Wiretap Complaint Lawrence v. Bear Stearns (JP Morgan) Etc. 07-05-30 DE#69 06-21952-CV-GOLD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 06-21952-CIV-GOLD

STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMAND
vs.
ALAN L. GOLDBERG, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC.,

BERGER SINGERMAN, P. A., PAUL S. SINGERMAN,
JAMES H. FIERBERG, PAUL AVRON, MELAND M
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiff, STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE, sues Defendants, ALAN L. GOLDBERG,
CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC., BERGER SINGERMAN, P. A., PAUL S. SINGERMAN,
JAMES H. FIERBERG, PAUL AVRON, MELAND RUSSIN & BUDWICK, P. A., MICHAEL
BUDWICK, COUDERT BROTHERS, EDWARD TILLINGHAST, III, MARK D. COHEN, P. A.,
MARK D. COHEN, INTERFOR, INC., JUVAL AVIV, BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC., DANIEL
TAUB, MARK LEHMAN, HOWARD KAHN, and KAHN ZUCKERMAN, P. A., and alleges as
follows:
1. This action is brought pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §2520 for violations of the federal
wiretapping provisions under Title III (18 U. S. C. §§2510-2522); pursuant to Florida state
wiretapping provisions, §934.10, Fla. Stat.; pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2701 et seq.; pursuant to 15
USC 1692d(1), 1692e(10), 1692f; pursuant to 42 USC §1983; pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964 for
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961 et. seq.;
for violations of Florida's civil RICO provisions, §772. 104, Fla. Stat.; and other inter alia causes.1
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. This action is proper in a United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331,
2
because United States District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over federal claims,
and 28 U.S.C. §1367, which provides this Court authority to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
to adjudicate state law claims alleged.
3. This action is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because: (a) a substantial part of Defendants' illegal conduct
and the events giving rise to Mr. LAWRENCE'S clams occurred in the Southern District of
Florida; and (b) Defendants transact substantial business and may otherwise be found in the
Southern District of Florida.
THE PARTIES
4. Plaintiff, STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE, is a resident of the state of Florida,
domiciled with the Southern District of Florida.
1
Plaintiff will file Exhibits reference in this Complaint under separate cover.
2
Plaintiff asserts that there is no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) for the claims in this complaint In re
Boone, 52 F. 3d 958, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1995). To the extent this Court rules otherwise in part or in whole then: (1) the
right to jury trial is still invoked and no consent is given to have such jury trial conducted in bankruptcy court; Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9015; (2) Plaintiff will proceed with same claims where directed but without waiver of any rights respecting
such designation or otherwise; (3) Plaintiff does not consent to bankruptcy adjudication over non-core "related to"
claims; 28 U.S.C. §157(c)(1), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9033; and (4) to extent necessary, and without waiver of any rights,
Plaintiff invokes 28 U.S.C. §1631 to ensure complaint (or appropriate) part thereof is routed to appropriate venue.
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5. Defendant, BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC. is a Delaware corporation, doing
business in New York and Florida.
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and upon that information and belief, states that
Defendants DANIEL TAUB and MARK LEHMAN are senior managing directors of BEAR
STEARNS and reside in New York and participated in illegal acts on behalf of BEAR STEARNS
and with the approval and consent of BEAR STEARNS in the States of Florida and New York.
Defendant CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC., is a Florida profit corporation.
Defendant ALAN L. GOLDBERG, is a Florida resident, is associated with CRISIS
MANAGEMENT and participated in illegal acts along with and with the approval and consent of
CRISIS MANAGEMENT in Florida and New York.
9. Defendant BERGER SINGERMAN, P. A. ("BERGER") is a Florida Professional
association which represents GOLDBERG.
10. Plaintiff states that Defendants PAUL S. SINGERMAN, JAMES H. FIERBERG,
PAUL AVRON, are attorneys at BERGER, are believed to reside in Florida, and participated in
illegal acts on behalf of BERGER and with the approval and consent of BERGER in the States of
Florida and New York.
11. Defendant MELAND RUSSIN & BUDWICK, P. A. ("MELAND") is a Florida
Professional Association which represents GOLDBERG.
Defendant MICHAEL BUDWICK is an attorney at MELAND and resides in Florida and
participated in illegal acts on behalf of MELAND and with the approval and consent of MELAND
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in Florida and New York.
13. Defendant MARK D. COHEN, P. A., is a Florida Professional Association which
represents BEAR STEARNS. Plaintiff is informed and believes and upon that information and
belief, states that Defendant MARK D. COHEN, is an attorney at MARK D. COHEN, P. A., and
resides in Florida and participated in illegal acts on behalf of and with the approval and consent of
MARK D. COHEN, P. A., in the States of Florida and New York.
14. Defendant COUDERT BROTHERS ("COUDERT") is a law firm with offices in
New York and other locations in the United States, and overseas which represented BEAR
STEARNS and ostensibly represented GOLDBERG.
Defendant EDWARD H. TILLINGHAST, III, is a resident of New York and a partner at
COUDERT and participated in illegal acts on behalf of COUDERT and with the approval and
consent of COUDERT, including within the State of Florida.
Defendant INTERFOR, INC., is a New York Corporation owned all or in part by JUVAL AVIV
(jointly "AVIV"). INTERFOR represented BEAR STEARNS and ostensibly GOLDBERG.
Defendant JUVAL AVIV resides in New York and participated in illegal acts on behalf of
INTERFOR and with the approval and consent of INTERFOR in Florida and New York.
18. Other defendants, excluding HOWARD KAHN, and KAHN ZUCKERMAN, P. A.,
are JOHN DOES who either worked with or for the Defendants respecting the claims in this
Complaint.
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
19. BEAR STEARNS is a major brokerage house doing business throughout the United
States. Europe and the Far East. A substantial part of their business is conducted by their specialist
clearance unit, which unit clears on and off exchange trades for other brokerage houses,
professional traders, and trading firms.
20. LAWRENCE and his associated companies conducted professional trading on
various exchanges and were a major multi-million dollar client of BEAR STEARNS' specialist
clearance unit during the 1980's. LAWRENCE and his companies did not have public customers or
public capital. LAWRENCE was never employed by BEAR STEARNS.
A. Background Litigation Events
21. In early 1993, BEAR STEARNS obtained a final federal judgment against
LAWRENCE based on brokerage industry arbitration proceedings, forced on LAWRENCE, which
resulted from a plain margin dispute occurring as a result of the stock market crash of 1987.
22. An issue in the arbitration was LAWRENCE'S entitlement to a share of profits
made in a special "liquidation account" set up by BEAR STEARNS' to liquidate several client
accounts, including LAWRENCE'S. LAWRENCE'S trading positions had been unilaterally
journaled into that account and BEAR STEARNS later claimed, after profitability was established
in the account, that LAWRENCE had no entitlement to any share of those profits that accrued from
his journaled trading positions, notwithstanding a statement by the Options Clearing Corporation
that they had no record of those trades. This issue was resolved by the arbitration panel, in favor of
BEAR STEARNS. BEAR STEARNS made no allegations of fraud against LAWRENCE.
23. In early 1991, LAWRENCE established a trust, outside of the United States, the
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LAWRENCE INTERVIVOS FAMILY TRUST (the 'TRUST"), with his own capital. Most of the
beneficiaries were non U. S. citizens and/or residents, and LAWRENCE, an initial Trust
beneficiary, was removed as a beneficiary in 1995.
24. In October of 1995, BEAR STEARNS filed a motion in Pompano Windy City
Partners v. Bear Stearns & Co., Case No. 93-6489-CIV-KING against LAWRENCE alone to set
aside as a fraudulent conveyance LAWRENCE'S January 1991 transfer of assets to settle the
TRUST, Id. DI 42. The district court ruled that the TRUST had to be interpleaded in order to set
aside the transfer to the TRUST, Id. DE's 101, 111. In November, 1996 BEAR STEARNS sought
to interplead the TRUST, id. DE 126, which motion was granted, DE 186.
25. The TRUST was governed by Florida Law. Accordingly, Florida law required
either a fraudulent conveyance action or attachment. Defendants knew that Florida law required
either a fraudulent conveyance action or attachment and Defendants sought to circumvent such
requirements.
B. The Association Of The Defendants And Their Actions
26. On June 12, 1997. LAWRENCE filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Southern
District of Florida and GOLDBERG (in association with CRISIS MANAGEMENT) was
appointed as trustee for the Estate. Shortly after his appointment as trustee, GOLDBERG retained
BERGER SINGERMAN (then named BURGER, DAVIS & SINGERMAN) to represent the
Estate, and in late 1997 GOLDBERG retained MICHAEL BUDWICK (then associated with the
law firm of KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON) as co-counsel to represent the Estate.
27. The herein claims are against GOLDBERG personally and not in his official
capacity as Chapter 7 trustee, no claim is presented against the Estate.
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sometime in late 1997, GOLDBERG, BERGER, and at some point BUDWICK, entered into an
informal undisclosed agreement with BEAR STEARNS where BEAR STEARNS made sufficient
promises to those parties that it would pay their fees, such that those parties went forward with
representation of the Estate.
BEAR STEARNS made a payment to BERGER at some time in 1997.
30. In 1997 or early 1998, GOLDBERG, BERGER, and BUDWICK willfully,
knowingly, and with fraudulent intent, agreed to perform services directly for BEAR STEARNS,
or for parties acting on behalf of BEAR STEARNS, outside the scope of their duties to the Estate.
These services included the commission of tortious and/or unlawful acts, to include concealing
those acts, as more fully described in this Complaint.
31. In early May 1998, JAMES H. FIERBERG executed a sworn affidavit (the
"FIERBERG Affidavit") in which he stated that: "it was disclosed to the undersigned that since
February 20, 1998, the Debtor, STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE has been engaged in a systematic
pattern of corrupt persuasion, intimidation and threat designed to induce" witnesses to give false
testimony. He accused LAWRENCE of using the 14 year old child of a witness to make threats in
furtherance of the alleged witness tampering.
32. The FIERBERG Affidavit was part of a motion signed by Mr. FIERBERG (the
"FIERBERG Motion") that was filed under seal in the bankruptcy court, in early May, 1998. Mr.
FIERBERG, in his motion, alleged that the testimony LAWRENCE sought to tamper with was
critical to then pending court natters. His motion states: "Many of the allegations which the Trustee
has asserted and which form the substantive basis for the Complaint and the Objection, arise from
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the testimony of Valerie Bach," a witness LAWRENCE allegedly tampered with.
33. The FIERBERG Motion and Affidavit were filed under seal in the bankruptcy court
and were not docketed at that time, and remained undocketed for at least six more years. Those
court papers were never served by GOLDBERG on LAWRENCE or his attorneys. A hearing,
believed to be unrecorded, was held on May 7, 1998 on the matters raised by FIERBERG and upon
information and belief, hearsay testimony and/or evidence was presented against Lawrence.
34. LAWRENCE first learned of the FIERBERG court papers and May 7, 1998
hearing in early 2006.
35. The FIERBERG Motion sought permission to hire private investigator WILLIAM
H. RILEY to investigate Mr. FIERBERG'S allegations, and requested that the motion be sealed
from LAWRENCE, "to prevent STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE and/or his agents from further
compromising the official processes of this Court.”
36. Mr. FIERBERG'S affidavit was knowingly and deliberately misleading, false, and
perjured, and its filing was known about by GOLDBERG, BUDWICK. COHEN, BEAR
STEARNS, HOWARD KAHN, and KAHN ZUCKERMAN, P. A.
37. The FIERBERG Motion and Affidavit were filed to further the Defendants'
ongoing efforts to commit the tortious and unlawful acts described in this Complaint; and the filing
without disclosure to LAWRENCE, was intended to prevent LAWRENCE from knowing who was
accusing him, what he was being accused of, so that he would be unable to defend himself, and to
prejudice him in further court proceedings without his knowledge and in other ways.
38. Plaintiff is informed and believes and upon that information and belief, states that P.
I. RILEY was never retained by the Estate.
39. After the FIERBERG motion and related court papers were filed in early May,
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1998, there are no other court papers on the docket concerning P. I. RILEY.
40. The docket shows no requests for approval of fee payments to P. I. RILEY,
disclosures of the work he did, or other court filings indicating his employment.
BEAR STEARNS agreed to pay P. I. RILEY's fees in early May, 1998 (or before), retained him,
and made one or more fee payments directly to P. I. RILEY.
42. BEAR STEARNS was a client of P. I. RILEY.
BEAR STEARNS obtained information from P. I. RILEY's investigations.
information BEAR STEARNS obtained from P. I. RILEY contradicted allegations made in the
FIERBERG Motion and/or Affidavit.
GOLDBERG obtained information from P. I. RILEY's investigations.
information GOLDBERG obtained from P. I. RILEY contradicted allegations made in the
FIERBERG Motion and/or Affidavit.
none of the alleged witnesses to the alleged witness tampering and/or the obstruction of justice,
ever executed or gave any sworn testimony in support those allegations.
48. Until at least late 2005, GOLDBERG made affirmative statements in his court
papers, including in filings in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to the effect that there were
no sealed bankruptcy court papers before 2000.
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49. Said misrepresentations were made with malice, deliberate, knowing, fraudulent,
and willful intent to keep disclosure of the FIERBERG Motion and Affidavit from LAWRENCE,
and in furtherance of the Defendants' tortious and unlawful activities.
50. In late July, 1998, hearing was held, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b), in the proceeding on
GOLDBERG'S complaint objecting to LAWRENCE'S chapter 7 discharge. As a result of the
hearing, the bankruptcy court entered a default sanction order on September 23, 1998, against
LAWRENCE denying him his discharge.
51. On July 14. 1999, GOLDBERG filed a motion seeking turn-over of the TRUST'S
assets by LAWRENCE, based on the "res judicata" effect of the September 1998 discharge order
and the bankruptcy record, and a turn over order was issued on August 26, 1999, on those grounds.
On September 8, 1999, LAWRENCE was held in civil contempt of court for his failure to comply
with the turn over order.
C. The Unlawful Electronic Communications Surveillance Of Lawrence And His

Attorneys By The Defendants, And Related Matters
52. In late January, 2000 GOLDBERG filed another motion under seal, without notice
or disclosure to LAWRENCE and his attorneys, where he sought permission to retain defendants
INTERFOR and JUVAL AVIV for investigative services respecting GOLDBERG'S allegations
that LAWRENCE was actively concealing and managing hidden assets, and in support of the
August 1999 turn over order.
53. The order granting GOLDBERG permission for the Estate to retain P. I. AVIV, had
as a required condition to that retention, that P. I. AVIV was to later comply with the reporting
requirements of 11 U.S.C. §330, which section and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016, requires P. I. AVIV to file
an application for fee payments in which he discloses the work he has done for the Estate along
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with his billing statements, and to serve the application on the U. S. Trustee; after hearing, the
bankruptcy court would then issue an order authorizing the final fee amount due to P. I. AVIV.
54. P. I. AVIV, in his sworn affidavit accompanying GOLDBERG'S motion to retain
him, stated that neither he "nor INTERFOR, INC. has rendered or will render investigative
services on behalf of any other entity [then the Estate] in connection with this case. " Thereby, he
swore that he was not and would not represent BEAR STEARNS in this bankruptcy case.
55. P. I. AVIV never submitted a fee application to the bankruptcy court so the
requirements of both 11 U.S.C. §330 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016 were never met.
56. Upon information and belief, P. I. AVIV's fee statements show that BEAR
STEARNS was his client on matters concerning the bankruptcy estate.
57. BEAR STEARNS made payments to P. I. AVIV.
58. The failure of P. I. AVIV to submit fee applications and billing statements to the
bankruptcy court, under 11 U.S.C. §330 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016, and the filing of his false
affidavit were done with knowing, fraudulent, and willful intent to conceal his relationship with
BEAR STEARNS and his role in furtherance of the Defendants" tortious and unlawful activities,
and his continued failure to file or otherwise disclose his billing statements constitutes ongoing
concealment.
59. On September 28, 2000, P. I. AVIV executed a sworn affidavit (the "AVIV
Affidavit"), that stated that LAWRENCE was managing secret international trading and bank
accounts from his home, and that he (P. I. AVIV) had located certain British bank accounts, that
belonged to and were managed by LAWRENCE, and which bank accounts contained millions of
dollars, and he further stated that his sources of information for the affidavit were multiple
unnamed confidential informants, and defendants SINGERMAN and FIERBERG.
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60. The address used as LAWRENCE'S domicile in the affidavit (where
LAWRENCE'S alleged activities were conducted) was not LAWRENCE'S address.
61. The AVIV affidavit was filed under seal with the bankruptcy court.
62. The sealed AVIV affidavit was not docketed.
63. The sealing of the AVIV affidavit was later confirmed by the bankruptcy court at a
hearing held on June 17, 2004.
64. P. I. AVIV's Affidavit was knowingly and deliberately misleading and false, and
was filed in furtherance of the Defendants' ongoing scheme to commit the tortious and unlawful
acts described in this Complaint.
65. On August 21. 2000, GOLDBERG filed another sealed motion to obtain
permission for the Estate to retain the law firm COUDERT BROTHERS, without notice or
disclosure to LAWRENCE and his attorney. The proposed retention was for COUDERT to
perform legal work for the Estate towards recovering alleged assets that LAWRENCE was
accused of hiding, and in support of the August 1999 turn over order.
66. The COUDERT retention motion was immediately granted, and an order
authorizing the Estate to retain COUDERT was issued; that order called for COUDERT to comply
with Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016 and to file a final fee application, and COUDERT was required to also
comply with 11 U.S.C. §327, 330.
67. COUDERT, after authorization for its retention was approved, never filed with the
court a fee application, never served the U. S. Trustee with its billing statements, and never
obtained an order approving the actual payments it received.
68. Payment for COUDERT's work for the Estate was made by BEAR STEARNS
under a July 31, 1998 court approved financing agreement where BEAR STEARNS agreed to
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advance to the Estate all funds needed to pay Estate expenses and to be paid back from recovered
Estate assets, if any.
69. The BEAR STEARNS financing agreement order did not waive the reporting and
disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§327, 330, and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016. BEAR STEARNS, in
all financing matters, retained the power to cancel future financing payments, if it saw fit to do so.
70. Neither the BEAR STEARNS financing agreement nor order contemplated
payments to other Defendants for any services provided by those other Defendants to BEAR
STEARNS.
71. GOLDBERG never listed any fee payments by BEAR STEARNS to any other
Defendants, as an obligation of the Estate to BEAR STEARNS.
72. Such payments as described in afore would constitute a fraud on the Estate because
they become funds owed by the Estate to BEAR STEARNS under the agreement.
73. COUDERT BROTHERS partner, EDWARD TILLINGHAST. III, in a sworn
affidavit attached to the COUDERT retention motion, stated that COUDERT had in the past
represented and may in the future represent BEAR STEARNS “in matters unrelated to the matters
in which the Trustee seeks to retain COUDERT BROTHERS in this chapter 7 case.”
74. The TILLINGHAST Affidavit also stated that prior approval of the court would be
sought if the matters on which it represents any entities, other than the Estate, changed to include
matters on which COUDERT was representing the Estate. COUDERT never filed such a conflict
notice or such a request for approval from the court.
75. COUDERT first filed its billing statements under seal in early 2003, even though its
retention order required COUDERT to file billing statements with the court within 10 days of
receipt of payment. The COUDERT billing statements and payments first began in 2000.
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76. The January 31, 2001 COUDERT billing statement, identified BEAR STEARNS
as a COUDERT client in the same matters that COUDERT was representing the Estate on. The first
page of that billing statement stated: "FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED to ALAN
GOLDBERG, as chapter 7 Trustee, and to BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC., in connection with the
above referenced matter [In re: STEPHAN J. LAWRENCE]. " The prior November 16, 2000,
billing statement only identified the Estate as COUDERT's client.
77. The COUDERT billing statements show that BEAR STEARNS and the other
Defendants participated in various strategy and other litigation related sessions throughout the
period from August 2000 to the end of 2002.
78. COUDERT's concealment of its representation of BEAR STEARNS on bankruptcy
matters (by withholding its billing statements and failing to correct its false filed disclosures), were
undertaken with knowing and deliberate intent and malice in furtherance of the Defendants'
ongoing scheme to commit the tortious and unlawful acts described in this complaint, including
ongoing concealment of those acts.
79. The BEAR STEARNS financing agreement, ostensibly used to pay COUDERT and
other defendants, was a fraudulent smoke-screen that the Defendants used to further cover-up their
tortious and illegal acts. The Defendants conspired and knowingly intended to make it appear that
GOLDBERG, and the ostensible representatives of the Estate, were not performing services for
BEAR STEARNS, including the tortious and illegal acts alleged in this Complaint, which acts
included knowingly and intentionally defrauding the Government of law enforcement tapes of
LAWRENCE'S phone communications at the FDC Miami (and other information) to: illegally spy
on LAWRENCE and the other victims he spoke to on the phone, for private commercial and
financial gain and debt-collection purposes and to snoop on his private personal life, all for
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blackmail and extortionate purposes, to gain advantage in pending federal and Florida State court
civil litigation, and to conceal their illegal acts as long as possible so as to prevent disclosure of
those acts, to deprive LAWRENCE of defenses to his incarceration and in other proceedings, to
tortiously and illegally exploit his incarceration, and for other tortious and illegal purposes.
80. LAWRENCE and his attorneys did not have access to (and were never
served with) any of the sealed record until after that record, on motion by LAWRENCE, was
ordered unsealed on August 17, 2004. after LAWRENCE's previous requests to the court for that
access had been denied.
81. Years later, at a bankruptcy court hearing held on June 17, 2004. Defendant
BUDWICK was placed under oath and asked if he could testify that he knew LAWRENCE did not
have any hidden assets, his response was: "I could not testify to that effect because I do not know
one way or the other whether or not he has hidden bank or stock accounts. " (Transcript p.55, ln.19
to p.57 ln.3).
82. GOLDBERG has admitted in pleadings he filed in late of 2004, that he never
recovered the secret accounts or assets he alleged LAWRENCE had.
83. GOLDBERG he has never filed in a U. S. Court or produced to LAWRENCE, the
alleged British (and other) account statements and supporting documents that he previously
contended proved his charges against LAWRENCE that he had hidden accounts and other assets.
84. At some time in mid to late 2001, P. I. AVIV either resigned or was fired. He was
replaced with a new investigator, JOHN FEATHERLY, who began his investigation from scratch.
85. P. I. FEATHERLY was retained and paid by BEAR STEARNS, and he also did not
submit a fee application, nor comply with 11 U.S.C. §330 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016.
86. On November 7, 2000, GOLDBERG filed a motion under seal seeking to order the
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FDC Miami to provide him with tapes of LAWRENCE'S phone calls at the FDC Miami, phone
logs, and other information maintained by the FDC Miami, where LAWRENCE had been
incarcerated on September 15, 2000. The stated purpose of the request was to obtain more
information on LAWRENCE'S alleged ongoing activities to hide assets, and to enforce the turn
over order. The motion sought secrecy because it alleged that LAWRENCE "continues to attempt
to thwart this Court's process." The motion further alleged that LAWRENCE was "actively trading
on international markets and that he has been doing so by and through, among other methods, third
party nominees with whom the Debtor nay be contacting from the FDC." The motion further stated
that GOLDBERG sought to identify “the methods by which the Debtor is moving funds."
87. Bases for the November 7, 2000 motion were the bankruptcy record, and
investigations of his "representatives, " hired under seal. Allegations in the motion were previously
made in the 1998 sealed FIERBERG court papers (which papers accused LAWRENCE of
intending to obstruct justice and to continue his hiding of assets), and the AVIV Affidavit.
88. On November 16. 2000, an off-docket closed hearing ('TAPE HEARING 1") was
held on the November 7, 2000 motion, without the knowledge of LAWRENCE or his attorney. The
hearing was attended by GOLDBERG (represented by defendants JAMES FIERBERG and PAUL
AVRON), the U. S. Attorney's Office ("USAO"), and the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("FBOP"). At
the hearing, the Government objected to providing tapes of LAWRENCE'S phone calls at the FDC
Miami, as being in violation of Title III (the "Wiretap Act" 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2522) and on privacy
grounds.
89. At the specific request of the attending parties. TAPE HEARING 1 and three
subsequent closed hearings were kept off of the court docket because of the stated fear that
“hearing[s] like this... might become public.”
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90. At TAPE HEARING 1, the Government stated: "[Compliance with the Trustee's
request would violate... Title 3 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 found
at 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510 through 2522[. J" 'The Government... does not have the authority to
disclose these records outside the Bureau of Prisons because the Bureau of Prisons has authority
pursuant to an exception to Title 3, which is basically the statute governing wire taps, and Title 3
excludes the interception of phone conversations through electronic means when said
conversations are intercepted by law enforcement officials in the ordinary course of their duties.
Under this very narrow exception the Bureau of Prisons records all inmate telephone conversations
and the Bureau does not feel that it's authorized to release these to a third party[.]"
91. After TAPE HEARING 1 did not resolve GOLDBERG'S request for phone tapes,
the Government still refused to provide GOLDBERG with the phone tapes and other requested
information.
92. On December 4, 2000, GOLDBERG filed a second sealed motion [CP 1074 in the
bankruptcy case] in further support of his November 7 motion. The December 4 motion stated that
GOLDBERG (through Defendant FIERBERG) had referred LAWRENCE to the USAO for
prosecution on the same matters for which he was seeking the tapes and that the tapes will also
“support a criminal prosecution for bankruptcy fraud[. ]" The two tape motions made it clear that
the tapes (and other information) would he used by P. I. AVIV and COUDERT in the matters they
were working on.
93. Attached to the December 4 motion was a copy of an FDC phone call log for
LAWRENCE [CP 1074 Exhibit A], which log showed the phone numbers LAWRENCE called,
when the calls were made, and the length of the calls.
94. Included in the log were entries for LAWRENCE'S calls (including the phone
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numbers) to both his appellate attorney, Ronald Neiwirth, and the attorney for the probate estate of
LAWRENCE'S late mother, Fredrica Lawrence.
95. At that time the Motion was filed, both GOLDBERG and BEAR STEARNS were
involved in Florida state court civil litigation with the probate estate on matters related to the
bankruptcy proceedings, and LAWRENCE had a pending appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals with Mr. Neiwirth as his appellate counsel.
96. GOLDBERG knew, from the FDC Miami phone logs he obtained, that he was
requesting LAWRENCE'S phone tapes of attorney-client communications, and he later obtained
access to tapes of LAWRENCE'S attorney-client phone calls.
97. A second undocketed closed hearing was held on December 5, 2000, on Tape
Motions 1 & 2 ('TAPE HEARING 2"), which was attended by the parties attending TAPE
HEARING 1.
98. At TAPE HEARING 2, even though GOLDBERG had referred LAWRENCE for
prosecution, the Government maintained their same objections to providing GOLDBERG with
LAWRENCE'S FDC Miami phone tapes (and other information), including their objection that
GOLDBERG and his representatives were not authorized "law enforcement officials" operating “in
the ordinary course of their duties” (see November 16, 2000, transcript at p.18 ln.25 to p.19 ln. 2,
and December 5, 2000 transcript at pp. 8, 17, 23).
99. At both TAPE HEARING 1 & 2, the Government rejected GOLDBERG'S legal
argument that LAWRENCE had consented to GOLDBERG obtaining his (LAWRENCE's) phone
tapes. First, the Government stated that the scope of inmate "consent'" to phone recording at the
FBOP was limited to and only "for purposes of the Bureau of Prisons law enforcement objectives"
(see November 16, 2000 transcript at p. 14 ln. 25 to p. 15 ln. 3, and December 5, 2000 transcript at
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p. 23 lns. 11-16). Second, the Government reviewed the "consent" cases that GOLDBERG cited to
in his Tape Motion 2, and determined that those cases did not apply to GOLDBERG because they
involved the Government using prison phone tapes in criminal proceedings which falls within the
limited scope of an inmate's consent to phone recording in an FBOP facility (December 5, 2000
transcript at p. 22 ln. 25 to p. 23 ln. 18, pp. 7-8, 17).
100. At some time after receiving some phone tapes from the United States, Mr.
FIERBERG executed a sworn affidavit and/or witness statement in connection with litigation in
Europe.
101. At some time after receiving some phone tapes from the United States, P. I. AVIV
executed a sworn affidavit and/or witness statement in connection with litigation in Europe.
102. The attorney who argued GOLDBERG'S Title III "consent" argument, at TAPE
HEARING 2 was PAUL AVRON, who never obtained a Title III order authorizing surveillance by
a trustee in a bankruptcy case or found such a bankruptcy case in his research, nor has he ever
before argued that matter in another bankruptcy case.
103. Through the end of 2004, GOLDBERG did not inform the Government that BEAR
STEARNS was to be provided and was in fact provided with access to the phone tapes that
GOLDBERG received. On information and belief GOLDBERG has never informed the
Government of said information.
104. The COUDERT billing statements show that COUDERT conducted no research on
Title III respecting the FDC Miami phone tapes, and COUDERT knew or should have known the
substance of the Government's objections to providing them with law enforcement tapes and they
made no effort to inform the Government that they would be providing and/or discussing the
contents of those tapes with BEAR STEARNS, or that BEAR STEARNS was a client concerning
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that matter. COUDERT relied on GOLDBERG'S attorneys for their legal advice on Title III
matters in this case.
105. Other Defendants did not inform the Government that BEAR STEARNS was to be
provided and was in fact provided with access to the phone tapes that GOLDBERG received.
106. Defendants BEAR STEARNS and COHEN knew or should have known the
substance of the Government's objections to providing GOLDBERG, COUDERT, and P. I. AVIV
with law enforcement tapes and never disclosed to the Government that they would be obtaining,
and did so obtain, access to the contents of those tapes.
107. Defendants BEAR STEARNS and COHEN knew that the Government was not
informed that they (BEAR STEARNS and COHEN) would be obtaining access to the contents of
the FDC Miami law enforcement tapes.
108. The Defendants, individually, received originals and/or copies of the FDC Miami
phone tapes.
109. Defendants BEAR STEARNS and COHEN never researched Title III matters, and
they relied on GOLDBERG'S attorneys for their legal advice on Title III matters in this case.
110. At TAPE HEARING 1, the court expressed uncertainty as to whether the Trustee's
motion should be granted and postponed decision on the issue. At TAPE HEARING 2, the
bankruptcy court stated that "one of the things that we don't do in Bankruptcy Court, of course, is
criminal matters[.]" (December 5, 2000 transcript at p. 20 lns. 3-5).
111. When the court asked Mr. FIERBERG: “Mr. FIERBERG, if you had this order
from this court, ex parte order, at some point LAWRENCE and his counsel may learn of course of
the order, and I'm wondering if you're concerned that you may have any exposure in that regard?"
Mr. FIERBERG responded: "the Trustee is willing to take the risk and the responsibility for his
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action." (December 5, 2000 transcript at p. 22 lns. 1-19)
112. All Defendants knew or should have known that the Government and well settled
case law did not support their position that they could obtain the FDC Miami phone tapes, and that
by not disclosing that BEAR STEARNS was to obtain and did so obtain access to the contents of
the FDC Miami law enforcement tapes they were withholding material information that was
relevant to identifying illegal and tortious actions on their part.
113. The Government questioned the authority of a bankruptcy judge to issue Title III
orders (November 16, 2000 transcript at p. 30 lns. 12-17).
114. GOLDBERG, argued that the FDC Miami phone tapes would play a crucial role in
proving LAWRENCE was hiding assets and in obtaining those assets. December 5, 2000 transcript
at p. 1 lns. 3-19.
115. The Motions to obtain LAWRENCE'S phone tapes and other information from the
FDC Miami was granted, and the FDC Miami was ordered to save past and future phone tapes of
LAWRENCE'S phone calls and to provide GOLDBERG unrestricted access to those tapes, with
no provision for screening out any category of calls [Bankruptcy CP 1088].
116. Defendants GOLDBERG, BERGER, and FIERBERG, admitted in an April 20,
2006 pleading filed by GOLDBERG in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, that they had shared
the contents of the FDC Miami phone tapes with BEAR STEARNS for their own unrestricted use.
See April 20, 2006 pleading at page 6 ¶6.
117. In the April 20. 2006 pleading, Defendant FIERBERG (using the term “the
discovery" as substitute for "FDC Miami phone tapes") stated: "Since Title III is inapposite...,
sharing the contents of the discovery obtained by court order with LAWRENCE'S largest creditor
--BEAR STEARNS & CO. — who is underwriting the Trustee's efforts... and investigators
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retained by the Trustee... was entirely appropriate so that they could determine what, if anything, in
the discovery obtained might be useful to them."
118. On December 28, 2000, after GOLDBERG obtained LAWRENCE'S prior phone
tapes (and some undisclosed records) from the FDC Miami, a third off-docket closed hearing was
held. At the hearing Mr. FIERBERG sought an extension of the first tape order and he disclosed at
the hearing his version of the purported contents of LAWRENCE'S phone tapes and their
relevance to the turn over and British proceedings. December 28, 2000 transcript at p.5 ln.23 to
p.8 ln.17.
119. P. I. AVIV, who attended the hearing telephonically, also reported on his review of
the phone tapes contents and concluded that they were important to GOLDBERG'S case against
LAWRENCE. P. I. AVIV also indicated that he had received “records of the accounts," he alleged
belonged to LAWRENCE. But those alleged records were never introduced into evidence nor did
GOLDBERG later provide them to LAWRENCE, despite his requests.
120. At no time were the tapes sealed or played in court, or were tape transcripts ever
introduced into evidence. When the purported contents of the tapes were presented in court by
GOLDBERG they were not introduced by a witness under oath.
121. On January 17, 2001, a 40-day "extension" order to the original December 2000
tape order was issued [Bankruptcy CP 1093].
122. There was no order from a court of competent jurisdiction, authorizing the use of
the contents of phone tapes in any United States court.
123. On February 1, 2001 another off-docket hearing was held in which GOLDBERG
contended that LAWRENCE'S phone tapes were useful and the bankruptcy court thereupon issued
a further "extension" order [Bankruptcy CP 1107] to the original tape order for three months.
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124. On May 2, 2001, upon GOLDBERG*s sealed motion, another "extension" order to
the original tape order was issued to further extend that order for two more months [Bankruptcy CP
1107].
125. In none of the sealed motions filed by GOLDBERG to obtain LAWRENCE'S FDC
Miami phone tapes and in none of the closed hearings held in 2000-2001 did he disclose that
BEAR STEARNS would be given access to or had obtained access to the contents of FDC Miami
phone tapes.
126. None of the Defendants ever disclosed to the USAO or FBOP that BEAR
STEARNS would be given access to or had obtained the contents of FDC Miami phone tapes.
127. BEAR STEARNS, in addition to being provided with contents of the phone tapes
by Defendant FIERBERG, also received copies of FDC Miami phone tapes from either
FIERBERG or one or more other defendants.
128. In court pleading dated November 21, 2005 (at page 2, paragraph 3), GOLBERG
stated that: “the Trustee was in error in stating that the tape recordings had been used in connection
with the proceedings in London, England.”
129. The Government was not a party to the LAWRENCE bankruptcy case, except to
appear on behalf of the FDC Miami at the closed hearings, and so stated at those hearings.
130. GOLDBERG, as a chapter 7 trustee, is not an "investigative or law enforcement
officer,” as defined under 18 U.S.C. §2510(7).
131. It is not appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of a chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee to have the Government disclose to him the contents of law enforcement tapes
made by the Government for prison security purposes.
132. The Defendants obtained the contents of LAWRENCE'S attorney-client phone
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conversations in which the discussed topics were: litigation and appellate strategy on pending
bankruptcy matters, other aspects of the bankruptcy case including relevant pre-bankruptcy
events, and other matters including concerning pending Florida state court litigation involving
GOLDBERG and BEAR STEARNS.
133. Mr. Ronald Neiwirth. LAWRENCE'S appellate attorney while the phone taping
was occurring stated in a letter to LAWRENCE dated September 21, 2005 that he never knew that
tapes of his FDC Miami phone calls with LAWRENCE had been provided to GOLDBERG and
that he did not consent to that eavesdropping.
134. The Defendants, by monitoring LAWRENCE'S phone communications, were able
to see if LAWRENCE knew about the closed hearings and their phone monitoring. That
information was useful to determining the risk of exposure of their tortious and illegal acts and to
making decisions on how to continue with those acts, including the continuing concealment
thereof from LAWRENCE and the Government.
135. Mr. Neiwirth's law firm, besides representing LAWRENCE, also represented
BEAR STEARNS at all relevant tines (including when the taping was occurring).
136. BEAR STEARNS, by obtaining unrestricted access to the contents of tapes of
LAWRENCE'S phone calls with Mr. Neiwirth, monitored the performance of their own law firm
in its representation of LAWRENCE without LAWRENCE'S or Mr. Neiwirth's knowledge thereof.
137. At no time did BEAR STEARNS inform LAWRENCE or Mr. Neiwirth of the
phone monitoring.
138. BEAR STEARNS never waived the conflict Mr. Neiwirth's law firm had in
simultaneously representing BEAR STEARNS and LAWRENCE.
139. After LAWRENCE obtained access to some of the sealed record, GOLDBERG
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used some of the purported contents of LAWRENCE'S phone tapes in various pleadings outside of
bankruptcy court, in late 2004 and 2005.
140. GOLDBERG never obtained a court order from a judge of competent jurisdiction
(as defined in 18 U.S.C. §2510(9)(a)), permitting him to use the contents of the FDC Miami tapes
in any court proceedings.
141. The Defendants knew that the parties LAWRENCE spoke to in his phone calls at
the FDC Miami: did not sign Government forms consenting to the taping of their conversations,
did not receive warnings during their calls with LAWRENCE that they were consenting to their
taping or even being taped, and were not otherwise individually notified by the FBOP that their
phone conversations were being taped.
142. The Defendants seek to confirm with those parties if they knew they were being
taped or that the contents of their phone conversations with LAWRENCE were being provided to
the Defendants.
143. The Defendants knew that the parties LAWRENCE spoke to on the phone at the
FDC Miami did not give their consent to their taping and did not consent to GOLDBERG and
other Defendants obtaining the contents and/or listening to those conversations.
144. The Defendants knew: (1) that LAWRENCE had not signed a consent form in 2000
or 2001; (2) that the notice on inmate phones states that monitoring is “pursuant to Bureau of
Prisons inmate telephone regulations”; (3) that within the constraints imposed by innate telephone
regulations, the FDC Miami's interpretation of its own facility-wide procedures is binding [28 C. F.
R. 540. 102]; and (4) that inmate telephone regulations require special screening of "consensual"
taping of attorney-client communications "[to protect the attorney-client privilege and to ensure
that the [criminal] investigation is not compromised by exposure to privileged material relating to
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the investigation or to defense strategy. " [28 C. F. R. §500-50l].
145. LAWRENCE never consented to waiving his attorney-client privileges, any other
privileges, or his statutory, constitutional, or other rights, concerning all phone calls with his
attorneys and otherwise.
146. LAWRENCE did not consent to either the taping of the subject phone calls, or to
GOLDBERG and/or other Defendants obtaining the contents (as defined in Title III) of said
conversations.
147. The intentional failure of GOLDBERG and BERGER to serve or otherwise notice
LAWRENCE of GOLDBERG'S motions to obtain LAWRENCE'S phone tapes, or to inform him
before his phone tapes were used in court (and otherwise) and thereafter, even after the tape orders
expired, were part of a deliberate scheme to fraudulently and illegally deprive LAWRENCE of his
rights, including appellate rights. Same and other related actions identified herein were malicious,
calculated, and deliberate actions by the Defendants for the purposes of committing criminal
and/or tortious acts in violation of the Constitution, federal laws and regulations, and Florida State
laws, including to improperly obstruct, impede, interfere with, influence, misuse a duly notarized
criminal investigation, including to improperly prevent or preclude such investigation(s).
148. Defendants, individually, knew that a bankruptcy judge is not a "judge of
competent jurisdiction" under 18 U.S.C. §2510(9)(a) and had no authority to issue orders
governed by Title III, and therefore the orders they were seeking to obtain, and did so obtain, were
void ab initio and without authority.
149. Defendants knew that because LAWRENCE was not served or noticed with
GOLDBERG'S tape motions that those motions were void on due process grounds and well-
settled law and that LAWRENCE was deprived of his right to protect irretrievable substantive
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rights and privileges, including his attorney-client privilege and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel among other rights.
150. Subsequent to GOLDBERG first obtaining some subject FDC tapes, P. I. AVIV and
Mr. FIERBERG each produced a new sworn affidavit and/or witness statement for use in British
(and other) litigation, for which litigation GOLDBERG represented he needed the FDC tapes.
151. The same sworn affidavit/witness statements were created for the purpose of then
perpetuating Defendant's fraudulent actions and allegations by misusing and then misrepresenting
the status and results of British litigation while withholding filing same statements in federal court.
The Defendants have continued to withhold same statements from LAWRENCE, federal courts,
and the Government to perpetuate their tortious and criminal acts.
152. GOLDBERG was seeking in British court a "Mareva injunction,” which is a
prejudgment injunction remedy.
153. GOLDBERG later admitted in various federal court pleadings, that he did not have
a “money judgment,” an “executable judgment,” or an “enforceable money judgment” against
LAWRENCE (or any party including the TRUST).
154. LAWRENCE will be employing a law firm at reasonable attorneys' fees, and is
incurring costs to bring this action. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2520, 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) and/or
Florida Statutes 934. 10, LAWRENCE is entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys" fees and
costs from the Defendants.
155. Mr. FIERBERG, in an August 9, 2004 letter to Lawrence accompanying all of the
sealed records he said his office maintained, stated that: “these documents do not constitute the
complete sealed docket at the bankruptcy court.” Missing were his May 1998 sealed off-docket
court papers, and subsequently, GOLDBERG continued representing that no sealed court papers
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existed before 2000.
156. Same loss of critical documents was a part of the Defendants' ongoing scheme to
destroy, purge) and/or conceal material documents for purposes of obstructing and impeding court
proceedings, criminal investigation(s), and in furtherance of the other tortious and illegal acts
identified herein.
157. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on September 19, 2005, ruled that
Lawrence has an unrestricted right of access to the Court.
158. None of the Defendants sought legal advice on Florida wiretap statute section 934.
One of LAWRENCE'S phone log printouts was obtained before the first tape order and was
attached as part of Exhibit A to GOLDBERG'S December 4, 2000 motion to the Bankruptcy Court
10741.
159. The next day, at the December 5. 2000 closed hearing on same motion (from which
the initial tape order was issued) Mr. FIERBERG represented that both he and Mr. AVRON (also
in attendance) had not seen the very phone logs attached to same motion (December 5, 2000
transcript at p.5 lns. 16-17).
160. The phone logs contained information concerning who LAWRENCE was calling,
how long the conversations were, and where he was calling to, GOLDBERG used that information
in the closed proceedings in support of obtaining the FDC Miami tapes and to impute wrongdoing
to LAWRENCE (even though they knew the phone calls were only to relatives, friends, and
attorneys). GOLDBERG, BERGER, Mr. FIERBERG and Mr. AVRON deliberately and
intentionally used illegally obtained information from the phone logs, in violation of Title III and
for the tortious and illegal purposes described herein.
161. Upon information belief, GOLDBERG and/or other Defendants obtained all of
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LAWRENCE'S phone logs from September 2000 at least through mid 2001. Some or all of those
logs have been destroyed or purged from their possession, or otherwise concealed, in furtherance
of the tortious and illegal acts described herein.
162. The equipment used by the Government to transmit, acquire, and electronically
store the communications at issue in this complaint are configured so that said communications are
not readily accessible by the general public.
163. Defendants successfully obtained imprisonment of Plaintiff to pay debt, in
violation of Florida Constitutional and statutory protections prohibiting imprisonment for debt.
164. Defendants successfully obtained imprisonment of Plaintiff to pay an unlawful
and/or non-existent debt through the means asserted herein.
165. Defendants never obtained a money judgment against Plaintiff that would be
recognizable in any Florida Court or under Florida law.
166. Defendants, through the knowing, deliberate, tortious, and unlawful acts asserted
herein, and other still concealed acts, successfully blocked Plaintiff from access to federal and state
court, including denying him the rights to petition the court, to have his defenses heard and
adjudicated, and to have representation of counsel, in order to protect his substantive constitutional
and statutory rights.
167. Upon information and belief the acts described herein occurred in Florida and/or
New York.
168. Defendant’s acts as described herein led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s
constitutional right to travel outside the state of Florida, and his statutory right to obtain a passport.
169. Defendant’s acts, as described herein led to Plaintiff’s physical exclusion from
hearings affecting his substantive rights, over his objections, including when he was pro se.
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170. In addition to the assertions contained herein, all relevant acts by Defendants
precedent to this action were willful, knowing, intentional, and not undertaken in good faith.
171. Defendants were “complaining witnesses” for purposes of this Complaint.
172. Defendants were private actors for purposes of this Complaint.
173. All conditions precedents to this action have occurred, have been performed, or
have been waived.
COUNT I
ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
174. Plaintiff realleges and restates the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 173 as if
fully set forth again herein.
175. In late 2000, Defendants intended to and endeavored to intercept and/or to procure
the FDC Miami to intercept Lawrence's FDC Miami phone calls tapes on a contemporaneous and
future ongoing basis for the purposes of obtaining unrestricted access to all of Lawrence phone
calls as described above.
176. Both Lawrence and the parties he spoke to, who uttered oral communications that
were intercepted or intended to be intercepted by the Defendants, did not know or expect that their
wire, oral, and electronic communications would be intercepted by Defendants or on their behalf
or consent to interception, and had an expectation of privacy respecting the communications,
including but not limited to, the use such communications were put to.
177. Defendants, intentionally intercepted said communications in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2517, 2518, and sections 934.03, 934.08, 934.09, Fla. Stat..
178. LAWRENCE suffered actual damages as a direct and proximate result of
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Defendants’ said violations. LAWRENCE is entitled to statutory damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants for general, actual,
statutory and compensatory damages, profits made, punitive damages (the right to seek leave to
amend a claim for damages is reserved), prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, together
with such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper. This relief applies to all
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq. and section 934, Fla. Stat..
COUNT II
ILLEGAL USE AND DISCLOSURE

OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED COMMUNICATIONS
180. From the time of obtaining FDC Miami law enforcement tapes and thereafter, on an
ongoing basis, Defendants' intentionally used and disclosed and endeavored to use and disclose,
the contents of the FDC Miami phone tapes and phone logs knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2511, 2517, 2518, and sections 934.03, 934.08, 934.09, Fla. Stat..
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq. and section 934, Florida Statutes.
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COUNT III
ILLEGAL USE AND DISCLOSURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PHONE TAPES
182. From at least as early as 2000 and continuing thereafter, Defendants intended to
intentionally disclose and endeavor to disclose to others (including each Defendant) the contents
of FDC Miami law enforcement tapes, intercepted by means authorized under 18 U.S.C.
§§2511(2)(c), 2516, 2518 and sections 934.03(2)(c), 934.07, 934.09, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception of those communications in
connection with a criminal investigation, and having obtained or received the information in
connection with a criminal investigation, and with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, and
interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(e), 2517, sections
934.03(1)(e), 934.08.
violations of Title III and section 934, Florida Statutes
COUNT IV
UNLAWFUL OBTAINING OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS
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184. Defendants intentionally accessed without authorization a facility through which
an electronic communication service is provided; and/or intentionally exceeded an authorization to
access that facility, and thereby obtained access to wire or electronic communications while they
are in electronic storage in such system in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(a), 2702(a), 2703,
2707(g), and section 934.21(1), 934.22(1), 934.23, 934.25.
185. Defendants deliberately and willfully failed to meet the notice requirements to
Plaintiff, of said provisions.
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., and section 934, Florida Statutes.
COUNT V
ESTOPPEL
187. Defendants actively concealed information necessary for Plaintiff to advance
defenses throughout all relevant time periods.
188. Plaintiff reasonably relied on representations made by Defendants as being
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complete and truthful, and thereby suffered to his detriment by not knowing of constitutional,
statutory, and other defenses available to him.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants and a prohibition of
Defendants’ defenses under estoppel principles and with such other and further relief that this
Court deems just and proper.
COUNT VI
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
190. Defendants acted intentionally, recklessly, tortiously, wantonly and their conduct,
as set forth in this complaint, was extreme and outrageous.
191. Defendants conduct caused and continues to cause Plaintiff severe emotional
distress, through but not limited to the successful implementation of the schemes and conduct set
forth in this complaint, to deprive Plaintiff of his freedom, other rights, and to destroy him
financially.
192. The defendants intentionally and recklessly continue in the above described
tortious conduct to continue to exploit their prior unlawful and tortious acts to inflict further
emotional distress on Plaintiff.
with such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper.
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COUNT VII
DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND RIGHTS PROVIDED

BY FEDERAL LAW PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983
194. Defendants acted under color of state law intentionally, recklessly, tortiously,
wantonly and their conduct, as set forth in this complaint, was extreme and outrageous.
195. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
clearly established constitutional and statutory rights which a reasonable actor, applying objective
standards, would have known it was violating.
196. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants interfered with and
obstructed Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights including to petition, and his right of access to the
Court including in connection with, but not limited to, secret, ex parte, off-the-docket hearings,
where Plaintiff's counsel and Plaintiff were without notice of, without knowledge of, and without
the opportunity to defend Plaintiff concerning the deprivation of Plaintiff’s substantive rights, and
where extensive hearsay through reference to documents not placed on the record and unidentified
witnesses were used.
197. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants interfered with and
obstructed Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights to travel.
198. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated Plaintiff's
Fourth Amendment rights, including by improperly acquiring law enforcement tapes as described
herein, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2511 et seq., 934 Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. §§2701 et
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seq., and using the powers of the state to imprison Lawrence to collect debt.
199. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights in connection with his imprisonment for over six years.
200. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment due process rights concerning the aforementioned ex parte hearings, withholding of
exculpatory evidence, use of perjury, use of hearsay, use of unsworn witnesses, use of secret
evidence not placed on the record and not made available to Plaintiff and his counsel, and other
allegations contained herein, including depriving him of his rights under the Constitution of the
State of Florida Article I section 11, prohibiting imprisonment for debt.
201. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated Plaintiff's Sixth
Amendment rights in connection with the aforementioned ex parte hearings, where Plaintiff's
counsel and Plaintiff were without notice of, without knowledge of, and without the opportunity to
defend Plaintiff concerning the deprivation of Plaintiff’s substantive rights, and through other
means as asserted herein.
202. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants obstructed, and
interfered with Plaintiff's Seventh Amendment rights to a jury trial.
203. Plaintiff, through no fault of his own, has been denied the equal protection of law
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment concerning the rights violations identified herein.
204. Other federal statutory and Constitutional rights asserted herein comprise further
bases for violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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COUNT VIII
DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND RIGHTS

PROVIDED BY FEDERAL LAW PURSUANT TO
BIVENS v. SIX UNKNOWN NARCOTICS AGENTS, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
206. To the extent any Defendant is deemed a federal officials or employee in
connection with COUNT VII, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the claims and remedies under that count are
hereby similarly asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
COUNT IX
VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION

PRACTICES ACT 15 USC 1692d(1), 1692e(10), 1692f
208. Part of Plaintiff’s debts includes consumer debt.
209. Defendants are debt collectors under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq..
210. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants acted in bad faith and
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violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(1), 1692e(10), 1692f.
statutory and compensatory damages (the right to seek leave to amend a claim for damages is
reserved), prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, together with such other and further relief
that this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT X
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
212. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of Defendants tortious and unlawful acts described
herein, Plaintiff was deprived of the ability to make a living and that those acts were deliberate and
calculated to collect an unlawful and/or non-existent debt.
COUNT XI
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
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214. Defendants initiated proceedings against Plaintiff, successfully blocked Plaintiff’s
rights to defend himself against substantive rights violations, as described herein, and had no
probable cause for their debt collection actions that harmed Plaintiff.
215. Defendants’ initiation and pursuit of challenged actions, that harmed Plaintiff, were
undertaken with deliberate malice.
216. Defendants’ unlawful and tortious acts that resulted in successfully blocking
Plaintiff from asserting rights identified herein, estop them from defenses to Plaintiff’s claims.
COUNT XII
ABUSE OF PROCESS
218. Defendants willfully and intentionally made illegal, improper, and perverted use of
process, as described herein.
219. Defendants’ ulterior motive and purposes in court process was to obtain unlawful
advantage in Florida State court litigation against Plaintiff and his family, deprive Plaintiff of his
substantive constitutional and statutory rights for unlawful debt collection purposes, retaliate for
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Plaintiff pursuing legal rights against Defendants, and other reasons.
220. Defendants’ actions caused injury to Plaintiff as described herein.
COUNT XIII
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
224. Defendants’ actions caused injury to Plaintiff through his detention for over six
years.
-40-
COUNT XIV
FALSE ARREST
228. Defendants’ actions caused injury to Plaintiff through his detention for over six
years
COUNT XV
CIVIL RICO
(18 U.S.C. §1962(c))
-41-
230. 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c) ("Conduct of an Enterprise*'), makes it unlawful to
“conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct” of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. The four primary elements of this subsection are: "(1) conduct, (2) of an
enterprise, (3) through a pattern, and (4) of racketeering activity.''
231. According to the allegations of the Complaint. Defendants violated 18 U.S.C.
§1962(c), by conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, the object of which, inter alia, was to enable Defendant
BEAR STEARNS to collect upon the prior judgment obtained in favor of BEAR STEARNS
against LAWRENCE, the collection which was contrary to, inter alia, the Fair Debt and Credit
Collection Act.
232. In furtherance of thereof, Defendants improperly intercepted, used and disclosed
acquired law enforcement tapes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 et seq., 2701 et seq. as described
herein.
233. In furtherance of thereof, Defendants committed mail fraud and wire fraud
through their scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, fraud, unlawful acts
described herein, including but not limited to false and perjured testimony,
representations, promises under oath, and they used the mails and interstate wire
communications in furtherance of their unlawful, tortious, and malicious scheme.
234. Plaintiff will file a Civil RICO Case Statement within 30 days from the date of
docketing this Amended Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, with pre and post
-42-
judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, together with such other and further relief as this Court
deems just and proper.
COUNT XVI
CIVIL RICO CONSPIRACY

(18 U.S.C. §1962(d))
236. Section 1962(d) ("Conspiracy") makes it unlawful to conspire to violate section
1962(a), (b) or (c).
237. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendant violated §1962(d) by an
agreement to join the conspiracy, agreement to commit predicate acts, having knowledge that the
acts alleged herein were part of a pattern of racketeering activity.
238. Defendants knew that receipt, retention, or use of the law enforcement tapes, inter
alia, was illegal.
239. Defendants knew that other acts identified herein were illegal and/or undertaken in
connection with illegal acts undertaken with knowing and willful intent and lack of good faith.
240. According to the allegations of the Complaint, the object of the conspiracy, inter
alia, was to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, such activities designed in part to enable Defendant BEAR
STEARNS to collect upon the prior judgment obtained in favor of BEAR STEARNS against
Plaintiff and to obtain unlawful advantage in Florida state court and other proceedings and to block
Plaintiff’s right of access to the court and other rights identified herein.
-43-
241. In furtherance of thereof, Defendants unlawfully acquired, disclosed and used law
enforcement tapes, as identified herein, deliberately, willfully, with malice and for unlawful
purposes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., 2701 et seq., 934 Fla. Stat., and other violations
of law the elements of which and/or statutes are identified herein.
242. Plaintiff will file a Civil RICO case statement within 30 days from the date of
docketing this Complaint.
COUNT XVII
CIVIL RICO
(§772.103, §772.104, Fla. Stat.)
244. §772. 103, Fla. Stat., provides that it “shall be unlawful for any person, (1) who has
with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
criminal activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or
indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in
the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment
or operation of any enterprise; (2) through a pattern of criminal activity or through the collection of
an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise or real property; (3) employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or
-44-
participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt.”
245. §772. 104, Fla. Stat., provides that "[an]y person who proves by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she has been injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of
§772. 103, shall have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such
action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200, and reasonable attorney's fees and
court costs in the trial and appellate courts."
246. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated §772. 103, by
conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity, the object of which, inter alia, was to enable Defendant BEAR STEARNS
to collect upon the prior judgment obtained in favor of BEAR STEARNS against LAWRENCE,
the collection which was contrary to, inter alia, the Fair Debt and Credit Collection Act and other
violations of law identified herein.
judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, together with such other and further relief as this Court
-45-
COUNT XVIII
CIVIL RICO CONSPIRACY

(§772.103(4), Fla. Stat.)
250. §772. 103(4), Fla. Stat., provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, "[t]o
conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of [§772. 103] subsection (1), subsection (2),
or subsection (3).”
251. §772. 103, Fla. Stat., provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, “(1) who has
with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
criminal activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or
indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in
the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the
establishment or operation of any enterprise; (2) through a pattern of criminal activity or through
the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise or real property; (3) employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of criminal
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.”
252. §772. 104, Fla. Stat., provides that “[an]y person who proves by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she has been injured by reason of any violation of the provisions of
§772. 103, shall have a cause of action for threefold the actual damages sustained and, in any such
action, is entitled to minimum damages in the amount of $200, and reasonable attorney's fees and
court costs in the trial and appellate courts.”
-46-
253. According to the allegations of the Complaint, Defendants violated §772. 103, by
conducting or participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity, the object of which, inter alia, was to enable Defendant BEAR STEARNS
to collect upon the prior judgment obtained in favor of BEAR STEARNS against LAWRENCE,
the collection which was contrary to, inter alia, the Fair Debt and Credit Collection Act and other
violations of law identified herein.
-47-
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of each and every cause of action.
VERIFICATION
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing Complaint and
that the facts stated in it are true to the best of my knowledge.
Executed on this 30th day of May 2007.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Stephan Jay Lawrence
Plaintiff, in propria persona
19500 Turnberry Way #23A
Aventura, FL 33180
-48-

Wiretap Complaint Lawrence v. Bear Stearns (JP Morgan) Etc. 07-05-30 DE#69 06-21952-CV-GOLD

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Wiretap Complaint Lawrence v. Bear Stearns (JP Morgan) Etc. 07-05-30 DE#69 06-21952-CV-GOLD

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 06-21952-CIV-GOLD

ALAN L. GOLDBERG, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC.,

RUSSIN & BUDWICK, P. A., MICHAEL BUDWICK, —J

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff, STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE, sues Defendants, ALAN L. GOLDBERG,

CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC., BERGER SINGERMAN, P. A., PAUL S. SINGERMAN,

BUDWICK, COUDERT BROTHERS, EDWARD TILLINGHAST, III, MARK D. COHEN, P. A.,

1. This action is brought pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §2520 for violations of the federal

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

to adjudicate state law claims alleged.

Southern District of Florida.

4. Plaintiff, STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE, is a resident of the state of Florida,

domiciled with the Southern District of Florida.

business in New York and Florida.

Defendant CRISIS MANAGEMENT, INC., is a Florida profit corporation.

Defendant ALAN L. GOLDBERG, is a Florida resident, is associated with CRISIS

CRISIS MANAGEMENT in Florida and New York.

9. Defendant BERGER SINGERMAN, P. A. ("BERGER") is a Florida Professional

association which represents GOLDBERG.

10. Plaintiff states that Defendants PAUL S. SINGERMAN, JAMES H. FIERBERG,

Florida and New York.

11. Defendant MELAND RUSSIN & BUDWICK, P. A. ("MELAND") is a Florida

Professional Association which represents GOLDBERG.

Defendant MICHAEL BUDWICK is an attorney at MELAND and resides in Florida and

13. Defendant MARK D. COHEN, P. A., is a Florida Professional Association which

MARK D. COHEN, P. A., in the States of Florida and New York.

14. Defendant COUDERT BROTHERS ("COUDERT") is a law firm with offices in

STEARNS and ostensibly represented GOLDBERG.

Defendant EDWARD H. TILLINGHAST, III, is a resident of New York and a partner at

consent of COUDERT, including within the State of Florida.

(jointly "AVIV"). INTERFOR represented BEAR STEARNS and ostensibly GOLDBERG.

professional traders, and trading firms.

20. LAWRENCE and his associated companies conducted professional trading on

public capital. LAWRENCE was never employed by BEAR STEARNS.

A. Background Litigation Events

LAWRENCE based on brokerage industry arbitration proceedings, forced on LAWRENCE, which

22. An issue in the arbitration was LAWRENCE'S entitlement to a share of profits

accounts, including LAWRENCE'S. LAWRENCE'S trading positions had been unilaterally

BEAR STEARNS. BEAR STEARNS made no allegations of fraud against LAWRENCE.

beneficiary, was removed as a beneficiary in 1995.

B. The Association Of The Defendants And Their Actions

capacity as Chapter 7 trustee, no claim is presented against the Estate.

representation of the Estate.

BEAR STEARNS made a payment to BERGER at some time in 1997.

30. In 1997 or early 1998, GOLDBERG, BERGER, and BUDWICK willfully,

those acts, as more fully described in this Complaint.

furtherance of the alleged witness tampering.

hearing in early 2006.

compromising the official processes of this Court.”

STEARNS, HOWARD KAHN, and KAHN ZUCKERMAN, P. A.

I. RILEY was never retained by the Estate.

and made one or more fee payments directly to P. I. RILEY.

42. BEAR STEARNS was a client of P. I. RILEY.

BEAR STEARNS obtained information from P. I. RILEY's investigations.

FIERBERG Motion and/or Affidavit.

GOLDBERG obtained information from P. I. RILEY's investigations.

information GOLDBERG obtained from P. I. RILEY contradicted allegations made in the

FIERBERG Motion and/or Affidavit.

ever executed or gave any sworn testimony in support those allegations.

no sealed bankruptcy court papers before 2000.

and in furtherance of the Defendants' tortious and unlawful activities.