FREUDS PHILOSOpHICAL INHERITANCE: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Beyond the Pleasure Principle Robert Grimwade

This essay explores the possible significance of Freuds references to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. It attempts to reveal two sides of Freuds philosophical inheritance and explores the structure of Freuds ambivalence toward his intellectual predecessors.

I see that you are using the circuitous route of medicine to attain your first ideal, the physiological understanding of man, while I secretly nurse the hope of arriving by the same route at my own original objective, philosophy. For that was my original ambition before I knew what I was intended to do in the world. Freud, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess, 1896 Are not Freuds repeated declarations of indifference to questions of priority and originality simply, in fact, so many negations which serve to conceal his fantasy of mastering his predecessors? A fantasy which concurs with the fantasy of the whole of western metaphysics since Aristotle. Sarah Kofman, Freud and Fiction

What did Freud inherit from philosophy? And what effect has this inheritance had on the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis? In To Speculateon Freud in The Post Card Derrida (1980) draws our attention back to the overwrought topic of Freuds troubled relationship with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. According to Derrida, Freud disavows Schopenhauer and Nietzsche:
No more than to Nietzsche, nothing is owed to Schopenhauer. As such psychoanalytic theory owes him nothing. It has no more inherited from him than one can inherit conceptual simulacra... Schopenhauers and Nietzsches words and notions resemble psyPsychoanalytic Review, 99(3), June 2012 2012 N.P.A.P.

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choanalytic discourse to the point of being mistaken for it. But they are lacking the equivalent of a content proper to psychoanalysis, which alone can guarantee value, usage, and exchange (p. 266).

Why did Freud disavow the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche when these texts contain formulations that are so similar to those of early psychoanalytic thought?1 In 1925 in An Autobiographical Study, Freud finally explained why he had been avoiding philosophy proper for so long, while simultaneous denying that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche had any influence on the unfolding of his thought or upon the birth of psychoanalysis:
I have carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper. This avoidance has been greatly facilitated by constitutional incapacity. ...The large extent to which psycho-analysis coincides with the philosophy of Schopenhauernot only did he assert the dominance of the emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the mechanism of repressionis not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. Nietzsche, another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psycho-analysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed. (pp. 5960)

If Freud had found semblances of psychoanalytic concepts in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, why didnt he investigate them? Was it simply a case of theoretical hygiene: a question of purity? As Derrida (1980) suggests, Freuds ostensible logic for avoiding philosophy is rather bizarre: What is closest must be avoided, by virtue of its very proximity. It must be kept at a distance, it must be warned (p. 263). If Freud really wanted to keep philosophy at a distance, then why are his texts littered with references to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche? Why do Schopenhauer and Nietzsche appear at decisive moments in the dynamic unfolding of Freudian thought? And why do these repudiated specters seem to appear during the many historic ruptures between Freud and some of his most highly esteemed disciples? At the height of his speculative enquiry in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (1920) passively refers to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In chapter 5, while discussing the possibility of death

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drives he writes: There is something else that we cannot remain blind to. We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbor of Schopenhauers philosophy. For him death is the true result and to that extent the purpose of life, while sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live (pp. 4849). In chapter 3, while discussing repetition compulsion, he refers to the eternal recurrence of the same (p. 22).2 Are these ostensibly passive and indifferent citations entirely devoid of significance? Are they mere slips of the pen? According to Derrida (1980), Freud disavows the illegitimate or counterfeit economy of philosophyas Freud sees it, this economy of ill-gotten gains deals in simulacrabut these disavowed philosophies return in his texts, penetrating and surrounding his entire corpus. Philosophy is operating behind the scenes in Freuds writings, framing the unfolding of psychoanalysis from its origin. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud is speculating. He is traversing the very boundary he established between philosophy and psychoanalysis. But rather than admitting that the official boundary has been transgressed, Freud insulates a purely scientific psychoanalysis from purely speculative metaphysics.3 Isnt this boundary, which seems to remain impermeable in Freuds self-understanding, actually much more porous than Freud would have liked to believe? Guided by the work of Alan Bass, Jacques Derrida, and Sarah Kofman, this essay suggests that buried within Freuds ostensibly passive references to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in Beyond the Pleasure Principle are many tortuous and dizzying questions that open up psychoanalysis to an integral part of its philosophical inheritance. Following Derrida, I argue that there is more at stake for Freud than merely justifying his own supposedly nonphilosophical attempts to speculate. I further suggest that Freud not only attempts to hide the speculative and illegitimate origins of his new Wissenshaft,4 but that he disavows both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer by inheriting their concepts and giving revisionist readings of their philosophies that seem to annihilate all trace of influence while simultaneously invoking the authority of their faded signatures. What are the hidden dimensions of this disavowal? What specters of philosophy haunt psychoanalysis from birth? Perhaps

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most importantly, what can these disavowed philosophies tell us about the metaphysical presuppositions of psychoanalytic metapsychology that frame the opening and unfolding of Freudian thought?
THE HARbOR Of SCHOpENHAUER The Freudian summary is not solely designed to refresh the readers failing memory, but has a very specific methodological function: it is the condition of possibility of the interpretation at the same time as being its product....more than being detailed interpretations of a text they leave intact, they are in fact the constructs of a completely different text; rewritings which weave the thread of the elements in the original text into a completely new tissue, involving them by displacement in a completely different play. Sarah Kofman, Freud and Fiction

Freuds relationship to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is disturbingly paradoxical. When Freud mentions either Schopenhauer or Nietzsche he seems to distort the meanings of their texts, effacing them in such a way as to disavow the inheritance that he has taken up, and yet there is little doubt that Freud is an heir to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In other words, Freud denies and suppresses his philosophical heritage while taking up its guiding questions and profiting from its resources. He recontextualizes these appropriations while involving them in a completely different play. This activity does not seem to be the effect of a constitutional incapacity for philosophy (Freud, 1925a, p. 59), but, rather, following Derrida (1980), it seems to stem from Freuds ambivalent desire to be the hero-founder of a new Wissenschaft, a pure creator without inheritance, the great father of a new line. As Kofman (1974) suggests, Freud, by leveling-down and appropriating his predecessors, seems to be repeating one of the fundamental gestures of Western metaphysics since Aristotle: a mode of inheritance that suppresses difference by extracting a kernel of so-called truth, but always leaves behind an excessive contextual remnant that can never be appropriated. But Freud was also concerned with the remnant left behind in the unconscious, the trace inexorably inscribed in the archive of the psyche. The repressed leaves its mark in the unconscious and determines the course of life

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from a beyond inaccessible to retrospection. In other words, Freud claimed, in the face of the Enlightenment tradition that and I take this as one of the central facets of Freuds geniuswhat is violently repressed never ceases to exert its influence. There are many ships and misty harbors in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as well as many perilous voyages on tempestuous seas. Ships depart regularly. Few return. While many bold explorers have ventured out on these mysterious waters in search of precious insights, much of this boundless territory remains uncharted. But when we unwittingly steered our course into the harbor of Schopenhauers philosophy who was manning the helm? Was Captain Freud steering the ship or simply allowing it to run aground on the muddy embankments of Schopenhauers thought to dispatch the ghostly visage of a secret sharer? How did we end up here? Was Captain Freud mapping the course or was he just clinging to the aft of a runaway ship? A ship which steers itself? We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbor of Schopenhauers philosophy. For him death is the true result and to that extent the purpose of life, while sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live (Freud, 1920, pp. 5960). (The section quoted by Freud in the original German Jenseits des Lustprinzips is actually much shorter: das eigentliche Resultat, p. 49.) The quoted portion is from Schopenhauers (1851) Parerga and Paralipomena,5 (vol. 1, p. 223).6 It lies in the concluding paragraph of an essay titled Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual. Before we dive into this essay, we must note a remarkable coincidence: The only text where Schopenhauer engages in a sustained discussion of dreamshis Essay On Spirit Seeing and Everything Connected Therewith begins on the following page. An inquisitive reader might venture the burning question: Did Freud discover Schopenhauers essay on Transcendent Speculation while conducting research for The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)? In fact, Freud (1900) does cite Schopenhauers Essay on Spirit Seeing in the Traumdeutung, but he does not acknowledge the striking parallels between these two dream theories, and defers any discussion of Schopenhauer (p. 36). While he does mention Schopenhauer again (pp. 66, 90, 503), he never treats, or even acknowledges, the striking conver-

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gence of his dream theory with that of the great pessimist. As we know, Freud returns to Schopenhauer many times in later works, but this discussion of the dream theory is postponed indefinitely. From this infinite deferral, another, more difficult, question forces itself to the fore: Is the innermost kernel of Freuds dream theory based upon something he read in Schopenhauers obscure text? If so, why does this source remain unacknowledged? Here are two passages from the Essay on Spirit Seeing (Schopenhauer, 1851):
Sensory nerves can also be stimulated to their characteristic sensations from within as well as from without. In the same way, the brain can be influenced by stimuli coming from the interior of the organism to perform its function of intuitively perceiving forms that fill space.... (p. 236) Since during sleep the brain receives its stimulation to the intuitive perception of spatial forms from within, as we have stated instead of from without, as during wakefulness, this impression must affect it in a direction opposite of the usual one that comes from the senses....The dream-organ is, therefore, the same as the organ of conscious wakefulness and intuitive perception of the external world only grasped as it were from the other end and used in the reverse order. The nerves of the senses can be rendered active from the inner as well as from their outer end....(pp. 249251)

In these passages, and throughout the text, Schopenhauer claims that dreams are the effects of stimulations from inside the organism acting upon the senses in the reverse order to that of waking life. And what is the ultimate source of these internal stimulations? The unconscious will. Is this not the kernel of Freuds theory of regression in dreams? And psychoanalysis owes nothing to Schopenhauer? Why does Freud, who is certainly not afraid of citing other sources, suppress this connection? And if the connection is a mere resemblance, then why does he not acknowledge the prescience of Schopenhauers dream theory? That many of the fundamental metaphysical presuppositions of Schopenhauers philosophyhis great metaphysical system of will and representation, where will is the dynamic unknowable striving force of the world understood as the timeless and spaceless thing-in-itself and representation is our consciousness of that

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force objectified and individuated in time and spaceresonate with many of the basic presuppositions of Freudian metapsychology is well known.7 What is less well known is that in this particular essay Schopenhauer (1851) draws a connection between dreams and madness on the basis of temporal immediacy (The dream bears an undeniable resemblance to madness; for what mainly distinguishes dreaming from waking consciousness is a lack of memory, p. 231), notes that dreams disguise themselves as one passes into wakefulness (p. 255), and proposes that the allegorical nature of dreams necessitates an interpretation with no fixed or universal lexicon (pp. 255, 256), as well as claiming that the immediate cause of dream hallucinations are stimulations arising from the interior of the organism (pp. 273, 275). But while Schopenhauers essay contains his most lengthy discussion on dreams, it is not primarily about dreams. Schopenhauer is predominantly interested in the possibility of explaining occult phenomenaanimal magnetism, oneiromancy, telepathy, deuteroscopy, and the appearance of specters and doppelgangers directly from his metaphysics. In fact, the essay attempts to demonstrate that the source of all these divergent phenomena is the timeless and spaceless world will, which operates directly upon the senses through the so-called dream-organ. If Freud had discussed Schopenhauers Essay on Spirit Seeing in The Interpretation of Dreams, he would have been forced to confront a series of questions regarding both the speculative origins of his own young theories and a series of questions concerning the occult, which might have amounted to a lethal combination for a Wissenschaft in its infancy. Did Freud defer this discussion of Schopenhauers dream theory because he was not ready to address the fact that psychoanalysis opened the door to questions far beyond the limited purview of late nineteenth-century positivism? Let us make a bold attempt at another step forward. In a somber letter to Lou Andreas-Salom dated August 1, 1919, Freud writes: For my old age I have chosen the theme of death; I have stumbled on a remarkable notion based upon my theory of the instincts, and now I must read all kinds of things relevant to it, e.g., Schopenhauer, for the first time. But I am not fond of reading (p. 99). Was Freud really going to read Schopenhauer for the

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first time in the fall of 1919? Did he refer to Schopenhauer in The Interpretation of Dreams (1905), Totem and Taboo (1913), On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1914), and A Difficultly in the Path of Psychoanalysis (1917) without having actually read any of his works? Was he a member of a reading society that focused on Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche who had never read any Schopenhauer?8 Can we really believe that the prodigious Freud, whose scholarly erudition is demonstrated on every page of every single one of his texts, was not fond of reading?9 Can we decide about Freud and Schopenhauer once and for all? But even if we could prove that Freud was present before Schopenhauers text, would anyone be so bold as to try to prove that he read it? Let us return to Schopenhauers (1851) essay Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual, which is the source of Freuds quotation in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Does this transcendent speculation have any connection to Freuds speculation in Beyond the Pleasure Principle? What is transcendent speculation and why does Schopenhauer disqualify it at the outset? The essay opens with the following lines which seem to retrospectively mirror Freuds (1920) repeated disclaimers in Beyond the Pleasure Principle:10 Although the ideas to be given here do not lead to any firm result, indeed they might perhaps be termed a mere metaphysical fantasy, I could not bring myself to consign them to oblivion...in them everything is dubious and uncertain, not merely the solution but even the problem (p. 201). In this supplementary work, this appendage to his proper philosophy, Schopenhauer is indulging in transcendent speculation, a kind of thinking that is perhaps nothing more that mere metaphysical fantasy. While Schopenhauer yields to its irresistible pull, he considers this particular kind of speculation to be entirely illegitimate because it addresses something that cannot be proven by any of the proper routes of philosophical inquiry,11 something undecidable, and yet perhaps irresistibly possible, at the very core of his metaphysics. While at times he may take a positive or even dogmatic tone, he assures the reader that this kind of speculation is not to be taken seriously (p. 201).

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In this essay, Schopenhauer (1851) is speculating about fate. When we recognize the hand of providence in our lives we say tunc bene navigavi, cum naufragium feci (p. 202). I have gone on the voyage appropriate to me, even if I was shipwrecked. I am guided through life, for better or worse, until I arrive at my final destination, washed up on the banks of Hades. But does fate lead me to my proper death or merely to a living death? Do fateful winds guide the ship of life toward death or merely into the harbor of Schopenhauers philosophy of resignation? In the New Introductory Lectures Freud (1933) states:
What we are saying is not even genuine Schopenhauer. We are not asserting that death is the only aim of life; we are not overlooking the fact that there is life as well as death. We recognize two basic instincts and give each of them its own aim. How the two of them are mingled in the process of living, how the death instinct is made to serve the purposes of Eros, especially by being turned outwards as aggressivenessthese are tasks which are left to future investigation. (p. 114)

What, if anything, does Freuds instinctive dualism of Eros and Thanatos have to do with Schopenhauers metaphysical opposition between will and representation? And most importantly, does Schopenhauers text state that death is the aim of life? While Schopenhauer believed that he had proven the strict necessity of all events a priori, what he calls demonstrable fatalism, in his prize-essay On the Freedom of the Will (1851, p. 202), if not already in The World as Will and Representation (1819), transcendent fatalism is something entirely different. While demonstrable fatalism is proven a priori and confirmed empirically by magnetic somnambulists, persons with second sight, and sometimes even the dreams of ordinary sleep [that] directly and accurately predict future events (Schopenhauer, 1839, p. 202), transcendent fatalism involves the postulation of an inner purpose or intention behind the blind events of demonstrable fatalism. In Schopenhauers (1850) words, transcendent fatalism is
the insight, or rather the view, that this necessity of all that happens is not blind and thus the belief in a connection of events in the course of our lives, as systematic as it is necessary,...a fatalism of a higher order which cannot, like simple fatalism, be demonstrated,

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but happens possibly to everyone sooner or later and firmly holds him either temporarily or permanently according to his way of thinking (p. 204).

This insight or view does not arise from a really theoretical knowledge but gradually reveals itself in the experiences of ones life (Schopenhauer, 1851, p. 204). This inner necessity that seems to guide ones life explains why an individual always seems to end up having experiences that are entirely appropriate to him or her (p. 204). From this viewpoint ones life seems as if it were as profoundly conceived as is the finest epic (p. 204), as if everything therein had been mapped out and the human beings appearing on the scene seem...to be mere performers in a play (p. 205). What is the source of this secret and inexplicable power that seems to guide our lives? Why do we each seem to end up in situations that are appropriate to our individual characters? What is this inner compass, the mysterious characteristic, that brings everyone correctly on a path which for him is the only suitable one (p. 206)? This systematic arrangement can be explained by the immutability and rigid consistency of the inborn character which invariably brings man back on to the same track (p. 205). This rigid atemporal identity operates as an infallible instinct passing into action without having entered clear consciousness (p. 206). But as Schopenhauer (1819) had already shown in The World as Will and Representation, this intelligible12 character is the immediate phenomenon of the will (p. 138). The question in Transcendent Speculation... is not whether the will determines the individual character, but whether the will has a purpose. In this essay Schopenhauer is revisiting a question that he asked himself in 29 of The World as Will and Representation (1819), namely, What is that will which is shown to us as the being-in-itself of the world striving after? (p. 162). Is the will really a blind impulse to exist without end or aim? (p. 156). Or does the will, in fact, have some mysterious final cause? What is the ultimate aim of this monstrous drive? According to Schopenhauers proper metaphysics, the will is a purposeless blind striving, an endless source of pain that can never be satisfied. However, in Transcendent Speculation... Schopenhauer (1851) is speculating as to

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the possibility that the will might guide us to turn away from itself toward a peaceful life of ascetic resignation and aesthetic indifference. Schopenhauer speculates that each individual is lead to the realization of this possibility by his or her transcendent fate: Now we have recognized from the results of...my philosophy...the wills turning away from life as the ultimate aim of temporal existence, we must assume that everyone is lead to this in a manner that is individually suited to him and hence often in a long and roundabout way (p. 223). Schopenhauers philosophy declares that our only hope of salvation is found in turning away from life, from the will itself, but is this turn necessarily a turn toward death? Where does our transcendent fate really lead us? According to Schopenhauer, transcendent fate, if it indeed exists, pulls us toward his own philosophy of immanent salvation, to the realization of tragic wisdom and resignation that suppresses and eventually annihilates the endless thirst of desire. In other words, Schopenhauer is speculating that the will leads directly to its own contraction. The will does not aim at death. It aims at a living death. It is not a death drive. For Schopenhauer (1819) the will, while blind and unconscious, is always a will-to-live, a will-to-will, a striving to strive without aim or goal: ...what the will wills is always life (p. 275). Even if the will is oriented toward a final aim, it is not death, but a living death characterized by ascetic resignation, the denial of the will-to-live, which comes from the intuitive knowledge that the in-itself of the world is will. If the winds of the will are guiding us anywhere, it is right into the harbor of Schopenhauers philosophy. It must be stressed that, contra Freuds revisionist reading, even Schopenhauer, the so-called great pessimist, does not posit a drive toward death. In fact, for Schopenhauer (1819), death cannot be a legitimate aim because death is nothing: neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject of knowing, the spectator of all phenomena, is in any way affected by birth and death (p. 275). The world will, as Kants thing-in-itself, is outside of space and time, and therefore remains absolutely unchanged by death. Even Schopenhauers intelligible character does not point toward death, but it does seem to imply an account of why we repeat inherently painful situations. According to Schopenhauer

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(1819), the intelligible character is an immediate manifestation of the will. It is not a drive to repeat, but a permanent and rigid special Idea which leads each individual toward situations that are appropriate to him or her (p. 158). While the will-in-itself is absolutely free, we, as its phenomenal manifestations, are absolutely determined by it. This results directly from Schopenhauers metaphysics: If under the same conditions, a man could act now in one way now in another, then in the meantime his will itself would have to be changed, and thus would have to reside in time, for only in time is change possible. But then either the will would have to be a mere phenomenon, or time would have to be a determination of the thing-in-itself (p. 292)for the will to change is, of course, impossible for Schopenhauer, for the will as Kants thing-in-itself is outside of space and time. Only the intuitive and immediate knowledge of the will as thing-in-itselfthe core insight of Schopenhauers philosophy13allows us to bypass the principle of individuation and escape the absolute determinism characteristic of the phenomenal world (Schopenhauer, 1819, pp. 398, 404). In Transcendent Speculation... Schopenhauer is speculating that even this one and only act of freedom of which we are capableour choice to deny the willis determined by the will itself. Here he imagines that each individual is lead to this realization by his or her transcendent fate. Schopenhauer and Freud do, however, seem to share a metaphysical presupposition about the nature of psychic forces and the structure of pleasure. For both thinkers pleasure is wholly negative: the discharge of painful tension. According to Schopenhauer (1819):
All satisfaction...is really and essentially always negative only, and never positive. It is not a gratification that comes to us originally and of itself, but it must always be the satisfaction of a wish. For desire, that is to say, want, is the precedent condition of every pleasure...so the satisfaction or gratification can never be more than deliverance from a pain, from a want. (p. 319)

This view of the economics of pleasure and pain is a direct consequence of Schopenhauers metaphysics. The world will is the ultimate source of the negative nature of pleasure, an endless striving incapable of final satisfaction (p. 308). What is this final and

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permanent satisfaction that Schopenhauer compares with the fleeting satisfaction of finite human life? Since the object of pleasure is wholly relativethe object of a desiring willwe cannot speak of a summum bonum, but if we were to say what the ultimate good is, it would be a final satisfaction of the will, after which no fresh willing would occur; a last motive, the attainment of which would give the will an imperishable satisfaction (p. 362). In its proper metaphysical sense, this ultimate satisfaction could only be death. Death would be the final and ultimate discharge of tension, the supreme orgasm. Among the living, tension is sporadically discharged, but it is always raised again by some internal or external stimulus. Unconscious desire, the striving of the world will, always multiplies and expands itself. It can never achieve ultimate satisfaction: tension can never be completely thrown off. For Schopenhauer there is no death drive, but, as in Freud, the backward pull of desirethe tendency to reduce tensionentails such a principle from the outset. If pleasure is merely satisfaction, un-pain, then desire itself must tend toward death: a striving for rest within the unconscious itself. But here we find a salient difference between Freud and Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer fails to notice the ultimate implications of his notion of pleasure, while Freud recognizes these implications in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. By recognizing this consequence, we might say that Freud beat Schopenhauer at his own game. For Schopenhauer, life is always striving for itself without any aim or end, and hence thwarts ultimate satisfaction, but if pleasure is the reduction of tension, then life must aim at death, that is to say, the will itself must be a death drive suspended. In Schopenhauers philosophy, the only escape from the incessant pain of life, from the perpetual increase of tension, is the pure knowing subjects conscious act of resignation. The ego must choose to turn away from life, to deny the will itself. If Schopenhauer had recognized that the will tends toward death, or, as he speculates in Transcendent Speculation . . . , toward resignation, then he would have been forced to revise his entire philosophy. If Schopenhauer accepted the results of this transcendent speculation, he would have had to admit that knowledge could no longer bring salvation because resignation, the denial of the will

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to live, would have to have been thought of as an unconscious tendency of the will itself. So Schopenhauer speculates, and by speculating he addresses the interest of disinterested knowledge without ever properly confronting it. Freud dethrones this conscious act of resignation by showing that even this act of resignation is ultimately determined by the inner nature of the unconscious drive. Was Freud pointing to this in Beyond the Pleasure Principle? Did Freud want us to see how he out-Schopenhauered Schopenhauer by pushing speculation beyond its proper limit? If all experienced satisfaction is temporal, and hence fleeting, where does the notion of absolute satisfaction come from? It is characteristic of logocentric metaphysics to split differential relations into absolute oppositions. In fact, one might even go so far as to say that Western metaphysics is driven by a desire for opposable absolutes. For both Freud and Schopenhauer, absolute satisfaction is primary, while the temporal satisfaction of immanent life is derivative, secondary, fleeting. Freud and Schopenhauer are not satisfied by thinking of satisfaction as the reduction of some tension, but instead incessantly push this notion toward the reduction of all tension. From the outset, prefigured in many ways by the economics of energy in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Freud conceives primary process as the unconscious drive to discharge tension. As Freud (1920) repeats in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution (p. 8). In other words, tension reduction is the inner tendency of the unconscious drive, and this is the essence of pleasure (p. 33).14 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle the pleasure principle is not opposed to the nirvana principle. In fact, the death drive might be seen as the result of Freuds absolutization of tension reduction. The death drive will then come, albeit briefly, to be understood as the very basis of the pleasure principle: The dominating tendency of mental life...is the effort to reduce, keep constant, or to remove internal tension due to stimuli...a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of that fact is one of the strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death drives15 (p. 55). What does the drive strive for, according to its innermost nature? The complete reduction of tension, complete satisfaction (p. 41), is its goal. For Freud, there is something deficient, not only in

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the drive repressed in civilized life, but within the drive itself. The drive can only achieve complete satisfaction in death, and hence strives for death. For Schopenhauer and Freud, temporal, finite, human desire is contrasted with a transcendent notion of complete satisfaction and found to be wanting. Much more could be said about this, but we shall defer this discussion in order to address something we cannot remain blind to. Let us make a bold attempt at another step forward. In Beyond the Pleasure Prinicple, Freud (1920) makes reference to Kants thing-in-itself:
As a result of certain psychoanalytic discoveries, we are today in a position to embark upon a discussion of the Kantian theorem that time and space are necessary forms of thought. We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves timeless....that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them. (p. 27)

Freud is reminding of us of insights expressed in The Unconscious (1915),16 ideas he would hold on to at least until 1938,17 if not until the very end of his life. Given the resemblance between Schopenhauers will and the Freudian unconscious, is Freuds timeless unconscious a transcendent unconscious? Freud certainly did not shrink from explicitly comparing the unconscious to the unknowable substratum of experienced objects that Kant called the thing-in-itself. But unlike Kant and much in accord with Schopenhauer, Freud (1915) finds something analogous to instinct in animals to be the nucleus of the unconscious (p. 194). Schopenhauer and Freuds analogous conceptions of the thing-in-itself as animal instinct or drive are plagued by the same obvious contradiction. What kinds of processes occur outside of time and remain unaffected by time? How can a process occur without a certain interval, temporal flow, and rhythm of becoming? Isnt the timelessness of the unconscious just another assertion of permanent presence, eternal truth, or transcendental ideality, which belong squarely to the unfolding of Western metaphysics since Plato? Isnt the Freudian unconscious, like Schopenhauers will, nothing more that the latest form of the transcendent real? Nevertheless, we must admit that whatever else it may be, the Freudian unconscious is also alterity, excessa certain field of difference that does not simply converge with conscious thought, and

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can never become present to consciousness. Is the Freudian unconscious inexorably tied up with Western metaphysics or is it something akin to the diffrance of deconstruction, or, perhaps, paradoxically, both at once? We return once again to that moment in Beyond the Pleasure Principle where the text cites Schopenhauer, where it cannot remain blind to Schopenhauer:
There is something else, at any rate, that we cannot remain blind to. We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbour of Schopenhauers philosophy. For him death is the true result and to that extent the purpose of life while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live. (Freud, 1920, pp. 4950, emphasis added) Let us make a bold attempt at another step forward. (Freud, 1920, pp. 4950, emphasis added)

Whose harbor have we sailed into? Who/What are we stepping beyond? Are we not stepping beyond Schopenhauer? Arent we, in fact, sailing from the harbor of Schopenhauer into new and uncharted waters? At the very moment when Freud steps beyond Schopenhauer, the text cites their affinity. It declares that now and hence never beforethe sober and painstaking investigations of psychoanalysis converge with Schopenhauers philosophy (Freud, 1933 , p. 107). Due to this apparently innocuous citation, this new affinity, if investigated, will of course prove to be nothing but a superficial and hence erroneous connection: It confirms Freuds self-proclaimed constitutional incapacity for philosophy, his supposed dislike of reading, preserves the purity of psychoanalysis, and confirms that Freud read Schopenhauer for the first time late in life (Freud, 1925a, p. 60). Perfectly, perhaps all too perfectly, Freud has shown, yet again, that psychoanalysis owes nothing to Schopenhauer. But through the citation of Parerga and Paralipomena the text itself literally points back to Schopenhauers dream theory, to a disavowed affinity that is covered up as it is stepped beyond. If Freud disavowed his inheritance from Schopenhauer, then through this ostensibly passive citation the repressed returns to haunt the text: Has the ghost of Schopenhauer, a spectral grandfather of psychoanalysis, come back to collect what is owed? Perhaps Freud, gripped by this speculating demon who pulls

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psychoanalysis back down into metaphysics, writes this affinity into the very structure of the text. Doesnt Schopenhauers philosophy reach out like the transcendent hand of fate unconsciously directing the outcome of Freuds earliest discoveries? Arent the results of the laborious investigations of psychoanalysis delivered over to the metaphysics of Schopenhauer because they presuppose elements of that very same metaphysics? But all such questions remain hidden, buried within the passive reference to Schopenhauer, lost like so many ships in the stormy seas of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
NIETZSCHES RHYTHm [It is] better to dance clumsily than to walk lamely. So learn from me my wisdom: even the worst thing has two good dancing legs: so learn, you Higher Men, how to stand on your own proper legs! Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (18831885)18 Time is not an irreversible progress beginning with an origin and oriented towards a specific goal: it is a rhythmic play between opposing of forces which prevail by turns, innocently constructing and deconstructing worlds. A rhythmic play which implies repression and the return of the repressed. Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor

In 1926 Freud received a magnificent and expensive birthday present from his once highly esteemed disciple Otto Rank. Unfortunately this gift was something Freud had purchased for himself some 26 years earlier: The Collected Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Perhaps this was an unheimlich19 moment for the seventy-year-old father of psychoanalysis? Had the secretly familiar, yet disavowed, philosophy of Nietzsche returned once again to herald the break with yet another promising disciple? Had the disavowed ancestor returned to threaten Freuds legacy? The progeny have discovered the ancestor. Legitimacy is questioned. They threaten to dethrone the king. Will Freud have an heir? At this moment, which seems to return again and again, the future is uncertain. Was this uncanny moment destined to recur eternally? Would Freud ever be able to escape his demon-double, the dancing Zarathustra who seems to have aped him from the beginning? Perhaps at this uncanny moment, Freud recalled the first pronouncement of the

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eternal return, which he may have encountered not long after the first publication of The Gay Science in 1882perhaps from his friend Siegfried Lipner or another of the former members of Freuds reading society in Vienna20 who were strongly interested in Nietzsche (Holub, 1999, p. 151; Lehrer, 1995, p. 15). In a letter to Fliess from February 1, 1900, Freud writes, I have just acquired Nietzsche, in whom I hope to find words for much that remains mute in me but have not opened him yet. Too lazy for the time being (p. 398). As Bass (1993, p. 197) points out, these lines are much more significant than they appear to be at first glance. How did Freud know that Nietzsche might have the words to fill his silence? At this time Freud must have known enough about Nietzsche to know where the missing words might be found. Do these missing words remain unread because Freud is too lazy for the time being? Is the prodigious Freud really too lazy to find these missing words? Here we should ask, with Bass (1993), what words does Nietzsche have that might be able to give voice to that about which Freud remains silent? That Freud disavows Nietzsche even more thoroughly than Schopenhauer should give us pause. What, if anything, is hiding within Freuds ostensibly passive and indifferent reference to the eternal recurrence of the same in Beyond the Pleasure Principle? This was not the first time Freud referred to the eternal return in a passive way: In a 1917 letter to Ferenczi, Freud writes: I smiled at your optimism in a downright superior fashion. You appear to believe in an eternal recurrence of the same and want to overlook entirely the unambiguous downward direction of the curve. There is certainly nothing noteworthy in the fact that a man of my age recognizes the unavoidable stepwise decay of his being (p. 251). For Freud, this affirmative, perhaps even optimistic, doctrine ignores the unambiguous downward direction of the curve. Does this reference have any significance or is it the product of mere chance? There are at least two ways of interpreting this reference. We might suggest that Freud is familiar with Nietzsches phrase, but knows little or nothing about the specifics of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Following this reading, we might say that Freud is using this phrase as a kind of clich, as it was certainly a phrase common to the intellectual circles he was frequent-

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ing at the time. We have every right to interpret it this way. But we may read it rather differently. We might suggest Freud was familiar enough with the meaning of this doctrine to know it was an affirmative doctrine for Nietzsche, one that ignored the downward direction of the curve, namely, a certain inner curve toward ones proper death. Does Freuds use of this phrase indicate a familiarity with Nietzsches doctrine? Does this interpretation hold any weight? Traditional psychoanalytic interpretation presumes that no expression happens merely by chance: In analysis I do not just mention something by chance. What are we to make of this reference? Perhaps, we might ask in a somewhat facetiously Derridian fashion: What are Freuds chances? In The Uncanny (1919), written around the same time as Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud links the eternal recurrence of the same (without scare quotes) with the demonic-doubling characteristic of the unheimlich. Do these references to the eternal return of the same indicate that Freud was aware of the two sides of the eternal return: that it is either affirmed or denied? This link between demonicdoubling and eternal return is repeated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920): the eternal recurrence of the same is used to refer to repetition compulsion (p. 23). What might this reference mean? Can we decide once and for all about Freud and Nietzsche? Let us make a bold attempt at another step forward. In his biography of Freud, Jones (1957) observed that Beyond the Pleasure Principle was discursively written, almost as if by free associations (p. 266). Laplanche (1970) says that Beyond the Pleasure Principle remains the most fascinating and baffling text of the entire Freudian corpus and that Freud had never been so profoundly free and audacious as in that vast metapsychological, metaphysical, and metabiological fresco (p. 106). And Derrida (1980) claims that the text of Beyond the Pleasure Principle is autobiographical, but in a completely different way than has been believed up to now (p. 322). Perhaps what stands written in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is, at least partially, the product of a kind of automatic writing where it writes for Freud, producing a text that is not only an autobiography of Freud the author, but of the it within. Returning to the text, we cannot remain blind to the strikingly autobiographical nature of the character-types dis-

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cussed immediately before Freuds (1920) reference to Nietzsche. Thus we have all come across people all of whose human relationships have the same outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger time after time by each of his protgs, however much they may otherwise differ from one another, and who thus seem doomed to taste all the bitterness of ingratitude (p. 23). It takes little imagination to see Freuds self-portrait here: Freud, the noble benefactor, rejected by the ungrateful protgs Adler and Jung.21 (And while Freud could not have known it while writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle, even Little Rank would soon go his own way.) The text continues: . . . or the man whose friendships all end in betrayal by his friend; or the man who raises someone else into a position of authority and then, after a certain interval, himself upsets the authority and replaces him by a new one (p. 23). Is Freud referring to himself again, and to the disciples who betrayed him? Who has betrayed whom? Are the disciples men who raise someone to authority only to give up on them? Is Freud afraid of being raised up and then usurped? Has this already happened? Is Nietzsche laughing somewhere nearby? Adler, Jung, and others are pointing at the denied inheritance and, whats worse, claiming legitimacy from it! The kingdom is threatened. And thenseparated by a single linewe have the words of an illegitimate ancestor who speaks without a proper name. His namelessness hides nothing for he needs no introduction. His infamous words stand starkly between quotes: the eternal recurrence of the same22 (p. 23). Who pronounces the eternal return, a demon or a god? Who is selected? Who is left behind? Who is destined to be a path breaker? The future is uncertain. Who is the legitimate heir? And who is destined to disappear? What, if anything, does the doctrine of eternal recurrence have to do with repetition compulsion? What brings these concepts together and what holds them apart? Let us speculate. Repetition. Repetition. Repetition is one of the basic elements of being-inthe-world, found everywhere from the deepest rhythms of nature to the habitual structures of everyday life. It is there in habit and memory, in dreams and fantasy, in symphonies and paintings, in ceremonies and poetry, in pleasure and in pain. Sometimes this return of the same is comforting and familiar, and sometimes it is

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haunting and demonic. We witness the same scenes recurring again and again, and we find ourselves playing all too familiar roles in those scenes. We find ourselves repeating the same old patterns again and again, and sometimes viciously, horribly. Thoughts, desires, and memories all have the potential to haunt us, turning life into an unbearable repetition of the seemingly identical. At times death seems to be the only escape from this monotonous and sometimes acutely painful repetition. In these Sisyphean moments it seems as if everything comes back, as if no specter can finally be put to rest, as if the haunting never ends. Psychic time often seems like a frightful circle of repetition, and at times a vicious one. Compared to the familiar and comfortable notion of linear time posited by Western metaphysics, the temporality of the eternal return might appear as if Lucifer himself concocted it: a time where everything repressed returns to haunt us. To what extent is being-in-the-world characterized by the unfolding of linear time? Does time progress in a series of discrete and separable moments? Does time support the dialectical progress of history toward the self-present identity of absolute knowledge? Or, rather, is time an endless repetition, a vicious circle of eternally recurring chaos? The eternal return is Nietzsches (1901) challenge to Western metaphysics: Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: the eternal recurrence (n.55). The first consequence of the eternal return is that evolution, dialectical progress, Aufhebung,23 is thwarted. Absolute knowledge will never be reached. There can be no future redemption. The kingdom of God shall never come. All those future utopias, including those considered secular, are shown to be nothing more than ghostly simulacra in the twilight of metaphysics. The eternal return, the temporality of the will-to-power, the finite repetition of differential forces, shatters all illusory identities, past, present and future, into the endless play of self-difference. If all is eternally returning becoming without end, there can never be a pure present or a complete and self-identical moment (1901, n. 708). Western metaphysics disavowed the circular time of ancient mythology, and with Nietzsche this secretly familiar time returns transformed. It cannot be the sim-

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ple return of the self-identical, but the infinite repetition of becoming, the eternal return of that which differs from itself. The circle circles through metaphysical repression, and when it comes back it comes back as the devil-double of itself: the uncanny vicious circle. So who better to introduce the eternal recurrence than a self-differing demon-god?
The heaviest weight.What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live it you will have to live it once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequenceeven this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust! Would you throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine. If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, Do you want this again and innumerable times again? would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, 1882, aphorism 341)

Who is this messenger, a devil-double or a god? Who comes as supposed self-identity and leaves as self-difference? A demon is supposed to be the opposite of a god, an angel who fell from god, the transcendent unity of self-presence. Nietzsches demon appears as both a demon and a god, for the collapse of transcendent being into immanent becoming leaves only the play of difference. He is the embodiment of difference deferred by Western metaphysics, who nevertheless comes back to shatter the identity of those who are seized by this thought of thoughts: My philosophy brings the triumphant idea of which all other modes of thought will ultimately perish... (Nietzsche, 1901, n.1053). How I interpret the eternal return tells me who I am. It reflects the very forces that constitute me. Traditional interpreta-

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tions of the eternal return of the same understand it as an eternal return of the identical, but this is only one side, one interpretation, of the eternal return. In the chapter titled On the Vision and the Riddle of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (18831885), Zarathustra and his dwarf-double stand at the gateway of the eternal return, inscribed Augenblick:24 a gateway with two faces, where two paths meet that no one has followed either to its end (p. 157). Two eternities that contradict each other, that offend each other face to face (p. 158). What separates and differentiates the dwarfs interpretation from that of Zarathustra? Does the dwarf not say that time is a circle? (p. 158). Have they not each spoken the same of the eternal return? Why does the dwarf disappear and Zarathustra remain? How does Zarathustra overcome his suffering and erase the dwarf in himself? As Nietzsche (1901) saysand both Heidegger (1961) and Deleuze (1962) have shown (albeit in markedly different ways)the eternal return has a selective power (n.1058): It shatters the metaphysical series of subjectconsciousnessidentity and gives way to an understanding of nonmetaphysical multiplicity and difference. What happens when the repressed circular time of mythology comes back as the eternal return of becoming? Perishing takes the form of self-destructionthe instinctive selection of that which must destroy (Nietzsche, 1901, n.55). The very thought of the eternal recurrence abolishes the transcendent beyond of metaphysics: There are no longer any permanent goals, ends, or aims that stand outside the endless flux of self-differential becoming. Time comes from and leads nowhere. The becoming of the will to power is auto-affective: It leads only to itself. Those possessed by reactive forces are no longer preserved by the comforting illusions of Western metaphysics. The will to destruction of life turned against itself is no longer suspended by metaphysical il lusions and is finally unleashed and exposed as the will of a still deeper instinct of self-destruction, the will for nothingness (Nietzsche, 1901, n.55). The thought of the eternal return pushes both active and reactive forces to the limit, beyond the limit. Those with a predominance of reactive forces will experience the belief in the eternal recurrence as a curse, struck by which one no longer shrinks from any action (Nietzsche, 1901, n.55). For when

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reactive forces are pushed to their limit they become activewhat they can do is no longer separated from what they are. As Deleuze (1962) tells us, Only the eternal return can complete nihilism because it makes a negation of reactive forces themselves. By and in the eternal return nihilism no longer expresses itself as the conservation and victory of the weak but as their destruction, their selfdestruction (p. 70). The eternal return destroys those forces which strive for the illusion of singular self-identity, the permanence of presence, and hence proliferates difference: The eternal return produces becoming-active (p. 71). It is a difference engine, a selective principle that destroys the proper temporality of Western metaphysics (Nietzsche, 1901, n.1058). In other words, eternal recurrence brings about the self-destruction of reactive forces: The will to nothingness of a form of life turned against itself, suspended from its completion by the illusions of Western metaphysics, finally completes itself, enacts itself. Through the eternal return, the death drive inherent to reactive forces finally and completely expresses itself.25 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, repetition compulsion points toward the death drive, that is to say, repetition is a force of death. While formally introduced for the first time in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the phenomenon of repetition compulsion was not entirely new to Freud. In Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through, Freud (1914) announced something which every analyst has found confirmed in his observations namely, that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it (p. 150). Instead of consciously remembering, the patient repeats his or her past in the transference: The patient acts out his or her relational historicity in the relationship with the analyst. In the transference the patients unconscious history repeats itself: Repetition is intrinsic to transference. In this way, repetition is intrinsic to the psychoanalytic situation, and the temporality of the psychoanalytic situation itself. The sessions repeat over and over again as the material is worked through again and again. In analysis the patient repeats and reworks material from a past that is never remembered, that was never present, but one that is never-

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theless acted out in the transference. But is the past that returns identical to that of the last session, an upsurge of the same unchanging unconscious substratum, the same intelligible character, the self-identical unconscious acting itself out?26 Doesnt each reenactment differ from the last time? Doesnt the shifting scene of analysis and the whole matrix of connections and relations between forces shape each repetition? This difference in repetition seems to be a necessary condition of the possibility of working through. For if the reenactment is identical with what it reenacts and hence identical in each repetition, change as such would be impossible. Difference in repetition is the possibility of change inherent to the psychoanalytic situation. In analysis eternal return is the temporality of both the illness and the cure. The illness is the return of the apparently identical in an apparently timeless way. The temporality of illness is being apparently stuck in time, and the cure is the patients recognition that what returns is not the return of the identical but the return of the same, of self-difference. Analysis is so painful because it forces the patient to confront the terror of differencethe abyssal play of becoming without permanence or stabilitya play that forces him or her to face the inevitability of change. It is unsurprising that the absolute terror in the face of repressed difference is experienced as demonic when freed from the static concept of identity. The cure for metaphysical illness is the recognition and affirmation of difference.27 Here then, we have a kind of temporality that can underlay both Nietzsche and Freuds concepts, one that can account for the very basis of psychoanalytic practice and the possibility of both illness and cure. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud attributes the compulsion to repeat to the internal nature of the drive itself. Nietzsche also links these two motifs together. As I alluded to earlier, the will to powerthe relational network of finite differentials of forceis composed of two kinds of forces: active and reactive. These two kinds of forces, however, are not absolute opposites, like life and death. One kind of force tends toward self-multiplication and overcoming, while the other is the same as this one, but turned against itself. According to Nietzsche, while one type of life, characterized by a predominance of active forces, is ascend-

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ing, in acts of rhythmic surpassing and exceeding itself, another type of life, characterized by a predominance of reactive forces, is declining, but preserves itself with delusions of permanence and purity. These delusive projections are what Nietzsche calls reactive nihilism or simply metaphysics. This is why Nietzsche can describe reactive forces, in Schopenhauerian terms, as a will to nothingness suspended by a will to self-preservation: a push toward death that defends itself with self-preservative illusions of permanence. In other words, a reactive force is a will to nothingness suspended from action: a death drive suspended. These forces, turned against themselves, aim to reduce tension and hence eliminate difference. Active forces, on the other hand, as drives toward life, toward self-multiplication and self-surpassing, strive to raise tension levels, to face and overcome resistances. How we interpret the eternal return tells us what kind of forces predominate in us at any given moment: our interpretation of the eternal return tells us who we are. Through the selective power of the eternal return reactive forces, the forces of nihilism or metaphysics become active forces of nihilism, an active will to self-destruction. Active forces, on the other hand, are multiplied by the eternal return: They are pushed passed the limit that they are already exceeding and liberated from their reactive counterparts. For some the eternal return is the greatest curse, for others it stimulates and furthers the affirmation of difference. Here we must address an obvious point. Who were Freuds patients? Who comes to analysis? Not those who are predominately active and life affirming, but those who are suffering from life: those who need help to break free of reactive forces. In strictly Nietzschean terms, Freud treated people with a predominance of reactive forces, namely, those who experience repetition as a curse and are trying to preserve themselves from an inherent will to nothingness. These individuals are bound to answer the question posed by the eternal return with a resounding no, for they are unable to affirm difference. Hence, Nietzsche might have seen Freud as a new type of priest, a new metaphysician who helps preserve those who are suffering from life.28 It would not surprise Nietzsche that Freuds concepts are at times reactive, one-sided, even Schopenhauerean, because they were developed from the

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study of predominantly reactive individuals. But before we are carried away by Zarathustras dance we need to address a somewhat obvious point. Who has ever been the expression of pure reactive forces? As Derrida (1985) has shown in The Ear of the Other, and we can see in Ecce Homo (Nietzsche, 1888), Nietzsche even understands himself as being split between active and reactive forces. According to Nietzsche, no human being has ever been entirely free of reactive forces. To reiterate: A purely active human being has never existed and may be nothing but a fantasy. As long as humanity remains human, reactive forces will plague it. Only an bermensch could be completely and utterly active, could embrace difference absolutely, but according to Nietzsche, the bermensch remains the great not yet hanging over us like the sword of Damocles. In other words: Despite our desire to twist free, we, as human beings, can never completely escape the pathological delusions of metaphysics. While there is a certain linkage of motifs between Freud and Nietzsche (repetition, the demonic, etc.), Freud could simply explain this associative connection as the result of Nietzsches tremendous powers of endopsychic perception (endopsychische Wahrnehmung). But even if this depiction is accurate, does this really invalidate Nietzsches discovery? Didnt psychoanalysis find one of its beginnings with a great self-analysis?29 Doesnt Nietzsche see into the depths of the unconscious, even if that unconscious happens to be his own? Further, isnt he quite aware of what he is doing? Doesnt Nietzsche recognize all philosophies, and all Wissenschaften, including his own, as a projection of the deep rhythms of differential unconscious forces: the becoming-play of will to power?30 Perhaps the greatest delusion is to think that Nietzsches discoveries, and even those of Schopenhauer, are absolutely different from those of Freud, or anyone else, by way of the supposedly infallible line drawn between illegitimate speculation and proper thought? In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche stresses that it is not Herr Nietzsche who thinks the thought of eternal recurrence. This idea was not worked out by the reflecting consciousness of an ailing philologist named Friedrich Nietzsche. This idea grasped and overtook him in a text 6000 feet beyond people and time (Nietzsche, 1888, p.

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123). The eternal return is not a thought of the one who thinks it: It is a thought that thinks itself. It seizes the one who thinks, it comes suddenly without herald or warning, like the demon-double in The Gay Science (Nietzsche, 1882, p. 341). The eternal return comes like fate and appears as destiny. But what is Nietzschean fate? Where does it come from? Nietzsches incessant affirmations of fate attest to the significance of fate in his thought. But the fate to which Nietzsche refers is not the transcendent fate Schopenhauer speculates about or a manifestation of Schopenhauers world will, but something immanent to the very thrust of life itself. Nietzschean fate is the eternal recurrence of the same itself: the endless playing movement of unconscious differentials of force repeating again and again, never identically but always the same (Nietzsche, 1901, n.1067). Amor fati is the joy of the circle, an affirmation of the vicious circular temporality of the interplay of the differentials of force the affirmation of the temporality of will to power, of ever recurring difference (Nietzsche, 1901, n.1067). We have speculated that psychoanalytic time is a kind of circle, a kind of repetition, and now we must ask, where does this primordial nonlinear time come from? If the eternal return is the circular time of the will to power, then time is the repetition of the finite differentials of force that characterize the deep unconscious or, alternatively, the path-breaking differentials of Freuds Project (1895). Interpreted this way, Nietzsches eternal recurrence of the same is similar to what Bass (2006) has called unconscious time (p. 23). Unconscious time is the time prior to the linear now time of metaphysics, and even the ontological time of Heidegger: It is a form of time beyond conceptualization: the periodicity of difference. While Freud was timid with regard to positing a theory of time, as Bass (2006) has clearly demonstrated in Interpretation and Difference, There is an unintegrated thinking of unconscious temporality in Freud (p. 20). As Bass (2006, p. 20) shows us, developing avenues found in Derridas corpus, Freud undermines his own theory of the timelessness of the unconscious in several works, including Beyond the Pleasure Principle and A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad. In A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad, Freud (1925b) states:
It is as though the unconscious stretches out its feelers, through the medium of the system Pcpt.-Cs. [perception-consciousness],

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toward the eternal world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it [...] this discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time. (p. 231)

Earlier we wondered whether Freuds conception of the timeless unconscious was a metaphysical inheritance of the world will posited by Schopenhauer as the Kantian thing-in-itself. Now we can begin to sketch out a possible answer to that complex and difficult question. While Freud repeatedly says that the unconscious is timeless (a metaphysical characteristic), he also subverts his own interpretation by positing a kind of unconscious temporality. Like the two philosophical legacies he inherits, Freud, in positing a timeless unconscious, repeats the fundamental gesture of Western metaphysics by positing the unconscious as a permanent presence,31 but he also undermines this permanence of presence by ascribing temporal processes and differential forces to the unconscious. In other words, Freud points toward an opening beyond metaphysics by inscribing Becoming (self-difference) into the heart of apparent Being (self-identity). Here we can begin to see the diverging structure of what I have called Freuds philosophical inheritance: We have Freud la Schopenhauer, but we also have Freud la Nietzsche. We uncover two dimensions of Freuds philosophical inheritance: one distinctly metaphysical and another that aspires to twist free from the metaphysical fantasy of permanent presence. With the positing of unconscious temporality, Nietzsche and Freud converge: There is a rhythmic periodicity inherent to the unconscious that stands beyond the linear now time of Western metaphysics and modern science. What is beyond the pleasure principle and even beyond time itself? Diffrance and rhythm: The rhythm of will to power: finite differentials of force repeating: the eternal recurrence of the same. In To Speculateon Freud Derrida (1980) writes the following cryptic lines: Beyond opposition, diffrance and rhythm. Beyond a beyond whose line would have to divide, that is to oppose entities, beyond the beyond of opposition, beyond opposition, rhythm (p. 408). The temporality of the will to power as the rhythm of the eternal return is beyond pleasure/pain,32 beyond life/death,33 beyond the absolute oppositions and hierarchies

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of metaphysics. But how do we account for Freuds two ostensibly opposed theories of unconscious time, namely, the timeless unconscious and the one that rhythmically repeats? How does one arrive at such a conflicting and paradoxical structure? What transfiguring mirror represents repetition as timelessness? What gives us the notion of being as eternal, as timeless, as permanent presence? In other words, from where do the pathological metaphysical illusions of permanent presence arise? Tired of speculating, I defer to Nietzsche (1901): That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being (p. 617). Permanent presence, referred to as being by Nietzsche, is an approximation (Annherung) of the self-differing rhythm of becoming: eternal repetition without beginning or end. For Nietzsche, approximation is always a falsificationa false equivalence, a metaphysical repression of differencehence the approximation of becoming and being is a twofold falsification: Two fold falsification, on the part of the senses and of the spirit, to preserve a world of that which is, which abides, which is equivalent, etc.(Nietzsche, 1901, p. 617). Who/What is approximating/falsifying here? Who/What desires to preserve? Just as nonmetaphysical reality differs from itself,34 the temporality of will to power as the eternal return of difference also differs from itself. So who/ what represents the endless repetition of the eternal return as being? Or, put differently, who/what represents self-difference as self-identity? Nietzsches answer is clear: The reactive force par excellence, the force that defends against difference by establishing unities out of multiplicities, the force that manufactures identities by repressing a primary difference: consciousness. By repressing difference, consciousness represents the repetition of difference as timeless being. The unconscious of reactive consciousness35 disavows unconscious time by replacing it with the metaphysical fantasy of the eternal now: Consciousness is engaged in this twofold falsification: Consciousness represents becoming as being.
CONCLUSION

One might wonder if what has been attempted in this essay is a yet another form of masteryan attempt at mastery by appropriation. While there is no (conscious? intentional? Are these words

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meaningful?) attempt here to undermine Freuds text, as Sarah Kofman (1974) once put it, There is perhaps, for every writer, one vital defense: to travesty his text, to cover it over, to protect it behind a bundle of themes; or to ask endless questions about the fabrication of the text, which can also be a means of trying to master it (p. 162). What is the drive for knowledge (Wisstrieb) other than, as Freud (1905) says, a sublimated manner of obtaining mastery [Bemchtigung] (p. 194)? Are we (I mean me, I myself, the It myself) trying to master Beyond the Pleasure Principleattempting to master Freuds attempt at mastery by speculative subversion and philosophical reappropriation ? Perhaps. Are we trying to deny the profundity and originality of Freud by undermining him? Here the answer is no. To suggest, speculatively, that Freuds concepts bear an inheritance in no way undermines the profundity of his discoveries. What Schopenhauer and Nietzsche discovered through rigorous philosophical thinking, Freud reinterpreted, developed, tested, expanded, and took out into the field to actually help people. Perhaps what has become Freuds greatest legacy is not only the discovery of the unconscious, which undermines the hegemony of metaphysical consciousness, but the development of these profound philosophical insights into a form of interpretive care. In other words, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche could obviously never be said to have invented or founded psychoanalysis, because psychoanalysis is a practice of care. It is precisely this legacy that belongs to Freud above all, embodied by the theory and practice of those who have followed in his footsteps.36 My otherbiographicalinterpretations of Freuds references to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are, of course, no more than associative interpretations, other speculations, that seem to resonate with something written on the reverse of the text. In the spirit of Freud, we have attempted to open our ears to the unconscious resonances and the emotional current of the text: Was Freuds anxiety about finding a legitimate heir, about being the father of a new Wissenschaft, associated with Nietzsche? Did Freud inherit ideas from Schopenhauer, disavow them, and then almost automatically hide them in a reference? Did Freud inherit the legacy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche? This is a matter of interpretation. Did he read them? All we can do is speculate. What I intend to suggest may be shocking to some readers: Freud is the

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heir of both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche whether he read them or not and no matter how much he (mis-)interpreted their texts and transformed their ideas. Is not an inheritance only worthy of the name if it is reinterpreted, revitalized, reinvested, and made to perform in different contexts? Does anything stand entirely outside the relays of inheritance? With our conceptual interpretations the story is more complex. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud all dove into the depths of the unconscious, returning with similar, but ultimately different treasuresdiscoveries standing apart, discoveries that differ without the possibility of any absolute synthesis. This, of course, does not make them opposed to one another, for any discordance requires the possibility of an inherent accordance, and the inherent complexities of these relations as relations cannot simply be ignored. Guided by the work of Derrida, Kofman, and Bass, we have explored various dimensions of SchopenhauerFreud and NietzscheFreud relations. What is the connection between Freud and Nietzsche? What can their deep affinity tell us about psychoanalysis and philosophy? What can philosophy teach psychoanalysis? What can psychoanalysis teach philosophy? What I have attempted here is merely to suggest some possible avenues for rethinking the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis. To understand and situate the NietzscheFreud relation, we need to understand that of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and that of Schopenhauer and Freud. But to understand psychoanalysis and philosophy beyond the artificial boundary lines of discipline, we need a philosophy of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis of philosophy. But perhaps we must go even further toward something that is neither philosophy nor psychoanalysis, something entirely without borders and oppositions. Perhaps, if I may be forgiven a somewhat awkward neologism, what is called for a kind of philopsychoanalysisbut who said that this does not already exist, traversing the proper border between psychoanalysis and deconstruction? Let us make a bold attempt at another step forward....

NOTES

1. One might wonder why I follow Derrida in suggesting that Freud disavowed his philosophical inheritance and why I dont simply treat it as case of mere

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forgetting. Why not follow Zilboorg (1956), who suggests, ....as to Freuds forgetting the sources of his own ideas,whether the ideas could be related to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegelian dialectics, or Herbartian trendsthat he forgot or was unaware of the sources of his own Weltanschauung, seems quite natural. Many of us are totally unaware of the fountainheads from which we refresh ourselves (p. 144). This essay will speculate as to how we might understand this forgetting as a structured and multifaceted disavowal. 2.In the Standard Edition, Strachey translates ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen as perpetual recurrence of the same thing. I have modified this translation to the eternal recurrence of the same. 3. Frie and Reis (2001) discuss Freuds strange relationship with philosophy: Freuds relationship to philosophy was...tenuous....Freud lauded such thinkers as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer for their considerable insights into the human mind, yet he also sought to distance the nascent science of psychoanalysis from what referred to as the speculative metaphysics of philosophy. Freud hoped to ensure that psychoanalysis could claim the objectivity of the natural sciences, rather than be seen as a branch of the humanities. In our opinion, Freud thereby left the unfortunate legacy of an artificial distinction between the disciplines of psychoanalysis and philosophy (pp. 298 299, emphasis added). 4. I use the German Wissenshaft to emphasize that psychoanalysis is a complex amalgam that traverses many traditional disciplinary boundaries, rather than one specific mode of knowledge. 5. Parerga and Paralipomena (Appendices and Omissions) is a collection of philosophical essays written by Schopenhauer to supplement his two-volume masterwork The World as Will and Representation (1819, 1849). Interestingly, it was this work and not The World as Will and Representation that sparked international interest in Schopenhauers philosophy after John Oxenford reviewed the work in the Westminster Review. 6. This quotation appears on page 236 of Freuds German edition of Parerga and Paralipomena. 7. That both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche share a conceptual affinity with Freud is well documented in the literature. While most authors grant Schopenhauers and Nietzsches influence on Freud, if only indirectly, the question of the nature of this influence is hotly debated. A small sample of influential writings in the psychoanalytic literature on Schopenhauer and Freud includes Bischler (1939), Proctor-Gregg (1956), Gupta (1975), and Young and Brook (1994). A small sample of influential writings on the Nietzsche Freud relation includes Mazlish (1968), Trosman (1973), Assoun (1980), Parkes (1994), Lehrer (1995), Bass (2006). 8. Trosman (1973) describes Freuds reading society: Freuds Leseverein took Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche as ideational leaders. It was believed that a new and artistically vital culture, opposed to the excessive rationalism of the past, had to be created. Political activity was to appeal to the integrated man and not regard his rational aspect as more important than his emotional side (p. 325). 9. Despite its merely extraneous significance, I cannot help noting that all this is expressed to the same Lou Salom who was the former object of Nietzsches misguided affections, and no doubt well versed in Schopenhauer. 10. Freuds (1920) disclaimers are all over Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the most famous of which is the opening of chapter 4 (p. 26).

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11. It is not one of the four types of legitimate knowledge Schopenhauer outlines in On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely, logical, empirical, transcendental, or meta-logical, and is not the fifth kind of eminently philosophical knowledge proposed in The World as Will and Representation (1819), namely, the immediate intuitive knowledge that the body as object has of the will-in-itself (p. 102). 12.In The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer (1819) draws a distinction between the empirical character and the intelligible character. The intelligible character is what he calls a special idea, namely, an archetypal form that determines the empirical character, which is merely its manifestation (pp. 158, 161). 13. According to Schopenhauer (1819), this doctrine is the essential core of the worlds great religions, particularly Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity (p. 408). 14. The reality principle only modifies the pleasure principle by deferring or postponing tension discharge: In other words, with the introduction of the reality principle, a certain amount of tension can be tolerated over time; pleasure, the reduction of tension, is deferred for the purposes of future discharge. 15.In the Standard Edition Strachey translates Trieb as instinct; here, and in each subsequent case, I have substituted for it the more appropriate drive. 16. The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs (Freud, 1915, p. 187). 17. On August 31, 1938, Freud wrote to Marie Bonaparte: So it might be that the idea of time is connected with the work of the system Pcs-Cs (perceptionconsciousness). Kant would then be in the right if we replace his old-fashioned a priori by our modern introspection of the psychical apparatus. It should be the same with space, causality, etc. (Jones, 1953-1957, vol. 3, p. 466). 18. By quoting this section I am suggesting that two of Freuds proper legs (to use the French term for legacies), at least of the philosophical ones, are Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Freud must learn to walk on his two good dancing legs. I am also referring back to the chapter of To Speculateon Freud (Derrida, 1980) titled in French Freuds Legs, where Derrida plays on the FrenchEnglish homonym legs. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (1920) quotes the poet: Was man nicht erfliegen kann, muss man erhinken. Die Schrift sagt, es ist keine Snde zu hinken [What we cannot reach flying we must reach limping.... The Book tells us it is no sin to limp] (p.64). Why cant Zarathustra invite Freud to dance? If these two legs are prosthetic, they are made of different materials and bend according to different joints: limping and dancing legs! 19.The unheimliche [uncanny] is something which is secretly familiar, which has undergone repression and then returned from it (Freud, 1919, p. 245). 20. See note 8. 21. Each of these men understood himself as an intellectual descendent of Nietzsche. 22. See note 2. 23. Aufhebung, often translated as sublation in English, is Hegels term for the

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dialectical process of canceling, keeping, and elevating that does not leave anything behind. 24.Augenblick is translated as moment or instant, but literally means wink or blink of the eye. 25.In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer (1819) indicates what his answer to the eternal return might be: At the end of his life, no man, if he be sincere and at the same time in possession of his faculties, will ever wish to go through it again....he would much prefer to choose complete non-existence (p. 324). 26. For Freud, acting out [agieren], as a manifestation of the return of the repressed, is the return of the identical. This is because what returns is apparently identical, but nevertheless permeated by difference. 27. The work of Alan Bass explores the relationship between pathology and metaphysics. See Psychopathology, Metaphysics (1993), Difference and Disavowal (2000), and Interpretation and Difference (2006). 28. Deleuze and Guattari (1980) state this Nietzschean position unambiguously in A Thousand Plateaus: The most recent figure of the priest is the psychoanalyst, with his three principles: pleasure, death, and reality (p.154). 29. I am referring to Freuds famous self-analysis that gave birth to The Interpretation of Dreams. 30.For example, Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche, 1886) chapter 1, aphorism 6. 31. Freud obviously subverts the permanent presence of consciousness. The question is whether Freud posits the unconscious as a permanent presence, that is, outside of time, outside of space, as the metaphysical subject like Schopenhauer does with the transcendental will. 32.In his Nachlass, Nietzsche states, Perhaps one could even describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of small unpleasurable stimuli... (Kritische Studienausgabe, 11[76], 1887-1888; alt. 1901, p. 697). 33.In The Gay Science Nietzsche (1883) states, Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is only a form of what is dead, and a very rare form (p. 110). 34. This is Nietzsches so-called perspectivism, which unfortunately is often (mis-)interpreted as a subjectivistic doctrine. The word of Nietzsche: nonmetaphysical reality is difference. 35. I use the phrase the unconscious of reactive consciousness because the process that gives rise to this hallucination must be an unconscious process. 36. We should also remember that Freud has other legacies, even outside of the proper boundaries of psychoanalysis: in continental philosophy, the social sciences, and other fields.
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Deleuze, G. (1962). Nietzsche and philosophy (H. Tomlinson, trans.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. ______ & Guattari, F. (1980). A thousand plateaus (B. Massumi, trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Derrida, J. (1980). The post card (A. Bass, trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. ______ (1985). The ear of the Other: Otobiography, transference, translation (P. Kamuf et al., trans.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988. Freud, S. (1895). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey, ed. and trans., The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. London: Hogarth Press, 19531974. 1:281391. ______ (1900). Letter from Freud to Fliess, February 1, 1900. In The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 18871904 (J. M. Masson, trans.; pp. 397398). Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985. ______ (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. Standard ed., 7:123246. ______ (1914). Remembering, repeating, and working through. Standard ed., 12:145156. ______ (1915). The unconscious. Standard ed., 14:159215. ______ (1917). Letter from Sigmund Freud to Sndor Ferenczi, December 16, 1917. In E. Brabant, E. Falzeder, & P. Giampieri-Deutsch, eds., The correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sndor Ferenczi (P. T. Hoffer, trans.; vol. II). Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 19932000. ______ (1919). The uncanny. Standard ed., 17:219256. ______ (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. Standard ed., 18:164. ______(1923). Two encyclopaedia articles. Standard ed., 18:233260. ______(1925a). An autobiographical study. Standard ed., 20:174. ______(1925b). A note on the mystic writing pad. Standard ed., 19:225232. ______(1933). New introductory lectures. Standard ed., 22:1182. Frie, R., & Reis, B. (2001). Understanding intersubjectivity: Psychoanalytic formulations and their philosophical underpinnings. Contemp. Psychoanal., 37:297327. Gupta, R. K. (1975). Schopenhauer and Freud. J. Hist. Ideas, 36:721728. Heidegger, M. (1961). Nietzsche (D. F. Krell, trans.). San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991. Holub, R. C. (1999). The birth of psychoanalysis from the spirit of enmity. In J. Golomb, W. Santaniello, & R. L. Lehrer, eds., Nietzsche and depth psychology (pp. 149170). Albany: SUNY Press. Jones, E. (19531957). Sigmund Freud: Life and work, vols. 13. London: Hogarth Press. Kofman, S. (1974). Freud and fiction (S. Wykes, trans.). Boston: Northeastern University Press. ______ (1983). Nietzsche and metaphor (D. Large, trans.). Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993. Laplanche, J. (1970). Life and death in psychoanalysis (J. Mehlman, trans.). Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. Lehrer, R. (1995). Nietzsches presence in Freuds life and thought. Albany: SUNY Press. Mazlish, B. (1968). Freud and Nietzsche. Psychoanal. Rev., 55:360375.

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Nietzsche, F. (1883). The gay science (B. Williams, ed.; J. Nauckhoff, trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ______ (18831885). Thus spoke Zarathustra (W. Kaufman, trans.). New York: Penguin, 1978. ______ (1886). Beyond good and evil (R.-P. Horstmann & J. Norman, eds.; J. Norman, trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ______ (1888). Ecce Homo: How one becomes what one is. In Antichrist, Twilight of the idols, and Ecce homo (A. Ridley, ed; J. Norman, trans.; pp. 70151). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. ______(18871888). Kritische Studienausgabe, 11[76]; alt. 1901. ______ (1901). The will to power (W. Kaufmann, trans.). New York: Vintage Press, 1968. ______ (2003). Writings from the late notebooks (R. Bittner, ed.; K. Sturge, trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parkes, G. (1994). Composing the soul: Reaches of Nietzsches psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Proctor-Gregg, N. (1956). Schopenhauer and Freud. Psychoanal Quart., 25:197 214. Schopenhauer, A. (1819). The world as will and representation, vol. 1 (E. F. J. Payne, trans.). New York: Dover Press, 1969. ______ (1839). Essays on the freedom of the will (K. Kolenda, trans.). Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2005. ______ (1849). The world as will and representation, vol. 2 (E. F. J. Payne, trans.). New York: Dover Publications. ______ (1851). Parerga and paralipomena, vol. 1 (E. F. J. Payne, trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Trosman, H. (1973). Freuds cultural background. Ann. Psychoanal., 1:318335. Young, C., & Brook, A. (1994). Schopenhauer and Freud. Internat. J. PsychoAnal., 75:101118. Zilboorg, G. (1956). Freuds one hundredth anniversary. Psychoanal. Quart., 25:139146.

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The Psychoanalytic Review Vol. 99, No. 3, June 2012