Illusion Shattered

Yedioth Ahronoth, 8/10/09 (p. 24) by Dov Weissglas (op-ed) –

The Fatah conference is being held at a time when the Israeli-Palestinian daily
reality is not bad: True, political negotiations are not being conducted, but quiet is
being maintained throughout Judea and Samaria, and terror has almost ceased,
to the benefit of Israelis and Palestinians alike. Israel has responded
accordingly: Military restrictions have been lifted, roadblocks removed,
cooperation with the Palestinian Authority has been improved, and as a result,
the economy is flourishing and life in Judea and Samaria is easier.
The Palestinian Authority enjoys worldwide support, and the US, Israel’s
greatest friend, looks more kindly upon the Palestinians than ever before. The
Palestinians certainly have cause for satisfaction. And although they will not
admit it, something has also changed in their attitude towards Israel after
Hamas’s rise to power in Gaza: The horrors of the “Iranian” lifestyle and the act
of throwing Fatah activists from rooftops made it very clear to the Palestinians
that their real trouble, as of now, threatens them from Gaza.
One might expect, therefore, that the voices and the resolutions being issued
from the Fatah conference would reflect to some degree the improved reality,
and demonstrate the start of greater moderation, in practical terms. But the
Palestinians hold true to form: An abundance of threatening and extremist
slogans, mostly detached from reality and some foolish. For example, the
resolution about “Israel’s responsibility for killing Arafat.” The PA leaders—
particularly those who turned to us at the time and requested that Arafat be taken
from the mukataa and flown abroad due to his severe illness—know full well that
this was the reason for his death. Nevertheless, they supported the resolution in
question. This is not important, except as testimony to the miserable nature of
those who passed the resolution: Leaders who are afraid to publicly reject a lie
that is ridiculous, though popular.
The reactions in Israel were predictable: The right wing finds in the statements
made at the conference further reinforcement of the eternal conclusion that there
is no one to talk to and there will never be anyone to talk to, and since this is the
case, [Jews] should continue to settle everywhere; the left wing tries to convince
that an in-depth analysis of the Fatah discourse leads to the conclusion that “it is
not terrible.” Both sides are wrong. There is no practical importance to the
content of the talk or the resolutions passed at the conference, but the clear and
disappointing conclusion that arises from them is that such a leadership is
incapable of bravely and honestly facing its people, as required by the effort to
obtain a final status arrangement with Israel.
An Israeli-Palestinian peace will require painful concessions not only
from Israel but also from the Palestinians: Leaving the large settlement
blocs in Israel’s hands, giving up the return of refugees into Israel’s
borders, and any possible arrangement in Jerusalem—these are things to
which the Palestinians will find it difficult to consent. Who exactly will
enforce this upon them? Those whom, in order to appease the extremists
on the street, lent their hand to a series of extreme and detached
resolutions? Those who feared to speak out against the ridiculous
resolution regarding Israel’s responsibility for Arafat’s death?
This is not being said with defiance or criticism towards the Palestinians (the
Israeli government has also not shown impressive diplomatic boldness so far),
but rather as a regrettable conclusion: Irrespective of the content of the final
status arrangement that will be proposed to the Palestinians, there is no
Palestinian leadership today—certainly not the one that convened in
Bethlehem—that is capable of accepting a final status arrangement,
enforcing it on the Palestinian people and implementing it.
The Israelis and the Palestinians, therefore, should deal with improving the
reality and improving the conditions of coexistence between the peoples, and not
deal with the illusions of the final status arrangement: Israel will reduce—as far
as enabled by security conditions—its military presence in Judea and Samaria
and will turn over additional areas to Palestinian security responsibility; it will
evacuate illegal settlement outposts and limit the development of settlements to
the large settlement blocs; it will remove roadblocks and improve travel
conditions and assist the Palestinians to promote their economy,
entrepreneurship, industry and trade.
In other words: Israel and the Palestinians will work to implement the first
section of the road map, with the aspiration of reaching the second section,
which states that in the future—when conditions are met—a Palestinian state will
be established. This is a practical political objective, which relieves the
leaderships, at this stage, of decisions that they are incapable of making.