THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM Volume XXXV, No.

3, Fall 2004

SEARLES REALISM DECONSTRUCTED

SAM PAGE

INTRODUCTION This article critically examines John Searles spirited approach to the contemporary realism and anti-realism debate in metaphysics. Searles treatment of the issues is rough. He blurs over many of the distinctions that matter in the debate and entertains uncharitable readings of perceived adversaries. His articulation of the position he refers to variously as Realism, Metaphysical Realism, External Realism, and sometimes Scientic Realism is shifty, but not because he moves from one position he calls Realism, to distinct positions he calls Metaphysical Realism and External Realism, respectively. Rather, it is shifty because he refers to several distinguishable positions as if they were one and the same position, using all three names in seemingly random fashion. Further complicating matters is that, on the one hand, Searle presents realism as if it were so commonsensical that it would be insane to reject, as he alleges that social constructionists do. On the other hand, Searles account, spreading across numerous books and articles, is a complex, intertwining network of subtle, sophisticated, technical, and contemporary insights and arguments that is challenging to see in its entirety. However, when viewed in its entirety, it is revealed not to be a single, unied tapestry, but rather several tenuously linked cloths. Nonetheless, Searles realism is a fascinating account to scrutinize closely, and has the value of raising passionately, albeit with concomitant confusion, the deep issues at the heart of the debate. This article proceeds as follows. First, Searles argument for External Realism, the thesis that there is a way things are that is totally mind-independent, is examined. Second, Searles claim that External Realism is the denitive conception of the Western Rationalistic Tradition is critically considered. Third, Searles logicaldependency argument is laid out, and its possible connections to External Realism are considered. The logical-dependency argument concludes that social reality is 249

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ultimately constructed out of brute physical reality. The External Realism and logical-dependency arguments combined are supposed to refute social constructionism, the provocative thesis that all reality is socially constructed. I argue at length that Searles refutation fails, not in virtue of some strength of social constructionism, but in virtue of weaknesses internal to Searles account. These weaknesses include (1) a tenuous connection between the two major arguments, (2) an apparent circularity in the logical-dependency argument, and (3) a compatibility between External Realism and social constructionism. The article concludes by considering some theories about the root problems of Searles account. SEARLES EXTERNAL REALISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM The origins of Searles The Construction of Social Reality are found in several earlier works, where Searle is preoccupied with realism, or Metaphysical Realism as he also calls it, and its ostensible rejection by anti-realists and others. Searle insists that the rejection of realism is responsible for the erosion of our intellectual and educational traditions. This is because, Searle succinctly writes: without metaphysical realism, anything is permissible.1 Searle denes the position he refers to variously as Realism and Metaphysical Realism as follows:
Reality exists independently of human representations. This view, called realism, . . . is that though we have mental and linguistic representations of the world in the form of beliefs, experiences, statements, and theories, there is a world out there that is totally independent of these representations.2

Metaphysical Realism, so stated, sounds uncontroversial. The claim is that although a natural reality, such as a mountain, may be described variously, there is a way the mountain is in reality that renders statements about it more or less true, or more or less false. Talking about mountains has no bearing on whether or not they exist. Mountains, along with indenitely more physical things, are causally independent of us; thinking does not make them so. Searle claims that numerous philosophers, including Thomas Kuhn, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty, reject realism, ostensibly in favor of the anti-realist position that all reality is socially constructed. Searle does not endorse the converse view that none of reality is socially constructed. Realities such as tax laws, home runs, and dollar bills, which Searle calls social (or institutional) realities, are clearly dependent on us. In addition, the portion of the world that is com1 2

John R. Searle, New York Review of Books (December 6, 1990): 40. John R. Searle, Rationality and Realism: What Is at Stake? Daedalus 122 (1993): 60.

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prised of minds is not mind-independent. However, there are vast stretches of reality that do not fall under these exceptional categories, and it is these stretches that are totally independent of us and our representations of them. For instance, the elliptical orbit of the planets relative to the sun, the structure of the hydrogen atom, and the amount of snowfall in the Himalayas, for example, are totally independent of both the system and the actual instances of human representations of these phenomena.3 Although linguistically representing these realities requires human participation, the actual situations in the world that correspond to these statements are not human creations, nor are they dependent on human motivation.4 All this sounds very sensible, but Searle is aware of the many objections looming in philosophical space. Thus, Searle makes the caveat that he is not privileging a particular description of the independently real, but is merely alluding to those things that are totally independent of us. Searle further develops his position, along with its caveats, in The Construction of Social Reality.5 There he dubs his version of Metaphysical Realism External Realism, which does not say how things are but only that there is a way that they are. And things . . . does not mean material objects or even objects.6 External Realism is purely formal without any specic content about, for example, objects in space.7 So much for the elliptical orbits of the planets, and so much for snowfall in the Himalayas. Searles external reality is totally devoid of specied content. Searle is not specifying how external reality is, but just that there is a way that things are that is independent of all representations of how things are.8 Searle writes that it is a mistake
to suppose that realism is committed to the theory that there is one best vocabulary for describing reality, that reality itself must determine how it should be described. (. . .) The view that the world exists independently of our representations of it does not imply that there is a privileged vocabulary for describing it.9
3 4 5

7 8 9

Searle, Rationality and Realism 61. Searle, Rationality and Realism 61. Though Searles title, The Construction of Social Reality, clearly sounds like a pun on the famous book The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann, Searle claims that he was neither responding to nor that he had heard of that book before choosing his title. John R. Searle, Replies to the Critics of The Construction of Social Reality, History of the Human Sciences 10, (1997): 106107. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995): 155. Searle writes on the previous page: I use the metaphor of external to mark the fact that the view in question holds that reality exists outside of, or external to, our system of representation. Searles External Realism contrasts obviously with Putnams Internal Realism, which holds that what we call realities can only exist internal to a system of representation. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 183. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 182. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 155.

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External Realism is simply the view that there is something out there to be described.10 Searle thinks that it is wrongly thought that Conceptual Relativism and Metaphysical Realism are incompatible. They are, Searle maintains, compatible, and it is this compatibility that provides support for External Realism. Searle denes the thesis of Conceptual Relativism as follows:
Systems of representation, such as vocabularies and conceptual schemes generally, are human creations, and to that extent arbitrary. It is possible to have any number of different systems of representations for representing the same reality.11

More succinctly, Searle writes: All representations of reality are made relative to some more or less arbitrarily selected set of concepts.12 According to Searle, Conceptual Relativism, so stated, is true and perfectly consistent with External Realism. To bolster his case, Searle adduces Hilary Putnams celebrated thought experiment.13 Imagine three objects, a, b, and c. How many objects are there? It is true that there are three objects, but depending on how we choose to individuate objects, it is also true that there are seven objects: (1) a, (2) b, (3) c, (4) a + b, (5) b + c, (6) a + c, (7) a + b + c.14 Searle writes:
So how many objects are there really in the imagined world? Are there really three or really seven? There is no absolute answer to these questions. The only answers we can give are relative to the arbitrary choice of conceptual schemes. The sentence, e.g., There are exactly three objects in the world, will be true in one scheme, false in the other.15

Putnams thought experiment, at least according to Searle, refutes the claim that there is one privileged description of reality. The point Searle emphasizes, though, is that each classication is of the same reality. Driving the point further, Searle writes:
If conceptual relativity is to be used as an argument against realism, it seems to presuppose a language-independent reality that can be carved up or divided up in different ways, by different vocabularies.16

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 161. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 151. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 161. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 1612. Objects 47 are called mereological objects or mereological sums in the literature. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 162. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 165.

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And furthermore:
That we use the word cat the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that use, and satises that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind-independent) fact.17

If Conceptual Relativism is true, and Searle thinks it is, then it requires that there be a reality that exists independently of classications, which those classications are about. It is in this way that Conceptual Relativism is compatible with and supports Searles External Realism. This argument from Conceptual Relativism is one of several arguments Searle adduces in support of External Realism. We will now consider a second. EXTERNAL REALISM AS A NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITION Beginning with his book Intentionality, Searle has claimed that realism is neither a thesis nor a theory. After defending External Realism, Searle concedes: I have not demonstrated that external realism is true.18 If Searles brand of realism is not demonstrably true, then exactly what status does it have? Searle writes:
I have tried to show that it [External Realism] is presupposed by the use of very large sections of a public language. (. . .) I have not shown that there is a real world but only that you are committed to its existence when you talk to me or to anyone else.19

Searle is relying on a robust distinction between a thesis and a presupposition. A thesis, as Searle is using the word, is an assertion that is in principle falsiable. For instance, the cat is on the mat is an empirically veriable assertion that is true if and only if it is the case that the cat is actually on the mat. The same goes for a statement such as the southern ank of Mt. Everest is in Nepalwe can actually check and see whether or not this statement is true. Conversely, statements like reality is independent of our representations of it are fundamentally different in kind from paradigmatic assertions. Determining the statements validity is not simply a matter of comparing the sentence with the corresponding state of affairs. Realism, writes Searle, is not a hypothesis, belief, or philosophical thesis,20 but rather the precondition of having hypotheses.21 Searle writes:
17 18 19 20

21

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 166. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 194. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 194. John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1983): 158. Searle, Intentionality 159.

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One can show that this or that claim corresponds or fails to correspond to how things really are in the external world, but one cannot in that way show that the claim that there is an external world corresponds to how things are in the external world, because any question of corresponding or failing to correspond to the external world already presupposes the existence of an external world to which the claim corresponds or fails to correspond. External realism is thus not a thesis nor an hypothesis but the condition of having certain sorts of theses or hypotheses.22

How would we check whether or not the statement there is an external world is true? By comparing that statement with the external world, which of course presupposes the external world, the very thing whose existence is under question. It is for this reason that Searle concludes that Realism, the view that reality exists independently of human representations, functions as part of the taken-forgranted background of our practices and as such cannot be demonstrated as true within these practices.23 Realism is a necessary presupposition for a large chunk of thought and language.24 Accordingly, there can be no knockdown, non-circular, non-question begging defense of Realism, beacuse any such proof presupposes it.25 It is for these reasons that Searle claims that the External Realism thesis is overwhelmingly compellingthough not quite, technically speaking, true. One thing is for certain, though, and that is that External Realism is not false. Searle writes: You cannot coherently deny realism and engage in ordinary linguistic practices, because realism is a condition of the normal intelligibility of those practices.26 Denying realism involves a performative contradiction. In performing the utterance there is no independently existing world, a condition necessary for determining the truth or falsity of this statement is contradictednamely, the condition that there is a way the world is. The same performative contradiction ensues from saying I do not exist. By saying I do not exist, I am contradicting one of the conditions that must hold for me to make that statement: namely, the condition that I exist. Perhaps there is a disanalogy here, though. There is no way that a living person stating I exist could be wrong. There is no discovery that could be made to falsify the statement. Now consider the claim there is a mind-independent reality. Would the discovery that the physical world is an illusion and everything is ultimately an idea defeat the claim? No, according to Searle, because even if it turned out that the physical world was a gment of our collective imagination, that would still be a fact about reality that is independent of what we say and
22 23 24 25 26

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 178. Searle, Rationality and Realism 80. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 182. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 178. Searle, Rationality and Realism 81.

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think about it. This is an important aspect of Searles External Realism that is worth belaboring for a moment. Searle rehearses the following dialogue, starting with an imaginary interlocutor:
But suppose it should turn out that the only things that exist or ever did exist are states of disembodied consciousness. Surely that would be inconsistent with realism. . . . No, not necessarily. Realism does not say that the world had to turn out one way rather than another, but only that there is a way that it did turn out that is independent of our representations of it. Representations are one thing, the reality represented another, and this point is true even if it should turn out that the only actual reality is mental states.27

That Searles External Realism seems compatible with idealism will be revisited later. The transcendental argument, as Searle calls it, that External Realism is a necessary presupposition of communicative practices, coupled with the argument from Conceptual Relativism, jointly support the conclusion that there is a totally mind-independent reality. The conclusion entails nothing specic about the character of the external world, because External Realism is a formal claim that is expressly not committed to any specic descriptions about the way the world is intrinsically. Here is a rough schematization of the argument for External Realism so far: Premise 5a: A public language presupposes a language-independent reality. Premise 5b: There is a public language. Premise 6a: Conceptual Relativism presupposes independent reality. Premise 6b: Conceptual Relativism is true. Conclusion 2: There is a way things are that is totally independent of us and our representations (no commitment to specic content, no privileged descriptions).28 Although Searles version of Metaphysical Realism seems uncontroversial, philosophers from across the realism/anti-realism spectrum nd it wanting. William Alston, who defends a stronger version of Metaphysical Realism, writes: that there is something that is not so dependent [on our conceptual-theoretical choices], is hardly signicant enough to be worth the trouble.29 Richard Rorty, on the other side, thinks Searle defends a version of Metaphysical Realism that
27 28

29

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 15657. Premises 5a and 5b clearly go together, as do 6a and 6b. Why the premises are numbered 5 and 6, and the conclusion 2, will be clear when the whole argument is schematized. William P. Alston, A Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 2001): 10.

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nobody has ever attacked.30 Rorty claims that what principally unites anti-realists is a suspicion of the idea that there is One Way the World Is intrinsically.31 However, Searles External Realism entails nothing specic about the intrinsic structure of reality. In order to nd the claims that aggravate anti-realists, and the claims that would be worth Alstons while, we must consider two of Searles other related theses. The rst thesis involves Searles claims about the role of External Realism in what he calls the Western Rationalistic Tradition. The second thesis is that all social reality logically depends on totally brute physical reality. These theses are considered in turn. REALISM AS THE DEFINITIVE PRINCIPLE OF THE WESTERN RATIONALISTIC TRADITION We have examined Searles claim that External Realism is a necessary presupposition of communicative interaction. If this is true, then it goes without saying that External Realism plays a very important role in socio-linguistic practice. This, however, is only one of several roles that Searle attributes to External Realism. Searle writes:
There is a conception of reality, and of the relationships between reality on the one hand and thought and language on the other, that . . . is so fundamental that to some extent it denes that tradition. (. . .) Without too much exaggeration one can describe this conception as the Western Rationalistic Tradition.32 Reality exists independently of human representations. This view, called realism, is the foundational principle of the Western Rationalistic Tradition.33

Searle thinks, uncontroversially, that the various practices, primarily the scientic ones, that emerged from the Enlightenment are worth preserving. What is controversial is Searles characterization of these practices. According to Searle (quoting from above), External Realism is the denitive conception, or in other words, the foundational principle of the Western Rationalistic Tradition. Furthermore, External Realism just is the Western Rationalistic Tradition: Without too much exaggeration one can describe this conception as the Western Rationalistic Tradition.
30

31 32 33

Richard Rorty, Realism, Antirealism, and Pragmatism, in Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology, ed. Christopher B. Kulp (New York: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers, Inc., 1997): 160. Rorty, Realism, Antirealism, and Pragmatism 160. Searle, Rationality and Realism 57. Searle, Rationality and Realism 60.

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The implication of Searles portrayal of the Western Rationalistic Tradition is that critiquing External Realism, as anti-realists, postmodernists and antirationalists have been doing recently, is tantamount to attacking and attempting to overthrow the Western Rationalistic Tradition.34 Searles implicit rationale is that if there is no External Realism, then there is no more Western Rationalistic Tradition. It is presumably this worry that makes defending External Realism so pressing for Searle:
So what difference does it make whether or not one says that one is a realist or an antirealist? I actually think that philosophical theories make a tremendous difference to every aspect of our lives. (. . .) The rst step in combating irrationalism . . . is a refutation of the arguments against external realism and a defense of external realism as a presupposition of large areas of discourse.35

One question raised by Searles claims about the role of External Realism involves the extent to which whole practices rely on or are dened by particular philosophical ideals. This is an important question to consider, because numerous advocates of particular philosophical abstractions express enthusiasm, albeit alarmingly, if not threateningly, for their favored abstraction in the following generalizable form: if there is no X (favored philosophical abstraction, such as God, absolute moral truths, and so on), then (1) the practices we cherish will collapse, (2) everything is permitted, (3) chaos will ensue, etc. Searle does the same, writing without metaphysical realism, anything is permissible.36 Leaving that for the reader to consider, two particular problems with Searles portrayal of the role of External Realism as the denitive conception of the Western Rationalist Tradition are worth noting. Here is one problem. First, if we take it for granted (agreeing with Searle) that External Realism is a necessary presupposition of communication, then External Realism is a necessary feature of any tradition (because traditions require communication). However, in order for some feature to be denitive of a thing, that feature must be (fairly) unique to that thing. Therefore, External Realism cannot be the distinguishing feature (or denitive conception) of the Western Rationalistic Tradition, because External Realism is a necessary feature of any tradition. A second problem with Searles portrayal is that if it is true that External Realism is a necessary presupposition of communication, then it is not clear why Searle feels the need to defend External Realism. If External Realism really is necessary, no argument from any anti-realist, postmodernist, or
34 35 36

Searle, Rationality and Realism 7679. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 197. John Searle, The Storm Over the University: An Exchange, New York Review of Books (February 14, 1991): 40.

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anti-rationalist could undermine External Realism, because their arguments would necessarily presuppose, and thus reafrm the truth of, External Realism. The weakness of Searles claim that External Realism is the denitive conception of the Western Rationalistic Tradition does not, however, undermine his External Realism thesis. Things do start to come apart, though, when its connection to the main argument of The Social Construction of Reality is stressed. THE COMPLETE ARGUMENT Searle acknowledges a limitation with his transcendental argument that External Realism is a necessary presupposition of communication, or in other words, that a public language presupposes a public world.37 The argument, if valid, is an answer to phenomenalist idealism but not to social constructionism.38 There is a problem with Searles statements here that requires immediate attention. It is not clear that Searles External Realism is a refutation of idealism, because elsewhere he suggests that External Realism is compatible with idealism. As he says, even if it turned that everything was actually ideal in nature, this would still be a fact about reality independent of what we think about it:
For the realist, even if there were no material objects in fact, there would still be a representationindependent reality, for the nonexistence of material objets would just be one feature of that representation-independent reality.39

It would perhaps be more consistent for Searle to say that the transcendental argument is a refutation of solipsism, but not idealism. But this is, for my purposes, a minor point. The point Searle is explicitly conceding is that the transcendental argument that a public language presupposes a public world is not a refutation of social constructionism, which, in Searles hands, is the thesis that all reality is socially constructed. This is because many public realities, such as dollar bills and touchdowns, are ontologically subjective (or socially constructed), because their existence depends on our institutions. To complete the argument, Searle adduces another transcendental argument to the effect that a socially constructed reality presupposes a reality independent of all social constructions.40 This is so, Searle writes:

37 38 39 40

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality

191. 190. 157. 191.

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because there has to be something for the construction to be constructed out of. To construct money, property, and language, for example, there have to be the raw materials of bits of metal, paper, land, sounds, and marks, for example. And the raw materials cannot in turn be socially constructed without presupposing some even rawer materials out of which they are constructed, until eventually we reach a bedrock of brute physical phenomena independent of all representations. The ontological subjectivity of the socially constructed reality requires an ontologically objective reality out of which it is constructed.41

What Searle argues in the rst part (which is discussed in following sections) of The Construction of Social Reality 42 is that social realities are logically dependent on brute physical realities that are at some level independent of all social constructions and representations. This additional transcendental argument, which I will call the logical-dependency argument, seems to provide additional support for the claim that there is a way things are that is totally independent of us and our representations of it. This is how the two arguments of Searles book connect. Or is it the other way around? For all his criticisms about the sloppiness of his opponents arguments, Searle is perplexingly ambivalent about the overall structure of his own argument. After laying out the logical-dependency argument, Searle writes: It is now time to defend the contrast on which the [logicaldependency] analysis rests, to defend the idea that there is a reality totally independent of us.43 But this idea just seems to be the conclusion, or at least a consequent, of the logical-dependency argument, not a premise of it. Although Searle is careful to schematize the arguments of his opponents, he does not offer a single schematization of his own argument, requiring the reader to sort out the complexities. There are two ways to structure Searles argument that have occurred to me. The rst is as a series of transcendental arguments, or as Searle says elsewhere, a full scale transcendental deduction:44
First transcendental argument: A subjects language presupposes an intersubjective or public language.

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43 44

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 19091. Searles argument for External Realism, which I covered rst, is actually the second part of Construction. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 149. An article published several years prior to The Construction of Social Reality was not, to quote Searle more completely, the ideal occasion for a full scale transcendental deduction of metaphysical realism; however I hope to develop this argument in more detail elsewhere. John Searle, The Storm Over the University: An Exchange, New York Review of Books (February 14, 1991). Presumably, Searles The Construction of Social Reality is the occasion for this full scale transcendental deduction, although Searle does not, as far as I can tell, indicate that this is so anywhere in the book.

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This is a refutation of solipsism.45

Second transcendental argument (the External Realism thesis): A public language presupposes a public reality.

This is, according to Searle, a refutation of idealism, although as I have already mentioned, it is not clear that this is the case.
Third transcendental argument (the logical-dependency argument): A public reality presupposes an ontologically objective reality.

This is, according to Searle, a refutation of social constructionism. Although this is a nice, neat structure, it is not clear it is what Searle intends or, even if it is, that it is viable. If this is the intended structure of Searles argument, it is unclear why he would say, after laying out the third transcendental argument: It is now time to defend the contrast on which the analysis rests, to defend the idea that there is a reality totally independent of us.46 Again, this idea that there is a reality totally independent of us, which Searle claims supports the third transcendental argument, just is the conclusion of the third argument. There is another reason to think that the second transcendental argument (the External Realism argument) should not be understood as supporting the third transcendental argument (the logical-dependency argument), contrary to what Searle indicates. Searle claims that External Realism is not a refutation of social constructionism, because the transcendental argument for External Realism is simply that a public world presupposes a public reality, and it could turn out that all such realities are socially constructed. In other words, External Realism is compatible with social constructionism. Searle then claims, in the passage quoted in the previous paragraph, that the essential contrast between brute and social realities, what would have to be the case in order for social constructionism to be refuted, is supported by External Realism. But if Searle really means that External Realism is compatible with social constructionism, then it is unclear how
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46

Notice that this transcendental deduction, whether or not it is actually Searles, starts not from thought, like Descartes, but from language. Starting from thought can get one to subjectivity, because thought presupposes subjectivity (I think, therefore I am). However, this starting point and subsequent move result in what Searle sees as the traps and dead-ends of epistemologythe difculties encountered in moving from subjectivity to the external world (radical skepticism) or to other minds is legion. Searle thinks he can avoid this dead-end by starting his transcendental deduction with a different given in Descartes thought experiment: language (I think). Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 149.

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External Realism can undergird the very contrast that is supposed to refute social constructionism. The second possible schematization of Searles overall argument is this: The logical-dependency argument: Premise 1: We live in one world. All realities are part of the same world. Premise 2: The fundamental features of the world are as described by the natural sciences; we live in a world made entirely of physical particles in elds of force. Premise 3: There are social (or institutional or ontologically subjective) realities whose existence depends on us. (Question: How do social realities t into a world that is fundamentally physical?) Conclusion 1: Social realities logically depend on (are constructed from) brute physical realities that are not in any way socially constructed.

The argument for External Realism:

Premise 4a (Conclusion 1): Social realities logically depend on (are constructed from) brute physical realities that are not in any way socially constructed. Premise 4b (Premise 3): There are social realities. Premise 5a: A public language presupposes a language-independent reality. Premise 5b: There is a public language. Premise 6a: Conceptual Relativism presupposes independent reality. Premise 6b: Conceptual Relativism is true. Conclusion 2: There is a way things are that is totally independent of us and our representations (no commitment to specic content, no privileged descriptions). According to this schematization, the logical-dependency argument is a tributary argument that provides additional support for the main External Realism argument. I think this is a more promising argumentative structure than the three-step transcendental deduction, and it is the one that I will reference in the remainder of this article. However, it does have serious problems, which will be addressed in the sections that follow. It is to the framework of the logical-dependency argument that I now turn.

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CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL REALITY: FRAMEWORK PRESUPPOSITIONS Searle begins his book with this sentence: We live in exactly one world, not two or three or seventeen.47 This statement, one can gather, is a response to Kuhns infamous claim that when our paradigms change, so does our world.48 Regarding this one world, Searle writes: As far as we currently know, the most fundamental features of that world are as described by physics, chemistry, and the other natural sciences.49 Early in the rst chapter, Searle writes:
The truth is, for us, most of our metaphysics is derived from physics (including the other natural sciences). (. . .) Two features of our conception of reality are not up for grabs. (. . .) The atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary theory of biology.50

And along the same lines:

Here, then, are the bare bones of our ontology: We live in a world made up entirely of physical particles in elds of force.51

In these statements Searle is not stating denitively what the fundamental nature of reality is, but just that for us, as far as we know, the fundamental nature of reality is particles in elds of force. Denitive or not, the claims are confusing, because Searle also states that External Realism does not say how the world is independently of us, but just that there is a way the world is independent of us. In these sentences Searle seems to be saying something specic about how the world is fundamentally, which, for all we know, means the same as totally independent of us. But before getting carried away, let us see where Searle goes with these assertions. Searle makes a distinction between social realities and brute physical realities. If people had never existed, there would still be physical realities, like molecules,
47 48

49 50 51

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality xi. John Hund, on the other hand, interprets Searles introductory line as a response to Durkheim. Hund thinks that Searle is wrong to think that there is one and only one world. Dogs, for instance, live in the world of physical realities, whereas we live in a world of both physical and institutional realities. However, Hund goes on to write something that could just as easily come out of Searles computer: This idea does not commit us to the absurdity that these two worlds are not part of the same reality. This is just a manner of speech. These two worlds, or levels of reality, are logically and conceptually interconnected (126). This latter claim is precisely the one Searle argues for at length in The Construction of Social Reality. John Hund, Searles The Construction of Social Reality, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28: (1998). Searle, The Construction of Social Reality xi. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 6. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 7.

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mountains, ora, and fauna. However, had people not existed, social realities, like money, home runs, and marriages, never would have existed, because social realities depend on us for their existencethey are socially constructed. Whereas social realities are ontologically subjective, meaning that their existence depends on us, brute physical realities are ontologically objective, meaning that their existence does not depend on us. This distinction also maps onto the distinction between what Searle calls intrinsic features of reality and observer-relative features of reality. Whereas a mountain is an intrinsic feature of reality, its beauty is observer-relative. Searle illustrates this distinction as follows:
From a Gods-eye view, from outside the world, all the features of the world would be intrinsic, including intrinsic relational features such as the feature that people in our culture regard such and such objects as screwdrivers. God could not see screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc., because intrinsically speaking there are no such things. Rather, God would see us treating certain objects as screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc. But from our standpoint, the standpoint of beings who are not gods but are inside the world that includes us as active agents, we need to distinguish those true statements we make that attribute features to the world that exist quite independently of any attitude or stance we take, and those statements that attribute features that exist only relative to our interests, attitudes, stances, purposes, etc.52

This distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative features of reality is important, according to Searle, because it is going to turn out that social reality in general can be understood only in light of this distinction.53 It is with this distinction that Searle articulates what he calls the structure of social reality. This structure, as we will see, involves hierarchical series of connections between intrinsic and observer-relative features of reality. Having laid the groundwork, including his distinctions between brute and social realities, and intrinsic and observer-relative features of reality, Searle denes the question:
Here, then, are the bare bones of our ontology: We live in a world made up entirely of physical particles in elds of force. (. . .) Now the question is, how can we account for the existence of social facts within that ontology?54

In other words:
Our aim is to assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry, and biology. To do this we need to show the continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, money and nation-states.55
52 53 54 55

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality Searle, The Construction of Social Reality

12. 12. 7. 41.

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In what follows, Searles explanation of how social facts t into a world that is fundamentally physical, along with its apparent connection to External Realism, is examined. THE LOGICAL DEPENDENCE OF SOCIAL REALITY ON PHYSICAL REALITY Searle accounts for social realities, like marriages and touchdowns, within a world that consists fundamentally of particles in elds of force, by arguing that all social realities logically depend on brute physical realities. These logical dependencies are what Searle calls constitutive rules of the form X (brute reality) counts as Y (social reality) in context C. For example, a piece of green paper with certain dimensions and markings (the brute reality) can count as a social realitynamely, money. Another example is, crossing a particular boundary with an inated pigskin in hand (the brute physical reality) can count as a social reality in the right contextspecically, it counts as a touchdown in a football game. Searle thinks that this sort of logical relationship holds between all social realities and brute realities. Were it not for this special counts as relation, imposed by collective intentionality, there would be no social realities. This is because particular constitutive rules actually constitute social reality in the way that the rules of chess, for instance, constitute that game. Were it not for the various rules of chess, there would be no social reality we call the game of chess. Searle writes that constitutive rules should not be confused with what he calls regulative rules. Constitutive rules of chess are rules like, bishops can only move along diagonals, players must alternate moves, only the horse can hop over pieces, etc. Constitutive rules actually constitute the practice of chess. If the constitutive rules are broken, then chess (proper) is no longer being played. Regulative rules, on the other hand, do not constitute the practice, but simply regulate it. So, for instance, regulative rules during a chess tournament might be that players must refrain from making excessive noise, that they must be present at a designated location at a designated time in order not to be disqualied, etc. Although a player could break both of these regulative rules and still be playing chess, a player could not break any of the constitutive rules and still be playing chess (proper). Ian Hacking articulates the distinction this way: Constitutive rules make possible some activity, while regulative rules tell how to conduct it, once the activity is recognized or engaged in.56
56

Ian Hacking, Searle, Reality, and the Social, History of the Human Sciences, 10 (1997): 88. For a criticism of Searles constitutive/regulative rule distinction, see David-Hillel Ruben, John Searles The Construction of Social Reality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVII (1997): 4424.

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Additionally, constitutive rules are not to be confused with conventions. An example of a convention of chess is that pawns are smaller than kings. One could break this convention, by playing with pawns that are larger than kings, or by substituting pennies for pawns, and still be playing chess. However, were one to play on a board with 100 squares, instead of 64, one would no longer be playing chess. Whereas piece size is conventional, board conguration is not. A crucial feature of constitutive rules for Searles account is that they can be iterated.57 Consider again the constitutive rule that certain kinds of green paper count as money. The brute reality, green paper, is itself a status imposed on a logically prior, more brute realitysay pressed dyed ber. Putting this in the form of a constitutive rule: pressed dyed ber counts as green paper. Furthermore, we could say that pressed dyed ber is itself a status imposed on a logically prior, more brute realitysay an amalgamation of organic and inorganic moleculesand so on down to a brute physical reality that is totally devoid of the imposition of status functions by collective agency. It is in this way that all social realities bottom out in totally brute physical realities. In Searles words, the hierarchy of constitutive rules has to bottom out in phenomena whose existence is not a matter of human agreement. (. . .) Eventually one has to reach a rock bottom of something that is not itself any form of status-function.58 Furthermore:
It could not be the case, as some antirealists have maintained, that all facts are institutional facts, that there are no brute facts, because the analysis of the structure of institutional facts reveals that they are logically dependent on brute facts.59

What Searle does in this argument is substantiate the claim that some realities are not just causally independent of us and our representations, but in the elusive metaphysical sense, totally representation-independent. Credible anti-realists do not claim that natural realities, like mountains, are causally dependent on us. Consequently, a challenge for realists, if they are to distinguish markedly their position from the mundane realism which anti-realists accept, is to articulate the sense in which some realities are not just causally, but totally independent of us. Searle articulates this total representation-independence as logical independence. The entities that are logically independent of our representations are the same entities that are totally independent of us in the robust metaphysical sense. As proof that Searle is using these senses of independence interchangeably, consider the following passages. Realism . . . says that there exists a reality totally independent
57 58 59

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 80. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 5556. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 56.

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of our representations.60 Realism is the view that there is a way things are that is logically independent of all human representations.61 Searle argues that if it is assumed that socially constructed reality does not require nonsocially constructed reality, then logical absurdities ensue. He writes:
Because the logical form of the creation of socially constructed reality consists in iterations of the structure X counts as Y in C, the iterations must bottom out in an X element that is not itself an institutional construction. Otherwise you would get innite regress or circularity.62

In other words, if you agree (1) that there is a distinction to be drawn between social and brute realities, even if it is only a matter of degree, and you accept (2) Searles story about the logical, structural relationship between social and brute realities, then you are forced to accept (3) that there must be some realities on the brute side that are not in any way socially constructed, that are not in turn logically dependent on even more brute realities. This is so, because believing otherwise means either that there is no end to the logical dependency, or that some social realities could be shown to be eventually logically dependent on themselves. CRITICAL ANALYSIS That there are rough and ready distinctions to be drawn between social and brute realities, seems wholly unproblematic, so I will focus instead on Searles story about the logical, structural relationship between social and brute realities. Central to Searles story is the claim that brute realities, like green paper, get counted as social realities, like dollar bills. However, it is often the case, in abstract conversations for instance, that the opposite happens: that a social reality (like a dollar bill) gets counted as a brute reality (a meaningless sheet of processed ber). Such examples suggest that Searles logic supports the conclusion opposite of that drawn by him: that brute realities can logically depend on social realities, or at least that the logical dependence goes both ways. Whereas Searle assumes that the X term is always given brutally, phenomenologists like Hubert Dreyfus contend that things are typically given already meaningful.63 Dollar bills are not typically presented as green paper and subsequently counted as dollars, but are presented as dollars. Searle recognizes this point, though:

60 61 62 63

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 155. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 155. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 191. The italics are mine. See, for instance, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Phenomenological Description Versus Rational Reconstruction, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 217 (2001).

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In most cases it is harder to see objects as just natural phenomena, stripped of their functional roles, than it is to see our surroundings in terms of their socially dened functions. So children learn to see moving cars, dollar bills, and full bathtubs; and it is only by force of abstraction that they can see these as masses of metal in linear trajectories, cellulose bers with green and gray stains, or enamel-covered iron concavities containing water.64

This recognition leads phenomenologists to ask the following questions. Why not take social realities for granted and ask how we can account for particles in elds of force within the model of intersubjective, immersed coping? Why take the abstract, scientic model for granted instead of the common sense phenomenology of everyday experience? These questions challenge Searles fundamental ontology, to which he seems rmly committed. To question it would be to engage in a radically different project. Short of that, is there any response open for Searle? Searle does have a compelling response at his disposal, and it involves necessary and sufcient conditions. Although it is true that a dollar bill can count as a meaningless piece of paper, this is not the same as saying that being a piece of paper is logically dependent on being a dollar bill. This is because being a dollar bill is only a sufcient condition for being a piece of paper, but not a necessary condition, whereas being a piece of paper is a necessary condition for being a dollar bill, but not a sufcient condition. In other words, in order to have dollar bills you need paper as raw material, but in order to have paper, you do not need dollar bills as raw, building material. In Searles words, the status function dollar bill is imposed on the paper by the public (or the intentionality of collective agency), but the status function of paper does not need to be imposed on a dollar bill, because a dollar bill already is paper quite independent of public agreement. In Searles words, the Y term has to assign a new status that the object does not already have just in virtue of satisfying the X term.65 It is for these reasons that logical dependence appears to be a one-way street. And if so, then perhaps Searle is justied in claiming that the hierarchies of constitutive rules have to bottom out in phenomena whose existence is not a matter of human agreement.66 However, numerous commentators are skeptical about the truth and utility of Searles claim that social realities bottom out in wholly brute realities. Thomas Osborne is skeptical of the utility of Searles claim. He writes:
In the social world we have moved so far from the anchors of material reality . . . that we are like one of those cartoon characters that has run off the end of a cliff and is still running happily along
64 65 66

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 4. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 44. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 5556.

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in mid-air. It is true that the ground is there somewhere, but it may be an awfully long way down. Is it really any comfort that Searle should insist that, if we fell far enough, we should eventually reach the ground? That is the difference with the constructionists. They think that, given the ground is so far down (assuming, indeed, that there is only one ground), it doesnt make much sense to refer to it for our bearings at all.67

David-Hillel Ruben, on the other hand, is skeptical of the truth of Searles claim that social realities bottom out in wholly brute realities. He writes: I can nd nowhere in the book where Searle offers a constitutive rule meeting this requirement.68 According to Ruben, Searle does not and cannot cite a brute fact that is not just relatively brute, but 100% brute. Ruben writes:
Amongst the facts required for any institutional fact, there will always be other institutional facts. Reference to institutions will always and ineliminably appear on the left-hand side of these rules with the form X in C counts as Y (where Y is institutional).69

Ruben concludes that institutional facts . . . ineliminably creep back into the base, rendering these accounts circular.70 Circularity is something that Searle clearly intends to avoid. The example that Ruben marshals to demonstrate the circularity is that a green piece of paper with the right sorts of markings (from the U.S. Treasury Department) (the brute fact) counts as a dollar bill (the social or institutional fact) in the context of global commerce. In this case, it is clear that the brute fact includes institutional elements, namely, the elements of authenticity from the U.S. Treasury Department. However, in defense of Searle, there are plenty of other examples Ruben neglects that avoid this alleged circularity. In his response to Ruben, Searle cites the example of a line of stones counting as a boundary.71 Another example is a rock counting as a paperweight. In both cases, it is hard to see, as Ruben maintains, that the line of rocks, or the individual rock, by themselves admit of institutional inuence. But is it Searles intention to argue that things like rocks are totally independent of us and our representations of them, that such things comprise the fundamental, intrinsic nature of reality? Searle is not exactly clear about what the intrinsic features of reality are. Furthermore, Searle, the External Realist, is not entitled to specifying what the intrinsic features of reality are. Although, in the rst part of The Construction of Social Reality, Searle certainly suggests what the

67 68 69 70 71

Thomas Osborne, The Limits of Ontology, History of the Human Science, 10 (1997): 101102. Ruben, John Searles The Construction of Social Reality 445. Ruben, John Searles The Construction of Social Reality 445. Ruben, John Searles The Construction of Social Reality 445. John Searle, Responses to Critics of The Social Construction of Reality, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVII (1997): 456.

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entities that are totally independent of us are like, and this is where he might get into trouble. John Hund, in his review of Searles book, sees Searles ambiguity about the intrinsic features of reality as especially problematic.
The basic problem with Searles account of realism . . . is that he advances several different, and inconsistent, conceptions of intrinsic features of the world. On one account, they are brute facts. On another account, they are unknowable noumena, and on yet another account, they are highly idealized constructions . . . [such as] elds of force, atoms, molecules.72

According to Hund, it is not clear what Searle means by totally independent reality, because he gives various examples that appear incompatible. First, are both mountains and the subatomic particles of which they are composed intrinsically real, or are the subatomic particles more real than the mountain? Second, Searle suggests that the externally real is merely a formal placeholder for that which is independent of our representations; but if so, what are we to make of Searles specic suggestions about what is real? Third, it seems that any specic claim made about what is intrinsically real conicts with Searles other claim that he is not privileging a particular description or worldview. Searle invites these confusions. On the one hand, Searle states that the fundamental features of reality are as described by the natural sciences. On the other hand, he states that the hierarchy of logical dependency entails that there must be a portion of reality that is totally brute, not in any way a matter of human agreement. The reader seems impelled to believe that Searle thinks that subatomic particles in elds of force comprise the level of reality that is totally, logically independent of us and our representations of it. But this contradicts Searles claim that External Realism does not say how things are, but only that there is a way that they are.73 If Searles logical-dependency argument is supposed to support his External Realism argument, as indicated in my second schematization of his overall argument, then there might be another problem. The argument for the logical dependence of social realities on brute realities, which rests on assumptions about the way things are fundamentally, is adduced in support of External Realism, which expressly prohibits such assumptions. This does not by itself undermine the External Realism argument, because the two other pieces of support remain intact. However, it casts serious uncertainty on the connection between the External Realism argument and the logical-dependency argument.
72 73

John Hund, Searles The Construction of Social Reality, 125. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 155.

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The assumption about reality being fundamentally physical (particles in elds of force) also seems to corrupt his logical-dependence argument in its own right. From this assumption, Searle asks how social realities t into a world that is fundamentally physical. Searle then shows the logical, structural relationship between brute and social realities. Searle concludes that the iterations of logical dependency must bottom out in a totally brute reality; but this conclusion seems to be just a restatement of the original assumption that at some level the world is fundamentally physical, and in some way social realities are built upon this foundation. Ian Hacking also senses that something is awry with Searles reasoning here, writing that, Searle gives the impression of arguing in a circle.74 That Searle concludes with the assumption with which he starts, if this is indeed the case, provides reason to think that the original assumption requires defense. There is additional reason to think this is so. The original assumption is that the world is fundamentally physical, and more specically, subatomic particles in elds of force. However, what it means to be fundamental, let alone what is fundamental, is not a settled, undisputed, objective matter. Several of Searles commentators have disputed his claims about fundamental reality. John Hund writes:
Searle says that the bare-bones of his ontology is that we live in a world made up entirely of physical particles in elds of force. But what kind of world is this? Dogs dont live in that world. It is only people who think they live in a world of intangible elds of force.75

Mary Midgley writes:

But in what sense is that particular way of describing the world magisterial? How are the features of the world described by physics more fundamental than other features? Fundamental to what? (. . .) [Searle] seems still to grant physics some kind of privileged access to reality.76

Searle cannot simply state, uncontroversially, that fundamental reality is comprised of particles in elds of force, because claims about the fundamental nature of reality are extremely controversial. In fact, such claims are at the heart of the realism/anti-realism debate. HOW DID SEARLE GET INTO THIS MESS? There is one theory worth considering about why Searle countenances these ostensible inconsistencies, and that is that he misunderstands the status of external reality. Searle writes that institutional facts can only exist within systems
74 75 76

Hacking, Searle, Reality, and the Social 91. Hund, Searles The Construction of Social Reality, 126. Mary Midgley, Skimpole Unmasked, History of the Human Sciences, 10 (1997): 96.

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of constitutive rules.77 Brute facts (or realities), on the other hand, do not require systems of constitutive rules within which to exist. Whereas realities about the game of chess require human society, realities such as Mt. Everest do not. But what status does external reality, technically construed, have? We know that Searle claims that external reality has the status of a necessary presupposition. What I will endeavor to show, using Searles own logical convention, is that external reality is a status that is imposed upon everyday brute realities, or to the same effect, that external reality only exists within systems of constitutive rules. This seemingly bizarre claim is a possibility in virtue of the fact that what is ultimately external, just as what is fundamental, is not settled. Let us just say for the sake of argument that Mt. Everest is considered to be part of mindindependent, external reality. Interestingly, this claim can be translated into the form of a constitutive rule: Mt. Everest (the brute reality) counts as intrinsic, mindindependent, external reality (presumably, the more social, institutional reality) in the context of Searles account. In this case, the status of being part of totally mindindependent, external reality is imposed on Mt. Everest, presumably by a collective agreement that Searle is seeking by writing his book. If this is an appropriate formulation of a constitutive rule, then it would seem that external reality (in Searles technical sense) is (merely) an observer-relative, institutional reality. There is another reason to think that external reality (in Searles technical sense) is an observer-relative, institutional reality. Searle claims that External Realism is a (necessary) presupposition of communicative practices. True as this may be, it does not entail, as Searle acknowledges, precisely which entities are part of external reality. As has already been mentioned, a problem in Searles book is that he recommends a variety of candidates for external reality: mountains, rocks, plants, animals, particles in elds of force, etc. That Searle is recommending various entities is important. Whenever Searle recommends a particular reality as external, the concept of external reality assumes the role of an institutional fact: what is taken to be external reality depends on our choices, interests, purposes, and so on. This is actually not surprising, because, as I have stressed, the meaning of such notions as absolute, intrinsic, and fundamental is not settled. What this suggests is that a misunderstanding about the role of a recommendation has misguided Searles reasoning about realism. A closely related way to understand Searles project is as an attempt at articulating the essence (or intrinsic nature) of reality (as a whole). In which case, we could imagine Searle maintaining that the essence of reality, that which is ultimately real, is particles in elds of force. Searle was heavily inuenced by his teacher, John Austin, who was in turn heavily inuenced by Wittgenstein. One gets a clear sense reading Searle that he has absorbed many of Wittgensteins
77

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 28.

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philosophical observations and insights. But there are a few notable disagreements between Searle and Wittgenstein; one of them revolves around the concept of essence. Wittgenstein was skeptical about essences. In a famous passage, Wittgenstein writes that games do not share an essential element in common, but rather share family resemblances of crisscrossing similarities and differences. In a passage that reveals Searles disagreement with Wittgenstein on this matter, Searle provides what he calls an answer to Wittgenstein on games.78 Searle writes:
Famously, Wittgenstein argued that there is no essence marked by the word game. But all the same, there are certain common features possessed by paradigmatic games, such as those in competitive sportsbaseball, football, tennis, etc. In each case the game consists of a series of attempts to overcome certain obstacles that have been created for the purpose of trying to overcome them. Each side in the game tries to overcome the obstacles and prevent the other side from overcoming them.79

My purpose in bringing this to light is not to suggest that one or the other is right on their view of essentialism, but rather to show Searles sympathies with it. This is no trivial matter. It is Searles commitment to essentialism that leads to the biggest, albeit subtlest, problems in his account. Searle says repeatedly that he is not an ontological dualist, that he rejects the Cartesian schism between mind and body, the Kantian dualism between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, and the related dualism between mind and world.80 Nonetheless, Searle insists on a distinction between social and brute reality. Hacking points out that for Searles argument about logical dependency to work, Searle does not need to show what is totally brute, or even that there are realities that are totally brute.81 Searle just needs that there be a relative difference, a matter of degree, a contrast to be drawn, between brute and social, which there clearly is. For instance, it is intuitively plausible that a rock (which can count as a paperweight) is at least more brute than a paperweight, or that a mountain ridgeline (which can count as a countrys border) is at least more brute than a countrys border. However, Searle, as the following passage indicates, expects more than a mere contrast:
Because the logical form of the creation of socially constructed reality consists in iterations of the structure X counts as Y in C, the iterations must bottom out in an X element that is not itself an institutional construction. Otherwise you would get innite regress or circularity.82
78 79 80 81 82

Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 103 (footnote). Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 103. Searle, Replies to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality 104105. Hacking, Searle, Reality, and the Social 84. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 191.

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The claim of interest is that the iterations must bottom out in an X element that is not itself an institutional construction. Searle expects an essential difference between social and brute realitiesthat at the endpoint of the iterations will be an X element that is 100% brute, not just relatively brute. But Hacking suggests that all that needs to follow, in order that the logical form of the creation of socially constructed reality consists in iterations of the structure X counts as Y in C, is just that any X element has to be more brute than the correlative Y element. Searle worries that if it were not the case that iterations of constitutive rules bottom out in an X element that is 100% brute, then you would get innite regress or circularity. It is worth considering that, in this case at least, innite regress is unobjectionable. An analogous inference is this: if you break something down into constituent parts, any individual part must be smaller than the original something. This physical structure is iterable, in that any one of the individual parts can in turn be broken down into smaller constituent parts. Now, does it follow that these iterations must bottom out in an element that is indivisible? Physicists do not agree on the answer to this question. One problem is that at the microphysical level, things do not divide in the same way that things at the macrophysical level do. The point is that it is not obvious that the physical structure of things bottoms out. Analogously, it is not clear that the iterations of logical structure bottom out either. One way around this objection for Searle is to simply state what the bottom realities are, which he does from time to time. But this, as I have already mentioned, raises a host of other problems.

CONCLUSION If Searle abandons an essential contrast between brute and social realities, and just sticks with the far more modest contrast, then certain advantages follow. He can avoid the trouble of specifying any facts that are 100% brute, can remain consistent with his non-committal External Realism, and can perhaps avoid arguing in a circle. There is one serious disadvantage Searle sees clearly, though: the account would not be a refutation of social constructionism. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Searles account is its conation of several distinguishable kinds of realism, which he calls by a variety of names, including Realism, Metaphysical Realism, Scientic Realism, and External Realism. He (1) says that his realism cannot say anything specic about the intrinsic nature of reality, (2) gives reason to think that pretty much any physical object is part of the intrinsic nature of reality, and (3) suggests that the intrinsic nature of reality is a status reserved for subatomic particles in elds of force. These are three signicantly different positions that require separation. 273

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An earlier and considerably shorter version of this paper was presented to the Society for the Realist/Antirealist discussion at the 2003 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, for which I would like to thank the convener John Rose. I would also like to thank Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) for copious comments on number of versions of this paper, and Paul Hoffman (UC Riverside) for organizing a discussion of the paper at UC Riverside.

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