEPTIONS 5 [1$ punis$men& for a 'rime [4$ mili&ar( ser/i'e [*rt. %%, Sec. #- ,eople v. >osa, 9" <. 12:2$ [9$ na/al enlis&men& [/obertson v. 8aldwin, 12( !S 4#($[#$ posse comit tus [.S v. ,ompeya, 91 'hil. 4#($ [($ re&urn &o !or" or%ers [-aisahan ng Manggaga4a sa -ahoy v. /otamco Sa4mills, #( <. Supp. 0o. 1, p. 1#:$ [2$ p tri potest s 5 unemancipated minors must obey their parents [7ivil 7ode, *rticle 911$ * housemaid who was being detained and required to render services was released on habeas corpus. [Caunca v. Salazar, "4 'hil. "(1$ The !S Supreme 7ourt declared as unconstitutional a penal statute declaring persons who receive advance payment for wor& but subsequently refuse to wor& as having induced said advance payment with intent to defraud. [,olloc# v. $illiams, 944 !S #$ Punishment PENALTY must ordinarily be proportionate to the offense 8!T, where the offense has become so rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent, a more severe penalty may be justified, li&e the theft of coconuts or jeeps, punished as qualified theft under the /evised 'enal 7ode. ) MECHANICAL failure in electric chair considered an unforeseeable event 5 not cruel and unusual punishment. [)ouisiana v. Res4eber, 941 !S #(1$ 0rticle III3 Section ;J F=< T$e emplo(men& of p$(si'al) ps('$olo#i'al) or %e#ra%in# punis$men& a#ains& an( prisoner or %e&ainee or &$e use of su s&an%ar% or ina%e6ua&e penal fa'ili&ies un%er su $uman 'on%i&ions s$all e %eal& !i&$ ( la!7 0rticle III3 Section =@7 No person s$all e imprisone% for %e & or non0pa(men& of a poll &a+7 DEBT 5 refers to any civil obligation arising from contract, expressed or implied 5 a purely private matter which gives rise only to civil actions. includes even debts obtained through fraud [/ana4ay v. @uillen, #4 'hil. " ($ BUT see Lo' no %. $ rtine' [1#2 S7/* 949$, where it was ruled that a person can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. Je is to be punished for his deceit, not his debt. * law required employers to pay salaries at least once every two wee&s, and punished them for not doing so. .ALID 5 punishment is for refusal to ma&e payment even if capable of ma&ing payment. [,eople v. Merillo, ../. 0o. 6)9# 1, Cune 4", 11(1$ * defendant in a civil action was ordered arrested for contempt because of his failure, owing to his insolvency, to pay the plaintiff past and future support. %0A*6%>. [Sura v. Martin, 42 S7/* 4"2$ 8!T NOTE new law which ma&es failure to give support a criminal offense, which may be justified as a valid exercise of the police power.
*n accused [esta!a$ as&ed to return the money he embeEEled may be subjected to subsidiary imprisonment for his failure to ma&e restitution 8!T the law has been amended and subsidiary imprisonment can be imposed only for non) payment of fines. [.S v. Cara, #1 'hil. "42$ * civil servant who fails to pay a debt may be validly suspended. [3lores v. atad, 12 S7/* 2:2$ /ou#le *eop rd( 2 The principle of double jeopardy applies only to criminal proceedings. [Res ?udicata in prison grey.$ CON.ICTED in ;T7 for grave oral defamation/T7 dismisses appeal on the ground of prescription after finding that the offense committed was only slight oral defamation 5 double jeopardy has set in. [Castro v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 1" "94, Culy 49, 4 "$ The principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. [Cayao0)asam v. Ramolet, ../. 0o. 1(1194, >ecember 1", 4 "$ REJUISITES 5 [1$ " lid compl int or inform tion 2 %f, without the express consent of the accused, the information is dismissed on the ground that it is defective when it is not so in fact, another prosecution based on the same allegation will constitute double jeopardy. [.S v. "am ung $ay, 41 'Jhil. 2:$ PETITIONERS and the other accused pleaded not guilty to the original informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners, through a joint petition for bail, they raised the issue of lac& of jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed +in relation to their office., <n the same day, respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0os. 11122 )21, 3ebruary 19, 4 1, 4 1$ The change of the offense charged from 8omicide to $urder is merely a form l mendment nd not su#st nti l mendment or a substitution. Jomicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder- thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the %nformation and not the dismissal of the original %nformation. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word +Jomicide, and writing the word +;urder,, instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. [,acoy v. Ca?igal, ../. 0<. 1(:#:4, September 4", 4 :$ 'etitioners cannot be validly convicted on the basis of the original information as the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that the crimes were committed +in relation to their office., 'etitioners were thus not placed in danger of being convicted when they entered their plea of not guilty to the
insufficient information. [Herrera v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0os. 11122 )21, 3ebruary 19, 4 1, 4 1- /uy v. ,eople, ../. 0os. 122:1#) 12, ;arch 4 , 4 1$ [4$ -iled #efore competent court
* person charged before an incompetent court is not placed in first jeopardy because, obviously, a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. [+e /uzman v. Escalona, 1" S7/* 211$ Ghere an information is motu proprio dismissed for lac& of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to hear, said dismissal will benefit the accused who shall be entitled to plead double jeopardy. [.S v. Regala, 4" 'hil. (:$ The Supreme 7ourt ruled that military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians. Cudgments invalidated. [&laguer v. Military Commission, 1( S7/* 1##$ So, in Cru' %. Enrile [12 S7/* : 4, it said cases may be re)tried, as there were no valid previous proceedings. BUT in T n %. 6 rrios [11 S7/* 2"2$, the Supreme 7ourt said that its ruling in Ol &uer should be applied prospectively only to future cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Jence, in the interest of justice and consistency, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Ol &uer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. <nly in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the 7onstitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the &laguer doctrine. %f a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process. %f a court)martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it may legally ta&e cogniEance- x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 11 4, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the *rmy, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the 'hilippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the !nited States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory. @ Marcos v. Chie! o! Sta!!2 *3,, "1 'hil, 4#2 @11(1B, at 4#")4(1, cited in /arcia v. E%ecutive Secretary ) ../. 0o. 11"((#, Culy 9 , 4 14, Third >ivision, 'eralta$ AN IN3ORMATION 3OR PARRICIDE dismissed by a regional trial court based on a mere manifestation of the public prosecutor, and without the judge ma&ing an independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record,
which dismissal resulted in the recall of the warrant of arrest$, is %0=33=7T!*6, and the judge is to be considered as having gravely abused his discretion, such that the subsequent filing of a case for rec&less imprudence resulting in parricide filed with the ;eT7 would not vest in it jurisdiction over the new case, the /T7 having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent. [Honrales v. Honrales , ../. 0o. 1"42(1, *ugust 4(, 4 1 $ [9$ To which the defend nt h d ple ded 0o double jeopardy if the complaint is dismissed before arraignment of the accused. [ .S v. Solis, 2 'hil. 2:2$ The accused, after pleading guilty, testified to prove mitigating circumstances. 'lea of guilty deemed vacated because of the testimony. 0o double jeopardy as there was no valid plea upon promulgation of judgment of acquittal. [,eople v. Balisacan, 1: S7/* 1111$ [#$ Of which he h d #een pre%iousl( c1uitted or con%icted or which w s dismissed or otherwise termin ted without his express consent >ismissal with the express consent of the accused will not bar another prosecution but consent, to be effective, must be express. ;ere silence or failure of the accused to object to the dismissal cannot be considered as consent. [,eople v. "lagan, (" 'hil. "(1$ The prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case in the morning. >efense counsel offered no objection. %n the afternoon of the same day, defense counsel and the accused submitted a formal manifestation objecting to the dismissal. SC ) =xpress consent. 0o double jeopardy. [,eople v. ,ilpa, :2 S7/* "1$ >ismissal, even if with the express consent of the accused, will give rise to double jeopardy if the same is based on the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution 5 acquittal. %n this case, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari questioning the erroneous dismissal by the judge. S7 said however erroneous the order of dismissal is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, double jeopardy sets in. [,eople v. City Court o! Silay, :# S7/* 4#"$ Rule ;;E3 Section J 5 the grant of a motion to quash, filed by the defendant before he ma&es his plea, can be appealed as the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy !06=SS &$e asis for &$e %ismissal is &$e e+&in'&ion of 'riminal lia ili&( an% %ou le 5eopar%(7 [)os Banos v. ,edro, ../. 0o. 1:9("", *pril 44, 4 1$ * judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. [,eople v. errado, ../. 0o. 1#"442, Culy 1#, 4 ", ((" S7/* "#, 19$ *s we have previously held in ,eople v. Court o! *ppeals [../. 0o. 1(1421, 3ebruary 41, 4 :, (12 S7/* 9"9$, La verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.L [Id., at 91:$ True,
the finality of acquittal rule is not one without exception as when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac& or excess of jurisdiction. %n such a case, the judgment of acquittal may be questioned through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under /ule 2( of the /ules of 7ourt. %n the instant case, however, we cannot treat the appeal as a /ule 2( petition as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate the judgment of acquittal. Suffice it to state that the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of evidence against both appellant and .inumtad. %t is a well)settled rule that this 7ourt accords great respect and full weight to the trial court?s findings, unless the trial court overloo&ed substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the case. [ ,eople v. Montinola, ../. 0o. 1:" 21, Canuary 91, 4 ", (#9 S7/* #14, #4:$ %t is not at all irregular for a court to convict one of the accused and acquit the other. The acquittal of .inumtad in this case is final and it shall not be disturbed. [,eople v. Banig ) ../. 0o. 1::19:, *ugust 49, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, del 7astillo$ %n the present case, the withdrawal of the criminal cases did not include a categorical dismissal thereof by the /T7. >ouble jeopardy had not set in because Soriano was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the fifty one @(1B cases against her. %t stands to reason therefore that the fifth requisite which requires conviction or acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. xxx. Since we have held that the ;arch 1:, 4 # <rder granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. =rgo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in. [See Cerezo v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 1"(49 , 1 Cune 4 11, 2( S7/* 444, 441, cited in ,hilippine 1ational Ban# v. Soriano ) ../. 0o. 12# (1, <ctober 9, 4 14, Second >ivision, 'ereE$ Appeal of &$e Prose'u&ion 0 *n a'6ui&&al [7astro v. 'eople, Culy 49, 4 "$ or a %ismissal %ue &o insuffi'ien'( of e/i%en'e ['eople v. 7ity 7ourt of Silay, :# S7/* 4#"$, except one made with grave abuse of discretion [.alman v. Sandiganbayan, 11# S7/* #9$, or a dismissal based on a %enial of ri#$& &o a spee%( trial ['eople v. *nano, 1: 'hil. 4"$, gives rise to double jeopardy. The grant of a %emurrer &o e/i%en'e operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, unless the court acted with grave abuse of discretion, as when the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case [when the court pre)emptively dismissed the case or aborted its right to complete its presentation of evidence$ or where the trial was a sham. ['eople v. Tan, ../. 0o. 12:(42, Culy 42, 4 1 $, even if done at the instance of the accused, give rise to double jeopardy, unless it can be shown that the court?s actions are tainted by grave abuse of discretion. ['eople v. 'ablo, 1" S7/* 4"1$
Gi/en that Custice 0ario?s %er# l order dismissing 7riminal 7ase 0os. 4(144)4(191 [on the ground of the accused?s right to a speedy trial$ is null and void, and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invo&e the constitutional right against double jeopardy. %n the instant 'etition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal cases against petitioners. [(acob v. Sandiganbayan, ../. 0o. 1244 2, 0ovember 1:, 4 1 $ Crimes Co%ered 2 The original offense charged OR for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof </ for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original complaint of information. [E%amples 5 murder and homicide$ /octrine of Super%enin& E%ent 2 *n accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged </ 7<0A%7T=>. [ Melo v. ,eople, "( 'hil. :22$ * person convicted of physical injuries may still be prosecuted for homicide if the victim dies later. [ +iaz v. .S, 449 !S ##4$ *fter pleading not guilty to a complaint for slight physical injuries, the charge was changed to serious physical injuries after it was determined that the injuries became permanent scars. 0o double jeopardy. [,eople v *dil, :2 S7/* #24$ Insep r #le Offenses 2 Ghere one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions, such as smo&ing and possession of opium. [.S v. ,oh Chi, 4 'hil. 1# $ <ne who steals several things from the same person on the same occasion can be held accountable only for one crime of theft. [,eople v. umlos, 2: 'hil. 94 $ <ne already convicted of less serious physical injuries cannot be later prosecuted for assault on a person in authority committed on the same occasion and against the same victim. [ acas v. Cariaso, :4 S7/* (4"$ PETITIONER was charged before the ;eT7 with two separate offensesD @1B /ec&less %mprudence /esulting in Slight 'hysical %njuries @7riminal 7ase 0o. "492:B- and @4B /ec&less %mprudence /esulting in Jomicide and >amage to 'roperty @7riminal 7ase 0o. "4922B. 'etitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in 7riminal 7ase 0o. "492: and was meted out the penalty of public censure. %nvo&ing this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the %nformation in 7riminal 7ase 0o. "4922 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of rec&less imprudence. /ec&less imprudence under *rticle 92( is a single quasi)offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi)offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi)offense, regardless of its various resulting acts [ ,eople v. +iaz. [1# 'hil. :1( @11(#B$ 'rosecutions under *rticle 92( should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. %n imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under *rticle 92( for each consequence alleged and proven. %n short, there shall be no splitting of charges under *rticle 92(, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. [Ivler v. Modesto0San ,edro, ../. 0o. 1:4:12, 0ovember 1:, 4 1 $ It is possi#le for one ct to &i%e rise to se%er l crimes 5 violation of motor vehicles law and damage to property. [,eople v. /uanco, #: <. #1:1$ O&$er e+amples ) falsification and violation of conditional pardon [Culanag v. +irector o! ,risons, 4 S7/* 1149$- illegal possession of firearms and carrying unlicensed firearms during the election period [ apales v. C*, 14 S7/* #:1$- %llegal recruitment and =stafa [,eople v. Saley, 411 S7/* :1($- ;urder and illegal possession of firearms [,eople v. ac0an, 1"4 S7/* 2 1$ * person acquitted of consented abduction was subsequently charged with qualified seduction arising from the same act on which an earlier prosecution was based. 0o double jeopardy. [,erez v. C*, 12" S7/* 492$ Ghether there can be a separate offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition if there is another crime committed was already addressed in *gote v. )orenzo. *gote, li&e petitioner herein, was convicted of separate charges of @1B illegal possession of firearm and ammunition and @4B violation of the election gun ban by the /T7 and the 7*. Jowever, applying Section 1 of /* "41#, we set aside *gote?s conviction for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same time @violation of the election gun banB. [Madrigal v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 1"421#, *ugust 19, 4 "$ * person who stole several items from a single victim on a single occasion may be prosecuted can be charged with only one crime of theft. [,eople v. umlos, 2: 'hil. 94 $ L ws nd Ordin nces 2 * person convicted of ?ueteng under an ordinance may not again be charged with the same act under the provisions of the /evised 'enal 7ode. %f the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. [ "ap v. )euterio, 6)1422, *pril 9 , 11(1$ The accused was charged for having installed a jumper under an ordinance. 7omplaint dismissed on the ground of prescription. 6ater, he was charged with theft of electricity under the /'7. 7ourt dismissed the second case, upon motion of the accused. The Supreme 7ourt sustained the dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. [,eople v. Relova, 1#" S7/* 414$ 0rticle III3 Section ==. No ex post f cto la! or ill of a&&ain%er s$all e ena'&e%7 E- POST 3ACTO LA,S 5 [1$ refer to criminal matters [4$ are retroactive in their application [9$ wor& to the prejudice of the accused ) E.EN if the law is criminal in nature and is made to operate retroactively, it will not be e% post !acto if it favors the accused. NOT E7 POST -0CTO ) Gar profits tax law retroactively imposing taxes in income acquired during the Capanese occupation. [ Republic v.
3ernandez, 11 'hil. 19#$ 'reventive suspension provided for in /* 9 11, not punitive, merely preventive. [Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 14" S7/* 9"9$ Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are not laws. [Montenegro v. Castaneda, 11 'hil. ""4$ The enactment of /.*. 0o.112 , on the other hand, is a significant development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted ban&ing transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere ban&ing regulation. To be sure, an indictment against =strada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of e% post !acto laws. [,eople v. Estrada, ../. 0os. 12#92")21, *pril 4, 4 1$ 0ot being penal laws, *dministrative <rder 0o. 19 and ;emorandum <rder 0o. 21 cannot be characteriEed as e%0post !acto laws. [ he ,residential *d0Hoc 3act03inding Committee on Behest )oans K33CB)M v. +esierto , ../. 0o. 1#(1"#, ;arch 1#, 4 "$ /* 19:1 providing for forfeiture as a penalty cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the 7onstitution condemning e% post !acto laws. [-atigba# v. Solicitor /eneral, 1" S7/* (# $ * new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. Jowever, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws. *lthough an additional fine of '1(, . is imposed by /.*. 0o. "41#, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under '.>. 0o. 1"22. ['aleroso v. ,eople, ../. 0o. 12#"1(, 3ebruary 44, 4 "$ *n *dministrative <rder limiting the authority of the <ffice of the 'resident to review determinations of the Secretary of Custice to capital offenses is not ex post facto, for being a mere procedural rule. [See *ngeles v. /aite, ../. 0o. 12(4:2, 0ovember 4(, 4 1$ /emedial laws may be given retroactive effect. ['ictorias Milling Co.2 Inc. v. ,adilla, ../. 0o. 1(2124, <ctober 2, 4 "$ <n 4 ;ay 4 2, /epublic *ct 0o. 19##, otherwise &nown as the LCuvenile Custice and Gelfare *ct of 4 2,L too& effect. Section 2" thereof specifically provides for its retro cti%e pplic tion [,eople v. Sarcia, ../. 0o. 1212#1, 1 September 4 1, (11 S7/* 4 $ xxx. 7learly, /epublic *ct 0o. 19## is applicable in this case even though the crime was committed four @#B years prior to its enactment and effectivity. 'arenthetically, with more reason should /epublic *ct 0o. 19## apply to this case as the 4 ( conviction by the lower courts was still under review when the law too& effect in 4 2. [ ,eople v. Sarcia, ../. 0o. 1212#1, 1 September 4 1, (11
S7/* 4 , at #")#1$ Section 9" of /epublic *ct 0o. 19## warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that heKshe has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. [ ,eople v. (acinto, ../. 0o. 1"4491, 12 ;arch 4 11, 2#( S7/* (1 , 241$ [,eople v. Monticalvo ) ../. 0o. 119( :, Canuary 9 , 4 19, Second >ivision, 'ereE$ BILL O3 ATTAINDER 5 a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. %t is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder. *nti)Subversion *ct is a bill of attainder because it pronounced the guilt of the 7'' without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial. [,eople v. 3errer, #" S7/* 9"4$ The !S Supreme 7ourt considered as a bill of attainder a law prohibiting payment from public funds of compensation to individually named respondents, except for jury or military service, unless they were reappointed by the 'resident with the advice and consent of the Senate. 5 punishment without judicial trial. [ .S v. )ovett, 949 !S 9 9$ An or%inan'e required employees to execute affidavits stating whether or not they were ever members of the 7ommunist 'arty and prohibiting the employment of persons who had advocated the overthrow of the government 5 .ALID 5 not #ill of tt inder 5 no punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. [/arner v. Board o! ,ublic $or#s o! )os *ngeles, 9#1 !S :1:$ R7A7 No7 A??; is not a bill of attainder. * bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. =ssential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lac& of judicial trial. [Misolas v. ,anga, ../. 0o. "99#1, Canuary 9 , 111 , 1"1 S7/* 2#", 2(1$ xxx. /.*. 0o. 199( does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. %t does not see& to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. /.*. 0o. 199( merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a 8%/ or 8<7 official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. [Bureau o! Customs Employees *ssociation v. eves ) ../. 0o. 1"1: #, >ecember 2, 4 11, En Banc, Aillarama$ CITIKENSHIP CITIKENSHIP is membership in a political community with all its concomitant rights and responsibilities.
* child born of a 3ilipino mother on Canuary 1:, 11:9 is a natural)born 3ilipino citiEen. * child born on Canuary 1:, 11:9 of a natural)born 3ilipino mother who, at the time of his birth, had embraced the citiEenship of her husband is a citiEen of the country of his father. 7hildren born of 3ilipino mothers before Canuary 1:, 11:9 could have elected 'hilippine citiEenship until the year 111#. * child born of a 3ilipino mother before Canuary 1:, 11:9 who elects 'hilippine citiEenship upon reaching the age of majority is a natural)born 3ilipino citiEen. NATURALIKATION is a process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by operation of law, the citiEenship of another state. DIRECT naturaliEation is effected by [1$ in%i/i%ual pro'ee%in#s, usually judicial, under general naturaliEation laws [4$ by spe'ial a'& of &$e le#isla&ure, often in favor of distinguished foreigners who have rendered some notable service to the local state [9$ by 'olle'&i/e '$an#e of na&ionali&( [naturaliEation en masse$ as a result of cession or subjugation and [($ in some cases, by a%op&ion of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are born. DERI.ATI.E naturaliEation is conferred on [1$ the !ife of the naturaliEed husband [4$ on the minor '$il%ren of the naturaliEed parent and [9$ on the alien !oman upon marriage to a national. 0<T= 5 does not always follow as a matter of course, for it is usually made subject to stringent restrictions and conditions. <ur own laws provide that an alien woman married to a 3ilipino shall acquire his citiEenship only i! she hersel! might be la4!ully naturalized. ;inor children born and residing in the 'hilippines shall, upon the naturaliEation of their fathers, be considered naturaliEed 3ilipinos. ;inor children born outside the 'hilippines but residing in the 'hilippines upon the naturaliEation of their fathers, shall be considered naturaliEed 3ilipinos. 7hildren of naturaliEed 3ilipinos born outside the 'hilippines shall be considered naturaliEed citiEens but only upon their election of 'hilippine citiEenship upon the attainment of the age of majority and their ta&ing of an oath of allegiance. * naturaliEed 3ilipino may be +denaturaliEed, if he becomes a nominal director of a corporation, pursuant to a shareholders? agreement, to accommodate his compadre, a foreigner, who wants to gain control of the corporation?s board of directors. The +denaturaliEation, of a naturaliEed 3ilipino shall have the effect of denaturaliEing his wife and children only if the ground for revo&ing his naturaliEation were based on the intrinsic validity of his naturaliEation. The State may revo&e the naturaliEation of a 3ilipino on petition of the Solicitor .eneral. %t is the State, through the Solicitor .eneral, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturaliEation in the appropriate denaturaliEation proceedings. %t is not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturaliEed citiEen?s descendant. [)im#aichong v. C&ME)EC , ../. 0os. 1:""91)94, *pril 1, 4 1$
RA A>>; ) Sec. #. +erivative Citizenship. ) The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen @1"B years of age, of those who re)acquire 'hilippine citiEenship upon effectivity of this *ct shall be deemed citiEens of the 'hilippines. CA :? 5 'hilippine citiEenship may be los& by 5 [1$ na&urali*a&ion in a foreign country [4$ e+press renun'ia&ion of citiEenship [9$ su s'ri in# &o an oa&$ of alle#ian'e to support the 7onstitution or laws of a forei#n 'oun&r( upon attaining eighteen years of age or more, provided, however, that a 3ilipino may not divest himself of 'hilippine citiEenship in any manner while the /epublic of the 'hilippines is at war with any country [#$ ren%erin# ser/i'e to or accepting commission in the arme% for'es of a forei#n 'oun&r( , unless with the consent of the /epublic of the 'hilippines, if it has a defensive pact with said foreign country, if said foreign country maintains armed forces in the 'hilippines with its consent, etc. [($ 'an'ella&ion of the certificate of naturaliEation [2$ having been declared a %eser&er in times of war, unless a plenary ardon or amnesty has been granted [:$ in case of a woman, upon $er marria#e &o a forei#ner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband?s country, sh acquires his nationality. 'J%6%''%0= 7%T%W=0SJ%' may be RE0 ACJUIRED by [1$ na&urali*a&ion, provided that the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturaliEation. [NOTE 5 Bengzon v. House o! Representatives$ [4$ repa&ria&ion of deserters, provided a woman who lost her citiEenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with te provisions of section 4 of 7* 29 after the termination of the marital status [9$ %ire'& a'& of Con#ress * soldier who renounced his 3ilipino citiEenship and joined the !S *rmy during the Second Gorld Gar shall not be considered as having lost his or her 'hilippine citiEenship despite his or her express or implied renunciation of the same. RA A>>; ) %t is hereby declared the policy of the State that all 'hilippine citiEens of another country shall be %eeme% no& &o $a/e los& their 'hilippine citiEenship under the conditions of this *ct. *ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural)born citiEenship by reason of their naturaliEation as citiEens of a foreign country are hereby %eeme% &o $a/e re0a'6uire% 'hilippine citiEenship upon ta&ing the an oath of allegiance to the /epublic. Na&ural0 orn 'i&i*ens of the 'hilippines who, after the effectivity of this *ct, become citiEens of a foreign country shall re&ain their 'hilippine citiEenship upon ta&ing the aforesaid oath. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen @1"B years of age, of those who re)acquire 'hilippine citiEenship upon effectivity of this *ct shall be deemed citiEens of the 'hilippines. Those who re&ain or re0a'6uire 'hilippine citiEenship under this *ct shall enjoy full 'i/il an% poli&i'al ri#$&s and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the 'hilippines and the following conditionsD @1B Those intending to exercise their ri#$& of suffra#e must
meet the requirements under Section 1, *rticle A of the 7onstitution, /epublic *ct 0o. 11"1, otherwise &nown as LThe <verseas *bsentee Aoting *ct of 4 9L and other existing laws- @4B Those see&ing ele'&i/e pu li' offi'e in the 'hilippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the 7onstitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, ma"e a personal an% s!orn renun'ia&ion of an( an% all forei#n 'i&i*ens$ip before any public officer authoriEed to administer an oath- @9B Those appoin&e% &o an( pu li' offi'e shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the /epublic of the 'hilippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of officeD ,rovided, That they renoun'e &$eir oa&$ of alle#ian'e to the country where they too& that oath- @#B Those intending to pra'&i'e &$eir profession in the 'hilippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice- and @(B That ri#$& &o /o&e or be ele'&e% or appoin&e% to an( pu li' offi'e in the 'hilippines 'anno& be exercised by, or extended to, those whoD @aB are 'an%i%a&es for or are o''up(in# an( pu li' offi'e in the country of which they are naturaliEed citiEens- andKor @bB are in a'&i/e ser/i'e as commissioned or non) commissioned officers in the arme% for'es of the country which they are naturaliEed citiEens. Repu#lic 0ct .o. J==?3 otherwise )nown s the Citi'enship Retention nd Re20c1uisition 0ct3 pplies onl( &o na&ural0 orn 3ilipino 'i&i*ens7 /u l citi'ens under R0 J==? re na&ural0 orn 'i&i*ens7 * dual citiEen who reacquires his citiEenship under /* 144( must comply with the twin requirements of oath of allegiance to the /epublic of the 'hilippines and renunciation of his foreign citiEenship to qualify to run for elective office. [)opez v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 1"4: 1, Culy 49, 4 "$ To qualify as a candidate in 'hilippine elections, 3ilipinos must only have one citiEenship, namely, 'hilippine citiEenship. [(acot v. +al, ../. 0o. 1:1"#", 0ovember 4:, 4 "$ /eacquisition of 'hilippine citiEenship under /epublic *ct 0o. 144( has no automatic impact or effect on his residenceKdomicile, for purposes of registering as a voter or running for public office7 [(apzon v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 1" "", Canuary 11, 4 1$ The so)called twin requirements do not apply to *mericans under the ?us soli rule and 3ilipinos under the ?us sanguinis principle. They are qualified to run for public office independently of the provisions of /* 144(. [Cordora v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 1:21#:, 3ebruary 11, 4 1$ 7onsidering the citiEenship clause @*rt. %AB of our 7onstitution, i& is possi le for &$e follo!in# 'lasses of 'i&i*ens of &$e P$ilippines &o possess %ual 'i&i*ens$ipD @1B Those born of 3ilipino fathers andKor mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of ?us soli- @4B Those born in the 'hilippines of 3ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers? country such children are citiEens of that country- @9BThose who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter?s country the former are considered citiEens, unless by their act
or omission they are deemed to have renounced 'hilippine citiEenship. NOTEL RA A>>; !nder 'hilippine laws, a 3ilipina who marries a foreigner, whose laws ma&e her automatically a citiEen of his country, retains her 3ilipino citiEenship unless by her act or omission she can be deemed to have renounced the same. !nder 'hilippine laws, an alien woman who marries a natural)born 3ilipino automatically becomes a 3ilipino citiEen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hilippines. !nder 'hilippine laws, an alien woman who marries a naturaliEed 3ilipino automatically becomes a 3ilipino citiEen, provided she is not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hilippines. 8oth male and female 3ilipino citiEens shall remain 3ilipinos despite their alien spouses except only when they may be deemed by their act or omission to have renounced their 'hilippine citiEenship. ) !nder Section 1( of 7* #:9, an alien woman marrying a 3ilipino, native)born or naturaliEed, becomes ipso !acto a 3ilipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citiEen of the 'hilippines under Section # of the same law. 6i&ewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturaliEed here follows the 'hilippine citiEenship of her husband the moment he ta&es his oath as 3ilipino citiEen, provided she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section #. [Moya )im "ao v. CIR2 #1 S7/* 414$ /u l citi'enship %oes no& al!a(s resul& in %ual alle#ian'e7 Dual 'i&i*ens$ip is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 3or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citiEens of a state which adheres to the principle of ?us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of ?us soli. Such a person, ipso !acto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citiEen of both states. Dual alle#ian'e, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Ghile dual citiEenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual?s volition. ) 'etitioner was a dual citiEen who consistently voted in successive elections. Je was considered to have effectively elected 'hilippine citiEenship. [Mercado v. Manzano, 9 : S7/* 29 $ 8eing a legitimate child, respondent?s citiEenship followed that of her father who is 7hinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects 'hilippine citiEenship. %t is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citiEenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. [/o2 Sr. v. Ramos, ../. 0os. 12:(21) : and 1:11#2, September #, 4 1, (1" S7/* 422, 41#)41($ *n illegitimate child of 3ilipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citiEens of the 'hilippines- he automatically becomes a citiEen himself. [Id. at 41($ 8ut in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a 3ilipino citiEen, she must
have validly elected 'hilippine citiEenship upon reaching the age of majority. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ../. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruary 1(, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
8ased on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing 'hilippine citiEenship areD @1B a statement of election under oath- @4B an oath of allegiance to the 7onstitution and .overnment of the 'hilippines- and @9B registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. [Ma v. 3ernandez2 (r.2 ../. 0o. 1"9199, Culy 42, 4 1 , 24( S7/* (22, (::$ 3urthermore, no election of 'hilippine citiEenship shall be accepted for registration under 7.*. 0o. 24( unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the *lien /egistration *ct of 11( . %n other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. [/onaldo '. 6edesma, *0 <!T6%0= <3 'J%6%''%0= %;;%./*T%<0 *0> 7%T%W=0SJ%' 6*GS, Aol. %, 4 2 ed., pp. (42$ 'ertinently, the person electing 'hilippine citiEenship is required to file a petition with the 7ommission of %mmigration and >eportation @now 8ureau of %mmigrationB for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of 'hilippine citiEenship and said <ffice will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. [ Id. at (4:, citing ;emorandum <rder dated *ugust 1", 11(2 of the 7%>$ *fterwards, the same is elevated to the ;inistry @now >epartmentB of Custice for final determination and review. [Id., citing ><C <pinion 0o. 1"4 dated *ugust 11, 11"4$ %t should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authoriEes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of 'hilippine citiEenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 4, /ule 1 " of the /ules of 7ourt on Cancellation or Correction o! Entries in the Civil Registry2 merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e.2 election, loss and recovery of citiEenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ../. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruary 1(, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$
8ased on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of 'hilippine citiEenship. /espondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of 'hilippine citiEenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citiEenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the 'hilippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of 'hilippine citiEenship cannot ta&e the place of election of 'hilippine citiEenship. Jence, respondent cannot now be allowed to see& the intervention of the court to confer upon her 'hilippine citiEenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect 'hilippine citiEenship. *s we held in Ching2 [Id. at 14$ the prescribed procedure in electing 'hilippine citiEenship is certainly not a tedious and painsta&ing process. *ll that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of 'hilippine citiEenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Javing failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent?s petition before the trial court must be denied. [Republic o! the ,hilippines v. Sagun ) ../. 0o. 1":(2:, 3ebruary 1(, 4 14, 3irst >ivision, Aillarama$ 3AILURE TO RENOUNCE 3OREIGN CITIKENSHIP in accordance with the exact tenor of Section (@4B of /epublic *ct @/.*.B 0o. 144( renders a dual citiEen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. xxx. The foreign citiEenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authoriEed to administer oath. Ge have stressed in *dvocates and *dherents o! Social (ustice !or School eachers and *llied $or#ers K**S(SM Member v. +atumanong [../. 0o. 12 "21, ;ay 11, 4 :, (49 S7/* 1 "$ that the framers of /.*. 0o. 144( did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citiEenship. [ Sobe?ana0 Condon v. Commission on Elections ) ../. 0o. 11":#4, *ugust 1 , 4 14, En Banc, /eyes$ The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one?s foreign citiEenship is a positive and voluntary act of one?s representation as to one?s nationalityit does not divest 3ilipino citiEenship regained by repatriation but it recants the oath of renunciation required to qualify one to run for elective office [under /* 144($. [Ma5uiling v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 11(2#1, *pril 12, 4 19- see also Reyes v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 4 :42#, Cune 4(, 4 19$ SU33RAGE Se'&ion 97 Suffra#e ma( e e+er'ise% ( all 'i&i*ens of &$e P$ilippines) no& o&$er!ise %is6ualifie% ( la!) !$o are a& leas& ei#$&een (ears of a#e) an% !$o s$all $a/e resi%e% in &$e P$ilippines for a& leas& one (ear an% in &$e pla'e !$erein &$e( propose &o /o&e) for a& leas& si+ mon&$s imme%ia&el( pre'e%in# &$e ele'&ion7 No li&era'() proper&() or o&$er su s&an&i/e re6uiremen& s$all e impose% on &$e e+er'ise of suffra#e7
The following shall be disqualified from votingD [a$ *ny person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnestyD 'rovided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. [b$ *ny person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti) subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with lawD 'rovided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. [c$ %nsane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority. [<mnibus =lection 7ode 5Section 11"$ >ual citiEens, under /* 144(, may exercise the right of suffrage under the provisions of /* 11"1, the <verseas *bsentee Aoting *ct of 4 9. [1icolas0)e4is v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 124:(1, *ugust #, 4 2$ =ven their children, who acquire derivative citiEenship when they were minors, may vote, under the same conditions. 8y law, however, the right of dual citiEens 4ho vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specificallyD the president, the vice) president, the senators, and party)list representatives. ['elasco v. C&ME)EC, ../. 0o. 1" (1, >ecember 4#, 4 "$ Se'&ion >7 T$e Con#ress s$all pro/i%e a s(s&em for se'urin# &$e se're'( an% san'&i&( of &$e allo& as !ell as a s(s&em for a sen&ee /o&in# ( 6ualifie% 3ilipinos a roa%7 T$e Con#ress s$all also %esi#n a pro'e%ure for &$e %isa le% an% &$e illi&era&es &o /o&e !i&$ou& &$e assis&an'e of o&$er persons7 Un&il &$en) &$e( s$all e allo!e% &o /o&e un%er e+is&in# la!s an% su'$ rules as &$e Commission on Ele'&ions ma( promul#a&e &o pro&e'& &$e se're'( of &$e allo&7 Section 4 is to be considered as an exception to the +six months, residence requirement in Section 1. xxx. [4$ Section (@dB of /.*. 0o. 11"1 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is +recogniEed as such in the host country, because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of oneRs residence in his country of origin. Jowever, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as heKshe executes an affidavit to show that heKshe has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 4 of *rticle A that +all citiEens of the 'hilippines not otherwise disqualified by law, must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that 7ongress must establish a system for absentee voting- for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the 'hilippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the 7onstitution to mandate 7ongress to
establish a system for absentee voting. [0oteD underta&ing to return after 9 years$ [ Macalintal v. C&ME)EC, ../. 1(: 19, Culy 1 , 4 9$

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