ARTICLE IN PRESS

Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208

www.elsevier.com/locate/jep

Moral reasoning and concern for the environment

Christie P. Karpiak, Galen L. Baril
Department of Psychology, University of Scranton, 206 Alumni Memorial Hall, Scranton, PA 18510-4596, USA
Available online 27 December 2007

Abstract

The relation between Kohlberg’s cognitive moral reasoning and concern for the environment was measured in 158 college students.
Rest’s Defining Issues Test and Thompson and Barton’s measure of environmental attitudes were administered. Principled moral
reasoning, the weighted ranking of responses at the most advanced level of moral development, correlated positively with ecocentrism
(belief in the intrinsic importance of nature), negatively with environmental apathy, and was unrelated to anthropocentrism (belief that
nature is important because it is central to human wellbeing). Ecocentrism, the only attitude that has been found in previous research to
correspond with environmentally friendly behavior, was predicted by principled moral reasoning, gender, and college major.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction However, a pro-environmental attitude may result from

1.1. Moral reasoning and concern for the environment
Philosophical, moral, and religious considerations of the
relationship between humans and the rest of nature date
back thousands of years to the major eastern religions as
well as tribal religions world wide (Nash, 1989). The
history of scientific research on these issues, embodied in
the areas of environmentalism, conservation, and sustain-
ability, is much shorter; it is nevertheless quite extensive.
For example, Vining and Ebreo’s (2002) review of the
range of theories that have been applied to this field
contains 165 references and at least 26 distinct theories.
Much of the research in this area has involved the
measurement of attitudes and opinions about the environ-
ment and conservation. Initially, these were somewhat
unsophisticated measures consisting of one or a few face
valid items. Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) developed and
later revised (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000)
one of the first psychometrically and conceptually sophis-
ticated instruments to assess positivity toward the environ-
ment: the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale, now
consisting of 15 items that generate a single score
representing attitude toward the environment.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 570 941 5886; fax: +1 570 941 7899.
E-mail address: karpiakc2@scranton.edu (C.P. Karpiak).
different motivations that could have very different
implications for behavior and cognitive process. For
example, Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993) and Schultz
(2000) proposed the value–belief–norm (VBN) theory that
identifies three types of environmental concerns: egoistic,
social-altruistic, and biospheric. Related to this concept,
Thompson and Barton (1994) developed a scale to measure
ecocentrism (the importance of the environment for its own
sake, similar to biospheric concerns), anthropocentrism
(the importance of the environment for use by humans,
which is similar to some combination of social-altruistic
and egoistic values), and finally apathy toward environ-
mental issues. They found ecocentrism to be positively
related to conserving behaviors and membership in
environmental organizations and negatively related to
environmental apathy. Anthropocentrism is positively
related to environmental apathy and negatively related to
conserving behaviors and membership in environmental
organizations.
Schultz and Zelezny (1999) found that ecocentrism is
also negatively associated with the values of power and
traditionalism while anthropocentrism is positively asso-
ciated with the values of power, tradition, security and, like
ecocentrism, the value of conformity. They also found the
NEP is positively related with ecocentrism, as might be
expected since the NEP showed exactly the same pattern of
relationships found for ecocentrism.

0272-4944/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.12.001
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
204 C.P. Karpiak, G.L. Baril / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208
All of these measures and much of the associated research
have an explicit or implicit foundation in moral/ethical
considerations. In fact, Kahn (2006) looks at the extent to
which explicit moral concepts and theories apply to
environmental/conservation research in general. His litera-
ture review is set in a broad context that includes ‘‘the
traditional moral-developmental view, as circumscribed by
Piaget and Kohlberg, that focuses on justice, rights and
obligations’’ (p. 461). However, there is no other reference to
either Piaget or Kohlberg in the article except for a mention
of ‘‘Kohlberg’s just community’’ (p. 464). In addition,
Vining and Ebreo’s (2002) review of theories that have been
applied to conservation research has no reference whatso-
ever to Kohlberg or Piaget. Finally, our extensive literature
search did not uncover any research at all on environ-
mental, conservation or sustainability issues that involved
Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development or deriva-
tives of it, e.g. Rest’s (1993) Defining Issues Test (DIT).
Kohlberg’s theory postulates the development of moral
reasoning based on the concepts of justice, fairness, rights,
and obligations. Such reasoning develops with age,
education, and experience from relatively primitive, self-
serving levels (Preconventional Stages 1 and 2) focused on
punishment and rewards, to reasoning that focuses on
personal relationships (Conventional Stage 3) and societal
rules and laws (Conventional Stage 4), and finally to
reasoning that takes into account the broader moral
principles of justice and fairness that underlie these rules
and laws (Postconventional Stages 5 and 6) (Kohlberg,
1984; Thoma, 2006). For a critique of Kohlberg’s theory,
see Lapsley (2006).
It seems obvious that the development of moral reason-
ing should be related to views about whether and why (e.g.,
ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism reasons) conserva-
tion and sustainability are important. Anthropocentrism
seems to be in part related to the pure self-serving concerns
of Kohlberg’s Preconventional Level because of the
egocentric component of anthropocentrism. However,
there is also the social-altruistic component, which is likely
to be related to higher levels of moral reasoning.
Ecocentrism would seem to be the most advanced level of
environmental concern and would therefore be associated
with the highest level of moral reasoning: the Postconven-
tional Level. Support can be found for this proposed
connection between Kohlberg’s justice reasoning and
sustainability attitudes in the research using Schwartz’s
Value Survey (Schultz et al., 2005; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999;
Schwartz, 1994), showing that the dimension of Univers-
alism, which contains social justice and equality as
components, is positively related to ecocentrism.
This study is a test of the relationship between
Kohlbergian moral reasoning and environmental opinions.
Specifically, we predicted that ecocentered attitudes would
be positively related to Postconventional (justice) moral
reasoning and that anthropocentric views and environ-
mental apathy would be negatively or unrelated to
Postconventional reasoning.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
One hundred sixty-four students (60% female) enrolled
in various sections of the introductory psychology course
at a comprehensive Jesuit University in Pennsylvania
received credit for participating in this study. Of these,
six turned in incomplete measures and were not included in
the current analyses. A wide array of academic majors were
represented, including biological sciences (17%), arts and
humanities (16%), social sciences (16%), nursing (13%),
occupational and physical therapy (11%), communication
(10%), business (8%), education (6%), and undecided/
other (2%). Students were predominantly white, Catholic
(67%), and of middle (48%) and upper-middle (38%)
socioeconomic class.
2.2. Measures and procedure
We administered a packet of tests and questionnaires to
groups of students. Demographic information included
academic major, gender, socioeconomic status (rated low,
mid-low, middle, mid-high, and high) and religious
affiliation.
The three-scenario version of Rest’s (1993) DIT was used
to measure participants’ cognitive moral reasoning. Parti-
cipants read the Heinz, Escaped Prisoner, and Newspaper
dilemmas. For example, the Heinz dilemma is about a
husband whose wife is dying and needs a drug for which
the husband does not have enough money to pay. Since the
druggist will not reduce the price, the husband is
considering stealing the drug.
Participants ranked their top four considerations in
reaching a solution for each dilemma from a list of 12
considerations per scenario. These rankings were converted
into scores for Stages 2 through 6 based on the weighted
rankings of chosen considerations from each stage (Rest,
1993). A P-score (principled moral reasoning) was then
generated from a combination of Stages 5 and 6 scores
(Postconventional reasoning). For instance, one P-score
item (Stage 5) is ‘‘Would stealing in such a case bring about
more total good for the whole society or not?’’ Ranking
this as one of the top four considerations in making the
decision to steal the drug or not would contribute to a high
P-score. ‘‘Whether a community’s laws are going to be
upheld’’ is an example of the Stage 4 item, and ‘‘Whether
Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help
someone else’’ typifies Stage 3. Finally, ‘‘Is Heinz willing to
risk getting shoty’’ is Stage 1/2. Following Rest’s (1993)
recommendations, only the P-score from this 3-scenario
‘short form’ version of the DIT was used in subsequent
analyses.
We measured attitudes toward the environment using
the instrument developed by Thompson and Barton (1994)
discussed in the introduction. This measure consists of 30
statements about the environment, each rated from 1
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
C.P. Karpiak, G.L. Baril / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208 205

(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and results in
scores on three scales. The ecocentrism scale provides
information about an individual’s degree of belief that the
environment, including animals and plants, is valuable in
its own right, separate from its utility for humans. The
anthropocentrism scale indexes a person’s concern about
the environment for its importance to human survival and
industry. The apathy scale is a measure of general lack of
concern about the environment and environmental issues.
Information about the reliability and validity of this
measure may be found in Thompson and Barton (1994).
3. Results
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1
for the three scales of the environmental attitudes measure
and for the principled moral reasoning score (the P-score)
from the DIT. Means and standard deviations for each
environmental scale were similar to average results from
the samples presented by Thompson and Barton (1994),
and data from the anthropocentrism and ecocentrism
scales presented for a large sample of the United States
college students by Schultz and Zelezny (1999). Internal
consistency was fully consistent with reports by Thompson
and Barton (1994), with Cronbach’s a ¼ .83 for ecocentr-
ism, .70 for anthropocentrism, and .81 for apathy. The
apathy scores evidenced moderate negative skew and a
square root transformation was conducted prior to the
linear analysis. The transformed variable was used in all
linear analyses involving the apathy scale.
Pearson correlations were run between the three
environmental scales, the principled moral reasoning score,
and the demographic and background variables of gender,
major, socioeconomic group (SES), and religion. Major,
SES, and religion were dummy-coded into specific con-
trasts (e.g., upper-middle SES versus all other SES) prior to
analysis for all groups that contained at least 16
participants, based on Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2001)
warning regarding problems posed for linear analyses by
markedly uneven distributions of dichotomous variables
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for primary variables
(90% or more in one category). Correlations between the
variables from our a priori hypotheses are reported in
Table 1, along with significant demographic variables.
Ecocentrism correlated positively with principled moral
reasoning. Anthropocentrism was unrelated to principled
moral reasoning, and apathy toward the environment
correlated negatively with principled moral reasoning. The
lack of relation between principled moral reasoning and
anthropocentric reasons for concern about the environ-
ment is interesting and perhaps counterintuitive, but is
consistent with reports from Schultz and Zelezny (1999)
regarding related values.
With regard to demographic and background factors,
only gender and major were related to the variables of
interest. Women were higher in ecocentrism and lower in
apathy than men. Consistent with much of the literature,
there was no relation between gender and principled moral
reasoning. Majors in biological sciences evidenced higher
principled moral reasoning and ecocentrism, and lower
anthropocentrism and apathy, than other majors.
A conservative statistical approach, standard multiple
regression with simultaneous entry of all independent
variables, was employed to examine the relative importance
of these correlates in predicting environmental attitudes.
Regression analyses were conducted separately for each of
the three environmental scales, with P-score, gender, and
biology major as predictors. Multiple R, R2, and adjusted
R2 for each dependent variable are presented in Table 2, as
are standardized regression coefficients (b) for each
independent variable.
These analyses indicated that principled moral reasoning
contributes to the prediction of ecocentrism and of apathy.
Ecocentrism was predicted by the model, F(3, 154) ¼ 6.48,
po.001, and each of the three predictor variables
contributed significantly to its prediction. Apathy was also
predicted by the model, F(3, 154) ¼ 8.57, po.001, but only
gender and P-score were significant contributors. In both
Table 2
Standard multiple regression analyses for variables predicting environ-
mental attitudes
Variable R R2 Adjusted R2 b

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 Ecocentrism .34 .11 .10

P-score .18*
DIT moral reasoning Gender .22**
1. P-score 26.75 14.93 Biological science .17*

Thompson and Barton environmental attitudes Apathy .38 .14 .13

2. Ecocentrism 3.85 .60 .21** P-score .26**
3. Anthropocentrism 3.17 .55 .11 .00 Gender .22**
4. Apathy 2.02 .61 .29** .55** .23** Biological science .14

Gender and relevant academic majors Anthropocentrism .22 .05 .03

5. Gendera .01 .20* .06 .20* P-score .07
6. Biological science .22** .18* .21** .17* .12 Gender .04
Biological science .19*
*po.05.
**po.01. *po.05.
a
Females ¼ 0 and males ¼ 1. **po.01.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
206 C.P. Karpiak, G.L. Baril / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208
cases the contribution was small, with the P-score
independently accounting for approximately the same
amount of variability in these attitudes as gender.
Anthropocentrism was also predicted by the model,
F(3, 154) ¼ 2.71, p ¼ .047. However, as expected based on
the zero-order correlations, the actual amount predicted
was very small (adjusted R2 ¼ .03), and biological science
major was the only significant predictor.
4. Discussion
The relationships we observed between the three scales
of the environmental measure are fully consistent with
those reported by Thompson and Barton (1994). Ecocentr-
ism is strongly negatively correlated with apathy, while
anthropocentrism is unrelated with ecocentrism and
positively correlated with apathy. Individuals who assign
intrinsic value to the environment are less likely to be
apathetic, while those who value the environment for its
utility to humans are more likely to be apathetic. These
results regarding anthropocentric motivations are consis-
tent with analyses by Schultz and Zelezny (1999), and with
the findings of Axelrod (1994), who used ecological
dilemmas to test hypotheses about value orientations and
found that socially oriented individuals ‘‘appear to place
the needs of many before the needs of any one individual or
the natural environment (p. 101).’’ A better understanding
of these intriguing patterns is potentially important in
promoting environmentally friendly behavior, since
Thompson and Barton (1994) found that ecocentric
attitudes are predictive of such behavior while anthropo-
centric attitudes are not.
We found women to be higher on ecocentrism and lower
on apathy than men. These findings are consistent with
popular conceptions about varying levels of concern for
others in women and men, with the environmental
literature (see Stern & Dietz, 1994), and with recent
meta-analyses (Zelezny, Chua, & Aldrich, 2000). None of
the publications that include the full scales of the
Thompson and Barton measure report their results for
gender, and Zelezny et al.’s (2000) results for a subset of
items of the ecocentrism scale were generally supportive of
higher scores for women, but did not evidence significant
differences between women and men in the United States.
Gender in our sample accounted for approximately 5% of
the variability in both ecocentric and apathetic attitudes
toward the environment, an amount that is fully consistent
with the large-scale data reported by Zelezny et al. (2000).
One of our primary predictions was that anthropocentr-
ism would be negatively or unrelated to principled moral
reasoning. We found that it was unrelated. Our reasoning
was that anthropocentrism is thought to be composed of
not only a concern for human kind generally but also an
egocentric concern (see Thompson & Barton, 1994; Schultz
& Zelezny, 1999) which is unlikely to be congruent with the
Postconventional level of moral reasoning. In fact, some of
the anthropocentrism items reflect a particularly callous
attitude toward the intrinsic importance of the environ-
ment (e.g., ‘‘The worst thing about the loss of the rain
forest is that it will restrict the development of new
medicines’’) that makes it surprising that ecocentrism and
anthropocentrism are not negatively related. Interestingly,
in our sample, students majoring in the biological sciences
evidenced less anthropocentric attitudes than students in
other majors. Self-selection into the field of biology
probably contributes to this relationship, but it is also
likely that the study of biology decreases anthropocentrism
through enhanced understanding of nonhuman life.
Biology majors also evidenced higher ecocentrism than
other majors.
As predicted, apathy was negatively related to principled
moral reasoning. People who are relatively low on
principled moral reasoning evidence higher levels of apathy
about the environment.
Finally, we predicted and found that ecocentrism is
positively related to Kohlberg’s principled moral reason-
ing. The basis of our prediction was that we thought that
justice-oriented morality would extrapolate from humans
to nature. However, most of the ecocentrism items seem to
reflect an emotional affinity toward nature (e.g., ‘‘Some-
times it makes me sad to see forests cleared for
agriculture’’) rather than the extrapolation from humans
to nature of an impartial and universal justice orientation
(Postconventional reasoning). In fact, a strong philosophi-
cal, even religious, aspect of the environmental movement
is the importance of an affectively based realization of the
‘‘oneness’’ of everything (see Suzuki, 2002). Schultz’s
(2000) study of the relationship between ‘‘perspective
taking’’ and biospheric concerns is congruent with this
conceptualization. Given these considerations, perhaps it is
counterintuitive that the cognitive justice orientation, the
product of rational thought, is positively related to
ecocentrism.
Why, then, are Stages 5/6 related to ecocentrism?
Because perspective taking is absolutely essential for the
application of fairness and justice to moral dilemmas
involving competing interests and rights, the core concern
of Kohlberg’s theory. In his chapter on ‘‘Justice as
Reversibility’’ (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 190–230) and elsewhere
(Kohlberg, 1986), Kohlberg describes in detail how ‘‘ideal
role taking’’ and a ‘‘‘second-order’ use of the Golden Rule’’
(p. 203) are necessary to fairly resolve moral dilemmas.
This perspective taking goes well beyond what occurs at
Stage 3 (where the basic Golden Rule is applied in the
context of a concern over the evaluation of significant
others). It involves a complex multiple reversing of
perspectives and the weighing of individual rights based
on these perspectives: for example, the perspectives of the
dying wife, the druggist, and the husband in the Heinz
dilemma. To extrapolate the rights of humans to the
‘‘rights of nature’’ requires both empathizing with nature
(Nash, 1989) and a clear understanding of ‘‘rights’’ in
general. Also, Walker (2006) finds that those at the higher
moral Stages are ‘‘more likely to be split in their moral
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
C.P. Karpiak, G.L. Baril / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208
orientation, that is, to evidence substantial amounts of
both care and justice reasoning’’ (p. 105).
One limitation of this study is that our sample is
demographically restricted in two ways. First, no attempt
was made to proportionally sample, much less randomly
sample, demographic categories. Our sample came solely
from introductory psychology classes, although a wide
variety of majors are represented. In addition, the sample
and the university in general are predominately white,
middle and upper-middle class, and Catholic. However, as
reported in the results section, the means of our measures
were comparable to the results of a broad, international
sample of college students obtained by Schultz and Zelezny
(1999). The amount of variability in environmental
attitudes accounted for by gender in our sample also
matches well with reports from the same broad, interna-
tional sample (Zelezny et al., 2000). In addition, our sample
shows wide variation for all of the relevant variables.
Nonetheless, caution is warranted, and further studies are
needed with more diverse samples.
Another concern is that the relationships we found,
although statistically significant, are small in terms of effect
sizes. This is typical of the current literature on demo-
graphic and psychological predictors of environmental
attitudes and behaviors, and we believe it probably reflects
real complexity in the development of these attitudes and
behaviors. A recent follow-up to our study (Irace, Cannon,
Karpiak, Baril, & Melone, 2007) replicated our basic
results with another, similar sample of university students,
adding strength to our assertions about the relations
between moral reasoning and environmental attitudes.
Still, further replication and extension to more diverse
samples are clearly needed. Finally, like most of the
relevant literature, our study is neither experimental nor
longitudinal and thus cannot provide clear indication of
causal sequence.
How then can this study contribute to the understanding
and development of environmentally responsible attitudes
and behaviors? First, it provides an empirical connection to
a well-developed area of theory and research: moral
reasoning and behavior. Although such a connection has
been alluded to by Kahn (2006) as mentioned above, it has
never been established. Our discussion above would be an
initial step in developing the theoretical links between the
two lines of research and an expansion of our under-
standing environmentalism.
In addition, new directions for increasing sustainable
attitudes and behavior might be suggested by successful
education programs used to increase moral reasoning. For
example, Rest and Thoma (1986) reviewed 55 studies of
moral reasoning interventions for college students. This
review was updated by King and Mayhew (2002) and
extended to programs for professionals by Rest and
Narvaez (1994) and Bebeau (2002). These reviews showed,
for example, that the ideal duration of such programs for
college students is between 4 and 12 weeks; shorter
durations are not effective and longer ones do not add
207
anything. Also, the strongest effects are found at the adult
levels.
They also found that moral reasoning educational
programs that focus on dilemma discussion were effective,
while general academic courses on ethics were not. This is
of particular interest since Axelrod (1994) developed
‘‘ecological’’ dilemmas to study the relationship between
value orientation, economic and social conditions reflected
in the dilemmas, and decision making. Such dilemmas and
similar ones could easily be incorporated into a section of a
course to develop environmental reasoning.
These reviews also showed that personality and social
development programs such as interventions that empha-
sized empathy training, communication skill training,
cooperation simulation games, and volunteer service work,
improved moral reasoning. Even though causal sequence is
not established by our study, our results suggest the
possibility that improving moral reasoning with regard to
humans might generalize to nature. If so, it is not such a
leap to entertain the intriguing possibility that increasing
sensitivity to humans might increase sensitivity to the
environment.
References
Axelrod, L. J. (1994). Balancing personal needs with environmental
preservation: Identifying the values that guide decisions in ecological
dilemmas. Journal of Social Issues, 50, 85–104.
Bebeau, M. J. (2002). The defining issues test and the four component
model: Contributions to professional education. Journal of Moral
Education, 31, 271–295.
Dunlap, R. E., & Van Liere, K. (1978). The new environmental paradigm:
A proposed measuring instrument and preliminary results. Journal of
Environmental Education, 9, 10–19.
Dunlap, R. E., Van Liere, K. D., Mertig, A. G., & Jones, R. E. (2000).
Measuring endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A revised
NEP scale. Journal of Social Issues, 56, 425–442.
Irace, C., Cannon, J. T., Karpiak, C. P., Baril, G. L., & Melone, A. N.
(2007). Environmental attitudes: Relationships with right wing
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, political affiliation,
and moral reasoning. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the
Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Kahn, P. H. (2006). Nature and moral development. In M. Killen, &
J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 461–480).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
King, P. M., & Mayhew, M. J. (2002). Moral judgement development in
higher education: Insights from the defining issues test. Journal of
Moral Education, 31, 248–270.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages
and the idea of justice. New York: Harper and Row.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: The nature and
validity of moral stages. New York: Harper and Row.
Kohlberg, L. (1986). A current statement on some theoretical issues. In
S. Modgil, & E. Modgil (Eds.), Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and
controversy. Philadelphia: Falmer Press.
Lapsley, D. K. (2006). Moral stage theory. In M. Killen, & J. Smetana
(Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 37–66). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Nash, R. F. (1989). The rights of nature: A history of environmental ethics.
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Rest, J. (1993). Guide for the defining issues test. Minneapolis, MN: Center
for the Study of Ethical Development.
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
208 C.P. Karpiak, G.L. Baril / Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208
Rest, J., & Narvaez, D. (Eds.). (1994). Moral development in the
professions: Psychology and applied ethics. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Rest, J., & Thoma, S. J. (1986). Educational programs and interventions.
In J. Rest (Ed.), Moral development: Advances in research and theory
(pp. 59–88). New York: Praeger Publishers.
Schultz, P. W. (2000). Empathizing with nature: The effects of perspective
taking on concern for environmental issues. Journal of Social Issues,
56, 391–406.
Schultz, P. W., Gouveia, V. V., Cameron, L. D., Tankha, G., Schmuck,
P., & Franek, M. (2005). Values and their relationship to environ-
mental concern and conservation behavior. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 36, 457–475.
Schultz, P. W., & Zelezny, L. (1999). Values as predictors of environ-
mental attitudes: Evidence for consistency across 14 countries. Journal
of Environmental Psychology, 28, 255–265.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure
and contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50,
19–45.
Stern, P. C., & Dietz, T. (1994). The value basis of environmental concern.
Journal of Social Issues, 50, 65–84.
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., & Kalof, L. (1993). Value orientations, gender, and
environmental concern. Environment and Behavior, 25, 322–348.
Suzuki, D. (2002). The sacred balance: Rediscovering our place in nature.
Vancouver, CA: Greystone Books.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Using multivariate statistics (4th
ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Thoma, S. J. (2006). Research on the defining issues test. In M. Killen, &
J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 67–91).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Thompson, S. C., & Barton, M. (1994). Ecocentric and anthropocentric
attitudes toward the environment. Journal of Environmental Psychol-
ogy, 14, 149–157.
Vining, J., & Ebreo, A. (2002). Emerging theoretical and methodological
perspectives on conservation behavior. In R. Bechtel, & A. Churchman
(Eds.), New handbook of environmental psychology (pp. 541–558). New
York: Wiley.
Walker, L. J. (2006). Gender and morality. In M. Killen, & J. Smetana
(Eds.), Handbook of moral development (pp. 461–480). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Zelezny, L. C., Chua, P., & Aldrich, C. (2000). Elaborating on gender
differences in environmentalism. Journal of Social Issues, 56, 443–457.