JAAKKO HINTIKKA

THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN WITTGENSTEIN AND HUSSERL Most of my colleagues these days seem to assume that they know well enough what the major thinkers meant who created the contemporary philosophy. Among these philosophers, the two figuring in my title, Wittgenstein and Husserl, loom particularly large. Over the years I have come to believe that my colleagues are wrong and that we have not fully grasped the import of the philosophy of the likes of Hussed and Wittgenstein. I have also come to believe that in trying to understand the founding fathers of twentieth-century philosophy comparative studies are extremely useful. Of course comparisons alone will not do the whole job. One of the reasons why Hussed and Wittgenstein have not been appreciated better is that the philosophical issues themselves with which they were struggling have not really been mastered. We have been unable to place the ideas of a Hussed or a Wittgenstein on the map of the relevant concepts, problems and issues because we have not succeeded in mapping the relevant philosophical landscape in the first place. It is not that philosophers have not discussed major figures like Hussed or even their relations to other thinkers and other scl\ools. Right down my alley in this paper one can :find extensive works like Manfred Sommer's Husserl und der jrt[he Positivlsmus (1985). But typically such works traffic in theses, doctrines, schools and ready-made systems and not in concepts; problems, attempted solutions and arguments. As a consequence, they miss far too often the real dynamics of philosophy, both the dialectic of its development and the internal tensions that are there often within a single philosopher's work. In this paper, I will show by means of examples how we can improve our grasp of the basic problems and ideas of contemporary philosophy through a careful analysis of their role in major philosophies like Husser! and Wittgenstein jointly with an analysis of their systematic import. To begin with a specific question, why do I bracket Wittgenstein and Hussed together? The answer is simple: they were both phenomenologists. Wittgenstein is reported to have uttered: "You can say of my work that it is 'phenomenology'." (Cf. Spiegelberg 1982.) And in his notebooks from 1929 on (MSS 105-107, von Wright) he frequently speaks of phenomenology and initially identifies his philosophical task as a construction of a purely phenomenological language. Why, then, has this been ovedooked? One reason is a failure to realize that Wittgenstein means what he says. He is
101 K. Lehrer and J.e. Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, 101-123. 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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envisaging a philosophically privileged language which faithfully captures what is directly given to me, so to speak the given, the whole of the given and nothing but the given. And while that is not all that is involved in phenomenology, it is an important and central kind of phenomenological enterprise. But even the happy few among Wittgenstein commentators who have realized their role of phenomenology and phenomenological language in the Wittgenstein of the 1929 vintage have usually dismissed it as a short passing episode in the saga of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. In doing so, they have missed the first and foremost point about Wittgenstein's development and about his early philosophy. The phenomenological philosophy Wittgenstein is taOdng about in 1929 is the philosophy of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's famous book is, I can say without stretching the term, an exercise in phenomenology. The ideal language envisaged in the Tractatus is ideal precisely in that it captures faithfully what is given to me. The simple objects postulated there are therefore the objects of my immediate experience, that is to say, phenomenological objects. The world according to the early Wittgenstein is the world of phenomenological objects. Massive evidence for this conclusion is assembled in chapter 3 of Hintikka and Hintikka (1986). I will mention only one item of this evidence here. It is the fact that Wittgenstein even has a designated term for phenomenological objects. Unfortunately, the force of this term in Wittgenstein's writings has not been fully appreciated, perhaps in part because he avoided the telltale word "phenomenological". Wittgenstein's term for a phenomenological object is the German word Aspekt. It is, not unexpectedly, usually translated into English as "aspect". This translation is not so much incorrect as misleading. The reason is that the English word is further ahead in its parallel semantical development than its German cognate. The German word has still a stronger element of the old sense which in English is illustrated by the OED example ''he is a man of stern aspect". Here the man in question does not only display a stern side to us. Sternness is a property of the entire phenomenological object that he presents to us. This meaning of "aspect" has in English receded into semantical history, but it is still alive in Wittgenstein's German. We cannot understand Wittgenstein without taking it into account. At an especially crucial junction of his philosophical line of thought he writes, speaking of figures that can be seen in two different ways:
I might for instance ask the question: When I said to myself "What at one time appears to me like this, at another.. .", did I recognize the two aspects, this and that, as the same which I got on previous occasions? Or were they new to me and I tried to remember them for future occasions? Or was all that I meant to say "I can change the aspect of this figure"?

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The danger of delusion which we are in becomes most clear if we propose to ourselves to give the aspects 'this' and 'that' names, say A and B. (The Brown Book, pp. 171-172.)

Wittgenstein's self-confessed mistake is not that "this" and "that" refer to mcets of objects, but that they refer to objects and hence can be given names. These alleged objects obviously are not physical objects, but phenomenological ones. In other words, Wittgenstein's mistake lies precisely where I am suggesting that it does. Wittgenstein's usage elsewhere conforms to, and confirms, this reading of his "Aspekt". If this perspective on the TractaJus still strikes you as contrived, I can make it more acceptable by putting it in a wide historical framework. In an earlier paper (Hintikka 1995) I have pointed out a remarkable parallelism between Husserlian phenomenology and Russell's one time theory of acquaintance. Both speak of reduction, Russell of reduction to acquaintance and Husserl of phenomenological reductions. Russellian knowledge by acquaintance Both corresponds in Husserl to what he calls intuitive knowledge. philosophers acknowledge objects of direct experience other than perceptual ones. Indeed, in Russell's posthumously published Theory of Knowledge (1913) we even find a neat counterpart to Husserl's categorial intuition, to wit, the idea that logical forms are among the objects of acquaintance. Furthermore, the Russellian construction of objects of description from the objects of acquaintance corresponds in Husserl to constitution; and so on. Now it is (or at least ought to be) beyond reasonable doubt that Wittgenstein's Tractatus is historically speaking nothing but a variant of Russell's theory of acquaintance. Hence, the, pa,rtial analogy with Husserl can be extended from Russell to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. I have rehearsed the reasons for these interpretations earlier, and I do not want to repeat the evidence here. I will not comment extensively, either, on the reasons why many philosophers have failed to see this deep kinship between Husserl, Russell and Wittgenstein. Prominent among the sources of this failure is a failure to grasp the meaning of such crucial terms as "phenomenology" (which is mistakenly confused with phenomenalism) and "intuition" (which is wrongly thought of implying a special mental source of insights). The former confusion may be partly explained, although not excused, by the loose earlier (pre-191O) usage in which no sharp distinction was made terminologically between phenomenalism and phenomenology. (Cf. Blackmore 1995, pp. 30-32.) It may even be the case that Mach was guilty of assimilating the two to each other. All this does not eliminate the distinction, however, as applied to the likes of Boltzmann, Husserl or Wittgenstein. One way of highlighting the kinship of Husserl and Wittgenstein qua phenomenologists is to point out that in all likelihood their use of the term

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"phenomenology" and their ideas of what phenomenology is had a common source. It has not always been recognized that the term "phenomenology" had an established usage in the early decades of this century in the philosophy of physics. It was used there, not as any sort of synonym of "phenomenalism" , but as a label for a view according to which physics ought to deal only with observable variables and to forsake all use of purely theoretical concepts. No reference to Hegelian or peculiarly Husserlian phenomenology is involved. This is the way the term "phenomenology" is used among others by Boltzmann, Planck and Einstein, to list only a few physicists whose writings attracted a wide readership. A typical use of the adjective "phenomenological" is found in thermodynamics, where a phenomenological approach was contrasted to a statistical approach. The former operated only with directly measurable variables, such as pressure, temperature, volume etc., whereas in the statistical approach thermodynamic phenomena were treated as statistical manifestations of the movements of a large number of unobservable atoms and molecules. This example illustrates vividly the fact that a "phenomenological" theory in physics has nothing to do with phenomenalism. To some extent, a parallel use of the term "phenomenology" was current in the philosophy of psychology. The main difference is merely that in psychology (and in the philosophy of psychology) the distinction between phenomenology and phenomenalism is more easily overlooked than in physics. Mach describes his project of a phenomenological science e.g. in (1898, especially p. 250). In both af these two directions, the most prominent "phenomenologist" was Ernst Mach. It was this phenomenological approach of his that prompted his tenacious attempt to exorcise atomism from physics. Now Husserl acknowledges himself that his phenomenology is a In his continuation and a radicalization of Mach's phenomenology. Amsterdam lectures we read (Husseriiana, vol.IX, pp.302-303):
Around the turn of the century there grew out of the struggle of philosophy and psychology for a strictly scientific method a new science, hand in hand with a new method of philosophical and psychological research. The new science was called phenomenology, the reason being that it, and its new method arose through a certain radicalization of the phenomenological method that had earlier been propagated and used by individual natural scientists and psychologists. The gist [Sinn] of this method, as it was used by men like Mach and Hering, consisted in a reaction against the bottomless theorization that threatened the 80called "exact" sciences. It was a reaction against theorization that used unintuitive conceptualizations and mathematical speculations ...

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Hussed makes it clear that he is talking here about natural sciences like physics and of their philosophy by adding:
Parallel to this we find some psychologists, in the first place Brentano, striving to create systematically a strictly scientific psychology based on pure inner experience and on a strict description of what is given in it ...

HUSserl recognizes also the terminological continuity between his own thinking and that of his "phenomenological" predecessors:
Hence the radicalization of these methodological developments (which incidentally were often already called phenomenological) was ... what led to a new methodology of purely psychological [psychischJ research ...

The authority of these pronouncements is enhanced by the fact that they are expansions of the first paragraph of Husserl' s famous Encyclopedia Britannica article (op. cit. p.237). They leave no room whatsoever for doubting that Hussed saw his phenomenology as a continuation and radicalization of the methodological views of philosophers of physics like Mach. In particular, there is little doubt at the very least that the term "phenomenology" had the same basic meaning for Husserl and the "phenomenologists" like Mach in the philosophy of physics. In general, the ubiquitous role of the idea of phenomenology in the philosophy of science of Mach's and Husserl's time is seldom mentioned and never emphasized in the phenomenological literature. It is for instance not even mentioned in the Manfred Sommer's (1985) learned and careful work on Husserl and the early positivism. Furthermore, it is demonstrable that Wittgenstein was familiar with this sense of the term "phenomenology". In listing crucial influences on his own thinking, one of the first names Wittgenstein mentions is that of Ludwig Boltzmann. It is reported that he hoped to study under Boltzmann, a plan made impossible by Boltzmann's death. It is known that he possessed several volumes of Boltzmann's writings, including Boltzmann's PopullJre Schriften (1905). One of the centerpieces of this collection is the essay "On the Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times". There Boltzmann discusses sympathetically but critically Mach's "phenomenology" using the very word "Phiinomenologie". When Wittgenstein uses the term in his notebooks in the late twenties, it is therefore amply certain that he has in mind something not unlike the phenomenology of his predecessors and contemporaries in the philosophy of

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physics. Indeed, when Wittgenstein indicates what he means by the term, his typical explanation turns out to be a freedom of "everything hypothetical". This is very much in step with Boltzmann's usage and completely out of step with any form of phenomenalism. What has been found has also implications for Wittgenstein's use of terms other than "phenomenology". One historical warning that we can extract from what has been said is that we have to be sensitive to Wittgenstein's use (and non-use) of terms like "atom" and "atomic" which are geschichtlich belastet through an association with atomism in physics. For instance, my analysis shows inter alia the expository tension between Wittgenstein's so-called logical atomism and atomism in statistical physics. In physics, atoms were at the time of the old Ernst Mach and 1he young Ludwig Wittgenstein the prime examples of unobservable, non-phenomenological entities. Wittgenstein's and Mach's simple objects are by definition cast into the role of the basic entities directly given to us. It is not at all accidental that Wittgenstein does not normally use the term "atomic", speaking of "elementary propositions" instead of "atomic propositions". In hindsight it is thus highly significant that the entire terminology of "logical atomism" was introduced by Russell, not by Wittgenstein, and that Wittgenstein in contrast to Russell never identifies the philosophy of the Tractatus as "logical atomism". It is thus a total misunderstanding of 1he spirit and the letter of the Tractatus to try to assimiJate his simple objects with physical atoms. One of the crucial ideas of the Tractatus was on the contrary to dispense with all hypothetical entities like physical atoms. It is striking how badly understood this parentage ofWittgenstein's notion of phenomenology is. That Wittgenstein got his notion from Boltzmann is mentioned by Spiegelberg (1981, p. 227) as a hypothesis, which he more or less rejects.
The difficulty for such a hypothesis is that Wittgenstein's Phiinomenologie is opposed to physics, physiology and psychology, whereas Boltzmann's is apparently [sic] a subdivision of physics.

But the "opposition" Spiegelberg finds here is a resultant of factors that include much more than the meaning of the term "phenomenology". Even though Wittgenstein nowhere (as far as I know) proffers an explicit definition of phenomenology and of the phenomenological, his usage makes it amply clear what he means. As was pointed out earlier, the phenomenological is characterized by its independence of all hypotheses, according to him. And this freedom of hypotheses is, mutatis mutandis which in this case is the

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intellectual context (epistemological vs. physical), precisely what was at issue between "phenomenologists" like Mach and realists like Boltzmann. But now we are presented wilh a new problem. If Wittgenstein's Tractatus is a phenomenological tract, and if he was familiar wilh lhe use of lhe term "phenomenology" as referring to essentially lhe same attempts to reduce everything to lhe immediately given as he was himself engaged in, why did he not call1he spade a spade or, ralher, call his own position in lhe Tractatus phenomenological? Or, if we try to put lhe shoe on lhe olher foot, why did Wittgenstein emphasize Boltzmann's influence on himself? We have seen lhe similarity between Mach's proto-phenomenology and Wittgenstein's philosophy in lhe Tractatus. In contrast, Boltzmann offered highly interesting criticisms of lhe phenomenological approach in lheoretical physics. He pointed out lhat it was not only such ontological assumptions as lhe postulation of atoms lhat introduce hypolhetical elements into a physicallheory. Even if one tries to give merely a description of a physical system as in malhematical terms, for instance by means of differential equations, this very malhematical apparatus introduces hypolhetical elements into one's lheory which cannot be based on direct observation alone. For instance, lhe use of differential equations are as based on continuity (and differentiability) assumptions lhat are substantial and nontrivial. Yet in spite of this criticism by Boltzmann of phenomenology in lhe philosophy of physics, Wittgenstein lhe phenomenologist admirers Boltzmann and criticizes Mach not only for his flat style but also for his flat ideas. In reality, Wittgenstein's judgements are not idiosyncratic obiter dicta, but rooted deeply in his own approach. They offer an interesting perspective in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. I have characterized it earlier (earlier in this paper and in earlier publications) as a result of revising Russell's 1913 lheory of acquaintance by omitting logical forms from lhe range of objects of acquaintance. This parentage shows olher things about Wittgenstein's approach as compared wilh lhat of lhe "phenomenologists". Unlike Mach, Wittgenstein was not only interested in lhe direct experiential basis of our knowledge. Like Boltzmann and Hertz, he was also, maybe even primarily, interested in how lhe immediately given reality was represented in thought and in language, including of course the language of mathematics. Those representations were typically referred to by Boltzmann as "pictures" (Bilder). Theories according to him are related to phenomena "as a sign to its designatum". Even lhough Boltzmann lhought lhat physicists cannot afford not to go beyond phenomena, he recognized lhat by devising suitable "pictures" or notations one could eliminate "metaphysical" notions like lhe concept of force. (Cf. here Hiebert 1980.)

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This enterprise is closely similar to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In keeping with the thought of Boltzmann and Hertz, the way in which Wittgenstein thinks that conceptual problems should be solved is by devising a suitable notation. This is for instance the case with the problem of color incompatibility. The problem is dealt with in Proposition 6.3751 as follows:
For example, the simultaneous presence of two colors at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of color. Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows-a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be at two places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are in different places cannot be identical.

Many commentators ,have thought that Wittgenstein is here appealing to the physical structure of color. However, Wittgenstein's reference to physics is calculated to explain his problem rather than his solution. Wittgenstein's later remarks on the color incompatibility problem show that what he was concerned with was the development of a notation that would turn color incompatibility into a tautology. What the mathematics of physics does that Wittgenstein mentions is not an explanation of color incompatibility, but an example of how to turn apparent dependencies between elementary propositions into logical truths (tautologies). What Wittgenstein was doing is very much like what Hertz saw as the first task of a physicist: to develop a system of ~ncepts ("images") governed by laws which match the laws that govern the phenomena they represent. His reference to physics is calculated to indicate this parallelism. It is this emphasis on the representation of reality in language that distinguishes Wittgenstein from Mach and aligns him with Boltzmann. It represents one of the most characteristic features of Wittgenstein's early philosophy. In the end-meaning, in the final version of the Tractatus- Wittgenstein's emphasis nevertheless reverted back to pure phenomenology. The reasons are rooted deeply in Wittgenstein's thinking. Reality was for him always phenomenological, and that reality determines in the last instance the way in which it is to be represented. In a correct notation, if such a notation is possible, there is no trace of the methods of representation used. And this is what Wittgenstein thought that he had shown in the Tractatus how to do through his idea of propositions as pictures. It does not reflect on the importance of the problem of representation, but it amounts to the thesis that

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a purely phenomenological language is possible, a language which represents faithfully what is immediately given to me. lt is not surprising, in view of Wittgenstein's heroic struggles with the problem of representation, that he resented Mach's failure even to see the problem clearly. Of course, this does not mean that he did not in the end come down in a sense on the side of Mach rather than Boltzmann in so far as the possibility of a hypothesis-free representation is concerned. However, he had to put his struggles past him before he was ready, a dozen or so years later, to call his own position phenomenological. There is more to be said here, however. As Haller (1993, pp. 39-40) points out, from a suitable point of view there is apparently a great deal in common between Mach, Hertz and Boltzmann here. Mach was after all interested in the way we represent the objects of our thoughts to ourselves and how we operate with them. Even on the logico-mathematical level, Wittgenstein's vindication of a phenomenological ontology and phenomenological language through the idea of tautology was in a sense anticipated by Mach and early Schlick, both of whom maintained that purely logical inference cannot yield any new information. The real differences between Wittgenstein and Mach are far subtler. Mach's idea of logical inference is a simplistic one, largely because his idea of logic is a crude Aristotelian one. It took the logical sophistication of Russell and Frege to bring home to Wittgenstein the full difficulty of the problem whether our language, including our mathematical language, contributes to and influences our knowledge of the world. His ultimate answer in the Tractatus is the picture theory of language, which very nearly takes the entire book to develop and defend. This is the reason why we find in the Tractatus ever so much more argumentation for the tautological nature of logical truths than in Mach or early Schlick. What Wittgenstein envisaged as a reasonable approximation to a universal Begrijfsschrijt is clearly something like the language of Russell's and Whitehead's Principia. In order to bring out what he considered its true logical forms he first proposed to eliminate quantifiers in terms of truthfunctions. Then he argued for the pictorial character of elementary propositions. Finally, he tried to extend this picture idea to all truth-functions of elementary propositions by means of the Sheffer stroke representation of all truth-functions. Right or wrong, all this is on an altogether different level of logical sophistication than Mach's musing about Aristotelian syllogisms or proofs in elementary geometry, in spite of the fact that the thesis he is thus defending is verbally very close to Mach and early Schlick. Wittgenstein might also have been put off by the unfortunate confusion in Mach between phenomenology and phenomenalism. Mach sometimes

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expresses himself in a way that literally taken would commit him to a phenomenalist position, for instance speaking as if our immediate knowledge were restricted to our sensations. I will not try to decide here to what extent Mach was merely expressing himself in an inappropriate way and to what extent we really have to classify him as a phenomenalist. Unfortunately, many subsequent philosophers have not only taken Mach to be a phenomenalist, but have assimilated the very meaning to "phenomenology" as applied to Mach with phenomenalism. In this respect, it is instructive to note that no such identification was made by the other philosophers of science at the time or by Husserl. What is even more interesting than the similarities between Husserl and Wittgenstein (the early one) are nevertheless the dissimilarities. Surprisingly, these dissimilarities are differences within a phenomenological framework. They do not concern the question whether the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a phenomenologist, but the question as to what kind of phenomenology he favored, i.e., what the structure of the given is according to him. Here we come to a most clear-cut and most remarkable difference between Wittgenstein and Husserl. It is a phenomenological difference. For Husserl, as we know, empirical experience does not come to us already articulated categorially. We structure it through our noetic activity; we impose the forms on the raw data (hyletic data) of experience that are needed to make that experience into experience of objects, their properties, relations, etc. We do not need to raise the question here whether these forms or essences are somehow components of the given which are merely brought to bear or hyletic data or whether they are so to speak imported from the outside for the purpose of "informing" the hyletic data. On either reading, they enjoy independent existence. These forms or essences can be considered in their own right, and we can have direct knowledge (I almost said, knowledge by acquaintance) of them, too, in what Husserl calls categorial intuition. In contrast, for Russell and Wittgenstein the most primitive, unedited experience is already articulated categorially. The building blocks of the world of the TractafUs are objects of different logical types. There is no place in this scheme for unarticulated hyle. By the same token, there is no place in the Russell-Wittgenstein theory for our constitutive activities, either. Many, perhaps almost all of the differences that there are between Husserl and Wittgenstein are ultimately due to this fundamental phenomenological disagreement between them. The crucial philosophical task both for Husserl and for Wittgenstein is to understand the relationship to our concepts, codified in a language, to the reality they can represent. For Husserl, this task involved a detailed examination of the all and sundry constitutive activities that mediate between the immediately given and our concepts (language). For

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Wittgenstein, of the Tractatuf, there is no mediation. His task is merely to see clearly and distinctly how our language works. A clarification of the logic of our language is all that is needed, and that is his project in the Tractatus. Moreover, if and in so far as we can reach a perfect (purely phenomenological) language, it merely reflects what is immediately given to me. It is therefore determined completely by the phenomena, without any contribution by my noesis. In this sense, Wittgenstein is a far purer phenomenologist than Husser!. Admittedly, there is in Tractatus a kind of reduction. Indeed, the main argument of the entire book is a gradual working out of this reduction. The main lines of his argument were sketched above. But, unlike what we can find in Husserl, this reduction is an intralinguistic one. Wittgenstein assumes that something like the language of Principia Mathematica is our true Sprachlogik. Given such a language, as was explained above, Wittgenstein's first attempts to reduce quantifiers to proposjtional connectives. Then he strives to show that all propositions are truth-functions of independent elementary propositions. In Wittgenstein's view, this suffices to establish a direct "pictorial" relation between propositions and states of affairs. It is a presupposition of this reduction that we do not have to carry it further. And this presupposes that a language with discrete names that are combined in different ways into elementary propositions is adequate for describing what is given to one in immediate experience. This assumption was not shared by Husserl, who therefore had to carry his reductions further and to account among other things for how our spontaneous sensory experience is articulated into objects which can be referred to by discrete names (in Wittgenstein's wide sense of the word). In this way, these phenomenological differences between Husserl and Wittgenstein come to color their respective conceptions of language. For Wittgenstein, no process of constitution is needed for the purpose of providing our language with the objects it refers to. Hence, the idea of a phenomenological language is an unproblematical one. In contrast, for Husser! the basic given in empirical experience includes an amorphous hyle, which does not yet provide objects for our language to refer to. Hence a purely phenomenological language of empirical experience is impossible for Husserl. Also, whatever analysis or reduction is needed to uncover the basis of our language and concepts in the given, will not reveal for Wittgenstein any influence of our constitutive noesis on the objects that our language refers to. Hence we can understand some of the main differences in emphasis between our two fellow phenomenologists. Wittgenstein emphasized phenomenological language while for Husser! phenomenological reductions loom especially large. It may sound like a paradox, even though it is not to emphasize that the

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founder of phenomenology did not have, and could not have, a conception of a purely phenomenological language. The other side of the same coin is that phenomenology was not for Wittgenstein, as it was for Husserl, a special method. Husserl needs such a method to disentangle the given from the contributions of our constitutive activities. According to Wittgenstein, all logical forms are given in full together with the objects they are forms of. Therefore, no special technique is needed to uncover them. The only question is how they are to be represented in language. Some people might claim that this absence of any phenomenological method in Wittgenstein disqualifies him as phenomenologist. Purely historically, there might very well be, something to be said for such terminology. Yet in a deeper sense this differrence between Husserl and Wittgenstein is merely a disagreement between two fellow phenomenologists. It concerns the structure of the immediately given. It nevertheless has extremely important consequences as to what kind of phenomenology it is that Wittgenstein or Husserl represented. For Husserl, our noetic activity is indispensable for the purpose of articulating the world into objects and hence indispensable for our knowledge of objects. We cannot disentangle the contribution of our own thinking to what we know about the world. Hence there can, and must, be an a priori element in all our knowledge, put into objects as it were in our activities of coming to know the objects of our knowledge. In contrast, for Russell and Wittgenstein there is no need and indeed no room for such a priori knowledge. Furthermore, there is another basic difference is evidence here, this time between Husserl and Russell (of the 1913 vintage) on the one hand and Wittgenstein on the other. For Edmund Husserl and Bertrand Russell, the forms (logical forms, essences, whatever you choose to call them) are among the objects of intuition or acquaintance. They can be considered in separation from their particular embodiments in sensory material. In contrast, the leading idea of the Tractatus is that there is no separate class of entities called logical forms. Logical forms are forms of objects, ultimately of simple objects. They do not exist separately, and they cannot be conceptually disentangled from the objects whose forms they are. They are given to us ipso facto when the objects themselves are given. They are not brought by us to bear on the objects or an some raw material of which the objects are made. As a consequence,logical forms are not, and must not be, represented in language by any logical constants. So-called logical constants do not represent anything at all. Complex logical forms are simply combinations of the logical forms of simple objects. The resulting conceptions oflogic, logical form and logical (a priori) truth are so radical that few Wittgensteinians have dared to follow their master fully

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when it comes to these notiom. First, logic is traditionally thought of as being grounded on the most general concepts and on the most general laws that there are. For instance, Frege said that logic deals with the most general laws of Wahrsein. In the early Wittgenstein, logic is grounded solidly on the simplest objects (of any logical type). All logical forms that there are are forms of simple objects and combinations thereof. This is the reason why I cannot tell a priori what logical forms are needed to describe the world, for instance, tell whether I need a 27-place relation in my language. Only experience can show me that. What is usually thought of as logic, for instance propositional logic, deals merely with the way in which simpler logical forms (pictures) can be combined into more complex logical forms (pictures). Since there is no constitution by us of the basic logical forms nor any imposition of logical forms on sensory raw material in experience, there is no non-trivial (synthetic) a priori. In this respect, Wittgenstein's well-known criticism (Waismann 1979,pp. 67-68) of Husserl's idea of the synthetic a priori, which at first sight might seem merely to echo Schlick's attacks on Husserl, is in reality founded deeply in his own ideas. These criticisms nevertheless do not show or even suggest that Wittgenstein's own early philosophy was not phenomenological, only that Wittgenstein's phenomenology was different (I am tempted to say, phenomenologically different) from Husserl's. This point is closely related to Wittgenstein's idea of logical truths as tautologies. Husserlian and Kantian notion of synthetic a priori knowledge is based on the idea that, as Kant put it, the reason has insight only into what it puts into objects according to a plan of its own. In other words, or in another metaphor, we can see reality only through glass darkly, the glass being a metaphor for our own conceptual system. Our synthetic a priori knowledge concerns what there is written on the glass. For the early Wittgenstein, the glass is crystal clear. It does not color our knowledge of reality, but by the same token there is nothing to be said or known about it. This is the basic reason why there are no synthetic truths a priori according to Wittgenstein. Here we can see also the reason why there was not, and could not have been, in the Tractatus any counterpart to Husserl's notion of categorial intuition. The reason is not that there could not be according to Wittgenstein immediate (or "intuitive", if you insist on the term) grasping of logical forms in one's thinking. (As we will soon see, in a sense Wittgenstein believed in such an immediate grasping.) Rather, Wittgenstein's point is that strictly speaking there are no separate entities to be so grasped. Thus, in a comparative perspective, we can see how the differences between the ideas of the early Wittgenstein and Husserl about logic and logical truth are firmly based on differences between their phenomenological

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assumptions. Even Wittgenstein's doctrine of logical truths as tautologies, which looks like a purely logical idea, turns out to be closely connected with his phenomenological views concerning the structure of the given. Wittgenstein's conception of logic in the Tractatus has a striking further feature which has not been emphasized sufficiently in the literature. Since logic is determined by the forms of simple objects, and since these objects are phenomenological, logic and phenomenology virtually coincide in the early Wittgenstein. This is in fact one of the most characteristic features of Wittgenstein's conception of logic. It should not be obscured by the fact that in his later writings he uses, instead of the word "logic", such euphemisms as "grammar". Thus we find in Wittgenstein's writings statements like the following:
Phenomenology is Grammllr. (Section title in TS 213, Chapter Phiinomenologie.) Physics wants to detennine regularities; it does not set its sights on what is possible. For this reason physics does not yield a description of the phenomenological state of affairs. In phenomenology it is always a matter of possibility, i.e., of sense, not of truth and falsity. (Waismann 1979, p.63.)

It is also highly instructive to see how the problem of color incompatibility is for Wittgenstein at one and the same time a phenomenological problem and a logical (conceptual) problem. (Cf. above.) There is an even more striking feature of Wittgenstein's conceptions of logic and \ogical form. This feature is illustrated by my second quote from Wittgenstein. The logical form of an object is what governs its possibilities of being combined with other objects into a fact. This is in fact (no puns, please) how logical forms determine the logical structure of the world. The sum total of these possibilities is rather like the law that governs. the logical behavior of an object, and the logical form of the object can be thought of as codification of this law. Yet the object in question, in ending into logical form, is a phenomenological entity, given to me in my immediate experience. And this seems to lead to an unbelievable or at least paradoxical combination of views. How can direct experience give me a law governing the entire totality of possible combinations into which the phenomenological object in question can enter? Isn't this view completely outrageous? Outrageous or not, it is Wittgenstein's view. How deeply rooted it is in his thinking is shown by his own confession concerning a closely related learning process, viz. the way we learn the rule that governs the meaning of a word:
Earlier I thought at one time that grammatical rules are an explication of what I experience on one occasion when I once use the word. They are as it were consequences or

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expressions of the properties which I momentarily experience when I understand the word. (MS 116, sec. 128 Nyman.)

(Cf. here Hintikka 1989a.) More generally speaking Wittgenstein held that:
Senstxlata are the source of our concepts. (Lee 1980, p. 81.)

If you ask me how this kind of instantaneous grasp of general rules is possible, I have no simple answer. There is nevertheless no doubt whatsoever that Wittgenstein held such a view. The best I can do to make such a view understandable is to 1hink of it as a generalization of ostensive defining. There is in fact no doubt that Wittgenstein's later criticisms of ostensive definitions were in the first place directed against his own earlier views as to how logical forms (and hence meanings) ~n be acquired. Another partial explanation why Wittgenstein thought at the time of the Tractatus that his version of Wesensschau is possible lies in his assumption of atomism. It is seldom understood fully what this assumption really means. It does not mean just that the wodd can be articulated into phenomenological objects of different logical types. It means that these atoms are mutually independent in the sense that the laws governing their mutual combinations will never create logical connections between different elementary propositions. Wittgenstein vitally needs such independence in the Tractatus, but he has precious little to say in its defense. Even the famous claim concerning color incompatibilities (6.3751, quoted above) is a promissory note rather than a fully worked-out eXample. And later, probably in 1928, the rejeqtion of this atomistic assumption was the first step off the plateau to which Wittgenstein's dispensable ladder had enabled him to climb in the Tractatus onto the slippery slope that eventually led him to the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations. Moreover, it is extremely important to realize that Wittgenstein is not assuming any mysterious capacity of the human mind which is supposed to intuit general rules. His assumption, whether true or not, is a phenomenological assumption, It is an assumption concerning the nature of our experience, more specifically what can be given to me in my immediate experience. Even though I cannot place Wittgenstein's view into a deeper topical perspective, I can place it into a collateral historical perspective. What Wittgenstein assumes possible is to all practical purposes Husserlian Wesensschau. The reason is that what Wesensschau is supposed to do is precisely to serve to grasp the general concept or essence which is embodied in an experientially given particular case. Hussed's notion of Wesensschau has often been taken a weak point in Hussed's thinking or at least a

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dangerously mysterious idea. No matter how we ultimately judge Hussed, we can now see how it can be demythologized. For one thing, Wittgenstein assumed an essentially (no pun intended) equivalent access to logical forms. Secondly, and more importantly, we can see precisely what it is that Hussed was assuming. Just as Wittgenstein was not postulating any mysterious intuitive capacities of the human mind when he thought that immediate experience gives us logical forms, as little is there a reason do we have to impute to Husserl any assumption of a special source of "intuitive" knowledge in the vulgar sense of the word as a basis of his notion of Wesensschau. Moreover, we can see here how the Husserlian and Wittgensteinian Wesensschau is related to other notions in Husserl. Roughly speaking, Wesensschau serves to separate a form from the hyletic data in which it is embedded. Eidetic reduction means concentrating one's attention on the forms and bracketing the matter in which they are embedded. Categorial intuition is one's direct access to the forms. Thus a comparison with Wittgenstein throws some light on Hussed's central notions. Conversely, the same comparison' also helps us to understand better Wittgenstein's thought. Among other things, the differences between Hussed and the eady Wittgenstein which we have noted also provide an answer to a question which a skeptical reader undoubtedly raised in the back of her mind long ago. If the Tractatus is a phenomenological treatise, where are the phenomenological reductions? This question can be countered by another one: What are such reductions supposed to accomplish? They are calculated to take us back to what is immediately given to me. But what is it that is added to the primary unedited self-presented direct experience that we have to reduce away, that is, what is it that happens on the way to our unreduced experience? As we saw, according to Husserl our noetic activities bring general essences to bear on our experience. Hence the phenomenological reductions have to lead us step by step to the different basic ingredients of our experience, on the one hand to the unarticulated hyletic data and on the other hand to the essences that are used to articulate them. In contrast, in Wittgenstein there are no uninformed data and no free-floating logical forms to bring to bear on something. Therefore, all that a reduction can do, if we think: of the process on the level of sentences, is to take us from complex sentences to the elementary ones, and from elementary sentences to their ingredients, the simple names. (Since language and thought operate in tandem in the Tractatus, this logical reduction reflects the conceptual reduction which is at issue here.) This is precisely what Wittgenstein seeks to establish through his pictorial analysis of elementary propositions and through the extension of the picture theory to all other

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propositions 1hrough 1he truth-function 1heory. These are hence Wittgensteinian counterparts to phenomenological reductions, mutatis mutandis. Conversely, a comparison between Wittgenstein and Husserl shows why there was a need of a special eidetic reduction in Husserl's phenomenology, but not in Wittgenstein's. Categorial (logical) forms are for Husserl imposed on hyletic data. Hence a phenomenological reduction must among other things by able to isolate those forms from the rest of our experience. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, logical forms are there as a component of the already articulated given, and they are thus given to me as a part of my experience. But Wittgenstein's interest as an object of comparison for other phenomenologists does not stop with his early philosophy. Admittedly, Wittgenstein came to reject the possibility of phenomenological languages as independent basic languages in October 1929. But some of the basic issues that concern anyone interested in phenomenology remained with him. First, Wittgenstein's change of mind was not just a one casual change in the multitude of his philosophical views. It was the crucial step in the development of his views away from the Tractatus and toward his later philosophy. His rejection of the possibility of phenomenological languages in one fell swoop changed Wittgenstein's entire philosophical methodology, including his ideas about the aims of philosophical activity. In order to see this, we have to ask: What precisely was involved in Wittgenstein's change of mind? For one thing, we have to realize that Wittgenstein's change of his basic language was just that: change of language, not a change of his view of the world. Perhaps the most revealing statement Wittgenstein ever made is among the ones recorded by Desmond Lee (1980). This statement was made well after Wittgenstein rejected the possibility of independent phenomenological languages.
The world we live in is the world of sense-data. but the world we talk about is the world of physical objects. (Lee 1980, p. 82.)

This statement (and other easily forthcoming evidence) shows the sense in which Wittgenstein remained a phenomenologist to the end of his days. The reality which he is dealing with and which we are trying to capture in language and in thought is the world of phenomenological entities. This is the reality that a philosopher is trying to capture. Unfortunately, that cannot be done directly by constructing a phenomenological language that would accurately reflect the structure of the given, as Wittgenstein thought in the Tractatus. But a comparative study of the different ways in which our language can serve, its purpose can do the same job as the construction of a phenomenological

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language and in a sense give us indirectly a representation of immediate experience, that is, a representation of the world in which we live according to Wittgenstein. Indeed, this is what Wittgenstein says in so many words on the first page of Philosophical Remarks. What we have here is nothing more and nothing less than an explanation of the reasons why the later Wittgenstein did not try to develop an ideal language, did not believe a sharp logic, emphasized the intrinsic imprecision of our actual language and above all why he concentrated on studying the actual use of language instead of forcing it to conform to a logically precise ideal language. Wittgenstein's reasons, it turns out, have nothing to do with the elusiveness of our actual language or of our actual usage. Even in the TractaJus, Wittgenstein had been fully aware of the complexities of our actual everyday language, and he had been perfectly happy to let this complexity be shown by the way we use our language. (See Tractatus 4.002, 3.326-7,

5.557.)
Nor do Wittgenstein's reasons for not believing in a rigid logic that underlies our language have anything to do with the differences between the different purposes that language can serve or, as he would have put it, with differences between different language-games. His original point can be made, and was made by him, by reference to descriptive (Augustinean) uses of language only. Wittgenstein's reasons have nothing to do with the richness and elusiveness of the experience that we are trying to capture in our language. Wittgenstein's reasons are very specific, and they concern the general conditions of the successful operation of our language, including purportedly phenomeoologicallanguages. But what, then, is the difference between the two kinds of language and why are the physicalistic languages the basic ones according to Wittgenstein7 And why did he largely stop speaking of phenomenological language after 19297 We are here approaching the most important questions not only of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but of philosophy of language in general. Wittgenstein's reasons for rejecting the primacy of phenomenological languages have to do with the conditions of comparing a sentence with reality with a view of verifying or falsifying it. The sentence is a physical object (configuration), and as such can be compared directly only with physical configurations. Hence the sentence can speak only of physical facts. Moreover, the comparison takes place in physical time ("information time") and indeed takes a non-negligible amount of (physical) time. Hence, again, the sentence can only speak of physical objects persisting in physical time. Unlike such physical objects, phenomenological objects (Wittgenstein thinks) are restricted for their identity and existence condition to the specious present

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and hence cannot be spoken of directly in language. (Cf. here Hintikka, "Wittgenstein on Being and Time", this volume.) It is important to see that there is absolutely nothing in Wittgenstein's argument that rules out phenomenological objects really existing in the real world. The problem is how to speak of them. Thus we can see what the original reasons were why Wittgenstein came to reject a strict logical approach to language and to philosophy. We saw earlier that Wittgenstein nearly identified of logic and phenomenology. This nearidentification allows a concise statement of Wittgenstein's reasons for denying that our language can directly embody a sharp logic. Our language cannot reflect (Wittgenstein claims) the genuine phenomenology of the world, ergo it cannot have a genuine, sharp logic, either. Thus, an insight into the phenomenological character of Wittgenstein's thought enables us to reach a most important insight into' his entire philosophical methodology, io:cIuding his changing relationship to logic and its role in philosophy. We can also see that Wittgenstein's original reasons for his later philosophical methodology have absolutely nothing to do with the views of his own followers, who base their views on the alleged elusiveness of ordinary usage and other such reasons that we just saw Wittgenstein not embracing, except perhaps as an afterthought. All this leads to a new set of questions, however. We have not reached, or perhaps I should say, Wittgenstein has not been seen to reach, a clarity even about the most basic concepts he is using. One absolutely fundamental question concerns the consequences of the distinction between phenomenology and phenomenalism which we encountered in exploring the ancestry of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's common background. "Phenomenological" theories in physics are not phenomenalistic. They do not deal with our impressions of physical objects but with physical objects themselves qua observable. And since this was the conceptual model of both Husserl and Wittgenstein, neither was dealing 'with our impressions of reality. Wittgenstein's phenomenological objects, including the simple objects of the Tractatus, are part of1he real world quite as firmly as Russell's sense-data are. And 1he reasons why we do find equally realistic phenomenological objects in Husserl is merely that he does not believe that the immediately given in experience is not structured into objects. This is nevertheless a fact about the (phenomenological) reality, not a concession by Husserl to phenomenalism. Wittgenstein makes it very clear that for him phenomenological objects are quite as fully real as physical ones. They are real objects directly given to us.
A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else but is the reality.

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A phenomenon is not a symptom of something else which then makes a sentence true or false but is itself what verifies the sentence. (MS 107, pp.223-224, dated Dec. 1, 1929.)

Also in Philosophical Remarks and elsewhere Wittgenstein makes it clear that a phenomenological language is but another way of speaking of what is actually going on in the world. The subject should not even be mentioned in such a phenomenological language. In some sense, a phenomenological language speaks of the same reality as a physicalistic one. All this illustrates strikingly how closely related Wittgenstein's conceptions of phenomenology and of phenomenological objects were still in 1929 to the sense of phenomenology in "phenomenological physics" . This reality of objects qua phenomenological objects enabled Wittgenstein to continue to envisage a separate discourse for them even after he gave up the Such a possibility of self-contained phenomenological languages. reconstructed "phenomenological" language is sketched by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Remarks, secs. 67-68. However, "reconstruction" has to be taken here in the dixie sense. In Wittgenstein's new sense, phenomenological (hypothesis-free) discourse is possible only as a special kind of sub-language or dialect of a more comprehensive physicalistic language. The contrast between physicalistic and phenomenological languages thus lost its absoluteness and most of its general philosophical interest for Wittgenstein. But what, then, is the difference between physical and phenomenological objects? And what is the difference between physicalistic and phenomenological languages in the first place? Wittgenstein never tells us. In his writings, for instance in the last few pages of The Blue Book, he nevertheless gives us some hints. He allows that phenomenological or, as he also refers to them, solipsistic, languages or "notations" are in principle possible, if only as a species of physicalistic languages. But what distinguishes them from normal physicalistic languages? The only clear-cut explanation that Wittgenstein offers is that in such phenomenological or "solipsistic" languages the person himself or herself serves as a reference point. For instance, Wittgenstein contrasts there "the geometrical eye" which is the vantage point of any seeing object from "the physical eye" which is one physical object among many. He adds:
The grammar of the word geometrical eye" stands in the same relation to the grammar of the word 'physical eye" as the grammar of the expression "the visual sense-datum of a tree" to the expression "the physical tree". (The Blue Book, p. 64.)

Even though Wittgenstein can scarcely be said to have reached a full clarity, it is unmistakable he is dealing with a distinction (or contrast) that is readily

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generalizable. For instance, instead of the geometrical and the physical eye, Wittgenstein could have spoken of the perspectival (geometrical) I and the physical (public) I. And when the contrast is generalized, it becomes patent that the distinction that he is making is to all intents and purposes the distinction which I have diagnosed as a difference between two different types of methods of identification. This is an extremely important distinction whose significance has not yet been fully appreciated by philosophers. (See Hintikka 1989b.) In the case of one type of identification method, we identify persons, objects, events, places and times in what might seem the obvious way, that is to say, by reference to some publicly available, object-oriented framework of reference. I have called such object-oriented modes of identification public, not to mark a contrast with what is only privately accessible, but to highlight the impersonal character of the framework of reference which is relied on in public identification. The contrast is, rather, with a mode of identification in which a person's vantage point plays a crucial role. For instance, in visual cognition the perceiver's visual space provides the requisite frame of reference. Even ifI do not see who the people around me are, in so far as I can make each of them out so clearly as to occupy a definite slot in my visual space, I will have to treat them as so many well-defined objects. For instance if I see a man there in the doorway, I can-and in some sense must-treat him as one and the same individual even if I do not see (or otherwise know) who he is. To adopt Quine's sometime quip for my purposes, there is room only for one man there in the doorway, even for only one phenomenological man, so to speak. I have called this kind of identification method perspectival. (See Hintikka 1989b.) . What such a method amounts to in the case of memory or knowledge is not hard to see. Indeed, in both instances, the contrast between different identification methods has been recognized, named, studied and sometimes misinterpreted independently of Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Hintikka. In the cognitive psychology of memory, the contrast is known as a distinction between episodic memory and semantic memory, introduced by Endel Tulving. In epistemology, we are dealing with nothing less than Bertrand Russell's contrast between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In both cases, the true nature of the distinction as concerning two modes of identification rather that two different kinds of memory or knowledge has often been misunderstood. By in effect turning phenomenological languages into mere alternative "notations" within the general physicalistic framework, characterized by a different mode of identification rather than by a different ontology, Wittgenstein domesticated them and deprived them of their status as serious rivals to physicalistic languages. That meant also that Wittgenstein lost most ofhis interest in them. Spiegelberg's emphasis is misleading when he speaks

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(1981, p. 211) of the "vanishing" of Wittgenstein's phenomenology. It remained alive and well in those works, such as Remarks on Color, that dealt with phenomenological problems. But the grand contrast was in his mind replaced by a contrast within a general framework of physicalistic languages, which implied a tremendous loss of interest in his own original notion of phenomenology . The ramifications and implications of the distinction between perspectival and public identification are too vast to be spelled out here. They are best left for another occasion, even though they play an important role in the evaluation of Wittgenstein, of Husserl, and of the very idea of phenomenology.

Boston University
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