DIMACUHA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 143705 February 23, 2007 GARCIA, J.

FACTS:

An honest-to-goodness entrapment operation which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law was conducted on August 10, 1995 against Dimacuha by the team composed of SPO2 Melanio Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr. and Felipe Evangelista. SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan positively testified that from a distance of more or less 5 to 7 meters, they saw petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu," and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo. A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. From a distance of more or less 5 to 7 meters, the police officers saw the petitioner took out from her brown shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu," and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo. Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white crystalline substance from Marcelo. A subsequent search on the petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small plastic sachet, also suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets was found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Then, they were brought to the headquarters. ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was justified under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court HELD:

We pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.

BONIFACIO vs RTC OF MAKATI G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

On behalf of Yuhengco family, Gimenez filed a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel against Phillip Piccio and others who are trustees of PEPCI. PEPCI previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC. Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com. By resolution, the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations charging them with libel. Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners, as co-accused, thereupon filed before the RTC, a Motion to Quash the Information on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published. The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the RTC. Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. The RTC granted the prosecutions motion for recon and ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue to which the prosecution then admitted.

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information which they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible. 2. Whether or not the venue of internet-published article libel is where the offended party accessed the libelous article. HELD:

No. The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions. In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363.

In this situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the matter was first printed and published.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

TRINIDAD vs ANG G.R. No. 192898 January 31, 2011 BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging this Resolution. On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City, an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. As the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the said order. The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC, in its Order dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph c[,] Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners arraignme nt on September 10, 2009. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC, in its decision of January 6, 2010, denied this petition. The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the RTC denied their motion in its order dated July 5, 2010. The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to show that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved. ISSUE: Whether or not the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment pending resolution of petition for review in DOJ is mandatory.

HELD:

Yes. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules. In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, Roberts, Jr. v. CA, and Dimatulac v. Villon were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.

PEOPLE vs TRINIDAD G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National Police, assigned at Nasipit Police Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City. TRINIDAD was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver. SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about 5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the Fiera. Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because, according to him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the shooting of LAROA but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in killing the two victims. ISSUE:

Whether or not the adduced evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD:

TRINIDAD's defense of alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the straightforward and detailed descriptive narration of TAN. The other inconsistencies TRINIDAD makes much of, such as, that TAN was unsure before the NAPOLCOM Hearing Officer whether TRINIDAD was wearing khaki or fatigue uniform but, in open Court, he testified positively that TRINIDAD was in khaki uniform; and that while TAN declared that TRINIDAD was wearing a cap, prosecution witness Felimon Comendador said that he was not but was in complete fatigue uniform, are actually trivial details that do not affect the positive identification of TRINIDAD that TAN has made nor detract from the latter's overall credibility.

Nor is there basis for TRINIDAD to contend that the absence of gunpowder burns on the deceased victims negates TAN's claim that they were shot "point-blank." Actually, this term refers merely to the "aim directed straight toward a target" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) and has no reference to the distance between the gun and

the target. And in point of fact, it matters not how far the assailant was at the time he shot the victims, the crucial factor being whether he did shoot the victim or not. TAN's testimony remained unshaken even during cross- examination. No ill motive has been attributed to him to prevaricate the truth. He was in the vehicle where the killing transpired was a witness to the actual happening, and was a victim himself who managed narrowly to escape death despite the weaponry with which TRINIDAD was equipped.

CAMARA vs PAGAYATAN GR No. 176563 April 2, 2007

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period. LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court. However the respondent judge found LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily withdrawable. Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ISSUE:

Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance. HELD:

Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance of the full amount of the preliminary compensation. This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction.

LEJANO vs PEOPLE G.R. No. 176389 /G.R. No. 176864 December 14, 2010 ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

HELD:

Not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria: First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold. And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Here, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

He presented documentary and testimonial proof that he was in the United States of America from March 1991 to October 1992 such as travel preparations, immigration checks, details of US sojourn and etc. Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi. Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

PEOPLE vs VILLARICO G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011 BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS: Haide was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his familys residence in Bolinsong, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. At that time, Haides sister-in-law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child who was answering the call of nature near the toilet. From where she was, Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door Ricky Villarico was at the left side, and Gilberto, Jr. stood behind him, while Gilberto, Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her, prompting Remedios to drop to the ground and to shout to Lolita Cagatan, her mother-in-law. At that instant, Remedios heard three gunshots. Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet. Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: Tabang kay gipusil ko ni Berting (I was shot by Berting). At that, she and Remedios brought the wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for gunshot wounds on his left scapular region (back of left shoulder) and right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to hypovolemic shock or massive loss of blood. However, some of the facts were proved corroborated by the Defense with the help of Peter Ponggos, who narrated that he had been on board a motorcycle (habalhabal) when Lolita and Remedios asked for his help; and that he then aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital. According to Peter, he asked Haide who had shot him, but Haide replied that there had been only one assailant whom he did not recognize. ISSUE:

Whether or not an identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who actually saw the assailants? HELD:

The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco about seeing the four accused standing near the door to the kitchen immediately before and after the shooting of Haide inside the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other logical inference than that the four accused were the persons who had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco needed to have actually seen who of the accused had

fired at Haide, for it was enough that they testified that the four armed accused: (a) had strategically positioned themselves by the kitchen door prior to the shooting of Haide; (b) had still been in the same positions after the gunshots were fired; and (c) had continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as they were leaving the crime scene. The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting uttered in the immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim was a true part of the res gestae. The statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. To conclude, the identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed,

trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. The petition was affirmed. The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

CHUA vs GAW G.R. No. 160855 April 16, 2008 NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20. On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: onehalf (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each. In said document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their coheir, Chua Sioc Huan. In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable within six (6) months without interest. Suy Ben Chua issued a check in the amount of P200,000 to the couple. However, the latter failed to pay the amount within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua sent them a demand letter, requesting to settle their obligation with the warning that he will take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so. Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the Regional Trial Court. During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his father who managed the business but he and his other siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc Huan, managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school, but he stopped when he got married and

found another job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy Lumber is operating. On cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990. On re-direct examination, respondent stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela. Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank, Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of them. He kept the amount in the house because he was engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the public market. Prior to the RTC decision Antonio died due to cardio vascular and respiratory failure. Thereafter RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua declaring that the latter is entitled to the payment of the amount of P200,000 with interest. Concepcion appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA denied Concepcions motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Concepcion contends that her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the Suy Ben Chuas testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Concepcion argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the calling party. ISSUE: Whether or not the adverse witness testimony elicited during cross-examination should be considered as evidence of the calling party.

HELD:

A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. This, the petitioner failed to do.

In the present case, the petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit the respondents testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she confessed that no other document was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that, after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business. Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented. All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. As already mentioned, in arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs ATIENZA G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008 CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original petition formandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001, approved by respondent Mayor on November 28, 2001, and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies. On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, theSanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil companies. This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. This was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals to "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-

3/MXD)" whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area from Industrial II to Commercial I. The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]. They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent. ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial admission is applicable against the respondent. HELD:

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same" as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedingsin the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity.

REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011 BRION, J.:

FACTS:

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, therespondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGGcontrolled board of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board and officers were elected. Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders directed Africa: to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI. During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"especially in the election of the members of the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourts control and supervision and prescribed guidelines." In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion. The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court and it enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.

In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident. During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution. The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130. In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]." The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009." On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane. Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners Motion to Admit the Bane deposition, the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice and Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence regarding the aforesaid deposition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the deposition is admissible in court. HELD:

The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses: (1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) (3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)

Considering that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation and, together with the parties affected, acted towards that end where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in another action must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence, and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence. Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the rule on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding.

The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing

evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed. The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed. The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines," or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved. In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions. In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the "parent" case Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases." To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice. We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an

exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. Second, the petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the petitioners attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan: Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that we should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.

PEOPLE vs SALAMEDA G.R. No. L-48274 January 30, 1982 FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS:

On August 14, 1977, Rosalino Tapalla Sr., a resident of Bo. lpil, Ormoc City, met the accused Jesus Fernandez at the tennis court of the Ormoc Sugar Company OSCO Fernandez told him to inform his son, Rosalino Tapalla Jr. to report to a boat (for work) The elder Tapalla did as requested and told his son to report for work. Rosalino Tapalla Jr. went to the boat past twelve o'clock midnight of Aug. 15, 1977 In the evening of August 15, 1977, past 12:00 o'clock, Reynaldo Rojas was at the conveyor near the Servo Balance of the OSCO sugar warehouse, Ormoc Sugar Central at Bo. lpil. He was going up the conveyor to work. He was following Rosalino Tapalla, Jr. At that time the accused Jesus Fernandez and Reynaldo Salameda were coming down the conveyor from the direction of the guntry. They met Rosalino Tapalla at the middle of the catwalk. They stopped for a while. Suddenly, Fernandez and Salameda assaulted and stabbed Rosalino Tapalla Jr. as a result of which Tapalla fell down. He then was thrown into the sea by the accused. When the accused were already almost approaching Reynaldo Rojas, the latter went down the conveyor and went home. ISSUE:

Whether or not the circumstantial evidence should be appreciated as sufficient to sustain conviction of the accused. HELD:

It appears from the errors assigned in the brief of the accused-appellants that the issues raised are factual. They are assailing the findings of fact of the trial court based on the credibility of witnesses. It is well settled that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the credibility of the witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed unless the said trial court overlooked facts of record which may change the result of the case. Thus, in People vs. Mercado, this Court held: We have held in a long line of cases that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts win generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly

overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case The conclusions reached by the trial court on the credibility of the contending witnesses are not to be disturbed. This is not only because of the peculiar competence of the trial court to observe first-hand the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and deportment as they confronted each other during the trial, but also because its conclusions are justified upon a judicious review of the evidence. As the records stand, there appears nothing of substantial importance that could justify a reversal.

The appellants have not shown that the trial court overlooked important facts which may change the result of the case. Indeed, the arguments in the brief of the appellants are concentrated on the alleged error of the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of the eye-witness, Reynaldo Rojas. It is to be noted that the trial court did not rely exclusively on the sole testimony of Reynaldo Rojas. The trial court considered established circumstantial evidence which supported the testimony of the eye-witness, Reynaldo Rojas.