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The Myth of the End of Terrorism

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By Scott Stewart 4n this 5ee67s 'eopolitical 8ee6ly 'eorge .riedman discussed the geopolitical cycles that change 5ith each generation9 .re:uently especially in recent years those geopolitical cycles have intersected 5ith changes in the 5ay the tactic of terrorism is employed and in the actors employing it9 The Ara; terrorism that ;egan in the #<="s resulted from the Cold 8ar and the +oviet decision to fund train and other5ise encourage groups in the Middle East9 The +oviet )nion and its Middle Eastern pro1ies also sponsored Mar1ist terrorist groups in Europe and >atin America9 They even ;ac6ed the ?apanese *ed Army terrorist group9 @laces li6e +outh -emen and >i;ya ;ecame havens 5here Mar1ist militants of many different nationalities gathered to learn terrorist tradecraft often instructed ;y personnel from the +oviet A'/ or the East 'erman +tasi and from other militants9 The Cold 8ar also spa5ned al Baeda and the ;roader glo;al Cihadist movement as militants floc6ing to fight the +oviet troops 5ho had invaded Afghanistan 5ere trained in camps in northern @a6istan ;y instructors from the C4A7s Office of Technical +ervices and @a6istan7s 4nter-+ervices 4ntelligence directorate9 Em;oldened ;y the +oviet 5ithdra5al from Afghanistan and claiming credit for the su;se:uent +oviet collapse these militants decided to e1pand their efforts to other parts of the 5orld9 The connection ;et5een state-sponsored terrorism and the Cold 8ar ran so deep that 5hen the Cold 8ar ended 5ith the +oviet )nion7s collapse many declared that terrorism had ended as 5ell9 4 5itnessed this phenomenon 5hile serving in the Counterterrorism 4nvestigations ,ivision of the ,iplomatic +ecurity +ervice D,++E in the early #<<"s9 8hile 4 5as in Ne5 -or6 5or6ing as part of the interagency team investigating the #<<$ 8orld Trade Center ;om;ing a ne5ly appointed assistant secretary of state a;olished my office declaring that the ,++ did not need a Counterterrorism 4nvestigations ,ivision since terrorism 5as over9 Though terrorism o;viously did not end 5hen the /erlin 8all fell the rosy sentiments to the contrary held ;y some at the +tate ,epartment and else5here too6 a5ay the impetus to mitigate the gro5ing Cihadist threat or to protect diplomatic facilities from it9 The final report of the Cro5e Commission 5hich 5as esta;lished to revie5 the t5in August #<<8 ;om;ing attac6s against the )9+9 em;assies in Nairo;i and ,ar es +alaam e1plicitly noted this neglect of counterterrorism and security programs as did the <F## Commission report9 The <F## terrorist attac6s triggered a shift in international geopolitics ;y leading the )nited +tates to concentrate the full 5eight of its national resources on al Baeda and its supporters9 4ronically ;y the time the )9+9 government 5as a;le to shift its massive ;ureaucracy to meet the ne5 challenge creating huge ne5 organi2ations li6e the ,epartment of (omeland +ecurity the efforts of the e1isting )9+9 counterterrorism apparatus had already ;adly crippled the core al Baeda group9 Though some of these ne5 organi2ations played important roles in helping the )nited +tates cope 5ith the fallout of its decision to invade 4ra: after Afghanistan 8ashington spent ;illions of dollars to create organi2ations and fund programs that in hindsight 5ere argua;ly not really necessary ;ecause the threats they 5ere designed to counter such as al Baeda7s nuclear ;riefcase ;om;s

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did not actually e1ist9 As 'eorge .riedman noted in the 'eopolitical 8ee6ly the sole glo;al superpo5er 5as ;adly off-;alance 5hich caused an im;alance in the entire glo;al system9 8ith the continued diminution of the Cihadist threat underscored ;y the May !"## death of Osama ;in >aden and the fall in >i;ya of the 'adhafi regime D5hich had long employed terrorismE once again 5e appear on the ;rin6 of a cyclical change in the terrorism paradigm9 These events could again lead some to pronounce the death of terrorism9 +everal developments last 5ee6 served to demonstrate that 5hile the perpetrators and tactics of terrorism D5hat +tratfor calls the J5hoJ and the Jho5JE may change in response to larger geopolitical cycles such shifts 5ill not signal the end of terrorism itself9

The Nature of Terrorism

There are many conflicting definitions of terrorism ;ut for our purposes 5e 5ill loosely define it as politically motivated violence against noncom;atants9 Many terrorist acts have a religious element to them ;ut that element is normally related to a larger political goal: /oth a militant anti-a;ortion activist see6ing to end legali2ed a;ortion and a Cihadist see6ing to end the )9+9 military presence in 4ra: may act according to religious principles ;ut they ultimately are pursuing a political o;Cective9 Terrorism is a tactic one employed ;y a 5ide array of actors9 There is no single creed ethnicity political persuasion or nationality 5ith a monopoly on terrorism9 4ndividuals and groups of individuals from almost every conceiva;le ;ac6ground -- from late Victorian-era anarchists to Alansmen to North Aorean intelligence officers -- have conducted terrorist attac6s9 /ecause of the impreciseness of the term +tratfor normally does not refer to individuals as terrorists9 4n addition to ;eing a poor descriptor JterroristJ tends to ;e a politically loaded term9 Traditionally terrorism has ;een a tactic of the 5ea6 i9e9 those 5ho lac6 the po5er to impose their political 5ill through ordinary political or military means9 As Carl von Clause5it2 noted 5ar is the continuation of politics ;y other meansK terrorism is a type of 5arfare ma6ing it also politics ;y other means9 /ecause it is a tactic used ;y the 5ea6 terrorism generally focuses on soft civilian targets rather than more difficult-to-attac6 military targets9 The type of 5eapon used does not define terrorism9 .or e1ample using a vehicle-;orne improvised e1plosive device against an 4nternational +ecurity Assistance .orce fire;ase in Afghanistan 5ould ;e considered an act of irregular 5arfare ;ut using it in an attac6 on a hotel in Aa;ul 5ould ;e considered an act of terrorism9 This means that militant actors can employ conventional 5arfare tactics unconventional 5arfare tactics and terrorism during the same campaign depending on the situation9 Terrorist attac6s are relatively easy to conduct if they are directed against soft targets and if the assailant is not concerned 5ith escaping after the attac6 as 5as the case in the Mum;ai attac6s in !""89 8hile authorities in many countries have ;een :uite successful in foiling attac6s over the past couple of years governments simply do not have the resources to guard everything9 8hen even police states cannot protect everything some terrorist attac6s invaria;ly 5ill succeed in the open societies of the 8est9 Terrorist attac6s tend to ;e theatrical e1erting a strange hold over the human imagination9 They often create a uni:ue sense of terror d5arfing reactions to natural disasters many times greater in magnitude9 .or e1ample more than !!H """ people died in the !""I Asian tsunami versus fe5er than $ """ on <F## yet the <F## attac6s produced a 5orld5ide sense of terror and a geopolitical reaction that has had a profound and unparalleled impact on 5orld events over the past decade9

Cycles and +hifts

A num;er of events last 5ee6 illustrate the changes happening in the terrorism realm and demonstrate that 5hile terrorism may change it is not going to end9 On .e;9 #H the ./4 arrested a Moroccan man near the )9+9 Capitol in 8ashington 5ho allegedly sought to conduct a suicide attac6 on the ;uilding9 The suspect Amine el Ahalifi is a clear e1ample of the shift in the Cihadist threat from one ;ased on the al Baeda core group to one primarily deriving from grassroots Cihadists9 As +tratfor has noted for several years 5hile these grassroots Cihadists pose a more diffuse threat ;ecause they are harder for national intelligence and la5 enforcement agencies to focus on than hierarchical groups the threat they pose is less severe ;ecause they generally lac6 the terrorist tradecraft re:uired to conduct a large-scale attac69 /ecause they lac6 such tradecraft these grassroots militants tend to see6 assistance to conduct their plots9 This

assistance usually involves ac:uiring e1plosives or firearms as in the el Ahalifi case 5here an ./4 informant posing as a Cihadist leader provided the suspect 5ith an inert suicide vest and a su;machine gun prior to the suspect7s arrest9 8hile many in the media tend to ridicule individuals li6e el Ahalifi as inept it is important to remem;er that had he succeeded in finding a real Cihadist facilitator rather than a federal informant he could have 6illed many people in an attac69 *ichard *eid 5ho many people refer to as the JAramer of al BaedaJ after the ;um;ling character from the television sho5 +einfeld came very close to ta6ing do5n a Cum;o Cet full of people over the Atlantic ;ecause he had ;een e:uipped and dispatched ;y others9 +till the fact remains that the Cihadist threat no5 predominantly stems from une:uipped grassroots 5anna;es rather than teams of highly trained operatives sent to the )nited +tates from overseas li6e the team that e1ecuted the <F## attac6s9 This demonstrates ho5 the Cihadist threat has diminished in recent years a trend 5e e1pect to continue9 This 5ill allo5 8ashington to increasingly focus attention on things other than Cihadism such as the fragmentation of Europe the transformation of glo;al economic production and 4ran7s gro5ing regional po5er9 4t 5ill mar6 the ;eginning of a ne5 geopolitical cycle9 >ast 5ee6 also ;rought us a series of events highlighting ho5 terrorism may manifest itself in the ne5 cycle9 On .e;9 #$ 4sraeli diplomatic vehicles in Ne5 ,elhi 4ndia and T;ilisi 'eorgia 5ere targeted 5ith e1plosive devices9 4n T;ilisi a grenade hidden under a diplomatic vehicle 5as discovered ;efore it could detonate9 4n Ne5 ,elhi a stic6y ;om; placed on the ;ac6 of a diplomatic vehicle 5ounded the 5ife of the 4sraeli defense attache as she headed to pic6 up her children from school9 On .e;9 #I an 4ranian man 5as arrested after ;eing 5ounded in an e1plosion at a rented house in /ang6o69 The ;last reportedly occurred as a group 5as preparing improvised e1plosive devices for use against 4sraeli targets in /ang6o69 T5o other 4ranians 5ere later arrested Done in MalaysiaE and Thai authorities are see6ing three more 4ranian citi2ens t5o of 5hom have reportedly returned to 4ran alleged to have assisted in the plot9 8hile these recent 4ranian plots failed they nonetheless highlight ho5 the 4ranians are using terrorism as a tactic in retaliation for attac6s 4srael and 4sraeli surrogates have conducted against individuals associated 5ith 4ran7s nuclear program9 4t is also important to ;ear in mind as this ne5 geopolitical cycle ;egins that terrorism does not Cust emanate from foreign governments maCor su;national actors or even transnational radical ideologies li6e Cihadism9 As 5e sa5 in the ?uly !"## attac6s in Nor5ay conducted ;y Anders /reivi6 and in older cases involving suspects li6e Eric *udolph Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Aac2yns6i in the )nited +tates native-;orn individuals 5ho have a variety of grievances 5ith the government or society can carry out terrorist attac6s9 +uch grievances 5ill certainly persist9 'eopolitical cycles 5ill change and these changes may cause a shift in 5ho employs terrorism and ho5 it is employed9 /ut as a tactic terrorism 5ill continue no matter 5hat the ne1t geopolitical cycle ;rings9 Clic6 here for ,etection @oints in the Terrorist Attac6 Cycle9 Clic6 here for ,etecting Terrorist +urveillance9

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