Universals

Ways of approaching this debate:What makes white things white? What makes horses, horses? What makes a chair a chair? What do all chairs, white things, horses share? What makes f things f? The concepts of chairs, white things and horses are concepts provided by a language game. A form of an ob ect e!ists in another dimension. Thing thing has been udged by humans to be of a certain type "hysical criteria: reflects all light #omething with a particular function i.e. you can sit on it

Definitions $niversal - something which can be instantiated by more than one entity "articular - something which cannot be instantiated by more than one entity. Every white thing is an instance of whiteness. A white thing (like a particular white piece of paper) cannot have any instances. A s uare is s uare by virtue of instantiating the universal s uareness. !ealism !ealism argues that universals really do e"ist. #owever$ there is disagreement as to where these universals$ and how$ they e"ist. %latonic realism argues that universals e"ist ante rem i.e. outside there instances whereas Aristotelian realism argues that universals e"ist in re &.e. within their instances. %latonic realism draws on two different arguments' perfection and human perception. (he first is that we observe universals within ob)ects in the world yet these are never perfect. *ne has never observed a perfect circle (that is a logical truth). (herefore$ our idea of a circle (that is perfect) must not come from this world i.e. a world of forms distinct from our own. +econdly$ we observe universals in different ob)ects that are different shades or not e"actly s liar yet we still understand them through the same universal. (he sky is blue and so are denim )eans$ yet the shades are different$ so too is the te"ture etc. yet in both instances we still ascribe the description of blue. As our knowledge of blue changes$ as we perceive different shades$ we cannot possibly hold onto the absolute concept of blue unless it e"ists distinctly from the ob)ects we observe. %lato,s argument from the forms poses several problems (though it does solve many too). -irstly$ how do universals who e"ist in an atemporal aspacial dimension interact with the world of substance. +econdly$ when new concepts are invented$ for e"ample the #oover or the i%ad$ are new forms also invented. /ut this would imply a sense of time$ yet the universal dimension is atemporal. Aristotle,s argument on the other hand poses a problem whereby do universals e"ist if the ob)ects in which they are instantiated do not. +urely concepts such as whiteness or s uareness e"ist in our minds even if they do not in the real world. &f we receive universals through sensory observation$ then how do we abstract a universal concept from imperfect instances. -or e"ample$ we may observe 011 circles each not entirely perfect$ yet we have the concept of circle which is perfect. #ow does the mind abstract this idea. 2a)or criticisms of realism 0. *ckham,s ra3or - we don,t need to think universals e"ist$ we can e"plain everything about them. 4. Epistemic considerations - how do we come to know the universals. 5. Arguably it involves an unintelligible ontology - the universals lack a criteria of identity. 6. 7icious infinite regress e.g. the third man fallacy. &f we have two men$ there must be (according to the theory) a form (resemblance) that they share. According to %lato,s assumptions there must also be a further form by which man 0$ man 4 and the form of the man resemble$ then another that resembles this resemblance and so on. 8ominalism 8ominalism asserts that there are only particulars such that general terms refer to the resemblances between them. &t denies the e"istence of universals. 9ithin nominalism there are various sub theories e.g. trope theory$ class nominalism and resemblance nominalism. (rope theory' tropes are particulars in the same way that individual people and individual apples are particulars. (he scartletness of a particular scarlet apple is a particular$ it is the scarletness of this apple$ which e"ists e"actly where this

apple is scarlet. A horse (particular) has a particular horseness (&.e. some D8A of horse type) which e"actly e"ists when this horse is a horse. #orse 0 will have horse trope 0 and horse 4 will have horse trope 4. #owever$ horse trope 0 must also resemble horse trope 4. (herefore there must be a further trope$ horse trope 5$ that e"plains the similarity between horse tropes 0 and 4. (hen$ a further trope is needed to e"plain the resemblance between horse tropes 0$ 4 and 5 - horse trope 6. /y trope theory we cannot e"plain this resemblance with reference to universals and therefore by trope theory it seems the case that there must be an infinite$ or near infinite$ regress of tropes. :lass nominalism' properties are classes of things. (he property of being red is the class of all and only red things. #owever$ you can have coe"tensive classes where if all red things were apples then the property of being an apple is the same as the property of being red. (his seems logically false. A solution to this problem is to involve possible worlds$ where properties are identified with classes whose members belong to the same possible world. :onceptualism (he theory that universals are mind dependent classificatory schemes. (here is nothing like scarletness and a thing that is scarlet in virtue of its falling under the concept scarlet. #ume Applying a universal idea does not involve any insight into the necessary universal properties of anything$ applying a universal idea involves entertaining a particular and associating by resemblance. 9hen we think of ,horse,$ a particular horse is in our minds but other particulars although not present to the imagination are ,easily recalled,. *ntologically$ epistemologically and semantically$ universals are function of the way particular ideas can stand for general ideas. (hree problems ' properties dependent on e"periential beings Different people might have different concepts therefore no ob)ectivity 9e feel surely there is some similarity that links ob)ects