Julie Blackett SID 17354921 On the 3rd October, 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stood before the

House of Commons of the United Kingdom Parliament and presented a speech defending the decisions made in the recent meeting at Munich. This speech, and more commonly others Chamberlain made to the people in the days prior, have come to be known as Peace in our time or Peace for our time speech, depending upon the source used. This speech provides an important insight into the events occurring during this pivotal time and how the decisions made had an impact upon subsequent events. This response will consider the context and significance of this speech and attempt to identify any problems it poses. Perhaps the most important aspect to consider in regards to this speech is the context. This speech was given in the days following the Munich Agreement and during a time in which Chamberlain was engaged in a period of appeasement towards Germany after the devastation of the First World War. This was done in an attempt to prevent or at the very least delay another war in Europe, particularly in light of the fact that Chamberlain was aware of Britains military weakness as compared with Germany. (Badertscher 2009) Chamberlain had appeared to misjudge Hitlers character and global ambitions, believing that traditional diplomacy and a few concessions would help avoid war (Badertscher 2009) which likely contributed to the Munich Agreement. Considering the content of Chamberlains speech to Parliament, it seems that he is trying to gloss over certain circumstances surrounding the Munich Agreement. Chamberlain states that we did not go there to decide whether the predominantly German areas in the Sudetenland should be passed over to the German Reich. That had been decided already. Czechoslovakia had accepted the Anglo-French proposals. (Chamberlain 1938) This is a somewhat questionable matter, as it known that Czechoslovakia was not even present during the Munich discussion and this fact questions what they actually agreed to. It could be said that Czechoslovakia was essentially blackmailed into agreeing to the Anglo-French proposals, since should Benes reject the Anglo-French proposals, Czechoslovakia must fight Germany alone.(Shepardson 2006) The conference, which involved Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, did not invite the Czechoslovakian government, nor were they consulted. Chamberlain finishes this point of his speech by stating that he hopes the conditions decided upon during the Munich conference will provide greater security than it had in the past. This was obviously not the case. Thus it becomes necessary to consider what else is not true. Chamberlain even provides some defence of Hitlers character, by claiming that his decision to meet with the others at the conference, even though Hitler had already made his decisions, was a great and real contribution (Chamberlain 1938). It is likely that Chamberlain was simply putting the best possible slant to the events and people involved. Chamberlain also seemed to be operating under the delusion that it was the peoples desire for peace that led to the concessions made at the conference, rather than any threat. This statement blatantly ignores the threats Czechoslovakia faced before conceding to the demands regarding Sedetenland. Historians have argued that Chamberlains period of appeasement in the 1930s was to buy time so that Britain would have a chance to prepare for war, should it occur again
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(Badertscher 2009). This was certainly the case as Hitler ignored the agreements made in Munich, as only months later Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia and annexed the country. This made clear that the appeasements had failed and provided Britain with a small period of time to prepare for war before Germanys invasion of Poland in 1939. It is important to note that there is still debate about the period of appeasement that Chamberlain is most well known for. Some historians take the view that it continued long past when it should have and that Chamberlain continued to hold belief in Hitler that was undeserved and unrealistic. Others saw it as providing Britain the best chance to survive economically, as well as providing Britain the chance to prepare for war should it occur. This view is enhanced by the fact that it must be said that Chamberlain did contribute to this process by building up Britains military and defence industry, including the institution of a draft.(Badertscher 2009) This was the first peace time draft in Britains history and supports the idea that Chamberlain was not as blind to the facts of the situation as some would say. It is important to note that this speech is often confused with the ones Chamberlain made to the public on his return from Munich. This leads to some conflicting ideas about what is said, for instance it is not during his speech to Parliament that Chamberlain uses the phrase peace for our time, but is rather used when addressing the public. It must also be noted that most of Chamberlains actions, including those contributing to the speech, are seen to have predominantly failed and the events leading up to and directly after this speech can be seen as the low point in his appeasement policy of the 1930s. The fact that Chamberlain resigns soon after matters come to head and then dies shortly after that also presents some problems when considering the causes and events that occurred during this time. Chamberlain wrote no political memoirs and did not really have the opportunity to explain his decisions after the fact or to address historys view of him and his actions. This speech provides a vital insight into the events that led to World War 2 and the people involved. It has become a popular reference, the term peace in our time being quite commonly, even though it is confused with the other speeches Chamberlain made to the public at the time. Overall, it is the defence of the decisions made at Munich and what that defence reveals, that makes this speech such a significant part of history.

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Bibliography Baderscher, Eric 2009, Neville Chamberlain, Great Neck Publishing, http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/ehost/detail?vid=3&sid=bcd0bca5-fcc7-4aa0b532405598f0815b%40sessionmgr198&hid=124&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29w ZT1zaXRl#db=f5h&AN=15315250 Chamberlain, Neville, 3 October 1938, Peace in our time, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 339, House of Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain Shepardson, D.E, 2006, A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered, The Midwest Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 81-99, http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/docview/195697949?accountid=36155

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