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Mark E. Dixon
P.O. Box 12695
Casa Grande, AZ 85130
(520) 705-2945
Pro Se
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_ RECeIVED --\COpy
JAN Bft
CLEflIK USDISTRICT
OISTRlCi OFAI'q/ZONA
!y P rv
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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CIV'092650PHXSRB
AMENDED COMPLAINT
v.
PLAINTIFF,
Mark E. Dixon,
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Stephen Clark, in his individual )
capacity; )
Travis Cote, in his individual capacity; )
Andrew Goode, in his individual )
capacity; )
Philip Leblanc, in his individual capacity; )
Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; )
Carol Lee Dixon, in her individual j
capacity; )
DEFENDANTS. )
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1. NOTICE OF IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES, CORRECTION
OF PARTY NAMES, AND CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS
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1. Mark E. Dixon, undersigned, and referred to hereinafter as ("Plaintiff"), as directed by
this Court, hereby submits this Amended Complaint for the purpose of clarifying the correct
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identity, and correct spelling of the names of above listed defendants I, 2 and 5. In addition,
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clerical errors previous manually corrected in his December 21, 2009, Complaint have been
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corrected, as well as the re-nwnbering of all paragraphs as needed.
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2. Plaintiff recently received from the Pinal County Sheriff's Office, docwnents
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confirming that Gregory Clark previously identified as "Defendant 1" in the Plaintiff's
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December 21, 2009, Complaint, was not the deputy identified in the Complaint in 6, 14-15,
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18-19,21,41-42. The Pinal County Sheriff Deputy present and referred in said paragraphs was
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1 in fact Stephen Clark. Henceforth; Stephen Clark will be identified as Defendant 1.
2 3. The correct spelling of the last name of Defendant 2, previously identified as "Travis
3 Cody" is Travis Cote, who will hereinafter be referred to as Travis Cote, or Defendant 2.
4 4. Defendant 5, previollslyidentified as Pinal County Deputy, "John Doe" has been
5 positively identified by the Pinal County Sheriffs Office as being Eli Pile.
6 5. Plaintiff begs the Court's indulgence, and requests that this Amended Complaint be
7 accepted to replace the Plaintiff s December 21, 2009, Complaint.
8 6. As of the date oftms document, the only Defendants having been served the
9 Summons and Complaint are Carol Lee Dixon, Philip LeBlanc, and Andrew Goode. Pursuant to
10 this Court's Order accepting this An1ended Complaint, Plaintiff will serve a copy of this
11 Amended Complaint to the three (3) previously served Defendants by U.S. Mail. In addition,
12 the Plaintiff, upon issuance of the three cOlTected Summons, by the Clerk of this Court, to be
13 properly served on the remaining three (3) Defendants, along with a copy of the Plaintiffs
14 Amended Complaint.
15 7. The Plaintiff further begs the Court to note that with the exception of the corrections
16 noted above, the substance of the Original Complaint has not been altered in this Amended
17 Complaint.
18 II. COMPLAINT
19 8. Plaintiff makes the following allegations based on facts, \\iitnesses, as well as actions
20 personally taken by the above named defendants directly against him, all of which are supported
21 by evidence. This matter has been brought before this Court not for any malicious purpose, nor
22 to harass the Defendants, but solely in the name of Justice. This is a Civil Rights action seeking a
23 declaratory judgment that the above named Defendants, did willfully and knowingly enter into a
24 criminal conspiracy to extort property that was legally in the possession of the Plaintiff prior to
25 December 2, 2009, and that the actions, willfully committed by the Defendants, has resulted in
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the crime of Extortion, against the Plaintiff, and has deprived him of his Civil Rights guaranteed
to him by the Constitution of the United States as well as the Constitution and laws of the State
of Arizona. The Plaintiff fmiher begs this Court's indulgence due to the length of this complaint,
but due to the unique circumstances, unquestionably documented herein, and despite the
Plaintiffs efforts to be as brief as possible the substance of this complaint is warranted.
III. JURISDICTION, STANDING AND VENUE
9. The District Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1331 and
1343(a)(l)(2)(3)(4), which confers original jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear suits
alleging the violation of rights and privileges under the United States Constitution. Additionally,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, if the violations are found to be of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party(s) found guilty.
10. This Court has authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201(a).
11. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. 1391(a)(b).
12. Plaintiff Mark E. Dixon, is a Citizen of the United States over the age of21, and
makes his primary residence in the County of Pinal, State of Arizona.
13. The Plaintiff is authorized to bring this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.c. 1983, and
1985, to enjoin the above named Defendants for the purpose of the redress of the actions,
inactions, crimes, and conspiracies, willfully preplanned and committed against him, which have
unquestionably resulted in blatant deprivations of the Plaintiffs Civil Rights, which are secured
and protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States, the Constitution of Arizona, and other significant State and Federal Laws.
14. Defendant Stephen Clark, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 1"), is a Citizen of
the United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the
State of Arizona and within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 1 is employed as a peace
officer with the Pinal County Sheriffs Office.
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1 15. Defendant Travis Cote, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 2"), is a Citizen of the
2 United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the State 0
3 Arizona, and within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 2 is employed as a peace officer
4 with the Pinal County Sheriff's Office.
s 16. Defendant Andrew Goode, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 3"), is a Citizen of
6 the United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the
7 State of Arizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 3 is employed as a peace
8 officer with the Pinal County Sheriff's Office.
9 17. Defendant Philip LeBlanc, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 4"), is a Citizen of
10 the United States over the age of 21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the
11 State of Arizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 4 is employed as a peace
12 officer \vith the Pinal County Sheriffs Office.
13 18. Defendant Eli Pile, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 5"), is a Citizen ofthe
14 United States over the age of21, and makes his primary residence in a County within the State 0
15 Arizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 5 is employed as a peace officer with
16 the Pinal County Sheriff s Office.
17 19. Defendant Carol Lee Dixon, referred to hereinafter as ("Defendant 6"), is a Citizen
18 of the United States over the age of 21, and makes her primary residence in Pinal County within
19 the State of Arizona, within the Jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant 6 is employed as a Loan
20 Officer with the Pinal County Federal Credit Union.
21 20. Defendants named in paragraphs 14-18 above, are Officers of the State of Arizona
22 and pursuant to ARS are required to take the following oath, " ... 1 do
23 solemnly swear (or affirm) that 1will support the Constitution ofthe United States and the
2 4 Constitution and laws ofthe State ofArizona, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
25 same and defend them against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and
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1 impartially discharge the duties ofthe office of .. . " In addition, ARS 38-231(F), states, " ... For
2 the purposes ofthis section, "officer or employee /I means any person elected, appointed or
3 employed, either on a part-lime or full-time basis, by this state or any ofits political
4 subdivisions ... "
5 21. Defendants named in paragraphs 14-19 above are being sued in their individual
6 capacity. In addition, Plaintiff, also gives formal notice, that the actions, inactions, crimes, and
7 conspiracies, willfully preplanned and committed against him by sworn officers of the Pinal
8 County Sheriffs Office, have unquestionably resulted in blatant deprivations of the Plaintiffs
9 Civil Rights, which are secured and protected by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of
10 the Constitution of the United States, and that at all pertinent times the above named Defendants
11 acted or failed to act under color of Arizona State Law.
12 IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS, MEMORANDUMAND POINTS OF AUTHORITIES
13 22. On December 1,2009, at 2:49 p.m., the Plaintiff received a telephone call from
14 Defendant 1, of the Pinal County Sheriff's Office. Defendant 1 informed Plaintiff, that pursuant
15 to a statement made by Defendant 6,
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that the Plaintiff was in possession of property belonging
16 to her, (a dog named Shilo) and that if the Plaintiff did not surrender the animal, Defendant 1,
17 would cause the Criminal Arrest of the Plaintiff for theft.
18 23. The Plaintiff advised Defendant 1, that the animal in fact belonged to him, and that
19 he could produce legal documentation that substantiated the Plaintiff's ownership of the animal.
20 Defendant 1, flatly refused to consider the Plaintiffs side of the story, and ended the
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1 Carol Lee Dixon, is in fact the ex-wife of the Plaintiff. The two were recently divorced in
April of 2009, as a result of a divorce petition initiated and filed by Ms. Dixon, said petition was
uncontested by the Plaintiff. Prior to the divorce, despite positive efforts by the Plaintiff to
obtain proper medical and psychological care for her condition, Ms. Dixon continued to display
erratic and irrational behavior, including a suicide attempt.
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1 conversation, by offering threats that he would forward a complaint to the Office of the Pinal
2 County Attorney, for Criminal Prosecution. 2
3 24. As a result of the conversation described in 22-23 above, on December 1,2009,
4 at 3:01 p.m., the Plaintiff contacted the Pinal County Sheriffs Office, and asked to speak.
5 to a "Supervisor" after which he was advised that "someone" would call him back.
6 25. On December 1,2009, at 3:27 p.m., the Plaintiff received a telephone call from the
7 Pinal County Sheriff's Office, from an individual, who later identified himself as Defendant 2.
8 26. The Plaintiff, advised Defendant 2, of his previous conversation with Defendant 1,
9 and fWiher advised Defendant 2, that the animal was in fact his property, and again offered to
10 produce documentation that proved the Plaintiff's ownership of the animal. This conversation
11 concluded with Defendant 2 stating that he would look into the matter and contact the Plaintiff
12 with his findings.
13 27. On December 1,2009, at 3:33 p.m., Defendant 2 contacted the Plaintiff with his
14 findings, and informed the Plaintiff that while he disagreed with the manner in which Defendant
15 1 was handling the matter, it was not within his authority to intervene or interfere with another
16 Deputy's investigation. 3 4 5
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2 Pursuant to A.R.S. 13-1804 A. (5) " ... A person commits theft by extortion by knowingly
obtaining or seeking to obtain property or services by means ofa threat to do in the future any
oUhe following: 5. Accuse anyone ofa crime or bring criminal charges against anyone ... "
3 Pursuant to A.R.S. 13-1003(A) "... A person commits conspiracy if, ..vith the intent to
promote or aid the commission ofan offense, such person agrees with one or more persons
that at least one ofthem or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and
one ofthe parties commits an overt act infitrtherance ofthe offense ... "
4 similarly, 42 u.s.c. 1985(3j states, " ... Jftwo or more persons in any State or Territory
conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises ofanother, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class ofpersons oUhe equal protection of
the laws, or ofequal privileges and immunities under the laws ... " In addition, 42 Us. C.
1985(3) further provides: " .. .in any case ofconspiracy set forth in this section, ifone or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act infurtherance ofthe object ofsuch
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28. On December 2, 2009, at 1: 15 p.m., the Plaintiff, along with his dog
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("Shilo"), who
has been the Plaintiffs constant "24/7" friend and close companion for the past two and one half
(2 1/2) years, both left from their residence located at I0380 W. Pasadena, in route to the Pinal
County Attorney's Office, located in Florence, Arizona, for the sole purpose of presenting the
ownership documents, previously ignored by Deputies of the Pinal County Sheriffs Office, as
stated in ~ ~ 23 and 26 above, to put an end to the matter in controversy once and for all.
29. The Plaintiff, intentionally brought Shilo, confident that the County Attorney's
Office, would as a matter of due diligence and its duty to insure the Plaintiffs Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process, would summon a Pinal County Animal Control Officer, who
could electronically verify Shilo' s ownership, resulting in a positive identification in favor of the
Plaintiff, and take proper action, including an immediate dismissal of any criminal charges that
may have been improperly initiated, as threatened by Defendant 1, as shown in ~ 23 above, who
had refused to assert any due diligence or fair consideration of the Plaintiff s Civil Rights in his
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived ofhaving and
exercising any right or privilege ofa citizen ofthe United States, the party so injured or deprive
may have an action for the recovery ofdamages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against anyone or more ofthe conspirators ... "
5 42 USc. 1986 definitively states, " ... Every person who.. having knowledge that any ofthe
wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 ofthis title, are about to be
committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission ofthe same,
neglects or refuses so to do, ifsuch wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party
injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such
person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an
action on the case; and any number ofpersonsguilty ofsuch wrongful neglect or refusal mav
be joined as defendants in the action ... "
6 Because of their longstanding, and close emotional attachment, the Plaintiff had gone to the
expense of having a "computer chip," surgically implanted into Shilo by a certified professional
Veterinarian, to insure her positive identification by any other Veterinarian or Animal Control
Officer, to insure Shilo's, quick and safe return, should she for any reason become separated
from the excellent care, protection, as well as the constant love and affection she is provided by
the Plaintiff, a single father who has also been awarded custody of both of his two children (one
male, and one female) by the Pinal County Superior Court.
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investigation.
30. Upon leaving their residence, the Plaintiff, with Shilo in the vehicle as a passenger,
proceeded West on Pasadena, and as required by law, properly "signaled" to indicate his
intention to make a right hand tum, after which he made a complete stop at the intersection of
Pasadena and Belaire. The pair then proceeded North on Belaire, and once again, upon
approaching the intersection of Belaire and Woodruff, as required by law, properly "signaled" to
indicate his intention to make a right hand tum, after which he made a complete stop at the
intersection of Belaire and Woodruff. The pair then preceded East on Woodruff a very short
distance when the Plaintiff, became aware that a Red Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV), \"lith flashing
lights was close behind him.
31. Quickly making the assumption that the vehicle was a Fire Department, Emergency
Response Vehicle, responding to an emergency, the Plaintiff, as required by law immediately
signaled to tum right, and pulled off the pavement, onto the right hand shoulder of Woodruff,
and made a complete stop, in a lawful and responsible effort to allow the Emergency Vehicle to
safely pass.
32. Rather than pass, the Red SUV with lights still flashing, came to a stop behind the
Plaintiff's vehicle. The Plaintiff, in his rear view mirror, then observed a white male, dressed in
"plain clothes," exit the Red SlTV and approach the Plaintiffs now parked vehicle which
contained the Plaintiff and his companion Shilo.
33. Upon reaching the Plaintiff's vehicle, the plain clothed individual, (later identified as I
being Defendant 3) walked up to the "driver side" window of the Plaintiff's vehicle and without
making any effort to properly identify himself to the Plaintiff, ordered the Plaintiff, to hand over
his driver license.? The Plaintiff then inquired as to the reason he had been pulled over?
7 The Plaintiff s proof of insurance and registration were never requested as is common
procedure in a "routine" traffic stop.
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1. Defendant 3, alleged that the Plaintiff had made an illegal right hand tum, and further stated the
2 Plaintiff failed to signal a right hand turn before preceding East on Woodruff after stopping at th
, intersection of Belaire and Woodruff.
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Upon receiving this questionable explanation, the
4 Plaintiff complied with the Officer's request to examine the Plaintiffs driver license, at which
5 time Defendant 3, with the Plaintiffs driver license in his possession, returned to his unmarked
6 vehicle with the Plaintiffs driver license.
7 34. The Plaintiff was then startled by a second "plain clothed" individual,9 later
8 identified as Defendant 4, who appeared outside of the Plaintiff's Driver side window.
9 Defendant 4, having deliberately "postured" himself immediately outside of the Plaintiff's
10 .1 vehicle, stood with his "gun hand" readied on his side-arm in a threatening, calculated manner,
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as if his true intention was to draw his weapon and fire upon Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then
startled by an third "plain clothed" individual (Defendant 5), [0 who also unexpectedly appeared
outside of the Plaintiffs passenger side window, and "postured" himself in a threatening
manner similar to that of Defendant 4.
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8 The Plaintiff was in fact never issued a citation or warning for the alleged illegal right hand
which also implies that the deputies in fact staged the traffic stop, resulting in a brazen criminal
scheme, executed in excess of the deputies' authority.
9This individual was unquestionably the "Supervising Officer in charge," who directed the
actions of the other Deputies.
10 The identity of this third plain clothed Deputy refen-ed to herein as Defendant 5, has yet to be
determined.
It A.R.S. 13-1804 A.(l) " ... A person commits theft by extortion by knowing/v obtaining or
seeking to obtain propertv or services by means ofa threat to do in the future any ofthe
following: 1. Cause physical injury to anyone by means ofa deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument ... " These same facts when considered within the provisions ofA.R.S. 13-1804 C.
"... Theft by extortion as defined in subsection A, paragraph 1 is a class 2 felony. Othenvise,
theft by extortion is a class 4 feLony ... " In addition, A.R.S. 13-1804 C when examined in the
context of the facts stated above unquestionably provides clear and convincing evidence that
Defendant 4, and Defendant 5 are guilty of nothing less than a class 2 felony within the meaning
of A.R.S. 13-1804 C! Further, as provided by A.R.S. 13-1003 C. "... A person who conspires
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1 35. The Plaintiff asked Defendant 4, if his actions were in regards to the Plaintiffs dog
2 and Defendant 4 stated that it was. Defendant 4 then asked the Plaintiff if he would surrender
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3 Shilo, and the Plaintiff infonned Defendant 4 that he would not, and that he was already in route
4 to the County Attorney's Office to properly address the pending Criminal charges, and to
5 provide the County Attorney with documentation to resolve the matter ofShilo's true
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7 36. Defendant 4, then infonned the Plaintiff that his driver's license was suspended and
8 he had the authority arrest the Plaintiff, as well as impound his vehicle (a significant tool
9 necessary for the Plaintiff to provide a living for himself and his children) for a minimum of 30
10 days, if the Plaintiff refused to submit to his threats, and sWTender Shilo. Defendant 4 then
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to commit a number ofoffenses is guilty ofonly one conspiracy ifthe multiple offenses are the
object ofthe same agreement or relationship and the degree ofthe conspiracy shall be
determined by the most serious offense conspired to ... "
12 The Plaintitl1ater ascertained that these two individuals had approached his vehicle from an
unmarked blue sedan they had concealed behind the Red SUV driven by Defendant 3.
13 42 u.s.c. 1985(2) "H.Obsrructing justice; intimidating partv, witness, or juror - Iftwo or I
more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any
party or witness in any court ofthe United States from attending such court, or tram testirying to
anv matter pending therein, freely. fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account ofhis having so attended or tesNfied. or to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment ofany grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror
in his person or property on account ofany verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented
to by him, or ofhis being or having been such juror; or i{tvlio or more persons conspire for the
purpose ofimpeding. hindering, obstructing, or defeating. in an}' manner, the due course of
justice in any State or Territory. with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection o{the
laws, or to injure him or his 12roDertv for lawfull}' enforcim!. or attemDtim! to enforce. the ri.ht a
any person, or class of persons. to the equal protection ofthe laws: ... "
14 Defendant 4, notified the Plaintiff of the Suspended License while Defendant 3, was still
running the Plaintiffs Driver License.
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implied that he would refrain from such actions if the Plaintiff agreed to surrender Shilo to him.
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37. Defendant 3, then approached from the Red SUV and notified the Plaintiff that his
Arizona Driver License was in fact suspended. Faced with the option of being deprived of his
liberty or submitting to the illegal seizure and unconstitutional deprivation of Shilo, the Plaintiff
reluctantly agreed to submit to the extortion conspiracy, and surrender his companion Shilo to
Defendant 4.
38. After further discussion, Defendant 4 agreed to follow the Plaintiff back to his
residence so the Plaintiff could obtain Shilo's leash and surrender her. After arriving at his
residence,16 the Plaintiff again politely asserted that Shilo legally belonged to him and assured
Defendant 4, that he could produce credible witnesses that could confirm Shilo's ownership.
Defendant 4 then informed the Plaintiff that Defendant 6 had made the allegation that Shilo's
computer chip would confirm she was the legal owner. 17
39. The Plaintiff's son James Dixon, having arrived at the Plaintiffs residence at the
same time as his father and the Pinal County Sheriff Officers, also pleaded with Defendant 4 to
allow him the opportunity to produce vvitnesses as well. The Plaintiff then produced credible
15 A.R.S. 13-1804 A. (7), which states that" ... A person commits theft by extortion by
knowingly obtaining or seeking to obtain property or services by means ofa threat to do in the
future any oUhe following: 7. Take or withhold action as a public servant or cause a public
servant to take or withhold action .. . "
16 The fact that these three deputies instructed the Plaintiff to illegally operate his vehicle with a
suspended driver license to obtain a leash for the dog, is proof positive that a pre-conceived
plan had been made for the sole purpose of obtaining the Plaintiffs dog. Pursuant to A.R.s.
28-351J(Aj " ... ..1 peace officer shall cause the removal and either immobilization or
impoundment ofa vehicle ifthe peace officer determines that a person is driving the vehicle
while either ofthe following applies: 1. The person's driving privilege is suspended or revoked
for any reason... '
17 No attempt was made to summon an Animal Control Officer to electronically scan the
computer chip and determine the ownership of the dog.
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documentation, including a certificate, that lists the Plaintiff as 8hilo' s registered owner, which
was issued by the Veterinarian who surgically implanted Shilo's computer Chip, a License
issued by the Pinal County Animal and Control, a Rabies Vaccination Celtificate issued by the
Casa Grande Animal Hospital and an invoice issued by the Casa Grande Animal Hospital
receipting that the PlaintitJhad invested over One Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($150.00) to ensure
Shi10 was well and would continue to be healthy. All of these documents provide a
preponderance of incontrovertible evidence establishing that the Plaintiff is, and continues to be
Shilo's legal owner.
40. None of the evidence swayed Defendant 4, in his unrelenting resolve to illegally
seize Shilo from her owner. Further, Defendant 4, failed to produce any Court issued Warrant,
Writ, Civil Standby Order, or any other valid Order signed by a Judge, which would have given
the Defendants the authority to seize Shilo from her legal 0'WTIer.
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the Plaintiffs ownership documents, took dO\vn some written notes and then advised James
Dixon that if he could produce affidavits that proved Shilo belonged to the l i n t i f t ~ Shilo would
be returned to James' father. James Dixon then inquired to Defendant 4, as to what he was
going to do with Shilo, and Defendant 4 advised him that it was his intention to deliver Shilo to
Defendant 6. i9
18 No reasonable person, nor Judge nor Jury, in good conscience, can deduce that the alleged
"illegal right tum" discussed in ~ 33, constitutes "probable cause" which would legally authorize
the Deputies to seize the Plaintiffs property \vithin the scope of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, especially in the absence of any Court issued documents.
19 As suggested by the statements made by Defendant 1 in ~ 22 above, this matter was
"allegedly" the result of a Criminal investigation. Proper procedure would be to confiscate and
secure the animal as evidence until the matter could be decided by a Judge. Defendant 4'5
actions have effectively broken the chain of evidence, which suggests that Defendant l's alleged
criminal investigation was nothing more than a fraudulent unfounded threat of Extortion.
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41. The Plaintiff then surrendered Shilo, leash and all to Defendant 4, who along with
the Defendants 3 and 5, appeared to be vacating the Plaintiff's premises. The Deputies, already
heading to their vehicles to leave, suddenly hesitated and after a short conference between
Defendants 3 and 4, that was held out of ear shot of both James Dixon and the Plaintiff,
Defendant 3, prepared a citation directed against the Plaintiff for driving on a suspended license,
which he then handed to Defendant 4, who in turn, handed to the Plaintiff. Defendant 4, then
further offered additional threats to the Plaintiff, by stating that if any of the infomlation he had
given to Defendant 4 were false, or there were any "problems," that Defendant 4 would come
back and arrest him for driving on a suspended license.
42. The Plaintiff then had his son James Dixon drive him to the Casa Grande City Court
and after determining that a previous civil traffic matter he previously thought had been resolved,
was still outstanding, paid the required fine. Jan1es Dixon then drove the Plaintiff to the Arizona
Department of Motor Vehicle Office (DMV). Upon receiving the required documentation
showing that the deficiency, which had resulted in the suspension of the Plaintiff's Driver
License, had been resolved, the Plaintiffs Drivers license was reinstated.
43. On December 3,2009, at approximately 12:00 p.m. James Dixon, as discussed in
40 above, obtained several affidavits from individuals asserting that Shilo was in fact owned by
the Plaintiff. As previously instructed by Defendant 4, James delivered said affidavits to the
Pinal County Sheriff Office, located at Trekell Road and Cottonwood lane in Casa Grande. The
documents were entrusted to a Sheriffs Office employee to be given to Defendant 4, for proper
consideration.
44. On December 4, at 8:32 a.m. the Plaintiff contacted the Pinal County Sheriffs Office
and left a message requesting Defendant 4, to contact him so a meeting could be arranged to
resolve this matter. To date no response has been received, and this inaction has subsequently
resulted in the filing of a fonnal notice of these violations, with service made by a professional
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1 process server, to the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, the Pinal County Sheriff, as well as the
2 Pinal County Attorney in addition to being sent certified mail to Arizona's Governor, Attorney
3 General, and Director of the Department of Public Safety all of whom have actively turned a
4 blind eye to this whole situation.
5 V. Conclusion
6 45. The above statement of facts sadly documents a shocking and repulsive account of
'7 an-ogant abuse of authority, perpetrated by the very individuals who have been entrusted by the
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citizens of Pinal County to abide by their solemn oath which pursuant to A.R.S. 38-231 (E),
9 clearly states that they are required to " ... support the Constitution ofthe United States and the
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Constitution and laws ofthe State ofArizona... "
46. Article II, Section 4, of the Arizona Constitution, definitively states that, "No person
shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw." In addition, Article
II, Section 2, which precedes section 4, definitively states that, "All political power is inherent
in the people, and govenunents derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and
are established to protect and maintain individual rights." Most importantly, Article II, section
1, which precedes all of the Articles of the Arizona Constitution, cited herein, definitively states,
"A frequent recun-ence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights
and the perpetuity of free government."
47. There is no question that the Pinal County Sheriff's Office has the duty to investigate
any matter which is brought to their attention. With this duty also comes the responsibility to
fairly and impartially conduct all investigations in a matter that protects the Civil Rights of all of
the parties involved. The Federal Courts have shown that they have little or no tolerance for
State Officials who fail to do so. See SCREWS v. UNITED STATES, L325 u.s. 91 (1945) at
Page 129; with the United States Supreme Court stating:
" ... Generally state officials know something ofthe individual's basic legal rights. If
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1 they do not, they should, for they assume that duty HJhen they assume their office. Ignorance of
2 the law is no excuse for men in general. It is less an excuse for men whose special duty is to
3 apply it, and therefore to know and observe it. Iftheir knowledge is not comprehensive, state
4 offiCials know or should A-710W when they pass (he limits oftheir authority, so far at any rate that
5 their action exceeds honest error ojjudgment and amounts to abuse oftheir office and its
6 function. When they enter such a domain in dealing with the citizen's rights, they should do so at
7 their peril, whether that be created by state or federal law. For their sworn oath and their first
8 duty are to uphold the Constitution, then only the law ofthe state which too is bound by the
9 charter... "
10 The United States Supreme Court further stated:
11 " ... officials who violate it must act in intentional or reckless disregard ofindividual
12 rights and cannot be ignorant that they do great wrong. This being true, they must be taken to
13 act at peril ofincurring the penalty placed upon such conduct by the federal law, as they do of
14 that the state imposes ... "
15 48. As clearly shown above, none of Defendants 1-5 made any remote attempt to
16 exercise proper due diligence with regard to the Protection of the Plaintiffs Civil Rights. The
17 callus and prejudicial manner in which this matter has been handled, implies not only that
18 Defendants 1-5, had already established a "questionable alliance" with Defendant 6, but that they
19 would go to any length to enforce their illegal position by offering severe "threats and
20 intimidations" to physically force the Plaintiff into surrendering property which the Plaintiff
21 could clearly prove belonged to him.
22 49. If Defendant 1, through his "investigation," had obtained evidence sufficient enough
23 to compel the County Attorney's Office into seeking a Criminal Indictment, then why didn't he
24 forward the matter to the County Attorney in the first place? Why didn't Defendants 1-5,
25 properly refer Defendant 6, to the Justice Court who has the proper authority to decide such
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Civil matters, instead of abusing their own limited authority by improperly taking the law into
their OWTI hands?
50. The facts stated above, provide a preponderance of evidence that Stephen Clark,
Travis Cote, Andrew Goode, Philip LeBlanc, Eli Pile, and Carol Lee Dixon all knowingly and
willingly committed crimes against the Plaintiff. Their motive which will no doubt cause the
rapid and subsequent destruction of their careers, has yet to be disclosed.
51. As shoWTI by the facts above, the Plaintiff has made every reasonable attempt to
assert his Civil Rights, each time being forcefully and intentionally denied any opportunity of
being afforded the equal protection of his rights guaranteed to him by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution ofthe United States of America, by the very individuals whom
the Fourteenth Amendment commands to uphold and provide due process protection.
52. The Supreme Court and Justice Rehnquist recognized the necessity for citizens to be
able to assert their Civil Rights in Federal Courts in PARRATTv. TAYLOR, 451 Us. 527
(1981) 101 S. Ct. 1908 by stating: "... The Court recognized as much in Monroe v. Pape, 365
us. 167 (1961 when we explained after extensively reviewing the legislative history of 1983,
that "[iJt is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford afederal
right in federal courts because, by reason ofprejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims ofcitizens to the enjoyment ofrights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the (Page 53) Fourteenth Amendment might be denied
by the state agencies." 1d., at 180.
53. Over One Hundred (100) years ago, the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Lee, 106 Us. 196 (1882), unequivocally stated:
" ... No man in this country is so high that he is above the 1m-v. No officer of the lmv
may set that 1m-vat defiance with impunity. All the officers ofthe government, from the highest
to the lowest, are creatures ofthe lmll, and are bound to obey it.
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The High Court then sincerely added:
" ... It is the only supreme power in our ofgovernment, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its fimctions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise ofthe authority
which it gives ... "
VI. STATEMENT OF CLAIM
54. As just compensation for the County's Duly Sworn Agents, intentional, malicious
and illegal actions, which in return caused the Plaintiff to deprived of the constant support,
security, comfort, as well as love and affection of his companion Shilo, the Plaintiff will accept
no less than $1,000.00 per day commencing on Wednesday December 2, 2009, until such a time
that Plaintiffs irreplaceable, companion Shil0 is safely returned to him, unharmed and in a
healthy condition.
55. As just compensation for the County's Duly Sworn Agent's intentional, malicious
and injurious behavior as described in 48 above, which has caused and continues to cause the
Plaintiff, constant worry, mental anguish, pain and suffering, loss of sleep, all of which has
manifested into a noticeable decline of the Plaintiffs physical health and well-being as further
made evident by a dangerous, and measurable increase in the Plaintiffs blood pressure, which in
return has resulted in a decrease of the Plaintiffs ability to productively and safely operate heavy
equipment, and recently culminated into a serious health condition that on December 19,2009,
required the Plaintiff s children to rush him to seek emergency medical attention, due to the fact
that a previously healthy man, aged only 45 years, was now experiencing severe chest
pains, dizziness and other life threatening symptoms of Cardiac Arrest, the cause of which has
been determined by heath care professionals as being "severe stress." The monetary costs of the
necessary medical care and subsequent overnight stay in the Hospital are yet to be detemlined,
however the Plaintiff requests no less than an additional $1,000.00 per day commencing on
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Wednesday December 2,2009, until such a time that Plaintiff's irreplaceable, companion Shi10
is safely returned to him, unharmed and in a healthy condition, which the Plaintiff requests to be
in addition to medical cost's mentioned above which are to be shared equally among the above
named Defendants.
56. As just compensation for the Defendants, including those who are duly sworn Peace
Officers, having entered into a conspiracy to extort from him his property, by employing various
threats as shown above which have unquestionably resulted in the blatant deprivations of the
Plaintiff's Civil Rights. The Defendarlts shall pay to the Plaintiff, no less than $600,000.00
composed of $1 00,000.00 for each of the above named Defendants' direct involvement in this
malicious and felonious assault on the Plaintiff's Civil Rights.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
57. The Plaintiff is authorized, purSUallt to 28 U.S.c. 2201(a), to seek equitable alld
declaratory relief.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that this Court enter all order:
a. Declaring that the acts, omissions and practices of the Defendallts set forth in the
paragraphs above, constitutes a malicious disregard of the Plaintiff's Civil Rights, alld caused the
Plaintiff to be forcefully, alld wantonly subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, and that pursuant to 42 U.S.c.
1983 and 1985, the Plaintiff is entitled to full redress, alld to once again made to be whole.
b. Permallently enjoining Defendants, their officers, subordinates, successors in office,
and all those acting in concert or participation with them from continuing the acts, omissions and
practices set forth in the paragraphs above as will ensure that the Plaintiff, nor ally citizen of the
State of Arizona will be subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States.
III
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c. Ordering the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff the monetary damages as outlined in
paragraphs 46-48 above, on the party(s) found guilty.
d. Sentencing the Defendants under State Guidelines, if pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 1988,
the alleged violations are found to be of a criminal nature, and requiring the infliction of
punishment on the party(s) found guilty.
e. The Plaintiff begs the Court to enter any and all such other orders, and any further
equitable relief including Court costs, as the Court may deem just and Proper.
..., iJ.
Respectfully submitted thisolL/ day of January, 2010.
B Y ~ ~
Mark E. Dixon
Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Original filed with the Clerk's Office, and upon receipt of this Court's Order, three (3) true and
13 correct copies of the foregoing will be transmitted to a professional process server along with
three (3) corrected summons, to be personaily served on each of the three (3) previously "un-
14 served" Defendants. In addition, a true and correct copy of the foregoing will be placed in the
U.S. mail to the following Defendants:
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Carol Lee Dixon
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P.O. Box 11152
Casa Grande, AZ 85130
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Philip LeBlanc
P.O. Box 2173
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Arizona City, A2 85223
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Andrew Goode
2328 W. Peggy Dr.
21 Queen Creek, AZ 85242
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by Mark Dixon
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRS Documenl11 Filed 01/22/10 Page 1 of4

9 Mark E. Dixon.
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O[fice of the Pinal Counl)' Attorney
Joe A. Alba. Sale Sar No. 004810
P.O. Sox 887
Florence. Arizona 85132
520-866-6242
520-866-6521 - Fax
Anomey for Defendants Goode and LeBlanc
UNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
NO. CIV 092650 PHX SRB
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Plaintiff.
v.
Gregory Clark. in his individuaJ capacity.
Travis Cody. in his individual caracity.
Andrew Goode. in his individua capacity,
Philip LeBlanc. in his individual capacity.
Deputy uJohn Doc". in his individual
capacity, and Carol Lee Dixon. in her
individual capacity.
Answer of Defendants Andrew Goode
and Philip LeBlanc
16 Defendants.
state as follows:
For their answer to Mark E. Dixon's complaint against them, Defendants Goode and Leblanc.
the complaint occurred in Pinal County. Arizona, and within the District of Arizona.
Arizona. and within the District of Arizona. The acts or omissions of all of the parties alleged in
the mancrs alleged in the complaint. PlaintifTand all named defendants reside in Pinal Count).
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I.
2.
Jurisdiction
These defendants deny that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide
Although plaintiffanempts to allege a cause of action under 42 USc. 1983. the factual
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allegations in the numbered paragraphs of the complaint fail to state a cause of action against
Dixon .... Clark. Cllli
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Documen111 Filed 01/22110 Page 2 of 4
these defendants upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.s.C. 1983. The complaint's
factual allegations allege neither a specific constitutional violation nor a violation of any clearly
established right. as required to invoke this Courfsjurisdiction.
Statement orthe Case
3. Plaintiffs complaint is based on the question of ownership ofa dog. Defendant Carol Lee
Dixon claims that the dog in question is separate property to which she is entitled. follo\\ing her
recent divorce from Mark E. Dixon. Mark E. Dixon claims that the dog is his constant
companion. Defendants Goode and LeBlanc, are. and at all material times were. Pinal County
Sheriffs deputies. Defendant Goode's only involvement is that he briefly detained and cited
Mark E. Dixon for a traffic offense on December 1, 2009. Defendant LeBlanc. along with other
deputies, formed an opinion that there was probable cause to believe that Mark E. Dixon had
committed a theft from Carol Lee Dixon, by controlling property orCarol Lee Dixon (the dog,
Shiloh) with the intent to deprive her of such property, in violation of A.R.S. 131802. Mark. E.
Dixon surrendered the dog to Defendant LeBlanc (Paragraphs 30 and 33 of the Complaint). The
complaint alleges neithcr a specific constitutional violation nor a violation of an) clearly
established right. entitling PlaintifTto relief.
4. The complaint fails to state a cause of action against these defendants upon which relief
can be granted. Federal Rules ofCivil Procedurc. Rule 12 (b) (6).
Answers to the umbered Paragraphs of the Complaint
5. Defendants Goode and LeBlanc admit the allegations in numbered paragraphs 2
and 3, 8 and 9.
6. Defendants Goode and LeBlanc deny the allegations in numbered paragraphs 5,13.
37,38.42 and 43.
Dixon v. Clark. et al
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 11 Filed 01/22/10 Page 3 of 4
7. Defendants Goode and LeBlanc deny the allegations in each of the other numbered
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paragraphs of the complaint, not otherwise specifically admined or denied. because they
lack sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the convoluted
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allegations in those paragraphs.
LeBlanc upon which relief can be granted by this court.
Relief Requested
1. That Plaintiff take nothing from Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.
filing of this pleading the only employees of the Pinal County Sheriff who have been
Affirmative Defense
Defendants Goode and LeBlanc. each sued in his individual capacity. affirmatively
Defendants Goode and LeBlanc allege upon information and belief that as of the
The entire complaint. if true. fails to state a claim against Defendants Goode and
10.
9.
I-laving ans1"ered each numbered paragraphs of the complaint. Defendants Goode
and LeBlanc pray tor relief as follows:
complaint. and that the complaint should be dismissed against each for failure lO state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
allege that they have qualified immunity from liability based on the allegations in the
served with the summons and complaint in this case are Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.
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2. Thallhe complaint against Defendants Goode and LeBlanc be dismissed for
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which relief can be granted.
l>i:wn v. Clan.. 1:'1 aI
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 11 Filed 01/22/10 Page 4 of 4
3. For Defendants' costs incurred.
4. For such as other relief as isjusl as to Defendants Goode and LeBlanc.
Dated this 22"" day of January. 2010.
lsi Joe A. Albo__ _
Joe A. Albo
Deputy County Attorney, Civil Division
Attorney for Defendant Paul Babeu,
Pinal County Sheriff
ORIGINAL filed electronicallY with the Clerk of the Court of
the District of Arizona this 22.-J day of January. 2010.
COPY oflhe foregoing mailed this 22"" day of January. 2010.
to:
Mark E. Dixon
P.O. Box 12695
Casa Grande. Arizona 85130
Plaintiff
Carol Lee Dixon
P.O. Box 11152
Casa Grande, Arizona 85130
Defendant
Dixon v. Clark. et:ll
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Mark E. Dixon,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Gregory Clark, in his individual capacity;
Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;
Andrew Goode, in his individual capacity;
Philip LeBlanc, in his individual capacity;
Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; Stephen
Clark, in his individual capacity; Carol Lee
Dixon, in her individual capacity,
Defendants.
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No. CV 09-2650-PHX-SRB
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants Andrew Goode and Philip LeBlancs Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Defs. Mot.) (Doc. 12). Defendants Gregory Clark,
Travis Cote, Eli Pile, and Stephen Clark have moved to join Defendants Motion (Doc. 21).
The Court also resolves Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive Memorandum Exhibit 8A
(Doc. 15) at this time.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mark Dixon charges that the Defendants, various Pinal County Sheriffs
Deputies (the County Defendants) and his ex-wife, Carol Dixon, conspired to deprive him
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 56 Filed 05/19/10 Page 1 of 7
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1
The Court cites to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which was filed after Defendants
Motion, because Defendants arguments apply with equal force to the more recent iteration
of Plaintiffs Complaint. (See Docs. 12, 17.)
2
In her Answer, Ms. Dixon states that the dogs name is spelled Shiloh. (Doc. 4,
Answer 1.) For the purposes of this Order, the Court will adopt the spelling contained in
the Amended Complaint.
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of his property. (Am. Compl. 8.)
1
Plaintiff alleges that he received a phone call from
Defendant Clark on December 1, 2009, in which he learned that Ms. Dixon had told the Pinal
County Sheriffs Office that Plaintiff had improperly retained possession of her dog, Shilo.
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(Id. 22.) Plaintiff told Defendant Clark that the dog belonged to him, and Defendant Clark
informed Plaintiff that Ms. Dixons complaint would be forwarded to the Pinal County
Attorneys Office. (Id. 23.) On December 2, 2009, Plaintiff left his home with Shilo and
set off to drive to the Pinal County Attorneys Office, with the purpose of presenting
ownership documents. (Id. 28.) En route, Plaintiffs vehicle was stopped by a red sports-
utility vehicle with flashing lights, and when he pulled over, a Pinal County Sheriffs Deputy
approached his car. (Id. 30-33.) The Amended Complaint states that the deputy told
Plaintiff he had failed to signal before turning right and asked to see Plaintiffs drivers
license. (Id. 33.) After checking Plaintiffs identification, the deputy informed Plaintiff that
his license was suspended. (Id. 36.) Plaintiff alleges that two deputies threatened to
impound his vehicle and arrest him if he did not surrender Shilo to them. (Id.)
The deputies followed Plaintiff back to his home and then left with the dog. (Id. 38.)
Plaintiff alleges that, at that time, he presented ownership documentation for Shilo, but the
deputies did not believe him and took Shilo anyway. (Id. 39.) Plaintiff was then cited for
driving on a suspended license. (Id. 41.) Plaintiff attempted to recover the dog from the
Pinal County Sheriffs Office. (Id. 43-44.) When that was unsuccessful, Plaintiff filed the
instant lawsuit.
Plaintiff argues that he has been deprived of property without due process of law as
a result of a conspiracy among the Defendants. (Id. 45-53.) Plaintiff seeks money damages
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and the return of Shilo. (Id. 54-57.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Join
As a preliminary matter, the Court grants Defendants G. Clark, Cote, Pile, and S.
Clarks Motion to J oin in Defendants Motion. The issues presented in Defendants Motion
are common to all the County Defendants, and it is appropriate to consider them together.
B. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, dismissal for insufficiency of a complaint is proper if the complaint
fails to state a claim on its face. Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 633 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1980).
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the
lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim.
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In determining whether an asserted
claim can be sustained, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d
752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994). [A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and
unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
However, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual
content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
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entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009)). In other words, the complaint must
contain enough factual content to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants Goode, LeBlanc, G. Clark, Cote, Pile, and S. Clark move to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions
related to the removal of Shilo from Plaintiffs possession. (Defs. Mot. at 3-4.) The
doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815
(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest
possible stage in litigation. Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
When determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the court
considers (1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right and
(2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendants alleged
misconduct. Id. at 816 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). If the answer
to both inquiries is yes, then the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. Davis v. City
of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). If either answer is no, then the officer is
entitled to qualified immunity. See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 762 (9th Cir. 2009).
Pearson held that the sequence set forth in Saucier is not mandatory and that district judges
have discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis
should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. 129 S.
Ct. at 818. Here, the Court will discuss the second prong first.
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A right is clearly established if a reasonable officer would know that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted. Espinosa v. City & County of S.F., 598 F.3d 528,
532 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d
1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint do not establish
that a reasonable officer in the position of one of the Deputy Defendants would have known
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. The Amended Complaint states
that Plaintiff was issued a citation for driving on a suspended license, but it does not allege
that the deputies knew that Plaintiffs license was not suspended or otherwise acted
improperly. (See Am. Compl. 41.) Likewise, the Amended Complaint essentially states that
the County Defendants gave credence to Ms. Dixons claim to ownership of Shilo, rather
than Mr. Dixons. This decision is not a violation of a clearly-established right. It was
reasonable for the County Defendants, in the course of doing their jobs, to believe one side
of a dispute over another. See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing
that officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well
elude an untrained person (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th
Cir. 2002))); Kulas v. Valdez, 159 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1998) (A reasonable belief that
the conduct was lawful is sufficient to secure qualified immunity.). Here, the deputies
reasonably decided to believe Ms. Dixons version of events, rather than Mr. Dixons. Mr.
Dixon may not agree with the County Defendants decision to credit Ms. Dixons story, but
the fact that they made the decision is not a violation of his constitutional rights or any
clearly-established law.
On the basis of this conclusion, the Court finds that the County Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity for the events giving rise to Plaintiffs lawsuit. The Court need
not address the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Therefore, Defendants
Motion is granted. The Amended Complaint is dismissed as to the County Defendants.
D. Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive Memorandum Exhibit 8A
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Allow Responsive Memorandum Exhibit 8A (Pl.s Mot.)
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on February 18, 2010. (See Doc. 15.) This document, filed two days after Plaintiffs
Response to Defendants Motion, appears to the Court to constitute an impermissible sur-
reply. Such a filing is not permitted under the Local Rules for this district without explicit
permission of the Court. See LRCiv 7.2 (providing for response and reply pleadings only).
Plaintiff has not sought permission, and the Court does not grant him leave to file any further
responses to Defendants Motion. Plaintiffs Motion is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the
pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. L.A.
Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure states that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so
requires. For pro se litigants, leave to amend should be granted unless it is absolutely clear
that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Id.; accord United
States v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, it is
absolutely clear that Plaintiffs claims against the County Defendants are precluded because
the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity for the actions that Plaintiff alleges violated
his rights. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the
County Defendants, and those claims may not be refiled.
IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants Gregory Clark, Travis Cote, Eli Pile, and
Stephen Clarks Motion to J oin (Doc. 21).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants Andrew Goode and Philip
LeBlancs Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 12) and dismissing the Amended
Complaint with prejudice as to Defendants G. Clark, Cote, Goode, LeBlanc, Pile, and S.
Clark.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Responsive
Memorandum Exhibit 8A (Doc. 15).
DATED this 18
th
day of May, 2010.
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 56 Filed 05/19/10 Page 7 of 7
~ u s ~ = = ~ ~
United States District Judge
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 58 Filed 06/02/10 Page 1 of 6
6
PLAINTIFF,
7
v.
8 1. Stephen Clark, in his individual
capacity;
9
2. Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;
3. Andrew Goode, in his individual
10
capacity;
4. Philip Leblanc, in his individual capacity;
11
5. Eli Pile, in his individual capacity;
12
6. Carol Lee Dixon, in her individual
capacity;
13
DEFENDANTS.
1
C
" ''',,'
__r.
JUN 220m
:;
'2Tf'}1'.>;,' 1 ../" 'f.
/- r:;"'I:": Y
., .
By
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
[Appellate] Rule 4(a)(4).").
construed as motions to alter or amend the judgment and are time tolling for the purposes of
reconsideration," federal courts generally treat such motions as a motion to alter or amend
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize a "motion for
Come now the Plaintiff, having received a Order to Dismiss the Pinal County Sheriff
Mark E. Dixon,
deputy defendants moves the court to reconsider said order under Rules 59(e) and Rule 60(b),
Mark E. Dixon
P.O. Box 12695
Casa Grande, AZ 85130
(520) 705-2945
Pro Se
judgment pursuant Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Cockrel
v.Shelby County School Dist" 270 F.3d 1036, 1047 (6
th
Cir. 2001)(citing 12 James Wm. Moore
et aI., Moore's Federal Practice 59.30[7] (3
rd
ed.ol000)); see also Moody v. pepsi-cola metro.
Bottling co., 915 Fold 20I, 206 (6
th
Cir 1990) ("Motions for reconsideration of a judgment are
) CIV'092650PHXSRB
)
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
) RECONSIDER ORDER AND MODIFY
) ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS
UNDERRULE 59(e) AND RULE 60(b)
)
)
)
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)
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 58 Filed 06/02/10 Page 2 of 6
1 The Plaintiff hereby apologizes to the court and begs the courts indulgence regarding the
2 length of the Complaint and Amended Complaint. Although lengthy there a several facts stated
3 which should cause the court to reconsider dismissing the Pinal County Defendants.
2
The Pinal County Defendants did in fact know that the Plaintiffs drivers license was
suspended prior to making the traffic stop on December 2, 2009 and further Defendant Goode
was at the Plaintiffs residence doing surveillance for the sole purpose of performing the traffic
stop which would give them the leverage of a suspended drivers license, show of lethal force and
threat of arrest to extort the Plaintiffs property, they had no legal means to otherwise achieve the
goal of the conspiracy.
Upon arriving at the Plaintiffs home, after the traffic stop on December 2, 2009, the Pinal
County Deputies were handed the only legal ownership documents for his property. Before that
point the Pinal County Defendants had not asked for, nor received any documents from the
Plaintiff which he had informed them on December 1, 2009 he possessed. Further the Deputies
made no effort to confirm the documents provided by the Plaintiff through the Counties own
records which would have taken a simple phone call. It should be further noted that the
Defendants, after receiving the legal documents, presented the Plaintiff with a traffic ticket for
driving on a suspended license with the threat that if the Plaintiff made any trouble over this they
would come back and arrest him on the ticket. The ticket was dismissed by the Pinal County
Attorney's office for no possibility of conviction. Discovery would prove that the Plaintiffs
license was wrongly suspended under very suspicious circumstances. The Pinal County
Defendants acted in their own interests whether motivated by passion, personal gain, or promise
of same with the sole intent of illegally extorting the Plaintiffs property for Ms. Dixon.
Several attempts were made to have justice done before filing this lawsuit in the Federal
District Court. The first attempt was submitting several affidavits and the only legal ownership
BACKGROUND I
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records to the Pinal County Sheriff's office, offering undisputable proof as to the ownership of
the property. When absolutely no response, not even a return phone call was received, the
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, serving the Pinal County
Sheriff and the Pinal County Attorney. Again with absolutely no response of any officials from
Pinal County the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in order to address the injustice done. There is
nothing instant about the actions taken by the Plaintiff rather all avenues available were
addressed including a plea to the Arizona Attorney General and the Office ofthe Governor with
absolutely no redress for the actions of the Defendants.
II Qualified Immunity
The Pinal County Defendants in no way performed any type of proper investigation, had
there been an investigation, especially an investigation performed by an officer with "specialized
training" it would have been discovered that the only license or other proof of ownership was,
and had always been in Plaintiff's name as his sole and separate property.
As far as evidence, Ms. Dixon only provided a fabricated and falsified story for her
version of events, while the Plaintiff provided not a story or version of events but rather hard
evidence of ownership of his property. Any reasonable person, not to mention an individual wit
experience and specialized training, would know that taking the property that was and always
had been the legal property of another would constitute theft. It is clearly established law that a
dog license is the only proof of ownership for a dog in Arizona. The Pinal County Defendants
clearly knew prior to taking the dog through threats, intimidation, and extortion that the dog was
the legal property of the Plaintiff.
III Admission of Guilt
It is astonishing to the Plaintiff that the Pinal County Defendants admit to the crimes they
committed in their answer to the amended complaint, paragraphs 8 and 9. Even with this
admission the Pinal County Defendants feel they are entitled to qualified immunity. Absolutely
3
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",
.
no reasonable wgul9 that any person is entitled to qualified immunity while
knowingly committing the fO,llowing acts as outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the amended
complaint.
Paragraph 8
"Plaintiffmakes the following allegations based onfacts, 'Witnesses, as well as actions
personally taken by the above named defendants directly against him, all ofwhich are supported
by evidence. This matter has been brought before this Court notfor any malicious purpose, nor
-
to harass the Dejenda6ts, but solely in the name ofJustice. This is a Civil Rights action seeking a
.
declaratoryjudgment (hat the above named Defendants, didwillfully and knowingly enter into a
..
criminal conspiracy to' extortproperty that was legally in the possession ofthe Plai'ntiffprior to
December 2, 2009, and that the actions, willfully committed by the Defendants, has resulted in
the crime ofExtortion, against the Plaintiff, and has deprived him ofhis Civil Rights guaranteed
to him by the Constitution ofthe United States as well as the Constitution and laws ofthe State
ofArizona. The Plaintiffftniher begs this Court's indulgence due to the length ofthis complaint,
but due to the unique circumstances, unquestionably documented herein, and despite the
Plaintiffs efforts to be as briefas possible the substance ofthis complaint is warranted,"
Paragraph 9
"The District Court has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 28 U. S.C 1331 and
1343(a)(l )(2)(3)(4), which confers original jurisdiction onfederal district courts to hear suits
alleging the violation ofrights andprivileges under the United States Constitution. Additionally,
pursuant to 42 u.s. C. 1988, ifthe violations are found to be ofa criminal nature, in the
infliction ofpunishment on the party(s) found guilty."
'''.
II
4
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IV Conclusion
Starting as a child we are taught about the Constitution of the United States and further we
are taught the basic ideals of right and wrong. Regardless of case law, which can be used to support
either side an what the Pinal County Defendants conspired to do goes to the basic
fundamentals ofwro,ng. To put it plainly the Defendants used their badge, the respect and power that
comes with that badge for their person gain, breaking the law, shamefully breaking the public trust.
Although the complaint and amended complaint may have been lengthy, the Plaintiff was
attempting to completely explain the allegation and crimes committed so there would not be any
confusion as to the nature of the case. The Pinal County Defendants have admitted to the actions

which they have been accused, that admission along with the facts as stated now and in previous
pleadings shows the complete disregard for the law and rights of citizens. The Pinal County
Defendants did enter into a conspiracy with Ms. Dixon and openly admit to that conspiracy and
extortion to deprive the Plaintiff of his property, all the while asking this court for qualified immunit
for their actions which they admit were illegal. The Plaintiff hereby asks the court to reverse the
previous ruling granting the Pinal County Defendants qualified immunity and reset the rule 16
scheduling conference, all this is asked to be done in the interest ofjustice.
Respectfully submitted this 2 day of June, 2010.
')
?7.c::=:}
Mark E. Dixon
Pro Se
II
II
II
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Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 58 Filed 06/02/10 Page 6 of 6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Carol Lee Dixon
16 P.O. Box 11152
Casa Grande, AZ 85130
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Original filed with the Clerk's Office, on JuneL, 2010, and a true and correct copy ofthe
foregoing was placed in the U.S. mail to each of the following:
Pinal County Attorney's Office
Deputy Pinal County Attorney
Joe A. Albo, State Bar No. 004810
P.O. Box 877
Florence, AZ 85132
The Appel Law Office, PLLC
Attn: Marc Appel
10601 N. Hayden Rd,
Suite 1-103
Scottsdale, Az. 85260

By Mark E. Dixon
Pro Se
/
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Mark E. Dixon,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Stephen Clark, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. CV 09-2650-PHX-SRB
ORDER
The Court has received and considered Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Order and
Modify Order Dismissing Defendants Under Rule 59(e) and rule 60(b).
Reconsideration is only appropriate if: (1) the court is presented with newly
discovered, previously unavailable, evidence; (2) the court committed a clear error of law and
the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) there has been an intervening change in
controlling law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1262 (9th Cir. 1993);United States ex rel Conveyor Rental & Sales Co. v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 1991 WL 495733, *1 (D. Ariz. 1991). Such a motion, however, may not be used
to re-litigate old matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to entry of judgment. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Agency v. World Univ., 978 F.2d 10,
16 (1
st
Cir. 1992); accord Backlund, 778 F.2d at 1388; 1 Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d 2810.1 at 127-28.
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 59 Filed 06/08/10 Page 1 of 2
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The Plaintiff does not allege that the controlling law has changed since this Court
rendered its initial decision. Rather, he argues that the Court erred in its interpretation of
both the law and the facts of this case.
Motions for reconsideration can not be used to ask the Court to rethink what the
court has already thought through, merely because a plaintiff disagrees with the Courts
decision. Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983); See Refrigeration Sales Co. 605 F.Supp. at 8. Such disagreements should be dealt
with in the normal appellate process, not on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
Database Am., Inc. 825 F.Supp. at 1220; Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc. 605 F.Supp. at 7.
This case does not fall within one of those narrow instances where reconsideration is
appropriate. The moving party must show more than a disagreement with the courts
decision; the court should not grant a motion for reconsideration unless there is need to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Database Am., Inc. 825 F.Supp. at
1220; Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc., 605 F.Supp. at 7. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has
failed to set forth sufficient grounds to cause the Court to reconsider its May 19, 2010 Order.
IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Order and Modify Order
Dismissing Defendants Under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b). (Doc. 58).
DATED this 8
th
day of J une, 2010.
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 59 Filed 06/08/10 Page 2 of 2
~ u s ~ = = ~ ~
United States District Judge
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1
Documents 54 and 55 are identical as Ms. Dixon responded to Plaintiffs Motion and
moved to dismiss in the same filing. The Court cites to Document 55, Ms. Dixons Motion
to Dismiss, in this Order.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Mark E. Dixon,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Gregory Clark, in his individual capacity;
Travis Cote, in his individual capacity;
Andrew Goode, in his individual capacity;
Philip LeBlanc, in his individual capacity;
Eli Pile, in his individual capacity; Stephen
Clark, in his individual capacity; Carol Lee
Dixon, in her individual capacity,
Defendants.
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No. CV 09-2650-PHX-SRB
ORDER
The Court now resolves Plaintiff Mark E. Dixons Motion for Default J udgment
Against Defendant Carol Lee Dixon (Pl.s Mot.) (Doc. 52) and Defendant Carol Lee
Dixons Motion to Dismiss (Def.s Mot.) (Doc. 55).
1

I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case were set forth in this Courts Order of May 19, 2010. (See Doc.
56.) The pertinent details will be summarized here. Mr. Dixon alleges that Ms. Dixon
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In her Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Dixon states that the dogs name is spelled Shiloh,
not Shilo. (Def.s Mot. at 3.) For the purposes of this Order, the Court will adopt the
spelling contained in the Amended Complaint.
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conspired with several Pinal County Sheriffs Deputies to deprive him of his property
without due process of law. (Am. Compl. 8.) Mr. Dixon alleges that Ms. Dixon improperly
caused the deputies to seize his dog Shilo
2
and give her to Ms. Dixon. (Id. 22-23, 28, 30-
33, 38-39.) Ms. Dixon asserts that Shilo was never Mr. Dixons dog and that he was only
temporarily caring for her. (Def.s Mot. at 2-5.)
On May 19, 2010, the Court granted the Pinal County Defendants Motion to Dismiss,
leaving Ms. Dixon as the only remaining Defendant. (Doc. 56, May 19, 2010, Order at 6.)
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint was filed on March 2, 2010. (Doc. 17.) Ms. Dixon did not
file an Answer to the Amended Complaint, although she did file an Answer to Mr. Dixons
original Complaint. (See Doc. 4.) In responding to Plaintiffs Motion, Ms. Dixon argues that,
as the Amended Complaint made only minor changes, she did not believe she was required
to answer because her first Answer addressed the substance of Plaintiffs claims. (Def.s Mot.
at 1-2.) The docket does not contain proof of service of the Amended Complaint on Ms.
Dixon.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment
Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires defendants to file an
answer within 21 days after being served with a summons and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), default judgment is to be
entered [w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend. Mr. Dixon moved for entry of default judgment against Ms.
Dixon after she failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint. (Pl.s Mot. at 1.)
However, as the record does not reflect that Ms. Dixon was ever properly served with the
Amended Complaint, she was under no obligation to answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion is denied.
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B. Defendants Motion to Dismiss
Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983, Mr. Dixon alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated when he was deprived of his dog. (Am. Compl. 13.) Ms.
Dixon argues that she is not an officer of the law and therefore cannot violate Plaintiffs
civil rights. (Def.s Mot. at 5.)
To obtain relief under 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of rights
protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by
conduct of a person (4) acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,
1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, a 1983 claim requires state action. [Section] 1983
excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). Here, Mr. Dixon does not allege that Ms. Dixon acted under color
of state law, as indeed he cannot because she is a private individual, not a state official. Mr.
Dixon also does not allege that Ms. Dixons conduct could be considered state action.
Likewise, rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments can
only be violated by state action. See Apao v. Bank of N.Y., 324 F.3d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment shields citizens from unlawful government
actions, but does not affect conduct by private entities); Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208
F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) (expressly holding that claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments require state action); United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080
(9th Cir. 1998) (The Fourth Amendment limits searches conducted by the government, not
by a private party, unless the private party acts as an instrument or agent of the
government.); Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1982) (The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment applies to actions of the federal government and not to individual
activities of private actors[, unless] . . . the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
of the [government] itself. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, because Ms. Dixon is not a state actor and her actions cannot be considered
the acts of the government itself, Mr. Dixon cannot state a claim against Ms. Dixon for
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Ms. Dixon requests sanctions against Mr. Dixon. (Def.s Mot. at 6.) Although the
Court grants Ms. Dixons Motion and dismisses the Amended Complaint in its entirety, the
Court does not exercise its discretion to sanction Mr. Dixon.
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violations of his constitutional rights, pursuant to 1983. Defendants Motion is granted.
3
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant Carol Lee Dixons Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 55) and dismissing the Amended Complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff Mark E. Dixons Motion for Default
J udgment Against Defendant Carol Lee Dixon (Doc. 52).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment of dismissal in
this matter.
DATED this 24
th
day of August, 2010.
Case 2:09-cv-02650-SRB Document 60 Filed 08/24/10 Page 4 of 4
~ u s ~ = = ~ ~
United States District Judge