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SORIANO VS LA GUARDIA G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009 Facts Petitioner (Soriano), as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC (Iglesia ni Cristo). These ensued 8 private complainants who are members of INC to file an affidavit-complaint against the petitioner before the MTRCB. After the preliminary conference the MTRCB ordered preventive suspension of his program for 20 days in accordance with Section 3(d) of PD 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. Later in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB on the ground that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. Issue Whether or not the MTRCB is entitled to issue preventive suspension Rulings YES. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of t he MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. The power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory. Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. The mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986 would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. It is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates.

Rodolfo Navarro v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita G.R. N.O. 180050

Facts

The Dinagat Islands having an average annual income of 82,696,433.23 and a population of 120, 813 and a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers was made into a province pursuant to the Presidents approval of R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Island s. It was ratified by a plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC which yielded affirmative votes both from the people of the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat Islands. Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
Issue Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional. Rulings

The court ruled on February 10, 2010 decision on the negative. It contends that RA 9355 is unconstitutional as the exemption on the land requirement of proposed provinces found in Article 9 par. 2 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code was null and void as the said exemption was not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing said law, the basic law prevails because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. However, in the decision dated April 12, 2011 the SC reversed its decision. It ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The court ruled interpreted that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82, 696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20, 000,000.00 for the creation of a province.

City Engineer of Baguio Vs. Baniqued G.R. No. 150270 . November 26, 2008 Facts A complaint was filed with the office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house of Baniqued built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City alleging that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion. Petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Issue Whether or not the action for prohibition was proper and whether the act of the mayor of issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function which can be prevented by a prohibition Rulings Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of pro hibition. Prohibition or a writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. As its name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The writ is also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasijudicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers.

DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164242, November 26, 2008 Facts Advertising Board of the Philippines is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation composed of several national organizations in the advertising industry. Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation through its advertising agency applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)." AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask them for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They argued that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions. Issue Whether or not the petition for a writ of prohibition is proper Rulings The court ruled that the petition is bereft of merit. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several membersorganizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.

GOVERNOR ORLANDO A. FUA, JR. vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 175803. December 4, 2009

Facts The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted a resolution granting an extra Christmas bonus at P20, 000.00 each to all its officials and employees. Another resolution was executed for the president to authorize the SP of Siquijor to grant such bonus. Petitioner on the other hand wrote a letter to the president reiterating said request and received an affirmative reply from the president. Relying on the note, the provincial government released the extra bonus to its officials and employees. A post audit was made and the legality of the said payments was questioned. The audit was then reviewed by Atty. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, COA Region VII. He disallowed the payments and issued Notice of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner then appealed to the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO-Local) however, the COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Directors Notice of Disallowance. After wh ich, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Issue Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies Rulings The court ruled in the affirmative. By immediately filing the present petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. Rule VI, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states that: The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper. The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit, would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on petitioners letter request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required approval. It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce evidence to prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. Thus, since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission Proper under the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a writ of certiorari, because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him. Petitioner having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by the COA-LAO-Local has become final and executory. Consequently, the Decision of the COA-LAO-Local can no longer be altered or modified.

Universal Robina Corp. (Corn Division) vs. Laguna Lake Developement Authority G.R. No. 191427. May 30, 2011

Facts Respondent, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), through its Pollution Control Division Monitoring and Enforcement Section, conducted a laboratory analysis on March 14, 2000, of petitioners (URC) corn oil refinery plants wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. Another laboratory analysis was conducted on August 31, 2000, which showed a continued failure to conform to its effluent standard in terms of Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Color and Oil/Grease. On May 9, 2007 on petitioners request, a re-sampling of wastewater was conducted which showed that petitioners plant finally complied with government standards. After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay (OP) (PHP 1,247,000.00) dated January 21, 2008 for discharging pollutive waterwaste. Petitioner moved to reconsider, however LLDA denied Petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari as premature, since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first be exhausted before invoking judicial intervention. Issue Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as ground, which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies

Rulings The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not deprived of due process. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard or an oppurtunity to explain ones side or oppurtunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Adminitrative due process cannot fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him be decided.

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011 Facts Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC), a registered cooperative established by Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad residents for the purpose of operating a domestic drinking water service, applied with the National Water Resources Board (the Board) for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to maintain and operate a waterworks system within its barangay. But respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a government-owned corporation that supplied water within La Trinidad for domestic, industrial, and commercial purposes, opposed the application. LTWD claimed that its franchise was exclusive in that its charter provides that no separate franchise can be granted within its area of operation without its prior written consent. Still, the Board granted TMPCs application. Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. LTWD contested the grant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad which, after hearing, rendered judgment setting aside the Boards decision and canceling the CPC it issued to TMPC. The RTC denied TMPCs motion for reconsideration, prompting the latter to come to this Court on petition for review. Issue Whether or not Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid to be the foundation of the rulings of RTC Rulings The court ruled on the negative. Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Plain words do not require explanation. The constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. There is no exception. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Since the Court, exercising its Constitutional power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198 void and unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginning. Thus, the decision of the RTC was set aside and the decision of the NWRB was reinstated.

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) Facts Petitioner Sterling Selections Corporation is assailing the decision of Pasig City RTC and resolution of Court of Appeals that it was not considered as a cottage industry. Sterling Selections Corporation is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry with the products manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders. It was complained sometime on January of 1998 because of the loud noise and offensive toxic fumes coming from the manufacturing plant. A formal complaint was also filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) NCR office, with the latter endorsing the complaint to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) which had territorial and functional jurisdiction over the matter. A notice of violation and a cease and desist order (CDO) was served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by RA 4850. Petitioner contended that, it is a cottage industry and its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. Under RA 6977, the law prevailing at the time of its registration with the SEC in December 1996, cottage industry was defined as one with assets worth Php 50,001.00 to Php 500,000.00, and, based on its Articles of Incorporation and CPAs Balance Sheet; it claims that its total assets, when it was incorporated, amounted only to Php312, 500.00. Issue Whether or not Sterling Selections Corporation be classified as a cottage industry and whether it is exempted from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA Rulings The amount of Php 312,500.00 represents the total amount of the capital stock already subscribed and paid up by the companys stockholders. As such, the amount does not represent the totality of its assets, even at the time of its registration. It is contrary to Section 3 of RA 6977, the prevailing rule during its incorporation, which provides that the term total assets was understood to mean inclusive of those arising from loans but exclusive of the land on which the particular business entitys office, plant and equipment are situated. Petitioner's own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4, 628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1, 746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries. The conclusion is that petitioner is not a cottage industry and, therefore, is not exempted from the requirement of securing an LLDA clearance. It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant. Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts. The Court recognizes the right of petitioner to engage in business and to profit from its industry. However, the exercise of the right must conform to the laws and regulations laid down by the competent authorities.

Gannapao vs. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011

Facts Petitioner SPO1 Gannapao was charged before the PNP Inspectorate Division at Camp Crame, for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming. The complaint passed a pre-charge investigation with The Inspector General, Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP, and petitioner filed his Answer denying that allegations of the complainant. Several stages of investigation and hearing was made starting from the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP up to the Court of Appeals which all rendered decision against the petitioner. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP since no notice and summons were issued for him to answer the charges and no hearing was conducted. He claims that his dismissal was not proper and legal as there was no introduction and presentation of evidence against him and he was not given the opportunity to defend his side. Also, petitioner assails the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him by the CSC, alleging that it was improperly imposed considering the mitigating circumstance of his length of service (14 years at the time the decision of the PNP Director General was rendered. Issue Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process Rulings The Court held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. . As records bear out, petitioner was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. In the Office of the Legal he was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. Petitioner had ample opportunity to present his side during the hearing and he was even advised by the hearing officer that he may file a supplemental answer or a counter affidavit. Instead, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, reiterating the ground of res judicata, based on his own assertion that the case against him had already been heard, tried and finally terminated. Petitioner, however, did not present proof of such dismissal. Consequently, when the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP found the complaint to be a proper subject of a summary hearing, and a further investigation was conducted pursuant to the rules, the recommendation to dismiss was deemed not adopted or carried out. Having been given a reasonable opportunity to answer the complaint against him, petitioner cannot now claim that he was denied due process.

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THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GSIS vs. VELASCO et. al., G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011 Facts On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia. Respondent Mario I. Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang for the implementation of his step increment but was denied. On 14 November 2003, respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. The trial court granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Issues Whether a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending administrative cases from the grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits, is unconstitutional Rulings Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. Therefore, on the matter of step increment, if an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like an employee on approved vacation leave without pay, then it is only fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee who was preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive suspension is not a penalty. If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee is not rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government service. Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension. The trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days from 23May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step increment.