review general military review<

DOCTRINE

2007 # 12

DOCTRINE Adaptation of Army Doctrine to Stabilization

FOREIGN STUDIES New COIN (Counterinsurgency) Concept of the US Marine Corps

FREEDOM OF SPEECH The Ivory Coast Republic: A Typical example of a Stabilization Operation?

STABILIZATION
STRATEGIC FUNCTION DECISIVE PHASE
>> Lessons learned
Principles of Pacification and Organization

Directeur de la publication : Gnral (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat Rdactrice en chef : Lieutenant Marie-Nolle Bayard Tl. : 01 44 42 35 91 Relecture des traductions : Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly Traductions : COL (CR) Robert Travaillot LCL (CR) Jean-Claude Laloire COL (CR) Daniel Sillon LCL (CR) Jacques de Vasselot LCL (CR) Alain Prignon LCL (CR) Donatien Lebastard Maquette : Christine Villey Tl. : 01 44 42 59 86 Schmas : PAO : Nathalie Dujardin Cration : amarena Crdits photos : SIRPA Terre (1re de couverture)

Table of contents # 12
Doctrine
Concerning the major doctrinal principles
From Transformation to Adaptation, a New Paradigm? Adaptation of Army Doctrine to Stabilization The Other Actors of a Stabilization Phase The Contribution of the Armed Forces in the Stabilization Processes Conception and Conduct of a Stabilization Phase at Interdepartmental Level A Comprehensive Approach to Crises p. 4 p. 9 p. 10 p. 16 p. 19 p. 22

Some particular perspectives

International Police Forces (IPF) in Stabilization Operations Is Stabilization the Desired End-State or Just one Stage of a More Elaborate Process? What Do CIMIC Activities Bring to Stabilization Operations - Operational Communication in Stabilization Operations Mastering the Time Factor: a Challenge The Main Stakes of Combat Service Support during a Stabilization Phase Taking the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical (NRBC) Hazard into Account during a Stabilization Phase p. 25 p. 29 p. 32 p. 35 p. 39

In order to prepare forces for stabilization missions

Stabilization Operations and their Influence in Terms of Equipment Taking into Account Stabilization Specificities within Preparation and Evaluation Exercices Stabilization: Even More Demanding as Regards Simulations Bibliography Main Abbreviations and Acronyms p. 55 p. 43 p. 47 p. 50 p. 53

Economica (4e de couverture)

Diffusion : Etablissement de Diffusion, dImpression et dArchives du Commissariat de lArme de Terre de Saint-Etienne Impression : Point dimpression de lArme de Terre de Saint-Maixent-lEcole Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires Dpt lgal : parution ISSN : 1293-2671 - Tous droits de reproduction rservs. Revue trimestrielle Conformment la loi informatique et liberts n 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, le fichier des abonns DOCTRINE a fait lobjet dune dclaration auprs de la CNIL, enregistre sous le n 732939. Le droit daccs et de rectification seffectue auprs du CDEF. Centre de Doctrine dEmploi des Forces BP 53 - 00445 ARMEES. Fax : 01 44 42 52 17 ou 821 753 52 17 Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr Mel : doctrine@cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr

French Military Thought: The officers publish

Interview of co-authors of the book Mountain Warfare - a Tactical Renewal p. 59

Foreign studies
New Coin (Counterinsurgency) Concept of the US Marine Corps Stability Operations - the Dynamics of COIN Doctrine in the Light of Recent British Experience German Army Stabilization Forces p. 62 p. 66 p. 71

Lessons learned
Principles of Pacification and Organization The EU in Africa: Complementarities and Limitations in Stabilization Operations The Medical Service within the Framework of Operation pervier No Stabilization Phase is like Another... but All Have the Same Basic Features p. 75 p. 79 p. 82 p. 85

Freedom of speech
Additional opinions on the stabilization
The Ivory Coast Republic: A Typical example of a Stabilization Operation? Military Co-operation in Stabilization: the Afghan example Pacification: the French School Operation Atlante (January-July 1954) - The Last pacification Operation in Indochina Win Hearts and Minds p. 89 p. 93 p. 97 p. 102 p. 106

Other contributions to doctrinal thought

The New Divisional French CP - A Situation Ten Years Later p. 108

Editorial
CDEF
he security of citizens is the very first mission of a State. But security must be understood as a whole: today, internal security is achieved as much outside as inside the national territory. Therefore, for the security of its citizens and the preservation of its interests, France needs to have a defense tool able to act outside its borders as the world evolution imposes a forward defense capability, but this must be a useful defense allowing it to effectively achieve on the ground the political effects it is looking for. First, this useful defense relies upon prevention and its various aspects, including deterrence which should also be multi-dimensional - which is not the least aspect. It also relies, if the crisis cannot be prevented, upon the stabilization of the conflict areas that will enable a return to normal living conditions and the suppression of the sources of violence before it spreads further - due to contagion or metastasis - and starts to threaten our own security.

Therefore, one can see that stabilization, globally speaking, is a strategic objective as well as a strategic effect and that, when analyzed at tactical level, it proves to be the very essential phase, the decisive phase, i.e. the one that wins the day of the strategic result and allows the achievement of the political effect. Of course it doesnt come out from the blue as it follows the intervention phase that, thanks to the often violent introduction of an armed force, is aiming at imposing a temporary order. This indispensable temporary order will have to be exploited as soon as possible thanks to and for the stabilization. It is easy to realize that the success of stabilization will very closely depend upon the conditions in which this first indispensable phase but only the preparatory one - of the intervention was conducted and that, therefore, this latter one must be conceived in accordance with the stabilization phase and in the manner it is intended to be carried out. This stabilization phase is complex, as far from being a river with a flow that consistently regulates itself as time goes by, it is basically hybrid and entails coercive and violence mastering periods and also high and low intensity ones. As noted by the Army Chief of Staff on October 19 2006 at the Ecole militaire in Paris: stabilization doesnt mark the beginning of a period of peace, on the contrary it is a period of confrontation in all the military and civilian fields. This is why one must be careful not to reason based upon a linear evolution of the situation. The storm can follow quietness without notice. It is also hybrid because success can only be constructed thanks to the convergence of various courses of action - the conventional military course of action being only one of its components - and thanks to the complementarity of joint actions but above all inter-ministry ones. Again for the Army Chief of Staff, it is the maneuver, i.e. the combination of military and civilian assets that is the only one producing the effects allowing the neutralization or the discredit of armed groups that offers prospects to population groups1. All this obliges. We will not carry out successfully the present and most likely operations in the future without undergoing a very serious reflection and adaptation effort. The effort to conduct is significant. It will have to deal with all the various factors that make up, for a modern army, the new operational capabilities of the land forces to which the world and the conflict evolutions have given back a really central role as far as the capability of the State to ensure the security of France and the defense of its interests is concerned.

When thinking further about this, one notices that today stabilization has a twofold dimension. First of all, it asserts itself as a real strategic function of its own and in itself, an aim of the action outside ones borders; in this respect, it could very well become one of the few essential strategic functions that would be selected in a possible future White Paper. Then today, it is considered as the essential tactical phase of the interventions of the French armed forces outside the national territory. This is the one we are concerned with in this issue. This phase is essential. It is essential because it is during this phase that the strategic and political success or failure of the military interventions decided by the government is achieved. In the same way that one speaks about the main effect when reasoning tactically, one can speak of main effort or essential phase, in the sense that success during this phase warrants the overall success of the intervention as well as the achievement of the main effect warrants the success of the tactical maneuver. The Army Chief of Staff was very clear on this point on October 18 2006: for him, the idea of a decisive battle is not as pertinent as it was before. It is now the stabilization phase of the ground space that focuses the main effort .

Brigadier General Vincent DESPORTES Commander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center

1 October 18 2006 - National Defense and Armed Forces Commission.

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Concerning the major doctrinal principles

From Transformation to Adaptation, a New Paradigm?

Brigadier general Vincent Desportes1, Commander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center, answers some questions raised by the necessary adaptation of the military tool to the new operations context.

n some way or other, all European armies are shifting over towards Transformation. Some authors believe this is an imitation of the American posture, others say this is an acculturation, as national specificities remain. Knowing that the European strategic thinking is rather close to Clausewitzs, do you think there is a risk of jominization of the European thinking?

Transformation is only the new name given by the Americans in the early 2000s to the RMA - or revolution in military affairs - to give it a new push. Therefore, it is a trend that goes beyond names although the American RMA concept - purely technological - is very much weakened compared to the richness of the initial Soviet concept that appeared in the early 60s with its three interwoven dimensions, the social one, the economical one... and the technological one. I do believe that tomorrow we could speak of something else as the Pentagon has just closed down its Transformation office and as the term has already lost a lot of its gorgeousness within the Joint Forces Command at Norfolk. One will notice that the Transformation term - very imprecise indeed, is vague enough to become a rag-bag notion with multiple meanings and could very soon be replaced by a new buzz word we might have to adopt. What seems important at this point as far as I am concerned is to notice that we seem to reach a kind of a dead end. Transformation does not really bring what we expected from it; by far it has not demonstrated its capability of producing on the ground the expected political results. While watching the last truly dimensioning matters - Iraq and Lebanon -, we can notice a major crisis of the concept that underlies modern Western warfare; we can really perceive the limit of what has been called Transformation. This should unavoidably lead to some reconsideration, not only of the modalities of Transformation, but also of its general philosophy.

allowed by the mastering of knowledge. But, what can be noticed? Results are not there. Not in technical terms effectively, Transformation seems to be able to destroy better - but in terms of strategic results. Initially, Transformation fell under a logic of destruction, generally in a stand off mode, at a security range, thanks to a better management of the communication networks. In some ways, it is the reflection of what could be called the targeting culture; indeed it had been conceived against an enemy perceived as a set of targets to be destroyed, but todays opponent has well grasped that he had the utmost interest to offer to our smart fires a battlefield that is either empty or very closely intermingled within the population. The transparency of the battlefield only pertains to objects that can be digitized that are neither the majority, nor essential in case of an asymmetrical warfare. Thus, one can observe a twofold phenomenon: the enemy less and less constitutes targets (as he has understood that if he became a target, he would be destroyed) and, on the other hand, destruction seems to become counter-productive in its ambition to directly produce some political efficiency. This was very clear in Iraq. One has been able to observe that the three weeks of war between March and April 2003 did not bring at this point any favorable strategic result although they were an outstanding tactical victory in which the OODA2 loop has never been so short. On the contrary.
One has indeed observed a technical result, but it finally equals to nil. Subsequently last summer, the Israeli difficulties were plain as day. Despite very significant technical results that are discovered gradually as far as the destruction of ground targets from the third dimension is concerned, Tsahal couldnt achieve the initial political goal. Technical perfection proves incapable of producing by itself the desired final effect. A fast result and a minimal commitment are being sought? Conversely, the outcome turns out to be lengthy land operations. Iraq is three weeks and a half of transformed warfare and 4 years and a half of asymmetrical crisis. Within two years and a half, the American power got rid of Germany, Italy and Japan;

If we go backward, what is Transformation? It is the taking into account of significant progresses made in the three fields of accuracy, detection and communication, all of this being packaged in a profound trust in the superiority

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where do we stand today in Iraq? What about Kosovo? 80 days of transformed or undergoing Transformation warfare, without reaching the political goal, and we have now entered the seventh year of non-transformed crisis. Therefore, we can really see that the strategic debate of the late 90s that - rightly then - gave birth to RMA and later to the Transformation, now seems to appear as being widely out of touch with the reality of the world and the evolution of the essence of conflicts.The transformed warfare does not seem anymore capable of efficiently carrying out politics by other means. At least it seems to be one time behind its adversary who already transformed himself according to this very transformation. Therefore, we cannot spare the essential issue pertaining to the new conditions of the employment of force, to the change in the military efficiency and the necessary evolution of this tool. Are the routes on which we engaged ourselves yesterday really fulfilling todays political requirements? The answer is probably no, and this is not illogical. Our vision of the world and of warfare gave birth to a military tool and courses of action that were adapted at that time, but it also led the potential opponent to change in nature and to find answers and some forms of new resistance facing the new weapons we had invented. There are no longer many opponents in the world wishing to become the willing victim of the kind of warfare that we master, that we are willing to conduct and to which, very often, we continue to prepare ourselves. In the end, one realizes that our technology addiction could have led us very well to a certain blindness and to raise the right questions too late. Today instead of wondering whether the European powers are to somewhat align themselves along the lines set forth by the United States - and here the answer is yes, for a certain number of reasons -, the question is to know whether we will not have to go backward. And here again, the answer is probably yes. One can notice that a great part of the American armed forces and I am especially thinking about the land forces, are undergoing changes. This does not mean that they reject technology - it is indispensable, for them as for us but they do realize that if they want to be able to solve

the political problems they are demanded to settle employing the force of weapons, they have to change their vision of conflicts, to adapt to the new wars, to the new threats, to their new expressions and field the instruments of the new military efficiency.

Doctrine

Another difficulty comes from the fact that first of all Transformation is turned towards overseas operations. But, more and more, the armed forces must be able to act inside their homelands, for assistance missions to the population and, if need be, in the answer brought to terrorism actions. Security is now global; globalization also encompasses violence. The population would not understand, rightly so, that the military tool could not be useful at home. If we cannot do it, we would take the risk of not being capable of carrying overseas operations because the budgets would shift to other ministries, which at the same time would deprive the government of its overseas action capability. General Bruno Cuche, the French Army Chief of staff, when addressing this topic, speaks about dual capabilities; this is a strong idea we are going to implement very actively. We have to think about the routes enabling us to carry out overseas and homeland operations, employing the same men and assets.

Some authors consider that along with the Effects Based Operations (EBO), the Americans are reinventing the wheel, by trying to impose to their opponent a well defined behavior. But others think that because of this the very nature of the EBO is able to counter this Transformation of the strategic thinking thanks to technology. But the issue, and one has just to read the literature, the EBO are however very much using technology. Do you think that the EBO will enable to get out of Transformation?

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The first point as far as the EBO are concerned, is that they teach us very little, to us the French; they appear somewhat as a banality adorned with an attracting name. How can it be envisaged that up to now warfare had been conducted without being concerned with the produced effects? In some ways, the EBO are the rediscovery by the Americans that the effect, or the end goal, is more important than the means. The notion of effect was not present in the American tactical military reasoning as this latter one is based on a succession of tasks to be achieved. Conversely, in the French military thinking, the tactic and strategic reasoning has always been based upon the notion of effect, articulated around the main effect, which is the converging point of the execution of the action. The Americans have extremely powerful reflection capabilities; they continue to refine the process. But are the EBO capable of overcoming the inherent contradictions of Transformation? Maybe. But it should not be forgotten while implementing it that this concept taken from General David Deptula to organize the rescue of the USAF thanks to the postponement of the sole attrition technique is a rhetoric that is firstly used for formal and budgetary purposes. I will add that the concept carries with it a great dangerous illusion: the one according to which the conduct of warfare can be meticulously orchestrated and individual behaviors

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are reasonably predictable. If that was true, with all the digitized power of the United States, the situation in Iraq would be very much different today! But this effect based maneuver concept has however a positive aspect; it has enabled for many, to rediscover the non-military dimensions of warfare. Operations have always been the convergence of a certain number of operation lines, with reference to a Jomini term. During the Cold War, the main operation line was of a military nature, up to the extent that we had forgotten that other lines of operations existed. When faced with the difficulties pertaining to the management of crises, we discovered other lines of operations that are quite as important, namely the diplomatic, humanitarian, security lines, etc. What now matters is the global coherence towards a unique political goal. One can no longer conceive operations that are solely military. The rediscovery of effects, first of all, consists in taking into account that very diversified tools and players must be implemented, or employed, to reach the political results. Finally, the EBO are a method enabling to place in coherence all these actions, but it faces a reality: this method of influencing behaviors only works if the opponent follows rationales that can be influenced, if he is organized around systems, which is barely the case today. What should especially come out from the EBO principles is to go beyond our somewhat too strong Western relationship with technology, the relationship that in the end has led us to forget that finality must prevail over capability and that the real issue is the one pertaining to the finality of the military action. I would like to come back for a while to the present difficulties pertaining to our military action classic models. To make it simple, probably caricatured, during centuries the military action was centered on the notion of State. The purpose was to defend a State or to destroy the expression assets of the State. It is the diversion of the notion of State, upwards but essentially downwards, its deliquescence in most crisis areas, which led to the efficiency deterioration of the former expression means of power. We are now speaking of increased security for the populations and of increased influence rather than power. Therefore the answers of yesterday centered on this capability to destroy or on the protection of the expression means of the State are no longer applicable. Yesterday, the military tool enabled to directly reach the strategic objective, because once the opposing armed forces had been destroyed we came to the peace treaty and matters were settled. This is over. Winning the battle remains an essential step - and one must have the best tools to this end -, an essential step, but only an intermediate one. After this first phase, the essential role of the military tool is now to establish, on the ground and in ne, the conditions enabling the accomplishment of the strategic result, therefore political. The military tool has now become a mediator; to employ modern jargon, it is no longer a direct doer. Therefore, it will be necessary to coordinate our action with the other players who will have to accompany it and later take over to reach the objective: other ministries, NGOs, international players, etc. One can see here that all the military action is modified by this. As Lyautey said, one does not capture a village in the same way as one opens a strategic line, or when it is the matter of reestablishing normal life conditions immediately the day after.... One can perceive that it is the very place of warfare that has changed. Yesterday, warfare was conducted in the three dimensions, in open spaces, amongst armed forces. Now, warfare is essentially conducted on the ground - because it is on the ground that crises are born and settled - in closed spaces and amongst the populations. This new emergence of the population as a stake and as a major player is absolutely fundamental. Yesterday, the population was the State: now, the population imposes itself at the very heart of any crisis and of any military action. There is only one single front to hold or to conquer, it is the one of populations, within a time span which is long, necessarily long. Yet, as all the Transformation is based upon the increase in the tempos, one can see that it loses some of its purpose as the crisis and conflicts are settled amongst the populations that live on another pace. The crises settlement time is no longer the OODA virtual time span, or the short time expected by the Western impatience, it is the lengthy time pertaining to crises management. The real time of the OODA and of plasma screens is not the useful time for the settlement of crises. One can notice this everywhere. In this useful time, the action and the ground environment are becoming more and more essential, but being part of an overall maneuver that can only obviously be of a joint nature, I think that this is never reminded enough. All this has another consequence. Previously, the decisive phase of warfare was the first brutal intervention one during which the utmost destruction and highest technology all came into play. Now, the decisive phase has become the one following the intervention phase, which is called the stabilization phase. This latter one is a lengthy one; its conduct, its success or its failure will allow or not the settlement of the crisis. Therefore, the military tool must no longer be conceived for the first phase only. The second one has very different implications: first of all it is a reconstruction phase, of the social contract and of all its underlying aspects (security, humanitarian conditions, minimal State...). After the intervention phase, one finds oneself in a vacuum, at the fugitive moment the AngloSaxons call the golden hour. If one is not able to take advantage of it very quickly, all achievements accomplished during the intervention phase will become useless. Therefore, the military tool must be able to shift promptly into this stabilization phase before handing over the relay to the other intervening parties during the so called normalization phase. This does not entail that the violence and destruction capabilities are not necessary. They are essential during the intervention, but also after it, as power is essential for the success of the 2nd phase. Indeed, it is the violence and deterrence capabilities that will allow, on the ground, thanks to the implementation of what we call the reversibility principle, to the decrease in the level of violence and the multiple actions of the various intervening parties. Therefore, the 2nd phase is a mix of initial capabilities and of some new capabilities and knowhows that the armed forces must also master.

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On the other hand, it is clear that if the Western powers did not preserve these conventional violence capabilities, we would very naturally return to this mode of expression of warfare. If one wants to prevent conventional confrontations, one must preserve this type of capabilities. The difficulty is that we are faced with the requirement of having a wide range of capabilities; as we have seen, we must have an army with dual capabilities, but also more polyvalent. But, as all Western armies, we are facing budget constraints. Choices are difficult to make, but a path seems to emerge: from the moment when no army in the world is able to resist in open terrain facing a Western coalition, do we still have to continue in this sort of drift towards a permanent high technology that renders armaments more and more costly? Some real questions may be raised about the pertinence of the increase of this technological gap. Other needs, other imperious requirements are emerging. Contrarily to what we might have thought, technology only very partially solves the issue of volumes. We still have the need for a significant volume of forces because the stabilization problems are settled thanks to a presence on the ground, because warfare, finally, is a matter of control and this control entails volumes in our ever widening areas of actions. If the United States are facing difficulties in Iraq, it is probably because the Americans have not committed on the ground - conversely to what the American generals recommended - enough people upfront; now they are significantly increasing their presence on the ground even if this might be too late. In fact, the initial mistake seems to be hard to overcome, as it was the case for the Israelis this summer. One must engage firmly on the way towards the appropriate technological level. One must think about the adequate balance to be found between the essential volumes that are necessary to the modern management of crises and the budgets that are to be invested in the technological contributions that are, on the other hand, unavoidable even if the asymmetrical stealthiness neutralizes a great deal of its aspects and if quantity is a quality in itself as the British say.

than the Americans, no greater observers of the war in Algeria and of the battle of Algiers, which was technically won by the French army, than the Americans. It would be pretentious to say that they integrate the French lessons learned. But the Americans have a considerable reflection power, are marked by the can do spirit and all this with a military budget amounting to half of the military expenditures in the world. As they encounter difficulties to solve their problems, they intelligently watch what is done elsewhere. They are very open to what we have been able to do. And they draw very quickly the lessons from their experiences. Indeed, I believe that it is one of the lessons we would be very inspired to remember. They are led by this efficiency will, without any prejudice. They consistently send teams to Iraq to observe what is going on and draw the lessons from this. This is true in the technical field, but also in other areas, that of doctrine for example. The Americans have understood that the stabilization phase is the actual strategic phase in the operation. Yes, in a certain way the American approach comes close to an old European one. I imagine that we will find a happy medium. In this respect, I can observe a surprising

Doctrine

The Marines and the US Army have just issued a new Joint Doctrine pertaining to counterinsurrection. It is based upon the Afghani and Iraqi experiences. It leads to think about certain prescriptions pertaining to the mastering of violence. Are the United States also in the process of integrating the European lessons learned?

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They are firstly integrating their own lessons learned. The notions of Rapid Decisive Operations and of Shock and Awe no longer operate, they have very well understood this; no one has been able to turn these operations into a strategic success. The sole expression of brutal power, the idea of remote control thanks to effects, are no longer valid because they are not capable, by themselves, to achieve the political result. The sole power-projection is not able to enforce political order: it is also necessary to deploy forces. And by the number. In addition, the Americans rediscover with a lot of interest the European experience of what was not yet called stabilization. There are no greater readers of Lyautey and Gallieni, of Galula and Trinquier,

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crossroad of trajectories: as the Americans pushed the European armies towards Transformation, we can now observe this move of the European armies going towards the American armies of yesterday and the American armies that are embracing the crises on the ground and that are evolving in the opposite direction. As far as the French armed forces are concerned, I believe they are going in the right direction. We are making progress in the improvement in our technologies but we also take into account the reality of crises. I think we will have to continue to raise some questions. What are the crises of tomorrow? Are we observing a definite change in the strategic picture? What combats will we have to conduct? The answer has to be given by the geo-politicians, but also by the politicians; the budgets must be allocated, the useful tool must be defined and the new model of army must be built in accordance with the political project and their vision of France in the world. Our French military tool has decreased in volume since the end of the Cold War but one can notice that it has been reduced in a homothetic manner. However, I observe that the crises have not changed at all in a homothetic manner. Therefore, we must think about what could look like, in the long term, to a kind of inadequacy if one is not careful. I believe that now everybody in France is calling for a new White Paper, the last one goes back to 1994 even if, in the meantime, it has been supplemented by other documents. In 1994, we had only roughly measured what the end of the Cold War entailed; but now, we are as far from the fall of the Berlin Wall as we were in 1939 from November 11 1918! There is no other choice but to take into account the evolution of the world and that of the potential opponents. While speaking extensively of techniques and capabilities, in a kind of understandable mimicry, we have forgotten to raise some fundamental issues about the finality of the military commitment. This might very well be because they did not raise this type of questions, because they encountered difficulties to understand their opponent that the Israelis intervened in Lebanon in an out of sync. manner in comparison with reality. Of course, they did not really lose the battle, but we know that when faced to an asymmetrical opponent, a Western power that does not win nevertheless encounters a real setback. We are one of the collateral victims of this engagement and of this lack of success: what came out definitely lowered is the classic vision of the military power, the one which still shapes us. Each of us was able to observe that the military power could be bypassed; we now have to think about the new answers that should be given and stop bringing smarter and smarter answers to questions that no longer exist. One must get prepared to the war we will have to conduct - and not to the one that we would like to do because we know how to do it - and we should know that the principles of irregular warfare, its politico-military grammar, are not affected by technological evolutions. From this standpoint, Transformation, as it presented itself up to now, often too disdainful vis--vis reality, seems to be long lasted. It can bring tactical results, it does not grant any warranty in terms of strategic success. We cannot remain idle, facing this unclear concept that sometimes seems to go forward only for the sake of its very existence. The essential term is no longer Transformation. What is fundamental is adaptation. We have to transform Transformation and once Transformation has been transformed, it is adaptation. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Georgelin, recently restated that the essential quality of the military tool was adaptability. It is around the same topic that the Army Chief of staff, General Cuche, recently expressed himself. Taking Transformation as the sole axis of evolution is no longer capable to answer the realities of today and tomorrow; it has demonstrated its incapability to settle crises on its own. If the Americans are adapting themselves, this is a good sign. In the French armed forces, for efficiency reasons and confronted to the multiple crises we are military committed into, we are working on similar themes.

The situation in Afghanistan is critical. Some persons criticize the policy consisting in setting up some PRTs and some stabilization elements that would entail a shift astray from combat operations, especially from the moment Pakistan plays an unclear role. In your opinion and in the absolute, what should be done?

It is not my job to deal directly with these matters. On the core of the problem, what is certain as far as doctrine is concerned, is that one should not have too ambitious objectives, and if there is no adequacy between ambitions and assets, success will not be there. The reasonable goal is to re-create a minimal State, to reconstruct a minimal social contract, their minimal social contract that might certainly not be similar to ours. And this can only be achieved when the security level is satisfactory. The idea behind the PRTs to put in coherence operation lines on the ground is obviously a good idea. But this is done under extremely difficult conditions; at the same time, the level of violence has to come down, employing violence each time this becomes necessary. There is no other solution. The Armed Forces must be able to carry out both at the same time.

1 This interview, which has been updated for this new publication, was published in its original form in the DSI publication (Dfense et scurit internationale). It is published here with the gracious authorization of the AREION group that publishes this publication. 2 Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.

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Adaptation of Army Doctrine

Doctrine

to Stabilization
N

ew conditions came to amend in the same time, the goals, ends and means of conflicts in respect of political as well as military levels. These conditions are the consequences of the strategic mutation created by the absence of either state of war or state of peace. It evolved towards an original between the two situation where nations are affected by a violent stress which overflows in armed conflicts. On the same theater of operations, confrontation goes on while peace is being built. Actors are more and more diverse, they are all interested under various accounts to the pursuit or to the end of hostilities. Regular armies gave way to terrorists, guerillas and criminal organizations. This threat does not follow any rule and in all cases not ours. It constantly looks for any imbalance in all fields to exploit our slightest weaknesses. It evolves indistinctly within populations, on all terrains, in particular the ones that operate their equalizing power against conventional forces. This is a kind of engagement where use of force is only a part of the solution. Military action is however often the main recourse to fulfill general security and reconstruction missions. This is the kind of engagement where smartness and moral strength are taking precedence over the mere destruction capabilities. It is no longer calling for confrontation but for resentment and bypassing. Thus technological power becomes a factor of unrest. War turns asymmetrical; power disappears when facing a willingness and a multitude of violence actors intermingled with the population. Recourse to mere and brutal violence is denying the world complexity. Other methods should then be elaborated to achieve the strategic objective. If military intervention remains indispensable to resolve a conflict, it is its capacity to create a stable and secure environment which is indeed decisive to lead to peace. The first consequence is the obsolescence of a closed distinction between the operating methods: coercion and violence control. The second one is the necessary control of the physical and human environment and its diversity. This is why a military intervention is now described according to an operations continuum. This takes into account the whole of operations types to be conducted and effects to be achieved, up to the establishment of the conditions indispensable for strategic success.

BY

COLONEL PHILIPPE COSTE - DEO/CDEF1

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Concerning the major doctrinal principles

The emergence of an operations continuum centered on stabilization phase
It appears that on the same theater and in the same time are conducted: - actions of coercion, usually against adversaries using guerrilla and terrorism, - actions of violence control against diverse protagonists including crowds, - and actions for re-establishment of urban living conditions. The political objective is nevertheless still the same: stabilizing the theater. This comes before the normalization phase which is the civilian phase of the exit of crisis. This is why several types of successive operations occur during a campaign. These are described according to the sketch hereafter:

The operations continuum

The first phase of operation is a purely military engagement. The objective of this intervention phase is to impose the military decision whatever the operation type is. This phase is indispensable, i.e. required but not sufficient. Then the stabilization decisive phase which is an interim period comes. Its objective is to conduct to peace. The (French) Army Chief of Staff defined it as: an operation phase following an initial intervention or a mere deployment designed to trigger, as soon as possible, a normalization process, especially in the field of security, in order to progressively transfer responsibilities from the force to a recognized authority.

actions to assist the population and to reconstruct including disarming and the re-establishment of military and security structures; actions to support the force engagement within the population (OMI2 et CIMIC3). These actions are not restricted to the sole military. It appears then necessary to progressively build up a capacity of civilian crisis management. This will be achieved through planning Frances participation in each of the above quoted areas while considering the international competition. The last phase of a return to a state of law includes the transfer of responsibilities. It cannot start prior to the stabilization phase is completed.

This phase gathers several types of actions: securing actions aiming at controlling the environment and encompassing: actions of general area control with a view of restoring a generalized security and freedom of movement; law and order actions including protection of individuals and properties and restoring law and order; intelligence actions;

Taking into account the environment complexity

The importance of stabilization phase is coming out of this operations continuum. During that phase, effects of armed force capabilities in material but also in immaterial fields of action will be considered. Land units benefit from the influence and the persuasion provided by the environment control, and security or humanitarian interventions.

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However, one of the main characteristics of this kind of operations lies with the multiplicity of actors influencing the conflict sequencing. These are temporary protagonists who adopt a hinge-type organization. They look for strategic and political achievements through succeeding tactical actions. Moreover, following the dispersion of traditional political entities, populations became both actors and stakes. In the same time, the diverse violence perpetrators are all claiming that they hold a legitimacy. This means acting in the name of a people, a community, an ethnical, religious or any other minority. The meaning each protagonist allocates to his war generates a real war of meaning. It is a legitimacy confrontation that justifies armed confrontation. A military intervention should also have a meaning, which can be understood by all actors and is likely to be approved and supported. The force under a mandate should justify its action and maintain this legitimacy. This is all the more required as going from the defense of vital interests to an intervention, for which these interests are not always jeopardized, does not imply an immediate adherence from the public opinion. This meaning war became a real military activity in parallel to coercion or violence control actions. Perception combat at tactical level involves all units. It is based on influence and behavior. Conventional relations between maneuver and space are still there but they are more complex due to the deep involvement of human aspects. Environment control is a condition to be capable to prevent violence escalation; direct action on belligerents constitutes often an epiphenomenon within an overall management of action in space. This last one got denser in respect of physical features and demography; it opened with the access to global information for all. It becomes more and more difficult to control whereas this control is the only way to enable stabilization operations to be successful. It is less the capacity to maneuver large formations of forces that matters than the capacity to control the overlapping of areas constituting the environment. Control of belligerents goes in particular through a precise knowledge of space and the part of technique decreases because experienced knowledge advantages the anticipation of actions.

Control consists in mastering land space and human space in respect of physical and immaterial fields. This will enable to act preventively or to react against what could be harmful to the security mission. It is the priority course of action as control is, at the end of the day, the goal of any military commitment: impose ones own will to the other while keeping ones freedom of action. The military leader should however combine processes presenting the best ratio cost/efficiency. He should try to control only what is strictly needed. He can concede the adversary, punctually and locally, zones for free movement. But, if he does not control all his AOR, he is monitoring its gaps. In this respect, environment control should not be confused with area control. According to the security degree looked for, control may either be focused on some specific threats or on some activities considered as priorities such as safeguard, or be general to make sure of the full ascendancy over physical, human and immaterial environment. Control design and implementation should be dynamic; it will be all the more efficient as it is supported by an efficient deterrence and response capabilities. Deterrence responds to a need to spare forces and to control violence. It corresponds to the influence and credibility that the forces should demonstrate to control the environment. It consists in showing ones force and determination to use it. Meanwhile we are aiming at not having to use it. It is based on a response capacity staged by the behavior of force members through spectacular demonstrations and through information. The spectrum of types of interventions designed to act by force on objectives previously identified is wide. It covers actions ranging from crowd control to large offensive actions. It requires a wide range of strengths for forces.

Doctrine

Conduct of stabilization
During stabilization, land forces are organizing their action around four generic tactical modes4. During this specific phase, their combination should enable the military leaders to deliver to the adversary as well as to the population the feeling that the force is almighty. It should however comply with the requirements to grade effects and to minimize damages. The commitment of local forces should also be privileged. This will enable to benefit from their knowledge of the area of action and contribute to conciliate with the population. Securing is the major tactical mode although not exclusive for the stabilization phase. It is implemented according to the following courses of action: counterinsurgency, area control, interposition and evacuation of threatened population. Processes are mainly aiming at controlling the environment, at assisting the population and the reconstruction process.

Actions in support of the population meet in priority the operation humanitarian requirements but also the needs for the force to found its action within the population. Usually initiated and supported by the international community, the reconstruction inter-agency process starts at the end of the intervention phase, gets more intense for the stabilization phase and ends during normalization phase. It intervenes in the economic, cultural and social fields. It is assigned mainly to CIMIC organizations within the force. This can also be associated to the political component of reconstruction, mainly through security and support of electoral processes. The situation prevailing at the end of the intervention requires moreover frequently to re-establish the local military and security forces. This specific component of reconstruction, known under NATOs acronym of SSR (Security Sector Reform) may constitute a key condition to military commitment. Reconstruction of military and security systems include actions of recruitment, education and training. It may need supplying equipment. It should be correlated with the process of disarming, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR). This last one aims at preventing from the return to any form of violence. It consists in disarming and demobilizing the armed fractions and to reinsert in civilian life those from their combatants who have not been reintegrated in the new armed and security forces.

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Subsequently, exploiting lessons learned from pacification5 operations and enriched by return of experience from present operations, CDEF launched doctrinal taking into account of the decisive aspect of the stabilization phase. A doctrine of employment for land forces in stabilization was published in 20066 and followed this year by guidance document FT 01 win the battle, conduct to peace7. Description of courses of action which are specific to securing shall then start with the updating of TTA 903 and 904 which is also scheduled in 2007. Taking into consideration this phase during operational preparation is needed. This enables to comply with the requirements of strictly targeting the preparation of our forces to the reality of their operational commitments such as referred to by the Army Chief of Staff.

1 DEO/ CDEF : Employment & Organization Division /Forces Employment Doctrine Center 2 OMI : oprations militaires dinfluence/military influence operations. 3 CIMIC: Civilian-Military Co-operation. 4 These are offense, defense, security and assistance. 5 As these from Marchal (General of the Army) Lyautey or Marchal Gallieni. See specific article in this magazine.

6 Approved November, 23 2006. 7 Published in January 2007. 8 General of the Army. 9 Translators note : Compagnie Europenne dIntelligence Stratgique.

If, when seizing a den, we mainly think of the market we will establish the day after, we do not seize it in the same way. And when we conquer with such a state of mind, some words are no longer keeping exclusively their military meaning. It is the method of military bases established rationally, pushed forward with a view of permanent occupation on the very land that has just been conquered; of the officer immediately turned into an administrator, a builder on the ground where he planted the flag, until quietness be granted and sturdily established pacification enable the hand over of this terrain to normal administration.
Marchal 8 LYAUTEY in Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar

A seminar organized at the Ecole militaire (Paris) on October, 19 2006 by the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF) in liaison with the Compagnie Europenne de Dfense 9 (CEIS) had for theme When weapons get silent. Anticipating and Managing the exit of crisis. Military and non military met to confront their respective roles, their experiences and to elaborate proposals in order to better manage these complex phases where numerous actors are inter-weaved. The outcomes from this meeting are gathered in a special issue of Doctrine magazine When weapons get silent.

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The Other Actors of a Stabilization Phase

T

Doctrine

he military actor is at the center of stabilization operations. This is by the way fully illustrated by a number of articles in this magazine. The seminar quoted in preamble demonstrates the will of armed forces to open themselves to the outside world. This world is indeed more and more present in modern conflicts. Moreover, this occurs earlier and earlier. The actors, who are numerous, organized, more or less powerful, may also have slightly divergent objectives. We must then know them, multiply exchanges, to converge towards a comprehensive coherence. It should, in particular, consist in enabling the transfer to normalization phase, equivalent to an exit of crisis strategy in optimized conditions (restoring the State authority and its prerogatives, reconstruction in final stage, re-starting the economic system). Whereas these actors are numerous, they can be grouped in two main categories: state actors and non-state actors. After a description of these two families of actors, it would then be possible to identify what should be complied with or improved in order to still increase the efficiency of the whole system.
BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRDRIC GOUT FROM DEO/CDEF1

State actors
State actors are today still occupying a huge space in conflicts resolution. Not to forget the State concerned by the on-going crisis, all external state actors are playing a role adapted to their capacities and to the needs considered when conflicts are dealt with. The multinational environment is often privileged both to establish the intervention legitimacy but also to share the burden of contributions to be provided.

of their actions as well as the resources committed allows to achieve the desired strength and coherence. States take a great responsibility for these commitments, even though their respective contribution seems not to be essential. The complexity is then to associate a multitude from different origins, each one having its own characteristics. Interventions of the IMF and the World Bank are relatively discreet and receive few media coverage, whereas their actions are key conditions for the normalization phase. Creating conditions viable on an economic consideration is a requirement to have some hope for an exit to the crisis.

Inter-state actors
UNO is the base on which the actions legitimacy is founded. We cannot envisage getting completely rid of today. NATO very frequently, the European Union more and more often and why not tomorrow the African Union or any interstate organization are the actors who assume responsibility for the conduct of an operation on the ground. In some particular cases, two distinct organizations may work alongside. For instance, in the Ivory Coast Republic, UNOCI is deployed in the same time as French operation Licorne. We can observe that in this specific case, France has been in particular assigned the mission to intervene for and under UNOCIs request. The scope is then perfectly defined and complementary functions established.

The local political class

The particularity of a stabilization phase followed by a normalization phase is that all should be progressively implemented to re-establish government organizations capable to ensure the state durability, after the departure of the last servicemen, advisors and assistants. The local political class should progressively take over all the State management responsibilities. This task is sometimes complicated by elections which come frequently to end this transition period. Complex responsibilities should then be taken, in a context always difficult with a legitimacy sometimes challenged while preparing the next electoral deadlines. The example of Iraq demonstrates the extreme fragility of local leaders. Conversely, that from Ivory Coast shows that President Gbagbo seems to be satisfied with a pre-electoral comfort.

Other actors alien to the theater concerned

A force is frequently built up by different States. The addition

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phases. They can indeed act on local populations for the benefit of the temporary authorities in place, for the benefit of the opposition or of a part of the population. Local population is at the very heart of the concerns of the whole of actors. It is sometimes also a melting pot which can generate terrorists either isolated or organized. It is then difficult to fight against these individuals or groups of individuals as they know how to melt into the population. Creation of militias, frequently exploited by leaders either governing or opposing, like in the Ivory Coast Republic, may become a destabilizing factor. Their actions more or less coordinated and controlled are frequently unpredictable. They can mainly instrument a part of the population, for which the trauma of a recent conflict is still very present. Criminal or mafia-like organizations are also taking advantage of the camouflage provided by the population to get organized and all the more fuelled by a context really favorable to their activities. The disorganized economic situation, idle and available labor force as well as a demanding market, are as many factors favorable to the development of mafia-like and criminal activities. In the same time, organizations dealing with fight against crime are still being educated, then established. However, educated and experienced specialists are missing. Finally, in some cases, the role played by religious organizations cannot be neglected. They can contribute to the country reconstruction or, conversely, call for a reinforcement of community spirit. Then it becomes an obstacle.

Non-state actors
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media and private companies are often actors alien to the theater. However, it is also possible to find some among local actors. These also include a number of other people involved (local populace, militias, criminal and mafia-like organizations, religious organizations). Their weight may be considerable in respect of the action to be led.

Actors alien to the concerned theater

NGOs are numerous and multiplied mainly in the eighties. They are frequently known as they need to communicate to validate their action and to collect the funds that are necessary for their running. On the ground, they cooperate with the whole or a part of the actors to be more efficient. Medias are present everywhere on crisis areas. They cover all events and may influence and even modify some decisions or orientations. They witness everything actors can do on the ground. They are both witness and actor. Private companies are occupying an increasing position when the stabilization phase gives way to the normalization phase. They often anticipate and are present very early, even when minimum security conditions are still not granted. They are directly contributing to the country reconstruction.

Local actors
Local non-state actors are numerous. Their interests are sometimes absolutely conflicting. Local media are rather powerful during the stabilization

ADC DUBOIS/SIRPA Terre

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For a comprehensive coherence

The actors previously considered were grouped in two logical sets. They can also be gathered in two opposed categories according to a new breakdown. The first category gathers all these who participate in setting up conditions for an exit of crisis strategy. The second one gathers those who draw a benefit from maintaining instable conditions that are favorable to the development of their own interests. An action should then be led against all these who oppose the implementation of conditions related to a normalization phase. It would reduce or remove an important harming capacity which could question the overall action. Multiplicity of actors, diversity of actions led and partly shared competences are requiring a co-ordination and a perfect control of the route to follow.

All equally insisted on a necessary co-ordination of actions. Complementary roles to better share the same understanding of issues, planning rationalizing to increase efficiency and shared information are looked for in a common interest. Logistics is a good example to illustrate this statement. Some assets, only held by state organizations may sometimes be used to forward food supplies or medicines to areas with a difficult access or when emergency is revealed. We should then try constantly to associate military and civilian actors at least on the concerned theater and even at a higher level.

Doctrine

Frances example
For each event, France activates a crisis management and coordination cell within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make the first urgent decisions. This crisis management cell is inter-agency and may also involve NGOs. It is not maintained for all the intervention duration. This would indeed require a human investment likely to be too important. It is thus difficult to maintain an inter-agency level coordination body that enables to associate in France actors who are then scattered on the concerned theater. Many are these who wish however reinforce such coordination in extending this crisis cell to what could be a permanent situation center. Frances power is obvious when the aim is to respond to an event thanks to a capability of immediate deployment of resources from civilian protection or armed forces. It would no doubt still increase its capacities in deploying also civilian experts or in diversifying the mobilized resources. The more optimistic are even proposing the implementation of a steering team at the Prime Minister level. It would be based on a crisis management committee allotted with a permanent secretariat and appropriate resources in order to fulfill the whole of assigned tasks.

Towards a common objective

Knowing from the beginning the desired end-state is of primary importance. The precise goal of the intervention, a strategic objective both explicit and realistic as well as a comprehensive strategy to achieve it are as many factors which will in a further stage make simpler the actions from one another. This whole should be clear enough, legitimate and then allow a road map to be established. This will then be a reference both mandatory and recognized by all involved parties. The action should be always legitimized by an international organization or through compliance with an agreement between states. However, this appears not to be sufficient to convince so many different actors. The final success is then linked to a number of exchanges. These are the sole grantors of a shared understanding of problems encountered.

A coordination difficult to achieve but necessary

Speeches during the seminar on October 19, 2006 illustrated the difficulties felt by all actors to exploit to the best each others competences while always looking for the highest efficiency.
1 Forces Employment and Command Structures Division /Forces Employment Doctrine Center. 2 General (retired) Thomann, a former Land Forces Commander, extract from Humanitaire et militaire, text published in the magazine Humanitaire n15, automne-hiver 2006.

The multiplication of organizations involved in stabilization operations increases the difficulty to manage this kind of theater. Return to coercion period stays possible at any time. Meanwhile actors systems2 are distributed all over the territory and sometimes overlapping. Their interests and wills may be different. Armed forces, either national or multinational, under unique command or not, are in all cases in charge of granting security on the related territory. Numerous and usually pretty well distributed over the territory, they should adapt to an organization defined by a federating organization. Everything will be implemented to co-ordinate a general action. Its sole objective will be to leave as early as possible a theater where all foreign presence then becomes useless.

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The Contribution of the Armed Forces in the Stabilization Processes

uring stabilization, which is the decisive phase of a conflict settlement, one can observe simultaneously or not the occurrence of coercion actions, of violence mastering or of re-establishment of the normal life of the city. During this phase, which prepares and will enable the exit from the crisis - normalization in the continuum of operations - three distinctive processes will take place: one political (peace, return to the State of law, minimal social contract, return of the fallen State amongst the concert of nations), one about security (cessation of combats, lowering in the level of violence, security for persons and properties, exercise of justice) and one of reconstruction (of public services, infrastructures, institutions, resumption of economic activities). These three processes have their own intermediate objectives, different paces but are interdependent and contribute to the same final goal.

The actions of the armed forces, and of the land forces at the first place, obviously contribute to the success of these three processes thanks to the combination of tactical courses1 encompassing courses of actions or sets of actions2 and processes or tasks that are sometimes rather far from the classic know-hows of the forces. The employed courses of action in coercion and in violence mastering are pretty well known; conversely the missions pertaining to assistance (re-establishment of the normal life in the country): support to the reconstruction of the State, support to the reform of the security sector or SSR3, participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR4) program are much less known. Less often known, less often implemented on the various theaters, they are often touchy but condition the road to peace5.
BY

COLONEL ALAIN CAPLAIN - CDEF SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICER

Reconstruction of the State, SSR and DDR

Assistance is by far the most complex tactical mode and probably the most constraining because of the diversity of the missions that can be assigned to the forces, the multiplicity of players and intervening parties. This is especially true as far as all aspects pertaining to the support

to the reconstruction of the State, to the participation in the SSR or the DDR, assistance to populations, or support to an international force are concerned. Although assistance to populations (actions of a humanitarian nature) or the support to an international force (Licorne in the Ivory Coast Republic) are now areas that are rather well known and mastered, the missions that can be assigned to the land forces pertaining to the reconstruction of the State, to the SSR or the DDR are much less known and are presently under study within the CDEF. In the end they should be formalized in a manual. As far as the reconstruction of the State is concerned, the land forces may be assigned some assistance missions for the electoral process encompassing various aspects: logistic support, support to freedom of movements, setting up of polling equipment, protection of individuals (voters, candidates, international verification personnel), protection of polling stations. These missions may be

CCH Jean-Jacques CHATARD/SIRPA Terre

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carried out in an autonomous way or in support to the local defense and security forces, if they exist and have the human and material assets to ensure them. The security sector reform (SSR) is a very wide domain as it does not only concern the armed forces but also the police, the paramilitary bodies, the special services and justice. In the strict military domain, the land forces might have to intervene in a constituted organic format6 or thanks to the detachment of personnel within the military and defense cooperation staff. The actions that can be engaged represent a rather wide spectrum: audit and counseling for the restructuring of forces, support to selection, mixing or training centers. Training can be carried out in the country (units) or in France (individuals). The support to redeployment of trained units also falls under the restructuring of forces program. On its part, the final goal of the DDR is to ensure the social and economic reconstruction of the ex-combatants so that they become again participating parties in the development process of their country. The land forces must be involved in this process from its conception in order to evaluate the volume of necessary military assets and precise their employment. The missions will be of a multiple nature: securing the layout, intelligence (on armed groups, on armaments), support to the elements involved in the DDR. But it is during the disarmament phase that the participation of the forces will be the most important, the most visible and also the most dangerous (collection of weapons, destruction or transport, management of stocks). Last, during the demobilization phase, the forces can be called into play to register the ex-combatants, establish their profile, as in some cases they might be integrated in the local defense and security forces that have been restructured or in the process of being restructured.

What are the eligibility criteria to the DDR? The multiplicity and the diversity of the players must be taken into account. During a DDR process, 5 groups that are called beneficiaries have been identified: members of armed forces or armed groups, compelled combatants, dependents (groups or communities whose means of living depends upon the armed groups or forces), refugees coming back on the national territory and specific communities. Within these groups some categories have also been identified (children, women, sick and wounded persons). The number of intervening parties is even greater with working methods that are often different from those employed by the military8. Therefore, the inter-ministry and inter-agency work will be the rule with all the entailed difficulties. Last, the disarmament phases will confront the elements responsible for this mission with specific situations. Whether it is the case of collecting weapons from the combatants with mobile teams, or if they are handed out on specialized locations, the entailed risks are high. The regrouping of certain factions in some centers will raise the questions of support (food, health), protection and of security in general. The progressiveness, the proportionality of the operation should have been envisaged; and last, the destruction of certain weapons, ammunitions, explosive devices, will require the assistance of specialists.

Doctrine

Complex and tricky missions

All these missions are much less known by the militaries who are poorly accustomed to them at least for every aspect pertaining to the DDR. The basic documents are presently under drafting and should in the long term bring precisions on the most likely missions that would be assigned to the land forces during the stabilization phase with a stress on their specificities. Without being comprehensive, a few aspects may be outlined, especially those pertaining to the missions to be fulfilled within the framework of the DDR. The awareness of the environment seems essential: what is the political context (are some elections due or have they already taken place? Were any peace agreements signed? Did all the parties sign them? Is there an amnesty law? Have some pardon measures been taken for the ex-combatants? What is the security environment? What are the real capabilities of the local forces? Who is responsible for the general security? Are some groups or certain communities under threat? Are there any local customs as far as the property of light weapons is concerned?7 What are the re-supply channels?

1 During the stabilization phase there exist 4 tactical modes: offensive, defensive, security building, assistance ; (Ref: land forces in stabilization employment doctrine). 2 Example of courses of action: area control; example of a set of actions: support to the reconstruction of the State. 3 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM. 4 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINSERTION. 5 FT 01 Win the battle; lead to peace. 6 OTD: operational training detachment. 7 Case of the tricky disarmament of the Karimojongs in Uganda. 8 Amongst the intervening parties in DDR: - The national players: the political parties, the government (if it exists) even the governments, the armed forces, the armed groups that have signed or not, the associations or societies, the media. - The international players : the United Nations (UNDP, WFP, UNICEF), the EU, the regional and sub-regional organizations (AU, ECOWAS, ECOCAS ....), member states of the UN and their embassies, the World Bank, NGOs, certain private companies, research centers dealing with peace, crises, disarmament.

Therefore, the stabilization phase offers to the land forces a very wide range of missions. Classic missions or not, it should be feared that they will probably become our daily future commitments as they depend upon the three processes taking place during stabilization that are aiming towards a single goal: peace. It is during the decisive phase that the commitment of the land forces will probably be the most complex within a fluctuating environment (neither peace nor war), alongside multiple intervening parties. An adequate picture assessment will probably be one of the most determining factors if not the determining factor of success.

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A few definitions
Source: Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards of the UNDP document (August 1 2006) Disarmament: Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. Demobilization: Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Re-insertion: Re-insertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longerterm process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of excombatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. Reintegration: Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

CCH Jean-Jacques CHATARD/SIRPA Terre

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Doctrine Conception and Conduct of a Stabilization

Phase at Interdepartmental Level
[No matter how strong one can be, he is never strong enough to be the master forever, unless he transforms his Strength into Rights and Obedience into Duties. Jean-Jacques Rousseau]

the ultimate signal of influence on the international scene, beyond the mere defense of national interests. But it is rather and mostly a question of establishing conditions for an in-depth stabilization through the build-up or the restoration of political, economic and social structures. The overall objective is basically the restoration of security, but, in order to reach it, it is necessary to deal also with other aspects. In the long term, it is the establishment of democratic institutions that respect all the different types of freedoms that constitutes the basis for that in-depth stabilization and security. During recent crises, most of them being still on going, France, with its major partners, took an important part in these stabilization operations, which were, most of the time multinational. These engagements constitute nowadays the major part of our operations abroad: France is present in Lebanon (UNIFIL), since September 2006. France has been in command and contributed most forces of the European force (EUFOR) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, during the election in that country (August - December 06). In the Ivory Coast, France conducts the Licorne operation to help stabilizing the country and looking for a political solution. Since 2002, France has been engaged in Afghanistan with its NATO partners in the largest stabilization operation ever conducted by the Alliance; we are in charge of the Kabul area until April 2007. And finally, in Kosovo, France is in charge, since 1999, of the northern district, a very sensitive one during that negotiation phase that focuses on the future status of the country. France contributes also to the UNMIK police force. In 2004, France deployed 1,000 men within the Multinational Interim Force in charge of stabilizing Haiti while waiting for the UN forces deployment.
BY FRANOIS RICHIER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SECURITY - DISARMAMENT STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ALEXIS MOREL, IN CHARGE OF ESDP, SECURITY - DISARMAMENT STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ince the end of the Cold War, stabilization operations have become one of the major components of S international actions intended to resolve crises and conflicts. Western countries armed forces participate in these operations in a visible and decisive way. These contributions are perceived, especially in Europe, as being

In spite of obvious differences, the resolution of these crises and the initiation of a stabilization phase present characteristics that are similar and that have been shaping European as well as US doctrines and have oriented the conception and conduct of these types of operations toward a logic that has become more and more interdepartemental. As a matter of fact, these operations, during which the employment of military forces remains decisive, have several factors in common: - Deployment in support of a local political process that aims at solving a crisis with the consent of the parties; - Under UNSCR mandate; - Conducted within a multinational or multilateral framework or within the framework of organizations such as NATO or the EU (with the noted exception of the Ivory Coast where our

forces are however deployed in support of the UNOIC). Politically, a single country has seldom enough legitimacy to assume that role. Technically, the financial burden linked to taking responsibility for an entire country goes far beyond the capabilities of a single country, be it the most powerful one; - The forces are provided with robust mandates and rules of engagements (ROEs) in order to make them become credible in front of the local actors who very rarely give up entirely the option of resorting to violence by signing an agreement. Mandates and ROEs enable the forces to achieve their objective even when the security environment is weak; - The military objectives are tightly linked to the objectives of the other actors (political, economic, social and humanitarian) present on the theater of operations.

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Although the notion of creating a safe environment, which is included in many operations mandates may be sufficient for implementing a military action, and although our forces have well adapted their employment doctrines to that type of situations, the stabilization objectives at political, economical and social levels are far beyond the reach of the armed forces action. As a consequence they require several conditions to be established. the interventions and a lasting involvement of the international community into the exit of crisis phases. It resulted, in particular, in the creation in December 2005 of the United Nations Peace-building Commission intended to become the forum where to give consistency to the political and security doctrines as well as to these related to the humanitarian and development domains. That commission favors also the establishment of a better coordination between short term stabilization actions and reconstruction of the institutional, economic and social frameworks at medium and long terms. This institutional innovation is paralleled in the field by the development of the UN integrated missions that intend to develop, more or less successfully, a consistent approach between the different military, police and civilian prospects.

A precise, and possibly restrictive, definition of the military operations perimeter and conditions
It is mainly a question of avoiding a dispersion of the military means into tasks that are not clearly military and during a phase where the civilian authorities, the police, the judicial system, the penitential administration, the health systems or the civilian infrastructures, as weak as they might be, are still operating, even at a very low level of activities, and are supported by civilian international organizations and NGOs, active in the reconstruction of a country in crisis. In front of the difficulties encountered for providing civilian assistance, state civilian authorities and even sometimes the international community might be tempted to abandon to the military several tasks that they should have normally kept at their level (in particular tasks related to police, health, infrastructure domains): although military support can sometimes be desirable when it relates to a vital and enduring requirement as well as when the deployment of a military force (CIMIC activities) would be helpful, a protracted military commitment to that sort of tasks is not beneficial for anyone: it establishes a confusion between civilian and military, weakens the military tools relevance, and prevents the host nations civilian authorities to regain responsibility. At national level, the very thorough political strategic planning of an operation, in its conception and control, is a responsibility that is traditionally shared between the Defense and the Foreign Affairs Ministries. This is particularly true for the operations that take place within the framework of international organizations of which France is an active member, such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In that sort of operations, the decision and final choices on the French engagement belong to the President of the Republic. In the international organizations, since these operations are decided and controlled by political bodies (UN Security Council, NATO North Atlantic Council, EU Political and Security Committee) as well as military ones (NATO and EU Military Committees) and political-military bodies, the defense of that general concept and of its implementation specific to each operation, often results into difficult negotiations with our partners.

ADJ Jean-Raphal DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

The definition of a continuum between military and civilian, diplomatic and economic actions
The lack of security is often only one of the many curses that weigh upon a country in an exit of crisis situation. Insecurity is often paralleled by strong ethnic divisions, contempt for Human Rights, endemic poverty, failed state institutions and financial system, development of trafficking of all kinds, etc. The commitment of a country and even more the one of the international community are valuable only if they are part of a more global strategy, of a policy that would allow to organize and co-ordinate the various means available. At national level, the conception of these actions that resort of the government, is conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in close coordination with the other concerned ministries. More and more often, the European Union which has a strong political legitimacy and which collects all instruments available to act in a crisis (from commercial sanctions to humanitarian assistance) is perceived as being the relevant coordination and decision level with our major partners in order to define that continuum of actions and to aggregate national initiatives since no country would nevertheless abandon the defense of its own interests. At the international level, the United Nations have initiated, and this particularly under the French influence, an ambitious study aiming at guaranteeing a better coherence of

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As a matter of fact, they all, and in particular those with which we are engaged, do not share our attachment to defining as precisely as possible the perimeter of the military action and they do not find it to be a problem to entrust their own military with tasks which are not military during stabilization operations. They dont have the same motives for doing so. Several Northern European countries which do not invest much in their military, have organized their armed forces in such a way that they are mainly capable of ensuring security and civilian protection tasks; engagement at the lowest level into stabilization missions which could almost be confused with civilian actions is very natural for these countries and it provides them with the noted advantage of not having to invest into an improved military tool. For different reasons, the United States favor also the concept of an increased overlapping of civilian and military efforts, to such a point that they would recommend a common planning. That approach would be the result of the lessons learned in operations, mostly in Iraq and in Afghanistan, that are perceived as having not enough associated the civilian agencies to operations planning and execution. The announced and already implemented evolution of the US diplomacy towards a so-called transformational diplomacy, more present in crises areas, and that would closely associate civilian and military efforts, illustrates that trend. Due to these differences of concepts, it exists nowadays a permanent debate about what should be the best type of organization to adopt for stabilization operations. That debate has been, at least partially, concluded at NATO level by the publication of the comprehensive political guidance, which puts limits to the armed forces interventions during Alliance operations, to the military support to reconstruction, a concept that actually provides a large variety of potential actions and gives some margin of appreciation. The Riga Summit in November 2006 confirmed that trend by emphasizing the necessary requirement for coordination between the various actors present on a theater of operations.

(financial support, funding of projects, cancellation of the debt) do not appear to be well adapted to be used for an expeditionary deployment. Our police forces are mainly intended to provide law and order and to search for the authors of crimes on the national territory and not to train local police forces or even less to conduct, on their own, local police operations in Pristina, Kabul or Kinshasa. The same for judges, customs officers, firemen, etc. Nevertheless it is becoming usual to train purely civilian missions alongside military operations. These experts have even sometimes become indispensable to the stabilization of a crisis area and even more to the restoration of credible state institutions.

Doctrine

The EU has become the most efficient tool to develop large (but still insufficient) number of civilian capabilities for crisis management; the preference demonstrated by several nations for non-military interventions abroad has, of course, very much helped the success of that process. Crises civilian management has nowadays become a large part of the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Not all operations conducted within that framework have a direct stabilization purpose, but their action, (in Bosnia, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Palestine, in Sudan) within the security reform, for the training of local security forces contributes to a better organization of the international efforts of stabilization. At the national level, the involvement of the concerned ministries (Home Affairs, Justice, Finance) progressed well since 2001 when these policies have been established at European level. France is today the top ranking nation in terms of contributing police officers and gendarmes to European missions. But the taking into account of the civilian management of crises is still insufficient and most of all insufficiently well organized. These civilian resources mobilization should be conducted faster and more easily. All this is a source of difficulties, especially when it has to be rapidly decided to send, or not, experts, civil servants (no funding identified, no single database). A study is on going to better adapt our national organization to the increased number of that sort of missions.

An effort to mobilize crisis management civilian capabilities to contribute to stabilization

Although our doctrine aims at leaving certain parts of stabilization operations to the armed forces (these tasks specifically linked to the establishment of a secure environment), it remains natural to attempt to mobilize civilian resources in conditions that are similar to the military operations ones: actions within a multinational framework, rapid deployment/reaction capabilities, cooperation with other actors including military ones in a theater of operation. There is a problem that is always difficult to solve: the civilian resources that are necessary to stabilize a country beyond the usual instruments of development

The development of negotiation strategies within multilateral organizations

Taking into account the above mentioned differences of approaches of a given crisis and of how to resolve it that may exist amongst our partners, within the UN and the EU for instance, the preparation and conduct of bilateral and multilateral discussions with our partners have now become a decisive objective that implies an efficient capability of our diplomacy to coordinate French efforts at national level and with our partners.

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Concerning the major doctrinal principles

The Joint Center for Concepts Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE) has been created by a decree dated 21 April 2005. It reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and is located at the Ecole militaire (Paris). CICDE develops and experiments joint concepts within national and multinational frameworks. It contributes to European doctrine development and participates in studies and operational research within a national and international interministerial framework.

A Comprehensive Approach to Crises

he process engaged by the international community in Former Yugoslavia permitted the co-existence of three communities which had different cultures, religions and ambitions. It also permitted the progressive build up of the Bosnia Herzegovina state. The successes that were achieved as well as the errors that were committed have been analyzed. They enriched experience and reflection. Within that context, an exit of crisis concept has been developed. Since then the face of war has changed and this means that this structuring document has to be updated in order to take into account the changes that occurred within the strategic environment and interventions conditions. This is the work that is currently performed by CICDE in close coordination with national and international corresponding bodies (CDEF1, CESA2 and EMM3). Once the determining factors of the crises have been analyzed, it is necessary first to understand what are the challenges that the armed forces have to face and to define the limitations that have to be set to their action. A new approach will have then to be proposed in order to put, as soon as possible, the military action within the entire spectrum of activities conducted by the international community in order to achieve the strategic objectives that have been set.
BY

COLONEL CHRISTOPHE DE SAINT CHAMAS (CICDE)

ADJ Jean-Raphal DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

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Complexity, a new determining factor for todays crises

The increase of the number of expeditionary operations goes together with a change of the armed forces interventions nature which mix together humanitarian, security and military types of objectives, and sometimes in concomitant of power interests. Military actions legitimacy, shapes and conduct as well as the transition to peaces parameters are not issues that appear sequentially anymore since they interact very closely before, during and after the conflict. These operations develop in a difficult context, within which multiple actors get involved, state and non-state, national and international actors, whose strategies are sometimes divergent. Operations duration has now become a structuring factor, as much as their intensity, versatility and distance from home base. Initial reaction, transition to stability and normalization phases are not as distinct from each other, in terms of space and time, as they used to be. Violence may reappear at any time whereas the need for undertaking reconstruction activities emerges immediately at the outset of the crisis. Due to the asymmetric nature of the confrontations, violence perpetrators favor operations that are conducted either in geographical areas or in information domains that can provide them with a tactical advantage or even with a strategic impunity, in that very place where stabilization and reconstruction operations could be won. Causes for intervention are diverse and plenty, but the final objective of each of the French engagements remains the pursuit of a lasting stability as well as local and regional prosperity. Force employment is not enough but, most of the time, it remains indispensable for achieving the conditions that are required to reaching the strategic objectives.

Participating in establishing the initial conditions for a jump start

Doctrine

An intermediate public order, still fragile, having been found, it is then necessary to bring all the necessary support to local and international actors who will work at the establishment of a lasting peace. In addition to maintaining security, military action should permit to cope with the initial lack of civilian capabilities, to prepare for the arrival of reconstruction forces, to facilitate the deployment of civilian actors and then to support their action. The military tool, in coordination with international security forces or with the national ones when they are being restored, must always and simultaneously guarantee the security, intervene swiftly to calm down outbursts of tension and contribute to developing a necessary environment of trust (public order, jump-starting public services, restoration of State institutions, etc.). It can also be a more or less dynamic participation in the fight against illicit activities that slow down significantly the return to normal life process. The success of these missions (be it a main mission or a supporting one) constitutes a fundamental building block of the strategic success which will be achieved later in time thanks to the efforts endeavored, in particular by international organizations.

Mastering transition towards local or international legitimate authorities

Achieving a lasting stability is an objective that is part of a process based on security, justice, reconciliation, well being and good governance. A permanent or, at least, recurring contact of the forces with the local populations allows the establishment of security, the disappearance of old dissensions, the reorientation of minds and hearts towards the future, the facilitation of the concurrence of all towards a common project and the support of the local authorities in their taking in charge of public services responsibility. It remains however true that military action must remain limited to the period of time that is required for establishing the minimum conditions for the strategic success which is also to be achieved later in the process; which means that this strategic success must have been clearly identified during the initial planning process.

Whats the military interventions relevance?

The different phases during which military action takes place, constitute a continuum in space and time, during all types of operations: mastering of violence, coercion, stabilization or normalization. The experience gained in the Balkans, in Afghanistan or in Iraq demonstrates that reconstruction participates in stabilization and begins, most of the time, at the outset of the operations. Within these conditions the relevance of the military intervention must be analyzed, especially its principle and its dimension.

A new approach to crises resolution

Within that environment, the willingness to resolve crises and conflicts means not only being able to enter first in the area but also and above all to anticipate an exit of crisis strategy. In order to respond to operational requirements, it is necessary to have the capabilities to command and control a multinational operation and to participate in high intensity operations alongside our strategic partners, and, should it become necessary, against a militarily strong opponent. Enforcing the silence of weapons, participating to establishing the preconditions for a new start and mastering the transition towards the relevant civilian international and local actors: all this preaches for a comprehensive approach of crisis management. The implementation of that approach implies the strengthening of the interministerial dimension in order to better coordinate the activities of the actors in various domains: state, diplomacy, economy, military and, if possible non governmental

Silencing the weapons: a condition that is necessary but not sufficient

Frances ambition is to be able to participate, alone or within a coalition, to the Early Entry Phase. The engaged means enable the force to achieve the military objectives that consist most of the time to stop the fights, to separate the belligerents or to freeze the physical expression of violence in the field. This doesnt mean that the silence of the weapons should be regarded as being the desired end-state. It is only a precondition for it and the fragility of that silence should step by step disappear. The military organization becomes then a major tool to the benefit of the other relevant actors. Military superiority remains indispensable, but it should not be regarded as being sufficient.

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Concerning the major doctrinal principles

postures in front of asymmetric types of situations. Forces that are present must thus be able to face a large spectrum of threats of all levels and all natures, while continuing to ensure their direct or indirect mission in favor of peace. Military action remains potentially war like even if contingencies are different.

CCH Jean-Jacques CHATARD/SIRPA Terre

Mastering technology
Technological evolutions bring responses to the change of nature and end state of force employment in the management of crises. Network operations permit thus to federate forces actions within a coalition as well as their coordination with all the actors of a crisis in order to achieve the effects leading to the desired end-state. These operations, conducted within an operational environment with overlapping domains, support the management of intermingling humanitarian actions, law and order enforcing operations, and pinpointed medium or high intensity operations. Networking allows the building up of ad hoc combined arms and joint modules, that are provided with all the required capabilities to confront a not well characterized opponent that appears particularly when violence resurrects. And lastly, these technological evolutions allow the improvement of the operational efficiency of the means that must be deployed while reducing the direct engagement of those which are to be protected, and by mastering force employment.

ones. It requires to shift from a logic of actions to a logic of results. It also imposes that the conditions for a transition to peace should be taken into account during the initial planning process. That approach permits to obtain a greater efficiency in the employment of national means in order to guarantee a lasting peace.

What are the consequences?

The consequences of the evolution of the crisis contingencies as well as the implementation of a comprehensive approach are plenty.

To operate within a coalition and to have an influence on this coalition

The comprehensive approach to crisis management is already implemented by our strategic partners, in particular European ones (German, British). In addition to maintaining interoperability with our main allies, French participation in the fifth multinational experiment cycle (MNE 5) aims at improving the efficiency of the armed forces engagement within the framework of a comprehensive policy as well as to promote our national views on coalitions. This is the reason why France will lead the works related to the drafting of a strategic planning guide at the interministerial and multinational level.

Mastering behaviors
Today, events are highly publicized and media exploited, attitudes and behaviors are thus fundamental. The exploitation of an error, even if it is regarded as being a minor one, may have major consequences for the treatment of the crisis. By the same token malicious solicitations can be provoked in order to discredit the force. An irreprehensible behavior is thus required. This is obvious for all but vulnerabilities are many, changing and even unexpected, within units for which it is required to live very close to the local populations. Maintaining all these how to behave has often been necessary, today this has become imperative! In addition, the threats that are unpredictable by nature, may appear at any moment, especially during the arrival of the units on a theater, knowing well that the period during which a unit is being relieved by another may constitute a vulnerability. This means, and more than ever, that the unit should be able, as soon as they deploy, to face any type of situation. Training spectrum must thus widen and, in addition to the basic know how, it must thus include demanding know how to behave, difficult to acquire and maintain in difficult situation.
1 Forces Employment Doctrine Center. 2 Air Force Higher Military Education Center. 3 French Navy Staff..

Managing a reversible continuum of high and low intensity actions

The most recent examples demonstrate that forces could be opposed to an opponent who, taking advantage of the technology equilibrating factor, would have at its disposal highly sophisticated weaponry. Following confrontations or conflicts of a rather dissymmetric nature that characterizes the initial phase, the situations that can be encountered on theaters of operations can shift from a low level of violence to high intensity thrusts which would put the forces into combat

Military strategy is now again a part of the State comprehensive strategy. Forces deployment, and even its potential employment allow to create the necessary but not sufficient conditions for the establishment of a lasting peace. Crisis management operations are thus imposing additional requirements, be it to demonstrate the national or international willingness to resolve lastingly the conflict or, even more, to define the armed forces desired effects or to coordinate activities with all the actors which contribute to the achievement of the desired end state. The studies are thus to be continued with determination in order to adapt the organizations, doctrines and training to today and tomorrow forces engagements.

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International Police Forces (IPF) in Stabilization Operations

Doctrine

Is Stabilization the Desired End-State or Just one Stage of a More Elaborate Process?

n response to UN recommendations provisioned forth in the Brahimi Report, August 2000, the European Union (EU) has developed several concepts in the scope of more effective IPF employment in PeaceKeeping Operations. The EU-validated scenario places stabilization-tasks in second rank out the three mission-stages that a stand-in police force should achieve. This sequence starts once deployment operations are achieved, and it is meant to prepare/organize the transition to a self-governed local police. According to the EU criteria -which might serve as a reference to others- the stabilization phase is to deal with all aspects of law-enforcement issues, which are instrumental to restoring normal living-conditions. In the course of its mission, IPF would therefore call the local police upon participation, progressively. In sum, the purpose is to re-energize the judicial and legal systems, whilst restoring public order and security.

With regard to the variety of situations that stabilization-operations would deal with, there is however no much sense reducing them all into one single mission-phase. For the record, each EU-led stabilization operation did require a different style of police-commitment, should it be in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUMP), or in the FYROM1 (Proxima), or in Albania (PAMECA2). Same thing for UN operations in Haiti (MINUSTAH 3) or in Kosovo (UNMIK). The panel of missions assigned was ranging from mere support to the local police up to all-out substitution for the failing structures, together with controlling-tasks possibly done by means of force. Hence, packing the whole lot under the same label just masks fundamental differences, too easily perhaps. Stabilization-missions are irrefutably subject to versatile conditions of implementation, but their success invariably depends on two parameters: a conclusively led deployment-stage, and a relevant handoverprocess for policing responsibilities. These will be redistributed as best appropriate, certainly not as fast as possible. The latter expression is irrelevant to the scale of values that IPF would utilize for evaluating when the local police is able to take over. As such, policing missions are objectively designed as a stabilization continuum, not as a goal proper. The end-state will be reached only once the local police can effectively repossess control over all missions and functions initially the responsibility of IPF. This means that the dogmatic approach is no longer an option, and that the whole game rather lies with a list of stabilization missions specific to the police forces, and a clever usage of all resources available to Law and Order (L&O) developments.

BY

MAJOR CEN FLORIAN VILLALONGA - DGGN4

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Some particular perspectives

Missions of the police forces in a process of stabilization
The prerequisites for a durably viable, local-police force are detailed below. Identify - weak-points and needs in the domains of law-enforcement and public safety; - human/equipments resources required against those actually available. Organize or reform - the local police forces, whilst developing operational structures, organic to the central administration, and to each territorial command HQ; - education/training programs and courses, together with relevant infrastructure developments. Upgrade local police forces to the international standards. Ideally, the selection and recruitment process and then the promotion lists should reflect all ethnic and cultural groups forming the society. The process may vary and any method aforementioned just prevails for a while. An important instrument for restoring L&O in a crisis-affected area, consolidation could also rely on programs of assistance developed by the European Community. IPF bridging-missions The status of interim-force applies where the whole statestructure collapsed. In this case, IPFs missions are meant to fill the gap and help restore public safety across the area of operation (public order; protection of persons and properties). Effective coordination between all players is essential as far as the IPF may need cooperation from other force-components and vice-versa, whilst insuring that the local set of laws is fully respected. IPF bridging missions may include assistance to the local legal system as well as to an international court of justice, if one is to be established. As well, all selection, education, coaching, control and other operational-support issues related to the local police must be planed, from start on, as a prerequisite to the reconstruction process ahead.

Three types of assignment would typically support that plan. IPF missions of reinforcement Reinforcement is based on an initial estimate of the local-polices status. Most complex projects aim at generating a brand-new police force, or reforming the current structures entirely. Three methods of consolidation have been established in support of the latter option: - work on a better organization/structure; - improve training and selection procedures; - coach and control current policing activities.

IPF missions of assistance Should the local police retain or acquire some prerogatives during the stabilization phase of an operation, the duplication of functions possibly overlapping must be avoided at all costs. This is why IPF would take the responsibility for operational decisions in general, and get involved in major security issues in particular. In such conditions, the local police operates as an auxiliary force and keeps subject to IPFs support and control, especially where its retained prerogatives are not meeting international standards. Missions of assistance clearly signals the transition stage of operations, but they may have started much earlier in some specific domains of activity. Prior to reaching the ultimate, full-autonomy stage, the local police will have to go through basic surveillance tasks, as advised, supervised and trained for by IPF.

SIRPA Gendarmerie

Tools available
Nations may contribute in a stabilization mission with individual police officers, reinforcing teams of specialists, or deployed police forces. These are due to be meeting three criteria: robustness -they must be capable of self

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defense and to adapt safety conditions to a hostile environment - operational flexibility and interoperability. Therefore and as directed by the EU, areas of advanced expertise -schools or education and training centers- have been selected or created for running specific courses and cooperative exercises oriented, amongst other issues, to necessary interoperability developments. This said, common structures are still to be explored though deciding on nature and size of the police force committed would rest with each contributing nation. Two sorts of police still operate under a different status, military or civilian, in many European Union member-states. This actually allows EU member-states for a richer response. Should the military bring their police resources together in a Gendarmerie-type EU force, such organization would afford additional value in terms of integrated planning and quick-deployment capability.

Additionally, teams of expert, national (NPET) or international (IPET), may rejoin the lot. Especially tailored for the mission such teams are trained and equipped for peculiar tasks. They can be placed OPCON or TACON to one of those specialized elements usually posted in the police staffs/HQ.

Doctrine

A NPET -purely national- is more appropriate where special training and working-methods applicable to high-risk missions or a hazardous environment would require unity of practices, techniques and equipments. An IPET -multinational- is eligible to deployment rather when the situation is assessed being acceptably stable. Multinational teams can gather a wider range of capabilities possibly including counter-terrorism warfare; combat against criminal organizations; intelligence and information management; nature/environment expertise; etc.

Integrated Police Units (IPU)

As designed by the European Council, IPUs are meant to substitute for the local police in domains such as legal proceedings; intelligence/information; security; protection and public order enforcement. Together with the three criteria aforementioned, such forces should be able to operate under military command for a time, until they can shift to police-tasks proper.

Prospective approach
Develop special skills
Usually EU state-members are deciding on the format and configuration of national police forces as of their proper needs. Hence, police units and officers must develop the qualifications specific to multinational operations for them to participate with more efficiency upon deployment.

Initiative and versatility Formed Police Units (FPU)

A FPU can be define as a quickly deployable police force composed of several national or multinational elements of a smaller size. Such formations exclusively operate under a civilian authority and deploy once the situation is stabilized, or so assessed. Their sphere of duty would principally keep within the limits of L&O enforcement and patrolling activities. Since a FPU is not supposed to perform the whole of police missions, it cannot be assigned an area of responsibility. Thus, it will operate as subordinate unit. Conversely to the IPU, a FPU is not self-support capable. Owing to potentially stretched distances and the variety of situations met, commanders and individuals are granted appropriate freedom of action/decision. In return, they must be capable of taking initiatives, understanding the situation and, above all, holding control over the scene in case of incidents. The latter exercise is not that easy in a context where the legitimate use of force goes with a graduated-response line; also ROEs and laws that would usually preclude from employing lethal weapons, except on last resort.

Ability to communicate and collect information

On the subject of information, it is expected that a nonpartisan approach of the various, possibly ethnical, groups composing the local society can help gain their confidence and cooperation. This is why the police forces and officers deployed in theater are encouraged to intermingle with the local populations, but whilst respecting their dignity, cultures and traditions. Such qualifications should instrument appropriate professional courses and training sequences, as well as a better selection process.

UPIs and UPFs constitute the core working element of the stabilization-mission. Command and control functions are decentralized with account to the sectors of responsibility delineated within the area of operations. Each unit commander is entitled to decide freely on tactical issues relevant to his assigned sector. To that extent, external orders and directions given to him would only deal with basic requirements such as coordination with other units and international bodies and the agenda frame planed for reaching the final objective or related to missiondevelopments. The chief, police-mission, exercises his prerogatives through appropriate communication-systems, reporting procedures and inspections. He can also decide on the re-location of police units, teams or officers. As deemed necessary, an operational Police Task Force (PTF) may be created out of several units and be placed OPCON to the chief of mission or another officer designated as PTF commander.

Benefit from lessons learned

IPF are currently confronted to many difficulties once committed to stabilization operations. Though nonexhaustive, the various factors listed below are commonlaw. - Peace-agreements imposing extremely tight deployment schedules. - Local police forces poorly educated and exercised. - Caveats posed, such as maintaining nearly all local police officers in their former functions.

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Some particular perspectives

SIRPA Gendarmerie

- Inappropriate human, material and financial resources. - Very low wages inevitably exposing the locals to corruption. - Political interferences, with and within the local police forces. All these obstacles may ruin any possible chance of success and jeopardize the whole process planned. Tackling them all obviously call for a newer approach of the many aspects5 of stabilization operations.

Conceivably, a Task Force Commander/HQ could provisionally supervise an International Police Mission. A UE civil-military cell has been even created for inputting plans on the subject of integrated, police-military strategic and operational responses. Resolve for setting a tighter coordination between the police and the military component exists and, by the way, it concurs with the Nice, European Councils conclusion. This said, some national rules or sets of laws preclude from military command over any police component, and therefore pose a challenge to generalizing the concept at the moment.

Coordination and cooperation with the international armed forces

Should no IPF be available, or should its commitment be not enough to, at least, diminish breach-of-law occurrences, L&O missions might turn into an additional task be devoted to the military. Nevertheless, interaction with all other armed forces keeps being a priority focus, which addresses the topic of a tighter coordination in terms of integrated planning. Areas of mutual support possibly overarching police and military operations must be identified and anticipated though respecting reciprocal spheres of duty.

1 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 2 NfT: Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania. 3 NfT: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Literally = UNSMIH 4 Direction gnrale de la gendarmerie nationale = Directorate, French Gendarmerie. 5 Military, police, justice, administration, society, economy, etc.

Stabilization-missions effectiveness depends very much on whether all parties can come to a similar understanding of the overall situation in spite of its complex nature. However, political consensuses generally result in guidelines so vaguely expressed that they may lead to diverging interpretations of the mandate. Especially, military and police forces would analyze this mandate with regard to their proper agenda and operating methods. To that extent, the enforcement, stabilization, normalization phasing-scheme cannot apply to police tasks, since these would rather develop in a nonstop but overlapping continuum. Indeed, armed forces are now to deal with many-sided tasks in asymmetrical threat conditions, but police-tasks are getting even hazier whilst underground-economy developing, criminal organizations ruling the stage, and local politicians possibly being involved in illegal activities. As far as the stabilization phase of an operation goes with the ambitious project of a durably restored L&O status and a fully effective local police, each of them dependant on economic and social progress, this phase is not going to be lasting for years but for decades.

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What Do CIMIC Activities Bring to Stabilization1 Operations

Doctrine

One starts a war whenever one wants, but one finishes that war when one can Machiavel (1469-1527)

t all starts with two observations. The first one is that it is uneasy for modern forces to win against guerillas. For western forces, the challenge consists in getting adapted, or getting re-adapted to an operational environment which is being transformed in depth and to new forms of engagement that are muddled, complex and protracted. The second observation is that winning the war doesnt always mean winning the peace. A lasting peace is much more difficult to achieve than a victory by the arms. Technological superiority and operational excellence do not guarantee the peace in front of the raise of asymmetric courses of actions. Following an initial, shorter or longer phase of combat, and coercion actions, all engagements go through a so-called stabilization phase during which peace can be won or lost. During all recent interventions of our armed forces in a crisis or a conflict, it was obvious that the local population had become the major center of gravity to be taken into account, and upon which it was essential to act. It is the peoples which are actually at stake during military interventions. Thats why CIMIC support in stabilization phase is vital even if it is the sort of activity that is conducted in the shadow, sometimes a frustrating job and not always acknowledged.

BY

COLONEL BERNARD HUE - EMA/CPCO2J9

CIMIC: a contribution linked to a French tradition that has been rediscovered

CIMIC (Civil Military Co-operation) activities are and have always been part of the French military culture. CIMIC contribution to current stabilization operations can already be studied though reading our military history. To demonstrate this, one has to read the book Du rle colonial de larme (the Soldiers colonial role) written by Colonel Lyautey in 1900: first, the experience of the past demonstrates that its very seldom possible, not to say impossible, to suppress by force a gang of pirates... Second, it has to be kept in mind that a pirate is, so to speak, that sort of a plant which can only be rooted in very specific types of soil, the best method is thus to render that soil improper to the pirate. Should we replace the word pirate by the word terrorist, the sentence remains astonishingly up to date. A

second major theme - which was already included in General Gallienis general guidance dated 22 May 1898 - relates to the behavior of our armed forces: when one is to capture an opponents den and simultaneously thinks of the market place that should be built in that same place on the following day, that position will be conquered in a quite different way. It appears clearly, today just like it did yesterday that a vision that would be military only would not be sufficient as such. Current French doctrine is very clear: civil-military cooperation presents an alternative or complementary solutions to the purely military courses of action when these become inappropriate or insufficient. It is interesting to notice that, during rather recent conflicts linked to French decolonization process in Indochina and later in Algeria, our armed forces obtained significant results relying on the population, with very little troops and equipment in comparison with the huge quantity of means the US utilized in Vietnam.

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French doctrine implemented in Algeria in domains such as counter guerilla operations and civilian military relations has become a reference. It is important to keep in mind that the many concepts and publications developed by the French at that time - documents that strangely enough have been forgotten at home and some words of them had even become taboo - these documents have been largely used as references by the Anglo Saxons to draft their own doctrine. In his book Les champs de braises [The ember fields] (P.240) Hlie Denoix de Saint Marc writes: Right after the anti- guerilla troops had forced their way in (...) as soon as a zone had been pacified, it was then time to build roads and to establish self defense posts and communities. New SAS (social and administrative services) centers were then established. In a few months, we built more local hospitals than since 1954, although it remained still insufficient. And last, within that same domain of recovering ownership of our heritage and echoing the previous citation, it is important to talk about the excellent paper produced by lieutenant (Res.) Lasconjarias and second lieutenant (Res) Jouan under the guidance of the CDEFs3 Research and Lessons Learned Division, about SAS units in Algeria, a tool for stabilization. such as CIMIC, PSYOPS, INFOOPS,... During planning and deployment phases, we can notice that we, the military, are always more attracted by the purely warrior facet of the mission. However, right after the first phase of the military action, it is in the longer term that stabilization can be consolidated and made to last. Gaining populations trust, assisting the country and its inhabitants to retake responsibility for their future is still a long lasting work during which CIMIC engagement has its full place. CIMIC role must be regarded just like the one of any of the combat support branches, such as artillery or engineers, during high intensity phases, and this role must be extended beyond, when the weapons have been silenced. It is a truism to write that it is of a major importance to know and take into account the differences of culture, and mentality between peoples with very diverse customs and religions, before developing courses of action. However, multiple and recent examples (Iraq, Afghanistan,...) demonstrate more than enough a recurring lack of preventive study or of adaptation to the local situations and specificities. CIMIC actions are not activities specific to specialists only, they are all soldiers business. They constitute a state of mind, a behavior, and even a how to be conduct that has to be implemented. It is important to avoid active behavioral errors that are unfortunately still too many, and sometimes the product of stupidity, lack of culture and also of the lack of initial education and pre-operation training. On the other hand, it is important to avoid the errors that could be referred to as passive. The most important of these being the soldiers indifference vis--vis the local populations. It is more insidious and silent but as destructive in the minds as the active ones. That lack of direct contact will be assessed as being arrogance, contempt and will be totally counter productive for the force since it will prevent it from gaining hearts and minds. The French Joint CIMIC group (GIACM) based in Lyon has been created in 2001 to that purpose. Its TSTs4 constitute a powerful capacity to evaluate the needs and remaining capabilities of a devastated area. That early awareness is indispensable for preparing a return to a normal situation and transitioning to civilian actors.

CIMIC: a course of action in support of stabilization

Western public opinion doesnt like conflicts that are protracted and costly in terms of troops and money. This imposes an urgency constraint which is not very much compatible with a stabilization policy that has to be implemented in the long term. It is thus necessary to take into account as early as the planning phase the various environment functions that our forces are rediscovering,

ADC DUBOIS/SIRPA Terre

A few examples of CIMIC contributions

I do not intend to develop a long list of potential contributions but rather to give a few focused examples

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of what can be done to support the exit of a crisis. During these last few years, our forces have intervened, in a very wide spectrum of missions, on theaters of operations very diverse such as (the Former Yugoslav Republic of ) Macedonia, Kosovo, Haiti, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad, Lebanon,... Each time they had to know how to adapt themselves and to demonstrate their humanist type of culture. This is the type of reality that our forces have to daily manage. Three major CIMIC contributions can be evoked: restoring the contact with the population, with local and international authorities, direct support to the population, and last contributing to the economic restart.

campaign plan. One should not demonstrate demagogy nor should it be thought that everything and everybody is always fine. The goal is to support the population in order to improve its living condition and not to transform them into supported forever. The good old motto help yourself and the force will help you is still to be applied. Making the population and local authorities participate in the elaboration and implementation of the projects, and then, at the time of the inauguration, emphasizing civilian actors and the forces role, through a sound use of the media, this is the sort of demarche to be implemented. The basic domains to be privileged by CIMIC are those that are linked to life: water (with wells building or rehabilitation), human health (with the joint medical services support and AMPs5), and cattle (with vet support particularly appreciated by pastoral populations such as the Afghan ones) education... Specific and priority attention must be paid to children and women. And last economic actions must be very quickly initiated, not only to preserve (even promote) national interests6, but also and above all, because a countrys stabilization goes through the restart process of its economic activities, from the lowest local level up to the national one. Countries which are undergoing stabilization can only come out of the crisis and exorcise their own devils if trading activities start again and living conditions improve lastingly. This is why it is so important to emphasize the CIMIC chains facilitating role vis--vis the economic community.

Doctrine

As we discussed it previously, the conflicts nature and environment have changed, and within that new environment where the military factor is not anymore the only one on the battlefield and even scarcely a decisive one, the crisis has now, more than ever, become a psychological one for the populations. What is subjective, what is felt,... is sometimes more important that the reality. The solution of a crisis is obligatorily the result of a comprehensive approach. Two different types of relationships have to be established. On the one hand with the local authorities, with influent people, with the population, and on the other hand with the international organizations (UN, EU, the Red Cross...), and the non governmental organizations that are present on the theater. CIMIC must thus be an interface, a relay of opinion with a complex civilian and military environment where all actors have not the same needs nor do they have the same centers of interest. It is necessary to go towards the people, to talk to them, to explain to them why France or the coalition is present and what is their mission. Even if nothing concrete seems to initially come out from these conversations, that demarche is necessary. The action, and potential coercion operations, will come next. The worst mistake made by armed forces would be to be separated from the populations within which they live and operate because of a lack of contact and dialogue. Liaison officers as well as CIMIC TSTs, being in permanence in contact with the populations and authorities, constitute, thanks to their knowledge of their area of operation and simple and sincere human relationships, a specially valuable source for the collection of environment information (HUMINT value). Intelligence research and collection that can result of it, remains of course a responsibility of the dedicated sensors and specialists. In order to have an impact on the populations, to support our forces image..., actions have to be conducted to the benefit of the population and with the population. However CIMIC actions should not be conducted only for the fun of it. These actions must correspond to an actual requirement, be efficient and be part of the commanders

During a conflict, CIMIC operates always in support of the purely military actions. Theaters stabilization can only result from a synergy within which CIMICs contributions are essential. CIMIC is thus an additional tool, an efficient tool to win hearts and minds, in support of the maneuver and essential in the hands of the commander to help him to better fulfill his mission and to win the peace.

1 The new document CIMIC Joint Concept and Doctrine 262/DEF/EMA/ EMP.1/NP has been approved on 03 March 2005 by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. It replaces the ACM (former CIMIC French equivalent) concept document published in 2002. Since this date, French doctrine doesnt mention ACM (Actions in the Civilian Military Domain) anymore but CIMIC. 2 Armed Forces Joint Staff/Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center. 3 Forces Employment Doctrine Center. 4 TST (Tactical Support team). 5 Medical Support to Populations. That name replaced the previous Free Medical Support. 6 This is the CIMIC 4th objective in the 2005 doctrine document.

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Operational Communication in Stabilization Operations

Mastering the Time Factor: a Challenge
perational Communication1 general principles and rules, as they are defined in the joint doctrine document dated July 2001, keep all their relevance within stabilization operations framework. However these operations specificities impose that some adjustments should be made in order to be able to fully respond to the assigned objectives. Mastering the time factor constitutes the Operational Communication major challenge.

O
BY

COLONEL MARC CONRUYT - EMA/CPCO 2

The media context

The rather good harmony that may exist between operations and media during the initial phase of a high intensity engagement (clear delineation between political and strategic levels, unity of command, identifiable decision making networks, rapid and visible successes, enthusiasm of the populations, international approbation...) tends to fade away during stabilization phase. That phase where the parties get lastingly frozen, the public debate gets rapidly focused on the stagnation issue, and its corollaries related to interest, legitimacy, efficiency, and military actions human and financial cost. The progress achieved can then appear to be fragile and rather

insignificant and could disturb national and international opinion as well as local populations which are seeking for rapid and blatant results that would correspond to the efforts that have been undertaken and to the possible human losses. Resorting to force presents then a risk to provoke public indignation in front of what is regarded as being a step backward. The media have less interest for stabilization, but excesses, errors and situations where the force appears to be powerless will be rapidly reported and analyzed by the media; whereas the opponents, who are now well trained at using Information warfare, wont hesitate to exploit these problems to legitimate their fight. In that domain, an actual asymmetry in the information domain can be observed, since the public opinions of engaged forces contributing nations follow from a distance whats going on in the theater and according to a rhythm that is discontinuous and at a low level as long as there is no actual crisis, whereas the local population receives in permanence the propaganda emitted by the opponents. Besides, during the stabilization phase, there is an increased number of actors involved (coalitions, international, regional and local institutions, governments, civilian society representatives,...) which makes

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the visibility of the military actions get blurred each one acting according to his own logic, his own sensitivities, his own objectives including what regards information. Within that context, Operational Communication risk to focus only on events having a negative impact indifference, tiredness, indignation - that can provoke a legitimate frustration from the part of the engaged forces.

The objectives
Operational Communication objectives consist principally in accompanying the forces action in the field by contributing to gaining adhesion or at least neutrality and trust of the local population and elites, to get the national public opinions support for a long and costly effort by convincing them of the actions legitimacy and usefulness. Operational Communication participates also in maintaining the morale of the forces which are engaged in accomplishing tasks that are complex and sometimes not very much gratifying, by promoting their actions; they also fight back disinformation operations that aim at downgrading the forces credibility and participate in asserting our countrys role. Relying on the classical four domains of action3, Operational Communication aims at targetting various types of public: local population and authorities, engaged military forces and their environment (families, homebase populations,...) national and international public opinion, French and foreign political and military decision-makers, international organizations, potential opponents.

The principles
In order to achieve the above described objectives, it is important that tactical, operational and strategic levels commanders get heavily involved in the implementation of a proactive type of communication which enables them to master the time factor in the long term. This implies, on the one hand, to implement a continuous information effort aiming at mobilizing and maintaining the public opinions support, and on the other hand to implement a permanent anticipation process in order to be able to pre-empt and face any crisis; and last it requires the development of a full coordination with all parties involved in the stabilization process. Operational Communication in stabilization tends to get closer to an institutional type of information. It is essential first to regularly, frequently and systematically explain the legitimacy and reality of the action that is being conducted, what are the motives for it, its objectives, its effects, its modalities, its legal framework. Media interest must be incited and maintained. In order to do that, one has to use conviction, seduction, imagination, and surprise through striking the minds and keeping the dissemination of information at a rather high tempo. French Marchal de Lattre, as soon as he had been assigned to Indochina, understood well that it was necessary to widen the scope of the conflicts exposure to the media in order to downgrade the public opinions indifference and to gain its concurrence4.

It is, in particular, a question of making the target audience understand that a strategy aiming at reaching lasting stability and prosperity, requires patience, determination and often firmness. The objective remains to convince it that the desired end state is much preferable to what existed before so that the force doesnt appear as being an occupation force responsible for the local populations hardships and sufferings. Our messages credibility in the long term relies mainly on simplicity, sincerity and invariability, and also on a permanent effort of pedagogy, accuracy and openness. But that effort must always remain compatible with operational security requirements5. That type of Operational Communication consists in proactively offering information, rather than responding to requests, by providing the journalists with means to go on-site and to do their job, by opening them the doors to units and staffs, by providing them with information that is trustable and updated, by explaining successes and failures, by feeling obligated to tell the truth. Information must, in particular, make sure that it shows precisely the diversity and complexity of all the daily tasks that are performed by the force, favoring presentations made by field actors, and involving the various echelons of the chain of command in order to give realistic and concrete view of the action and to give value to their engagement and their knowledge of the environment. In order to achieve that objective, CIMIC actions, which constitute a high value leverage means must receive the highest support possible. This is the condition for making disappear any doubts about the forces action especially when stabilization process appears to be going slower due to reasons that can be more of political than a military nature and even sometimes that might originate from the renouncement of a State to take responsibilities.

Doctrine

That sort of proactivity must be accompanied by a willingness to anticipate and to react which requires the taking into account of the media factor by the chain of command during the planning and conduct of each of the actions that are undertaken. Operational Communication must first aim at convincing the target audience that military means have the deterring coercion capability and, although these assets are progressively fading, they are often the only ones being capable to face a downgrading situation and the resurrect of violence by neutralizing, if required, the potential perturbing elements. It is thus necessary to remind that the military actions prime objective remains to be able to impose our will, and if necessary through the use of force. In addition, Communication must be able to pre-empt any event and to keep the initiative in case of a crisis. In that respect, Operational Communication must be trustable and responsive in order to be the first source able to provide information that clearly and accurately explain what is the crisis about and aim at making accepted the employment of force. The use of force cannot appear as being due to disarray but rather to a firm and constant resolve. It must thus be anticipated in order to be able to demonstrate its legitimacy and that the risks taken by our forces are justified and that a particular attention is given to mastering the violence and to avoiding collateral damages, topics which are particularly sensitive for local, national and

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international public opinions. In that respect, the planning process must include the image factor which has now become indispensable in order to provide indisputable evidences to render credible the developed thesis6. And last, Operational Communication must necessarily be coordinated and organized in concert with all other local, national and international actors information campaigns in order to avoid releasing contradictory messages and thus being detrimental to the international actions overall consistency. They must emphasize the complementarity that exists between the force and all other military and civilian actors operating in the field by showing that the military component is the one that makes things possible for the others. In the theater, the sought efficiency requires a close coordination with the coalitions various contingents, the national diplomatic representation, the international institutions missions operating in the field and the local administration representatives. At the national

level, it requires an interministerial co-ordination indispensable to create a synergy of the efforts which would be capable of relaying at strategic and political levels the proactive type of communication that is implemented in the field.

1 A command responsibility actions coordination, subsidiarity, willingness to inform, accuracy, proactivity, reactivity, respect of freedom of thought and of freedom of expression. 2 Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center. 3 Media, internal information, internet, network communication. 4 This war, we are going to show them what it is all about, and the French will thus tell us if they want to continue it or not. 5 Most journalists understand well that some pieces of information cannot be released to them. 6 All opponents are now capable of producing and rapidly disseminating their own images.

The respect of these conditions in the long term constitutes a difficult and demanding challenge. However this is the price to pay for our Communication organization to be recognized as being the source capable to deliver information that is legitimate, comprehensive, relevant, up to date, and accurate in front of our opponents adverse messages, and to thus participate in the missions execution.

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The Main Stakes of Combat Service Support during a Stabilization Phase

eing a transition period, the stabilization phase is particularly sensitive for logistics: indeed it is characterized by strong doubts during which all imperatives pertaining to a 3 block war type situation will have to be fulfilled simultaneously. The addition of the burdens ensuing the changes in posture and in the task organization of the force, as well as the temporary taking into account of certain needs of the population, are likely to generate an increased activity whilst the context calls for assets savings. In addition, the fragile security of the situation and the operational reversibility requirement limit the possible reduction of the logistics and entail heavy operation constraints.

Doctrine

The issue during this phase may then be simply summed up as being the best adaptation of the administrative and logistic support system to the realities and risks of the new situation. Achieving this objective may be analyzed in accordance with three main challenges of the decision making process, which will be used as a main thread in order to integrate the evolution factors and the selection criteria: a reorganization of assets, in coherence with the reshaping of the force, which warrants the action reversibility and at the same time integrates the concern for costs savings; the progressive adaptation of rules and procedures to the change in the operational situation; the preparation of the future with a view of looking for the most efficient transition towards the desired end state.

BY

COLONEL PATRICK LEFEBVRE - LAND FORCES LOGISTIC COMMAND (CFLT)

The structural adaptation

Although the projection phase justifies a high ratio of logistical assets to warrant the entry of the force on the theater of operations and the success of combats, the stabilization phase favors a better productivity of logistical support that makes it possible to adapt structures. The matter is to take advantage of this improvement in the logistic performance both for economic reasons (roughly 85% of the excess cost of an overseas operation is connected to personnel pay and accommodation) and for operational reasons (concern for rebuilding the forces projection strategic capability1 in the home territory). On the theater, as the favored operational course of action during this phase consists in controlling the environment, the engaged force is then very often faced with a sizeable change in the nature of its units, its task-organization and its deployment. In particular, the tactical units will often be scattered and they require an adapted support that imposes a certain fractioning of the logistical structures. In addition, the shift to a zonal type support mode must be accompanied by a review of the structures that can prove to be very

significant: merging of certain support levels, merging of CPs, shift from an organization based on specialized crafts organizations to multi-functional structures such as the Logistics Bn one. During this structural adaptation process, in terms of logistics the operational reversibility imperative translates into the ability to cope with certain activity peak loads under very short notice (casualties, over-consumptions, technical losses, temporary reinforcements support, humanitarian assistance, ...) deriving from punctual crises, short intensive engagement periods or serious troubles impacting the populations. Therefore, the adequacy of assets must be reasoned, per activity areas, in accordance with the estimation of the peak of these workloads (whose validation is a command responsibility) and not in accordance with the average technical activity encountered in usual operations2. In this approach, it matters to consider logistics as an efficiency amplifier thanks to its capability to directly contribute to the achievement of the wanted effects on the population (lets notably quote the medical and veterinary assistance, some human support capabilities, CIMIC support, impact of local markets on the economic reconstruction,...).

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Outsourcing or subcontracting of certain functions represents the favored solution in order to adapt the projectable support strengths to the change of phase. This process, which consists in handing over to civilian personnel positions for which the operational situation no longer justifies them to be held by military requires a careful analysis of opportunities and risks. Recourse to outsourcing or subcontracting by the French services is presently only carried out on theaters that are considered to be stabilized. Later, outsourcing is a means of support that gives an additional capability to the military capabilities; as stated by General Marescaux, it contributes to extra muscle over the projection capability skeleton. This is indeed what is acknowledged in the CAPESFRANCE program we will speak about later on. However, as a stabilized situation is still likely to deteriorate, the reversibility issue must be included in the approach, either during the studying phase or during the implementation one (emergency procedures). The outsourcing of support for overseas operations can be pushed very far, but unlike certain armies, France does not outsource logistical functions directly connected with the operational engagement. Outsourcing in the French way essentially pertains to functions connected with daily life and stationing support. In this way, the management of the Warehouse Camp, main French stationing in Afghanistan, has been outsourced since the summer of 2006 and that the management of the French camps in Kosovo will be outsourced during the spring of 2007 within the framework of the joint CAPESFRANCE program, which also concerns Chad and strategic transportations (Afghanistan; Balkans and Chad). The management of the camps encompasses basic functions (catering, maintenance of premises, condition of personnel on operations, laundry...) as well as all aspects pertaining to infrastructure ranging from usual maintenance to the setting up of surveillance systems and the handing back of locations. Last, it should be emphasized that the French legislation, especially the law dealing with mercenaries, imposes very strict limitations to the use of non-combatant personnel for activities of an operational nature. Last, the multinational nature of the operation noticeably impacts the reorganization of supports during the stabilization phase. It is well known that multinationality entails logistical redundancies, as each national contingent is looking for its logistical autonomy thanks to its own assets and in accordance with its standards. However, the entrance in the stabilization phase multiplies, at least in principle, the rationalization opportunities in the form of mutualization, of crossed services that are thoroughly described in the NATO doctrine (lead nation, role specialist nation, MILU) and is facilitated by the exercise of LOGCON, according to which the force commander exercises a coordination authority over the national logistical assets. However, the changes in the composition of the force, even some hasty re-deployments of contingents, do not facilitate stable logistical arrangements; besides, they can prove to be very constraining as they sometimes bind the involved parties beyond what is necessary. This is why the French services remain very cautious vis--vis mutually shared logistical organizations and globally reluctant regarding their participation in multinational integrated logistic units (MILU). Therefore, the adaptation of logistic support must not be reasoned in a homothetic way in accordance with the restructuring of the force. Depending on the operational sensitiveness of the support functions, the weight must synthesize the threshold effects of certain specialties, the possibility of punctually performing services from the national territory and the opportunities offered by outsourcing or multinational cooperation.

The functional adaptation

The change in the posture of the force in stabilization entails a noticeable evolution of standards, rules, procedures and priorities in the conduct of logistic support. Conveniently this adaptation should judiciously follow the evolution of the operational situation, along a validation approach of permanent operational policies and procedures carried out under command and control supervision. In the first place, the requirement definition pertaining to the support of personnel (including the condition of personnel on operations) tends to come close to those of daily life

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standards. Fighting against the long lasting installation of the force, preserve its rusticity whilst ensuring good physical and morale recuperation conditions for combatants then becomes a real challenge. The evaluation of the appropriate limit in this area cannot be universal. The standards that have to be selected are obviously depending upon the environment characteristics and the employment conditions of the units, and they may vary from one area to another. Therefore, needs must be evaluated within the framework of theater policies3 that must be finalized as soon as possible in order to guide collective action and avoid local abuses. The legal and administrative dimension represents the second main axis of functional adaptation. The taking into account of the hygiene and security function on operations, which also directly contributes to the preservation of men strengths, is essential as soon as operational circumstances make it possible. In this field also, a theater policy has to be implemented and it should include environment preservation criteria. In most cases, simple behaviors and of good sense4 are sufficient to avoid most risks. But they have to be encouraged the soonest possible and co-ordinated. It is important to connect this approach with the sanitary prevention policy, which must be amplified to incorporate the new risks, notably those pertaining to unsuitable behaviors likely to occur during relaxation and leisure activities5. Last, the employment and implementation rules will have to perfectly address the specific operational difficulties that the combat service support units have to face ensuing the change of the course of action. The main characteristics that should be kept in mind are: the impossibility to secure the whole of the territory thus creating large lacunary areas, the permanence of the action in built-up areas, the decentralization of area control action down to the lowest tactical levels and the preservation of centralized action capabilities of rapid reaction forces, possibly airmobile ones, whose support during their action must naturally be carried out.

Therefore, the functional adaptation of logistic support must not be left to the sole technicians. It directly concerns command and control as far as the validation of standards, the definition of policies for the theater and the drafting of the SOPs are concerned.

Doctrine

Anticipation
Anticipation is a cardinal principle for the logistician, this approach is all the more important in a stabilization phase as this phase is marked by uncertainty. The first imperative is to warrant the reversibility of the courses of action, in case of an overall deterioration of the situation on the theater sanctioned by a durable resuming of combats. One of the key success factors then lies in the anticipation planning quality that enables the power rebuild-up of the logistical system in order to ensure the support of reinforcements, the resuming of outsourced functions and if necessary the planning for nationals evacuation. In this process, it is essential to make sure that the logistical function is correctly integrated at the appropriate level and in all its aspects in planning studies. In a second step, it is the case of adopting the most advantageous posture in order to facilitate the shift towards the normalization phase and the final disengagement of the force. The planning for redeployment must be started as early as possible, since it may prove useful to warrant the best emergency withdrawal conditions if need be. On a logistical point of view, the stabilization phase is therefore rapidly marked by the re-deployment logic. Thus, the logistical weight of the force must be regularly revisited in view of facilitating its withdrawal and no longer its build-up. Whilst warranting the general efficiency of support, the technical-administrative decisions must be guided by a longer term vision that integrates this final perspective, otherwise resources are likely to be wasted or efforts dispersed. Therefore and concretely, one has to find the right tuning for the logistical weight of the force in accordance with the withdrawals hypotheses set out by the command. This action is more particularly addressing stocks levels and allocations and the volume of man support equipments deployed in the units. The guidelines pertaining to stationing support must naturally be established in coherence. The administration function also takes an active part in this anticipation process by regularizing a maximum of situations enabling the avoidance of final litigations (work contracts for civilian personnel recruited locally, rental contracts of infrastructures, ...). Therefore, the person in charge of logistics must be able to go beyond the conduct of usual support in order to include the daily tasks in a perspective and prepare for the future as much as the circumstances allow it.

Within this framework, the permanence of insecurity and of asymmetrical action particularly jeopardizes logistics whose dispositions represent tempting targets. The issues pertaining to the protection of convoys and to the security of logistical deployments remain very acute. On this point, the army has been able to take full advantage of lessons learned pertaining to ongoing conflicts, especially those of the American forces in IRAQ, as shown by the adopted measures within the framework of operations Licorne or Pamir6. Other support actions, which seem purely technical, such as the recovery of a damaged armored vehicle or a medical evacuation, can also require the setting up of a real combined arms maneuver within the particular context of combat in built-up areas7. The measures pertaining to this type of situation must be formalized ASAP in permanent standard operational procedures (SOPs) known by everybody.

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1 This concern is all the more acute as, unlike combat assets, the size of the logistical capabilities reservoir was determined without any adaptation coefficient in relation with the operational contract. 2 In addition of course, certain capabilities can be ensured using temporary reinforcements depending on their sensitiveness and on the imposed reactivity (repairs of certain smart techniques for example). 3 Drafting of the action plan pertaining to the condition of personnel on operations on the theater, definition of the usage of non-ministry assistance funds for the theater (financed thanks to a contribution based on soldiers clubs sales), action priorities for stationing support, equipment priorities for equipments specifically dedicated to the personnel support, deployment rules pertaining to collective assets for life on the field (module 150), etc. 4 Rationally organize the stocking of hazardous materials in relation with personnel, take into account the prevention against fires, set out circulation rules, etc. 5 Such as alcoholism, hazardous sexual behaviors, ... 6 In the Ivory Coast, all logistical convoys are systematically escorted by a protection platoon. The conduct of this operation is ensured by the Operation Center of the Joint Theater HQ, which can rely upon permanent operational procedures specifically issued for this purpose. 7 See the account of Captain (US) BAIRD in the issue N 8 of the Doctrine publication.

Action must be built based on contingencies. This quotation of General De Gaulle is particularly well adapted to the logistical function that, far from relying upon a single process ensuing from a frozen doctrine, has to permanently adapt itself to circumstances. Logistics are permanently maneuvering, thanks to the task organization and the employment of its assets as well as through the functional management of the various fields of activities. The variety of the situations in the theaters of operations presently gives us many implementation examples of this principle thanks to the adaptation of the logistical systems to the characteristic circumstances of the stabilization phases.

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Taking the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical (NRBC) Hazard into Account during a Stabilization Phase

Doctrine

W
BY

hen the French armed forces and their allies are committed in an overseas theater, they are likely to meet a NRBC-type event during the so-called stabilization phase. Indeed, either under an asymmetrical - of a guerilla-type or terrorist - threat or for the management of a technological hazard, we are likely to have to deal with such an issue. Owing to the nature of their deployment and of their capabilities, land forces will be in the front line again.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANELLI - CDEF/DEO

The basic features for these kinds of events

There are various operational consequences that could influence all deployed units or some of them. Besides, they will be exacerbated by the civilian population/armed forces entanglement, and the armed forces land component is dependent on this situation. Indeed, if military personnel and their equipment are respectively rather battleseasoned and hardened in front of these threats, the situation will be different for civilian populations that will have to be rescued1. But, beyond these generic aspects, let us consider what the specific consequences of a dubious or proven use of a radiological, biological or chemical agent against the forces would be. First, taking the event into account quite clearly results into movement restriction2 and an increase in the forces protection level. The immediate consequence will consist in stopping the maneuver in this specific area; then, following this, a noticeable decrease in operational effectiveness 3 due to protection gear being worn. Then, it is necessary to restore the previous combat effectiveness of the forces. Decontamination - efficient against radiological and chemical agents - compels to reorganize the structure and units affected will be unable to operate for some time. What is less known, danger coming from some pathogens B will compulsorily lead to isolate affected personnel4. This hazard requires establishing a specific and protected site, specific logistic and psychological support as well as increased communication. At medical level, a specific prophylaxis will have to be carried out with the purpose of maintaining capabilities while taking immediate or long-term secondary effects into account. As regards prevention, we also have to demystify probable hazards.

The conspicuous unicity of the NRBC acronym is misleading; actual nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical hazards are different, depending on their effects, the operational consequence on combatants, equipment and terrain and eventually because of their legal environment. If the luminous-thermic, mechanical, electromagnetic and radioactive effects of a nuclear weapon (N) are well known, as well as those linked to chemical weapons (toxicity and persistency), it is, however, necessary to remind that: chemical danger (C) could also be linked to the explosive feature, the inflammability, the toxicity and the corrosiveness of some chemical items5 coming from industrial operations; the radiological danger (R) is linked to irradiation due to emitted radiations and to a likely contamination by radioactive particles; obviously, the biological danger (B) comes from the toxicity of (incapacitating or lethal) agents but especially from their likely contagious character.

With these technical effects, it is necessary to stress the unpredictable psychological effect6, whose importance may range from stress in a localized conflict to overall panic. On this account, the recent example about the difficulty to deal with the avian influenza epizootic and the tricky isolation measures set up only enable to lift a corner of the veil. The legal environment linked to this weapons category so-called WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction)7 should prevent their use, upstream. Yet, these treaties and conventions only bind the member states that signed and ratified them.

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Worsening factors Host nation
The commitment of armed forces implies a certain number of constraints, among which the most important one is the civilian population to be taken into account, as this factor is not optional. Owing to the effects of these weapons and the lack of protection for the population on the one hand, and commanders priorities on the other hand, this hazard will be exacerbated by the likelihood of not being able to process the whole of exposed personnel or part of it.

SIRPA Terre

Under no circumstances, they apply to an infra-state organization of the revolutionary or terrorist type or to non signatory states8. On the other hand, it will have an influence on the local management of the crisis, by providing it with an international dimension9. Its specific aspects during a stabilization phase In his book, LArme Chimique (Chemical Weapons), Colonel MEYER defines the asymmetry of a weaker against stronger warfare, in which the weaker party would use forbidden weapons that would bring the stronger one - with its conventional weapons - to a deadlock, and this latter one could not use the same means as his adversary because of ethic, and even material reasons.

Condition of the country

The poor state of industrial web (abandoned plants, badly maintained and unprotected storage) results into industrial hazards likely to endanger the deployed force. Operations carried out in FY (Former Yugoslavia) were characterized by the extent of this problem; abandoned chemical agents, chemical item leakages, radiological pollutions... Furthermore, the possible state of insalubrity of the country where commitments are taking place could result into a likely natural biological hazard10 that the force would have to face.

Many-sided likely-to-occur NRBC hazards

The typology of NRBC actions that could be considered during a stabilization phase could be defined as follows: illegal use or threat of illegal use of violence from radiological, biological and chemical agents or matters, aiming to put pressure through induced terror, harassment, destabilization and disruption. Starting from the assumption that the deployed force is in a stabilization phase, it necessarily overwhelms its opponent militarily. This axiom forbids considering a massive use of NBCrelated weapons. On the contrary, a scenario with multiple insignificant operations, aiming more to destabilize psychologically and to disorganize temporarily rather than to have a considerable effect is to be feared. However, in the biological field, we cannot exclude the use of contagious agents that could result into heavy losses. Beyond the fear caused by the use of NRBC assets, it will be looked for wearying, even destabilizing the force. An enemy using such assets could strive to weaken an interfering power - moreover a coalition member - through induced disruption.

Urbanized terrain and empty areas

As regards potential aggressors (guerilla, terrorists, fighters...), urbanized terrain provides them with a large panel of possible actions owing to the mix11 of above mentioned factors that increase risks. Moreover, as it is impossible for the force to control the whole territory where it operates, this will result into uncontrolled empty areas where the enemy will be free to develop new COAs (Courses of Action) or deny the access to some specific areas. Thus, influence areas will come up.

Duration and time scale

The very duration of the stabilization phase will also be against the force. Indeed, when meeting these hazards and if it is possible to keep a good level of protection during a certain time, the fact that they are spread over time will necessarily result into the posture being loosened, a situation that the enemy is likely to exploit.

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A targeted and tailored NRBC Defense

Risks linked to this kind of event should not be overestimated but considered at their right level to enable to have a good balance between possible dangers and brought-in responses in terms of assets, specialized manpower and engagement capabilities.

The 2nd Dragoon NRBC Defense Battalion: the implementation military wing

Doctrine

Intangible doctrinal principles

If concept and doctrine pillars in the NRBC field are common to the whole of the armed forces, each of the Services and the French Gendarmerie have specific features regarding the capabilities to have and induced NRBC COAs12 - through their specific COAs and differences induced from various environments. Since the setting up of a joint organization in 1999, dealing with NRBC defense within the Armed Forces Joint Staff, a joint NRBC doctrine was drafted (document PIA-03-203.1, agreed on March 19, 2004). Each Service has developed its own concepts and doctrines13 in front of these kinds of aggression. Thus, from this basis, the Army has implemented a NRBC doctrinal package, whose cornerstones are AGESTER 101 and the concept14 of employment of NBC defense in operation. All major functions, which are planning, prevention, management and restoration, are presented at the various operational and tactical levels.

Specialized NRBC defense units already have a certain number of specific skills: location and area reconnaissance, assessment of industrial hazards, risk management, decontamination of heavy equipment. For example, DNBC 101 modules in this battalion provide any deployed force with experts16 able to bring an answer to nearly all the NRBC situations that could be considered during a stabilization phase. Already during the years 2000, the deployment of elements from the NBC defense group in Kosovo perfectly showed the variety of missions that could be carried out by specialized NBC Defense during a stabilization phase. As far as prevention is concerned, they enabled to have a right appraisal of - either industrial or terrorist - risks, on the one hand by advising operational decision-makers and on the other hand by systematically looking for dangerous items in the theater. Thus, very concretely and regarding the precaution principle, they removed and stored potentially dangerous products that were in areas already controlled by KFOR units17. They were also directly committed in the wake of incidents, such as a sulfuric acid leakage in a plant, which highlighted their outstanding expertise when dealing with such industrial risks. Eventually, as regards restoration - apart from the confinement of dangerous materials already mentioned - they eliminated highly toxic matters and carried out an important clearing work, thus enabling industrial activity to be resumed in some industrial sites. Always operating to achieve normalization, they trained KPC (Kosovo Protection Corps) units to industrial hazard awareness in order to enable Kosovo to gain selfsufficiency as far as possible prevention and management of these hazards is concerned. The fact that we have taken issues linked to radiological, and biological hazards into account formerly within the framework of the NBC Defense Group, and currently within the 2nd NBC Defense Battalion18 - a unique unit within the armed forces is an undisputable asset for a theater military commander, in particular during the stabilization phase of a conflict.

The building-up of decision-making tools

Since September 2005, the Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center (CPCO) has included a new element with a horizontal capability - the CARBC (Decision support element in the radiological, biological and chemical hazards areas). This cell is the core of a network for the surveillance and the analysis of radiological, biological and chemical hazards; it is composed of the BEDOUIN cell from IMTSSA (French joint tropical medicine institute) in Marseilles, the Operational Center, French Joint Medical Service (DCSSA) and experts from the French Directorate, Military Intelligence (DRM). Its role goes beyond mere surveillance - by the way necessary for J2 and J5. It also compensates for the identified absence of NRBC expert in J3, thus in the control of operations when facing an event of this kind. Should an incident occur, it advises J3 and brings in its expertise to set up a joint assessment cell, fitted to the encountered problem, using the CAGEC15 (crisis management support cell) manpower as a reservoir. Within the Army, this joint assessment cell has a relay of experts available, trained in G3s NRBC cells, to the benefit of which the Land Force Commander has brought in a major contribution since a couple of years. However, the setting-up of decision-making tools would not be enough to meet any NRNC event - should it occur - if there was no available asset reservoir to operate.

Improvement margins
When being deployed, NRBC defense should improve its capability to anticipate events, by systematically collecting information focused on the threat or NRBC hazards. Relying on the awareness of agents, of probable carriers to spread them, and of potentially dangerous locations, NRBC cells should be able to activate battalions scouting units in order to be able to provide the theater commander with intelligence. On the homeland territory, civilian emergency services units and mobile teams for chemical emergency (CMICs) have the expertise and equipment devoted to industrial risk management. During a normalization phase, the NBC defense battalion should extend its array of deployable capabilities, in particular in the fields of depollution, infrastructures reconnaissance, and contaminated area processing - in particular regarding biological hazards.

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1 In compliance with Geneva Convention, Protocol 1, Article 48. Soldiers code of behavior: Keeping his force under control, he respects the populations and strives to save them. 2 Indeed, the chances for these contamination or epidemic disease to be spread impose such restriction of movement. 3 Exercise CAPOPS 2003 demonstrated that in harsh climatic conditions, a soldier even well trained and acclimatized, could not comply with his mission for more than two hours and a half. 4 The decision to evacuate affected personnel, be it true or only suspected, will have certainly the most striking psychological and media-related effect. 5 NATO has constituted a list of industrial chemical toxics that is regularly up-dated. 6 Being contaminated or to fear to be contaminated, together with the difficulty to identify the contaminating agent, is a powerful factor of anxiety. 7 This appellation is widely utilized because it strikes peoples imagination. In fact it is a misuse of language. Several years ago, the expression Weapons of Mass Disruption was to replace it; but because people were accustomed to the former one, although it was more accurate, it was not successfully employed. 8 Egypt, Syria, North Korea and Isral are supposed to possess chemical weapons; however these states have not ratified the convention prohibiting their use (OIAC). 9 NATO has developed procedure SIBCRA to report any CBRN event up to the highest level of the Organization. Besides, concerning the employment of such assets, international organizations in-charge will be involved in order to identify the contaminating agent; for instance, to identify from where comes some Polonium used for poisoning purpose. 10 For instance, the exposure to malaria during Operation Licorne and chikungunya fever virus treatment. 11 In 1984, in Bhopal, the explosion of the industrial site in an urban environment caused thousands of casualties. 12 Nevertheless, as for the biological domain, it is necessary to possess a common base especially in order to manage the biological event, search for evidences and monitor the possible development of the epidemics. 13 Concerning the support the armed forces are supposed to bring as a public service, in the occurrence of a NRBC event on the national territory, the conceptual and doctrinal body is still to consolidate. However, a protocol has been drafted in 2001. It establishes how and which NRBC defense assets are to be made available within the frame of an intervention to rescue populations on the national territory. 14 The document DNBC 100 issued in 2000 should be modified when the Army decontamination doctrine is approved. 15 CAGEC allows to dispose of a number of NRBC experts able to assist in managing a crisis with radiological, biological or chemical aspects, either on the national territory or overseas. Established in 2006, it is manned with personnel from the French verification Unit and the Armed Forces Joint Staff Arms Control Division. 16 The personnel from the 2nd Dragoon (NBC) are qualified in one unique expertise domain. 17 400 liters of hydrocyanic acid in the life support area of a French infantry battalion and some fifteen barrels of hydrazine methylated spirit two in a Danish battalions. 18 Within VIGIPIRATE plan, this battalion keeps on alert a number of modules ready to be deployed all over the national territory.

Thanks to the momentum created by the setting up of the NRBC joint defense cell, the Army was able to establish the basis for an adequate response to this kind of events. Now, we have to accumulate these achievements by keeping adapting them to terrorist threat and industrial hazards. The 2nd NBC defense battalion, its kingpin, will be fully operational only when its personnel strength is completed and the whole of its major equipment fielded. Eventually, at a time when we are looking for possible synergies, we will have to make sure that the Army keeps the control of the unique capabilities it is entrusted with.

CCH Jean-Jacques CHATARD/SIRPA Terre

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Stabilization Operations
and their Influence in Terms of Equipment

Doctrine

hroughout the past fifteen years, French troops have been participating in operations almost exclusively related to stabilizing-missions, most of them requiring commitments on the long-term. It is now well established that land forces are to apply a mix of coercion actions -brutally on occasion- and violencecontrol strategies during this decisive phase of operation. In that scope, many doctrinal documents recently published clearly address all missions oriented to security and assistance issues as a priority, but whilst maintaining the focus on offensive and defensive procedures at the same time. In fact, this doctrine reflects the full spectrum of skills and techniques that the French forces already use to practice on a daily basis. Noticeably, a large majority of our pieces of equipment -either already issued or still on the purchase-listhave been typically designed for the coercive phase of an operation, namely when combat-sequences would come first. This aspect of our equipment policy is worth noticing since France actually means to hold her rank amongst the few nations capable of running first-entry operations on their own where necessary. On the other hand, the same equipments demonstrate to be also somehow fitted to the various missions assigned to our troops. Even better, though their aging design may look one-step behind any recent military specifications, these actually meet the reversibility key-criterion demanded to land component forces for them to achieve the stabilization phase of an operation. Since the concept of reversibility is requested by the continuum of operations as well as by the mode of military commitment in stabilization, the general characteristics of the equipments have not to be fundamentally changed overnight. So, existing equipments appear to be globally appropriate at the moment. However, this statement does not preclude from pointing at some necessary adjustments. As well, it may be worth seeing where French forces can still improve in that context.
BY

COLONEL LAURENT MICHON - CDEF/DREX1

Where Stabilization Operations give reasons to land forces for no hast in deeper refurbishment
Reversibility is no doubt a key-requirement for any stabilization -oriented mission, where our troops could have to tackle dissymmetrical and asymmetrical situations at the same time, each of them subject to a personalized strategy. Deterrence keeps being however instrumental to expeditionary missions. Otherwise, the country will not be secured, the population will be no longer protected, and nation-building activities may never start. This reads like a clich, but it actually addresses a variety of demands in terms of spirit, doctrine and organization, all of them related to the notion of reversibility. So let us elaborate on this notion where applicable to military assets, but while keeping in mind that every piece of equipment can be reversible by nature or by the usage made of it. Ever-improving technologies, together with financial considerations, are clearly driving military equipments into

highly integrated and multifunctional systems. Aggression, protection, surveillance and mobility are now conceived and developed in a coherent way for optimizing military assets. As a result of this policy, a unique tool may respond to a large variety of tasks, since it would have been designed in advance as a reversibility-capable and multi-purpose system. However, integrated functions often result in a lower upgrading potential for such sophisticated assets. In Kosovo, battle-tank Leclerc is an effective deterrence-tool for patrolling in periods of trouble. It is also appreciated in Lebanon as an expedient and well-protected observation platform. In return and compared to the Markava now available under its version 4, this will be difficult to enhance that complex combat-vehicle in the course of its operational life. Proper usage of assets not specially tailored for stabilization operations can also cater for reversibility-capable structures and maneuvers. In fact, all Western armed forces would work on ingenious solutions of their own for setting up a better organization -provisional or durable- and so make the best of

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their current equipment. They would switch between deception and deterrence strategies; also resort to the use of force upon warning or by surprise, as relevant to either military effect desired, namely intimidation or neutralization. Excerpts from the long list of contingency-replies already tested with success are worth a quote, i.e. the AMX10Ps2 and VBHMs3 deployed in support of soft-skin VLRAs4 operating in the Ivory Coast; the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) created for Bosnia operations and the reinforcement-troops sent to UNIFIL 2 in Lebanon, both of them equipped with top-of-the-art target-acquisition systems and self-propelled pieces of artillery. Also, firing smoke-rounds straight at some Serbs ARTY bases just to make them feel our resolve, for free until the worst comes up, was quite an innovative twist to the original purpose of such ammunition. To that extent, imagination keeps ruling the scene anyway. It should be stressed that the local populations, who are the main targets for the stabilization efforts, cleverly understand at whom the show of force is actually directed. Kosovo Albanians use to wave cheers at patrolling tanks and may come closer to see armor crews at work, provided troops be walking aside the Leclerc. Our operational environment has been changing along decades and so have our organic equipments together with the clever and inventive usage made of them in the field of tactics. To that extent, there is payback finally, for the 20 years of efforts spent at hammering that, whatever branch he belongs to, every soldier must be allotted modern gears and weapons, as much as an Airman or a Sailor. In fact, a platoon, a company team or a battalion TF may have to fight a battle even in the context of stabilization operations; but expeditionary forces cannot just rely on assets entirely dedicated to violence-control tasks. And financial considerations practically bar the option of conceivably allotting a double set of equipments to all and any (except for a few special functions). logistic flows, and thus reduce the costs of logistics, technology alone will probably not cater for all aspects of the dilemma aforementioned. Now, though the major equipments currently fielded throughout our forces happen to acceptably match operational requirements, these will not live forever. This is why the VAB5, the ERC6 and the AMX 10 RC7, these beasts of burden harnessed to our operational contract, are now subject to a rehabilitation program just like our allies M1 Abrams, Warriors and helicopters. Given that all vehicles concerned will go back to their mother-firms, this program goes with challenging anticipations on how the renovation-cycle can synchronize with our units duty-tours, the frequency of which is far from dropping down. By the way, industrial capacities are often limited and the budgeting efforts devoted to urgent fixes are usually proving detrimental to long-term modernization plans. In short, where retrofit primes over the development of newer systems, this option just increases the burden of the defenses procurement budget without arousing much thrill amongst the weapon-manufacturers community. This is why commanders and crews should learn accepting that they will have to make for equipments possibly old-fashioned today and others probably not perfect tomorrow. Give me more should stop driving specifications requirements into some endless spillover. The right level of completion stands at 80% of what you can afford dreaming. It is enough that the tool strictly responds to actual needs. The money so saved will then help fund a larger number of less expensive pieces of equipment. Typically, each UK unit use to deploy with a standard park of Land Rovers and Warriors, which allows for modular reversibility as the situation would command. In return, simplicity, serviceability, reliability and upgradingpotential must be present8 at the end, since these criteria are essential to the sustained rate of commitments demanded to our forces. On the subject, all Western armed forces happen to be applying similar enhancement-methods to major equipments, owing to the common characters of their present style of

Some adjustments are yet necessary to effectiveness-enhancement

Current stabilization operations however reveal the need for some reforms. On the one hand, many equipments prematurely worn-out in a succession of theaters need refurbishment or replacement. On the other hand, the specifics of stabilization operations require that each related course of action be methodically instrumented. The standard set of capabilities eligible to deployment for running present-days expeditions would encompass firesupport and force-protection, as well as tactical and air mobility assets. Such a demand actually poses a problem in terms of cost/effectiveness and of limitations, and this difficulty is likely going to be exacerbating along the times ahead. In the future, Army forces are to reconsider the present dissemination of assets with regard to their reducing number and ever-growing operating-cost. Though it is expected that computer-assisted maintenance might hopefully authorize less maintenance-personnel and lower

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SIRPA Terre

commitments. An expeditionary force does not necessarily take side in the conflict and legitimacy of the mission must be apparent. This statement entails special attention for accurate and justifiable proceedings. Force protection function should be quoted first with regard to the tactical and political effects that casualties would produce, as related to the long time usually spent until the stabilization phase of an operation is over. Nations accept the idea of losses only when they truly feel at war, but they are certainly not going to feel so for the type of missions where France, Germany, Italy, and Spain are now recurrently called upon participation. The subject of casualties is also central to disputes running over the Iraqi War, in the USA and/or in the UK. In that scope, most studies on technical enhancements are typically dealing with topics such as: simple and robust helicopters; or hardened skin/armor for a variety of vehicles ranging from tanks to logistic trucks; individual gears; secured military compounds; etc. The aggression function must also undergo some changes. Many of our ammunitions (tanks as well as artillery) have been optimized for piercing increasingly resistant armor-shields, whereas gunmen operating from and inside built-up areas are presently considered the main source of danger and our priority target. Weapons and mostly ammunitions have to be adapted consequently. But there is still even more work to do on suitably tackling the question of civilian populations, which systematically happen to interfere with operations. Account to this factor just starts informing the doctrine, training activities, and our equipment-policy. - Intelligence Staffs should be allotted high-performance tools: adequate sensors; open-sources information processing systems; data-bases permitting to figure abstract networks; non-military bugging and detection devices; etc. - Our weaponry-lot should respond to a larger spectrum of issues, from self-defense to crowd-control: non-lethal and/or reduced-effect weapons; counter-riot passive/active protection-gears; rudimentary-arms-proof shields, (i.e. against makeshift mortars or improvised explosive devices). - The specifics of urban and other difficult areas usually harboring hostile forces are still imperfectly taken into account, i.e. gallery/sneaking techniques of progression across buildings; improved air-mobility that could ease haulage and support from adverse trafficability conditions; systems that could allow for detecting, identifying, lodging and engaging hostiles from behind the hill or the bar of buildings masking them. - Operational information now happens to be a standard mission-support function. Because of the media present in the theater; the importance given to a right perception of events; also the dissymmetrical nature of most encounters; facts must be recorded, and pictures and films taken for use in information campaigns supporting the mission. Additionally to the topics aforementioned, stabilization operations require that the logistic aspects of force-projection be more precisely addressed. I mean, monitoring, management and transshipment assets (recurrent shortfalls are: forklift trucks, generator units and deployment support

facilities). Sustainable reversibility would demand that the tactical echelons be allocated with more substantial selfsupport capabilities, whereas operational stocks get thinner and strictly tailored to actual needs.

Doctrine

All in all, some adjustments would be advisable; and it is time to examine them under the scope of feasibility.

How adjust our equipments to Stabilization Operations in a better way?

Best pragmatic approach could be to explore those tracks leading to improve the way we will have to adapt in the short term, medium term, and long term. The responsiveness track comes first to mind. I mean quick, minor, and provisional hardware-adjusts and/or add-ons. Every commander is to figure out which change should be implemented, keeping in mind the possible resulting risks to instant operating capabilities or serviceability in the next future; and this risk evaluation is not that easy. It is up to him to accept hasty, provisional fixes such as a digital camera strapped on a helicopter to film crowds within Mitrovica, or a clearing blade soldered to a VAB for breaking some barrier down in Abidjan. Nevertheless, once hot time is over, this commander is to make sure that such makeshift devices are removed, and call the STAT9 upon gap-stops for the future. Urgent fixes decided by the commander and more elaborate responses reflecting them can contribute in force-protection and success of the mission. Beyond the notion of accountability, which is a matter of fact for any military commander, one can easily imagine the machinery required for meeting the armed forces demands for customized equipments. Concurring with pro-activity, anticipation is the second track worth exploring for medium-term requirements. In fact, there is no much sense opposing short term to long term in that field. Swift-reaction capability actually goes with enabling measures earlier taken and studies previously accomplished. Without preparation, nobody and no system will do better than cater for superficial solutions, if not simply missing the point. Anticipation is meant to early identify which manufacturer can rapidly develop such capability potentially required; or where and at which price such jamming-device could be purchased, occasionally, in some allied country; or which clause should be added to a contract for getting extra pieces when needed. All these measures would burn time, energy and money, but this is the price to pay for boosting responsiveness once troops committed to stabilization operations are deployed in theater. To finish with and in a longer-term perspective, there must be a clear policy-line established to provision for the families of equipment that Army forces are wishing to get in the scope of a sustainable reversibility: typically, assets that could all the same fit for the coercion and violence-control phases of stabilization operations10. Given that resources are limited -i.e. finance, training and strategic lift capabilities-, also that there is

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no question of allotting a double set of equipments to deployed troops, longer-term projects are going to take on one or the other option expressed below. - Either improve the versatility of existing models; - Or switch our minds to major equipments based on a standardized platform. Namely a generic hull/chassis that could be derived into many versions and therefore allow for a wider range of technical upgrades. Unfortunately, technological sophistication usually clashes with the easy-upgrading potential we need for making the best of modern systems. Conversely, the control of many specialized components implies that the nature of troops eligible to deployment be lucidly addressed in the OPLAN, with a view to get the right ones at the right moment in the course of any long-lasting mission. Typically, all or part of those units engaged in the intervention phase of an operation will have to be relieved just when the stabilization phase starts, so that it remain adapted to the missions which are necessarily to change.

1 Forces Employment Doctrine Center/Research & Lessons Learned Division. 2 NfT: French Armored Personal Carrier (APC) (tracked). 3 NfT: French High Mobility Armored Vehicle (HMAV). 4 NfT: A family of robust, 4 WD light truck. 5 NfT: French Armored personnel carrier (wheeled). 6 NfT: French, six-wheeled and turreted light armored vehicle (gun). 7 NfT: French medium tank (wheeled). 8 Air-mobility is a touchy question still pending for some nations. Actually, it is quite difficult to make a sound decision on whether all aging crafts should be replaced by a smaller park of advanced/costly machines, or, if it is possible, just keep on a cheaper retrofit-line, and maintain alive most of those robust pieces having proved reliability in the past, despite some of them are now amply worn out. 9 Section technique de larme de terre. Army Technical Development Branch. 10 The intervention phase may also require that different types of mission be running at the same time.

ADC DUBOIS/SIRPA Terre

It is well established that the present system, based on complementary modular units fitted with a common set of versatile capabilities, allows our Army forces for broadly fulfilling their operational contract, mainly oriented to stabilization missions. Amending this system more quickly and flexibly, but with no intention of turning the whole of it upside-down, sounds like the tone of reason. However, the method entails that the focus be clearly placed to technical enhancements that strictly respond to immediate and patent operational needs. Thus it is necessary to get more doctrinal innovation, in better and better coherence with future or quickly adapted pieces of equipment, without being disturbed by administrative slow-downs.

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Taking into Account Stabilization Specificities within Preparation and Evaluation Exercises
T
oday, one fourth of the French Army has to be operationally ready in permanence for performing different types of mission which include GUEPARD, homeland security missions, presence and sovereignty forces, and expeditionary operations (OPEX). More than 9 000 Army troops participate in these OPEX which include today the stabilization operations in the Ivory Coast Republic, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Chad, the Central African Republic.

Doctrine

Up to now, and although France participates in the field to stabilization operations, the French land forces were being trained in centers that were implementing principally coercion types of scenarios. That type of operational preparation oriented towards high intensity is determining to maintain these know how which, should they be momentarily forgotten, could not be recovered rapidly. However, these centers which get adapted to the changes in forces engagements, are now offering more and more often exercises that include the types of know how that are required during stabilization phases.
BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JEAN KERGUS - CFAT/BCPO1

Land Forces Commands role

Operational preparation which is the Armys number one priority enables staffs and forces to get engaged in the best possible conditions on theaters of operations abroad. This implies that CFAT guarantees the Army Chief of Staff - who is the advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA) for land forces employment - that he will be provided with Command Posts (CPs) and units immediately able to be engaged within the framework of the French Army operational contract. In that respect, CFAT is responsible for the conception and overall conduct of CPs and forces operational preparation and conditioning for expeditionary deployment. The implemented operational preparation process has thus to be oriented towards the most probable types of engagements and adapted to open theaters, bringing the forces to mastering combined arms type of combat down to the lowest levels. The units operational preparation in accordance with the Three Block Operations concept, and which includes actions linked to stabilization, constitutes one of the Army and Land Forces Command major efforts. In order to meet that requirement, CFAT has at its disposal the Army National Training Center (CPF) which constitutes an actual operational preparation brigade for training brigades and Land Force HQs (EMF)2.

The specialized centers

The Force on Force Training Center (CENTAC)
CENTAC allows company teams(Co Tms) training and evaluation within high intensity combat environment. Each two weeks tour involves simultaneously 3 Co Tms and a Bn TF (GTIA3)s tactical HQ. CENTAC is based at Mailly-le-Camp over about 100 km2, it is comprised of the CENTAURE simulation system, an OPFOR unit with two multi-roles companies (able to simulate any existing types of belligerents as well as civilians). Upon request of battalion commanders, CENTAC missions may include stabilization types of missions and know how: crowd control, reaction in front of a demonstration,... In addition, CENTAC reviews existing exercise scenarios to take into account the new engagements framework and proposes thus to the visiting units variable intensity types of sessions.

Military operations in urban terrain training center (CENZUB)

The taking into account of the population, which is gathered mostly in urbanized areas, constitutes the major stake of a stabilization phase and is at the very heart of the forces concerns. In order to meet that requirement, CFAT has had at its disposal the CENZUB since September 2006.

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spectrum of ready to wear exercises with a variable CEPCs involvement: - PONEY EXPRESS: a brigade CP self training exercise. - AURIGE: a combined arms brigades CP evaluation exercise. CEPC puts thus at the FAT CPs disposal an efficient platform using since the end of 2005 a simulation tool called SCIPIO4. SCIPIO presents many exercise capabilities including stabilization phases since it allows representing crowds and asymmetric threats. In 2009, it will allow to simulate actions in urbanized areas.

Lieutenant-colonel Jean KERGUS

Based in the Sissonne training camp, CENZUB permits today to train a Co Tm (infantry heavy) at the village of Beausjour. The first week of the tour is dedicated to training platoon and combined arms detachment level to practicing tactical and technical know how specific to built up areas through a series of workshops (searching a house, movements in urbanized environment, movements within an infrastructure or over a structure, air assault,...). The second week is dedicated to training the Co Tm, including its organic elements and reinforced with its combat support elements (Armor, Artillery and Engineers), confronted to an OPFOR that can impersonate several types of enemies, regular infantry unit, rebels, terrorists. By the end of 2008, CENZUB will provide Co Tms with the town of Joffrecourt which, in the future (2012), will include a complete urban environment, with industrial and commercial areas, individual housings (one floor), town center, modern housing area (5 to 6 floors). In addition to that location, a built up area firing range complex will be created, it will be comprised of 8 individual firing ranges among which one will be dedicated to getting accustomed to blast waves and to operating in battlefield noises environment. These firing ranges will permit live fire (up to 50 Cal.) training and maneuver for a combined arms detachment.

- GUIBERT at division CP level: during the second half of 2007, CEPC will take into account for its CP training exercises the newly developed generic scenario. - That scenario, which takes place in the Iberian Peninsula, will, in particular, allow the players to conduct Early Entry types of operations as well as stabilization actions within multi-ethnic sub regions. CEPC will also include data taken from the Army new TTA 8085 that describes several scenarios and types of threats. Since the end of 2006, the CEPC has proposed to the brigades and Bn TFs staffs designated to conduct isolated missions (Afghanistan, Lebanon) several ready to wear preparation to projections sessions, adapted to the deployment theaters.

Conditioning for projection (MCP)

These preparation sessions which are nowadays the number one priority for operational engagement preparation, constitute the last step of the units build up before engagement: they are mission specific and targeted, they are intended to verify and certify the ability of an element to be immediately engaged on a given theater. During these sessions, the concerned units (Brigades CP Bn TFs...) are provided with as much information as possible to prepare the mission (theater situation, threat, rules of engagement), and to conduct an operational preparation focused on the conditions of engagement specific to that theater (case studies, vignettes, etc.). In addition some infantry companies must attend crowd control MCP as part of the indispensable know-how to be mastered for participating in a stabilization phase. Crowd control is a specific requirement that corresponds to a specific and codified course of action conducted with specific equipment. It is related to several theaters only

The Command Post Battle Command Training Center (CEPC)

CEPC is intended to provide level 2 and 3 CPs with operational preparation exercises that will unable them to be engaged into all types of operations within a joint and multinational environment. The various scenarios that are proposed are implemented within the framework of an engagement that includes intervention, stabilization and normalization phases. The objective is to provide the commanders with a wide

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The taking into account of the stabilization specificities is closely linked to a realistic and efficient lessons learned process, conducted by CFAT that will allow the optimi-zation of the units MCP. The highly satisfactory feed back received from the units that followed these operational preparation sessions demonstrates the good taking into account of the land forces real engagement conditions by the French training centers.
1 CFAT/BCPO: Land Forces Command / operational preparation division. 2 EMF: French Land Force HQ (Division level CP). 3 Combined Arms Battalion Task Force. 4 SCIPIO: Combined arms combat simulation for interactive preparation to operations. 5 Doctrine document describing the exercise generic OPFOR (ORBAT, COAs, ...). 6 Identified by the Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center (CPCO).

Although it remains indispensable to maintain the coercion related know how, land forces must however be also trained to simultaneously conduct operations of different nature, in accordance with the Operations Continuum (intervention - stabilization - normalization) and to maintain the reversibility capability that allows changing posture instantaneously to face without any transition, very diverse high and low intensity situations.

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Lieutenant-colonel Jean KERGUS

(Kosovo, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan) and to several well identified6 infantry units. That session which is conducted under gendarmeries control, includes a phase of training to close operational intervention techniques (TIOR), a field training phase to acquire technical and tactical know how and a final implementation of these know how in coordination with a gendarmerie company. The canine team that will be engaged on the theater of operations participates also in the final (MCP) crowd control training exercise.

Doctrine

In order to prepare forces for stabilization missions

Stabilization:
T

Even More Demanding as Regards Simulations

he features of stabilization operations have shown the extent to which simulations carried out in the 90s were relatively inappropriate to represent them. For the same reason as conventional training has changed to take new situations into account, simulation is compelled to improve itself. We can see the first effects but simulations will have to get through the modeling of new actors and new kinds of confrontation.

After having identified the advantages and disadvantages of conventional simulations, the way JANUS and SCIPIO teams will take up this challenge will be shown in this article.

BY

COLONEL FRDRIC MORINIRE AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS GUILLAUME DANES AND LAURENT TARD - CDEF/DSRO1

Simulation still has ever useful and exploitable advantages...

As it is aiming at educational goals, positive simulation2 is a tool enabling to support the work of response cells in training exercises and for operational preparation rehearsal. It provides us with a realistic time-space framework, automates some tasks, sets rules and makes their implementation easier. In particular, it can measure the impact of the actions conducted by the personnel being trained and shows them the validity of their decisions and orders. Computers have provided simulation with accuracy and speed, and thus they have

enabled us to carry out more actions or interactions between friendly models, enemy models and terrain. Modeling quality keeps improving steadily and it enables to have ever richer fighting replication capabilities, while enabling to make up for some constraints. Simulation compensates for the decrease in deployable assets compelled by budget and environment requirements. It also enables to represent actual actions such as delivering fires. Besides, simulation provides the OCE (Officer Conducting the Exercise) and DICONSTAFF3 (Direction & Control Staff, also in charge of AARs) a reference view of the tactical situation and the capability to control the way actions evolve dynamically. Tactical maneuvers are ratified by friendly and enemy losses and by conquered terrain. These indicators enable commanders to judge the efficiency of their actions.

But it shows shortages in the support of some phases of a stabilization exercise...

If we take the example of a brigade-level exercise, the CP should simultaneously plan and conduct coercion and protection operations and humanitarian support operations, in open spaces and on urbanized terrain. It should organize specific operations such as crowd control or weapons gathering and use operational functions, some of which - such as CIMIC (Civil-

ADJ Jean-Raphal DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

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Military Co-operation) and operational information - are of paramount importance. The enemy - ever more difficult to detect and identify - is intermingled with the force that occupies the whole territory. The goal of operations often consists in keeping the level of violence as low as possible by minimizing (friendly, enemy and collateral) casualties and damages. However, a sole comparison of losses is not enough to assess the situation. Headquarters should take many more actors into account. To symmetrical and asymmetrical enemies in coercion operations, we have to add criminal, terrorist or paramilitary organizations; and also fanatics, demonstrating crowds and ethnic groups in addition to refugees from combat areas. Headquarters should co-ordinate their operations at joint level with other Departments, international organizations, NGOs (Non Governmental Organizations), and local public services and authorities. While carrying out simulation, the sole detect, fire, destroy confrontation mode is not enough to provide personnel being trained with the assessment of the efficiency of orders relying on violence control and thus to take decisions upon themselves. Thus, shortages are about the different kinds of actors, their non-replicated actions, and the geographic sophistication of formerly carefully avoided - urbanized terrain. For the time being, these inconveniences are compensated by a simultaneous use of simulation and of a so-called MEL/MIL4 planned list of events. Indeed, this list enables to describe an isolated incident with details that cannot be generated with simulation. A MEL/MIL list is appropriate to task a CP to respond to the reading of a press article written by a journalist having accompanied a subordinate unit. Simulation is less accurate: it cannot write a journalists article. Conversely, it can generate a set of coherent incidents that will lead to the feeling of a deteriorating situation through an effect of logical spreading. Thus, a simulation will be able to adapt a crowds behavior to the presence of journalists. Then, simulation will enable to generate damages or injured people among a force, a crowd, and NGOs. Casualty evacuation will depend on the availability of first-aid assets. This action will influence the crowds behavior and the forces freedom of action. Today, achieving such a scenario through simulation is no longer utopian thought. With their specific characteristics and constraints, both JANUS and SCIPIO initiatives endeavor to better represent the complexity of stabilization environment to get used to them. Both paragraphs below show the first changes.

and the representation of new actors. For example, it is possible to task a group to search a building, to fight inside of it or in sewers. A new confrontation model based on physical opposition takes violence control into account in order to have ROEs (Rules of Engagement) enforced. It enables to have forces groups closing with crowds. In order not to be overstretched, trainees should bring in augmentation forces or use non-lethal weapons. Thus, decisions not only deal with tactics, but with ROEs enforcement. Non-lethal weapons could also have harmful effects that military leaders should assess before deciding to use them and they should also take consequences upon them - returned by simulation.

Doctrine

In its next release, JANUS will include a crowd model - in the form of two ellipses that can be distorted - and enabling to conceal a terrorist. The new generic Threat has also been modeled. Delivered by summer 2007, this new release will thus ease the training of a land force committed in a stabilization phase. However, all these new features will have to be tested and validated; and additional improvements are likely to be necessary.

And SCIPIO too

SCIPIO5, a simulation tool implemented by the CP Battle Command Training Center (CEPC) in Mailly, enables to complete CPXs at division- and brigade-level. Usually, simulations for brigade-level CPs include company-level (n-2 level) modeling. SCIPIO includes platoon modeling, automatically activated by company-level modeling. It also enables to represent platoonlevel (n-3 level) commitments, without increasing DICONSTAFF manpower. This advantage improves the realism of coercion operations as well as the realism of other operations carried out in stabilization phases. Therefore, a TF (Task Force) can protect an area by combining fixed and mobile outposts, checkpoints and platoon- or company-level reserve. It will be possible to threaten the selected structure with the various enemies (nicknamed: GLAISE (clay), TOURBE (peat) and HUMUS (humus)) included in French Field Manual TTA 808, and with terrorists or a demonstrating crowd. Entities modeled by MASA6 reckon force ratios to achieve their missions. In simulations only dedicated to coercion, military units close up with each other until they are destroyed. In SCIPIO, each unit selects a doctrine-compliant COA (Course of Action), after having assessed enemy capabilities and the losses it could bear. Should a force ratio be unfavorable, the computer would refuse to fight. Thus, an outpost, whose mission does not include combat, will break contact if it is threatened by a warring faction. On the contrary, a terrorist, programmed to be resolute, will endeavor to infiltrate a secured structure until he is neutralized or until he achieves his aim. A similar concept was set up as regards contacts between military units and population. Operations carried out by an armed force towards a crowd should not be presented as firing at demonstrators! With SCIPIO, a military unit imposes its will through deterrence and ROEs enforcement. A peaceful demonstration arriving at an entrance to a secured area will be

But JANUS is changing...

JANUS is a tactical simulation tool representing combined-arms operations and activating system-level non-incorporated entities (vehicles of dismounted soldiers) for coercive operations in open terrain. This tool aims to train companygrade officers in schools, to train level-4 command posts and to prepare for level-3 ones. In order to adapt it to the new kinds of conflicts, we have endeavored to improve modeling as regards urbanized terrain

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In order to prepare forces for stabilization missions

CDEF DSRO

stopped by a checkpoint. If a demonstration gets stronger, the checkpoint will be overwhelmed unless a major unit commits reinforcements. The arrival of a company equipped with LO (Law and Order) assets will restore order. If the atmosphere of a demonstration changes, the commander is likely to change ROEs and authorize the use of non lethal means to hold up a crowd. Thanks to its robots and to its confrontation models, SCIPIO already enables to have lots of representations. In particular, it still has to represent urbanized terrain and new actors. It will be the purpose of release V1.STAB version planned by 2010.

1 Forces Employment Doctrine Center/Simulation and Operational Research Division. 2 This article mainly deals with digital and networked simulation, for officers, NCOs and staffs, so-called positive simulation. 3 A specific and basic simulation module, making lessons learned from exercises easier through After Action Reviews (AAR). 4 Main Event List, Main Incident List. 5 Unlike JANUS, SCIPIO includes an industrial project management; thus, the evolution process is organized through the contract signed with the firm. 6 MASA is a contracting company (alongside with THALES). 7 Directorate for Combat Developments (usually attached to a Branch School).

Despite these new and already important possibilities, other improvements still have to be achieved to enable to represent all the scenarios that are likely to support the building-up of a major land unit. In particular, it is necessary to sharpen the reckoning model pertaining to force ratio towards a crowd. The absence of a population DEP7 makes this work more difficult. The representation of an urbanized terrain should also be improved for DICONSTAFF to be able to put to good use the complexity of the three dimensions of such an area. If the model of an urbanized terrain can easily be defined, it is still difficult to get the data describing the towns of any theater of operation. But the major challenge consists in representing civilian actors (government, firms, NGOs...) living in the exercise area and their interactions with the forces. In order to be both reasonable and educational, the solution could consist in limiting entity modeling to the features upon which military units interact. These simulated entities would be computerized to meet their vital needs and achieve a main activity. Simulation could permanently reckon the satisfaction levels for their vital needs (food, health, accommodation and safety), the achievement of their activities (work, looking for vital resources and associated movements), and the support to armed units operations. The attitude of each group towards a military unit would depend on this level of support. With such a representation, the trained CP would be likely for example - to have an effect on populations opinions. This solution will prevail only if we rely on a battle-seasoned doctrine pertaining to land force operations in immaterial areas (psychological operations for example). Thus, as regards simulation, the stabilization phase brings in numerous challenges that are not yet solved. Thanks to steady technological improvements and mens imagination, simulation tools keep improving. The most difficult part could consist in defining educational goals to be achieved and in finalizing the exercise scenarios that will enable to reach them.

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French Armed Forces Field Manuals

Strategic level
- Notice provisoire sur la participation aux oprations de maintien de la paix mene sous lgide des Nations Unies, (Provisional manual about military involvement in peace keeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations) approved December 15th 1994, under n 573/CDE/BEE/SECE - Instruction provisoire sur la contribution des armes aux missions de scurit publique dans les oprations de soutien de la paix, (Provisional direction about the involvement of the armed forces in law and order enforcement missions, in the frame of peace support operations) approved June 12th 2002, under n496/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP

Bibliography

Operational level
- Concept demploi des forces terrestres en phase de stabilisation, (Forces employment concept in stabilization phase) approved June 21st 2005, under n 980/DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO/10 - PIA 03-100 Concept demploi des armes ltalit rduite, (Concept of employment of reduced lethality weapons) approved January 27th 2005, under n 98/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP - PIA 09-100 Concept et doctrine interarmes de la coopration civilo-militaire, (Joint CIMIC doctrine and concept) approved March 3rd, 2005, under n 262/DEF/EMA/EMP1/NP

Tactical level
- FT-01 Gagner la bataille - conduire la paix, (Win the battle - Proceed toward peace) CDEF/DEO, February 2007 - Doctrine des forces terrestres en stabilisation, (Land forces stabilization doctrine) approved November 23rd 2006, under n 744/DEF/CDEF/DEO/BENG - Doctrine demploi des armes non ltales, (Non-lethal weapons employment doctrine) approved May 13th 2004, under n 397/DEF/EMAT/BCSF/CTC - Concept demploi des forces terrestres en contrle de foules, (Crowd control concept for land forces) approved May 31st 2005, under n 857/DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO2 - TTA 950 Manuel provisoire demploi des forces terrestres dans le contrle de foules, (Provisional manual of land forces employment for crowd control) approved June 28th 2004, under n 528/DEF/EMAT/BCSF/CTC

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Some Books Dealing with Stabilization

- La fin du risque zro (The end of zero risk), by Xavier Guilhou and Patrick Lagadec, Editions Eyrolles Les Echos, 2002 - Ruptures cratrices (Creative disruptive innovations), published under the direction of Patrick Lagadec, Les Echos, 2000 - Le temps des ruptures (When the time of ruptures comes), Patrick Lagadec and Xavier Guilhou, under the direction of Major General (Ret) Eric de La Maisonneuve, Review AGIR n 6, January 2001 - Exigences stratgiques (Strategic requirements), published under the direction of Major General (Ret) Eric de La Maisonneuve, Review AGIR n 28, October 2006 - Un monde repenser 11 septembre 2001 (A world to be thought about again - September 11th, 2001), under the direction of Major General (Ret) Eric de La Maisonneuve, Economica, 2001 - Stratgie, crise et chaos (Strategy crisis and chaos), Major General (Ret) Eric de La Maisonneuve, Economica, 2005 - Justifier la paix? (How to justify peace?), under the direction of Gilles Andrani and Pierre Hassner, Sciences Po les presses, 2005 - Ncessit dune approche globale de la gestion des crises : quelles rponses et quelles adaptations ? (Necessity of a global approach for crises management: what responses and what adaptations?) Collection des chercheurs militaires (CCM) (Military researchers collection), Des Riaux edition, October 2006 - Guide du maintien de la paix, (Peace keeping handbook) J. Coulon, Athna Editions, 2006 - Larme franaise et les oprations de maintien de la paix, (The French forces and peace keeping operations) T. Paulmer, LGDI, November 1997 - Parier pour la paix (Betting on peace), General (Ret) Jean Cot, Editions Charles Lopold Mayer, 2006 - Les conflits asymtriques, lavenir de la guerre ? (Asymmetrical conflicts, the future of war?), under the direction of Barthelemy Courmont, revue internationale et stratgique (International and strategic review) n 51, Autumn 2003 - Quand la France se rveillera (When France is to wake up) Xavier Guilhou, Editions Eyrolles, 2007 - La stabilisation, phase dcisive (Stabilization: the decisive phase), DOCTRINE n 12, to be published in May 2007

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Main Abbreviations and Acronyms

in the stabilization area used in the articles
Land Space Management CIMIC (See CCM)

Principaux sigles et acronymes

concernant la stabilisation utiliss dans les articles de la revue
AGESTER ACM Agencement de lespace terrestre Actions civilo-militaires (remplac par CCM) Aide mdicale gratuite (remplac par AMP) Aide mdicale la population Arme nationale afghane Bataillon logistique Bataillon dInfanterie de Marine Base logistique interarmes de thtre Bataillon de quartier gnral Base de soutien vocation interarmes Capacit oprationnelle Cellule daide la gestion de crise Cellule daide la dcision en matire de risques radiologiques, biologiques et chimiques Coopration civilo-militaire Communaut conomique des Etats de lAfrique de lOuest Corps expditionnaire franais en Extrme-Orient Chef dtat-major Communaut conomique et montaire dAfrique centrale Chef dtat-major interarmes Centre dentranement au combat Centre dentranement en zone urbaine

Doctrine

Free Medical Assistance (See AMP)

AMG

Medical Assistance to the Population Afghan National Armed Forces Logistic Battalion French Marine Infantry Battalion Theater Joint Logistic Base HQ Battalion Joint Support Base Operational Capability Crisis Management Assistance Cell (NBC) Decision Making Assistance Cell (NBC)

AMP ANA BATLOG BIMa BLIAT BQG BSVIA CAPOPS CAGEC CARBC

CIMIC

(Civil-Military Co-operation) West Africa States Economic Community

CCM CEDEAO

French Expeditionary Corps in Far East (French Indochina War) COS Chief of staff Central Africas Economic Monetary Community Armed Forces Joint Chief of Staff Force on Force Training Center Military operations in urban terrain training center (Brigade and Above) CP Battle Command Training Center Joint concepts, doctrines and experimentations center

CEFEO

CEM CEMAC

CEMIA CENTAC CENZUB

CEPC

Centre dentranement des postes de commandement Centre interarmes de concepts, de doctrines et dexprimentations

CICDE

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IC

International Community

CI CMIC CPF COIN

Communaut Internationale Cellules mobiles dintervention chimique Centre de prparation des forces Counter- insurgency Operations (United Kingdom)

Chemical Rescue Mobile Cells National Army Training Doctrine de contre-insurrection britannique

Force Commander Commander, French Elements Commander, Medical Elements Air Component Commander

COMANFOR Commandant de la force COMELEF Commandant des lments franais

COMSANTE Commandant des moyens sants COMTACAIR COMTACTERRE COS CPCO Commandant tactique air

Land Component Commander

Commandant tactique terre

CEM

Chef dtat-major Joint Operations Planning and Command & Control Center Personnel Welfare in Operation Directorate, Defense and Military Co-operation

Chief of staff Centre de prparation et de conduite des oprations Condition du personnel en opration Direction de la coopration militaire et de dfense Dsarmement, dmobilisation et rinsertion Direction gnrale de la gendarmerie Dtachement dinstruction oprationnelle Director of staff Effects Based Operations Elments franais du Tchad Etat-major des armes Etat-major de force Etat-major interarmes Etat-major tactique European Union Police European Union Security Evacuation sanitaire Evacuation sanitaire par hlicoptre mdicalis

CPO DCMD

DDR

Disarmement, Demobilization, Reintegration

DDR

FMTU

Directorate, French Gendarmerie nationale Foreign Military Training Unit Officier adjoint au CEM Oprations bases sur les effets French Elements in Chad Armed Forces Joint Staff (Division Level) Force HQ Joint Staff

DGGN DIO DOS EBO EFT EMA EMF EMIA EMT EUPOL EUSEC EVASAN EVASAN HM

Tac HQ

Tactical Headquarters Mission de Police de lUE au Congo Mission de Scurit au Congo

MEDEVAC

Medical Evacuation Medical Evacuation by Helicopter

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ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

FIAS

Force internationale dassistance la scurit (Afghanistan)

Doctrine

Multinational Force in Central Africa International Monetary Front Armed Forces of New Forces (Ivory Coast Rebels) Ivory Coast Defense-Security Forces (Loyalists) OPFOR Opposing Force Mobile Administrative Detachments (French Indochina War)

FOMUC FMI FAFN

Force multinationale en Centrafrique Front montaire international Forces armes des forces nouvelles

FDSCI

Forces de dfense et de scurit de Cte dIvoire Force adverse Groupes administratifs mobiles (pendant la oprationnels (Guerre dIndochine) Groupe de dfense NBC Groupement interarmes des actions civilo-militaires Groupe mobile (pendant la Guerre dIndochine) Groupement tactique interarmes

FORAD GAMO

NBC Defense Battalion CIMIC Battalion

GD NBC GIACM

Mobile Task Force (French Indochina War) BG 1 500 Battle Group 1 500 (European Union Combined arms task force) Hygiene and Work Security in Operation Corps de protection du Kosovo Liste des vnements et incidents dans lanimation dun exercice DCA Droit des conflits arms

GM

GTIA

HSO KPC MEL/MIL

Hygine et scurit en opration Kosovo Protection Corps Main Event List, Main Incident List Law of Armed Conflict (United Kingdom) Mission dassistance militaire Marine Corps Special Operations Command Mise en condition de projection Mission dobservation des lections de lUnion europenne Mission de la CEDEAO en Cte dIvoire Nuclaire, radiologique, biologique et chimique Oprations militaires dinfluence Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

LOAC

Military Assistance Mission Commandement des oprations spciales pour les Marines Operational Readiness EU Mission for Election Controls

MAM MARSOC

MCP MOEUE

NRBC

Mission of West Africa States Economic Community in Ivory Coast Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical Psychological Operations Processus US : Observer, Orienter, Dcider, Agir

MICECI NRBC

PSYOPS

OMI OODA

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisations

ONG

Organisations non gouvernementales

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UNOCI

United Nations Operations in Cte dIvoire

ONUCI

Opration des Nations unies en Cte dIvoire Politique europenne de scurit et de dfense Poste de commandement Poste de commandement interarmes Poste de commandement interarmes de thtre Procdures oprationnelles permanentes Province Reconstruction Team

ESPD

European Security and Defence Policy

PESD

HQ/CP JHQ JTHQ

Headquarters/Command Post Joint Headquarters Joint Theater Headquarters

PC PCIA PCIAT

SOPs

Standard Operating Procedures

POP

Equipe daide la reconstruction dans les provinces afghanes Republic of Ivory Coast or Republic of Cte dIvoire RAM Rvolution dans les affaires militaires Mortar Platoon Ground Air Very Short Range Missile ACOS Assistant chief of staff Armed Forces Medical Service Rforme du secteur de la scurit Army Technical Development Branch LPD Landing Transport, Dock Centre des effets tactiques (charg du "ciblage") Chemical Industrial Toxic Products Close Combat Technics

PRT

RCI

Rpublique de Cte dIvoire

RMA SAM SATCP SCEM SSA SSR STAT TCD TEC

Revolution in Military Affairs Section Appui Mortier Sol-Air trs courte porte Sous-chef dtat-major Service de sant des armes Security Sector Reform Section technique de larme de terre Transport de chalands de dbarquement Tactical effect center

TIC TIOR

Toxiques industriels chimiques Techniques dinterventions oprationnelles rapproches Tactical Operational Center Tactical Support Team (CIMIC) Military Integrated Logistic Units

Centre doprations (tactique) Equipe tactique dappui CCM Units logistiques multinationales intgres Formed Police Units (EU) Integrated Police Units (EU) Arme de lair amricaine Arme de terre amricaine Corps des Marines amricains ADM Armes de destruction massives Confidence Area (Ivory Coast)

TOC TST MI LU

UPF UPI USAF US USMC WMD ZDC

Units de police formes (UE) Units de police intgres (UE) United States Air Force Army United States Army US Marine Corps Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone de confiance (RCI)

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ea H w e AN

ding

The officers publish

Mountain Warfare
a Tactical Renewal
(Editions Economica. Collection Strategy and Doctrine) preface by (French) General Henri BENTGEAT,

Interview of co-authors, lieutenants colonels Herv de Courrges, Pierre-Joseph Givre (EMAT) and Nicolas Le Nen (27e BCA),

Doctrine: The three of you have just written a tactics book called Mountain Warfare, a tactical renewal. Could you tell us what is it all about?
Youll find in that book the six tactical principles adapted to fighting in a compartmented environment: preparation to the engagement conditions, ubiquity, opportunism, control of the battlefield, complementary action of the fire support assets, besieging of the enemy. These have been developed in accordance and consistency with Marchal Fochs general principles, they constitute in fact an adaptation of these three fundamental principles of the war to the requirement of an environment where freedom of action, economy of forces and concentration of the efforts may seem to be less understandable and applicable. In that respect, the six principles of the combat in a mountainous environment must be regarded as being employment principles derived from the principles of the war and adapted to the mountainous environments specific requirements1.

constraints that mountainous environment puts on the maneuver. In addition, while we were revisiting the battles of the last two centuries and analyzing them thanks to a logical method, number of constraints and guiding principles for action appeared, whose right or wrong implementation allowed to better understand victories and defeats. Last and to demonstrate these principles relevance, we present in a pedagogical way, six emblematic and recent battles that allow a better perception of these engagements nature. The reader can thus go through the Dobropoli battle in 1918, Suomussalmi in 1939, Appenines in 1944, the Panjshir V operation in 1982, Mount Harriet battle in 1982, and Anaconda operation in 2002. That diversity of example allows to scan all type of modern era conflicts on different continents and to draw practical lessons out of them.

Doctrine: Do you believe that this type of conflict is really modern?

During the intervention in Afghanistan that began in the winter 2001-2002, the western forces have rediscovered that mountain could become an area for high intensity engagements, not in a marginal way but in a more permanent one. However, since the Former Yugoslavia conflict, with the strategic role that Mount Igman took during the Sarajevo siege, mountain is not anymore a mere training field but rather once again an unavoidable engagement area.

Doctrine: Isnt that description of the tactical principles a little hard to read?
To avoid that which could have been a real problem, we illustrated our publication with many very concrete historical examples that emphasize the immutable

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French Military Thought

Doctrine: What are the recent engagements which could be studied in order to identify what western forces would have to do in such an environment?
Since the 11 Septembers terrorist attacks, western forces have bluntly entered into the asymmetric conflict era where their armament and equipments quality, their technological advance and their forces training level make them be the strong. It would however be hazardous to describe the enemy as being the weak, seeing the way it has been able to neutralize the best equipped and trained forces in mountainous areas; yes they were the best equipped and trained forces, but only for conventional type of combat and on a flat terrain. The spring 2002 combats at Tora-Bora and in the Shah-i-Kot2 valley demonstrate that fact very well. Both of these operations as well as those that were conducted by the Soviet forces in the 80s in Afghanistan, and more recently by the coalition in that countrys eastern part or by the Russian in the Caucasus, allow to better understand the nature of the combats that army units could be led to engage in mountainous terrain.

Doctrine: Does mountainous environment give a specific style to the maneuver?

Yes, as a matter of fact, mountain operations are not fully part of the Three block war concept, which implies that some sort of simultaneousness between the three types of actions (interposition, humanitarian support and coercion) should be achieved. Those operations switch from long terrain patrolling, to assistance to valleys populations to collect intelligence, to very violent combat phases to destroy enemy field organization when it has been unveiled5. Between these two very distinct types of warfare, there is no or very little place for low intensity combat since the enemy has no interest in attracting and fixing forces in areas where it needs to have as much freedom of action as possible. An engagement in a mountainous area constitutes thus a type of warfare that has two main tempos which include long phases with rare direct contacts with the enemy and high intensity combat phases.

Doctrine: What type of enemy can be met in these areas and how is it organized?
On the Afghan theater of operations as well as on many mountainous theaters where more or less known asymmetric operations are taking place3, the mountains constitute sanctuaries where insurrection movements get equipped, train, are refurbished and that they use for relocating their fighters and to organize their logistical flows. In those sanctuaries, these forces implement classical guerilla techniques that are now well known: mingling with the local population, splitting apart the weapons manufacturing or collection areas from the storing areas, avoiding fighters concentration, limiting as much as possible the use of communication means and deploying discreet but efficient intelligence and warning organization. Although mountainous terrain constitutes a definite plus for the enemys concealment ability, it makes it however very much dependant on the few inhabited areas for its resupply, for feeling less isolated and for getting intelligence. In addition mountain populations are, by nature, very independent and proud. These populations constitute a reservoir of tough fighters, whose endurance and terrain knowledge can be feared. As Jomini wrote it: Mountainous areas are particularly well fitted for defensive operations when wars are national [...]. All territorial gains will thus have to be paid a high price4. Land forces that will be engaged in mountainous areas will thus be confronted to an enemy that is particularly reactive, mobile, stealthy and who knows perfectly how to use human and natural environment to its own benefit.

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The officers publish

relies mostly on the Army National Training Center consisting of the CP Battle Command Training Center, the Force on Force Training Center and the Military operations in urban terrain training center. Since the Army is confronted to a multiplication of operations in mountainous terrain, it is now required to complete the training organization with a fourth pillar, a training center for operations in difficult terrains.

Pierre-Joseph GIVRE

Doctrine: Could that type of engagement prefigure other types of engagements in other environments that would be as complex as the mountainous one?
Yes, mountain warfare is not anymore an utopia for a small number of soldiers who are either idealistic or who have the nostalgia of WW2 or colonial warfare in difficult terrains. The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the one against terrorism have put mountain warfare at the very heart of todays engagements. The types of combat that land forces will have to conduct in that environment, within the framework of counter rebellion operations, in such a difficult terrain will be violent, protracted and recurrent. Theyll require full combined arms and joint cooperation down to the lowest command levels. Theyll also require a combination of much diversified tactical and technical know-how ranging from motorized warfare techniques in the valleys to dismounted infantry actions in high terrain, to covert operations intended to collect intelligence, as well as brutal and violent destruction actions. Within that framework, all combat units that could be engaged in mountain warfare, whatever might be their echelon and size, have to be powerful, flexible, responsive and polyvalent.

The army organization for operational engagement preparation would thus be fully coherent and would allow land forces to get efficiently ready for current operations.

Doctrine: What would be your conclusion?

Our publication is consistent with the efforts that CDEF and CoFAT6, each one in its own domain, have undertaken to revitalize the tactical thinking and to improve armys officers and NCOs military culture. We chose a theme that can be supported by an important historical background in order to illustrate current and future engagements. We do hope that readers will find in it substance for debates and studies that will be useful for getting ready for engagement as well as for conducting a maneuver. We hope theyll enjoy participating in these tactical debates which can be a source of personal enrichment and above all a source of efficiency when time for implementation has come within an operational environment that is ever more complex and uncertain.

Doctrine: Has our Army all whats required to get efficiently ready for that type of engagement today as well as for those of tomorrow?
Training to mountain warfare must aim at developing and improving all these tactical and technical know-how. In order to prepare its operational engagements, the Army has today at its disposal an efficient organization that

1 See the article written by the same authors are the Fochs principle immutable? published in the Heracles magazine # 19 of JanuaryFebruary, pp. 52-53. 2 The Anaconda operation. 3 Chechnya, Sin - Kiang, Kashmir, Khurdistan or Columbia, to quote only the major ones. 4 Clausewitzs Principle of war, Jominis Art of war in Roots of strategy Book 2, Stackpole books, 1987, p 488. 5 Should conventional forces deliberately keep most of their forces at the limit of the mountainous areas and go into it only to collect intelligence and to fight. Conversely, continuous series of harassment actions by the asymmetric enemy could occur. 6 CDEF: Forces Employment Doctrine Center. CoFAT: Army Training Command.

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New COIN (Counterinsurgency) Concept of the US Marine Corps1

he Marine Corps commitment in war against terror is, in practice expressed through an increased participation in stabilization and counter-insurgency missions. Integrating its action in the long run, the Marine Corps published in April 2006 the Grey Book or Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment2 which describes the whole of phases within a crisis. One of the essential points underlined in this document is the emergence and perennity of asymmetrical and irregular threats. The concept of Countering Irregular Threats: A New Approach to Counterinsurgency looks for a comprehensive understanding much beyond than the mere military problem. It deals with combat operations but also training and advising host nation security forces, restoring essential services, promoting governance, economic development and Information Operations.

However, with the exception of Small Wars manual, there was no doctrinal document for this concept. This is why, under General Mathis impulse, USMC launched the drafting of a conceptual document about counter-insurgency. This concept by historical reference3 was called A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Couterinsurgency4. This document has a double objective. It should be first the base for reflection by the military leader on the ground, mainly at battalion level and above. It should also be the doctrinal document for all staff in charge of making the military toolkit (doctrines, regulations, organization, capacity studies, etc.). It is built in two parts. The first one describes the concept itself placed in a much wider problem and presents the solution that the Marine Corps selected. The second one is much more detailed. It focuses in delivering precise recommendations to future planners and lists the points to be reviewed in domains as diverse as forces organizations, military education or new capacity needs.

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIPPE SUSNJARA - LIAISON OFFICER TO US MARINE CORPS (USMC) QUANTICO (USA)

The USMC concept

A new environment
Preeminence of irregular threats Supported by a large number of US or foreign historical or contemporary writings, the Marine Corps document tries to demonstrate how the so-called irregular threats are permanent. The traditional or conventional approach which still prevails within US armed forces was tailored for conflicts between regular armies. Since the Soviet block disappeared, the occurrence of such type of conflict moved away.

Conversely, modern armies are more and more committed in operations of stabilization, reconstruction, keeping or restoring peace and counter-insurgency. Although these various missions require often similar assets and courses of action, this concept is focused on COIN operations.

The insurgency specific case An insurgency5 is the volitional utilization by a group of individuals of violence to damage, amend or destruct the base of political legitimity of authorities in a ruled6 state. It is the outcome from the conjunction of two factors :

The existence of a political, economic, social and/or religious deteriorated situation. Generally, the population perceives this situation as a deadlock and sees a possible improvement only through deep and radical changes (overthrowing government, throwing occupation forces out). The presence of an active or triggering element. This element, composed of indigenous or non-state actors is the hard core of insurgency. It catalyses the population unhappiness and channels violence towards organized actions. These may be of a political as well as military, economic or psychological nature.

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Counter-insurgency consists then in eliminating catalyzing agents while trying to stop fuelling the insurgency through the improvement of the population general situation.

Population as the center of gravity Insurgency is fuelled with the desperation of population which provides it with a logistic support and a reservoir for recruitment. Subsequently, the disparition of the insurgency breeding ground implies the population recognizing the legitimacy of local authorities. This change in behavior goes through the concrete improvement in day-to-day life and the consideration of the expectations from its various components. Civilian population is then at the center of the concerns of the various protagonists. Consequently, any concept of operations should integrate civilian population and their environment either of a political or social, economic, cultural, religious and psychological nature.
Counterinsurgency is a complex problem requiring a comprehensive answer.

US ARMY

In this context, usage of force is not put forward but is part of a wider set of tools. Purely military operations are considered indeed as essential but not as sufficient.

Lines of operation To meet the best the requirements of COIN operations, the Marine Corps concept envisages conducting these operations according to a holistic approach. This includes the 6 lines of operations defined by Lieutenant General Chiarelli, namely :
1. combat operations; 2. training and advising the host nation security forces; 3. restoring basic services; 4. promoting governance; 5. economic development; 6. information operations.

A comprehensive approach
A needed co-ordination Complexity and volatility of the irregular conflicts environment require actions that are numerous, precise and adequate in a wide variety of domains. Consequently, the needed coherence of the force action requires a wide coordination of all the actors present on the theater. Such coherence cannot be achieved without a clear definition of the final objective. This desired endstate should be common to all involved parties, especially within the likely coalition-to-be and all involved US agencies.

(political, economic, security etc). COIN forces should then constantly adapt to the current situation in trying to take then to keep initiative in all concerned domains. For this, the principle selected is an iterative process7 from the following type: To do this, the conduct of operations should take into account comprehensively 6 lines of operations previously defined. It should maintain a harmonious balance between them. Moreover, it is indispensable to define criterias for success and other indicators to correctly assess the situation and efficiently act on the whole of the parameters. This enables to keep initiative and to capitalize on successes of a military as well as economic or political nature.

Lines of operation
An iterative process both balanced and synchronized The environment of COIN operations is quickly changing. Insurgents are trying to adapt as quickly as possible to new situations generated by the force actions. During the campaign, the population expectations are varying according to a number of parameters
In the continuation of the document, the Marine Corps details the 6 lines of operations. In particular, it delivers precise recommendations to future planners and lists some points to study in the areas of forces organization, military education and training or new capacity needs.

Situation assessment

Maneuver elaboration and conduct

Amendment of maneuver

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This part will only underline the major facts in each line of operation. The reader wishing more details will refer directly to part II of the Marine Corps document.

From a global perspective, all these reflections reinforce the Marine Corps in its will to develop its concept of Distributed Operations.

Promoting fair governance corresponds to the restoration of rule of law and the establishment or re-establishment of the government capacities. Restoring a rule of law or a legal system formalizing the rights vis--vis the governing body and relationships between individuals within the society is an essential step in COIN fight. Governmental capacities correspond the most often to the implementation or restoration of a bureaucracy capable to relay the government action within the population.

Combat operations
At the core of Marine Corps competences, this part is no doubt the field where recommendations are the most revolutionary.

Training and advising the host nation security forces

This domain includes military education, training and equipment of local security forces. A special unit, the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), was formed within MARSOC (Marine Corps Special Operations Command). However, the Marine Corps wishes all its units to be capable to accomplish this kind of mission. The key point is to adapt to the real theater needs. A program of military education and training focused on future missions of indigenous units should then be implemented. The goal is that local security forces be in charge of protecting the populations as well as maintaining the country stability.

Selected principles The very principle of counter-insurgency requires to focus on the population security and isolation of insurgency. Combat actions remain necessary to eradicate insurgency but they occurr within the population and in fine for its benefit. In this particular background, the use of force may be counterproductive. This is why the Marine Corps develops the police-like concept of de-escalation, which implies using a measured force8 to accomplish the mission. This kind of operations requires a good knowledge of the political, cultural, social and economic environment in the area but also a perfect understanding of the political goal to be achieved.
To do that, the Marine Corps recommends the preferable employment of smaller units (company level being a maximum) at direct contact of the population to conduct targetted actions in a known environment.

Restoring essential basic services

Restoring basic services is with establishing a safe atmosphere one of the essential stages to win the populations support. These basic services are mainly food, potable water, power and rudimentary medical support10. This specific domain is typically inter-agency but requires a specific investment from the military, in particular in the early stages of the operations due to their assets immediately available. The core principle is to identify, quantify and prioritize the needs of the population. Subsequently, the actions are realistic and adequate for the country situation. Civil affairs units are at the heart of this problem.

Generally speaking, intervention forces should, as much as possible, be supported by existing models complying with local traditions ( religious, social, historical, etc.) and should not try to impose a western model. This very sensitive domain should be taken in charge as soon as possible by the competent civilian agencies. For the intervention force, it is of primary importance to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations in the operations (arrest, searches, sentences, imprisonments, etc.) by its own forces as well as by local security and police forces. Similarly, the force should put forward the government actions and fight against corruption.

Economic development
An insurgency is frequently initiated in economic problems and is fed by these problems especially through young unemployed who constitute a reservoir for recruitment. The objective of counterinsurgency is then in the short term to make unemployment decrease and in the long term to ensure a durable economic development, this being a pledge for stability. In this specific area, the military action is most of the time limited to civilianmilitary actions11. It is however essential that the economic domain is taken into account at all hierarchy levels to gain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in every zone.

The axes of effort Development of this type of combat requires a sensible betterment of smaller units regarding tactical as well as technique levels. At tactical level, the aim is to develop know-hows at squad and platoon levels while increasing the selfsufficiency of their leaders. In practical terms, this requires to amend the programs of military education and training. Regarding capacity, the relative selfsufficiency of smaller tactical echelons requires adaptation or generates new needs in the domains of direct or indirect fire support, command, land mobility9, tactical intelligence and logistics.

Promotion of fair governance

This line of operation is considered as one of and even the most important. It indeed grants a long term stability in the host nation. This ensures a exit strategy to the conflict and offers a durable solution for the best interests of indigenous population and of the US.

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1 This article is inspired from the text of information note 44 /EU/DLT/Quantico/06 August 17, 2006 as authorized by the US Army Liaison Team. 2 See note Marine Corps concepts against asymmetrical threats 29/EU/DLT/Quantico/NO/06 May 11, 2006, published in monthly issue June 2006 from US Army Liaison Team. 3 After the battle of Gallipoli (known as Dardanelles in France), most military theorists considered amphibious operations as impossible and unrealistic. However, when assessing the threats of the anticipated conflict in the Pacific, the Marine Corps decided to conduct studies on these operations. The result was a Tentative Manual for Landing Operations published in 1934. This document was regularly refined up to 1940. It has been the base for the elaboration of a number of doctrinal documents and rules of employment. 4 This document is available on the link: www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/manual.pdf 5 This definition is not an exact translation as the concept calls upon more than provides a definition. See Part I The Concept, Irregular Threats and Insurgency, pp 7-8. 6 Rules were preferred here to the idea of state of law too frequently linked to the idea of democracy. 7 This process is described in Marine Corps concept by Design Learn Re-design 8 The measured force is preferred tominimum force. This is considered as too limiting and bears a negative sense that lets believing its use is to be forbidden. 9 We should here remind that units from Marine Corps are few or not motorized. 10 During the operation, we may also add garbage collection, drainage system, a minimal schooling level, restoring road, river and port infrastructure, a sufficient number of housings, etc. 11 However, through CIMIC projects, economic activity can re-start locally. Moreover, a good knowledge of the terrain also enables an optimal use of the funds available on the theater.

US ARMY

Information operations
Once the physical area of operations is dealt with, the Marine Corps concept insists on the psychological or virtual field. This domain is much wider than what would be expected from the motto of Winning Hearts and Minds. These information operations have effectively a double objective: Internally, the aim is to keep the troops morale at a high level while bringing practical elements to enable a better understanding of the mission. This is more important as in small wars, tactical actions have strategic consequences. Externally, the aim is to isolate insurgents from their support in delegitimizing their actions (defense) and to positively influence the population in promoting the actions of the government and of the force (offense).

The Marine Corps insists on the absolute requirement not to use these operations for deception. Such an utilization would totally blur the message and would jeopardize all the construction. In such type of conflict, information operations look much more like marketing than propaganda. The document recommends to study the formation of specialist units such as PSYOPS or the reinforcement of the Public Affairs function. The main effort should however be on education and training of men, especially for contact leaders for them to be able to understand the stakes of their mission and to adapt to the environment.

This concept is close to French conceptions for operations of stabilization, reconstruction, keeping or restoring peace. Its comprehensive approach expresses a real evolution within the Corps. Traditionnally, it presented itself as an emergency strike force. Today, purely military operations stay essential but are no longer sufficient. Perfectly fitted in the adaptation process launched by the Marine Corps, the concept of counter-insurgency operations reinforces the decisions to develop learning languages and cultures as well as the concept of Distributed Operations, especially the components education of contact leaders and smaller units self-sustainability. These changes are important and even revolutionary from some point of view. The Marine Corps should then meet the challenge of their implementation. It will have to face a strong inertia and, maybe worse, a cultural block.

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Stability Operations
The Dynamics of COIN Doctrine in the Light of Recent British Experience
he post major combat operations phase of Operation TELIC has posed major challenges to the Armies of the Coalition in Iraq. These challenges arise from the need to deter and, if necessary, fight armed groups opposed to Coalition presence, as well as to help enable the humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building activities in support of fragile or non-existent governance structures. The analysis of British operations in Iraq over in the period May 2003 to 31 January 2005, when the first Iraqi elections were held, offers a number of insights for study and action. Foremost, it is clear that the present experience is unlikely to be unique and that the British Army is very likely to become engaged in similarly complex operations in other theatres; indeed, some similarities are already apparent in current operations in Southern Afghanistan.

The analysis of the Iraq campaign and, in particular, the stability operations that underpin it, has recently been published in the United Kingdom. It highlights aspects that went well, but it also concentrates on areas where work is needed on optimising the British Armys counter insurgency response to ensure that it is able to address all three blocks of the Three-Block War. This article aims to highlight those areas covered in the analysis that illustrate the dynamic nature of COIN operations and provide indications on the current and future conduct of stability operations worldwide.

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES RUTTER - BRITISH LIAISON OFFICER TO CDEF

Current British Land Doctrine

The Iraq campaign has revealed gaps and outdated aspects of British Army doctrine. Deployed commanders and officials have had to rely on doctrine that has its origins in dealing with communist insurgency in South East Asia in the 1950s and 60s and, although some of the guidance has been useful, the Iraq experience has shown the difficulties of practical application in a very different modern world.

The campaign has identified a need to address the global context for violence in Iraq, the asymmetry of the ends and means involved, the nature of states in crisis, the absence of definable geographical limits, the concept of intensity of warfare and the effects of the use of suicide bombers. British analysis has identified the importance of the Comprehensive Approach embracing military and non-military activities and the fact that, in a complex crisis, there is a need for rapid, informed comprehensive planning, in order to

address questions of capability, timing, provision, and threat levels in theatre. Events in Iraq, including terrorist action in urban areas, have brought the paucity of British doctrine for peace enforcement into focus. In this, the factor of scale has emerged, both in terms of geography and in the level of violence. The British have not had to handle large-scale urban violence nor a major operation such as that carried out by the Americans in Fallujah. However, by forcing extremists into

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areas where action could be taken against them, British forces have undertaken robust counter insurgency operations in urban areas at brigade strength, and their ability to be restrained, to ease tactical restraints and then reimpose them, has been notable. British determination not to respond or over-react to provocation, a lack of reprisals and the sparing use of heavy equipment and weapons, as well as a disciplined and generally resilient approach have also been positive. and supported groups with access to porous borders, ample finance, state research-backed terrorist know-how, who use very different tactics, including suicide bombing. To avoid training for the last war, the British Army is having to examine its mental approach, doctrine and capabilities in order to respond to and match the type of complex challenge found in Iraq and elsewhere, and it will need to consider how these might develop in the future. of the operation, to agree on priorities across Iraq and resource them, seriously hindered Stability Operations in theatre. From the British aspect, neither the Theatre Headquarters nor that of the 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division had dedicated Phase IV planning teams or time to plan for Occupying Power obligations in detail. Following the success of the intervention phase, the delay in developing the vital non-military roles of government and reconstruction, and the rapid drawdown, meant that British forces were initially unable to contend effectively with the wave of lawlessness, including looting, in their area. Suitable Rules of Engagement were not initially available and the lack of contingency plans to deal with disorder, criminality and insurgency was very apparent. The lawlessness led to international criticism, and to opportunities for activists to exploit. The inability to restore security early during the Occupation was a critical failure; human rights abuses involving detainees then compounded the problem of lack of respect for the Coalition and Iraqi Interim Authority. The tasks facing the British were broad and included the provision of security for the region, Security Sector Reform, assistance with Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration, support for the search for weapons of mass destruction and assistance in reconstruction and nation-building tasks. While local, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic and political factors need to be taken into account, the implications are that Stability Operations need as much planning as does warfighting. Comprehensive Approach Planning is more difficult since many departments and agencies, none of them under military command, are involved, and their efforts need to be coordinated. Stability operations take years to complete, but the achievements of the first few weeks are critical. Lack of Phase IV planning meant that Coalition Forces were ill-prepared and equipped to deal with the problems in the early, defining

UK MOD

Counter insurgency experience from Northern Ireland and the Balkans enabled the British Army to make a positive start in Iraq and it has gained a great deal of experience in counter insurgency in a complex crisis context in the past three years. The approach to people, the ability of commanders to think on their feet, to brief the media, to draw on proven tactics, techniques and procedures, and specialist skills and equipment, have all proven invaluable. Many lives have been saved as a result. Common experience, which enabled rapid shifts between the tasks described in the Continuum of Operations, and between the conditions in the UK and US areas with minimal orders, is a huge advantage. However, the campaign in Iraq is very different from that in Northern Ireland. The Coalition is not facing one, homogeneous, English-speaking enemy; it is confronted by well armed

Planning and Priorities

Once major combat operations in Iraq were declared over, some Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) actions proved ill-advised. The disintegration of the Iraqi army and police, and the de-Baathification programme, was rapid. The melting away of the existing structures created a security vacuum which the Coalition lacked the manpower to fill, and meant that disaffected Iraqi officers, soldiers and officials were excluded from the security and reconstruction process. Disorder, which started as the regime collapsed, escalated. Delays in re-establishing order and creating security forces gave credence to the Iraqi view that the Coalition would occupy their country for years, and gave a cause to anti-Coalition activists. These factors, together with the scale of the problem, shortcomings in planning for Phase IV (post conflict) in both the US and UK before the start

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stage of the campaign. Winning the early support of the population is a demanding target. Early planning and resources allocation must ensure that humanitarian aid and reconstruction can start immediately areas are secured, or an intervention force arrives.

Security and Reconstruction

In the immediate post-combat operations transition phase the military requirement is likely to include light forces and boots on the ground in large numbers, some to maintain or restore security, and others to undertake non-military tasks. In addition, specialist, primarily engineer, equipment is required in support. The military have to take the lead, supported by Other Government Departments and NonGovernmental Organisations, although agencies may need military security and life support. At the same time as essential services are restored, plans have to be made for the longerterm rebuilding of security, economic and social services. A pan-Government response, with appropriate funding is fundamental at this stage.

The inability to restore security early during the Occupation was a critical failure and undermined Coalition and Iraqi Interim Authority. Security tasks in Iraq included the need to secure military, logistic, police and government bases, international borders, the protection and orderly functioning of health facilities, food warehouses, and detention centres and prisons, arms and ammunition storage sites, banks and financial institutions, shops and markets, media offices, and, as events rapidly proved, museums and cultural sites. The lack of rapid improvements to essential services and the standard of living, together with disorder meant that much of the population was not persuaded to support the Coalition. Iraqi aspirations outran the ability of the Coalition to deliver visible improvements. Local people soon resorted to violence in order to obtain food, drinking water and fuel, consumer goods and property, behaviour that may feature during any humanitarian disaster. With no local police, military forces had to restore order. However, in Iraq, as in Kosovo in 1999, there was no effective legal structure and process available to

the troops at the outset. The failure to restore law and order quickly led to the emergence of rival factions and media condemnation. Restoration of essential services is important for humanitarian reasons, and to meet Geneva Convention and UN Charter obligations. The key lesson relearned in Iraq is that an intervention force needs to establish itself quickly as a credible and efficient administrator. Factions will be quick to capitalise on situations in which the new authority appears less able to provide than the previous or an alternative regime; in a failing state armed factions may already exist. Plans were made, with appropriate funding to avert a humanitarian disaster in the post-combat phase, but in the event a disaster did not occur. The UK did not envisage becoming involved in protracted large-scale reconstruction, and initially no financial resources were approved specifically for reconstruction. After the riots in BASRAH in August 2003, however, the UK Government did approve some 500M for reconstruction funding. However, the lack of an early identification of

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this problem and the resultant five month reconstruction vacuum in the British area lost not only time, but also the support of many local Iraqis.

Civil Affairs
Operation TELIC has identified the need for a better definition of the role, capabilities, functions and resourcing of the British Armys CIMIC and Civil Affairs elements, and of the wider liaison required with civilian agencies. Despite being critical enabling functions to aid coordination of resources, there is evidence of little effective correlation in the planning of reconstruction projects with Coalition and UK strategic aims. The complexity of the crisis, and anecdotal observations on the limited UK reconstruction programme, suggest that greater coordination of military and non-military tasks is required if strategic success is to be achieved.

sustainment and enhancement of the campaign authority, and the use of military elements employing reasonable force with perseverance. These were followed with some success, however, some early theatrelevel decisions, including the deBaathification programme and disbandment of the army and police, and an inadequate reconstruction programme, have militated against the achievement of success to date. The lack of a unified Coalition political and military authority able to coordinate the campaign strands created confusion, and diffused reconstruction efforts.

Legal Issues
The recognised period of major combat operations and of the UK as an Occupying Power was governed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which encompasses various treaties and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. At the declared end of major combat operations, the legal situation became more complex and ROE changed. International law, itself dynamic in nature, applied in various situations at this stage, alongside Iraqi law and, in terms of British military discipline, UK Statute Law.

In Iraq, the UK military staffs worked both with UK Government Departments (who did not always have the same priorities as the deployed British military forces) and with a wide range of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This is not easy as these bodies invariably have their own priorities and agendas, but there is a need to coordinate efforts, particularly where security plans are concerned. Military restoration planning needs to cover both prevention of a humanitarian disaster, and for an efficient interim administration, so that occupying forces are seen to be more effective than the authority or regime they are replacing. Strategic and immediate operational military advantages accrue from a forces ability to support provision of food, fuel and drinking water, and basic essential services such as health care, sewerage and education. The immediate post-conflict period sets the conditions for the population and its respect for the new authority for the next few months. The tenets of the guidance in British doctrine include the creation,

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As the UK had recently ratified Additional Protocols to the 1977 Geneva Conventions, the Human Rights Act (2000), and had become a signatory to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), operations in Iraq were conducted in a new and developing legal environment; while, in theory, different legal considerations apply to combat operations and occupation phases of a conflict, there was inevitably some overlap. Commanders and staffs now need much more detailed knowledge of the laws that govern their actions, and the legal implications in complex crises. Legal issues should be considered as a factor in planning, and legal guidance may need to be included in orders and briefings before operations. As in the first Gulf War (1991), the handling, processing and care of the various categories of prisoners proved a major task and provided a graphic reminder that looking after prisoners is manpower intensive and procedurally complex; the penalties

UK MOD

for failing to do so properly can be strategic. The chain of command must ensure that soldiers are clear about their responsibilities and are trained for prisoner handling tasks, so that the force can meet its legal obligations in this area. Troops can help restore a system of law and order (police,

judiciary, courts and detention facilities), but they lack resources to run it unaided.

The implication for Stability Operations doctrine is how to reflect the cross-Government Comprehensive Approach when there is an insurgency as well as the problems of a fragile or failing state. A crisis may be said to become complex if there are economic, social, legal or ethnic/cultural difficulties in addition to political or governmental weaknesses, and if violent threats necessitating the use of armed policing or military elements on operations are also present. The campaign in Iraq has been significantly different to other operations on which British forces have been deployed in the last 85 years, due not only to the Coalition approach, but also because of the elements of inter, intra and extra-state violence. Many in the Islamic crescent, and their supporters worldwide, regard Iraqi insurgents as soldiers rather than criminal terrorists. Al Qaida may not be a homogeneous, global terrorist group, but its message, and that of sympathetic Islamists, is global, and this will require a coordinated worldwide effort if it is to be countered effectively. This context will need to be reflected in any revised counter insurgency doctrine.

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German Army Stabilization Forces
T
he first German contingent having taken part to the European security and defense common policy (ESDP)-compliant, EU-led mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was repatriated, 1 December 2006. Up to that date, these German troops had been integrated into an EU force, whose assigned duty was to secure presidential elections in the DRC and pave the way, through its presence, to a dispassionate and democratic status in this civil-war affected country. Such commitment from the Bundeswehr was unconceivable fifteen years ago. The whole population and the media would surely have made a fuss about the subject. Now that the Bundeswehr has been regularly stepping in some UN, NATO and EU led missions, stabilization-operations are now considered a routine or so.

BY

MAJOR (I.G.1) MATZKEN HEERESAMT I 1 (3)

The political-military situation has been subject to drastic changes since the 90s. Many countries, including Germany, have taken their chance forging a better future for themselves out of a globalizing free-market and improving technology. Quick switches have occurred at the planet-scale and are still rolling on even faster. Climax to the Eastern Block collapse, many of its former members have rejoined NATO and the EU. Thus, the past threatening Cold War scenario is not likely to reproduce again. The so created EuroAtlantic area of stability seems to preserve our liberty and security as never seen before in history. In return, other types of threat came up nesting in the power-gaps left by this new world-order, i.e. ethnic and religious conflicts, which got burgeoning together with the international terrorism. In a white-book on the German Defense/Security Policy and the Bundeswehrs future, published in 2006, the Federal Government

establishes the various tasks that its armed forces are going to deal with in response to these new threats that are not only directed at our country, but also at all our allies. International terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their vectors; also the many areas of unrest created by States disintegrating therein; all these dangers clearly address measures for the preservation of security. As such, these would require a truly cooperative and articulate safeguard policy, at the national and the international levels, which could also face risks and threats where they originate2. Therefore, the Federal Government seeks responses for that 21st centurys series of threats, noticeably with a Bundeswehr instrumental to the wide-ranging and prospective demarche, which guides our defense and security policy3. Participation in stabilization operations helps reach that goal.

However, what does a military operation of stabilization mean precisely? In the newer field-manual for Army forces Hv 100/100, actually a draft paper named Combined arms Command for Land Forces, there is a full chapter presenting stabilization as one of the four combat-procedures currently admitted, besides offense, defense and delaying actions. The same chapter specifies to future combined arms Commanders that a stabilization mission is meant to bridle the conflict, compel the warring parties to give up fighting, prevent hostilities from resurging, and establish a secure environment. Therefore, the combined arms commander is to gain warring parties on compliance or neutralize them if they are not willing to cooperate. He will also work on getting trust and adherence from the populations side4. Reversibility of operations and more or less progressive or sudden changes in intensity would characterize such type of operation.

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Stabilization operations put a challenge to Bundeswehr 5

How does the Bundeswehr and, more precisely the German Army, meet the challenge posed by stabilization operations? In January 2007, the situation can be described as follows. Besides the troops committed to minor operations, Germany is providing about 900 military personnel to EUFOR, 2,400 to KFOR, 2,900 to ISAF and 1,000 to UNIFIL. Additionally, an Operational Reserve Force (ORF) of 650 is kept on stand-by in Germany. A few times ago, one more contingent of 750 troops was participating in an EU-led, stabilization operation in RD Congo.

The security context aforementioned, together with quickly evolving political, social, economic, and technological factors, did play as a triggerbackground for the whole transformation process. Within a context of Bundeswehrs transformation, that goes together with the one of the German Army, plan is meant to meet that challenge whilst re-assorting current military personnel to three different categories of forces, each of them specialized in one type of commitment, namely: intervention, stabilization and support operations. These forces will be optimized for the spectrum of tasks they are going to be assigned, with regard to the capabilities demanded and the budget available to get them. Formations dedicated to intervention are mainly designed for high-intensity combat conditions occurring in a combined-joint, information-centered environment. Conversely, supporting forces would primarily assist the forces oriented to intervention and stabilization missions in preparing/running operations in Germany and/or a distant theater. Stabilization forces are planed for long-lasting employment in low to medium intensity combat-conditions, and the larger variety of tasks that stabilization and peace-support operations would demand6.

Stabilization forces
Given todays security status in this world of ours, Germany and, by the way, its allies would rather commit itself in stabilization operations. These require a large variety of qualifications from the military, Army troops in particular. Grasp of the cultural, ethnical and social situation of the civil populations present in theater not only facilitates the mission, but it also contributes notably in force protection issues. Indeed, stabilization forces will actually rule the scene under the condition that military means and actions keep visibly commensurate to the mission. As well, full understanding of the situation and its likely evolution is instrumental to supporting the stabilization process in theater. In that scope, constant Intelligence-coverage is essential.

Troops and units must be especially equipped, educated and trained for such kinds of operations and missions. Thus, the Bundeswehr has started generating forces with enhanced structural, material and individual capabilities, the latter including psychological preparation to expeditionary operations. Same deep changes affect the German Army, which is the main contributor in stabilization operations with 50% of its strengths some 7,500 military personnelregularly ordered into action.

Their mission
The primary mission of the stabilization forces is to create the conditions for a durable peace settlement, so that a functional government/social structure can be established. As necessary, these forces may participate in nation-building activities. Should the situation turn worse than expected, these forces should be armed and fit for clashes possibly escalating in high-intensity combats, whichever the level of command is considered. Therefore, their possible cooperation with intervention forces must be based on a set of concepts and exercises common to both categories of troops. From a military point of view, it can be useful and reasonably envisioned to engage intervention units and stabilization forces simultaneously under a unique Command/HQ, or to order them successively into action at very close times or in areas very close-by. According to basic directions stated forth in the National Defense Policy Book, the whole of the German stabilization forces should be ready for commitments to a maximum of five separate theaters at the same time. This would mobilize a resource of 14,000 troops in total.

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Foreign studies
Their structures
German Army stabilization forces are organized in two divisions. HQ, 10th Armored Division and HQ 13th Mechanized Infantry Division cater for C2 responsibility over two stabilization brigades each, though these staffs would not necessarily deploy as an OHQ proper. These Div HQs are responsible for their Brigades training and preparation to combat. The main body of stabilization forces is made of three slightly different, mechanized brigades - two mechanized infantry brigades and one armored brigade - and one mountain infantry brigade. Strong with three combat battalions; one Intel battalion; one signal battalion; one engineer battalion and one CSS battalion; these stabilization brigades are ideally structured and equipped for separate, long-lasting missions. More precisely, each mechanized brigade encompasses two mechanized infantry battalions and one armored battalion, whereas the mountain infantry brigade being composed of three Alpenjger battalions. As such, these stabilization forces are suitably tailored for combined arms7 styles of action and personnel-demanding military tasks such as interposition activities, checkpoints handling, and patrolling. Where appropriate, all these forces may be placed under command of the Framework HQ that the airmobile division is tasked to deploy for stabilization operations. The other elements identified as stabilization forces are the 31st airborne brigade detached from the special operations division; the Army, combat-support and logistic Command; also AMBs modules detached from the airmobile division. Conversely to the intervention forces, the brigades belonging to the stabilization forces are not organically equipped with field artillery but the combat support and logistic Command can cater for such reinforcement from the airmobile division as necessary.

Stabilization forces preparation

Education and training
Broadly speaking, stabilization forces can only incorporate professional troops, contracted personnel, and volunteers recruited for a given time because of the qualifications required for expeditionary operations, which are anyway subject to prior approval by the Bundestag8. Same education and training apply to intervention and stabilization forces except in terms of topics priority, since the latter may also have to deal with high-intensity combatcondition in a limited space/time framework, should the situation command. Nevertheless, all Army personnel are going to share the very same basic doctrinal approach. Basic and advanced courses for all military leaders and future commanders are based on similar rules, thus addressing uniformed qualifications and programs. On the principle, education and training for stabilization forces mainly address low to medium intensity combatconditions. However, the ability at highintensity combats must be maintained and such sequences will be played, regularly, in all tactical, peace-support mission exercises9 applying up to the level of a Combined Arms Battalion Task Force. Consistent with their primary employment-conditions in low to medium intensity operations, stabilization troops will be mainly trained on how to interpose between conflicting parties; ensure that a cease-fire agreement is respected; enforce measures of embargo; respond to local attacks from regular/irregular troops;

protect local authorities; and secure law and order across the assigned theater. Additional education-programs will deal with topics such as information operations superiority and cooperation with international, governmental or nongovernmental organizations.

Equipment
Besides education and training, equipment is the other key-aspect of force protection. The growing number of armored vehicles, possibly hardened, which are deployed in theater, demonstrates serious concerns for security issues during stabilization operations. The German Army seems to have already reached a high level of protection with the DINGO 2 (armored scout vehicle); the MUNGO (Special operations forces tactical vehicle); the WIESEL 2, the Hgglund BV-206-S (armored personnel carrier); and the BOXER (a modular armored vehicle). The Futures Infantry Combat Suit (French FELIN-equivalent) will help display improved performances in the fields of combat-superiority, durability, C2 functions, mobility, and the survivability of soldiers dismounted. Accurate information on the enemy also contributes in force protection. Our intelligence network is already equipped with high-performance tools such as the reconnaissance vehicle FENNEK, the Artillery radar system COBRA and target acquisition drone systems (KZO BREVEL, or LUNA). The German Army is going to beef up its detection network with the ALADIN, a drone operating in the troops vicinity-area (within a range

Major MATZKEN

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GERMAN LAND FORCES

of 5 km or so), and micro-drones dedicated to the surveillance of urban areas. On the subject of modernization, Army is placing much hope in one of its major R&D project, the armored infantry fighting vehicle PUMA. A real quality-leap in terms of serviceability, this combat vehicle should equip intervention and stabilization forces as well.

Forces, employment planning

Apart from exploratory orientations, financial constraints and pieces of technology available from the shelves, the development of newer systems will continue to depend largely on concrete operational requirements, threats identified, and the missions assigned to our troops. On its side, the German Army has established a detailed rotation plan for its units deployed in current operations, from now on to 2008, with

account to the transformation process running in parallel. Armys operational planning for beyond 2009 will be based on strengths provisioned forth in the New Land Forces structure and the number of units assorted to each function-related category composing them. Given the number of operations presently running or planned, the German Army cannot meet all of its operational requirements out of the sole stabilization forces. This is why its rotation plan for stabilization operations will change by 2009. On a yearly basis, the two divisions allotted to the stabilization forces (10th Armored and 13th Infantry) will assume in turns this responsibility, with the 1st Armored Division normally earmarked for intervention operations which will play the role of lead division for the circumstance. The air-mobile and the special operations divisions will support them all.

The intervention operations branch will systematically cater for Germanys commitment to the NRF and the EU BG 1,500, whilst harnessing its division to them in priority, and units from the stabilization forces providing support assets as appropriate.

1 Graduate, German Army Staff College (Fhrungsakademie). 2 Livre blanc 2006, p. 8. 3 Livre blanc 2006, p 11. 4 Draft Field-Manual HDv 100/100, 12007. 5 Intermediate headlines added by the editor. 6 WWH, 2nd update-release, p. 34 7 Quote from the draft, field manual HDv 100/100: combined arms procedures typically apply where national or multinational military assets would interact, at the tactical level, in an operation placed under the responsibility of a unique commander, whose objectives completion depends on the full spectrum of missions that the land forces can actually achieve, including non-military tasks. 8 FRGs Parliament. 9 Guideline directive for the New Army Forces exercises, chap. 2, p. 3.

Every member of the German Army must be combat-capable and properly utilize his working tools. In that scope, the reorganization in different categories of forces is not going to create 1st class and 2nd class types of unit. We will continue to possess one Army standing as the pillar instrumental to land operations, placed under a unique command, and governed by the same united and cooperative military policy and culture.

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Lessons learned
In 1899, while writing the book Trois Colonnes au Tonkin (Three military columns in the Tongking) (18941895), general Gallieni is based at Tananarive, where he is the general Governor of Madagascar (1896-1905). In this book he relates the events that occurred when he was the commander of the 2nd military territory of the Tongking. At that time his commander in chief gives him the responsibility for carrying out operations against the pirate groups that were holding nearly all the high region of the Tongking. Thus, general Gallieni headed three expeditions (columns) in the Kai-Kinh area, against the pirate leader Ba-Ky, and also in the YenThe area. Although admitting that each territory has its own characteristics that one should know and respect, he nevertheless gives in the very last conclusion of this book (hereafter extensively quoted) generalities that can be implemented on all theaters. This paper notably shows the extent to which some of the truths of the late 19th century are still applicable nowadays even if the political context of operations has significantly changed.

Principles of Pacification and Organization1

BY

MARCHAL JOSEPH GALLIENI (1849-1916)2

1 The administrative organization of a country must be perfectly in sync. with the nature of the country, of its inhabitants and with the aim we are all searching to achieve; 2 Every administrative organization must follow the country in its natural development.

It is in accordance with those two completely general principles that a given method, successfully used in a given area, becomes regrettable in another; that a given set of administrative processes, excellent today due to the present state of affairs, will have to be rejected a few months later if some events modify the situation of the regions in which they are implemented. Nothing must be more flexible, more buoyant, than the organization of a country whose evolution occurs thanks to the impulsion of energetic agents that the civilization and in this case the European colonization are implementing. The upper administration must call upon the good sense and initiative of territorial commanders who are in close contact with the populations, in order to get acquainted with the revealing symptoms of the changes pertaining to the moral and political state of the provinces they control and monitor. An administrative evolution must comply with every political and economical evolution.

The best way to achieve pacification with the limited resources that are usually available in the colonies is to employ the combined action of force and politics. We must remember that in the colonial fights that the insubordination of the populations too often unfortunately imposes to us, we must destroy only at the last resort and, even in this case, only destroy to better reconstruct. We should always spare the country and its inhabitants, as this latter one is deemed to welcome our future colonization enterprises and as they will become our main agents and contributors to carry these enterprises to a successful conclusion. Each time war incidents compel one of our colonial officers to act against a village or an inhabited center, he should not forget that his first objective, once the subjection of inhabitants has been achieved, will be to reconstruct the village, to immediately create a market and to settle a school. Therefore, any unnecessary destruction must be carefully avoided. It is the combined action of politics and force that must lead to the pacification of the country and the first upfront primary organization.

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Political action - The political action is by far the most important one; its draws its main force from the knowledge of the country and of its inhabitants; this is towards this aim that any territorial commanders first efforts should be directed. The study of the races that occupy a region will determine the political organization to be implemented and the manners to employ for its pacification. An officer who has been able to draw a sufficiently accurate ethnographic map of the territory he commands is not far from reaching its complete pacification, ensued by the best possible suitable organization. Any gathering of individuals, race, people, tribe or family represents a sum of common or opposing interests. Although some customs and behaviors are to be respected, there are also some hatreds and rivalries that one must be able to sort out and take advantage of, by opposing the ones to the others, by relying on the ones to better defeat the others. Nevertheless, it is also important to look for and find the reasons that govern some rebellions, some general movements of populations against us. In most cases it is mistrust towards us; an instinctive repulsion to acknowledge the presence of Europeans as leaders, mistrust and repulsion that are exploited by some seditious individuals pushed by ambition or personal interests. Striking the head and reassuring the mass led astray by deceitful advice or calumnious statements, here lies the secret of a pacification.

All in all, any political action must consist in detecting and taking advantage of local elements that are employable, in neutralizing and destroying the local elements that are not usable. Above all, the essential employable element will be the people, the working mass of the population who can, for a certain time, be led astray and dragged along, but whose interests are hooked to our fortune and who rapidly knows how to understand it, from the moment he is told so and this becomes acknowledged. The essentially harmful elements are formed by the rebel or unsubdued leaders, around whom a vacuum has to be achieved, by ruining their prestige by any available means, political and military, thanks to repeated and ceaseless strikes, up till their complete extinction or subjection. Last, two suspicious elements exist: 1 The native chief who has to be closely watched over, whose actions that are sometimes pushed by insatiable greed and personal interests, have to be closely monitored. Whatever his drawbacks might be, whatever the troubles he might cause, generally, it proves better to keep this power in name only, to which the native is more accustomed to, and behind whom we will be able to maneuver more freely. Some discrimination in his selection, a little cleverness in arousing his selfesteem and ambition, might even turn him sometimes into an auxiliary not to be left aside;

2 All the category of people who were before in power and who are ruined by our presence, as political element at least; although demonstrating subordination and flattery, they will hide for a long time their resentment for the benefit of which they will exploit our slightest weaknesses. A well organized police and a wise firmness will keep them at bay. Action by force - Any forward movement of troops must have as a result to effectively occupy the seized terrain. This is an absolute principle. Action by force must encompass two forms: the slow action and the swift one. The first one, the most recommended and certainly the most efficient one consists in occupying, from the start, the political centers with permanent positions, as well as the points from which our opponents obtain their supplies and the communication routes. The rest of the country is progressively cleared, either thanks to small military operations, or even, and above all, thanks to the won over population that is armed, supported and supplied with ammunitions by us. It has, as strong points, temporary posts that are successively brought forward in sync. with the clearing progress; it is spurred on in its zealousness thanks to easily found expedients, favorable auctions of rifles, rewards for obtained subjections, etc. It is the oil stain method. One only gains terrain forward after having completely organized the one in the rear. The unsubordinated natives of yesterday are the ones who help us, who are used to winning the unsubordinated ones of tomorrow. One move forward with certainty and the last occupied post firstly becomes the observation point from which the military district, sector, territory commander assesses the situation, tries to meet with the unknown elements he is faced with by using those he has just subdued, determines the new positions to seize and prepares, in one word, a new step forward. This is the method that best spares the country and its inhabitants and that best prepares the transition towards our influence over these new

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territories. It requires from the part of our officers a set of rare skills: initiative, intelligence and activeness, in order to avoid missing any opportunity to get a foothold in the still unknown and unsubordinated regions; carefulness, calm and insight, in order to avoid any failure, which is always detrimental to our prestige and to be able to perceive those of the opponents failures that can be used for the new progresses to accomplish. Pacified areas immediately receive an administrative organization; at first, they are held and watched over by regular troops, and later, when quietness is well restored, by militias or simply by armed partisans; at the end, when all dangers have faded away, one can and one must recover from the population the weapons allocated that are no longer needed. The swift action is the exception: it is the action carried out by the military columns. It must only be employed against precise targets, where force is required, force being the characteristic of the columns; their duration, except for case of force majeure, must not exceed three months; beyond this time limit, attrition and wearing out of troops occur. The organization of these columns varies in accordance with the aim to be obtained: in principle, they must encompass, as we have already seen it, a nucleus of European troops reinforced by native troops and later, each time this will be possible, groups of partisans that do not represent a really serious resistance element, but that can be used for scouting and pursuit. Let me restate this, the columns must really be the exception and must only be employed against numerous and dangerous gatherings, fortified in strong positions, in forests, in natural amphitheaters, from which they threaten the security of the neighboring areas and jeopardize the subjection and obedience of the hesitant populations that are only waiting for the destruction of these gangs to acknowledge our influence; the three examples given are typical. Political action and action by force are the two main agents employed during the first period of an occupation or of a conquest. If their combination is successful, a second period immediately occurs: the organization

period, which calls upon a third factor, the economic action.

Lessons learned
goods that are somewhat lacking today in our colonies and, in any case, some local resources that are missing in most cases. It would be an overstatement to implement sumptuous laws whose implementation would prove touchy and whose principles are in opposition with our liberal and egalitarian ideas; but there is no inconvenience to bring the leaders under our orders to adopt our garments and customs, to encourage their women to get rid of the flashy rags they are often fond of and to dress themselves in the European way with French origin clothes. The vanity and mimicry spirit of the natives will generally be strong enough to achieve the rest. On the other hand, the agricultural colonization will prove happy to have agents and workers accustomed to our methods. We will prepare the ground by determining beforehand the perimeters of the colonization, by supplying it with the labor force by all the means in our power, by the large and well understood implementation of labor laws that each colony will have to draft in accordance with the customs of its inhabitants and the efforts that are expected from them. The task will be eased for everyone by the knowledge of our language that the natives will have learned in our schools. A well understood and well directed education will turn the generation that follows the one that has endured the conquest, into a population that will be entirely dedicated to us and receptive to all our ideas. The gradual development of the road network will just only help to reach this result. Besides, the territorial commanders must apprehend their administrative role in the least formal manner. Regulations, especially those pertaining to economical matters in the colonies, only state general outlines that are planned for a set of cases, but that are sometimes not applicable to a specific case. Our administrators and officers must defend, in the name of good sense, the interests they are endowed with, and not fight against them in the name of regulations. The administrative organization will always allow for an entire freedom of initiative to the upper authority

Economic action. Organization At the same time pacification is implemented, agriculture starts over again, markets reopen and business resumes. The soldiers role shifts into the background, the role of the administrator begins. On the one hand, one must study and fulfill the social requirements of the subjected populations; on the other, favor the extension of the colonization that will develop ground natural resources and open prospects for the European trade. I believe these are the two main conditions for the economic development of a colony; in no way they are in opposition. Generally the natives have very few needs. They live in a state close to poverty, which is human seeking to improve; but the new living mode they will adopt thanks to us, by creating needs they did not have before, will require from their part resources that they still do not have and that they will have to find elsewhere. They will therefore have to overcome their laziness and resolutely begin to work, either by bringing a new life to sleeping industries, either by increasing cultures or by adopting more productive methods for them, or by bringing their labor force to the European settlers. It falls under the responsibilities of our territorial commanders to set up vocational schools where the natives will improve their crafts thanks to the study and the implementation of methods that experience and science brought to us, to set up model farms where they will grasp the more prolific culture methods we use and that they do not know, to encourage the resuming of national industries by easing the settlement of the first manufactures that will be organized and by subsidizing them if need be, to create markets, at first without taxes and which will only be taxed later on very gradually, etc. Inevitably, a wealth increase in the country will occur and as a natural consequence a need for well being, and even luxury, that the European trade will take advantage of. They will find in the new products generated by the activity we will have thus created, the export

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lives amongst populations that are not yet definitely won over and that his very strict duty is to closely monitor them, using, for this purpose, the morale prestige pertaining to the success of the conquest. At first sight, these administrative functions seem to be incompatible with the idea that one has of the military in some circles. However, here lies the true role of the colonial officer and that of his dedicated and intelligent collaborators, the noncommissioned officers and soldiers he commands. This is also the touchiest one, the one which requires the utmost dedication and amount of efforts, the one where personal qualities can emerge; as destroying is easy, reconstructing proves more difficult. Moreover, these obligations are imposed on him by contingencies. A country is not conquered and pacified when a military operation has decimated its inhabitants and bent all heads under the terror ensuing the processes the operation is compelled to employ. Once the first terror is over, some ferments of rebellion will germinate, further increased and increased again by the accumulated resentments ensuing from the brutal action of the force. In the least case, an instinctive mistrust will remain in the minds that has to be calmed down at any cost. As long as this reluctance will remain, the civilian regime will be premature: the conqueror is the only one strong enough to allow himself clemency actions that the people will not perceive as a weakness and that will rally them to us. The organization of the military territories, with its close surveillance, is the only one capable of digging down deep enough to eradicate the roots of rebellion that might still remain.

delegates. They will have a complete freedom in the selection of the assets to be employed but will also take all the responsibility for obtained results. By centralizing in their hands the civilian, military and judicial powers, they have at reach all the essential elements of action that are indispensable to any vigorous and bright administrator. In the military territories, a surveillance that is more delicate to exercise, partitions the areas that have just been conquered into restricted areas. The sector becomes the basic command unit. Its role, the military district and territory commanders role, whose regulating action leads to a convergence of the efforts of the sector commanders towards the same goal, are nearly exclusively of a military nature in the first place. At first the soldier demonstrates he is a soldier, the emblem of the force necessary to impress the not yet subdued populations; later, once peace has been reached, he lays his arms down; he becomes an administrator, without however losing sight that he

During this period, the troops only have a police role that is soon handed out to special troops, militias and police per se, but it is wise to take advantage of the inexhaustible dedication and cleverness skills of the French soldier. As a works supervisor, a teacher, a craftsman worker, a small post commander, everywhere his initiative, his self esteem and his intelligence are called upon, he is up to the task. And one should not take it for granted that this temporary desertion from the parade ground is detrimental to the discipline spirit and to the military duties beliefs. The colonial troop soldier is generally old enough to have more than once followed the exercises training cycles and to have very few things to learn as far as theories and limbering up exercises that are taught to recruits in France are concerned. Conversely, the services that are expected from him entertain a moral and physical activity which increases tenfold his strength due to the interest of the allocated task. Moreover, by interesting the soldier in our achievement in the country, we end up interesting him in the country itself. He observes, memorizes, he even plans and often, when discharge time comes, he will have decided to develop a piece of land, to use the resources of his craftsmanship in the colony, in one word to bring his dedication and good will for the benefit of the colony. He becomes one of the most reliable elements of the small colonization, which is an essential complement to the large one. In all our colonies a great deal of our soldiers requests occurred in this direction. They should be favored and encouraged.

WIKIPEDIA

1 Extract of Trois colonnes au Tonkin (Three columns in the Tongking (1894-1895). 2 Nominated Marchal de France (Marshall) in 1921 (posthumously).

Here are, briefly expressed, the principles that have always been my guide; the method was tried and tested successfully in Sudan, Tongking and in Madagascar. I believe this is the one that can take the utmost advantage of everyones skills and is able to arouse the self esteem of the least of the soldiers to whom a task is given and brings a responsibility.

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The EU in Africa: Complementarities and Limitations in Stabilization Operations

Lessons learned

lthough military Europe has, for a long time, been developed against somebody or something, be it in 732 under Charles Martels command 1, be it in 1812 against Napolon or closer in 1948 with the Western European Union, it has nowadays learnt how to grow up with a pro attitude. Much more simply, and in spite of some recent problems due to the rejection of a text that could have served as a foundation, this Europe which is being built, needs a drive, and projects, realism, and common successes. An actual political project takes long to implement and requires instruments. Simultaneously, several regions of the world constitute permanent seeds for crises and instability, which is indeed the case for Africa. This is on that continent that the EU has conducted two of its only three operations: two in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Artemis and EUFOR DRC), the third one having been conducted in the (Former Yugoslav) Republic of Macedonia. Why Africa? No doubt about the fact that from now on these countries which still have friends and interests in Africa, find it more difficult to get there alone, not only in terms of force capability, but also in terms of legitimacy.

Whatever the motives for the latest EU intervention in Congo, this operation has been the first, in Africa, to be European only from planning to execution: a stabilization operation that forced our armed forces to go far beyond where they had ever gone in terms of cooperation and coordination. Therefore, beyond the requirements for a European engagement, that operation has been an actual life experimentation in the field of the European military tool, i.e. that necessary cooperation we hope for, rather than a mere ad hoc coalition. Although some problems occurred during that experiment which was the product of a mix of different histories and cultures, it had positive results even though there is still progress to be achieved.
BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STPHANE PAU - LAND FORCE HQ N 4

Different motivations for a common mission

General framework
The EU intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo, from June to December 2006: a four month long mandate that corresponded to the legislative and presidential elections period in that country that had never held any election since it gained its independence from Belgium in the 60s. That exhausted country, that was coming out of several years of war which had resulted into more than 4 millions casualties, could, through that process, hope to exit out of a long crisis and impoverishment period. The UN forces (MONUC), in charge of restoring security in a country four times bigger than France, consist of 17,000 people, most of whom being based in the south eastern region of the country, especially

in Ituri and Kiwu, where fights are still going on. UNSCR 1671 thus entrusted the EU force with, as its main mission, supporting the MONUC over the three fourths of the country, where MONUCs capabilities were insufficient. That mission was mainly focused on Kinshasa, and also on four other towns (Lubumbashi, Mbandaka, Kananga, Muji Mayi) located at a distance between 400 and 2 000 km from the capital city. In these towns, the risks of a crisis were important and MONUC forces insufficient. Distance was thus what made the mission a complex one, distance from home bases as well as in theater distances. Other motives of complexity lied also in the interoperability of the various contingents and also in the very nature of that country where three hundred languages are being spoken and where three hundred ethnic groups

maintain cross borders friendly relationships. Even the wording of the mission was complex: protection of endangered populations, and support to MONUC upon its own request

The risks linked to having different cultures and objectives

Countries history have influenced the design of their forces, sometimes the opposite is also true. European countries defense systems are diverse depending on whether the countries are continental, insular or located between two threats; all these heritages are not easily mixable. France has a long colonial history which made her leave behind her pre-positioned and sovereignty forces intended to enable her to react rapidly through the world. Belgium, just like France and several other European countries is also used to

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go to Africa within operational or exercise frameworks. That historical background is not shared by all European countries which were part of the EUFOR operation: Africa which has now become a land of expeditionary deployments for the entire French Army, still remains an unknown territory for many European countries. What were thus supposed to do these 22 European countries in the Democratic Republic of Congo? The response is principally political by nature, linked to foreign policy and also to internal policy. First, that intervention didnt come out of the blue, it logically followed previous European commitment in DRC, assistance and financial investments, medium term support through organizations such as EUPOL2 or EUSEC3, or on a more ad hoc basis the MOEUE4. There was thus an EU collective interest. And then there were interests that were more specific such as those that Belgium kept with its former colonies and that werent broken when the decolonization process occurred. And lastly, and above all, there has been that willingness to conduct a military operation in common, to make it instrumental for revitalizing the EU. The situation was supposed to be manageable even if it was regarded as a volatile one. However there was an actual risk for Europe to fail, to be unable to act decisively should that be required, and even worse there was a risk to put soldiers in an inextricable situation.

Variable engagements
The various countries contribution to the force shows their common willingness to co-operate. The force generation process has been long and painful: it has been necessary to convince the nations to contribute up to the required level. The force would include 2,500 soldiers, with 18 nations actually present in the field and with a corresponding diversity of land forces equipment. In total, the force had at its disposal in the field (including special forces means) about 10 fixed wings tactical aircraft (C160 or C130), 7 helicopters (CH53, Puma and Gazelle), F1 CR Reconnaissance Fighters on emergency call or conducting reconnaissance missions, 4 combat companies, one protection company, a support element and the Force HQ. EUFOR deployed to two different locations: Kinshasa in DRC, as a Forward Deployed Base, to demonstrate EUs resolve, and in Gabon, between Libreville and Port Gentil, for the Reaction force. Volumes may seem to be limited but the mission didnt require more to provide pinpointed support in specific key points of the country or in support of area protection operations in Kinshasa. Once the force generated, it remained to deal with the caveats, those limitations imposed by each of the countries to the engagement of their contingent for legitimate national reasons: although these caveats

resulted in being a major problem to solve, they nevertheless remained an issue internal to the force that were unknown by outsiders. For that mission, European multinationality and the visibility of it were paramount.

A generally positive result

A painful force generation process and a diversity of objectives but a common vision, those were the starting elements of that EUFOR DRC operation. Planning for that operation has also been a bit tricky due to the differences of both staffs battle rhythms and to their specific objectives. The OPLAN produced by the end of May 2006 was common to both the strategic and operational/ tactical levels with all its multinational political acceptability, but it was very much lacking field specificities. However, that European stabilization operation went well. Amongst its successes, it has to be listed the legitimacy of the force, the coordination of military and non military means, the complementarity and quality of the engaged forces, the situation awareness down to the lowest levels and, of course, the willingness to make that complex organization work well in the field.

Legitimacy, complementarity, tactical success

The sought multinationality is without any doubt at the origin of the forces legitimacy, and even more when it is naturally associated to proven impartiality. The force, the engagement of which had been accepted by the outgoing President, Mr Joseph Kabila, was installed on a military airbase commanded by a Congolese general who was very heavily involved politically. This was obviously sending a message contradicting the very notion of neutrality and impartiality. EUFORs engagement during the night of 21st August, following the results of the first round of the presidential elections, and during which the runner-up candidates residence was besieged by elements of the governmental forces, demonstrated decisively the forces impartiality that had been permanently questioned before.

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The complementarity of the contributing nations resulted in a measured engagement. But the means were also complementary: it was, of course the force generations main issue. Even though caveats brought some limitations to EUFORs freedom of action, all contingents, Spanish Tercio, German paratroopers, French 8th RPIMA (Marine Infantry Battalion -Airborne), Polish military police, French, Portuguese and Swedish special forces, German Intelligence units, Belgium UAVs, all units brought the quality of their expertise and know how . Although they were operating together, their courses of action were sometimes different, more robust for the Spanish who were coming back from Iraq or closer to the population for the 8th RPIMA. Simultaneously deterring and reassuring, forces actions, supported by CIMIC activities and widely publicized by means of operational communication, have at the same time ensured the forces credibility and a certain attachment of the population. The many friendly reactions mixed with some apprehension at the time of EUFORs departure constituted a demonstration of the success in the field.

languages in DRC) their interaction with the population remained limited. And what about the non French speaking intelligence units?

Lessons learned
Once the force is deployed, it appears that the first victim of the operation is the plan itself. The art of the force is then to demonstrate its flexibility and to amend its course of actions should it be required, while ensuring the operations coherence and keeping also in sight the desired end-state: EUFOR did it but it could have been possible to improve the process. Nothing should come and blur the message that the force intends to send to the authorities and local populations: in that regards, the lack of a significant enough EU budget (different from the national ones) dedicated to CIMIC activities is rather regrettable.

Interoperability within the force has not always been very efficient: although, within the FHQ, the SOPs served as a basis for working together, they required an important amount of work to review and amend them since they responded imperfectly to the requirements. At unit level, the need for interoperability is even more obvious: as a matter of fact, within a crisis environment in a city with more than 7 millions inhabitants, coordination is essential to avoid fratricides. The solution that was adopted was to avoid as much as possible mixing units together in the field, be it MONUC and EUFOR units or even EUFOR with other EUFOR units, to keep away from issues linked to differences of language, CIS incompatibility, differences of procedures and diverse interpretation of the Rules of Engagement (ROEs).

Lessons learned and recommendations

Although that European engagement has been quite short, it however resulted in the finding of many lessons, some of them were even identified before the deployment took place. These lessons can be regrouped in terms of planning, coordination and subsidiarity. It starts with planning. Between that process and the force generation that follows it, it is necessary to be quite clear: the objective is not to please the nations but rather to provide the force in the field with the means necessary to operate in accordance with the agreement given by the nations themselves.

And last, in order to make an EU operation a success, it is necessary that, at each of the command levels, commanders implement the principle of subsidiarity, that guarantees the indispensable level of autonomy for subordinate levels. Each one being, at his own level, responsible for one part of the whole operation. That confidence which is the only means to establish such relationships among the nations cannot originate in individuals only but is rather the product of long-lasting work, common training and operations conducted in common.

Limitations of cooperation in stabilization operations

However, several aspects of the operation demonstrate the limitations of that type of missions. First the language issue. Although English is now the international staffs language, the operating language in the theater was French. This was at first a definite advantage for French speaking contingents (French or Belgium). Although the Spanish, German or Poles employed interpreters and made an effort to speak a few words of French or Lingala (one of the four official

1 In 965, Isidore Le Jeune, an historian, described these peoples and tribes who voluntarily fought under Charles Martels command, as being European: the word Europeenses was, as a matter of fact, used for the first time to qualify a group of human beings. 2 EUPOL: European Union Police, with a mission of reform and support to the Congolese police. 3 EUSEC: European Union Security, with a mission of reform and assistance to the Congolese armed forces. 4 MOEUE: European Union Elections Monitor Mission (EUEMM).

EUFOR DR Congo fulfilled entirely its mission. The behavior of all soldiers from all contributing nations should be added to all the criteria for success that have already been mentioned. It has also to be mentioned the support provided by MONUC and European organizations that provided the force with a situation awareness sufficient to control the environment when required. That stabilization operation that has been managed by the EU from one end to the other had positive results but demonstrated also limitations that should not be hidden. In a near future, the European stand-by unit, the Battle Group (BG) 1,500, should be used for that type of engagement, and this should help avoiding some of the mistakes or deficiencies that have been observed, thanks to a thorough and efficient preparation effort.

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The Medical Service

within the Framework of Operation pervier

O
BY

peration pervier is considered as a stabilized operation and the SSA (Joint MSC) adapted itself to the theater and to rapid augmentation capabilities but this structure is still perfectible and it can be improved.

An experience induced by the French Armed Forces Joint Staff, setting up a medical task force, has been carried out since October 2005. Recent events in Chad in 2006 enabled to test this concept.
CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER SERGE CUEFF - COMMANDING THE HUMAN RESOURCE ORGANIZATION BUREAU, REGIONAL COMMAND, SSA1 TOULON

A theater of operation is in line with the different stages of a life often emerging into difficult conditions and into emergency, followed by a stabilization phase that must be regularly adapted, and eventually a withdrawal phase that is a specific moment for making up and to draw lessons learned. These different stages could last between several months and

several dozen of years. For a theater, one of the most critical stages is the stabilization phase closely dependent upon a geopolitical and military situation in the area. It looks like a young volcano, whose eruptions are repeated and unexpected. Therefore, these are the following questions: From which moment could we consider that an area is stabilized?

If the area is unstable or seems to be unstable, should we start an adaptation phase or downsize the initial structure? In which proportion? For which mission? Which safety margins do we decide to have? Which way do we organize it?

The evolution of the French military disposition in Chad

Chad is the very example of a theater that is changing permanently though it is in a stabilization phase, thus leading to a permanent adaptation of the SSA (Joint MCS) and of the EFT2 (French Forces in Chad). The French presence on this territory - as an intervention force dates back to 1983, during operation Manta that was completed in 1984. After some time without any commitment, France was committed again in 1986, within the framework of operation pervier, and it is still continuing. During these various events, SSA support structures to the forces changed a lot, on the one hand because of the changes in committed forces, and on the other hand because of the pledges of the French governments. The current mission for operation pervier consists in protecting French or foreign nationals, and logistic support to Chad government forces. During the period of military cooperation, the medical service has several dozens of personnel (physicians, paramedics) spread across the whole country (NDjamena, Abch, FayaLargeau, Sahr, Barda, etc.).

SSA

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MCMs3 (French military cooperation mission) then MAMs4 (military assistance mission) manpower attached to Chadian forces - gradually decreased and even a lot. Currently, this cooperation is organized by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within this framework, the medical service only has 5 personnel left. As a consequence and unlike the initial situation, the medical service can only rely on Operation pervier personnel to carry out its mission throughout the whole territory of Chad, to sustain forces, nationals, Chadian forces and eventually populations.

Owing to the time spent there, all these elements have been appraised again and again in order to be perfectly fitted to this operation - changing all the time though supposed to be stabilized.

Lessons learned
the agreement of the EMA5 (French Armed Forces Joint Staff), in order to reorganize this structure, for it to be better optimized. A medical group was created; its missions are considered to be operational for the same reasons as land and air task forces. The other components and the BSVIAv6 (Joint Support Base) take part in supporting its missions - often with deployment. In the former organization, all medical assets used to report to the BSVIA commander.

Currently, Joint MSC assets are gathered at three locations: on Kossei AFB (Air Force Base); on the fringe of Abch airport; on a concession in Faya-Largeau. This disposition enables to carry out: medical or paramedical support to French forces nomadism that varies depending upon their size, their elongation and the season; the security of aeronautical platforms; daily medical support to the French forces; medical support to populations.

Adaptation of the SSA (French Joint MSC) to the operation

As for the French Joint MSC and during the stabilization phase of a conflict, the issue consists in finding the adequate human-equipmentefficiency ratio, while carrying out its mission. To define it, we have to clearly identify the MSC mission framework in the area, logistic difficulties and the time required for reinforcements to be set up.

Operational optimization of the French Joint MSC by setting up a medical group

Thus, this structure results from a long maturation. An experience has been in progress since October 2005 -with

Previously the COMELEF7 (French Force Commander) Medical Assistant had no direct technical authority on strategic assets that remained under the control of the BSVIA commander who could use these medical assets without any advice from the medical assistant on specific occasions. This situation resulted into major failures, personal conflicts and obnoxious effects regarding the control of requirements. In this tested architecture, the COMSANTE8 (Medical Commander), while being a Medical Assistant, directly commands and controls all

OVERALL ORGANIZATION FOR FRENCH FORCES IN CHAD

FRENCH FORCE COMMANDER

DJS QMG
JOINT STAFF
B2-B3-B4-B6

MEDICAL COMMANDER

LAND TF
Land tactical commander

AIR TF
Air tactical commander

MEDICAL TF
Medical commander

JOINT SUPPORT AREA

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the medical assets in Operation pervier. This enables him to have all his assets available on a permanent basis; so, he can operate them immediately, without any intermediary, in coordination with the land and air task forces and with the BSVIA support. The efficiency of this direct mode of command and control was highlighted during the events that took place in September 2006: The crash of a Mirage F1 in the Mongo area resulting into the implementation and the coordination of a forward Aeromedical MEDEVAC9 (Medical Evacuation) with a medevac helicopter from Abch, to take care of the ejected pilot followed by another Aeromedical MEDEVAC10 from NDjamena; Combats between rebel forces and Chadian forces in the Eastern part of the country, during which we carried out WIA (Wounded in Action) medical regulation in Abch, their MEDEVAC to NDjamena, then their sharing out among Chadian medical facilities or among Operation pervier medical facilities. During these events, the presence of the COMTACAIR11 (Air Tactical Commander), of the COMTACTERRE12 (Land Tactical Commander), of the CEMIA (DJS)13, of the COMELEF (French Force Commander) and of the COMSANTE (Medical Commander) at the EMIA (Joint HQ)14 or at the PCIA (Joint CP)15 enabled to implement and coordinate the French forces assets in Chad with the agreement of French and Chadian authorities. These procedures and this organization have shown that a commander is able to have an immediate - both technical and operational - answer, with assets to be implemented, thus optimizing and making it easier to the French commander to make decisions.

Within the framework of this operation, the Medical Commander has available assets that enable him to meet a certain number of situations and to absorb operational fits and starts during their early phases. To reach this aim, it has: In NDjamena: A surgical center composed of a medical facility including 2 physicians and a dozen paramedics, a surgery unit including 1 anesthetist, 2 surgeons and 9 paramedics, and 6 ambulances. A medical supply platoon including 5 personnel, among whom 1 pharmacist in order to supply the medical facility with medical and surgical equipment, to carry out medical tests and to maintain technical equipment. A veterinary, whose main function consists in keeping a constant watch over food and animal hygiene. In Abch: A medical facility with 1 physician and 3 orderlies, among whom 1 Chadian one and equipped with 2 ambulances. In Faya-Largeau: A medical facility with 1 physician and 1 Chadian orderly.

During engagements in the Eastern part of the country and in NDjamena in April, September, October and November 2006, the efficiency and the relevance of the 12-hour reinforcement concept was shown within the framework of GUPARD warning by setting up or by alerting medical reinforcements timely.

This review leads us to the following conclusion: With less than 41 personnel, spread across the territory, there is no margin of maneuver in this organization, whereas it perfectly corresponds to current needs in the theater. With such a size and despite distances, this organization can be reinforced with personnel and equipment from France within 12 hours and achieve strategic MEDEVACs. On purpose, events and requirements should be anticipated through a good coordination and a good communication within the Joint HQ.

1 SSA - Service de sant des armes : Joint MSC (Medical Service Corps) 2 EFT - Elments franais au Tchad : French Forces in Chad. 3 MCM - Mission militaire de coopration: Military Co-operation Mission. 4 MAM - Mission dassistance militaire : Military Assistance Mission 5 EMA - Etat-major des armes : French Armed Forces Joint Staff. 6 BSVIA - Base de soutien vocation interarmes : Joint Support Base. 7 COMELEF - Commandant des lments franais : French Force Commander. 8 COMSANTE - Commandant des moyens sants : Medical Commander; he commands and controls the Medical Group. 9 EVASAN HM - Evacuation sanitaire par hlicoptre mdicalis : MEDEVAC (Medical Evacuation) with a medevac helicopter. 10 EVASAN - Evacuation sanitaire : MEDEVAC. 11 COMTACAIR - Commandant tactique air : Air Tactical Commander; commands and control the Air Force elements. 12 COMTACTERRE - Commandant tactique terre : Land Tactical Commander; commands and controls the Army Task Force. 13 CEMIA - Chef dtat-major interarmes : Chief of staff of the Joint HQ. 14 EMIA - Etat-major interarmes : Joint HQ. 15 PCIA - Poste de commandement interarmes : Joint CP.

Selecting and operating a medical structure in a stabilized theater is difficult. It should be able to meet the missions it is regularly tasked to and be prepared to meet a situation of instability and tension while waiting for asset reinforcement. The structure of Operation pervier enabled to reach this balance and recent events highlighted it. The structure of a Medical Group showed and confirmed that it greatly optimized the operational feature of medical assets and met the commanders expectations. It would be interesting to extend this experience.

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No Stabilization Phase is like Another... but All Have the Same Basic Features

Lessons learned

tabilizations in Iraq, Haiti or Kosovo display obvious differences that everything intensifies. However, looking

more closely, common points shall appear. Stabilizations phases are like carpets: their weft maintaining wool

threads is always similar to the others, while their colors forming specific patterns make a difference between them. Like carpets, each one being unique, no conflict is similar to another. Identifying the weft is as necessary as distinguishing the threads. It enables to better understand this stabilization phase which is decisive for the

success of a military operation.

BY

COLONEL LUC DU PERRON DE REVEL - HEAD OF CDEF/DREX1

Permanent features of stabilization phases

Use of force
Going from the intervention phase to the stabilization one is expressed by an evolution of the force employment. The military victory of a party over another or the separation of belligerents mean the end of combats. The nature of these latter is mainly symmetrical or dissymmetrical.

Those who want to go on fighting against intervention forces or against the current authorities have no other option than embarking in an asymmetrical fight. It constitutes the only opportunity to hope winning one day. However the growth of such form of violence is progressive. Stabilization often starts by a period when intense political and diplomatic activity and violence temporarily quasi-

disappearing are the source of hope for better days for the majority. But such state of grace where everything seems possible does not last long. Some months or weeks of political or military mistakes, difficulties, changes or headlong rush of some people are enough for generating a re-start of oppositions and for violence to re-appear. Such violence is fuelled by an increasing discrepancy between military forces and populations.

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Subsequently, although always necessary, force is less useful. It appears frequently as an insufficient and sometimes inefficient response. Capacities of destruction and aggression leave partly way to controlling and understanding the environment or the forces protection. However, conventional and dissymmetrical fights still remain in the stabilization phase. They happen, either from time to time on the occasion of crisis that are always violence bursts (Kosovo, Ivory Coast) or in a permanent way in areas surrounded by instability where armed and organized opponents are concentrated (Afghanistan).

this can be such specific state or the international community. Constant slaughters are covering with blood some crisis theaters (Balkans, Ivory Coast, Darfur, Iraq...). They demonstrate how important for decision are the action, non-action or incapacity of these third parties, including sometimes our own forces in regard of perpetration or pursuit of these crimes. Massacres perpetrated almost under the eyes of international forces in Srebrenica in Bosnia or in Guitrozon and Petit Dukou in the Ivory Coast can only favor the repudiation of forces unable to grant a minimum security to populations. This security is essential but so difficult to achieve. It stresses the expectations of those for whom the end of conflict should allow better living conditions. Their impatience regarding this matter is growing as the time elapses. Any prolonged failure in this area generates a feeling of rejection. This can drive entire groups in the adversarys hands as he appears as a possible recourse. As urban areas are concentrating a large part of the population, they are at the heart of power stakes. They subsequently remain the privileged action field for the asymmetrical adversary. They are then essential areas for military forces which should act and deploy there in stabilization phase. However, current crisis, for a part of them, are occurring in regions where rural population is still numerous. Some of these areas are crisis focal centers where lies a part of the conflict origins: land and ethnical conflicts in west Ivory Coast or in Darfur, mine resources in Liberia or Congo, ethnical enclaves in Kosovo, etc. They require a military presence. Other areas with difficult accesses, sometimes close to borders or common to several countries may constitute sanctuaries for enemy forces (tribal areas in Afghanistan) or favor fugacity and self-sufficiency of groups either hostile or manipulated by some conflict actors (Ivory Coast, Congo, Chad - Sudan Central African Republic)...

A number of actors
By nature, stabilization always occurs in a country where the State is in crisis, in bankruptcy or has practically disappeared. Subsequently, it can only, in the best case, play its role imperfectly. A part of its missions is then performed by international and humanitarian organizations with which military forces should act and coordinate. But, with the exception of some specific domains such as the interposition between fighters, duties of general security or fight against guerrilla, these are not calling the tune. They are often obliged to wait for the political actors to progress in the crisis resolution and can only accompany them. In this context, the military are working together with multiple actors with whom they should develop a close cooperation.

Population, both actor and stake

Mere victim of conflicts for long, population became on all theaters a major stake and a full-fledge actor. It is everywhere at the heart of operations conception and conduct. It is a constant concern for military forces. These draw a part of their legitimacy, a priori as well as a posteriori, from the feeling of security felt by everyone. In this field, any failure is charged to the forces account, including when this security is not relevant to their mission. While maintaining such violence, the adversary may want to deny such legitimacy, try to provoke a destabilizing political effect or continue his own objectives with a bet on the passivity of stabilization forces. This was the case in 2004 when Ivorian forces repressed with a lethal violence a tentative demonstration in Abidjan in March or when internal disputes within Forces nouvelles2 killed dozens of victims at Korogho in June. That occurred in the north as well as in the south without impartial forces being capable to oppose. However, massacres are also a matter of a mere dynamics of violence. War by favoring the conditions to act out is the main matrix. The victims-persecutors relationship cannot ignore the third component the third party - military forces being part of it as well as the neighbor:

This frame common to all stabilization phases generates consequences for the forces: - The transition period between intervention and stabilization phases is a key period of the conflict which can durably orientate its course. It can be a privileged time of action, subject to have been anticipated and prepared. It is also frequently the prelude to an increase of asymmetrical violence. - The committed forces are focused on a force employment totally devoted to military victory. Although this is indispensable to the intervention phase, the forces should however be able to re-orientate it in the stabilization phase. They should take care of not fuelling a violence they try to control and have available a sufficient power to impose a force sometimes necessary. - The population security is one of the pillars of legitimacy of the forces action even when it is not an explicit mission. - The capability to intervene in urban areas as well as on wider and wider spaces along with difficult accesses is a constant in the forces action. - Civilian-military dialogue is a key point. At all levels, the military should

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integrate the action of various interlocutors. Their objectives, resources or interests, may however noticeably differ one from another.

implementing, with no difference, courses of actions or recipes that have been efficient elsewhere.

Lessons learned
The intervention origin
The conflict can be the outcome of a crisis specific to the country. At the end of a shorter or longer process, it results in the intervention of forces from outside. This was the case of Ivory Coast or Congo, for instance. In this case, the military commitment aims, on behalf of international legitimacy, at enabling the restoration of a stable social and political system. The political goal of the operation is to return to peace. More modestly for an operation limited in space and time, it can be only the success of a specific phase. This was the case for operation Benga in 2006 where, in the wider framework of a UN operation, the European force (EUFOR) accompanied the organization of elections that were crucial for the country. Even if the task may reveal difficult, political legitimacy is usually accepted and reinforces this of military operation on the ground.

Differences between stabilization phases

Countries and cultures
Countries and cultures are diverse, so are the conflicts. Ethnical, religious, historical and political aspects of countries in crisis are dramatically influencing the sequencing of the conflict. Excepted that both of them do not belong to the western world, there is less common points between Afghan and Ivory Coast cultures than between this last one and French culture. Our units are going from one theater to another in a feeling of continuity reinforced by a high operational tempo. They could then be tempted by an abusive generalization and by

Moreover, these differences of culture have a direct impact on the forms of violence that the forces have to face out. These request diverse responses and, no doubt, resources to face them out or to be protected from them that are also diverse as well. The extreme violence of the Iraqi theater does not seem reproducible in Balkans or Ivory Coasts theaters. This would be due in particular to the deep historical roots of local antagonisms or to the cultural and religious dimension. This enables a sublimation of individual martyrdom which is unknown in other regions. On the one hand, the act of the sniper covering Sarajevo streets with blood seems to remain a local course of action. On the other hand, violently hostile demonstrations, already experienced at a lower scale in Kosovo, developed at an exceptional level against our forces in Abidjan.

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The crisis may also be the outcome of an intervention from abroad, itself locally generating the conflict, even if it can be considered as a piece of a wider whole. Iraq and Afghanistan are currently the best examples. Foreign forces intervene to overthrow the authority in place, replace it by a new form of government and promote the advent of a new society, democratic to be specific. This idea naturally conflicts with multiple oppositions. These are supporting the adversary in order to combat stabilization forces. These forces are considered as an occupation force by an increasing part of the population if the situation does not improve quickly. Success of the operation is, at least, extremely difficult. Key points are, on the one hand the achievement of transition period between intervention and stabilization phases and, on the other hand, the accuracy of initial orientations.

integrated to UNOCI3 Force. In Afghanistan, although under NATO command and UN mandate, ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force) intervenes in coordination with coalition forces under US command from operation Enduring Freedom. Conversely, in Central Africa, French detachment Boali provides support to Central Africa multinational force (FOMUC) established by CEMAC4... These different legal frameworks imply subsequently roles, missions and rules of engagement (ROEs) which are very diverse for the forces. The outcome is an always different assessment of action boundaries for military forces and relationships they should establish with their environment. It should be as accurate as possible.

freedom of action and not to commit himself beyond his domain of responsibility, - a fair definition of the role of forces he commands and subsequently of the nature of required units as well as the most appropriated missions and courses of actions, - a full understanding of the crisis, of the general situation and of the threats in order to estimate protection measures, capabilities to deploy and risks likely to be taken, - a knowledge as comprehensive as possible of the environment and culture specific to the society where the forces are immersed.

Different legal frameworks

From all on-going operations, none refers to the same legal framework. In the Ivory Coast, French forces from operation Licorne were initially committed on a national basis. They are now acting within the framework of a UN resolution without being

The consequences for the forces of these differences from a stabilization theater to another build the original and non-reproducible framework of each conflict. They oblige every military leader to ask himself the eternal question: what is it about?. Without forgetting the common frame of these operations, responses that he brings enable him to favor a success based on: - a good assessment of his battle space and objectives to achieve in order to keep, in this scope, his

1 DREX: Research & lessons learned division. 2 Translators note: New Forces: Opposing Ivorian party. 3 UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Cte dIvoire. 4 CEMAC : Communaut conomique et montaire dAfrique centrale / Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community.

Although incomplete, the weft and colors so sketched out can enable to make a combination. On the one hand, lessons learned perpetuate a base from a crisis to another. On the other hand, the changing characteristic of crisis gives each of them unique features. This harmonious alliance only can successfully conduct the stabilization decisive phases.

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Freedom of speech
The Ivory Coast Republic:
A Typical example of a Stabilization Operation?
he least that can be said is that more than four years after the beginning of operation Licorne, this engagement of the French forces on the Ivorian territory is complex as it has numerous elements whose material or logical organization is difficult to grasp. In fact we are not confronted to a post-crisis stabilization operation that follows a more or less linear track leading to normalization. This crisis has an indisputable emotional load and involves two players (France and the Ivory Coast) in a manner never equaled before in any other peace operation. Thus, from this standpoint it has all the characteristics of an erratic situation. The credit of the Licorne force has been to permanently adapt itself to the various specificities of the Ivorian theater of operations and to the multiple evolutions of this crisis. Although the situation encountered in the Ivory Coast today is especially representative of a stabilization phase, the conditions of a political settlement existing thanks to the action of the impartial forces, the Ivorian crisis still presents some numerous and interesting specificities that emphasize the continuous requirement for an adaptation of men and courses of action.

BY

MAJOR GENERAL ANTOINE LECERF

A force that watches the painful birth of the Ivorian nation

Nothing is simple in the Ivory Coast when we are a French force and when we are supposed to narrow the gap between two parts of the population that had long been considered as making up a whole and that are tearing each other apart. In 2002, we should have kept remembered a statement of the old wise man Flix Houphout-Boigny, who declared at the beginning of independence: I inherited a State from France, it just remains to create a nation. The Houphouetistic illusion of national unity lasted up till his death in 1993. Up till then, the stature of the Commander had allowed believing in a community and consensus settlement of the conflicts between the Ivorian people, in the same way the Baoules refuse

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Additional opinions on the stabilization

conflict situations with others. Starting in 2002 and during the following years, the Ivorian people discovered they were incapable of managing the conflicts between the various communities making up the country because they had always denied the existence of such conflicts between them. Therefore, the Licorne force has been watching the birth of a Nation since the beginning of the operation.

Licorne at the very heart of the Ivorian cauldron

The incapability and the blindness of the Ivorian people to accept the difficult birth of their Nation rapidly led them to find a scapegoat for their difficulties. The former colonial power, France, was obviously naturally called upon to play this role. Considered at length as a part of the landscape, the French forces in the past were the life insurance of the Ivory Coast. When asked what would you need for your army, the old wise man, him again, had indeed replied a brass band.... For the rest, I have the Marine infantry Battalion. In 2002, the French army thus represents the warranty of a perpetual golden age for the Ivory Coast. Not for long now. Its involvement in the crisis, following the request of the Ivorian authorities, shows a new face of it to the Ivorian people more accustomed to meet with the French military during the open days in Port Bouet or in the Abidjan maquis1 than at checkpoints or during armed patrols. The very strong visibility of France, in New-York, in the international and African instances, the ambitions and the very performance of the Ivorian players of the crisis relayed by malevolent and instrumentalized media did the rest. Reluctantly, the French forces were immediately placed in the first lines. Despite the Mission of the ECOWAS in the Ivory Coast (MICECI) and a true cooperation with the ONUCI (UN mission in the Ivory Coast), they are still a crisis player that is very much in the public eye. The love-hate relation between the Ivorian people and the French, with all entailed excesses, has been a strong structural data of this peace operation in the Ivory Coast Republic since the beginning of the crisis.

In 2003 hopes are there as the end of hostilities was declared in May together with the extension of the confidence area up till the border of Liberia, the end of the involvement of this country in the crisis and the return of the ministers from the New Forces movement back to Abidjan..., the beginning of the actions pertaining to disarmament - demobilization - reintegration (DDR) that was planned to start towards the end of July 2003!? And then 2004 occurred, a first year of transition..., then a second one whilst awaiting other things to come. One must bow to facts and admit that this crisis falls under a length desired and imposed by the Ivoirians themselves. Why? Simply because the Licorne force intervenes in an environment where the belligerents assent is uncertain (this is why it is a peace enforcement operation under Chapter 7), where some main Ivorian political players have no interest in seeing the crisis coming to an end rapidly due to the income it gives to the rich and the fact that the population is taken as hostage by Ivorian leaders who are often inconsistent. Under these conditions, how is it possible to believe in a rapid ending of our engagement that has up till now enabled, and this is much to the credit of our country, to avoid a bloodshed? The Ivory Coast reminds us that peace operations, similarly to those in the Balkans, are always lengthy and expensive. Let us stay therefore, maybe, but there is no fatality! The first in, first out principle is a topical axiom, Licorne can and must change, Licorne has no wish to stay if there is not a greater will to reach civilian peace.

Licorne: a chameleon doing the splits

The engagement of the force Licorne falls in a very specific environment that sometimes renders discussions about the strengths and the assets to be committed somewhat sterile. The absence of the resumption of belligerence has a cost (250 million euros per year), finally not that expensive if one considers that warfare also has a cost. One example amongst others to make it clear: Abidjan (4.5 million inhabitants) has a surface equivalent to the area of responsibility of the Kosovo Northern multinational brigade in 2002 but five times fewer men are deployed there whilst the population is ten times higher than the one of the region of Mitrovica. Licorne is a chameleon force that is consistently doing the splits. Indeed, it is faced with paradoxes that dimension its action.

Is Licorne there to stay?

How many times since September 2002 have we announced the coming end of the crisis and the withdrawal of the Licorne (the unicorn).

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The first one of them is the relation it must maintain with a host State that considers itself both as judge and jury in the conflict, an area under the control of the New Forces that consider themselves as being representative of a large part of the population, a population which is present in a confidence area where the Southern and the Northern authority have no expression. In any case, we are not acting in a grey area as it was the case in Somalia. On the other hand, the theater of operations is polymorph. It is divided into three sub-theaters that are very different: the Western Ivory Coast that has always been an instable area for the Ivory Coast Republic, the confidence zone that must remain proof against any penetration of the belligerents and Abidjan which is the resonance chamber of the crisis. There are also three types of terrain, an open one in the North, of a pre-Sahel and pastoral nature, an agricultural one in the South where the forest people live in closed spaces and the third one in Abidjan, which is a combination of modernity and shantytowns with the very constraining situation of the lagoon. Last, there are three threats. The structural threat is made up by the Ivory Coast Defense and Security Forces and the armed forces of the New Forces. This is the most readable and predictable one. The contingency threat is made up of militiamen and patriotic Last there is also the versatility of the players and the fluctuating determination of the international community facilitators. In the Ivory Coast Republic, agreements are only valid for a certain time but just. The volatility of the situation is real. Only the unpredictable is certain. However, it remains that the prevarications of the international community, the refusal of imposing sanctions whose effects are tangible and recognized, have a direct consequence over the behavior of the local players. There is no flat crisis, i.e. a crisis that settles by itself. The force Licorne offers the best answer to this complex crisis. It is flexible and reactive, able to act rapidly over the complete operational spectrum. First, its quality resides above all in its 3,500 men. Lets give them the credit for that as their commitment is complete. Every day they must find a solution to squaring the circle: remain vigilant when the situation is quiet, be ready to switch from a posture to another without notice, be in second line behind the ONUCI still knowing that they have an essential role in the military action of the international community in the Ivory Coast Republic. Every day they must play it low key, whilst keeping their heads up, which is an exercise that needs situation awareness and cold blood. General de Gaulle used to say that one should permanently be in a position enabling to employ all assets under good conditions. Temptation is great to caricature the action of the force Licorne. Why does Licorne exist as nothing happens? Everybody knows that nothing happens because Licorne is there. To close the issue about men. Does stabilization in the Ivory Coast Republic turn soldiers into policemen or into civilians? Let us leave this answer to Lyautey in his still very topical Tongking and Madagascar letters : Never will one be compelled to admit that a course of action that involves on a daily basis, at any possible hour, all the virile faculties, initiative, responsibility, judgment, fight against men and elements, demilitarizes... It de-corporalizes maybe, which is not the same thing. On the other hand, the assets of the force Licorne are well balanced. First, they are adapted to the three sub-theaters and to the first two threats. The principle of self-sufficiency in terms of unique capabilities (VSHORAD, Mortar Platoon, AMX10P), the mobility allowed by wheeled vehicles, the deterring ubiquity of helicopters, the flexibility allowed by the Transalls and the Amphibious Assault Ships2, the essential contribution of the gendarmerie for crowd

PCIAT LICORNE

groups and it is the most dangerous and unpredictable one. Due to its fluidity, it imposes to have capabilities in order to foresee its actions and to counter them thanks to rapid maneuvers favoring mobility. The informal one is the one pertaining to disinformation, agitation and propaganda, men and ideas manipulation, and it is the most difficult one and it leaves the Licorne force very undefended.

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control, in clear an exemplary combined arms and joint cooperation, all this brings, an always adequate and sufficient answer to events, and this an essential advantage. Above all, the range of assets gives the possibility to select the course of action enabling efficiency whilst reducing the employment of force to a minimum. Licorne deters. The force Licorne also has a permanent CP structure enabling, despite the geographical co-localization (Port Bout for example) and the operative and tactical piling up, to exercise command and control without any entryism and any shift astray towards micro-management. Last, the logistic organization of Licorne offers a good example of operational logistics applied to a territory of 324,000 square kilometers. The organization is stabilized and is permanently looking for a better rationalization as shown by the setting up of the Theater joint logistics base at Abidjan. The tactical-logistics mix, performed at such a level, is obviously a force multiplier. Last, in terms of doctrine, Licorne is a laboratory. Laboratory for the command and control concept of Joint Theater HQ. Initially armed with a projected light brigade under emergency, later by the Force HQs, this model of structure has demonstrated that it has to change in accordance with events and evolve together with the situation. It has also shown that it should

necessarily have environmental planning capabilities (effects based operations, disarmament, electoral process, security sector reform, etc.). Above all it is in respect with intelligence and military influence operations (including CIMIC) that experimentations have been the most numerous. The action in quasi Franco-French, a commitment in a French speaking country and a good previous knowledge of the Ivory Coast and of the Ivory Coast people, have favored the perfect assets complementarity for four years. The cultural proximity with a people accustomed to French culture, educated in our schools and still thinking in majority as the French, has enabled some often pertinent influence actions (especially addressed towards youth movements) even if their effects often still remain difficult to quantify.

1 Familiar word for Cafs. 2 TCD - transport de chalands de dbarquement = LPD Landing Transport, Dock. Amphibious Ship for the transport of LCM.

The trend consisting in categorizing operations under generic terms somewhat rather vague naturally leads to consider the crisis in the Ivory Coast Republic under the angle of a military engagement in the framework of a stabilization phase. This would suppose that we are in a post-crisis transition phase and that supposition would probably be a mistake as we are still in the crisis, and at the same time very close to normalization: the crisis indeed is latent, with presently little violence but with very high potentialities of outburst in Abidjan if it is not settled in the more or less short term. Therefore and in a very classic manner, the force Licorne carries out a peace support operation that is as usual lengthy, expensive and difficult.

Pessimistic people will say as Churchill did that we are not at the beginning of the end of crisis in the Ivory Coast Republic but that we are at the beginning of the beginning. But this beginning does not only depend upon the free will of the local players. The international organizations and the nations that support the exit of crisis process, have an assessment duty and the freedom (they bear the financial costs!) to draw the consequences upon their level of commitment.

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Military Co-operation in Stabilization: the Afghan example
A lost sprint

sprint race was lost: by the end of 2001, the US threw the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan. Western forces were especially welcome and considered by the population as liberators. In parallel, all the country fragile structure disappeared: no more administration, no more army, no more police. On December 3, the signature of Bonn Agreements initiates the country reconstruction process. In theory, the operation enters into the stabilization phase. The fight against the Taliban is considered as won. Alongside with the US, France decides to participate in the establishment of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The objective is to form a modern and multi-ethnical army, 70,000 strong, under the authority of Afghanistans official government.

Four years later, the situation is not, at the best, particularly successful. The Afghan national army is not in a position to efficiently face out an armed anti-coalition opposition. 31,000 Afghan soldiers have been recruited and trained but operational capability of units is limited. Strength is no more than 20,000 in organic units. The war burden still lies on American and allied forces. A number of factors may explain this half failure. Afghanistans history, tribal culture, presence of local despots, refusal of a centralized system are often put forward to justify the difficulties of such a venture.
BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL YVAN GOURIOU (27 BCA1)

TH

The lack of results is also linked to the way with which military cooperation was initiated. We can consider that organization and operating criteria with which this mission was elaborated and designed are indeed conventional for military

operations. The concept of support to operations has not been sufficiently taken into account in the early stages. Subsequently, results have not been immediately achieved on the ground. In this sense, we can say that a sprint was lost. The aim of this article is then to review the fields which could have been the subject of specific reflections. These would have aimed at cooperation becoming a direct support to the operations led in the stabilization phase. Initial conditions for setting up the mission were not in line with the expected results and the traditional operating process of a conventional military cooperation. An echelon of multinational coordination at theater level would have been necessary.

ADC DUBOIS/SIRPA Terre

Moreover, the displayed objective was to build up a rapidly operational army, capable to take part in the on-going operations. This should then have led to integrate, at operational level, the training component in a line of operation.

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Finally, human and equipment resources, initially invested for the country reconstruction and the formation of a national army, were insufficient in regard of the ambition of such a venture and of the expectations from the Afghan people.

A command or coordination echelon appears necessary between conduct of operations and training
Western countries, including France, did not know how to adapt their traditional military cooperation mode to a crisis situation. They stayed in a scheme falling in a rationale more diplomatic than military. In France like in the US, military co-operation is not directly subordinated to the Armed Forces Joint Staff (EMA). The DCMD2 is presented as a key component of our diplomatic action3. Subsequently, it is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DCMD objectives are by definition more diplomatic than military. When France announced its participation to the formation of Afghan national army, the mission analysis was led in a traditional way both by DCMD and EMA. We can then understand that the purely operational characteristics of the mission (training Afghan units to fight alongside with coalition forces) have not prevailed against more diplomatic objectives (making visible Frances participation to the country stabilization without taking directly part in operations). Moreover, the juxtaposition of several multinational operations on the theater made very difficult the coordination of efforts. In April 2001, the situation was as follows: Operation ENDURING FREEDOM gathers allied forces conducting the war against the Taliban under command of US headquarters (US CENTCOM) based in Tampa (Florida). In parallel, ISAF under a UNO mandate is securing Kabul and its region. The formation of Afghan army is conducted from the American embassy in Kabul directly subordinated to the Pentagon. The two US organizations are not collaborating with each other. In May and June 2002, to airlift recruits who cannot reach Kabul by road, the US embassy was not provided any assets from operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Finally, France accepted to make two Transalls available to carry out this transportation mission. This lack of coordination could also be noticed on the French side. The first French training detachment (operation EPIDOTE) started its mission separately, apart from French operation PAMIR

detachment attached to ISAF. Under EMA direct command from Paris, there was no coordination link with the US force providing the bulk of effort clearly established. The decision-making level, whatever the nature and importance of the issue encountered, still lies with national HQs. For instance, several weeks were needed to decide that US equipment stocks would also be used for French led battalions. In exchange for that, France accepted to make an advance to the US with the dollars (in cash) needed to pay the first Afghan battalion. The absence of coordination echelon and even of regional command cannot allow for an optimal running of a military cooperation on a just stabilized theater. Defined early, the objectives are subsequently blurred or few appropriate to the situation. Subsequently, the two components (operations and training) are, at the best, ignoring each other; at the worse, they are disturbing each other. In direct support of an operation, a coordination mission should be integrated or, at least, have available liaisons with the HQ in charge of on-going operations. For this purpose, a centralized command echelon capable to establish these junctions should be established on the theater. This integration is all the more difficult to achieve as contributions are multinational. However, it should be looked for from the beginning. This was done later in Afghanistan where the countries participating in the country reconstruction specialized in precise fields: the United Kingdom in fight against drug and the US in training Afghan army. Such specialization enabled to re-define the action boundaries for each participating country.

Integration of objectives for military cooperation in a line of operation at operational level should be looked for
If a decision is made to coordinate the objectives of a military cooperation mission with the on-going operations, we can imagine the creation of a specific line of operation integrating the training component in the overall plan. In the system initially set up, the first battalions, after 10 weeks of basic course, were handed over to Afghan authorities. However, in case of an engagement alongside coalition forces, the allied commanders knew neither the education level delivered nor the real operational capability of the related unit. This was due to all the training phase was completely out of their control.

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CCH Jean-Jacques CHATARD/SIRPA Terre

The definition of a line of operation requires the creation of decision key points. Such decisive points could be quantified objectives (number of companies educated, number of equipped companies...) or certifications (operational readiness tests for trained companies). This would enable monitoring of progress for the operational training. This is to be delivered according to objectives either re-defined or validated by the theater or operation commander. Subsequently, we could have noticed earlier the existing inadequacy between the westernlike training for infantry battalions and the real operational requirements (light teams specialized for counter-guerilla warfare in mountainous areas). As indigenous troops were not complying with such requirements, this role was assumed by coalition allied units. On a theater not yet stabilized, operations commanders should, as the users of trained units, have a right to observe and to make proposals. These would encompass military education programs, assigned objectives as well as the budget of the cooperation mission.

Military cooperation during stabilization phase requires resources appropriate to operational conditions
At the end, an efficient military cooperation during stabilization phase can never be free from a significant investment in men and equipment. We should not indeed believe that 60 instructors would change within 2 months 650 peasants into an operational unit. At that time, the prevailing idea was that the local warlords would naturally integrate their trained men into the new Afghan national army. Each province (21 in total) would provide each month 30 men with a Kalachnikov and four magazines to the training center, i.e. 630 men per battalion. In fact, recruits were peasants, less than 25% of them had an obsolete weapon. The 20,000 Panshiris over-equipped of Fahim Khan, the 10,000 militiamen of Ismael Khan in Herat or the Ouzbek militias of Dostom never joined the new Afghan army: they stayed under control of their local leaders. To train soldiers, adequate infrastructure and reliable equipment are required.

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Infrastructure was not a problem that cannot be solved as a former military academy was rather quickly refurbished to accommodate, feed and educate recruits. Conversely, the training teams were not provided with any performing equipment: the only thing Afghanistan is not short of is weapons. Reinforced with this statement, the international community made a guess that the weapons needed for training would come from spoils of war, i.e. stocks belonging to the Taliban. In fact, these remained the property of local leaders. Military basic training was then conducted with some hundreds of Kalachnikovs delivered by Romania and salvaged collective armament of a poor quality (106 mm recoilless guns and 82 mm Chinese mortars). Training was focused at rifle platoon and company levels, combat service support was then totally absent. After two months, battalions were transferred to the Afghan Army Staff without any weaponry or equipment (communication, vehicles...). These battalions were then not operational at all, because the ANA Staff had no assets available. Moreover, the financial resources to pay the officers and recruits were not sufficient. Payrolls ranged from 30 euros a month for a soldier to 300 euros a month for the battalion commanding officer. Arbitrarily selected, low-paid, ill-equipped, far from their village, recruits deserted in mass. Out of 650 recruits drafted in May 2002 by French DIO n1, 350 completed their training. Desertions went on after the battalion joined its new garrison in Kabul. As British Major General John Colin McColl ISAF Commander said early in 2002 at Kabul: the more difficult is not to train them but to retain them.

To avoid such disappointments, financing must be in place before start of training. The management of these resources should be partly in the hands of the force commander COMANFOR (as far as a coordination entity has been implemented at this level of responsibility). This would gain some responsiveness and allow to target the needs in the best manner. These difficulties are now partly over. Salaries have been upgraded and equipment donations were done by contributing countries. In April 2005, i.e. 3 years after the beginning of ANA training, the US gave the first pieces of equipment, corresponding to a mechanized battalion (63 M113 A2 and 16 M577 command vehicles) for an amount of 10 millions dollars. In July 2005, India gave 50 transport trucks. Each one of these decisions was made as a reaction. A worthy and difficult to catch up time was then lost.

1 BCA - Bataillon de chasseurs alpins : Mountain Infantry Battalion. 2 Directeur de la coopration militaire de dfense : Defense Military Co-operation Directorate. 3 Speech by General Beth, Director, Defense Military Cooperation, December 5th 2006: Military and defense cooperation is today an unavoidable component of the French diplomatic action. Its insertion into the Political and security affairs general directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shows that we are seeking coherence in the conduct of all bilateral and multilateral cooperation activities, and that we intend it to take an active part in the French policy making process.

Today, the training of Afghan national army is conducted more rationally and efficiently. Countries shared education and assistance missions between themselves. The designers of this project are back in a rationale of employment that did not exist at the beginning. However, the current situation allows to believe that military education and training should have been better anticipated in compliance with principles specific to a military cooperation supporting an operation. Then coalition forces would have had available Afghan units being educated, trained, experienced and reliable prior to anti-coalition forces to have enough time to rebuild and to threaten the country reconstruction In stabilization phase, inter-weaving of military, political and diplomatic problems requires a comprehensive situation assessment. We must get out of a system partitioned into fields of responsibilities. No doubt, we must re-think the way of constructing and running command organizations in a complex multinational operation.

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Pacification: the French School

1
trange era: life expectancy is increasing but anyone could notice when looking at his time-table that we spend less and less time to enjoy life. Everywhere, complexity is put forward as a typical feature of current times but the period of time dedicated to reflection is shrinking away. The military cannot avoid this race against the clock: we should cast the net wide but sometimes we forget to plough deeply. To keep the tempo, we come to forget where we come from. We may even not know where we are going. Urged by a feeling of emergency, we are then tempted to inspire from Anglo-Saxon concepts for civilian-military operations, psychological or stabilization actions: when there is a hurry, translation is more efficient than investigation. There is however a French thinking for pacification, elaborated at the end of 19th century under the impulse of Marchal Gallieni, Marchal Lyautey and General Pennequin. They were then colonels or majors when they imagined and implemented this pacification policy on land conquered in Tongking or Madagascar. The era is no longer the one of conquest: the context has changed. Time dramatically speeding up is a real upheaval for reflection as well as decision-making and action. Two pitfalls should be avoided: the first one is to forget a rich doctrine heritage and a very worthy know-how. The second one is to transpose an idealized past onto a burning present. We can outline in this pacification work some major principles that are still relevant. Moreover, some features of personality for these great commanders make us think about original solutions to face nowadays challenges. An expression from colonel Lyautey in his short book About the colonial role of the Army2 summarizes the principles of the French pacification school: military occupation consists less in military operations than in an organization which works. The tone is set but which principles are generating efficiency?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIPPE SAVARY DE BEAUREGARD - COFAT*

ECPAD

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the classical theater rules: in one place, in one time, one sole action commanded by a sole leader, either military or civilian. He refuses distinction between political or civilian action and military action. He In the first place, both Lyautey and Gallieni are criticizes any command structure which forgets that privileging the recourse to indirect administration force action and political action are always as an organization model. This structure offers combined. much flexibility and avoid upheaval of ancestral We should destruct only to build better, spare the habits. These have their understanding and their country and its inhabitants. The first concern of an rationale. Arriving on a officer, as soon as a village territory or a theater submits to our control, is to When seizing a den, we of operations is stepping reconstruct it. Political action is mainly think of the market into an history. Instead of the most important and putting apart the former subsequently pacification we will set up the day after, leaders, it is preferable to should be planned before subsequently, we do not employ them: governing intervention. The conquering seize it in the same way. with the mandarin and not leader looks differently at what against the mandarin... is on the ground when he Then shake no tradition, change no habit, say to selects objectives according to the principle: less ourselves that in any society there is a leading class destruction today for more production tomorrow. born to lead, without it we can do nothing and a Following his senior in Tongking, Lyautey writes: class to be governed, put the leading class in our When seizing a den, we mainly think of the market interests 3. we will set up the day after, subsequently, we do not seize it in the same way5. This requirement is Lyautey understood that adherence of population applied down to the lowest operating levels. Their is the main objective to achieve the desired end actions and behavior should permanently reflect state. We must then be respectful of traditions and this concern for adaptation. habits. He recommends to set aside any tax system, ban any administrative complexity. We should be Soon the disciple surpasses the master, gains selfgenerous, he said. In Madagascar, Gallieni has to confidence. When asked to calm unrest on Algerias face a different situation but he keeps the principle borders, he addresses the governor as follows: of minimal change. Political reasons lead him to Mister Governor, either you give me through the war depose the queen. He achieves that in a very skilled minister all my freedom of action or you send me way. Moreover, he requires his subordinates when back to Paris. I want what I had in Madagascar, what operating their administrative powers to involve as Gallieni had in Tongking. I want unity of my territory... much as possible the native administration. Then I also want under my command not only all military the military districts division of the Imerina in services but also all political agencies, intelligence the center of the island have followed officers... all of it and in case of emergency, I want to the boundaries of general government for these discuss directly with the war minister... if you want territories as well as subdivisions4. the south of Oran to be pacified, it is indispensable6.

The key for durable pacification: an adequate organization

Our two pacification thinkers devote the same aversion to the French administration. It is considered more stiff than rigorous. It is maintaining a taste for procedure in itself and trying to interfere in all details. Lyautey has strong words to denounce such administrative excesses which slow down pacification. To stabilize a country, today like yesterday, we cannot ignore the past and want to impose to a society a model that does not match with its legitimate expectations. In this respect, the will to export the western democratic model seems sometimes inadequate.

An Army cannot on its own stabilize a country but it always brings an essential contribution. There should be unity of the political project that is expressed through unity of command whether it is military or civilian. Nowadays, we could envisage a military commander to have available troops but also civilian actors subordinated to him in the early stages of stabilization. In a further stage, command could be civilian and encompass the required volume of forces. Too frequently, actions are parallel and do not express a coherent line of conduct. The demand for action unity cannot tolerate improvisation. Undertaking pacification requires a method in relation to the stakes. In Tongking, military bases are established rationally, pushed one by one. The aim is a permanent occupation on the ground that has just been conquered.

Unique action is required

In this perspective, Gallieni considers that pacification action should in some way meet

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The officer immediately turns into an administrator, a builder on the land where he had the flag flying; and this until quietness is ensured and pacification steadily established in order to enable the handover of this land to normal administration. Gallieni insists on the necessity of manning at the rear smaller sized fighting bases. These are very fortified but in a sufficient number and enjoying a strong logistic self-sufficiency especially regarding ammunition. He denies the efficiency of large bases. In 1898, in Madagascar, his instructions

Prosperity serving pacification

But most of all, Lyautey has an unshakable belief that he will implement from Tongking to Morocco via Madagascar: there is no use to set up operations aiming only to destruct piracy or insurgency. These insurgency movements have always mobility advantage. Heavy columns are, according to the wording of that time, condemned to failure by exhaustion. It is much better to oppose piracy the best of obstacles: organization. There is no means more efficient than turning land resistant into pirates8. According to him, it is more efficient to cut the grass under piracys feet by cleaning up the environment where it develops. However, the insalubrious environment shows very often civilian symptoms: failing administration, damaged road network, weakening of legitimate authorities, corruption... Re-establishment requires however a military and civilian action. For the first component of this action, he recommends to occupy the territory with or without fight, to isolate it from sanctuary areas and support from outside and eventually to provide weapons to the population. The second component will aim at re-establishing the population, markets and cultures as well as opening the roads. The pirate will not come back to an area that is not a vacant lot any more. We should then carry out the meticulous work of reconstruction of the area taken back from insurgents, re-open roads, markets, recall villages, in a word re-create life. Today, we could see in Anglo-Saxon PRTs9 a very slight implementation of this French concept.

ECPAD

Subsidiarity and pragmatism

explain the chronology for actions: the leading element can progress in the conquest of new territories only if the rear is completely organized. We should be pushed forward by the pacification progress, being supported by rallied populations who facilitate actions to go on. He prefers this method as it takes care of the country and the population. It requires officers to have qualities of initiative, understanding, prudence, calm and perspicacity. This method is progressive and goes against the method of military columns7. Lyautey denounces its main drawback: to dissociate military and political actions. The column should be employed in the sole objective to fight an enemy grouped, steadily installed and threatening from this favorable position. Subsequently, still now, we could not undertake pacification without a reliable and highly trained military force capable of quick changes of posture. Should we conclude that these two great commanders had a will to centralize? Surely not, as both are not envisaging pacification without leaving an initiative as wide as possible for all command echelons. The unrestricted trust that they could inspire characterize their outstanding qualities as military commanders: so many officers, so many processes, so much variety of constructions contributing to the same objective. Gallieni defines the concept of responsibility of all echelons as a key factor to return to order and security. His instructions fix objectives to achieve but leave full initiative for means as well as courses of action. No matter if the military district commander appoints militiamen, provides weapons to the population, mixes inhabitants and European soldiers for night patrols. Lootings and fires should be avoided first as they slow down pacification. We should remind a still valid formula: In pacification, there is no rules only situations10. The situations singularity should then inspire actions to be led in priority with the greatest pragmatism.

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A capacity: flexibility, an attitude: curiosity

These principles, quickly described here, could be complemented through the consideration of some features of these two very different commanders. They met and appreciated in Tonkin although they did not look like each other. Gallieni said about Lyautey : it is strange, he is noble, he was educated by Jesuits and he is clever11. The first is a convinced republican whereas it was said about the second: he is a monarchist who gave an empire to the republic. In both characters, there is an anti-conformist dimension. When Lyautey describes Gallieni, he speaks with veneration of the one he considers as a conqueror, an explorer, a war leader of excellence. He describes him as the antipode of a corporal and even I would say almost of the military in the French official and routine meaning of this word. Form, reports, clichs and even hierarchies are no longer existing for him. The outcome is his unique goal and subsequently the infinite flexibility for means and free use of instruments; for anything, he would subordinate a colonel to a captain more clever. Moreover, he graduated from Staff College, but really does not care about it12. On his part, Lyautey suffocates within the military institution. Back from Tongking, he is just about to have a breakdown: for 8 years in my life, from 39 to 47, I devoted myself to a concept and to colonial development, French policy outside Europe. But I can no longer go on. All my efforts lead me to stay firm up to October 24, 1903, when I am entitled to retirement. When my brain, within some months, will be used to consider minor issues and no longer thinks of great ones, I will achieve a mental condition adequately fit for a cavalry colonel. I will not suffer anymore13. Such anti-conformism does not express an unlimited fantasy but a strong character and convictions rooted in a sound culture. The thoughts of these two commanders set aside any form of wild imaginings but are supported by a thirst for knowledge and real opening of mind. No operational activity could divert them from reading books of all kinds or from writing a correspondence revealing a real culture. Their mutual correspondence is filled with references to their common readings as well as the exchange of impressions on articles from the famous Revue des Deux Mondes14. For Gallieni, politics should go through a thorough understanding of populations. He even believes that an officer who perfectly knows the population is getting close to pacification. He estimates indeed that ethnical knowledge will determine the political organization to implement and the means to pacify.

Place the action within a strategic vision

Finally, these two commanders have a strategic vision for their mission. This provides them with a high sense of responsibilities. They have not acted within a clear political framework giving them precise objectives. They managed to place their mission within a strategic perspective: Keeping Tongking without developing all consequences of its occupation is like, as we are familiar with, wasting men and money. What was the initial idea of those who sent us there? Settle merely a colony for people, a colony for exportation? No. Their main objective was penetrating commercially China from the south... Our reason to be here, in the global policy, is to be the vanguard in the big conflict of dislocation and civilization which is suspended on Far-East15. Gallieni lets this higher point of view appear through a very cunning communication policy during Madagascars pacification. Internally, his directives are numerous and enable everyone to understand the mission spirit. Externally, Gallieni was not duped and he did not miss any opportunity to warn Malagasy ministers and senior civil servants who were hostile to Frances policy: I do not ignore that some Malagasy officials in view did not always keep the behavior that the government is rightly expecting from them. Conversely, I am firmly decided to punish any hostile act against the French authority16. These warnings were not enough and Gallieni executed what he threatened to do. He pronounced death penalties, got rid of the Prime Minister whose functions were suspended as soon as October 11, 1896. In the same time, by posters, he addressed the population to explain his action. At this message, he allocates responsibility for insurgency on those who wanted to harm the country and its prosperity. He refers to trouble perpetrators as belonging to the elite class and warns them of his extreme rigor. He comments upon his initiative to suppress slavery. The short term objective of this decision is to attract without delay an important part of the freed population. He realizes a kind of political pincers while, on the one side pressing strongly the leading class and on the other side making sure of the full support from the more disfavored part. This clever maneuver ensures him to bring in the majority. There cannot be stabilization achievement without an internal and external communication aiming at persuading everyone of the cogency of the action in progress.

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3 H. Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar 1894-1899, 2e dition, Paris, A. Colin, 1921. 4 Gallini reported his mission in Madagascar in a book called: Rapport densemble de la pacification, lorganisation et la colonisation de Madagascar, (Overall report of Madagascars pacification, organization and colonization) published at LAVAUZELLE and available under ref 24511 at CESAT library. 5 H. Lyautey, op. cit. 6 Quoted by Andr Maurois in Lyautey, Plon, 1934. 7 i.e. a task force (from company to brigade level according to the mission). 8 Lyautey, lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar 1894-1899, 2 dition, Paris, A. Colin, 1921. 9 PRT: Province Reconstruction Team; US inspired structures mixing security forces and assistance for reconstruction in Afghan provinces. 10 H. Lyautey, op. cit.,1931. 11 Quoted by Herv de Charrette, Lyautey, J.C. Latts, 1997. 12 H. Lyautey, op. cit.,1931. 13 Quoted by Andr Maurois in Lyautey, Plon, 1934. 14 Journal of the two worlds 15 H. Lyautey, op. cit.,1931 16 Gallieni, op.cit. 17 Principe dintervention qui voudrait quune force arme entrant en premier sur un thtre, le quitte aussi en premier.

ECPAD

* Commandement de la formation de larme de terre : Army Military Education Command. 1 Article already published in Cahiers du CESAT n 3, septembre 2005, p 47. 2 H. Lyautey, Du rle colonial de larme, (About the colonial role of the Army) collection questions du temps prsent, Paris, 1931.

No doubt, no French colonial conquest would have occurred without action men of great stature, outstanding characters. But this adventure would not have worn our three colors as far, if it has not been supported by a community of thinking, the relevance of a reflection on the sense of action and the most adequate manner to conduct it. One of the pillars of this thinking community is based on a paradox: the best pacification method is to get rid of any method or more precisely of any constraint. The contradiction is then only apparent. It means merely to refuse any ideology, to want to know a country, a situation, a culture and to adapt to it, should we want to act efficiently. On the other hand, to be successful this idea should demolish a regulation formalism: we should invent, imagine new solutions. In this sense, French school of pacification is then a powerful invitation to innovation in order to meet the new challenges of stabilization. The bases of such imagination could be the following principles: an army does not stabilize on its own and the state which engages armed forces in stabilization should dedicate political, economic, cultural assets. Action is unique as command. Sequential cut-out as well as parallel chains should be avoided. The one like the other encourage competition more than complementary actions. Finally, stabilization is first a matter of persuasion. Then comes credibility of the armed force, communication, leaders charisma. Whether supporters of first in, first out17 like it or not, it is also a matter of time: win the confidence of a population, an essential lever for stabilization, is taking an irreversible commitment. There again, the French army has an experience that it wishes never to experience the bitterness again.

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Operation Atlante (January-July 1954)

The Last Pacification Operation in Indochina
peration Atlantes objective was to stabilize four Annam provinces located south of the 16th parallel, by eliminating a Vietminh stronghold that was partitioning Indochina into two distinct areas since 1945. Atlante was the first massive engagement of the recently created Vietnamese armed forces; it partially reached its objectives in the midst of the French Indochinas wreckage.

O
BY

COLONEL GRINTCHENKO (IGA/T1)

Pacification, an ancient concept inherited from French history

The pacification concept belongs to our military history. It is very much linked to our colonial empire, it constitutes the hearts and minds conquest phase, intended to definitely uproots the potential future rebellions seeds. Following the immediate conqueror echelon, pacification units work for the longer term by implementing series of quick impact actions intended to restore the trust among a hesitant population that has lost its former masters. After the conquest of the terrain and victory over the enemy, which constitutes the armed forces favorite domain, time comes to conquer the populations hearts, and this is a domain where armed forces operate in complement of the State and societys other forces. Pacification is a course of action almost permanent and comprehensive, which covers both high intensity operations, that establish a favorable framework, and daily proximity activities. Pacification regroups together peace and war operations; it allows having permanently available series of means which permit to switch from one domain to the other in order to regain the initiative. The continuum does not so much fit in line with a legal status logic peace, crisis, war but rather with the complementary nature of the actions that are being conducted in response to a tactical requirement. Through the use of trust and gentleness it is possible to get the information that gives the possibility to apply onto the opponent all the violence necessary to neutralize it. In that case, it is not the friendly party that decides unilaterally to switch from one phase to another one, but rather the opponent and its remaining capability that determines the intensity of the action that will then

be applied against it. The issue is thus to maintain its nuisance capability below an acceptable threshold. Pacification is thus multifaceted and its expression is different according to space and time. It permits to reassure the friendly side and to rally the hesitant ones in order to deprive the enemy from a supporting environment and to oblige it to evolve in a hostile milieu and to stay in the open.

Atlante, a well conceived pacification operation that failed due to a lack of tactical victory
In 1954, pacification operations in Indochina had already been going on since the beginning of the war. The French Expeditionary Corps to the Far East (CEFEO), that was comprised of 200,000 troops was then distributed over the territory which was under control, and that represented only a small part of the French Indochina2. These troops were supporting the 250,000 soldiers of the Vietnamese national armed forces, the military quality of which was only slowly improving. Appointed in 1953 with the mission to create a situation favorable to an honorable exit of crisis, General Navarre had planned that his action would have to last for about two years. In 1954, he decided to adopt a defensive posture north of the 16th parallel and to clean up the south by engaging the recently created Vietnamese army into a vast reconquest and pacification operation. In 1955, taking advantage of the aura he would have acquired during the 1954 combat operations, he envisioned the destruction of the very heart of the Vietminh stronghold that was located north of

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the 16th parallel. But since war has always been the confrontation of two willpowers, it was General Giap who forced him to make his effort, one year earlier than planned, in Dien Bien Phu, ruining thus completely that nice intellectual construction. Operation Atlante was a result of that plan. The general idea was to go from South to North with a piston-like movement, and to delay Vietminh main forces destruction until the latest moment possible, when forces ratio would be the most favorable, at that very moment when enemy forces would have been concentrated in a shrunken area and a pincer attack would have become possible3. Since the operation was supposed to take place in an area with more than 300 km of maritime facade, it was indispensable to conquer an intermediate airnaval base. The planning process was initiated in the second half of 1953 and the operation was supposed to be conducted in three phases. The first phase of the operation, named Arthuse, committed about 25,000 troops from January to March 1954, over a distance of about 100 km. Arethuse permitted to liberate the Phu Yen province with a rather reasonable level of casualties. Following the military forces, the Vietnamese administration was then established. By Mid-March, General de Beaufort, launched the second phase, named Axelle, which started with the Qui-Nhon landing. But on the same day, and 1,000 kilometers more in the north, General Giap attacked Dien Bien Phu. Atlante, that was supposed to be the major event of Navarres plan, became secondary and then totally occulted. Just like all the rest of French Indochina, Atlante remained in the expectative, waiting for the outcome of the war to be determined first militarily at Dien Bien Phu and then diplomatically at Geneva. The situation in the Atlante area was then very complex: in the plains, General de Beaufort kept most of the initiative, but it was difficult for him to keep control of the pacified areas; on the plateaus, he had to engage all his reserve forces to contain the Vietminh offensive, the forces of which had conducted an attack, since the end of January, towards the high plateaus and was expecting to reach the outskirts of Saigon. Troops were very much intermingled. They eroded each other and the weakest were starting to doubt. In spite of these difficulties, the area was more or less held, with ups and downs. Amongst the ups, let us mention a counter attack conducted by a mobile task force that included a majority of Vietnamese units, and which, by the end of May, stopped a Vietminhs attack. Amongst the downs, it has to be acknowledged that this very attack should have been conducted with two mobile task forces, but, at the time, the second was on strike. The third phase named Attila, which should have permitted from May to July 54, to destroy the enemys main battle forces, was abandoned: only the units that were not essential elsewhere in Indochina were maintained on their position. Some of them were entirely imbricated within the enemy disposition. That rather fragile equilibrium lasted as long as there was some sort of consistency between military and diplomatic requirements. During the Geneva talks, the Bidault teams French negotiators stood firm on the war map positions: the more the terrain was captured, the stronger could be the diplomatic position. The diplomatic stand off was the expression of a corresponding military situation. But, by mid-June, following the fall of the French government, the MendsFrances team changed its strategy: it decided to negotiate on the basis of the remaining military forces, since the Dien Bien Phu defeat had only caused a 4% loss among the total number of friendly forces. It was then more than urgent to avoid being inflicted a new disaster. The isolated deployments, the increased involvement of Vietnamese units, the resistance centers in hostile environment: all became suspect. Everybody was becoming an improvised tactician, forcing the military to regroup far from enemys presence.

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A catastrophic period followed then, with divergences between diplomatic and military logics, which led to a direct interference of the politicians into the military action. Although the Geneva miracle stole the tactical victory from the Vietminh, it had however been reached at the cost of a terrible mess in the field. In spite of the advice given by the military leaders at the contact in the field, units received the order to withdraw and abandon the terrain that had been previously conquered. The withdrawal occurred from June to July 54: units had to abandon the areas that they retained in contact with the enemy and to regroup further away. The mobile Task Force 100 that had received the order to withdraw from Ankh was then entirely destroyed during that move. The Phu Yen province that had been militarily conquered was abandoned for irrational reasons; the battle blazed up for two days: 500 vehicles were destroyed and most of the terrain that had been gained during Atlante was then abandoned. In such a short article, it is impossible to give full details about that large operation into which were involved more than 40 000 troops, 7 mobile TFs, 45 battalions and more than 20 ships. That operation demonstrated all the limitations that reality brought then to the principles. It would also show that it was not possible to improvise the creation of armed forces and that the good looking Vietnamese armys elite units, heavily influenced by the Vietminh propaganda, were unable to withhold, whereas the rustic mountaineers who were fighting on their own soil, did it very bravely, saving their French brothers in arms, belonging to the Korea Regiment, from a disaster4. When studying that operation, we could also observe how much pacification relied on the exemplarity of everybodys behavior, and, above all, it could be possible to measure how high has to be the quality of the units that constitute the interface between populations and forces. Without going that far down in the study, it is however possible to feed the current strategic thinking by highlighting several lessons learned on that occasion.

legitimacy enables the forces to avoid acting as an occupation force serving puppet authorities unable to crush down by themselves a heroic resistance. In addition it cannot be a question of restoring the former order without taking into account the improvements proposed to the population by the opponent. During operation Atlante there had been a Vietminh government which implemented its political promises: the agrarian reform took place, a new specific currency was introduced, armed forces were created, and taxes were collected. The troops action was part of an actual project that was nuanced, and not a mere step backward to the previous order. Besides, the political dimension presents, at the general campaign level, several levers onto which a military commander has no power. Atlante was accompanied by a full blown financial campaign, the objective of which was to devaluate the old currency in order to incite the population to come and give back that old currency that was not worth anything anymore. Vis--vis the taxes, new and former masters initiated a race to establishing the lowest possible level of taxation in order to please the population, with the risk of not being able to fund the provinces budget! And last, additional plans were developed to coordinate the market places opening hours, the type of products to be sold and the restoration of the administrative structures. The area was then regarded as pacified when the military authorities were able to transition power to civilian authorities and self defense autonomy was guaranteed by the population itself. It was thus a question of creating military and civilian militias thanks to a delicate process intended to make defectors join up the new power. In order to rally former opponents, it is necessary to convince, filter and certify. All this requires a huge organization with transit camps, interrogations conducted by specialists and infiltration operations to verify on the opponents side the sincerity of those who had joined up. It was thus a question of coordinating the operations conducted by police, and justice representatives as well as secret operations. In order to make defectors join up, it is necessary to create a psychological shock strong enough to overcome the fear of reprisals, and to achieve it, it is important to communicate, to conduct actions onto the symbols that give structure to the society and guarantee the irreversibility of the defection. This doesnt fit very well with tactical or political reconfigurations. When abandoning, even temporarily a gained piece of terrain, pacification forces definitively ruin their action.

Lesson learned: to win in order to pacify, then to pacify in order to win hearts
General concept
The conquest of a population by means of armed forces is part of a comprehensive action conducted by a legitimate state which aims at recovering its authority over its entire territory. The action

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if the zero killed concept may be an attractive one, it is illusory to believe that pacification can be conducted without having previously achieved a military decision. Pacification comes on the top of the victory, it doesnt replace it. Atlante demonstrated as well that armed forces cannot be improvised. When forces have to last, while receiving hits and overcoming doubts, they have to be strong, and even more when they are imbricated with the enemy. The Vietnamese forces that were able to keep up with the situation were, at least three years old. They were regional forces and fighting for their real country, not for a country the regional unity of which was only a planned one. The other forces were just able to make illusion for a short period of time. They became the victims of propaganda and sank rapidly. But the worst was that they had created the mirage of a power onto which had been built too ambitious projects. Armed forces cannot thus operate without falling into a logic of number, because soldiers are needed to make war! And in that domain, technological power has only a limited role. The US forces before their engagement in Viet Nam assessed that the right forces ratio in a counter guerilla type of situation was about 15 or 20 to 1. The extensive study of operation Atlante confirms that assessment. This is a standard that should be revised in the light of recent engagements since the forces ratio logics are so exacting. This is that standard which should be used to determine the expeditionary forces volume, the armed forces dimension as well as the size of the alliances to be established!

ECPAD

Pacification is, above all, a war of interfaces. During Atlante, Algerian and Tunisian units achieved the pacification of an Annamese group of population which didnt always speak French. However, the permanent intelligence collection requires the ability to communicate5. The actions credibility relies on these interfaces quality. For Atlante, Operational Mobile Administrative Groups (GAMO) were put at the local authorities disposal to play that role. Each GAMO had been selected and trained for more than one year. Although the first of them were excellent, the last ones put a lot of pressure on the populations and became according to French authorities reports - worst than the Vietminh. A pacification operation cannot be improvised. It requires behavioral excellence.

Tactical data
Atlantes originality - it was also its weakness - was to have assessed that it would have been possible to conduct pacification operations whereas no tactical decision had been achieved. However, could anyone have dared announcing: join me because I am going to win? Arent we more credible when the enemys combat power has already been destroyed ? Is it possible to create a psychological shock based on an illusion? In about six months, the forces were being split apart between pacification and covering missions: pacification missions that required decentralized courses of action, whereas the other demanded a concentration of the means, strengthening the positions and dividing the space of maneuver. Even

1 Inspection gnrale des armes/Terre : Office of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces /Land component division. 2 Map 1. 3 Map 2.4 In June 1954, the GM 42 Mountaineers rescue and save the GM 100 survivors after 4 days of combat against 12 Vietminh battalions. 5 Communication through talking, presence, humanitarian actions, and confidence in the future.

May these memories pulled out of our history serve to pay all due respect to our elders and be used as a basis for todays reflections!
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Win
T
BY

Hearts and Minds

here is some kind of stylish claim for winning hearts and minds in many speeches and documents, which seems to be agitating both sides of the Atlantic. France would typically line up this clich with the quite messianic role of universal truth-teller she is so fond of playing. On reflection and having crooned that refrain myself, I am wondering if the motto really fits in the context of our military commitments, or worse, if it might not lead to some kind of cutthroat.
COLONEL JEAN-MICHEL DESTRIBATS (CDEF)

In a time when France was extending her possessions overseas, winning hearts made sense indeed. Success of the pacifying forces actually lied with their presence and ardor at instilling love for France amongst the local population. The relationship we are now going to have with the populations in the countries where we deploy is of a different nature. A force does not need being worshiped and seduction is not its business. Suffices that it be accepted and respected; also that its mission be understood. This is quite a challenging posture. On the one hand, we would like to build up some no-dupe type of relationship between equals, without an excessive credulity but altogether with a good understanding and firmness. On the other hand, anytime a Force is to step into the domestic affairs of a country, even when called upon for its defense, the scenario would actually run into dominating/dominated dealings. An expedition force means a foreign body imposed to the population. Thus, such presence may harm its standards, traditions, customs and daily-life organization. A picture published in La lettre du recrutement1, July/August 2006, is a typical example of where seduction efforts can lead to claptrap. It shows a couple of soldiers patrolling in Kabul, male and female. The man

proudly exhibits on his beret the crescent of the 1st rgiment de tirailleurs2. A confusing image in a Muslim country that actually reveals a cultural gap, poor understanding of the situation and some patronizing hype about our proper values. Neither hatred nor love, respect is the only feeling that a soldier needs to display and inspire. Should troops get involved beyond that pragmatic posture, their passion might command on rationale, thus interfering with the crisis-management process running. In fact, too much amenity impinges on the discernment of whoever is to make a decision. Relationships get biased; objectivity yields ground to wishes that quickly vanish; hearts gained once may sway down in a flash and become appealresistant for long. This said, risks are more serious whilst ill interpreting the second proposition of the motto, I mean, winning minds. What is the purpose? Gain, or convert, or inhibit minds? All these questions are coming up to my mind, anytime I can read or hear that slogan again. As well, I cannot help seeing implied connections with this pretense of ours at imposing our allegedly universal system of values. As if

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Anyway, disbanding the whole administration of a country often jeopardizes nation-building attempts for lack of reliable foundations. Additionally, the local population would most of the time reject the idea of foreigners trying to rule domestic affairs. Few Iraqis actually mourned Saddam Husseins death, but many of them still resent the humiliation of having lost control over their proper Nations fate. The other issue to be addressed consists in making our public opinion admit that the western model of society is not instantly applicable to all and any. To that extent, some well-accepted interim objective, though imperfectly meeting our criteria, is preferable to any uncertain transplant. Instead of exporting our proper convictions, we should try to understand local creeds and cleverly approach the appropriate authorities on how the society could evolve without hurting or putting much stress on people. Overriding local convictions is sometimes necessary, but this seldom leads to persistent solutions.

Democracy were some kind of paragon instantly applicable to the whole world, and as if centuries of traditions, creeds and culture should give way to its evident virtue. Rather than gaining minds -questionably to our proper ambitions- I do believe that, instead of patting the ego of some Westerners, our efforts would be better placed at obtaining a large adhesion to political objectives that actually help crisis-affected countries project themselves in a better future/scope, with account to their proper interests and tangible benefits for their citizens. This demands that the Force be perfectly informed on the local society and call the most reliable local leaders upon support to the mission. Nothing but an easy choice, I must admit, between a ruling authority probably not exempt of any blame, and parties possibly emerging from the same mud, whereas no one knows whether the latter will ever meet the popular assent required for their legalization.

1 NfT: French Army Pamphlet concerning the recruitment. 2 NfT: A French Infantry battalion so named from traditional appellation of the native troops from the French North Africa or Black Africa.

Nowadays, rather than hearts and minds, I believe that it is more important to gain the confidence of people by making it clear that the action of the Force is positive by nature, and it is to be welcome only if it brings unquestionable and rapid benefits for each individual and the whole local society. Only this confidence, resulting of a deep respect, will allow us to achieve our mission with all necessary freedom of action, and succeed in protracted achievements.

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Editors note
The following article takes up the essential part of the document written by Major General (Ret) Jean-Franois Durand (especially the 2nd and 3rd parts) dealing with the After Action Review of the 2nd level CPs during the 1996 - 2006 period an extract of which (dealing with intelligence) has already been published in the N18 issue of Hracls.

The New Divisional French CP

A Situation Ten Years Later1
fter numerous evolutions and going through numerous inter-European and world conflicts, the French division of today continues to fall under the tradition of de Guibert2 by constituting the first combination level where all the operational functions necessary for modern engagements can be found. In France, since 1996 within the framework of the re-foundation of the French Army, a revolution has been accomplished. This became necessary due to the evolution of our national strategy and the professionalization of our services. After the staffs of the light divisions of the Lagarde type, which in fact were heavy brigades, came the Force HQs (EMF) with the requirement of finding again an operational level of excellence for this type of command, also called level 2, which seems to be in favor for the engagement of the forces in the actions assigned today to the military. The aim of the present article is not to recall the history and why this evolution took place. Here the matter is just to present the observations made pertaining to two aspects of the present level 2 command, which is the type of the NATO division: the operation of a divisional CP and the exercise of command at this level; our reflections are based upon roughly ten years of experience of exercises and research observed by after action analysis teams from the CDES3, which is now the CDEF. And thus we would contribute to the thinking process that will enable the publication in the near future of a doctrine document dealing with command and control.

BY

MAJOR GENERAL (RET) JEAN-FRANOIS DURAND

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A few considerations about the level 2 CPs
Imperatives to be fulfilled
The setting up of a large unit CP, whatever its level may be4, must take into account a certain number of imperatives: - what are the operational functions to be performed? - what is its rank in the hierarchy (national and multinational) of this command? - what is the allocated resource (officers, noncommissioned officers, qualifications...)? - what command and control information system will it be given (with their limits and foreseeable evolutions)? - which infrastructure should be used (shelters5, tents, buildings...)? - which mobility should be achieved (stability, homothetic step up or sliding)? - what are the necessary support elements (HQ unit, security)?

The commanders personality

In addition to this the involved commanders personality must be taken into account: even if a certain coherence must be looked for in terms of organization, we assume that a CP must allow a staff to work for the benefit of a commander endowed with an operational responsibility. On this point, one must acknowledge that the rotation system, involving a switch of the commander and of the playing staff during each Guibert exercise, has not eased things. This could be notably observed in the evolution of the divisional CP architecture that were originally conceived along a scattered option allowed by the new shelters and that was of interest in a high intensity context; then, from 2004 onwards, it became more and more consolidated by exploiting what had been observed in low intensity overseas operations amongst our allies.

The level 2 CP
The Force HQ concept, enriched by the work carried out by each staff and coordinated by the Land Force Command monitoring committee, has however allowed to find a solution for

ADC DUBOIS/SIRPA Terre

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the essential part of these issues. A level 2 CP is an organization encompassing an operations center (OPS Center) of roughly 280 persons, including more than 180 officers (most of them senior ones) that are using a network of the same number of C3I screens spread in roughly fifty shelters organized in functional benches for the various divisions and complemented by adapted inflatable tents, allowing the permanent command and control of the force. To complete the CP, must be added its headquarters formation (reinforced HQ Bn), a small signals battalion and some protection elements in coherence with the threats faced in the deployment area; this constitutes a mobile village gathering 700 to 900 persons. Therefore, in terms of personnel, the OPS center is manned with officers and non-commissioned officers who are coming from the leader Force HQ reinforced by those coming from another Force HQ, and operational reinforcements that have been if possible earmarked and trained to work at this level. One must be careful to organize the staffing and the work of shifts that can be equal (high intensity combat - 24/24) or unequal (crisis engagement). It is deployed on a location close to an infrastructure allowing accommodation with several functional areas: OPS center on shelters per say, CP of the possible combat support unit operating centers, field of antennas, life support area. It is supported by a Headquarters battalion of roughly 200 persons, responsible for usual general support and immediate security and it must be able to call upon a protection unit if its setting up area is not entirely secure. In practical terms, in order to set up such a CP, it is necessary to regroup the assets coming from two Force HQs (staff and HQ Bn) and to have them significantly reinforced, especially for the setting up of the shelters and the fulfillment of security measures (an issue overlooked during exercises).

successful technical experience in 1999, studies have dealt with the step up capabilities between two identical CPs (Guibert 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004), then, with the arrival of the extended LAN technology, they have dealt with a step up by sliding and even with the aggregate construction of a modular CP (Guibert 2004 et 2005). Technically and tactically these experiences were globally successful and one can now say that the specialists in this domain really master this domain at divisional level. What will be said as far as doctrine is concerned and about the frequency and the necessity pertaining to the movements of this type of CPs should not be faced with technical obstacles.

The additions to the main CP

Another point pertains to the adjunct CPs that are necessary to this type of large unit, which is sometimes responsible for a very wide area of action with or without a responsibility over the rear area. One must acknowledge that this aspect has not been really studied extensively as the parts of the Land Forces Command generic theme that have been selected to reach the desired operational objectives during the various Guibert exercises have not allowed real studies about these issues. However, technically speaking, the tactical CPs (2004) or dedicated CP (2006) have been set up and we are confident about their operational capabilities. In fact, it is possible today to give the essential of the operational information in real time to the commander or to his deputy up to thirty kilometers away from the main CP, and tomorrow much farther. Last, one must be aware that a CP is not only a group of staff officers that are reasoning and working with more or less sophisticated CIS assets. It is also a living structure that can be moved as needed in a somewhat hostile environment. This is why a life support protection - general support structure is necessary with some specialized personnel in headquarters support and some others ready to deal with the basic security of the various sensitive points that build up this CP. In conclusion, the architecture of a consolidated CP as it has appeared since exercise Guibert 2004 seems to be the most pertinent one to allow the best possible synergy in terms of staff work in the various possible contexts for the engagement of a division today.

The mobility of the level 2 CP

A significant work has been achieved in terms of CP step up, although no decision has been taken to know whether this proved really pertinent in operational terms. Indeed it was essential for the teams operating the CIS assets to be able to transfer all the operational data contained in the computer network of the active CP without encountering any loss in data and any disruption in command and control. After a first

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Freedom of speech

ADC DUVBOIS/SIRPA Terre

A level 2 CP must be able to benefit from a certain mobility, notably for security reasons if it is set up in a high intensity context, and the necessary delays for a step up must not be prohibitive or incoherent with the working horizon of a CP of that level. Conversely, due to the necessary limitation in terms of costly assets (shelters, CIS, screens, etc.) it seems advisable to favor the CPs step up by sliding under extended LAN.

The experience technically carried out by the Force HQ N4 during exercise Joint Sword 2006 seems to be the example to follow, although it is true that the exercise conditions did not allow its validation.

The exercise of level 2 command and control

The commander

At the level of the tactical or dedicated CP, even though the requirement is not absolutely demanding for the sake of the sole conduct of operations, since modern CIS allow to command from practically any location, it can be necessary for political reasons: the general who commands the division or the operational area must be able to show his presence in contact of an engaged troop in a risky or difficult action or in front of local populations or authorities. One must then be able to apportion tasks between the main CP and this light CP.

In all cases, the division commander who plays the exercise is the Force HQ commander appointed by the Land Forces Command to become the nucleus of the staff that has to be trained. During the exercise, he will be subordinated to the Land Forces Command (in fact the 1st deputy general) responsible for the operational evaluation on behalf of the French Army Chief of Staff or of a NATO army corps commander (Cf. Joint Sword 2006).

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His overall responsibility is the command and control of the allocated troops, generally multinational, in accordance with several subordinations: OPCOM, OPCON TACOM, TACON. For the Anglo-Saxons we are speaking of Command and Control which is difficult to translate in French but that really encompasses maneuver planning and conduct with its combat and combat service supports, as well as the administration of an area of action that can have several aspects by itself. He normally has one year to get prepared to this milestone, essentially in liaison with the appointed Force HQ in reinforcement but the pace of real operations notoriously jeopardizes this process and compels to a full interoperability as important positions such as the ACOS can sometimes be assigned to officers belonging to this other Force HQ (cf. Joint Sword 2006).

The Chief of Staff (COS) was responsible for the technical build up in the garrison of the playing staff, especially for the preparatory exercise that has now become unavoidable and he has all the leverages upon the Manning6 as well as upon the exercise. He has significant signature delegations for the orders as well as for the reports. After having been sometimes limited into a simple regulator of the staff work, he seems to have found his place during exercise Joint Sword 2006 as the commanding officer of the Main CP in charge of Control whilst the CG keeps his hands over Command. It may be added that the COS can sometimes be the spokesman of the large unit commander as far as communication with the media is concerned.

The command group

We are here speaking of the team who is by the side of the commander (CG standing for commanding general) and who multiplies his action through his staff. It is generally composed of the deputy commanding general (DCG), the chief of staff COS, who himself also has a deputy called now the (DOS - Director of staff ) and three ACOS (Assistant chief of staff ) who are in charge of supervising and coordinating the tactical and logistical aspects of the staff work. These officers, who are one of a kind each, do not have any alter ego and are also the warrants of the uniqueness and permanence of the operational action. The general efficiency of the staff was a result of the cohesion of this group and this was demonstrated by the experience of exercises.
The DCG is often employed to ensure the continuity of command and control during the night. But this role is somehow simplistic as he must above all be the first advisor to the CG, and be ready to take over in case of unavailability (death or wound) but also in case of a punctual action of an operational nature (decentralized action, river crossing ...) or of a politico-military nature (liaison or negotiation) with a civilian authority or the population. It must be recognized that during exercises these things are not easy to play, especially because most of the Force HQ DCGs do not have a real experience at this level as they were undergoing training during the considered time.

The deputy Chief of staff, formerly the D/COS who has now become the DOS - Director of staff , is responsible for assisting the COS in the organization and regulation of the CP work in order to reach the best technical efficiency and the issuance of order and reports in due time. This work, which is somewhat unrewarding, is essential at this level due to the multiplicity of the implemented operational functions and to their reciprocal interactions. He notably supervises the technical cell in charge of the formatting, the forwarding, the reception and the filing of messages. He is also in charge of the practical organization of the work (daily cycle, compendium...) as well as of internal information, thanks to loud speakers or a telephone network for the staff. It should be noted that this function is somewhat in sync. with what the Force HQs have usually been doing in their garrison organization since the adjustments carried out in 2003.

The three assistants COS are the executive assistants of the Chief of Staff. Each of them heads, and in synergy, one part of the staff divisions: the ACOS OPS heads the G5, TEC, G35, G3, TOC, G2 Fires/3D and 2D/AGESTER7, the ACOS C3I heads the G6 and the ACOS LOG heads the G4, G1, G7 and the G Med. The G9 (CIMIC) is given to one or the other depending on the prevailing nature of the operation. On the other hand, the functions pertaining to operational communication and psychological operations are directly monitored by the commanding general (there is a daily dedicated meeting).

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The advisors
Around the commander there is a certain number of advisors whose role is very useful but they are very envied as they are in direct contact with the general and deal with their matters without going through the staff filter. From this standpoint, on top of the political advisors (POLAD), the legal one (LEGAD) and maybe a communication one (PIO) who are unavoidable in present operations, a certain number of division heads would like to fulfill theses functions: psychological operations, CIMIC, Fire support ... Today, despite achieved progress in the technical field and the real taking into account of the environmental operational functions in the same way as the always political and legal aspects of a military engagement are taken, it becomes necessary to clarify this concept. Indeed, any staff officer can be considered as an expert and an advisor. Identically, the commanding general may collect when he so wishes the advice he wants in the fields he selects. If an advisory board is needed at the top of a staff of this level, should it not be limited to the command group only complemented by the political and legal advisors and calling upon the necessary experts in the given field when needed? out upstream of the ongoing action and, at the TOC level, one has just to be aware of the situation in all the operational functions and manage the operation by using appropriate indicators, by updating the indispensable daily book and by disseminating FRAGOs of a relative limited impact. This body must also be able to give the staff an up-date briefing should the situation require it or upon request of the commanding general. As we have noticed it in several exercises, if the TOC is badly conceived or ill commanded, this can have serious consequences upon the efficiency of the staff work. From the start of the first exercises Guibert, the TOC, which was then called the CTCO, raised a problem: must it be a decision center, a meeting room? Do we need a synthesis map on the wall or on a table, no map but a wall of pictures...? Who is responsible for the concatenation necessary for the coherence of orders towards subordinates? Should it be placed under the orders of the D/COS or of the ACOS/OPS? What is the place of its head in the hierarchy of the staff? Etc. The issue is not simple and one can say that all the solutions have been tried and tested during various exercises. Gradually, the TOC came out from the shelters that were too small to become a reduced staff settled in a tent at the CP center. The solution played during Joint Sword 2006 has demonstrated its pertinence and its flexibility in all types of operations but it is rather heavy (roughly fifteen officers with CIS (SICF) screens linked to the private space of their division of attachment). One might be afraid of seeing this structure bypass the rest of the staff; although it did not happen, one should be aware that this risk may exist.

The TOC8, the Heart of the CP

Starting from the situation - synthesis cell that has been existing in any staff for a long time and taking into account the achievements of data processing in network allowed by the progressive fielding of the SICF (French CIS) as well as the experiences encountered by our allies (the JOCs of Anglo-Saxon staffs), it appeared very quickly that a control center was necessary.

The TEC9, the Mind of the CP

The unfolding of the tactical reasoning (implementation of the elaboration method of the operational decision) is performed at staff level by a succession of multi-disciplinary teams each one moving on after the previous one to achieve their own tasks of preparation being part of the operational documents, according to the unifying thread of the OPS connections: G5-Planning, G35-Future operations, TOC- Current operations. Although level 2 does not really conduct land operations, it is neither responsible for

As far as the divisional level is concerned, one must recall that, with the exception of very specific cases, it does not conduct land operations (this is the responsibility of the brigades or of battalion taskforces) but it enables the success of the action by coordinating the direct support functions (Combat supports, AGESTER,...) the environment ones (COMOPS, PSYOPS, CIMIC,...) and the combat service support ones (all aspects of logistics). Therefore, the essential part of the staff work is carried

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targeting nor for the effects maneuver, which are the prerogatives of the commander of the component (LCC) and even more of the operative level (CJTF). However, the division remains an involved party of this aspect, especially because it must always control a territorial area of responsibility. This is why, taking into account the emergence of this issue with the build up of the French Rapid Reaction Corps and the interest of this type of approach, especially for operations in connection with crises, the Force HQ N4 set up a TEC during exercise Joint Sword 2006, as an informal working group with daily meetings; it was headed by the officer responsible for targeting, and linked with the G5 ; it has been considered as essential for the thinking process about the actions that have consequences on the environment of the operation. This first experience should be further confirmed and improvements are possible; but it seems difficult today for a level 2 CP to do without a body of this nature, notably because of the undergoing evolution taking place at upper level (JEC of the French Rapid Reaction Corps).

With his command group and a few competent and close advisors, the CG employs his staff for the preparation of the tactical actions and for the coordination of combat and combat service supports he employs to mark his effort. Within the framework of present operations, in order to be able both to anticipate and to monitor the operational action, two main tools, necessarily highly capable, seem to be necessary: a TOC and a TEC.

The general commanding the division or the operational sector with a level 2 CP is responsible for the Command and Control for the troops that have been assigned to him but, allowing for exceptions, he does not personally conduct the land operations.

1 1997: setting up of 2 pre-Force HQs. 1999: the first two Force HQs are declared operational. 2 The name division appeared in the military vocabulary in the middle of the 18th century, especially in the famous Essai gnral de tactique (General essay on tactics) written by Count de Guibert that will be the reference document for the organization of the victorious armies during the Napoleon period, followed by all the European and American armies. 3 French Armys Doctrine and higher military education command (which preceded the Force Employment Doctrine Command -CDEF). 4 Level 1 = Army Corps, 2 = DIV, 3 = Combined arms brigade for the large units. For information, levels 4 and 5 are respectively the ones pertaining to the Battalion Taskforce and the companyteams. 5 Or MTS (mobile tactical shelter). 6 Staffing of the CP. 7 AGESTER = organisation of the land space. 8 Tactical operational center. 9 Tactical effect center.

The new divisional CPs of the Army, that are called level 2 CPs and are built up from the Force HQs, are today ready to fulfill their operational responsibility contract in the joint and multinational framework that is theirs from now on; and these CPs enable the generals commanding the divisions or the forces of that level to assume their command in all the types of actions that are presently assigned to the military.

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in pictures

Conception and Conduct of a Stabilization Phase at Interdepartmental Level- p. 20 ADJ Jean-Raphal DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

STRATEGIC FUNCTION - DECISIVE PHASE

Operational Communication in Stabilization Operations Mastering the Time Factor: a Challenge - p. 34 SIRPA Terre

No Stabilization Phase is like Another... but All Have the Same Basic Features - p. 85 ADJ Jean-Raphal DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

STABILIZATION

Win Hearts and Minds - p 106

DOCTRINE

Just out The Utility of Force by (British) General Sir Rupert Smith with a preface by (French) General Bruno Cuche, Army Chief of Staff Collection : "Stratgie et Doctrine (Strategy and doctrine)" - Economica Outlining a brilliant picture of the military experience from the Napoleonic era until today's conflicts, this fundamental work brings out the contemporary evolutions in the use of force. It shows why force is working well only if it is useful. The utility of force provides a very fresh analysis, a new and bold view of the role of the armed forces for crisis management. Built upon history and upon an especially abundant personnel experience, this basic work deeply modifies the vision we may have about conflicts, war and the use of military force nowadays. General Sir Rupert Smith has been in command of a British division during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, of the United Nations Forces in Bosnia in 1995 and of the Northern Ireland theater from 1996 to 1999. His last assignment was as the Deputy Commander of NATO forces in Europe (DSACEUR), before retirement in 2002. He is one of the most experienced general officer and military thinker of our days.

C.D.E.F Forces Employment Doctrine Center