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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Political Law defi ed That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the government organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law 1, 11th ed., 1 !"# Scope of Political Law.$$ The entire field of political law may be subdivided into (a# the law of public administration, (b# constitutional law, (c# administrative law, and (d# the law of public corporations. These four subdivisions may be briefly described for the time being, as follows% The first deals with the organization and management of the different branches of the government& the second, with the guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations on governmental action& the third, with the e'ercise of e'ecutive power in the ma(ing of rules and the decision of )uestions affecting private rights& and the last, with governmental agencies for local government or for other special purposes. (Sinco 1# !. Co "tit#tio al Law Defi ed * constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. +t, therefore, embodies legal rules as well as political principles. *nd so when we spea( of constitutional law in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the constitution. ''' ''' +n the sense in w,c the concept is understood in *merican and Philippine -urisprudence, constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application made by courts of the provisions of the constitution in specific cases. ''' .onstitutional law forms a distinct branch of /urisprudence dealing w, the legal principles affecting the nature, adoption, amendment, and operation of the constitution. (Sinco !0.# Types of .onstitutional Law.$$ +n general, there are three (1# different types of constitutional law, namely, (1# the 2nglish type, characterized by the absence of a written constitution (Sinco !0# *n unwritten constitution, and the

power of /udicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts cannot invalidate the acts of the parliament as being unconstitutional because of 3parliamentary supremacy.3 (4irasol notes.# ("# the 2uropean continental type, where there is a written constitution w,c gives the courts no power to declare ineffective statutes contrary to it (Sinco !0.# * written constitution but no power of /udicial review by the courts. The so$called .on$ stitutional .ourts of 5rance do not e'ercise real /udicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional )uestions upon the re)uest of the government, not of parties in actual litigation. (4irasol notes.# (1# the *merican type where the legal provisions of the written constitution are given effect through the power of the courts to declare ineffective or void ordinary statutes repugnant to it. (Sinco !0.# * written constitution and the e'ercise of /udicial review by the courts, which is the power of the courts to determine the constitutional validity of the acts of legislature and other branches of government. (4irasol notes.# C. Co "tit#tio Defi ed

+t is 3a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing.3 (6amilton.# Such a view found acceptance in the wor( of Tanada and 5ernando% 3+t may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People.3 5rom 4alcolm and Laurel% 3+t is the written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful e'ercise for the benefit of the body politic.3 *ccording to Schwartz, 3a constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in *merican theory. 7The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fi' the limits of governmental activity.73 (5ernando, The .onstitution of the Philippines, "8$"1, "nd ed., 1 00 Maca$iola % A"# cio , 119 S.:* 00 (1 ;"# 5% The complainant alleged that respondent /udge of the .5+ violated paragraphs 1 and <, *rt. 19 of the .ode of .ommerce (w,c prohibited /udges, among others, from engaging in commerce, either in person or in pro'y or in the financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies w,in the limits of the

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districts# when he associated himself w, the Traders 4ftg. = 5ishing +ndustries, +nc. as a stoc(holder and pres., said corp. having been organized to engage in business. 62L>% *lthough this provision is incorporated in the .ode of .ommerce w,c is part of the commercial laws of the Phils, it parta(es of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, li(e /ustices and /udges. Political law has been defined as that branch of public law w,c deals w, the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state w, the inhabitants of its territory. Specifically, *rt. 19 of the .ode of .ommerce parta(es more of the nature of an administrative law bec. it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees w, respect to engaging in business& hence, political in essence. ''' ?pon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to ?S, and later on from ?S to the :epublic of the Phils., *rt. 19 of the said .ode must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not w, those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are e'pressly re$enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no enabling or affirmative act. .onse)uently, *rt. 19 of the .ode of .ommerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to respondent -udge. Types of .onstitutions .onstitutions are classified as follows% (1# written and unwritten, and ("# rigid and fle'ible. @ritten and ?nwritten (.lassification as to when it is adopted.# (a# A w$itte co "tit#tio $ provisions have been reduced to writing and embodied in one or more instruments at a particular time. 2.g. The ?S .onstitution $ also called co %e tio al o$ e acted, as they are given definite form by a steadily constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time. $ also de&oc$atic o$ &o a$c'ical. De&oc$atic co "tit#tio " $ essentially spring from the authority of the people. Mo a$c'ical co "tit#tio " $ those granted by a monarch as an act of grace to his sub/ects& also called oct$o(ed co "tit#tio ". They belong to the past age. (b# *n # w$itte co "tit#tio A has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development. 2.g. The 2nglish .onstitution is the $ (nown also as c#&#lati%e o$ e%ol%ed, as they are not formulated at any definite time but are rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process. 5le'ible and :igid .onstitutions. (.lassification according to amendment process.# The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and inaccurate bec. no written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain substantially unchanged in its original condition other than by formal amendments. '''. To classify constitutions into rigid and fle'ible is to use a basis that has to do more w, their nature rather than their mere form. (a# Ri)id.$$ * constitution is classified as rigid when it may not be amended e'cept through a special process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. +t is supposed that by such a special procedure, the constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby ac)uires a greater degree of stability. (b# *le+i,le.$$ * constitution is classified as fle'ible when it may be changed in the same manner and through the same body that enacts ordinary legislation. The British .onstitution is fle'ible. * constitution7s stability depends upon other factors than the mere rigidity or fle'ibility of the amending process, such as (1# the general temperament of the people and their leaders and ("# the degree of a nation7s political maturity and social homogenity. (Sinco !;$08.# The Philippine .onstitution is both written and rigid (See *rt. CD++ on the *mendment process#.

II. THE -./0 CONSTITUTION

E @hat was the basis of the *)uino governmentF >id it assume power pursuant to the 1 01 .onstitution, or was it a revolutionary governmentF A. P$ocla&atio No. -, 12 *e,$#a$( -./3 4P$o%i"io al )o%e$ &e t5.66 But Proclamation Go. 1 which announced the Provisional .onstitution, seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government, since in one of its whereases it announced that the 3new government was installed, through a direct e'ercise of the power of the 5ilipino people assisted by units of the Gew *rmed 5orces,3 referring to the 2>S* revolution. The better view is the latter view. The *)uino government was not an offshoot of the 1 01 .onstitution for under that .onstitution, a procedure was given for the election of the President $$$ proclamation by the Batasan $$$ and the candidate Batasan proclaimed was 4arcos.

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!. P$ocla&atio No. 7, Ma$c' 12, -./3 4P$o%i"io al Co "tit#tio 5.66 The Provisional .onstitution or 5reedom .onstitution was adopted on "< 4arch 1 ;! through Proclamation Go. 1. +t abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1 01 .onstitution, modified the provisions regarding the e'ecutive department, and totally reorganized the government. (+ts use of the 1 01 .onstitution, however, is not be to construed that it was a continuation thereof.# Then it provided for the calling of a .onstitu$ tional .ommission, composed of 18 to <8 members appointed by the President within !8 days. C. Ado8tio a d Effecti%it( 7. P$ocla&atio No. 2/ 4P$oclai&i ) t'e Ratificatio of t'e -./0 Co "tit#tio 5, *e,$#a$( --, -./0 % COMELEC

P'ili88i e !a$ A""ociatio

-. P$o%i"io al Co "tit#tio , A$t. 9. *>HPT+HG H5 * G2@ .HGST+T?T+HG Section 1. @ithin si'ty days from the date of this Proclamation, a .ommission shall be appointed by the President to draft a Gew .onstitution. The .ommission shall be composed of not less than thirty nor more than fifty natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, (nown for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society. Section ". The .ommission shall complete its wor( within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to drat a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the 5ilipino people. Section 1. The .ommission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have ade)uate participation in the formulation of the Gew .onstitution. Section 9. The plenary sessions of the .ommission shall be public and recorded. Section <. The Gew .onstitution shall be presented by the .ommission to the President who shall fi' the date for the holding of a plebiscite. +t shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a ma/ority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of !8 days following its submission to the President. 1. "ec. 10. -./0 Co "tit#tio , A$t. :9III,

The constitutionality of BP ;;1, calling for special elections (this was the snap election with 4arcos vs. *)uino as candidates#, was contended since there is no actual vacancy in the office of the president KThe .ourt cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new presidentL A -ustice Teehan(ee KM Petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP ;;1 clearly contravenes any applicable constitutional provision. Besides, the issue posed by these petitions is essentially political in characterM the Supreme .ourt has no authority to determine whether or not the act of the Legislature of .hief 2'ecutive is against the .onstitutionL A -ustice 2scolin The main doctrine here is that the Supreme .ourt recognizes the separation of powers. There is what we call a political )uestion wherein only the involved department may resolve to the e'clusion of the other two. Hne division is not more powerful than the other and the decision of each is accorded great respect.

Law(e$;" Lea)#e %". A<#i o The legitimacy of the *)uino government was being contended The .ourt ruled that the legitimacy of this government is a non$/usticiable matter. K+t is only the people of the Philippines who may be the /udge of its legitimacy. Since such government is accepted by the people, it is not merely a de facto government but also a de /ure government. 4oreover, the community of nations has recognized its legitimacyL @ith all this in mind, the petitioners have no personality to sue and no cause of action The .ourt again reiterates the doctrine of separation of powers, deciding that such case is not for the courts to decide on.

This .onstitution shall ta(e effect immediately upon its ratification by a ma/ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede the all previous .onstitutions. The foregoing proposed .onstitution of the :epublic of the Philippines was approved by the .onstitutional .ommission of 1 ;! on the twelfth day of Hctober 1 ;!, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of Hctober 1 ;! at the Plenary 6all, Gational Iovernment .enter, Juezon .ity, by the .ommissioners whose signatures are hereunder affi'ed.

$e: Sat#$ i o !e$&#de= The petitioner is as(ing for a declaratory relief and to e'plain the NambiguityO in the proposed 1 ;! .onstitution as to who was being referred to as President and Dice$President in *rt CD+++ Sec 0. The .ourt ruled that they do not have original /urisdiction over declaratory reliefs KThere is lac( of personality to sue and

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such petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent PresidentM it is e)ually elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.L +n the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from e'ercising /udicial review% 1. 5riendly, non$adversary proceedings. (no vital conflict# ". *nticipation of a )uestion of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (premature case# 1. 5ormulation of a rule broader than is re)uired by the precise facts to which it is applied. 9. 2'istence of other grounds upon which the case may be disposed of (not the very lis mota# <. * complaint made by one who fails to show in/ury as to its operation. (no standing# !. +nstance of one who has availed himself of its benefit. 0. Possibility of a construction of the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional )uestion. Re"c#e A$&( ca"e Policy of strict necessity The court must, as much possible, refrain from e'ercising /udicial review unless all the re)uirements for its e'ercise are fulfilled because of % 1. The danger of e'ercising the function, in view of possible conse)uences for others stemming also from constitutional roots. ". .omparative finality of those conse)uences. 1. .onsideration due to the /udgment of the other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authorities. 9. Gecessity for each to (eep within its own power. <. +nherent limitations of the /udicial process $ its largely negative character, and its limited resources for enforcement. !. @ithal in paramount importance of constitutional ad/udication. Thus, the following must be avoided% (i# political )uestions, (ii# advisory opinions, (iii# moot and academic issues, and (iv# no standing. !. Co ditio " fo$ t'e E+e$ci"e of >#dicial Re%iew -. Ca"e a d Co t$o%e$"( Peo8le % 9e$a -. Laurel laid down the doctrine that /udicial review can only be e'ercised in an actual case and controversy. This means (1# a party with a personal and substantial interest, ("# an appropriate case, (1# a constitutional )uestion raised at the earliest possible time, and (9# a constitutional )uestion that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable )uestion. 1. Sta di ) * party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really in/ured if it is decided against him.

III. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: >UDICIAL RE9IEW UNDER THE -./0 CONSTITUTION
A. Nat#$e of >#dicial Powe$?Re%iew A$t. 9III, Sec. -. T62 -?>+.+*L PH@2: S6*LL B2 D2ST2> +G HG2 S?P:242 .H?:T *G> +G S?.6 LH@2: .H?:TS *S 4*P B2 2ST*BL+S62> BP L*@. -?>+.+*L PH@2: +G.L?>2S T62 >?TP H5 .H?:TS H5 -?ST+.2 TH S2TTL2 *.T?*L .HGT:HD2:S+2S +GDHLD+GI :+I6TS @6+.6 *:2 L2I*LLP >24*G>*BL2 *G> 2G5H:.2*BL2, *G> TH >2T2:4+G2 @62T2: H: GHT T62:2 6*S B22G * I:*D2 *B?S2 H5 >+S.:2T+HG *4H?GT+GI TH L*.Q H: 2C.2SS H5 -?:+S>+.T+HG HG T62 P*:T H5 *GP B:*G.6 H: +GT:?42GT*L+TP H5 T62 IHD2:G42GT. T'eo$( of >#dicial Re%iew A )a$a % Electo$al Co&&i""io , +n 1 1<, the Gational *ssembly adopted a resolution that 3all members$ elect, with no election protest filed on or before 1 >ecember 1 1< are deemed elected.3 The 2lectoral .ommission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the >ecember 1 1< as the deadline for the filing of election protest. Pnsua, who lost to *ngara, filed a motion of protest (complaint# on ; >ecember 1 1<. This was entertained by the 2lectoral .ommission. *ngara contended that the deadline set by the Gational *ssembly was controlling. @ho prevailedF The S., through -. Laurel, ruled for Pnsua, thereby upholding the authority of the 2lectoral .ommission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the 2lectoral .ommission /urisdiction over election protests. +n /ustifying the power of /udicial review, -. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. +t simply carries out the obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. A"'wa de$ %". Te e""ee 9alle( A#t'o$it( of

Seven (0# rules of avoidance constitutional )uestions (-. Brandeis#%

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Standing is established by two ne'uses% the party7s status and the type of legislative act being )uestioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal sta(e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional )uestions (Ba(er v .arr, supra.# * person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct in/ury as a result ot its enforcement. (Peo8le %. 9e$a.5 !oa$d of O8to&et$( %". Colet >octrine of Locus Standi 5or the party to have locus standi to )uestion the validity of a statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct in/ury as a result of its enforcement Hnly natural and /uridical persons or entities authorized by law my be parties in a civil action and every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest The two parties here were not registered associations, worse, two of the presidents of the associations contending the validity of *rt ;8<8 or the :evised Hptometry Law of the 1 < were not even optometrists Ta %". Maca8a)al funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,7 which may be en/oined at the re)uest of a ta'payer.3 @here a constitutional )uestion is raised, a senator has been considered as possessed of the re)uisite personality to bring a suit, e.g., in Ma,a a) %". Lo8e= 9ito and Tole ti o %. Co&&i""io o Electio ".R

KMS*Rs far as a ta'payer7s suit is concerned, this .ourt is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertainedM Petitioner Ionzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the .onstitution. +t was only then that the matter was ripe for ad/udication. Prior to that stage, the /udiciary had to (eep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fitM. 4ore specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of /udicial oversight. Hnly after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. ?ntil then, the courts are devoid of /urisdiction. 7. Ri8e e"" * constitutional )uestion may come to the court either too early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion#, or too late, so that the court7s decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness#. The court must resolve constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness#. Ao =ale" %". COMELEC +SS?2% Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of a statute S:* 9;;8 or the :evised 2lection .odeR which calls to a halt the undesirable practice of prolonged political campaigns. 4ore precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invo(ed to nullify the act. 6eld% petition was dismissed. 3*lthough the instant petition did not see( to restrain respondent .ommission on 2lections from performing any specific act, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition. The e'ceptional character of the situation that confronts this .ourt, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely si' months away, reinforce this stand. +t would appear undeniable, therefore, that before this .ourt is an appropriate invocation of this .ourt7s /urisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. The .ourt is left with no choice. Then, it must act on the matter. 3The language of -ustice Laurel fits the

+SS?2% * petition assailing the validity of the Laurel$Leido :esolution dealing with the range of the authority of the 1 01 .onstitutional .onvention (@HG it had the power to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which see( to revise the present .onstitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present .onstitution# 6eld% motion for reconsideration was denied. ST*G>+GI A T*CP*P2:7S S?+TS%

5rom Peo8le % 9e$a% 3The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct in/ury as a result of its enforcement.3 5rom Pa"c#al % T'e Sec$eta$( of P#,lic Wo$@": 3*gain, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct in/ury, in conse)uence of its enforcement. Pet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of ta'payers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the 7e'penditure of public

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case% 7*ll await the decision of this .ourt on the constitutional )uestion. .onsidering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that SitsR constitutionality . . . be now resolved.7 S)uoted from People v DeraR +t may li(ewise be added that the e'ceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely si' months away, reinforce our stand.3 B. Moot e"" * case becomes moot when there are facts, in/uries and heated arguments but for some reason the legal problem has become stale. @hen a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. *ny decision reached by the court would not be conclusive on the parties. 2'ceptions to mootness% 1# +f the )uestion is capable of repetition and evasive of review. "# +f there e'its a mere possibility of collateral legal conse)uences if the court does not act. 1# Doluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways. C. *# ctio " of >#dicial Re%iew -. C'ec@i ) $ invalidating a law or an e'ecutive act that is found to be contrary to the .onstitution. 1. Le)iti&ati ) 4le)iti&i=i )5 $ upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of that law. @hen the .ourt e'ercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is 3not unconstitutional3. This is no mere semantics. The .ourt cannot declare the law constitutional for it en/oys the presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not ma(e it more constitutional. Hn the other hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show its invalidity. >eclaring that the law is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden re)uired. ELegitimating and .hec(ing *spects of -udicial :eview. >ismissal of .hallenge to a Law7s Dalidity Legitimizes it. +n Occe a % COMELEC, which sought an in/unction to prohibit the .H42L2. from proceeding with the plebiscite for the proposed 1 ;1 amendments, and in Mit$a % COMELEC, which sought a mandamus to compel the .H42L2. to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1 01 .onstitution, both prayers based on the premise that the 1 01 .onstitution had not been ratified, the S. held that the failure of the .ourt in the -avellana v 2'ecutive Secretary case to muster the votes re)uired to declare the 1 01 .onstitution as being invalidly ratified, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit )uestioning the validity of the ratification of the .onstitution, in effect legitimated the ratification. +n Occe a, the .ourt ruled that% 3The Supreme .ourt can chec( as well as legitimate. +n the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in the -avellana resolution. Since then, the .ourt has invariably applied the present .onstitution.3 7. S(&,olic $ to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great public importance. Salo )a % C$#=6Pa o, The case against petitioner for subversion which was filed by the fiscal on the basis of flimsy testimony given by Dictor Lovely was already dismissed without pre/udice by the fiscal (upon anticipation of adverse ruling#. *nd yet, the S. noting that as the fiscal said the dismissal of the charges was without pre/udice to the filing of new ones for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double /eopardy does not apply, the case is not entirely moot, decided to perform its duty to 3formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts and doctrines or rules3 for the guidance of the bar and bench. +t thus, went on to lecture about its anti)uated understanding of the inciting test, and how it could not be proved by a mere photograph. >a%ie$ % COMELEC, The case was already mooted not only by the death of 2velio -avier, but also by the abolition of Batasan, the *nti)ue seat which he and Pacificador were contesting for. *nd yet the S., claiming to be 3not only the highest arbiter of legal )uestions but also the conscience of the government,3 decided the case anyway 3for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The citizen comes to us in )uest of law but we must also give him /ustice. The " are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter bec. the issue has been settled and the decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. -ustice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.3 De&ete$ia % Al,a, The S. struc( down Sec. 99 of P> 1100, authorizing the President to transfer funds from one department to another, on the ground that it overe'tended the privilege granted under *rt. D+++, sec. 1!(<# of the 1 01 .onstitution, even if such provision was already abrogated by the 5reedom .onstitution. Then, citing the -avier

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case on the need 3not only for the vindication of an outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future,3 it lectured on how this law would open the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled e'ecutive e'penditures, diffusion of accountability for budgetary performance, and entrenchment of the por( barrel system, and on how this would create temptations for misappropriation and embezzlement. e'pressing lac( of the respect due coordinate branches of government& or an unusual need for un)uestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one )uestion.L Ta ada %". C#e co +SS?2% *ssails the validity of nomination in the Senate 2lectoral Tribunal of " other senators from the ma/ority party 62L>% The term 3political )uestion3 connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a )uestion of policy. +t refers to those )uestions which, under the .onstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or e'ecutive branch of the Iovernment (1! .. -. S., 911#. +t is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The Senate is not clothed with 3full discretionary authority3 in the choice of members of the Senate 2lectoral Tribunal. The e'ercise of its power thereon is sub/ect to constitutional limitations. +t is clearly within the legitimate province of the /udicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith. 6ence, this .ourt has, not only /urisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. P!A % COMELEC, @e see a reversal of /udicial review. The case was clearly a /usticiable controversy. +s the resignation submitted by 4arcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap 2lection LawF The .ourt could have validly issued an in/unction to stop the .H42L2. from proceeding with the prepara$ tions for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason for its inaction. *ccording to the court, what at first was a legal )uestion became a political )uestion because it was overta(en by events. DD% * .ourt which does not issue an in/unction to en/oin an official act when it could have issued one is actually deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. 5ailure to issue an in/unction is as much an e'ercise of /udicial review. Ro&#lo % Y i)#e=, @e see another trend of /udicial review. @hat seems li(e a legal )uestion when viewed in isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for impeachment against the President is constitutional.# is really a political )uestion when viewed in a broader conte't (i.e., that the case was filed against the Spea(er of a co$e)ual

C All co#$t" ca

e+e$ci"e D#dicial $e%iew

A$t. 9III, Sec. 2415. The Supreme .ourt shall have the following powers% ''' ("# :eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the :ules of .ourt may provide, final /udgments and orders of lower courts in % (a# *ll cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e'ecutive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in )uestion. (b# *ll cases involving the legality of any ta', impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (c# *ll cases in which the /urisdiction of any lower court is in issue. (d# *ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (e# *ll cases in which only an error or )uestion of law is involved. D. Political E#e"tio *n issue is a political )uestion when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but with the very wisdom of the law itself. @hen a /udge attempts to resolve a political )uestion, he is not e'ercising a /udicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government. !a@e$ %. Ca$$, has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a )uestion is political or not. KProminent on the surface of any case held to involve a political )uestion is found a te'tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department& or a lac( of /udicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it& or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a (ind clearly for non$/udicial discretion& or the impossibility of a court7s underta(ing independent resolution without

8
branch to compel him by mandamus to recall the complaint from the archive, and that the ultimate result of the case was to )uestion the decision of the Batasan to shelve the case, a matter, that is solely committed to that department.# Pet, despite the really political nature of the )uestion, the S. passed on the validity of the rules to erase doubts that may still be entertained. Ad%i"o$( O8i io * case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutional construction for its resolution. This may ta(e the form of declaratory relief. +t is not wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion because% a# This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel )uoting 5ran(furter# b# The /udicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law. E. Effect of U co "tit#tio alit( a Decla$atio of in fact compelled to presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn duty under the .onstitution. *s the court put it in C'icot Co# t( Di"t$ict % !a+te$ State !a @, the past cannot always be erased, so that statements of principle of absolute retroactivity is not acceptable in all cases. Said the court, 3STRhe actual e'istence of a statute, prior to such determination, is an operative fact, and may have conse)uences which cannot /ustly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new /udicial declaration. The effect of the subse)uent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. ''' 3 The case of Se$$a o de A),a(a i % PN! is in point. +n 1 1 , *gbayani borrowed P9<8 from PGB secured by a realty mortgage. +n 1 99, the loan matured but PGB could not collect because it was at this time of the war. +n 1 9<, Pres. Hsmena issued the >ebt 4oratorium Law (2H T1"#, suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravages of war. +n 1 9;, :* 19" e'tended the >ebt 4oratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1 <!#. +n 1 <1, however, the S. declared :* 19" as unconstitutional in the case of R#tte$ % E"te,a . +n 1 < , PGB filed a suit for payment of the loan. 6as the action prescribedF +f we ta(e the orthodo' view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of :* 19" as unconstitutional retroacted to 1 9< when 2H 1" was first issued. Between 1 99 when the loan matured and 1 < , when PGB collected the loan, 1< years had elapsed. SThe orthodo' view was announced by 4r. -. 5ield, in the case of Gorton vs. Shelby .ounty where the court held that% 3'''. *n unconstitutional act is not a law& it confers no rights& it imposes no duties& it affords no protection& it creates no office& it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.R But if we ta(e the unorthodo' view, as the S. did, the action could still prosper. The period from 1 9< when the law was promulgated, to 1 <1 when it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the >ebt 4oratorium Law was operative during this time. +n effect, only 0 years had elapsed (1 99$9<, 1 <1$< #.

Ci%il Code, A$t. 0. CCC @62G T62 .H?:TS >2.L*:2 * L*@ TH B2 +G.HGS+ST2GT @+T6 T62 .HGST+T?T+HG, T62 5H:42: S6*LL B2 DH+> *G> T62 L*TT2: S6*LL IHD2:G. CCC The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to ma(e the law either void or voidable. +t is void if on its face, it does not en/oy any presumption of validity. *s such, it produces no effect whatsoever, creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. @hatever penalty was paid during the period of its operation must be remitted. *n e'ample is BP <" in I)ot % COMELEC, providing that anyone who has been charged of rebellion, etc. is prima facie presumed to be dis)ualified from running for a local post. Hn its face, it blatantly goes against the constitutional presumption of innocence. *nother e'ample is a law imposing prior restraint which is, according to S#lli%a % !a ta& !oo@", a d US % New Yo$@ Ti&e" , presumptively unconstitutional. But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it en/oys the presumption of validity. +n this case, it becomes inoperative only upon the /udicial declaration of its invalidity. *nd even so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be un/ust to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification. 5rom the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into various transactions and relations, e'pecting and

9
+ndeed, it would be un/ust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1 <1 because the >ebt 4oratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. *rt. 0 of the .ivil .ode which provides that, 3@hen the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the .onstitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.3 seems to be the orthodo' view on the matter. dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. Philippine territory consists of% the Philippine archipelago& and all territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or /urisdiction The *rchipelagic >octrine% Bodies of water within the baseline, regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago and are considered as internal waters. !. PEOPLE

THE STATE I.

Three 4eanings of the word KpeopleL

STATE DE*INED.

1. I 'a,ita t", as used in% *:T+.L2 ++, .onstitution Section 1<, 1 ;0

Prof. Borlongay, )uoting Iarner, +ntroduction to Political Law, 91% * State is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fi'ed territory and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. a. b. c. d. 2L242GTS% People $$$ inhabitants of the State Territory $$$ fi'ed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State Iovernment $$$ agency, instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, e'pressed, and realized Sovereignty $$$ supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed CASE: Collecto$ of I te$ al Re%e #e %. Ca&8o" R#eda S9" S.:* "1 (1 01#R% * State is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting through government functioning under a regime of law.

The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. *:T+.L2 ++, .onstitution Section 1!, 1 ;0

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. *:T+.L2 +++, .onstitution Section ", 1 ;0

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable ' '' *:T+.L2 C+++, .onstitution Section 1, 1 ;0

The .ongress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political ine)ualities, and remove cultural ine)uities by e)uitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. CASE: E#a C'ee Aa %. De8o$tatio !oa$d S S.:* "0 (1 !1#R% The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the .onstitution. ?nder our .onstitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and indisputably applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.

II.

COMPONENTS O* PHILIPPINE STATE.

A. TERRITORY

THE

*:T+.L2 +, 1 ;0 .onstitution

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or /urisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and

". Citi=e ", as used in% P:2*4BL2, 1 ;0 .onstitution

@e, the sovereign 5ilipino people, imploring the aid of *lmighty Iod, in order to build a /ust and humane society and establish a government that

10
shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, /ustice, freedom, love, e)uality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this .onstitution. *:T+.L2 ++, Section 1, 1 ;0 .onstitution citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this .onstitution& those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines& those born before -anuary 10, 1 01, of 5ilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of ma/ority& and those naturalized in accordance with law.

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. *:T+.L2 ++, Section 9, 1 ;0 .onstitution

The prime duty of the Iovernment is to serve and protect the people. The Iovernment may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be re)uired, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military, or civil service. *:T+.L2 +++, .onstitution Section 0, 1 ;0

The right of election permitted under *:T+.L2 +D, Section 1 (1#, 1 ;0 .onstitution, is available only to those born to 5ilipino mothers under the 1 1< .onstitution, who, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining ma/ority age. Hbviously, election is not necessary in the case of a child born to a 5ilipino mother under the present .onstitution, as such child is considered a 5ilipino citizen at birth. CASE: Co %. Electo$al T$i,# al of t'e Ho#"e of Re8$e"e tati%e" S1 S.:* ! " (1 1#R% *:T+.L2 +D, Section 1 (1#, 1 ;0 .onstitution applies not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after 5ebruary ", 1 ;0, but also to those who, having been born of 5ilipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. This is to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a 5ilipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural$born citizen, while one born of a 5ilipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. 4oreover, when Hng was nine years old, his father became a naturalized 5ilipino. Section 1< of the :evised Gaturalization *ct s)uarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in the country. .oncededly, it was the law itself that had elected Philippine citizenship for Hng by declaring him as such.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. *ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, sub/ect to such limitations as may be provided by law. 1. Electo$", as used in% *:T+.L2 D++, .onstitution Section 9, 1 ;0

The President and the Dice$President shall be elected by direct vote of the people ' ' ' *:T+.L2 CD+, .onstitution Section ", 1 ;0

The .ongress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall ta(e effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum. *:T+.L2 CD+++, .onstitution Section "<, 1 ;0

@ho are natural$born citizens% *:T+.L2 +D, Section ", 1 ;0 .onstitution citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac)uire or perfect their Philippine citizenship& and those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with *:T+.L2 +D, Section 1 (1#

*fter the e'piration in 1 1 of the *greement between the :P and ?S* concerning 4ilitary Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines e'cept under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the .ongress so re)uires, ratified by a ma/ority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. @ho are citizens% 1 ;0 .onstitution *:T+.L2 +D, Section 1,

The following are natural$born citizens% citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1 ;0 .onstitution those born of 5ilipino mothers, fathers (after 10 -anuary 1 01# those born before 10 -anuary 1 01, of 5ilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of ma/ority

11
those naturalized in accordance with law @ho must citizens% be natural$born (1 year for declaration of intent, and " years for the /udgment to become e'ecutory# applicant must% a.# be "1 years of age b.# be a resident for ! months c.# have good moral character d.# have no dis)ualification

President *:T+.L2 D++, Section " Dice$President *:T+.L2 D++, Section 1 4embers of .ongress *:T+.L2 D+, Sections 1 and ! -ustices of S. and lower collegiate courts *:T+.L2 D+++, Section 0 (1# Hmbudsman and his deputies *:T+.L2 C+, Section ; 4embers of .onstitutional .ommissions (.S.# *:T+.L2 +C B, Section 1 (1# (.H42L2.#*:T+.L2 +C ., Section 1 (1# (.H*# *:T+.L2 +C >, Section 1 (1# 4embers of the .entral 4onetary *uthority *:T+.L2 C++, Section "8 4embers of the .ommission on 6uman :ights *:T+.L2 C+++, Section 10 ("#

".

:epatriation woman who by her marriage lost her citizenship those declared by authorities to be deserters of the *rmed 5orces Legislative *ct both a mode of ac)uiring and reac)uiring citizenship

1.

>ual allegiance (*:T+.L2 +D, Section <, 1 ;0 .onstitution# contemplates the case of aliens who are naturalized as 5ilipinos but remain loyal to their country of origin, as well as the case of public officers who, while serving the government, see( citizenship in another country. ?nder Sec. 98 (d# of the Local Iovernment .ode, those with dual citizenship are dis)ualified from running for any elective local position. (but see Me$cado %. Ma =a o I: 11<8;1 4ay "!, 1 #

*s per *:T+.L2 C++, Section ;, 1 ;0 .onstitution, a natural$born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may still be a transferee of private lands, sub/ect to limitations provided by law. Irounds for Loss of .itizenship% Gaturalization in a foreign country S.* !1, Sec.1 (1#R 2'press renunciation or e'patriation S.* !1, Sec.1 ("#R Ta(ing an oath of allegiance to another country upon reaching the age of ma/ority *ccepting a commission and serving in the armed forces of another country, unless there is an offensive, defensive pact with the country, or it maintains armed forces in :P with :POs consent >enaturalization Being found by final /udgment to be a deserter of the *5P 4arriage by a 5ilipino woman to an alien, if by the laws of her husbandOs country, he becomes a citizen thereof 2'patriation is a constitutional right (Ao A#llia %. Ao%e$ &e t#. Go one can be compelled to remain a 5ilipino if he does not want to.

CASE: Re8#,lic %. Li Yao S"19 S.:* 01;R% * certificate of naturalization (.HG# may be cancelled if it is subse)uently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and /urisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a .HG upon grounds, conditions which arise subse)uent to the granting of such certificate. 4oreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a /udicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein does not constitute res /udicata as to any matter that would support a /udgment canceling a .HG on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof. CASE: *$i%aldo %. COMELEC S109 S.:* "9< (1 ; #R% 4ere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a sufficient act of repatriation. :epatriation re)uires an e'press and e)uivocal act. CASE: Re8#,lic %. De La Ro"a S"1" S.:* 0;<R% * former citizen who opts to reac)uire Philippine citizenship thorough naturalization under .om. *ct Go. !1 is duty$bound to follow the procedure prescribed by law, and it is not for him to decide and select the re)uirements which he believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a 5ilipino citizen and one who was never such.

2C.2PT+HG% * 5ilipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the :epublic of the Philippines is at war with any country. (Sec. 1 (1#, .om. *ct Go. !1# 6ow may citizenship be reac)uiredF 1. Gaturalization (.om. *ct Go. !1 and .om. *ct Go. 901# now an abbreviated process, with no need to wait for 1 years

12
5ailure to comply with the posting and publication re)uirements under the law rendered null and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered, and the oath of allegiance ta(en. CASE: La,o %. COMELEC S10! S.:* 1R% .* Go. !1 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost, and among them are% 1# naturalization in a foreign country, "# e'press renunciation of citizenship, and 1# subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the .onstitution or laws of a foreign country. 4eanwhile, Philippine citizenship may be reac)uired by direct act of .ongress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. CASE: La,o %. COMELEC S"11 S.:* " 0 (1 "#R% +n the absence of any official action or approval by proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reac)uisition of the applicantOs Philippine citizenship. CASE: Y# %. Defe "o$6Sa tia)o S1! S.:* 1!9R% Pu lost his Philippine citizenship via e'press renunciation when with full (nowledge and capacity he applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents. CASE: A= a$ %. COMELEC S1;< S.:* 081 (1 8#R% .onsidering the fact that admittedly, HsmeUa was both a 5ilipino and an *merican, the mere fact that he has a certificate stating that he is an *merican does not mean that he is not still a 5ilipino, since there has been GH 2CP:2SS renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. CASE: Peo8le %. Ma a(ao S09 Phil 0"1 (1 90#R% +t would shoc( the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that 4anayao, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. +f this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment. CASE: Caa"i %. CA: To be K)ualified to run for elective officeL in the Philippines, the law (Sec. !; of the Hmnibus 2lection .ode re)uires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have Kwaived his status as a permanent resident immigrant of a foreign country.L Therefore, private respondentOs act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office does not constitute such waiver. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act,s independent of and done prior to the filing of his candidacy. CASE: Peo8le %. A%e )o=a S11 S.:* 11 (1 ;"#R% * woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to a .hinese citizen and thereby gaining the latterOs citizenship, must first /udicially prove that she was 5ilipino citizen prior to her marriage, before she can be repatriated by virtue of the death of her husband. CASE: >ao %. Re8#,lic S1"1 S.:* 1<; (1 ;1#R% There is no law re)uiring or authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a /udicial proceeding. *ll that is re)uired for a female Philippine citizen who lost her citizenship to an alien to reac)uire Philippine citizenship upon the termination of her marital status is for her to ta(e the necessary oath of allegiance to the :P and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry. :eac)uisition of citizenship is a purely administrative procedure. C. AO9ERNMENT

KIovernmentL is that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society ma(es and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. (US %. Doo$ " Phil 11"# 5?G.T+HGS% 1. ". .onstituent functions constitute the very bonds of society compulsory 4inistrant functions underta(en to advance the general interests of society optional e.g. public wor(s, public charity, and regulation of trade and industry

6H@2D2:, the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is not relevant in our /urisdiction. P9TA %. CIR S!< S.:* 91!R reiterated the ruling in ACC*A %. *ede$atio of La,o$ U io " S18 S.:* !9 R that the distinction has been blurred because of the repudiation of the laissez$faire policy in the .onstitution. KIovernment of the :epublic of the PhilippinesL is defined as Kthe corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are e'ercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the conte't, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay subdivisions, or other forms of local government.L (Sec. " (1#, *dministrative .ode of 1 ;0#

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@hat is the doctrine of parens patriaeF 1. 9. +nternal sovereignty $$$ power to control domestic affairs 2'ternal sovereignty (also (nown as independence# $$$ power to direct relations with other states

Parens patriae is the tas( of the government to act as guardian of the rights of the people. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes e'erted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. (.ruz# @hat are de /ure and de facto governmentsF

@hat is the KTheory of *uto$LimitationLF +t is the property of the State$force due to which a State has e'clusive legal competence of self$limitation and self$ restriction. @hat is the difference between KdominiumL and KimperiumL. K>ominiumL refers to the capacity of the State to own property. +t covers such rights as title to land, e'ploitation and use of it, and disposition or sale of the same. The :egalian doctrine whereby all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and anyone claiming title has the burden to show ownership, comes within this concept. +n this capacity, the State descends to the status of ordinary persons and thus becomes liable as such. K+mperiumL refers to the StateOs authority to govern. +t covers such activities as passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion. @hen the State acts in this capacity, it generally en/oys sovereign immunity. @hat is -?:+S>+.T+HGF -urisdiction is the manifestation of sovereignty. The /urisdiction of the state is understood as both its authority and the sphere of the e'ercise of that authority. (Sinco# Q+G>S% 1.# Territorial /urisdiction authority of the State to have all persons and things within its territorial limits to be completely sub/ect to its control and protection ".# Personal /urisdiction authority of the State over its nationals, their persons, property, and acts, whether within or outside its territory. e'. .ivil .ode provision that prohibitory and mandatory laws follow citizens wherever they go 1.# 2'traterritorial /urisdiction authority of the State over persons, things, or acts, outside its territorial limits by reason of their effects to its territory e'. *:T. " of the :evised Penal .ode @hat is the basis of the Kdoctrine of sovereign immunityLF

* de /ure government has rightful title but no power or control, either because this has been withdrawn from it, or because it has not yet actually entered into the e'ercise thereof. * de facto government is a government of fact, that is, it actually e'ercises power or control but without legal title. @hat are the governmentF 1. 1 (inds of de facto

".

1.

that which gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the ma/ority, the rightful legal government, and maintains itself against the will of the latter& that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state& that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated as a government of paramount force, li(e the Second :epublic of the Philippines, established by the -apanese belligerents

.haracteristics of the 1rd (ind of de facto government% its e'istence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government during its e'istence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts o obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible as wrongdoers for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government D. SO9EREIANTY

Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which the State is governed Q+G>S% 1. Legal sovereignty $$$ power to issue final commands ". Political sovereignty $$$ power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum total of the influences that operate upon it

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*:T+.L2 CD+, Section 1, 1 ;0 .onstitution% The State may not be sue without its consent. Positivist theory% There can be no legal right as against the authority that ma(es the laws on which the right depends. SFawa a a@oa %. Pol(,la @ "8< ?S 19 R Sociological theory% +f the State is amenable to suits, all its time would be spent defending itself from suits and this would prevent it fro performing it other functions. SRe8#,lic %. 9illa"o$ <9 S.:* ;1R 6owever, distinctions must be made between sovereign and proprietary acts since the State may only be liable for proprietary acts. *s for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. +n what instances is implied consent shownF @hen the government enters into business contracts @hen it would be ine)uitable for the State to invo(e its immunity @hen the State ta(es private property for public use or purpose @hat is the procedure to be followed regarding money claims against the governmentF *ll money claims against the government must be filed with the .ommission on *udit, which has !8 days within which to act. +f it fails to so act, the claimant must wait anyway. Hnce a decision has been made, he has 18 days to appeal by certiorari, said decision to the Supreme .ourt.

+s the Kdoctrine of sovereign immunityL available to foreign StatesF P2S, it is, insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign e)uality of States, under which one State cannot assert /urisdiction over another. To do so would Kunduly ve' the peace of nations.L (.ruz# @hen is a suit against the StateF * suit is against the State regardless of who is named the defendant, if it produces adverse conse)uences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and loss of government property. @hen a suit is against the State, it cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent. +n the following cases, it was held that the suit is not against the State% a.# when the purpose of the suit is to compel an officer charged with the duty of ma(ing payments pursuant to an appropriation made by law in favor of the plaintiff to ma(e such payment, since the suit is intended to compel performance of a ministerial duty. (Begoso v. PD* and >el 4ar v. PD*# b.# when from the allegations in the complaint, it is clear that the respondent is a public officer sued in a private capacity& c.# when the action is not in personam with the government as the named defendant, but an action in rem that does not name the government in particular.

*:T. "1;8 of the .ivil .ode allows a suit against the government for )uasi$delicts committed by the government when acting the employee in his personal capacity. But if the tortuous act was committed by a regular employee, the in/ured party could only bring a suit for damages against the employee in his personal capacity. @hen the Iovernment creates a corporation, it invariably provides this corporation a separate entity and with the capacity to sue and be sued. +f the government entity is given the capacity to be sued, the suit encompasses any (ind of action, including one from tort. .onsent to be sued includes actions based on )uasi$delict even though committed by regular, and not special, agents. So the rule, it seems, is that a government entity can be sued for tort, but if it is, it can invo(e the defense that it acted through its regular employee, and not through a special agent. @hen the government is in the performance of a governmental function (/ure imperii#, even if it enters into a contract with private persons, it cannot be sued without its consent. But when the government enters into commercial contracts and descends to the status of ordinary persons (/ure gestioni#, it can be sued li(e any other person. @hen consent to be sued is provided by the charter, the consent does not sop with the rendition of the /udgment, but goes up to the satisfaction of the

6ow is the StateOs consent to be sued givenF The consent of the State to be sued may be manifested e'pressly or impliedly. 2'press consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. +t is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. .onsent is implied when the State enters into a contract or itself commences litigation.

15
/udgment. CASE: Re8#,lic %. 9illa"o$ S<9 S.:* ;1 (1 01#R% +t is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the /uristic concept of sovereignty that the State as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. * sovereign is e'empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma(es the law on which the right depends. Social /urisprudence supplies a similar answer. * continued adherence to the doctrine of non$suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of /udicial remedy were not thus restricted. CASE: Re8#,lic %. *elicia o S19; S.:* 9"9R% * suit against the government for the recovery of possession and ownership of land based on a possessory information should be disallowed because a suit for the recovery of property is an action in personam which see(s to bring the State to court /ust li(e any private person who is claimed to usurp a piece of property. @hat the plaintiff should have done was to apply for a /udicial confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 9; (b# of .om. *ct Go. 191, which is an action in rem, i.e., one directed against the whole world and not the government in particular. The Proclamation of the President of the Philippines recognizing private rights to the land cannot be the source of the StateOs consent to be sued since said proclamation is not a legislative act. CASE: !e)o"a %. C'ai$&a of P9A S1" S.:* 9!! (1 08#R% @here a litigation may have adverse conse)uences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non$suability may appropriately be invo(ed. +t has no application however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff. CASE: Del Ma$ %. P9A S<1 S.:* 198 (1 01#R% The doctrine of immunity of the government from suit finds no application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of said claimant. CASE: S'a#f %. CA S1 1 S.:* 011 (1 8#R% +nasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invo(ed where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen, for acts without authority or in e'cess of the powers vested in him. * public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or /urisdiction. CASE: Re8#,lic %. Sa do%al S""8 S.:* 1"9 (1 1#R% The principle of State immunity from suit does not apply when the relief demanded re)uires no affirmative official action on the part of the State no the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the State and as its agents and servants. CASE: Re8#,lic %. P#$i""i&a S0; S.:* 908 (1 00#R% * contract entered into by the :ice and .orn *dministration (:.*# stipulating that in the event of breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a money claim against the :.*, a government entity under the Hffice of the President, since the :.* had no authority to bind the government to be sued. Hnly a statute could.

CASE: Sa("o %. Si )"o S<9 S.:* ";" (1 01#R% The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the *uditor to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the courts e'cept with the consent of the State. The respondent should have filed his

16
claim with the Ieneral *uditing Hffice, under the provisions of .* 1"0, which prescribe the conditions under which money claims against the government may be filed. Hnce the consent is secured, an action may be filed. But there is nothing to prevent the State from re)uiring that certain administrative proceedings be had and e'hausted. CASE: Me$$itt %. Ao%e$ &e t of t'e P'ili88i e I"la d" S19 Phil 111R% The Iovernment of the Philippine +slands is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees, when they act as special agents within the meaning of (*:T. "1;8 (!##. * special agent is one who receives a definite and fi'ed order or commission, foreign to the e'ercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in representation of the State and e'ecutes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any e'ecutive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not when the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office which can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. CASE: U.S. %. Ce,allo" S1;" S.:* !99R% Suability depends of the consent of the State to be sued& liability on the applicable law and established facts. The circumstance that a State is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable& on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the State has allowed itself to be sued. @hen the State does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff a chance to prove that the defendant is liable. *:T. "1;8 of the .ivil .ode establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this article only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. 4oreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated. Lastly, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. CASE: PN! %. CIR S;1 S.:* 119 (1 0;#R% By engaging in business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation sub/ect to the rules governing private corporations. Iarnishment is a proper remedy for a prevailing party to proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. Since the P66. has the capacity to be sued, any /udgment against it could be enforced by a writ of e'ecution, and its funds could even be garnished. CASE: Ra(o %. C*I of !#laca S118 S.:* 9<!R% The government has organized the GP. as a private corporation, put money in it, and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. *s a IH.., it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the government. 4oreover, the charter provision that the GP. can Ksue and be sued in any courtL is without )ualification on the cause of action and accordingly, it can include a tort claim. CASE: SSS %. CA S1"8 S.:* 080
(1 ;1#R% ?nder its charter, the SSS can sue and be sued. So, even assuming that the SSS en/oys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions by virtue of the e'plicit provision of the enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability.

CASE: USA %. R#i= S11! S.:* 9;0 (1 ;<#R% * contract for the repair of wharves and piers at the naval base in Subic is in line with the defense of both the ?S and the Philippines $$$ indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, $$$ hence, State immunity e'ists. CASE: Malo ) %. PNR S11; S.:* !1 (1 ;<#R% Got all government entities, whether corporate or nonorporate, are immune from suits. +mmunity from suit is determined by the character of the ob/ects for which the entity is organized. @hen the government enters into a commercial transaction it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated li(e any other corporation. +n this case, the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PG:. CASE: A&i)a,le %. C#e ca S91 S.:* 1!8R% The S. allowed suit for the recovery of possession of titled lands

17
previously ta(en over by the government for e'pansion of roads without /ust compensation and the proper e'propriation proceedings. +t would be un/ust for the government to invo(e immunity after it has itself violated the rights of the parties$ claimants by ta(ing over the possession of the lands. CASE: Sa tia)o %. Re8#,lic S;0 S.:* ";9 (1 0;#R% The S. allowed the revocation of a deed of donation made to the Bureau of Plant +ndustry for its failure to comply with the condition that it should install a lighting and water system on the property and build an office building with par(ing lot before said date. +t would be unfair for the government to invo(e its immunity after gratuitously receiving property and not fulfilling its conditions. CASE: Co&&i""io e$ of P#,lic Hi)'wa(" %. !#$)o" S ! S.:* ;11R% *lthough it was shown that plaintiff had not previously filed a claim with the *uditor Ieneral as normally re)uired, she has the right to sue the government for the value of her property which had been converted into public streets without payment of /ust compensation. The doctrine of State immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetuating an in/ustice. CASE: *$oila %. O$ie tal Pa S'i88i ) S1" S.:* "0! (1 <8#R% @hen the State itself files a complaint, the defendant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. This is based on e)uitable grounds. The government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint$in$intervention for the purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff. CASE: Co&&i""io e$ of P#,lic Hi)'wa(" %. Sa Die)o S11 S.:* !1! (1 08#R% *lthough the Iovernment, as plaintiff, in e'propriation proceedings, submit itself to the /urisdiction of the court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the /udgment that is thus rendered re)uiring its payment of the award determined as /ust compensation for the condemned property, as a condition precedent to the transfer of title thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon e'ecution. +t is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the /udgment, since the Iovernment cannot (eep the land and dishonor the /udgment.

NATIONAL AO9ERNMENT I. LEAISLATI9E DEPARTMENT

-. Nat#$e a d Li&it" of Le)i"lati%e Powe$

Nat#$e: The authority to ma(e laws and to alter or repeal them. Dested in .ongress, e'cept to the e'tent reserved to the people by provision on initiative and referendum Plenary (The .ongress may legislate on any sub/ect matter provided that the limitations are observed.# Cla""ificatio of Le)i"lati%e Powe$: 1. Hriginal $ possessed by the sovereign people ". >erivative $ delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people 1. .onstituent $ power to amend and revise the .onstitution 9. Hrdinary $ power to pass ordinary laws

Li&itatio " o t'e Le)i"lati%e Powe$ of Co )$e"": 1. Substantive $ curtails the contents of a law ". Procedural A curtails the manner of passing laws Co$olla$ie": 1. .ongress cannot pass irrepealable laws. ". *s a general rule, .ongress cannot delegate its legislative power. 2'ceptions% 1. >elegation of tariff powers to the President (*rt D+ sec. ";("##. ". >elegation of emergency powers to the President (*rt D+ sec. "1("##. 1. >elegation to the people at large. 9. >elegation to local governments. <. >elegation to administrative bodies (rule$ ma(ing power#. *dministrative *gencies may be allowed to% a. fill up the details of an already complete statute b. ascertain the facts necessary to bring a KcontingentL law into actual operation Te"t" fo$ a 9alid Dele)atio : 1. The .ompleteness Test A The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him e'cept enforce it. ". The Sufficient Standard Test A The law must fi' a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 1. Co&8o"itio , E#alificatio " a d Te$& of

STRUCTURE AND POWERS O* THE

18
Office a. Se ate *rt. D+ secs. "$9 Co&8o"itio of t'e Se ate: elected at large "9 senators he see(s to represent <. * resident of the said district for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election Te$& of Office: 1 years, commencing at noon on the 18th day of -une ne't following their election.

E#alificatio " of Se ato$": 1. Gatural$born citizen ". *t least 1< years old on the day of the election 1. *ble to read and write 9. * registered voter <. :esident of the Philippines for at least " years immediately preceding the day of the election Te$& of Office: ! years, commencing at noon on the 18th day of -une ne't following their election Te$& Li&it": Go Senator shall serve for more than " consecutive terms. 6owever, they may serve for more than " terms provided that the terms are not consecutive. ,. Ho#"e of Re8$e"e tati%e" *rt. D+ secs. <$; Co&8o"itio of t'e Ho#"e of Re8$e"e tati%e": Got more than "<8 members, unless otherwise provided by law, consisting of% 1. >istrict :epresentatives $ elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the 4etropolitan 4anila area. ". Party$List :epresentatives $ constitute "8V of the total number of representatives $ 5or 1 consecutive terms from " 5ebruary 1 ;0, "< seats shall be allotted to sectoral representatives. The sectoral representatives are to be chosen by appointment or election, as may be provided by law. ?ntil a law is passed, they are appointed by the President from a list of nominees by the respective sectors. (*rt. CD+++, sec. 0#

Te$& Li&it": Go member of the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall serve for more than 1 consecutive terms. 9ete$a ;" *ede$atio %. COMELEC 41GGG5 5ormula for the number of additional seats to be awarded to all the other parties under the Party$ list System% Go. of addOl seats for other parties Go. of votes for the concerned party Go. of votes for first party

'

*ddOl seats garnered by first party

A ) !a)o ) !a(a i %. COMELEC 41GG-5 The rules with regard to the Party$list System are that% 1# The parties must represent the marginalized and underrepresented. "# The members must come from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors Their nominees must come from the same party *rt +C, ., secs !$; *rt CD+++, sec. 0 Di&a8o$o %. Mit$a 4-..-5 +n B.P. Blg. ;;1 members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, e'cept for President and Dice$President. The term of office prescribed by the .onstitution may not be e'tended or shortened by the legislature ("" :...L.#, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure# may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not e'ist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office. ?nder the )uestioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its une'pired portion c. S( c'$o i=ed te$&" of office *rt. CD+++ secs 1$" Section 1. The first elections of 4embers of the .ongress under this .onstitution shall be held on the second 4onday of 4ay, 1 ;0. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the 4embers

R#le" o A88o$tio &e t of Le)i"lati%e Di"t$ict": 1. 4aintain proportional representation based on number of inhabitants. 2ach city with a population of at least "<8,888, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative.2ach province, irrespective of the number of inhabitants, shall have at least 1 representative. 2ach legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and ad/acent territory. ". Legislative districts shall be re$apportioned by .ongress within 1 years after the return of each census. E#alificatio " of Re8$e"e tati%e": 1. Gatural$born citizens ". *t least "< years old on the day of the election 1. *ble to read and write 9. :egistered voter in the district

19
of the .ongress. +t shall include the election of all 4embers of the city or municipal councils in the 4etropolitan 4anila area. Section ". The Senators, 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, and the local officials first elected under this .onstitution shall serve until noon of -une 18, 1 ". Hf the Senators elected in the elections in 1 ", the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for si' years and the remaining twelve for three years. 7. Electio a. Re)#la$ Electio *rt D+ sec. ; ?nless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall be held on the second 4onday of 4ay. ,. S8ecial Electio *rt D+ sec. +n case of vacancy in the Senate or in the 6ouse of :epresentatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives thus elected shall serve only for the une'pired term. Lo=ada %. COMELEC The .onstitution mandates that there should always be ade)uate representation for every province or legislative district. +f a vacancy occurs in a manner contemplated in the .onstitution, then .ongress has the authority if not the duty to call for special elections (sub/ect of course to the limitation of time as specified in the .onstitution& see *rt D+ Sect of .onstitution and :* !!9<#. B. Sala$ie", Di"<#alificatio " P$i%ile)e" a d PHILCONSA %. Mat'a( +n this case, the Supreme .ourt held that the phrase 3all members3 of both houses, refers to houses as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them, the fundamental consideration being that the terms of office of all members of the legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or :epresentatives# must have e'pired before the increase in compensation can become operative. 3The .onstitution, instead, uses (1# 3Senate3 and 36ouse of :epresentatives3 and, ("# adds 3all3 before 3the 4embers3, clearly intending that no increase in the compensation therein provided for shall ta(e effect until after the e'piration of the term of the most /unior among the members of the Senate at the time the increase was approved. Precisely, therefore, because the .onstitution spea(s of 3Senate3 and 36ouse of :epresentatives3 instead of 3.ongress3, the prohibition against effectivity continues even after the end of the .ongress which approved the measure and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the end of the term of the members of the 6ouse of :epresentatives approving the increase. +n specifying 3the e'piration of the full term of all the 4embers of the Senate and of the 6ouse of :epresentatives approving such increase3 the .onstitution leaves no doubt that until after the condition is met as to the Senate, no increase in the compensation laid down for Senators and :epresentatives shall ta(e effect.3 Li)ot %. Mat'a( @hile it is .ongress, thru a salary law, that possess the authority to determine the salary of each member, the .onstitution prohibits any increase in said compensation to ta(e effect until after the e'piration of the full term of all the members of the two houses approving such increase. The Supreme .ourt held that a law increasing the 3retirement gratuity3 of members of .ongress falls within the prohibition stated above. +n this case, the law (.ommonwealth *ct 1;!, section 1" (c# as amended by :epublic *ct 9 !;# provided that although the increase in salary was not going to ta(e effect until the ne't term, such increased salary would be made the basis in computing the retirement pay of the incumbent members. This was deemed by the Supreme .ourt as a circumvention of the .onstitutional provision and thus void. ,. *$eedo& f$o& a$$e"t *rticle D+, Section 11 * Senator or 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than si' years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the .ongress is in session. Go 4ember shall be )uestioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the .ongress or in any committee thereof.

a. Sala$ie" *rticle D+, Section 18 The salaries of Senators and 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall be determined by law. Go increase in said compensation shall ta(e effect until after the e'piration of the full term of all the 4embers of the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives approving such increase. *rticle CD+++, Section 10 ?ntil the .ongress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos& the Dice$President, the President of the Senate, the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, and the .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt, two hundred forty thousand pesos each& the Senators, the 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, the *ssociate -ustices of the Supreme .ourt, and the .hairmen of the .onstitutional .ommissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each& and the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

20
Ma$ti e= %. Mo$fe * legislator shall be privileged from arrest while the .ongress is in session. +n the 1 1< .onstitution, under which this case was decided, immunity from arrest was only from civil arrest. This very limited (privilege against civil arrests only# immunity provided under the 1 1< .onstitution (or at least as was interpreted by the court in this particular case# was e'panded under the 1 ;0 .onstitution stating that a member 3shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than ! years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the .ongress is in session.3 c. S8eec' a d De,ate Cla#"e >i&e e= %. Ca,a ),a ) +n this case, a clarification of the scope and limitation of the parliamentary immunity was made. There was reiteration that, first, .ongressional immunity is a guarantee of immunity from answerability before an outside forum but not from answerability to the disciplinary authority of congress itself& second, to come under the guarantee the speech or debate3 must be one made 3in .ongress or in any committee thereof.3 3Said e'pression refers to utterances made by .ongressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of .ongress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in .ongress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by .ongressmen, either in .ongress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of .ongress and of .ongressional .ommittees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in )uestion.3 O"&e a %. Peda t# 2ach 6ouse of the .ongress can discipline its members for disorderly conduct or behavior. @hat constitutes disorderly behavior is entirely up to .ongress to define. *lthough a member of .ongress shall not be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the .ongress or in any committee thereof, such immunity, although absolute in its protection of the member of .ongress against suits for libel, does not shield the member against the disciplinary authority of the .ongress.The .ourt upheld the 1< month suspension, but in retrospect, it was such a harsh punishment (read note on *le/andrino case# that measures were ta(en in 1 01 and subse)uently in the 1 ;0 .onstitution to devise a system of allowing suspension as a penalty but limited its period to si'ty days. (*rt D+, Sec 1!(1## d. Di"<#alificatio " 1. 4ay not hold any other office or employment in the government during his term without forfeiting his seat. ". 4ay not be appointed to any office created or the emoluments thereof were increased during the term for which he was e. D#t( to Di"clo"e *rticle C+, Section 10 * public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be re)uired by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. +n the case of the President, the Dice$ President, the 4embers of the .abinet, the .ongress, the Supreme .ourt, the .onstitutional .ommissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag ran(, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. *rticle D+, Section 1" *ll 4embers of the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall, upon assumption of office, ma(e a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the 6ouse concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. *rticle D+, Section "8 The records and boo(s of accounts of the .ongress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such boo(s shall be audited by the .ommission on *udit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and e'penses incurred for each 4ember. 2. I te$ al Ao%e$ &e t of Co )$e"" of office$" elected. 1. .annot personally appear as counsel before any court, electoral tribunal, )uasi$ /udicial and administrative bodies during his term of office. 9. Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or franchise or special privilege granted by the government during his term of office. <. Shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government when it is for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

a. Electio

O**ICERS: 1. Senate President ". Spea(er of the 6ouse 1. Such officers as deemed by each house to be necessary Electio of office$": By a ma/ority vote of all respective members ,. E#o$#& 4a/ority of each 6ouse shall constitute a )uorum. * smaller number may ad/ourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members. +n computing a )uorum, members who are outside the country, thus outside of each

21
6ouseOs coercive /urisdiction, are not included. A%eli o %. C#e co @hen the .onstitution declares that a ma/ority of 3each 6ouse3 shall constitute a )uorum, 3the 6ouse3 does not mean 3all3 the members. 2ven a ma/ority of all the members constitute 3the 6ouse3. There is a difference between a ma/ority of 3all members of the 6ouse3 and a ma/ority of 3the 6ouse3, the latter re)uiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute ma/ority (1"# of all members of the Senate less one ("1# constitutes constitutional ma/ority of the Senate for the purpose of the )uorum. +n simple terms, Kma/orityL refers to the number of members within the K/urisdictionL of the .ongress (those it can order arrested for the purpose of )uestioning#. +n this case, one Senator was out of the Philippines which is not within the K/urisdictionL of the Senate, so that the wor(ing ma/ority was "1 Senators. c. R#le" of P$oceedi )" 2ach 6ouse shall determine its own procedural rules. Hn matters affecting only internal operation of the legislature, the legislatureOs formulation and implementation of its rules is beyond the reach of the courts. 6owever, when the legislative rule affects private rights, the courts cannot be altogether e'cluded. .orollary to .ongressO power to ma(e rules is the power to ignore them when circumstances so re)uire. suits for libel, does not shield the member against the disciplinary authority of the .ongress. The .ourt upheld the 1< month suspension, but in retrospect, it was such a harsh punishment (read note on *le/andrino case# that measures were ta(en in 1 01 and subse)uently in the 1 ;0 .onstitution to devise a system of allowing suspension as a penalty but limited its period to si'ty days. (*rt D+, Sec 1!(1## e. >o#$ al a d Co )$e""io al Reco$d" 4-5 T'e E $olled !ill T'eo$( *n enrolled bill is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the certifications of the presiding officers of each 6ouse. Thus where the certifications are valid and are not withdrawn, the contents of the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the courts. The respect due to a co$e)ual department re)uires the courts to accept the certification of the presiding officer of the legislative body. Ma,a a) %. Lo8e= 9ito * duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This .ourt held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of three$fourths of the members of the .ongress (as re)uired by the .onstitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments# was not actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the 6ouse of :epresentatives and of the Senate. Ca"co %. Ai&e e= The Kenrolled billL is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the certification of the presiding officer of the legislative body. .ourts must accept certification of the presiding officer as conclusive assurance of the billOs authenticity. The enrolled bill prevails over the /ournal. +t is well settled that the enrolled bill X which uses the term 3urea formaldehyde3 instead of 3urea and formaldehyde3 X is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by .ongress and approved by the President . +f there has been any mista(e in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of .ongress and approved by the 2'ecutive X on which we cannot speculate, without /eopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system X the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by /udicial decree. 415 P$o,ati%e %al#e of t'e >o#$ al The -ournal is conclusive upon the courts. But when the contents of the /ournal conflicts with that of an enrolled bill, the enrolled bill prevails over the contents of the /ournal.

d. Di"ci8li e of Me&,e$" 2ach house may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of ",1 of *LL its members% 1. Suspension (shall not e'ceed !8 days# ". 2'pulsion AleDa d$i o %. E#e=o The history of the si'ty$day limitation on the period of suspension of elected officials (and + thin( for officials with constituencies, even in the e'ecutive branch# traces bac( to this case. The Supreme .ourt said that it was not in the realm of power of the Legislature to suspend its member since suspension deprived the constituents (of the suspended member # the right to be represented in .ongress. +n effect, the suspension can become an act of punishment of the constituents. O"&e a %. Peda t# 2ach 6ouse of the .ongress can discipline its members for disorderly conduct or behavior. @hat constitutes disorderly behavior is entirely up to .ongress to define. *lthough a member of .ongress shall not be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the .ongress or in any committee thereof, such immunity, although absolute in its protection of the member of .ongress against

22
US %. Po " .ongress may validly continue enacting bills even beyond the reglementary period of ad/ournment. @hen the /ournal shows that .ongress conducted a sine die session where the hands of the cloc( are stayed in order to afford .ongress the opportunity to continue its session. *ll bills enacted during the sine die session are valid and conclusive upon the .ourts. The -ournals are conclusive evidence of the contents thereof and .ourts are bound to ta(e /udicial notice of them. 475 Matte$" $e<#i$ed to ,e e te$ed i t'e >o#$ al (a# Peas and Gays on third and final reading of a bill (b# Deto message of the President (c# Peas and Gays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President (d# Peas and Gays on any )uestion at the re)uest of 1,< of members present 4B5 >o#$ al E t$( R#le %. E $olled !ill T'eo$( A"to$)a %. 9ille)a" The bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law as indeed both the President of the Senate and the .hief 2'ecutive withdrew their signatures therein. +n the face of the manifest error committed and subse)uently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the .hief 2'ecutive, for this .ourt to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous conse)uences not intended by the law$ma(ing body. Mo$ale" %. S#,ido The enrolled *ct in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 18 is e'actly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. @e cannot go behind the enrolled *ct to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Iovernment demands that @e act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Htherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawma(ing, with conse)uent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. +f an enrolled bill conflicts with the -ournal on a matter re)uired by the .onstitution to be entered in the -ournal $ has been e'plicitly left by the Supreme .ourt as an open )uestion 425 Co )$e""io al Reco$d f. Se""io " 4-5 Re)#la$ Se""io " .onvenes once every year on the 9 th 4onday of -uly. .ontinues to be in session until 18 days before the start of its ne't regular session, ,. Nat#$e of *# ctio >#$i"dictio : 2ach 2T shall be the sole /udge of all .HGT2STS relating to the election, returns, and )ualifications of their respective members. e'clusive holidays. of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal

415 S8ecial Se""io " .alled by the President at any time when .ongress is not in session 475 AdDo#$ &e t" Geither 6ouse can ad/ourn for more than 1 days during the time .ongress is in session without the consent of the other 6ouse. Geither can they ad/ourn to any other place than that where the two houses are sitting, without the consent of the other. 4B5 >oi t Se""io " 4a5 9oti ) "e8a$atel( $ .hoosing the President (*rt. D++, sec. 9# $ >etermining the PresidentOs temporary disability (+d., sec. 11, par 9# $ .onfirming the nomination of a Dice$ President (+d., sec. # $ >eclaring a state of war (*rt. D+, sec. "1(1# $ *mending the .onstitution (*rt. CD++, sec. 1(1# 4,5 9oti ) >oi tl( $ To revo(e or e'tend martial law or suspension of privilege of habeas corpus (*rt. D++, sec. 1;# 3. Electo$al T$i,# al" a. Co&8o"itio 1. 1 Supreme .ourt -ustices to be designated by the .hief -ustice (The senior -ustice in the 2lectoral Tribunal shall be its .hairman.# ". ! 4embers of the Senate or 6ouse, as the case may be, chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and party$list organizations The 2T shall be constituted within 18 days after the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentative shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Spea(er. 4embers chosen en/oy security of tenure and cannot be removed by mere change of party affiliation. Ta ada %. C#e co A,,a" %. SET The five L>P members who are also members of the Senate 2lectoral Tribunal may not inhibit themselves since it is clear that the .onstitution intended legislative and /udiciary membership to the tribunal. *s a matter of fact, the " %1 ratio of legislative to /udiciary indicates tat legislative membership cannot be ignored. To e'clude themselves is to abandon a duty that no other court can perform.

23
This includes determining the validity or invalidity of a proclamation declaring a particular candidate as the winner. *n Nelection contestO is one where a defeated candidate challenges the )ualification and claims for himself the seat of a proclaimed winner. +n the absence of an election contest, the 2T is without /urisdiction. A )a$a %. Electo$al Co&&i""io The 2lectoral Tribunal of each 6ouse is the SHL2 /udge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and )ualifications of the members of .ongress. +n the absence of election contest, the 2lectoral Tribunal has no /urisdiction. The 2lectoral Tribunals are independent constitutional bodies and cannot be regulated by .ongress. Supreme .ourt has /urisdiction over the 2lectoral .ommission and the sub/ect matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and e'tent of the constitutional grant to the 2lectoral .ommission as 3the sole /udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and )ualifications of the members of the Gational *ssembly.3 Re<#e"t of >#"tice" Mele cio6He$$e$a, C$#= a d *elicia o to ,e Relie%ed a" &e&,e$" of HRET 4Re". Ma$c' -., -..-5 c. I de8e de ce of t'e Electo$al T$i,# al" Since the 2TOs are independent constitutional bodies, independent even of the respective 6ouse, neither .ongress nor the .ourts may interfere with procedural matters relating to the functions of the 2TOs. !o doc %. Pi eda The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two$thirds of its members are politicians. +t is a non$political body in a sea of politicians. @hat this .ourt had earlier said about the 2lectoral .ommission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and 6ouse of :epresentatives% 3The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the 2lectoral .ommission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously e'ercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members. 3The power granted to the electoral .ommission to /udge contests relating to the election and )ualification of members of the Gational *ssembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.3 3The 2lectoral Tribunals of the Senate and the 6ouse were created by the .onstitution as special tribunals to be the sole /udge of all contests relating to election returns and )ualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.3 (Suanes vs. .hief *ccountant of the Senate, ;1 Phil. ;1;.# To be able to e'ercise e'clusive /urisdiction, the 6ouse 2lectoral Tribunal must be independent. +ts /urisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the .ourts. 3The 2lectoral .ommission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ& while composed of a ma/ority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. 3 Dalid grounds , -ust cause for termination of membership to the tribunal. 2'piration of .ongressional term of office >eath or permanent disability :esignation form political party which one represents in the tribunal :emoval form office for other valid reasons d. Powe$" A )a$a %. Electo$al Co&&i""io , S#8$a La=ati %. HRET Since the candidate has already been proclaimed, /urisdiction now belongs to the 6:2T, thus its rules must be applied. e. >#dicial $e%iew of deci"io " of Electo$al T$i,# al" -udicial review of decisions of the 2TOs may be had with the S. only insofar as the decision or resolution was rendered without or in e'cess of /urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to denial of due process. Co %. HRET *s constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the 2lectoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the e'ercise of their functions independent organs X independent of .ongress and the Supreme .ourt. The power granted to 6:2T by the .onstitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature (*ngara vs. 2lectoral .ommission, !1 Phil. 11 S1 1!R#.

0. Co&&i""io o A88oi t&e t" Co&8o"itio : 1. Senate President as e'$officio chairman (.hairman shall not vote e'cept in case of a tie.# ". 1" Senators 1. 1" 4embers of the 6ouse The 1" Senators and 1" :epresentatives are elected on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and party$list organizations. The .* shall be constituted within 18 days after the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentative shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Spea(er. The .* shall act on all appointments

24
within 18 session days from their submission to .ongress. The .* shall rule by a ma/ority vote of all its members. was done 3on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.3The other political parties or groups in the 6ouse, such as petitioner7s Q*+B* (which is presumably a member also of the .oalesced 4a/ority#, are bound by the ma/ority7s choices. 2ven if Q*+B* were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner .oseteng# represents only .9V or less than 1V of the 6ouse membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 1" 6ouse seats in the .ommission on *ppointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the .ommission on *ppointments, a political party should represent at least ;.9V of the 6ouse membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 10 congressmen or congresswomen.

Meeti )": .* meets only while .ongress is in session. 4eetings are held either at the call of the .hairman or a ma/ority of all its members. Since the .* is also an independent constitutional body, its rules of procedure are also outside the scope of congressional powers as well as that of the /udiciary. >#$i"dictio : 1. .* shall confirm the appointments by the President with respect to the following positions% 6eads of the 2'ecutive >epartments (e'cept if it is the Dice$President who is appointed to the post# *mbassadors, other public ministers or consuls Hfficers of the *5P from the ran( of .olonel or Gaval .aptain Hther officers whose appointments are vested in him by the .onstitution (e.g. .H42L2. members# ". .ongress cannot by law re)uire that the appointment of a person to an office created by such law shall be sub/ect to confirmation by the .*. 1. *ppointments e'tended by the President to the above$mentioned positions while .ongress is not in session shall only be effective until disapproval by the .* or until the ne't ad/ournment of .ongress. C# a a %. Ta Da=a %. Si )"o The court resolves that issue in favor of the authority of the 6ouse of :epresentatives to change its representation in the .ommission on *ppointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. +t is understood that such changes in membership must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. Co"ete ) %. Mit$a The composition of the 6ouse membership in the .ommission on *ppointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the 6ouse. There are 1!8 members of the L>P in the 6ouse. They represent 0 V of the 6ouse membership (which may be rounded out to ;8V#. 2ighty percent (;8V# of 1" members in the .ommission on *ppointments would e)ual .! members, which may be rounded out to ten (18# members from the L>P. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Derano$Pap# as the ne't largest party in the .oalesced 4a/ority and the QBL (respondent :o)ue *blan# as the principal opposition party in the 6ouse. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the 6ouse membership in the .ommission on *ppointments

A#i )o a % Ao =ale" The provision of Section 1; on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the ma/ority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation& otherwise, the party with a ma/ority representation in the Senate or the house of :epresentatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By re)uiring a proportional representation in the .ommission on *ppointments, Section 1; in effect wor(s as a chec( on the ma/ority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. Go party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the .ommission on *ppointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same to(en, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the .ommission.3

The .onstitution does not re)uire that the full complement of 1" Senators be elected to the membership in the .ommission on *ppointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 1" Senators to the .ommission. The overriding directive of *rticle D+, Section 1; is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the .ommission on *ppointments and that the specification of 1" members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the ma'imum complement allowable under the .onstitution. The act of filing up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations li(e the case at bar. /. Powe$" of Co )$e"" a. Ae e$al Ple a$( Powe$" ,. Li&itatio " o t'e le)i"lati%e 8owe$ 4-5 S#,"ta ti%e li&itatio " 4a5 E+8$e"" "#,"ta ti%e li&itatio " 4,5 I&8lied "#,"ta ti%e li&itatio "

25
$ Ieneral :ule% Gon$delegability of Legislative power $ 2'ceptions% i. >elegation to the President ii.>elegation to local govOts $Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws Pelae= %. A#dito$ Ae e$al 415 P$oced#$al Li&itatio " *rt. D+ Secs "!$"0 Section "!. (1# 2very bill passed by the .ongress shall embrace only one sub/ect which shall be e'pressed in the title thereof. ("# Go bill passed by either 6ouse shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its 4embers three days before its passage, e'cept when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. ?pon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be ta(en immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the -ournal. Section "0. (1# 2very bill passed by the .ongress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. +f he approves the same he shall sign it& otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his ob/ections to the 6ouse where it originated, which shall enter the ob/ections at large in its -ournal and proceed to reconsider it. +f, after such reconsideration, two$ thirds of all the 4embers of such 6ouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the ob/ections, to the other 6ouse by which it shall li(ewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two$thirds of all the 4embers of that 6ouse, it shall become a law. +n all such cases, the votes of each 6ouse shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the 4embers voting for or against shall be entered in its -ournal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the 6ouse where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. ("# The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not ob/ect. c. E#e"tio Ho#$ A$t. 9I Sec. 11 The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the re)uest of either 6ouse, as the rules of each 6ouse shall provide, appear before and be heard by such 6ouse on any matter pertaining to their departments. @ritten )uestions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. +nterpellations shall not be limited to written )uestions, but may cover matters related thereto. @hen the security of the State or the public interest so re)uires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in e'ecutive session. d. Le)i"lati%e i %e"ti)atio " Li&itatio ": 1. The in)uiry must be in aid of legislation. ". The in)uiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. 1. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such in)uiries shall be respected. Co$olla$ie":
1. The power of investigation necessarily includes the power to punish a contumacious witness for contempt. ". 6owever, legislatureOs power to commit a witness for contempt terminates when the legislative body ceases to e'ist upon its final ad/ournment. 6ouse of :epresentatives A 1 years Senate A indefinite (Senate, with its staggered terms, is a continuing body.# 1. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in .ongress and this power is sui generis. ?nless e'pressly authorized, local government units cannot e'ercise said power.

A$ a#lt %. Na=a$e o The power of in)uiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate au'iliary to the legislative function. The in)uiry, to be within the /urisdiction of the legislative body ma(ing it, must be material or necessary to the e'ercise of a power in it vested by the .onstitution, such as to legislate or to e'pel a member. +n order to ascertain the character or nature of an in)uiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an in)uiry is proposed to be made. Hnce an in)uiry is admitted or established to be within the /urisdiction of a legislative body to ma(e, the investigating committee has the power to re)uire a witness to answer any )uestion pertinent to the sub/ect of the in)uiry, sub/ect of the course to his constitutional privilege against self$incrimination. The materiality of a )uestion that it may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the sub/ect of the in)uiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. @here the immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its /urisdiction, the .ourt is duty bound to pass upon the contention. *lthough the legislative body has the power to ma(e the in)uiry, the .ourt is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the e'ercise of that power. The power of investigation necessarily includes the power to punish a contumacious witness for contempt. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the e'istence of that body. @hile the e'istence of the 6ouse of :epresentatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to e'ist

26
upon the periodical dissolution of the .ongress or of the 6ouse of :epresentatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate7s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be e'erted. A$ a#lt %. !ala)ta" The principle that .ongress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the e'ercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. The Senate being a continuing body unli(e the 6ouse has the power to order such witness to remain in detention. !e )=o %. Se ate !l#e Ri,,o Co&&ittee The power of both houses of .ongress to conduct in)uiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. +ts e'ercise is circumscribed by the afore$)uoted provision of the .onstitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be 3in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure3 and that 3the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such in)uiries shall be respected.3 +t follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of :ights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one7s self. The power to conduct formal in)uiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate :ules of Procedure Ioverning +n)uiries in *id of Legislation. Such in)uiries may refer to the implementation or re$ e'amination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also e'tend to any and all matters vested by the .onstitution in .ongress and,or in the Senate alone. e. Act a" a ,oa$d of ca %a""e$" fo$ P$e"ide tial a d 9ice6P$e"ide tial electio " Y *rticle D++, Section 9, par 9 The returns of every election for President and Dice$President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the .ongress, directed to the President of the Senate. ?pon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives in /oint public session, and the .ongress, upon determination of the authenticity and due e'ecution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. Y :ep. *ct Go. 01!!, Section 18 election shall be deemed certified under paragraph ", Section "!, *rticle D1 of this .onstitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the .ongress. *ppropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be e'empt from the re)uirements of paragraph 9, Section "<, *rticle D1 of this .onstitution. The convening of the .ongress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Go special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the ne't presidential election. ). Re%o@e o$ e+te d "#"8e "io of 8$i%ile)e of Ha,ea" Co$8#" o$ decla$atio of &a$tial law Y *rticle D++, Section 1; The President shall be the .ommander$in$.hief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. +n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety re)uires it, he may, for a period not e'ceeding si'ty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. @ithin forty$eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the .ongress. The .ongress, voting /ointly, by a vote of at least a ma/ority of all its 4embers in regular or special session, may revo(e such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. ?pon the initiative of the President, the .ongress may, in the same manner, e'tend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the .ongress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety re)uires it. The .ongress, if not in session, shall, within twenty$four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the e'tension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. * state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the .onstitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of /urisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons /udicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. >uring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be /udicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

f. Call "8ecial electio fo$ P$e"ide t a d 9ice6P$e"ide t Y *rticle D++, Section 18 The .ongress shall, at ten o7cloc( in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Dice$President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Dice$President to be held not earlier than forty$five days nor later than si'ty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special

27
'. A88$o%e P$e"ide tial a& e"tie" Y *rticle D++, Section 1 2'cept in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this .onstitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final /udgment. 6e shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .ongress. i. Co fi$& ce$tai a88oi t&e t" !( Co )$e"" Y *rticle D++, Section @henever there is a vacancy in the Hffice of the Dice$President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Dice$ President from among the 4embers of the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a ma/ority vote of all the 4embers of both 6ouses of the .ongress, voting separately. !( Co&&i""io o A88oi t&e t" Sa$&ie to %. Mi"o +n Sarmiento vs. 4ison, et al. (1<! S.:* <9 S1 ;0R#, we construed Section 1!, *rticle D++ of the .onstitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 1!, *rticle D++ re)uire confirmation by the .ommission on *ppointments. The ruling in 4ison was reiterated in the recent case of 4ary .oncepcion Bautista vs. Sen. -ovito Salonga, et al. (I.:. Go. ;!91 , promulgated on *pril 11, 1 ; #. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph ", Section <, *rt. D+ may be filled by appointment by the President by e'press provision of Section 0, *rt. CD+++ of the .onstitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the 6ouse of :epresentatives are among the 3other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this .onstitution,3 referred to in the first sentence of Section 1!, *rt. D++ whose appointments are sub/ect to confirmation by the .ommission on *ppointments (Sarmiento v. 4ison, supra#. D. Co c#$ i t$eatie" Y *rticle D++, Section "1 (through senate# Go treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two$thirds of all the 4embers of the Senate. @. Decla$atio of wa$ a d dele)atio of e&e$)e c( 8owe$" Y *rticle D+, Section "1 The President shall address the .ongress at the opening of its regular session. 6e may also appear before it at any other time. l. !e t'e D#d)e of t'e P$e"ide t;" 8'("ical fit e"" Y *rticle D++, Section 11, par 9 +f the .ongress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is re)uired to assemble, determines by a two$thirds vote of both 6ouses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Dice$President shall act as President& otherwise, the President shall continue e'ercising the powers and duties of his office. &. Powe$ of i&8eac'&e t i. who are sub/ect to impeachment Y *rticle C+, Section " The President, the Dice$President, the 4embers of the Supreme .ourt, the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and the Hmbudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. *ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. ii. grounds for impeachment Y *rticle C+, Section " iii. Procedure for impeachment Y *rticle C+, Section 1 (1#$(!# (1# The 6ouse of :epresentatives shall have the e'clusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. ("# * verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any 4ember thereof, which shall be included in the Hrder of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper .ommittee within three session days thereafter. The .ommittee, after hearing, and by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers, shall submit its report to the 6ouse within si'ty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the 6ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof. (1# * vote of at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the *rticles of +mpeachment of the .ommittee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each 4ember shall be recorded. (9# +n case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse, the same shall constitute the *rticles of +mpeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (<# Go impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (!# The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. @hen sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. @hen the President of the Philippines is on trial, the .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt shall preside, but shall not vote. Go person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two$thirds of all the 4embers of the Senate. Ro&#lo %". Y i<#e= v. .onse)uence of impeachment Y *rticle C+, Section 1 (0# -udgment in cases of impeachment shall not e'tend further than removal from office and dis)ualification to hold any office under the :epublic of the Philippines, but the party

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convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub/ect to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. vi. 4ust impeachment precede filing of criminal caseF Leca$o= %. Sa di)a ,a(a Pes, it wonOt prosper if no conviction . Powe$ wit' $e)a$d to #tili=atio of at#$al $e"o#$ce" Y *rticle C++, Section " *ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. @ith the e'ception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The e'ploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly underta(e such activities, or it may enter into co$production, /oint venture, or production$sharing agreements with 5ilipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least si'ty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not e'ceeding twenty$five years, renewable for not more than twenty$five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. +n cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. The State shall protect the nation7s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and e'clusive economic zone, and reserve its use and en/oyment e'clusively to 5ilipino citizens. The .ongress may, by law, allow small$scale utilization of natural resources by 5ilipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish$ wor(ers in rivers, la(es, bays, and lagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign$owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large$scale e'ploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.+n such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the .ongress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its e'ecution. o. A&e d&e t of t'e co "tit#tio Y *rticle CD++, Sections 1$" Section 1. *ny amendment to, or revision of, this .onstitution may be proposed by% (1# The .ongress, upon a vote of three$fourths of all its 4embers& or ("# * constitutional convention. Section ". *mendments to this .onstitution may li(ewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Go amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this .onstitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The .ongress shall provide for the implementation of the e'ercise of this right. Y *rticle CD (1 1< .onstitution# The .ongress in /oint session assembled, by a vote of three$fourths of all the 4embers of the Senate and of the 6ouse of :epresentatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this .onstitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this .onstitution when approved by a ma/ority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. .. Le)i"lati%e P$oce""

a. Re<#i$e&e t" a" to ,ill" 4-5 A" to title" of ,ill" 2very bill shall embrace only 1 sub/ect which shall be e'pressed in the title thereof. The title does not have to be a complete catalogue of everything stated in the bill. +t is sufficient if the title e'presses the general sub/ect of the bill and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general sub/ect. * bill which repeals legislation regarding the sub/ect matter need not state in the title that it is repealing the latter. Thus, a repealing clause in the bill is considered germane to the sub/ect matter of the bill. @hich should control, the title or the te't of a statuteF C$#= %. Pa$a" 415 Re<#i$e&e t" a" to ce$tai law" 4a5 A88$o8$iatio law" Limitations% *o$ Ae e$al A88$o8$iatio " !ill" Y .ongress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Iovernment as specified in the budget. Y 5orm, content and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law. Y Go provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Y Procedure in approving appropriations 5H: T62 .HGI:2SS shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. Y Go law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations. 6owever, the following may, BP L*@, be authorized to *?I42GT any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations% 1. President

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". 1. 9. <. Senate President Spea(er of the 6ouse .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt 6eads of the .onstitutional .ommissions augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. A#i )o a %". Ca$a)#e Since 1 ;<, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of P" ,098,!11,888.88 set aside for the >epartment of 2ducation, .ulture and Sports under the Ieneral *ppropriations *ct (:.*. Go. !;11#, is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the the constitutional mandate according highest priority to education. 6aving faithfully complied therewith, .ongress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good /udgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. +t is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. 4ore especially, the very survival of our economy is at sta(e. Thus, if in the process .ongress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the .ourt finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. 5our phases of IovernmentOs budgeting process. Budget preparation Legislative authorization Budget e'ecution Budget accountability 4,5 Ta+ law" :e)uirement% Go law granting any ta' e'emption shall be passed without the concurrence of a 4*-H:+TP of *LL the members of the .ongress. .onstitutional Ta' 2'emptions% 1. The following properties are e'empt from :2*L P:HP2:TP ta'es% a. .haritable institutions b. .hurches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto c. 4os)ues d. Gon$profit cemeteries& and e. *ll lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and e'clusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. ". *ll revenues and assets of GHG$STH.Q GHG$ P:H5+T 2>?.*T+HG*L institutions are e'empt from ta'es and duties P:HD+>2> that such revenues and assets are actually, directly and e'clusively used for educational purposes (*rt. C+D sec. 9 (1##. 1. Irants, endowments, donations or contributions used actually, directly and e'clusively for educational purposes shall be e'empt from ta', sub/ect to conditions prescribed by law (*rt. C+D sec. 9 (9##. Limitations% 1. The rule of ta'ation shall be ?G+5H:4 and 2J?+T*BL2. ". .ongress shall evolve a P:HI:2SS+D2 system of ta'ation.

Y >+S.:2T+HG*:P 5?G>S appropriated 5H: P*:T+.?L*: H55+.+*LS shall be disbursed only% Y 5or public purposes Y To be supported by appropriate vouchers Y Sub/ect to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law Y Go public money or property shall be appropriated Y +f .ongress fails to pass the general appropriations bill by the end of any fiscal year% Y The general appropriations bill for the previous year is deemed reenacted Y +t shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by .ongress. *o$ S8ecial A88$o8$iatio " !ill Y Shall specify the purpose for which it is intended Y Shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the Gational Treasurer or to be raised by corresponding revenue proposal therein Li&itatio o U"e of P#,lic *# d"HA$t. 9I, I1. Y Go money shall be paid out of the Gational Treasury 2C.2PT in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Y 6owever, this rule does not prohibit continuing appropriations, e.g. for debt servicing, for the reason that this rule does not re)uire yearly or annual appropriation. Limitations% Y *ppropriations must be for a P?BL+. P?:PHS2 Y .annot appropriate public funds or property, directly or indirectly, in favor of 1. *ny sect, church, denomination, or sectarian institution or system of religion or ". *ny priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. 2C.2PT if the priest, etc is assigned to% 1. the *rmed 5orces& or ". any penal institution& or 1. government orphanage& or 9. leprosarium Y 6owever, the government is not prohibited from appropriating money for a valid secular purpose, even if it incidentally benefits a religion, e.g. appropriations for a national police force is valid even if the police also protects the safety of clergymen. Y *lso, the temporary use of public property for religious purposes is valid, as long as the property is available for all religions. De&et$ia %". Al,a The provision in )uestion unduly overe'tends the privilege granted to the president under Sec. 1! (<# of the .onstitution insofar as it empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be ta(en, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of

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1. The power to ta' must be e'ercised for a public purpose because the power e'ists for the general welfare 9. The due process and e)ual protection clauses of the .onstitution should be observed. Y The President must communicate his decision to veto within 18 days from the date of receipt thereof. +f he fails to do so, the bill shall become a law as if he signed it. Y To override the veto, at least ",1 of *LL the members of each 6ouse must agree to pass the bill. +n such case, the veto is overridden and becomes a law without need of presidential approval. +tem veto Y The President may veto particular items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. Y This veto will not affect items to which he does not ob/ect. Y Deto of a :ider Y * rider is a provision which does not relate to a particular appropriation stated in the bill. Y Since it is an invalid provision under Section "<("#, the President may veto it as an item. !oli ao Elect$o ic" Co$8 %". 9ale cia *n invalid veto is as if the President did not act on the bill at all. Bill becomes a law by e'ecutive inaction. * condition in an appropriation bill may be not be vetoed without vetoing the item to which it is attached.The veto made by the President is invalid since the 2'ecutiveOs veto power does not carry with it the power to stri(e out conditions , attached to an item. 5urther, the conditions vetoed were germane to the appropriation hence should have not been vetoed. +f the veto is unconstitutional, it produces no effect whatsoever. The restriction , condition imposed by the appropriation bill remains. Ao =ale" %". Maca$ai). >H.T:+G2 H5 +G*PP:HP:+*T2 P:HD+S+HGS * provision that is constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue item. President may veto KridersL. Provision involved% S2.. <<. Prohibition *gainst the :estoration or +ncrease of :ecommended *ppropriations >isapproved and,or :educed by .ongress% Go item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to .ongress pursuant to *rticle D++, Section "" of the .onstitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this *ct shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. *n item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by .ongress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this *ct.3 The PresidentOs veto of such provision is constitutional since the provision does not relate to any particular , distinctive appropriation in the bill. :ather, it applies to all items disapproved , reduced by .ongress in the budget proposal submitted by the President. The disapproved , reduced items are nowhere to be found in the face of the bill. To discover them, resort should be made to the original recommendations made by the President. Detoed sections are more of an e'pression of .ongressional policy in respect the augmentation from the savings rather than an budgetary appropriation.

S8ecial *# d" Y 4oney collected on a ta' levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. Y Hnce the special purpose is fulfilled or abandoned, any balance shall be transferred to the general funds of the Iovernment P4.* v. .ollector of +nternal :evenue !i"'o8 of N#e%a Se)o%ia %. P$o%i cial !oa$d P$o%i ce of A,$a %. He$ a do A8o"tolic P$efect %. T$ea"#$e$ ,. P$oced#$e fo$ t'e 8a""a)e of ,ill" Bills that 4ust Hriginate from the 6ouse of :epresentatives% 1. *ppropriation bills (* bill appropriating a sum of money from the public treasury.# $ * bill creating a new office, and appropriating funds therefor is GHT an appropriation bill. ". :evenue bills (* bill specifically designed to raise money or revenue through imposition or levy.# 1. * law regulating an industry, though incidentally imposing a ta', does not ma(e the law a revenue bill. 9. Tariff bills <. Bills authorizing the increase of public debt !. Bills of local application 0. Private bills :eadings% Y 2ach bill must pass 1 readings in both 6ouses. Y 2ach reading shall be held on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form shall be distributed to its members 1 days before its passage. 2'ception% +f a bill is certified as urgent by the President as to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency, the 1 readings can be held on the same day 5irst reading% Hnly the title is read& the bill is passed to the proper committee Second reading% 2ntire te't is read and debates are held, and amendments introduced. Third reading% Hnly the title is read, no amendments are allowed. Dote shall be ta(en immediately thereafter and the yeas and nays entered in the /ournal. c. T'e P$e"ide t;" 9eto 8owe$ *rt. D+, Z"0 Y 2very bill, in order to become a law, must be presented to and signed by the President. Y +f the President does not approve of the bill, he shall veto the same and return it with his ob/ections to the 6ouse from which it originated. The 6ouse shall enter the ob/ections in the /ournal and proceed to reconsider it.

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!e )=o %". D$ilo President *)uino vetoed the appropriation of the (increased# pension of retired /ustices setting up as a defense the standardization of compensation in the government. The act of the 2'ecutive in vetoing the particular provisions is an e'ercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the .onstitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its e'ercise. The veto power is not absolute. The pertinent provision of the .onstitution reads% 3The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not ob/ect.3 (Section "0("#, *rticle D+, .onstitution# The HSI is correct when it states that the 2'ecutive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. 6e or she cannot act li(e an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she disli(es. +n the e'ercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. 6owever, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the *dministration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain ob/ectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. +t is for this reason that the .onstitution has wisely provided the 3item veto powers3 to avoid ine'pedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. The .onstitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. *n item is distinguished from a provision in the following manner% 3The terms item and provision in budgetary legislations and practice are concededly different. *n ite& in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill. +t is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. *n 7item7 of an appropriation bill means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.73 The president cannot veto unavoidable obligations such as the payment of Pensions which has already been vested by the law. The veto is invalid since it is violated the separation of property and the /udiciaryOs fiscal autonomy. d. Le)i"lati%e %etoe" Mille$ %. Pa$do e. Effecti%it( of law" Y *rticle " (..# Laws shall ta(e effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Hfficial Iazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This code shall ta(e effect one year after such publication. Y 2'ecutive Hrder Go. "88 (-une 1;, 1 ;0#

Ta ada %". T#%e$a >ue process re)uires that laws of general application to have force and effect must be published. Ta ada %". T#%e$a, Re"ol#tio of M*R The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with. -G. I itiati%e a d Refe$e d#& *rt. D+, Z1" The .ongress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the e'ceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or re/ect any act or law or part thereof passed by the .ongress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. :* !01< (*ug 9, 1 ; #

II. E:ECUTI9E DEPARTMENT

A. THE PRESIDENT -. E#alificatio ", electio , te$& a d oat' A$t. 9II, Sec. 1. Go person may be elected President unless he is a natural$born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. The candidate must be )ualified on the day of the elections. Bear in mind that residency and domicile mean the same thing under election law, i.e., the ff must be ta(en into consideration% bodily presence, animus manendiand animus revertendi. A$t. 9II, Sec. B. The President and the Dice$ President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of si' years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of -une ne't following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date si' years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. Go person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be )ualified for election to the same office at any time. Go Dice$President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Doluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. ?nless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Dice$President shall be held on the second 4onday of 4ay. The returns of every election for President and Dice$ President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each provinces or city, shall be transmitted to the

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.ongress, directed to the President of the Senate. ?pon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of election (w,c is the "nd Tuesday of -une#, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and 6ouse of :epresentatives in /oint public session, and the .ongress, upon determination of the authenticity and due e'ecution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificates of canvass# the votes. The persons having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an e)ual and highest number of votes (tie#, one of them shall forth with be chosen by the vote of a ma/ority of all the members of .ongress, voting separately. The .ongress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme .ourt, sitting en banc, shall be the sole /udge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and )ualifications of the President, or Dice$President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Electio a d Te$& of P$e"ide t par. 1# The person who succeeds as President and not /ust in an acting capacity, could either be (i# the Dice$President, or (ii# one who was elected President in a special election. +n both cases, if he has served for more than 9 years, he is ineligible for re$election as President. +f he served for 9 years or less, he can run for re$ election, it is submitted, since (a# the term 3succeeded3 encompasses election and (b# the general rule prohibiting the President to run for re$election refers to the President elected during the regular election. 5urthermore, it is submitted that this person may resign on the 9th year so as to be )ualified to run for President, since there is nothing in the .onstitution that prohibits this. +n view of the wording of *rt. CD++, Sec. <, however, President *)uino can run for the 1 " election as President without violating the rule against re$ election since the 5ebruary 0, 1 ;0 election was not conducted under the present .onstitution, the 1 " Presidential election being the 3first regular elections3 to be held under this .onstitution. 5urthermore, although she may have served for more than 9 years as President by then, she will have done so not as successor to the Presidency. +f Dice$President Laurel is the one who serves as President for more than 9 years, then he cannot run for the Presidency in 1 ". The Dice$President on the other hand, shall not serve for more than " successive terms. *nd for this purpose, a voluntary (but not involuntary# renunciation of office for any length of time, shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full terms for which he was elected. (*rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. "#. This is applicable, however, beginning 1 ", because of the Transitory Provisions. (This prohibition is similar to that applicable to Senators.# .anvassing of 2lection :eturns *s already noted in the Hther Powers of the Legislature, supra, it is the .ongress that acts as Board of .anvassers of every election for President and Dice$President. 2lectoral Tribunal for the President and Dice$ President 2lection of the

:egular 2lection and Term The President and Dice$President (who shall be elected with and in the same manner as the President# shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of ! years, which shall begin on the noon of -une 18 ne't following the day of election. The regular election for President and Dice$President shall be held on the "nd 4onday of 4ay. (*rt. D++, Sec. 9 pars. 1 = 1#.Special 2lection and Term +f a vacancy occurs in the offices of President and Dice$ President more than 1; months before the date of the ne't regular presidential election, a special election to elect the President and Dice$President shall be called by .ongress, pursuant to D++, 18. (See discussion under Hther Powers of .ongress, supra and Succession, infra.# * conditional resignation by the incumbent President is not a real resignation that creates a vacancy for the purpose of calling a special election. But in the P'ili88i e !a$ A""ociatio , I c. % COMELEC, the failure of the S. to issue an in/unction on time is already a decision in itself in favor of the validity of the law calling for Snap 2lections despite the absence of vacancy& only, it is a decision that is not supported by a ratio decidendi. +ndeed, a midterm election in a presidential system of government in response to popular clamor for it, is a legal anomaly. The .onstitution is silent as to whether the persons elected in the special election shall serve only for the une'pired portion of the term, and whether the new President can run for re$ election if he has not served more than 9 years, which depends on the construction of the phrase 3has succeeded as the President,3 discussed in the ne't section. DD% Hnly une'pired portion. :e$election The President shall not be eligible for any re$election. 5urthermore, no person who has 3succeeded3 as President and has served as such for more than 9 years, shall be )ualified for any election to the same office (the Presidency# at any time. (*rt. D++, Sec. 9,

The Supreme .ourt, sitting en banc, shall be the sole /udge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and )ualifications of the President or Dice$President, and may promulgate its rules for that purpose. (*rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. 0.# Gote that while election controversies in the .ongress are under the e'clusive /urisdiction of their respective 2lectoral Tribunals, those in the 2'ecutive are under the Supreme .ourt itself. Oat' of Office A$t. 9II, Sec. 2. Before they enter on the e'ecution of their office, the President, the Dice$President or the *cting President shall ta(e the following oath or affirmation% 3+ do solemnly swear (or affirm# that + will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Dice$President or *cting President# of the Philippines, preserve and defend its .onstitution, e'ecute its laws, do /ustice to every man, and consecrate to myself to the service of the Gation. So help me Iod.3 (+n case of affirmation, last sentence will be

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omitted.# 1. P$i%ile)e a d "ala$( A$t. 9II, Sec. 3. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Dice$President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. Go increase in said compensation shall ta(e effect until after the e'piration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not received during their tenure any other emolument from the Iovernment or any other source. A$t. :9III. Sec -0. ?nless the .ongress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of P 188,888& '''. 7. P$o'i,itio " A$t. 9II, Sec. -7. The President, Dice$ President, the 4embers of the .abinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this .onstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$ owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, or the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, or as Secretaries, ?ndersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Ci%il Li,e$tie" U io %" E+ec#ti%e Sec$eta$(, 5*.TS% petitioner challenged 2'. Hrder Go. ";9 which in effect allowed .abinet members, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the 2'ecutive >epartment to hold other positions in the govt., albeit, sub/ect of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners7 argument that the measure was violative of *rt. D+++, Sec. 11, invo(ed *rt. +C$B, Sec. 0, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions. 62L>% +n declaring the 2H unconstitutional, the S. held that by ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that .abinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than " positions in the govt. and IHH.s, 2H ";9 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the e'press mandate of *rt. D+++, Sec. 11 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1 ;0 .onstitution itself. +f ma'imum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head7s ability and e'pertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment. The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 11, *rt. D++ as compared to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under *rt. +C, B, Sec. 0, par. " are proof of the intent of the 1 ;0 .onsti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibtions. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the .abinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when e'pressly authorized by the .onsti. itself. ''' 6owever, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under *rt. D++, Sec. 11 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the 2'ecutive officials specified therein w,o addition compensation in an e'$officio capacity as provided by law and as re)uired by the primary functions of said official7s office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise 3any other office3 w,in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials. Ada8ted. Co&8a$e P$o'i,itio " a)ai "t ot'e$ official" A$t. 9I, Sec. -7. Go Senator or 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives may hold any other office or employment in the Iovernment, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Geither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. A$t. I:, A, Sec. 1. Go 4ember of a .onstitutional .ommission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Geither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Iovernment, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. A$t. I:, !, Sec. 0. Go elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. ?nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. A$t. 9III, Sec. -1. The 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing )uasi$/udicial or administrative

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functions. E+ce8tio " to $#le 8$o'i,iti ) e+ec#ti%e official" f$o& 'oldi ) additio al 8o"itio ": a. President (1# The President can assume a .abinet post, (because the departments are mere e'tensions of his personality, according to the >octrine of Jualified Political *gency, so no ob/ection can be validly raised based on A$t. 9II, Sec. -7.# ("# The President is the .hairman of G2>*. ( A$t. :II, Sec. .# b. Dice$President A$t. 9II, Sec. 7. ''' The Dice$President may be appointed as member of the .abinet. Such appointment re)uires no confirmation .c. .abinet (1# The Secretary of -ustice shall be an e'$officio member of the -udicial and Bar .ouncil. ( A$t. 9III, Sec. /J-R# "# ?nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, appointive officials shall not hold any other office or employment in the Iovernment or any subdivi$ sion, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$ owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (A$t. I:, !, 0, 8a$. 1# *rt. D++, Sec. 11 tal(s of 3unless otherwise provided by the .onstitution.3 +n the case of .abinet members, this refers to *rt. +C, B, 0, par. ". Thus, the .onstitution allows a .abinet member to hold another office provided either (1# such is necessitated by the primary functions of his position (e.g. Secretary of Trade and +ndustry as .hairman of G>., Secretary of *grarian :eform as .hairman of the Land Ban(#, or (ii# is allowed by law. The validity of 2H ";9 allowing members of the .abinet and their ?nder$ Secretaries to hold " additional offices was decided in the case of .L? vs 2'ec. Secretary. B. S#cce""io (1# *t the beginning of term A$t. 9II, Sec. 0. The President$elect and the Dice$President elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms. ''' CThis provision refers to the President and Dice$President elected in the regular election, and so the term referred to begins on -une 18 ne't following the election on the "nd 4onday of 1 ", and every ! years thereafter. 9aca c( i t'e P$e"ide c( There are two sets of rules on succession, depending on whether the vacancy too( place before the beginning of the term on -une 18, or during the pendency of the terms that commences on -une 18. (The cut$off point is unsettled. Hne view is that the cut$off is noon of -une 18, as e'pressed in *rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. 1. The other view is that the cut$off is midnight of -une " when -une 18 begins.# *. Temporary or permanent vacancy in the Presidency before the term 1. +f the President$elect cannot assume his post at the beginning of his term because i# he has not )ualified as yet ( e.g. he had an operation and so he could not ta(e his oath of office on -une 18#, ii# or a President has not been 3chosen3 and )ualified as yet (e.g. there is a tie and .ongress has not yet bro(en the tie#, then the Dice$President shall act as President until the President$elect shall have )ualified, or shall have been 3chosen% and )ualified, as the case may be. (*rt. D++, Sec. 0, pars. " = 1#. A$t. 9II, Sec. 0. ''' +f the President$elect fails to )ualify, the Dice$President$elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and )ualified. +f a President shall not have been chosen, the Dice$President$elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and )ualified. ''' ". +f the President$elect i# dies, or ii# becomes permanently disabled 3at the beginning of the term of the President3 (i.e., before the term#, then the Dice$President elect shall become the President. (+d., par. 9# A$t. 9II, Sec. 0. ''' +f at the beginning of the term of the President, the President$elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Dice$President$elect shall become President. 1. +f both President and Dice$President (i# have not been 3chosen3 or (ii# have not )ualified, or (iii# die, or (iv# become permanently disabled, then the President of the Senate, or in case of his inability, the Spea(er of the 6ouse, shall act as President until a President or a Dice$President shall have been 3chosen3 and )ualified. (par. <# A$t. 9II, Sec. 0. ''' @here no President and Dice$President shall have been chosen or shall have )ualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall act as President until a President or a Dice$President shall have been chosen and )ualified. (par. < thereof.# +n case both the President of the Senate and the Spea(er of the 6ouse are unable to act as President, then .ongress shall by law, provide for the 3manner of selecting3 the one who will act as President until a President of Dice$ President shall have (been either 3chosen3 or 3elected3 pursuant to the special election referred to in D++, 18, and )ualified. A$t. 9II, Sec. 0. ''' The .ongress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Dice$President shall have )ualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the ne't

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preceding paragraph. (par. ! thereof.# A$t. 9II, Sec. -G. The .ongress shall, at ten o7cloc( in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Dice$ President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Dice$President to be held not earlier than forty$five days nor later than si'ty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph ", Section "!, *rticle D+ of this .onstitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the .ongress. *ppropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be e'empt from the re)uirements of paragraph 9, Section "<, *rticle D+ of this .onstitution. The convening of the .ongress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Go special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the ne't presidential election. ("# >uring term A$t. 9II, Sec. /. +n case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Dice$President shall become the President to serve the une'pired term. +n case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Dice$President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, shall then act as President until the President or Dice$President shall have been elected and )ualified. The .ongress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the *cting President. 6e shall serve until the President or the Dice$ President shall have been elected and )ualified, and be sub/ect to the same restrictions of powers and dis)ualifications as the *cting President. B. Permanent Dacancy in the Presidency during the term 1. +n case of the President7s (i# death (ii# permanent disability, (iii# removal from office (the only way is by impeachment#, or (iv# resignation, the Dice$President shall become President for the une'pired portion of the term. (par. 1# ". +n case of both the President7s and Dice$ President7s death, permanent disability, removal from office (by impeachment#, or resignation, then the Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Spea(er of the 6ouse, shall act as President until the President or Dice$President shall have been 3elected3 (pursuant to the special election in *rt. D++, Sec. 18# and )ualified. (par. 1.# @hen the *cting President (i.e., the Senate President, or Spea(er of the 6ouse# dies, becomes permanently disabled, or resigns (but is not removed, because there is no need to impeach him, his stay being temporary#, then the .ongress shall by law, provide 3who3 shall be *cting President until the President or Dice$ President shall have been 3elected3 (pursuant to the special election in *rt. D++, Sec. 18# and )ualified. This *cting President shall be sub/ect to the same restrictions of powers and dis)ualifications.(par. "# E"t$ada %" A$$o(o The S. held that Pres 2strada resigned, thereby leaving the position vacant. This was based on statements he e'ecuted before he left 4alacanang and the published diary of 2. *ngara in the Philippine >aily +n)uirer. E"t$ada %. De"ie$to 41GG-5 K The presidentOs resignation must willful and intentional, and it must be strictly construed. @hen impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the Pres, proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. Re"ol#tio A o t'e Motio fo$ Reco 41GG-5

The totality test was applied to determine whether or not the president has indeed resigned. 4any things were considered including the *ngara >iary. .omparisons and distinctions between the two vacancies% a# The incumbent President never holds$over the Presidency in any case. b# The vacancy must occur in the offices of both the President and Dice$President in order for the Senate President, or the Spea(er, or, in their inability, the one provided to succeed according to the Law of Succession passed by the .ongress, to succeed as *cting President until the )ualification of the President. c# The Law on Succession must be passed by the .ongress in both cases in the event that the President, Dice$President, Senate President and the Spea(er are all unable to act as President. But in the case of a vacancy occurring before the term, the law provides only for the 3manner of selecting3 the *cting President, while in the case of a vacancy occurring during the term, it provides for 3the person3 who shall act as President. +n both cases, the stint of the *cting President is temporary. d# @hen the vacancy comes before the term, the .onstitution tal(s of the successor acting as President until a President has been 3chosen3 and 3)ualified3& when it comes during, it tal(s of 3elected3 and )ualified. The reason is that before the term, the vacancy in the Presidency need not be filled up by election, since it may be filled up by a vote of .ongress in case of a tie (*rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. <#& but during the term, the only way to fill up the vacancy is by special election. e# * special election in both cases is held, pursuant to *rt. D++, Sec. 18, only when both

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offices of President and Dice$President are vacant. 6owever, if the vacancy occurs before the term, the grounds are limited to " (death and permanent disability or both#, while if the vacancy occurs during the term, the grounds are 9 (death, permanent disability, removal, and resignation#. f# The vacancy that occurs before the term of office may be temporary or permanent& the vacancy that occurs during the term of office can only be a permanent one. Thus, a different set of rules applies, to be discussed ne't following, in case of the temporary inability of the President during the term of office. A$t. 9II, Sec. -G. The .ongress shall, at ten o7cloc( in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Dice$ President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Dice$President to be held not earlier than forty$five days nor later than si'ty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph ", Section "!, *rticle D+ of this .onstitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the .ongress. *ppropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be e'empt from the re)uirements of paragraph 9, Section "<, *rticle D+ of this .onstitution. The convening of the .ongress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. Go special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the ne't presidential election. (1# +n case of temporary disability A$t. 9II, Sec. --. @henever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Dice$President as *cting President. @henever a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .abinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Dice$President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as *cting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives his written declaration that no inability e'ists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. 4eanwhile, should a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .abinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the .ongress shall decide the issue. 5or that purpose, the .ongress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty$eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. +f the .ongress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or if not in session, within twelve days after it is re)uired to assemble, determines by a two$thirds vote of both 6ouses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Dice$President shall act as President& otherwise, the President shall continue e'ercising the powers and duties of his office. ETemporary Dacancy in the Presidency during the term * vacancy in the Presidency arising from his disability can occur in any of the following ways% 1. * written declaration by the President ". @ritten declaration by the .abinet 1. 5inding by .ongress by ",1 vote that the President is disabled. +n all these cases, the Dice$President temporarily acts as the President. Doluntary declaration of inability by President a. @hen the President transmits to the Senate President and the Spea(er his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Dice$President as *cting President. b. The Dice$President shall so act until the President transmits to the Senate President and the Spea(er a written declaration that he is no longer unable to discharge his office. .ontested inability of the President a. @hen ma/ority of all the members of the .abinet transmit to the Senate President and Spea(er their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge his office, then the Dice$President shall immediately assume the Presidency in an acting capacity. b. The President can contest this by sending his own written declaration to the Senate President and Spea(er, that no inability e'ists. ?pon such transmittal, the President shall automatically assume his office. c. Should the ma/ority of the .abinet insist on their original stand by transmitting a second written declaration of the President7s inability within < days from resumption of office of the President, then .ongress shall step in. d. ?pon receipt of this second declaration by the .abinet, .ongress shall convene, if it is not in session, within 9; hours, without need of call, in accordance with its rules. (+f it is already in session, it must meet right away, as glimpsed from the fact that they only have 18 days to decide, whereas if it is not in session, it must convene in " days and decide before the 1"th day.# e. .ongress shall determine the President7s inability within 18 days after receipt of the second written declaration by the .abinet if it is in session, or within 1" days after it is re)uired to assemble by its respective presiding officer if it is not in session.

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f. +f the President, by a ",1 vote of both houses voting separately, determined to be 3unable3 to discharge his office, then the Dice$President shall act as President. +f less than ",1 find him unable, then the President shall continue e'ercising the powers and duties of his office. Serious +llness of the President A$t. 9II, Sec. -1. +n case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the .abinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the .hief of Staff of the *rmed 5orces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. 2. Re&o%al A$t. :I, Sec. 1. The President, the Dice$ President, the 4embers of the Supreme .ourt, the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and the Hmbudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal or public trust. *ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. A$t. :I, Sec. 7. (1# The 6ouse of :epresentatives shall have the e'clusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. ("# * verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any 4ember thereof, which shall be included in the Hrder of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper .ommittee within three session days thereafter. The .ommittee, after hearing, and by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers, shall submit its report to the 6ouse within si'ty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the 6ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof. (1# * vote of at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the *rticles of +mpeachment of the .ommittee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each 4ember shall be recorded. (9# +n case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse, the same shall constitute the *rticles of +mpeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (<# Go impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (!# The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. @hen sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. @hen the President of the Philippines is on trial, the .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt shall preside, but shall not vote. Go person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two$thirds of all the 4embers of the Senate. (0# -udgment in cases of impeachment shall not e'tend further than removal from office and dis)ualification to hold any office under the :epublic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub/ect to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. S* more detailed discussion on this topic can be found above under Hther Powers of .ongress% +mpeachment. RBernas% The officer can still be tried for a criminal case aside from impeachment K+nitiationL is governed by the rules of the 6ouse of :eps& KtrialL is governed by the rules of the Senate. @hat is sought to be discovered is not /ust the guilt or innocence in the criminal sense, but a public officialOs worthiness or unworthiness of the solemn trust conferred upon him by the people. Thus, impeachment is political in nature. 3. Powe$" a d *# ctio " of t'e P$e"ide t

(-5 E+ec#ti%e Powe$ A$t. 9II, Sec. -. The e'ecutive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Sec. -0. The President shall have control of all the e'ecutive departments, bureaus, and offices. 6e shall ensure that the laws be faithfully e'ecuted. EThe e'ecutive function is essentially the duty to implement the laws within the standards imposed by the legislature. ?nder the .onstitution, this power is e'ercised by the President. Thus, when the .abinet and other branches of the 2'ecutive >epartment implement the law, they are acting under the control of the President. Ma$co" %" Ma )la8#" 5% This is a petition for mandamus as(ing the .ourt to order the respondents to issue travel documents to 4r. 4arcos and his immediate family and to en/oin the implementation of the President7s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is whether or not, in the e'ercise of e'ecutive power, the President may prohibit the 4arcoses from returning to the Philippines. 62L>% *lthough the 1 ;0 .onstitution imposes limitations on the e'ercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of e'ecutive power. .orollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific power enumerated in the .onstitution. +n other words, e'ecutive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. The framers did not intend that by enumerating the powers of the Pres, he shall e'ercise those powers and no other. These unstated residual powers are implied from the grant of e'ecutive power and which are necessary for the Pres to comply with his duties under he .onsti. 415 Co t$ol of e+ec#ti%e de8a$t&e t"

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A$t. 9II, Sec. -0. The President shall have control of all the e'ecutive departments, bureaus, and offices. 6e shall ensure that the laws be faithfully e'ecuted. 3.ontrol3 is the powerof an officer to alter or modify or nullify or to set aside what a subordinate has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute one7s own /udgment in that of a subordinate. ?nder the )ualified political agency doctrine, Kall the different e'ecutive and administrative organizations are mere ad/uncts of the 2'ecutive >ept, the heads of the various e'ecutive depts. *re assistants and agents of the .hief 2'ecutive, and, e'cept in cases wherein the .hief 2'ecutive is re)uired by the .onsti or by the law to act in person or the e'igencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious e'ecutive and administrative functions of the .hief 2'ecutive are performed by and through the e'ecutive depts., performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the .hief 2'ecutive, presumptively acts of the .hief 2'ecutive.L (*$ee Tele8'o e Wo$@e$" U io %". Mi i"te$ of La,o$ a d E&8lo(&e t5 475 Ae e$al "#8e$%i"io of local )o%e$ &e t" a d a#to o&o#" $e)io " A$t. :, Sec. B. The President shall e'ercise general supervision over local governments. ''' A$t. :, Sec. -3. The President shall e'ercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully e'ecuted. 3Ieneral supervision3 means the mere overseeing of a subordinate to ma(e sure that they do their duties under the law. But this does not include the power to overrule their acts, if these acts are within their discretion. Aa =o %" CA The grant of mere supervisory power over local governments and autonomous regions is in line with the policy of the State to promote the autonomy of local governments and autonomous regions. There can be no real local autonomy while the Gational Iovernment controls the local governments. 4B5 Powe$ of a88oi t&e t .ruz% *ppointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested w, the power, of an individual who is to e'ercise the functions of a given office. The power of appointment is, according to the S. in Co ce8cio % Pa$ede", the most eminently e'ecutive power, because it is through his appointees that the President can e'ecute laws. The power of appointment by the President under the 1 ;0 .onstitution has been significantly curbed. +t can be classified as follows% Wit' t'e co "e t of t'e Co&&i""io o A88oi t&e t" Sa$&ie to %" MI"o The power to appoint is fundamentally e'ecutive or presidential in nature. ?nder the 1 1< .onsti, almost all presOl appointments re)uired confirmation. The 1 01 .onsti placed absolute power of appointment in the Pres. The 1 ;0 .onsti is the middle ground of the previous .onstis. There are 9 groups of officers whom the Pres may appoint% 1. heads of the e'ec dept, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, offciers of the armedforces from the ran( of colonel or naval capt and other officers whose appointments are vested in him& ". all other officers of the govOt whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law& 1. those whom the Pres may be authorized to appoint& 9. officers lower in ran( whose appointments .ongress may by law vest in the Pres alone 6eads of bureaus were deliberately moved from the provision of appointments re)uiring confirmation and were included in the 9th group and hence, their appointments no longer need confirmation. !a#ti"ta %" Salo )a The position of .hairman of the .6: is not specifically enumerated in the 1st sentence of *rt D++, Sec1!. .6: should be independent, and the officersO tenure should not be dependent on the Pres. 6ence, .ommissioner Bautista should be removed only for cause. E#i to"6Dele" %" Co&&i""io o A88oi t&e t" The seats reserved for sectoral reps may be filed by appointment by the Pres under *rt CD+++, Sec0. +t is indubitable that sectoral reps to the 6ouse are among the Kother officers whose appointments are vested in the Pres in this .onstiL, referred to in the 1st senrtence of *rtD++, Sec1!. These appointments re)uire the confirmation of the .ommission on *ppointments. Calde$o %" Ca$ale (decided after the promulgation of the 1 ;0 .onsti# Sec 11 of :* !01< amending Sec"1<, Labor .ode re)uiring confirmation of the appointments of the officers of the GL:. was declared unconstitutional on the ff grounds% 1. it e'pands the confirmation powers of the .* without constitutional basis ". appointment of the GL:. officers fall within the "nd sentence of *rtD++, Sec1! (those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appoint# and the 1rd group under the 4ison cgoupings. 6ence, these re)uirements do not re)uire the confirmation of the .* 1. it amends by legislation the " nd sentence of *rt 0, Sec 1! by imposing the confirmation of the .* on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only to the discretion of the Pres. Ra&o" %" Al%a$e= (decided under the 1 1< .onsti# +SS?2% @HG appointment of members of the Provincial Board is sub/ect to the confirmation of the .ommission on *ppointments 62L>% Pes. ?nder the 1 1< .onsti, this

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appointment falls under the 1rd group (Kthose whom the Pres may be authorized by law to appointL#. This appointment re)uires the confirmation of the .*. Sec "1(b#, :evised 2lection .ode does not e'plicitly say that the power of appointment is solely on the Pres. *bsent a phrase of sole designation, it is presumed to need the approval of the .*. Note": 5rom the 4ison, 1<! S <9 #, 1!8, and >eles v. 100 S "< , these rulings in Sarmiento +++ v. Bautista v. Salonga, 10" S .onstitutional .ommission, doct$i e" are deducible% (i# .hairman and .ommissioners .onstitutional .ommissions of the

1. .onfirmation by the .* is re)uired only for presidential appointees as mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 1!, *rt. D++, including, those officers whose appointments are e'pressly vested by the .onstitution itself in the president (li(e sectoral representatives to .ongress and members of the constitutional commissions of *udit, .ivil Service and 2lection#. ". .onfirmation is not re)uired when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (li(e the .hairman and 4embers of the .om. on 6uman :ights#. *lso, as observed in Sarmiento v. 4ison, when .ongress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. (a# 6eads of the e'ecutive departments A$t. 9II, Sec. -3. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments, appoint the heads of the e'ecutive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the ran( of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this .onstitution. 6e shall also appoint all other officers of the Iovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he may be authorized by law to appoint. The .ongress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in ran( in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to ma(e appointments during the recess of .ongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the .ommission on *ppointments or until the ne't ad/ournment of the .ongress. (b# *mbassadors, other public ministers and consuls (+d.# (c# Hfficers of the *rmed 5orces of the Philippines with the ran( of colonel or naval captain (because these are officers of a sizeable command enough to stage a coup# (+d.# (d# Hther officers whose appointments vested in the President in the .onstitution% are

A$t. I:, !, Sec. -. 415 The .hairman and the .ommissioners (of the .ivil Service .ommission# shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Hf those first appointed, the .hairman shall hold office for seven years, a .ommissioner for five years, and another .ommissioner for three years, without reappointment. *ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for une'pired term of the predecessor. +n no case shall any 4ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity .Id., C, Sec. -. 41# The .hairman and the .ommissioners (of the .ommission on 2lections# shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Hf those first appointed, three 4embers shall hold office for seven years, two 4embers for five years, and the last 4embers for three years, without reappointment. *ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for une'pired term of the predecessor. +n no case shall any 4ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Id., D, Sec. - 41# The .hairman and the .ommissioners (of the .ommission on *udit# shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Hf those first appointed, the .hairman shall hold office for seven years, a .ommissioner for five years, and another .ommissioner for three years, without reappointment. *ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for une'pired term of the predecessor. +n no case shall any 4ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (ii# :egular members of the -udicial and Bar .ouncil (composed of the +BP representative, professor of law, retired S. /ustice, and representative of the private sector. Gote the e'$officio members% .hief -ustice, Secretary of -ustice, and representative of .ongress# *rt. 9II, Sec. /. 41# The regular members of the (-udicial and Bar# .ouncil shall appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments. Hf the 4embers first appointed, the representative of the +ntegrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired -ustice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (iii# Sectoral representatives A$t. :9III, Sec. 0. ?ntil a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph ("# of Section < of *rticle D+ of this .onstitution. (iv# :egional .onsultative .ommission

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A$t. :, Sec. -/. The .ongress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the e'ecutive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall li(ewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law /urisdiction consistent with the provisions of this .onstitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by ma/ority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. U8o $eco&&e datio !a$ Co# cil of t'e >#dicial a d whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the .ommission on *ppointments or until the ne't ad/ournment of the .ongress. 1. Those vested by the .onstitution on the President alone (e.g. appointment of Dice$ President to the .abinet# S*rt. D++, Sec. 1("#R ". Those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. 1. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. 9. Those other officers lower in ran( whose appointment is vested by law in the President (alone#. The phraseology is muddled. The meaning of T9 was touched upon in Sa$&ie to % Mi"o . +n arguing that even bureau chiefs needed confirmation even if they are of inferior ran(, the argument was the phrase, 3The .ongress may, by law, vest in the appointment of other officers lower in ran( in the President alone3 meant that until a law is passed giving such appointing power to the President alone, then such appointment has to be confirmed. Hnly after such law is passed does the necessity for confirmation no longer hold. The S. dismissed this view however, saying that the inclusion of the word 3alone3 was an oversight. Thus, the .onstitution should read 3The .ongress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in ran( in the President.3 425 Li&itatio " o P$e"ide t[ a88oi ti ) 8owe$ of t'e

(a# 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and all other courts A$t. 9III, Sec. .. The 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar .ouncil for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. 5or the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. (b# Hmbudsman and his < deputies (for Luzon, Disayas, 4indanao, general and military# A$t. :I, Sec. .. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least si' nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar .ouncil, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall re)uire no confirmation. *ll vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. A88oi t&e t of 9ice6P$e"ide t a" Me&,e$ of t'e Ca,i et A$t. 9II, Sec. 7. '''The Dice President may be appointed as a 4ember of the .abinet. Such appointment re)uires no confirmation A88oi t&e t" "olel( ,( t'e P$e"ide t A$t. 9II, Sec. -3. The President shall ''' also appoint all other officers of the Iovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom, he may be authorized by law to appoint. The .ongress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in ran( in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to ma(e appointments during the recess of .ongress,

A$t. 9II, Sec. -7. '''The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, or the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, or as Secretaries, ?ndersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Id., Sec. -2. Two months immediately before the ne't presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or *cting President shall not ma(e appointments, e'cept temporary appointments to e'ecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will pre/udice public service or endanger public safety. a. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 9th civil degree of the President shall not, during his 3tenure3. be appointed as (i# members of the .onstitutional .ommissions, (ii# member of the Hffice of Hmbudsman, (iii# Secretaries, (iv# ?ndersecretaries, (v# .hairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. b. Two months immediately before the ne't presidential elections ("nd 4onday of 4arch#, and up to the end of his 3term3 (-une 18#, a President (or *cting President# shall not ma(e appointments.

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2'ception% Temporary appointments, to e'ecutive positions, when continued vacancies therein will (1# pre/udice public service (e.g. Postmaster# or ("# endanger public safety (e.g. .hief of Staff#. This provision seems to have overruled previous pronouncements of the Supreme .ourt on the validity of 3midnight appointments3.(*d interim appointments could either be 3midnight3, if made by the President before he steps down from office or recess, if made by the President when .ongress is not in session.# A(to a % Ca"tillo, The S. ruled that while 3midnight appointments3 are not illegal, they should be made in the capacity of a 3care$ta(er3 doubly careful and prudent in ma(ing the selection, so as not to defeat the policies of the incoming administration. Said the court% *fter the proclamation of an incoming President, the outgoing President is no more than a 3careta(er3 administrator duty bound to prepare for the orderly transition to the new President, and he should not do acts that would obstruct the policies of his successor. The filling up of vacancies in important posts, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees )ualifications, may be undoubtedly permitted. But the issuance of 1<8 appointments in one night, and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may be regarded as abuse of presidential prerogatives. E#i"#&,i ) % TaDa )la )it, The S. emphasized that the *ytona ruling does not declare all midnight appointments as invalid, and that the ad interim appointment of the petitioner chief of police here, whose )ualification and regularity were not disputed, e'cept for the fact that it was made during the last few days of the old administration, is thus not invalid. I Re A88o t&e t of 9ale =#ela The Pres is not re)uired to fill vacancies in the /udiciary, in view of *rt D+++, Secs 9(1# and of the .onsti during the period of ban on appointments imposed by *rtD++, Sec1<. The said provisions of *rtD+++ merely re)uire the Pres to fill vacancies in the court within the timeframes provided unless prohibited by said *rtD++, Sec 1<. The constitutional re)uirement for the Pres to ma(e appointments to the /udiciary within 8 days applies only to the period not covered by *rtD++, Sec1<. De Ra&a %. CA 41GG-5 The prohibition against midnight appointments applies only to the president and does not e'tend to local elective officials. 4oreover, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from ma(ing appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. I te$i& o$ $ece"" a88oi t&e t" A$t 9I, Sec. -.. The 2lectoral Tribunals and the .ommission on *ppointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Spea(er. The .ommission on *ppointments shall meet only while the .ongress is in session, at the call of its .hairman or a ma/ority of all its 4embers, to discharge such powers and functions as herein conferred upon it. A$t. 9II, Sec. -3. ''' The President shall have the power to ma(e appointments during the recess of .ongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the .ommission on *ppointments or until the ne't ad/ournment of the .ongress. :egular and recess (ad$interim# appointments *ppointments re)uiring confirmation are of two (inds, (i# regular, if the .*, that is, .ongress, is in session, or (ii# during the recess of .ongress (because the .ommission shall meet only while .ongress is in session S*rt. D+, Sec. 1 R#. :egular appointments re)uire confirmation before the appointee can ta(e his post. The President nominates, .ongress receives the nomination and forwards this to the .* for confirmation, then the Hffice of the President issues a .ommission, at which point the appointee can assume his office. :ecess appointments, on the other hand, need no confirmation to be effective, albeit temporarily. The appointment is effective until it is disapproved by the .ommission on *ppointments, or until the ne't ad/ournment of .ongress (unless meantime, it is confirmed by the .ommission# (*rt. D++, Sec. 1!, par. "# Mati,a) %" !e i8a(o *d interim appointment A a permanent appointment made by the Pres in the meantime that .ongres is inrecess. +t is permanent as it ta(es effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn bythe Pres once the appointee has )ualified into office. The fact that it is sub/ect to the confirmation of the .ommission on *ppointments does not alter its permanent character. 6ence, said appointment is effective until (1# disapproved by the .* or ("# the ne't ad/ournment of .ongress *cting,Temporary appointment A can be withdrawn or revo(ed at the pleasure of the appointing power. The appointee does not en/oy security of tenure. This is te (ind of appointment that the .onsti prohibits the Pres from ma(ing to the independent constitutional commissions. Pacete %" Sec$eta$( The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration of the confirmation of an appointment cannot have the effect of recalling or setting aside said appointment. The .onsti is clear A there must either be a re/ection by the

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.ommission on *ppontments or non$action on its part for the confirmation to be recalled. *lso, the power to approve or disapprove appointments is conferred on the .* as a body and not on the individual members. Temporary >esignations% Ad&i i"t$ati%e Code of -./0, !oo@ III Sec. -0 The President may designate an officer already in the govt. service or any other competent person to perform the functions of any office in the e'ecutive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when% (a# The officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause& or (b# There e'ists a vacancy& +n no case shall a temporary designation e'ceed one (1# year. 435 Li&itatio " o t'e a88oi ti ) 8owe$ of t'e Acti ) P$e"ide t A$t. 9II, Sec. -B. *ppointments e'tended by an *cting President shall remain effective unless revo(ed by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office. E deals with appointments made by an acting Pres A$t. 9II, Sec. -2. Two months immediately before the ne't presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or *cting President shall not ma(e appointments, e'cept temporary appointments to e'ecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will pre/udice public service or endanger public safety. Cdeals with appointments made by a Pres within " months before the ne't Presidential elections and up to the end of his term A$t. 9II, Sec. -3. ''' The President shall have the power to ma(e appointments during the recess of the .ongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the .ommission on *ppointments or until the ne't ad/ournment of the .ongress. Edeals with regular presidential appointments. @ith or without confirmation of the .*, and with recess or ad interim appointments. 405 E+ec#ti%e cle&e cie" A$t. 9II, Sec. -.. 2'cept in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this .onstitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final /udgment. +t shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .ongress. A$t. I:, C, Sec. 2. Go pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation 2lections.# by the .ommission (on

EThe President may grant (i#reprieves, (ii# commutations, and (iii# pardons, and (iv# remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final /udgment, e'cept % (a# +n cases of impeachment, and (b# *s otherwise provided in this .onstitution, viz Defi itio " :eprieve is a temporary relief from or postponement of e'ecution of criminal penalty or sentence or a stay of e'ecution. +t does not more than stay the e'ecution of a sentence e'tended to a prisoner to afford him an opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence imposed. (Blac(.# +t is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of e'ecution, a temporary suspension of e'ecution. (People vs. Dera, infra.# .ommutation is a reduction of sentence. (Blac(.# +t is a remission of a part of the punishment& a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. (People vs. Dera, infra.# Pardon is a permanent cancellation of sentence. (Blac(# +t is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the e'ecution of the laws, which e'empts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. +t is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the offense. (People v Dera, infra.# Qinds of Pardon.66 Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional and plenary or partial. *n absolute pardon is one e'tended w,o any strings attached, so to spea(, whereas a conditional pardon is one under w,c the convict is re)uired to comply w, certain re)uirements. * plenary pardon e'tinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities, whereas partial pardon does not. @here the pardon is conditional, the offender has the right to re/ect the same since he may feel that the condition imposed is more onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. But in the case of an absolute pardon, the pardonee has no option at all and must accept it whether he li(es it or not. +n this sense, an absolute pardon is similar to commutation, w,c is also not sub/ect to acceptance by the offender. *mnesty is a sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by government generally to a class of persons who have been guilty usually of political offenses (treason, sedition, rebellion#, and who are sub/ect to trial but have not yet been convicted, and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. (Blac(& Brown v @al(er, 1!1 ?S !8"#. Probation is a disposition under which a

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defendant after conviction and sentence is released sub/ect to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer. SSec. 1 (a#, P> !;.R Parole is the suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence shall be suspended. 4a5 Pa$do di"ti )#i"'ed f$o& 8$o,atio repealed. The .ourt said that parole is part of the pardoning power of the President. -ustice 5ernando points out, however, that this is not accurate. +f ever the President has the power to grant parole, it is because the law grants him that power, and not because parole is part of pardon. Hne of the conditions for the pardon was that Khe will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner.L 4ere commission and not conviction will suffice. The determination of whether he violated the conditions of the pardon rests solely on the sound discretion of the Pres. To$$e" %. Ao =ale" The grant of pardon and determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely e'ecutive acts and are not sub/ect to /udicial scrutiny. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon may be (1# purely e'ecutive or ("# a /udicial act consisting of a trial and conviction for violation of conditional pardon. The Pres may choose which proceeding to use. 4c5 Pa$do di"ti )#i"'ed f$o& A& e"t(

Peo8le %". 9e$a, !< P <! (1 10# Probation and Pardon are not coterminous& nor are they the same. They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and nature. +n probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. 6e is not finally and completely e'onerated. 6e is not e'empt from the entire punishment w,c the law inflicts. ?nder the Probation *ct, the probationer7s case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody$$ sub/ect to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non$fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. EGotes% +n both cases, there must be a final /udgment of conviction, and the convict must be e'empted from service of sentence. But pardon is granted by the .hief 2'ecutive for any crime, while probation is granted by the court after investigation by a probation officer only for cases where the penalty imposed does not e'ceed ! years and 1 day (prision mayor#, where the crime is not against the security of the State, where there was no previous conviction for an offense punished by arresto mayor, and where there was no previous availment of probation. +n absolute pardon, the sentence and its effects, including the accessory penalties, are abolished upon the grant of pardon. +n probation, the restoration of the probationer to his civil rights ta(es places only after his final discharge after the period of his probation. (Secs. 19 = 1!# 4,5 Pa$do di"ti )#i"'ed f$o& Pa$ole

1. Pardon is usually granted for common crimes& amnesty, for political crimes. ". Pardon is granted to individuals& amnesty, to a group, class, or community generally. 1. Pardon can only be granted after conviction& amnesty may be granted even before trial. 9. Pardon loo(s forward and relieves the offender from the conse)uences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment& amnesty loo(s bac($ ward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overloo(s and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged that the person released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrio)uinto v 5ernandez, infra.# <. Pardon is a private act of the President w,c must be pleaded and proved by the person bec. the courts do not ta(e /udicial notice of it& amnesty is a public act of w,c the courts ta(e /udicial notice. (.ruz, Philippine Political Law, 1 1 ed.# !. Pardon does not re)uire the concurrence of the .ongress& amnesty re)uires such concurrence. (id.# !a$$io<#i to et al %. *e$ a de= +t is not necessary for them to plead guilty before they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. +t is sufficient that evidence shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of the amnesty proclamation. Pardon A granted by the .hief 2'ecutive& private act which must be pleaded and proven by the person pardoned because courts ta(e no notice thereof& granted to a person after conviction& loo(s forward and relieves offender from conse)uences of an offense of which he has been convicted& abolishes punishment. *mnesty A proclamation by the .hief 2'ec with the concurrence of .ongress& public act which the courts should ta(e /udicial notice of& granted

Pardon may be granted by the .hief 2'ecutive under the .onstitution and formerly the *dministrative .ode, at any time after final /udgment of conviction, even before service& while parole is granted by the Board of Pardons and Parole under the +ndeterminate Sentence Law only after the convict has served the minimum term of his sentence. +n pardon, the convict becomes a free man& in parole, he is not really free because although he his released from the custody of the law, he must submit to periodic e'amination by the Board of Parole. Te"o$o % Di$ecto$ of P$i"o ", The S. dismissed the contention that because parole is not mentioned in the .onstitution, then the power to grant parole is also deemed

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to a class of persons who may be guilty of political offenses& granted before criminal prosectution or sometimes after conviction& loo(s bac(ward and abolishes the offense itself so that he stands before the law as thugh he had committed no offense EGotes% The fifth distinction bet. pardon and amnesty is that pardon is a private act of the President, and so must be impleaded in court& amnesty is a public act by the President and .ongress, and so the court is en/oined to ta(e /udicial notice of it. (supra# The <th distinction (pardon is a private act while amnesty is a public act# is not true in Philippine law. The case holds that pardon must be raised as a defense, otherwise the court cannot ta(e /udicial notice of such pardon. But under *rt. ; of the :P., absolute pardon e'tinguishes criminal liability. *nd under the .onstitution, pardon can only be granted after final conviction. +f so, once, a convict has been granted pardon, this implies that he has already been convicted, and that precisely he has been e'empted from the penalty arising from conviction. @hy would he still have to invo(e itF This seems to contemplate a situation where he is being charged again of the same crime, and that he needs to invo(e the pardon as a defense, which is impossible because of double /eopardy. The error in the Barrio)uinto ruling is that it borrowed this distinction from *merican law, which allows the President the power to grant pardon even before conviction (thus, 5ord was able to pardon Gi'on even without a trial.# Such was our law under the -ones Law of 1 1!. But under the 1 1< .onstitution, this rule was changed% pardon could only be granted after conviction, +n 1 01, it was made stricter% pardon could be granted only after 3final3 conviction. Then, in 1 ;1, the phrase 3after final conviction3 was dropped, thus going bac( to the rule under the -ones Law and the President could grant pardon anytime. +n 1 ;0, the phrase reads% 3after conviction by final /udgment.3 *side from e'tinguishing criminal liability, pardon also wor(s to remit fines and forfeitures paid in favor of the Iovern$ ment. But it does not automatically restore the public office forfeited, nor relieve the pardonee of civil liability and other claims pertaining to the private offended party. (d5 Effect" of Pa$do C$i"to,al % La,$ado$, There are " limitations upon the e'ercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. to grant pardon% (1# that the power be e'ercised after conviction& ("# that such power does not e'tend to cases of impeachment. ''' *n absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. +n the present case, the disability is the result of conviction w,o w,c there would be no basis for the dis)ualification from voting. The pardon e'tended is conditional in the sense that 3he will be eligible for appointment only to positions w,c are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or prop. resp., 3 it is absolute insofar as it 3restores the resp. to full civil and political rights.3 Pelo,ello %. Palati o *bsolute pardon has the effect of removing the dis)ualification from voting and being elected incident to criminal conviction under Sec 9(a# of the 2lection .ode. The .hief 2'ecutive, after in)uiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the e'tent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. Mo "a to %" *acto$a Pardon implies guilt and does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. +t does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to a public office necessarily relin)uished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although EGotes% 3Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless e'pressly grounded on the person7s innocence (w,c is rare#, it cannot bring bac( lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly (ept in mind lest we lose trac( of the true character and purpose of the privilege. '''3 4e5 Sa ctio " fo$ %iolatio " of co ditio al 8a$do To$$e" %" Ao =ale" +n proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the 2'ecutive >ept. has " options% (i# to proceed against him under Sec. !9(i#, :*.& or (ii# to proceed against him under *rt. 1< , :P. which imposes the penalty of prision correccional minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the .hief 2'ecutive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. 6ere, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under the :*.. That choice is an e'ercise of the e'ecutive prerogative and not sub/ect to /udicial scrutiny. 4f5 Doe" 8a$do i ) ad&i i"t$ati%e ca"e"L 8owe$ a88l( to

Lla&a" %" E+ec#ti%e Sec$eta$( The .onst. does not distinguish bet. w,c cases e'ecutive clemency may be e'ercised by the Pres., w, the sole e'clusion of impeachment cases. +f the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant e'ecutive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. 6owever, the power of the President to grant e'ecutive clemency in administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the 2'ecutive branch and not in the -udicial or Legislative branches of the govt.

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?nder the doctrine of Jualified Political *gency, the different 2'ecutive departments are mere ad/uncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. +n this case, the President in the e'ercise of her power of supervision and control over all e'ecutive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. +t is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant 3e'ecutive clemency3 but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. +t is in this sense that the alleged e'ecutive clemency was granted. Sec. 27, C'a8te$ 0, S#,title A, Title I, !oo@ 9, Ad&i i"t$ati%e Code of -./0 :emoval of *dministrative Penalties or >isabilities.$$ +n meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the (.ivil Service# .ommission, the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or employees in disciplinary cases, sub/ect to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service 4)5 W'o &a( a%ail of a& e"t(L Tole ti o %" Cato( 5*.TS% Petitioner was a 6u(balahap who was found guilty of illegal assembly in furtherance of the 6u(balahap designs. *fter the /udgment was promulgated, the President issued Proc. Go. 0! granting amnesty to leaders and members of the 6u(balahap. Petitioner who was already serving his sentence, sent a petition to the President for his release under the provisions of the proclamation. Go action was ta(en on his petition. 6e then went to court and filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 62L>% Though some members of the .ourt )uestion the applicability of *mnesty Proclamation Go. 0! to 6u(balahaps already undergoing sentence upon the date of its promulgation, the ma/ority of the .ourt believe that by its conte't and pervading spirit the proclamation e'tends to all members of the 6u(balahap. +t ma(es no e'ception when it announces that the amnesty is proclaimed in favor of the leaders and members of the associations (nown as the 6u(balahap and Pambansang Qaisahan ng 4agbubu(id (PQ4#. Go compelling reason is apparent for e'cluding 6u(balahaps of any class or condition from its ob/ect which is 3to forgive and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc.3 +f total punishment is foregone in favor of 6u(balahaps who succeeded in evading arrest, it stands to reason that those who fell into the clutches of the law have a better claim to clemency for the remaining portion of a punishment fi'ed for the same offense. The avowed practical ob/ective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constituted authorities and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits and occupation. This ob/ective cannot be e'pected to meet with full success without the goodwill and cooperation of the 6u(balahaps who have become more embittered by their capture, prosecution and incarceration. 5undamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Pardon includes amnesty. Pardon and amnesty are both construed most strictly against the state. Maca)a6a %" Peo8le Petitioners were charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents by the Sandiganbayan. They claimed that they had been granted amnesty by Presi$ dent 4arcos. The Sandiganbayan claimed that the benefits of amnesty were never available to petitioners under P> 11;". The S. agreed with the Sandiganbayan that in fact the petitioners were e'pressly dis)ualified from amnesty. The acts for which they were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political comple'ion and consisting only of diversion of public funds to private profit. The amnesty proclamation covered only acts in the furtherance of resistance to duly constituted authorities of the :epublic and applies only to members of the 4GL5, or other anti$govOt groups.. 4/5 Powe$" a" co&&a de$6i 6c'ief A$t. 9II, Sec. -/. The President shall be the .ommander$in$ .hief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. +n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety re)uires it, he may, for a period not e'ceeding si'ty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. @ithin forty$eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the .ongress. The .ongress, voting /ointly, by a vote of at least a ma/ority of all its 4embers in regular or special session, may revo(e such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. ?pon the initiative of the President, the .ongress may, in the same manner, e'tend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the .ongress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety re)uires it. The .ongress, if not in session, shall within twenty$four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the e'tension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. * state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the .onstitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of /urisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

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The suspension of the privilege shall apply only to persons /udicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. >uring the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be /udicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. A$t. III, Sec. -7. *ll persons, e'cept those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guild is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. 2'cessive bail shall not be re)uired. A$t. 9III, Sec. -. ''' -udicial power includes the duty of the courts of /ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Iovernment. E*s .ommander$in$.hief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the President has the following powers% a. 6e may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. b. 6e may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or c. 6e may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines or any part thereof. Sub/ect to% A$t. 9III, Sec. - 8a$. 1. -udicial power includes the duty of the courts of /ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Iovt. .all out the *5P to prevent lawless violence $ This is merely a police measure meant to )uell disorder. *s such, the .onstitution does not regulate its e'ercise radically Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus $ * 3writ of habeas corpus3 is an order from the court commanding a detaining officer to inform the court (i# if he has the person in custody, and (ii# what his basis in detaining that person. The 3privilege of the writ3 is that portion of the writ re)uiring the detaining officer to show cause why he should not be tested. Gote that it is the privilege that is suspended, not the writ itself. :e)uisites% 1# There must be an invasion or rebellion, and "# The public safety re)uires the suspension. 2ffects of the suspension of the privilege% 1# The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons 3/udicially charged3 for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion (*rt. D++, Sec. 1;, par. <#. Such persons suspected of the above crimes can be arrested and detained without a warrant of arrest. 3-udicially charged3 as used in the .onstitution is imprecise. 5or if one were already /udicially charged, his detention would be legal and so he could no longer petition for habeas corpus. 6abeas corpus precisely contemplates a situation in which a person is being detained without being charged in court. Thus, the provision should read 3one who is suspected of complicity in3 the two crimes above. *s a general rule, no person could be arrested without a warrant of arrest (validly issued upon probable cause to be determined personally by the /udge after e'amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, (cf. *rt. +++, Sec. "#, unless (i# the arrest was made in connection with a crime committed in the presence of the detaining officer, or (ii# the privilege of the writ was suspended. +f the public officer arrests him without a warrant, the officer becomes liable for 3arbitrary detention3 under *rt. 1"9 of the :P., and a petition for habeas corpus can be filed to see( his release. The suspension of the privilege does not ma(e the arrest without warrant legal. But the military is, in effect, enabled to ma(e the arrest, anyway since, with the suspension of the privilege, there is no remedy available against such unlawful arrest (arbitrary detention#. The arrest without warrant is /ustified by the emergency situation and the difficulty in applying for a warrant considering the time and the number of persons to be arrested. But the crime for which he is arrested must be one related to rebellion or the invasion. *s to other crimes, the suspension of the privilege does not apply. "# >uring the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be /udicially charged within 1 days, or otherwise he shall be released. (*rt. D++, Sec. 1;, par. !#. +n other words, the public officer can detain a person without warrant of arrest, but he can only do so for 0" hours. Before the lapse of 0" hours, an information must have been filed in the proper court charging him of the offense for which he was arrested. ?nder the :ules of .riminal Procedure, if the detainee wants a preliminary investigation to be first conducted by the fiscal, he must sign a waiver of the effects of *rt. 1"<. (delay in the delivery of detained persons# The effect of the suspension of the privilege, therefore, is only to e'tend the periods during which he can be detained without a warrant. ?nder *rt. 1"<, as amended by 2H "0", the public officer can only detain him for 1", 1; or 1! hours depending on the gravity of the offense of which he is charged& within this time, he must be /udicially charged, otherwise, he must be released. @hen the privilege is suspended, the period is e'tended to 0" hours. @hat happens if he is not /udicially

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charged nor released after 0" hoursF The public officer becomes liable under *rt. 1"< for 3delay in the delivery of detained persons.3 *s to the detainee, it is submitted that he or someone else in his behalf can file a petition for habeas corpus. 5or even if the suspension has a lifetime of !8 days in general, as to that person, the suspension only has an effectivity of 0" hours, so that after this time, the suspension is lifted as to him. 1# The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. (*rt. +++, Sec. 11# A$t. III, Sec. -7. ''' The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of 6. is suspended. 2'cessive bail shall not be re)uired. This new provision abrogates the ruling in Mo$ale" % Po ce6 E $ile which held the contrary.Proclaim 4artial Law :e)uisites% 1# There must be an invasion or rebellion, and "# Public safety re)uires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof. 2ffects of the proclamation of martial law% The President can% 1# Legislate "# Hrder the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort. But the following cannot be done (*rt. D++, Sec. 1;, par. 9# 1# Suspend the operation of the .onstitution. "# Supplant the functioning of the civil courts and the legislative assemblies. The principle is that martial law is proclaimed only because the courts and other civil institutions li(e .ongress have been shut down. +t should not happen that martial law is declared in order to shut down the civil institutions. 1# .onfer /urisdiction upon military courts and agencies over civilians, where civil courts are unable to function. This is the 3open court3 doctrine which holds that civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. But if the civil courts are not functioning, then civilians can be tried by the military courts. 4artial laws usually contemplates a case where the courts are already closed and the civil institutions have already crumbled, that is a 3theater of war.3 +f the courts are still open, the President can /ust suspend the privilege and achieve the same effect. 9# *utomatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This overrules the holding in *)uino v Ponce$ 2nrile, < S.:* 1;1 (1 09#, that when the President proclaims martial law, he also impliedly suspends the privilege of the writ. The S. ruled that the supremacy of the .onsti is not diminished by the advent of national emergencies. ?nder the present rule, the President can still suspend the privilege even as he proclaim martial law, but he must so suspend e'pressly. T'e Role of Co )$e"" a. @hen the President proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ, such proclamation or suspension shall be effective for a period of !8 days, unless sooner revo(ed by the .ongress. b. ?pon such proclamation or suspension, .ongress shall convene at once. +f it is not in session, it shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call within "9 hours following the proclamation or suspension. c. @ithin 9; hours from the proclamation or the suspension, the President shall submit a report, in person or in writing, to the .ongress (meeting in /oint session of the action he has ta(en#. d. The .ongress shall then vote /ointly, by an absolute ma/ority. +t has two options% (i# To revo(e such proclamation or suspension. @hen it so revo(es, the President cannot set aside (or veto# the revocation as he normally would do in the case of bills. +f .ongress does not do anything, the measure will e'pire anyway in !8 days. So the revocation must be made before the lapse of !8 days from the date the measure was ta(en. (ii# To e'tend it beyond the !8$day period of its validity. .ongress can only so e'tend the proclamation or suspension upon the initiative of the President. The period need not be !8 days& it could be more, as .ongress would determine, based on the persistence of the emergency. +f .ongress fails to act before the measure e'pires, it can no longer e'tend it until the President again redeclares the measure, for how do one e'tend something that has already lapsedF Gote that .ongress cannot 3validate3 the proclamation or suspension, because it is already valid. +t is thus restricted to the " measures above. +f .ongress e'tends the measure, but before the period of e'tension lapses, the re)uirements for the proclamation or suspension no longer e'ist, .ongress can lift the e'tension, since the power to confer implies the power to ta(e bac(. +f .ongress does not review or lift the order, this can be reviewed by the Supreme .ourt pursuant to the ne't section. T'e Role of t'e S#8$e&e Co#$t The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of (a# the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b# the e'tension thereof. +t must promulgate its decision thereon within 18 days from its filing. (A$t. 9II, Sec. -/ 8a$. 7# This is because /udicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Iovernment. ( A$t. 9III, Sec. -, 8a$. 1# The /urisdiction of the S. may be invo(ed in a proper case. * petition for habeas corpus is one

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such case. @hen a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in his behalf has the standing to )uestion the validity of the proclamation or suspension. But before the S. can decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension. The test to be used by the Supreme .ourt in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or suspending, or the act of .ongress in e'tending, is the test of arbitrariness which see(s to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The )uestion is not whether the President or .ongress acted correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact. >eciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction, which is now made part of /udicial power by *rt. D+++, Sec. 1, par. ". This curbs radically the application of the political )uestion doctrine. La "a ) % Aa$cia, The issue there raised was whether in suspend$ ing the privilege of the writ in 1 01, 4arcos had a basis for doing so. The S., in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a# the Senate report on the condition in .entral Luzon and (b# a closed door briefing by the military showing the e'tent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act arbitrarily. Hne may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis. " conditions must cincur for the valid e'ercise of authority to suspend the privilege% (a# there must be an actual invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger and (b# public safety must re)uire the suspension of the privilege. This holding of the S. is now found in *rt. D++, Sec. 1;, par. 1.R The function of the court is to chec( and not supplant the e'ecutive or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of /urisdiction, The proper standard is not correctness but arbitrariness. @ith this test and the new provisions in the 1 ;0 .onstitution, the case of Aa$cia6Padilla % Po ce E $ile, is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. +n that case, the S. held that the President7s proclamation of martial law is beyond /udicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the President acts in good faith. The cases of !a$celo % !a@e$ and Mo te e)$o % Ca"ta eda, which ruled that the validity of the suspension of the privilege was a political )uestion, are li(ewise buried in the grave of /udicial history. There are 9 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted% 1# Lifting by the President himself "# :evocation by .ongress 1# Gullification by the Supreme .ourt 9# Hperation of law after !8 days Milita$( T$ial of Ci%ilia " 9oid E%e U de$ Ma$tial Law, If Ci%il Co#$t" A$e O8e . 4A$t. 9II, Sec. -/, 8a$. 2.5. A<#i o %" Milita$( Co&&i""io No. 1, The S. upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus re/ecting the 3open court3 theory. The S. there held% 34artial law creates an e'ception to the general rule of e'clusive sub/ection to the civil /urisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of e'ecutive process for /udicial process. The immunity of civilians from military /urisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. ''' Ola)#e$ %" Milita$( Co&&i""io No. 7B, The A<#i o %". Milita$( Co&&i""io No. 1 decision was reversed. *ccording to the S., civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by /udicial process. Since we are not enemy$occupied territory nor are we under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and e'ercise /urisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President7s power as .ommander in .hief or on any theory of martial law. *s long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and e'ercise /urisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.3The presiding officer at a court martial is not a /udge whose ob/ectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the /udicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. *part from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court$martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. 4.5 E&e$)e c( 8owe$" A$t. 9I, Sec. 17. ''' ("# +n times of war or other national emergency, the .ongress, may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period, and sub/ect to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to e'ercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. ?nless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the .ongress, such powers shall cease upon the ne't ad/ournment thereof. EThis grant of emergency power to the President is different from the .ommander$in$.hief clause. @hen the President acts under the .ommander$in$.hief clause, he acts under a constitutional grant of military power, which may include the law$

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ma(ing power. But when the President acts under the emergency power, he acts under a .ongressional delegation of law$ma(ing power. The scope of the grant is such 3powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.3 ?nder the 1 1< .onstitution, this was construed the power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the declared policy. The 1 ;0 .onstitution, it is submitted, does not change the scope. 3Power necessary and proper3 should mean legislative power, because .ongress is only allowed to delegate legislative power, being its only inherent power. +ts other powers are only granted to it by the .onstitu$ tion, and so it cannot delegate what has only been delegated to it. This power is (1# for a limited period, and ("# sub/ect to such restrictions as .ongress may provide. The power ceases (a# upon being withdrawn by resolution of the .ongress, or, if .ongress fails to adopt such resolution, (b# upon the ne't (voluntary# ad/ournment of .ongress. 5or the fact that .ongress is able to meet in session uninterruptedly and ad/ourn of its own will proves that the emergency no longer e'ists is to /ustify the delegation. This rule or the termination of the grant of emergency powers is based on decided cases, which in turn became A$t. 9II, Sec. -2 of t'e -.07 Co "tit#tio . A$a eta % Di )la"a , The .ongress granted the President certain emergency powers. (.*!01# *fter the war, .ongress held a special session. The S. held that the emergency power lasted only until .ongress held its regular session. The fact that .ongress could now meet meant that there was no emergency anymore that would /ustify the delegation.The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal .*!01 is not in harmony with the .onsti. +f a new law were necessary to terminate it, then it would be unlimited and indefinite. This would create an anomaly since what was intended to meet a temporary emergency becomes a permanent law. Rod$i)#e= % Aella, The specific power to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative is a limitation on the general power to e'ercise such other powers as the e'ecutive may deem necessary to enable the govOt to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.Barlongay% Gotice the apparent inconsistency bet. the .onstitution and the cases. The .onsti. S*rt. D+, Sec. "1 ("#R states that the emergency powers shall cease upon the ne't ad/ournment of .ongress unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of .ongress whereas the cases tell us that the emergency powers shall cease upon resumption of session. To reconcile the two, + believe that it would not be enough for .ongress to /ust resume session in order that the emergency powers shall cease. +t has to pass a resolution withdrawing such emergency powers, otherwise such powers shall cease upon the ne't ad/ournment of .ongress. 4-G5 Co t$acti ) a d )#a$a teei ) fo$ei) loa " A$t. 9II, Sec. 1G. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the :epublic of the Philippines with the prior concur$ rence of the 4onetary Board, and sub/ect to such limitations as may be provided by law. The 4onetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every )uarter of the calendar year, submit to .ongress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Iovernment, or government$owned or controlled corporations, which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters provided by law. A$t. :II, Sec. 1-. 5oreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. +nformation on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Iovernment shall be made available to the public. Re8#,lic Act B/3G 6 *G *.T *?T6H:+\+GI T62 P:2S+>2GT H5 T62 P6+L+PP+G2S TH HBT*+G S?.6 5H:2+IG LH*GS *G> .:2>+TS, H: TH +G.?: S?.6 5H:2+IG +G>2BT2>G2SS, *S 4*P B2 G2.2SS*:P TH 5+G*G.2 *PP:HD2> 2.HGH4+. >2D2LHP42GT P?:PHS2S H: P:H-2.TS, *G> TH I?*:*GT22, +G B26*L5 H5 T62 :2P?BL+. H5 T62 P6+L+PP+G2S, 5H:2+IG LH*GS HBT*+G2> H: BHG>S +SS?2> BP .H:PH:*T+HGS H@G2> H: .HGT:HLL2> BP T62 IHD2:G42GT H5 T62 P6+L+PP+G2S 5H: 2.HGH4+. >2D2LHP42GT P?:PHS2S +G.L?>+GI T6HS2 +G.?::2> 5H: P?:PHS2S H5 :2$L2G>+GI TH T62 P:+D*T2 S2.TH:, *PP:HP:+*T+GI T62 G2.2SS*:P 5?G>S T62:25H:2, *G> 5H: HT62: P?:PHS2S. !e it e acted ,( t'e Se ate a d Ho#"e of Re8$e"e tati%e" of t'e P'ili88i e" i Co )$e"" a""e&,led: Sec. -. The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized in behalf of the :epublic of the Philippines to contract such loans, credits and indebtedness with foreign governments, agencies or instrumentalities of such foreign governments, foreign financial institutions, or other international organizations, with whom, or belonging to countries with which, the Philippines has diplomatic relations, as may be necessary and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, to enable the Iovernment of the :epublic of the Philippines to finance, either directly or through any government office, agency or instrumentality or any government$owned or controlled corporation, industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or pro/ects authorized by law% Provided, That at least seventy$five per cent shall be spent for purposes of pro/ects which are revenue$producing and self$li)uidating, such as electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and improvement of highways and bridges, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, water wor(s and artesian wells, air navigation facilities, development of fishing industry, and other% Provided, That such foreign loans shall be used to meet the foreign e'change re)uirements or liabilities incurred in connection with said development pro/ects to cover the cost of

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e)uipment, related technical services and supplies, where the same are not obtainable within the Philippines at competitive prices as well as part of the peso costs, other than wor(ing capital and operational e'penses not e'ceeding twenty per cent of the loan% Provided, further, That in the case of roads, bridges, irrigation, portwor(s, river controls, airports and power, the amount shall not e'ceed seventy per cent of the loan. The authority of the President of the Philippines as herein provided shall include the power to issue, for the purposes hereinbefore stated, bonds for sale in the international mar(ets the income from which shall be fully ta' e'empt in the Philippines. Sec. 1. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, e'cluding interests, which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this *ct shall not e'ceed one billion ?nited States dollars or its e)uivalent in other foreign currencies at the e'change rate prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred% Provided, however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this *ct shall not e'ceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this *ct, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year thereafter, all in ?nited States dollars or its e)uivalent in other currencies. *ll loans, credits and indebtedness under the preceding section shall be incurred only for particular pro/ects in accordance with the approved economic program of the Iovernment and after the plans for such pro/ects shall have been prepared by the offices or agencies concerned, recommended by the Gational 2conomic .ouncil and the 4onetary Board of the .entral Ban( of the Philippines, and approved by the President of the Philippines. Sec. 7. The President of the Philippines is, li(ewise, hereby authorized, in behalf of the :epublic of the Philippines, to guarantee, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, foreign loans e'tended directly to, or bonds for sale in international mar(ets issued by, corporations owned or controlled by the Iovernment of the Philippines for industrial, agricultural or other economic development purposes or pro/ects authorized by law, such as those mentioned in Section one of this *ct, including the rehabilitation and modernization of the Philippine Gational :ailways, the cash capital re)uirements of the Land Ban( , electrification, irrigation, river control and drainage, telecommunication, housing, construction and,or improvement of highways, housing, construction and, or improvement of highways, airports, ports and harbors, school buildings, waterwor(s and artesian wells, air navigation, development of the fishing industry, iron and nic(el e'ploitation and development, and others% Provided, That at least seventy five per cent shall be spent for purposes or pro/ects which are revenue$producing and self$li)uidating. The loans, or bonded indebtedness of government$ owned or controlled corporations which may be guaranteed by the President under this *ct shall include those incurred by government$owned or controlled financial institutions for the purpose of re$lending to the private sector and the total amount thereof shall not be more than five hundred million ?nited States dollars or its e)uivalent in other foreign currencies at the e'change rate prevailing at the time the guarantee is made% Provided, That the government$owned or controlled financial institutions shall re$lend the proceeds of such loans and, or bonded indebtedness to 5ilipinos or to 5ilipino$owned or controlled corporations and partnerships, at least si'ty$si' and two$ thirds per centum of the outstanding and paid$ up capital of which is held by 5ilipinos at the time the loan is incurred, such proportion to be maintained until such time as the loan is fully paid% Provided, however, That during anytime that any amount of the loan remains outstanding, failure to meet with the capital ownership re)uirement shall ma(e the entire loan immediately due and demandable, together with all penalties and interests, plus an additional special penalty of two per centum on the total amount due. Sec. B. The implementation of this *ct shall be sub/ect to, and governed by, the provisions of 2'ecutive Hrder "1!, dated 5ebruary 11, 1 <0, prescribing procedures for the planning of development finances, the issuance of government securities, and the disbursement of proceeds and creating the 5iscal Policy .ouncil and the Technical .ommittee on >evelopment 5inance, as amended by 2'ecutive Hrder Go. "1!, dated 4ay "!, 1 !!, not inconsistent with this *ct, which are hereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of this *ct. Sec. 2. +t shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every regular session, to report to the .ongress the amount of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees e'tended, and the purposes and pro/ects for which the loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees e'tended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to 5ilipino$owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes.Sec. 3. The .ongress shall appropriate the necessary amount of any funds in the Gational Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become due. Sec. 0. This *ct shall ta(e effect upon its approval.*pproved, September ;, 1 !!. CDoe" Co )$e"" 'a%e to ,e co "#lted ,( t'e P$e"ide t w'e 'e co t$act" o$ )#a$a tee" fo$ei) loa " t'at i c$ea"e t'e fo$ei) de,t of t'e co# t$(L The affirmative view cites *rt. D+, Sec. "9 which holds that all bills authorizing increase of the public debt must originate e'clusively from the 6ouse of :epresentatives, although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The negative, and stronger view, is that President does not need prior approval .ongress because the .onstitution places power to chec( the President7s power on the by the the

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4onetary Board and not on .ongress. .ongress may, of course, provide guidelines for contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, and have these rules enforced through the 4onetary Board. But that .ongress has prior approval is a totally different issue. *t any rate, the present power, which was first introduced in the 1 01 .onstitution, was based on :* 9;!8 or the 5oreign Loan *ct. @hat used to be a statutory grant of power is now a constitutional grant which .ongress cannot ta(e away, but only regulate. 4--5 Powe$" o%e$ fo$ei) affai$" 4a5 T$eat(6&a@i ) 8owe$ A$t. 9II, Sec. 1-. Go treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two$thirds of all the members of the Senate. EBy reason of the President7s uni)ue position as head of state, he is the logical choice as the nation7s spo(esman in foreign relations. The Senate, on the other hand, is granted the right to share in the treaty$ ma(ing power of the President by concurring with him with the right to amend. T$eat( di"ti )#i"'ed a)$ee&e t" f$o& e+ec#ti%e arrangement therefore includes the obligation to return the une'pended amounts. +n this case, Pres. Juirino approved the negotiations. 6e had power to contract loans under :* "11 amending :* 1!. *s to the contention that the agreement lac(s ratification by the Senate, it was held that the yearly appropriations by .ongress of funds as compliance with the agreement constituted ratification. But even if there was no ratification, the agreement would still be valid. The agreement is not a 3treaty3 as the term is used in the .onstitution. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence. +t must be noted that a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. 5or the grant of treaty ma(ing power to the 2'ecutive and the Senate does not e'haust the power of the govt. over international relations. .onse)uently, e'ecutive agreements may be entered into with other states and are effective even without the concurrence of the Senate. 5rom the point of view of international law, there is no difference between treaties and e'ecutive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. The distinction between an e'ecutive agreement and a treaty is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance. Gature of 2'ecutive *greements % There are " classes % (1# agreements made purely as e'ecutive acts affecting e'ternal relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements, and ("# agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of .ongress, or .ongressional$2'ecutive *greements. The :omulo$Snyder *greement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on Sept. 1;, 1 9!, .ongress specifically authorized the President to obtain such indebtedness w, the Iovt of the ?S, its agencies or instrumentalities. 2ven assuming, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the :omulo$Snyder *greement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category. This "nd category usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. !a(a %" E+ec#ti%e Sec$eta$( +SS?2% .onstitutionality of the D5* 62L>% Hnce the Senate performs the power to concur with treaties or e'ercise its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the .onsti, the concurrence cannot be viewed as an abuse of power, much less a grave abuse of discretion. The Pres, in ratifying the D5* and submitting the same for concurrence of the Senate, acted within the confines and limits of the power vested in him by the .onsti. The Pres merely performed a constitutional tas( and e'ercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. 4,5 De8o$tatio of # de"i$a,le alie " E#a

2'ecutive agreements entered into by the President need no concurrence. The reason is that although e'ecutive agreements are a (ind of international agreements, when the .onstitution intends to include e'ecutive agreements, it says so specifically, as in *rt. D+++, Sec. <, par. ", when it spea(s of the power of the S. to review final /udgments of lower courts in cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e'ecutive agreement, is in )uestion. Co&&i""io e$ of C#"to&" %". Ea"te$ Sea T$adi ), +nternational agreements involving political issues or changes in national policy and those involving international agreements of permanent character usually ta(e the form of T:2*T+2S. But the international agreements involving ad/ustments in detail carrying out well$ established national policies and traditions and those involving a more or less temporary character usually ta(e the form of 2C2.?T+D2 *I:2242GTS. USA**E 9ete$a " A"" . %" T$ea"#$e$ 5*.TS% The central issue in this case concerns the validity of the :omulo$Snyder *greement (1 <8# whereby the Phil. Iovt. undertoo( to return to the ?S Iovt. in ten annual installments, a total of ]1< 4 dollars advanced by the ?S to, but une'pended by, the Gational >efense 5orces of the Philippines. The ?S*552 Deterans contended that the money delivered by the ?S were straight payments for military services and that therefore there was nothing to return to the ?S and nothing to consider as a loan. They also contended that the :omulo$ Synder *greement was void for lac( of authority of the officers who concluded the same 62L>% The funds involved have been consistently regarded as funds advanced and to be subse)uently accounted for. Such

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C'ee Aa % De8o$tatio !oa$d 1. The Pres may deport only according to grounds enumerated by law since it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the use of an unlimited discretion by the Pres. ". " ways of deporting an undesirable alien% (a# by order of the Pres after due investigation and (b# by the .ommissioner of +mmigration 1. The Pres can delegate the power of investigation not to order the arrest of an alien. 9. The >eportation Board may not order the arrest of the alien in this case. +f an implied grant of power, considering that no e'press authority was granted by law, would curtail the right of a person then a delegation of the implied power must be re/ected as inimical to the liberties of the people. Ao Te@ % De8o$tatio !oa$d 1. The >eportation Board can entertain deportation based on grounds not specified in Sec 10 of the +mmigration Law. The Board has /urisdiction to investigate Io Te( even if he had not been convicted yet. ". The PresidentOs power to deport aliens and to investigate them sub/ect to deportation are provided in the :evised *dmin .ode. 1. The State has inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. This power is e'ercised by the Pres. There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the .hief 2'ecutive the full discretion to determine whether an alienOs residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect the security, welfare or interest of the state. The .hief 2'ecutive is the sole and e'clusive /udge of the e'istence of facts which would warrant the deportation of aliens. 4-15 Powe$ o%e$ le)i"latio 4a5 Me""a)e to Co )$e"" A$t. 9II, Sec. 17. The President shall address the .ongress at the opening of its regular session. 6e may also appear before it at any other time. E2very 9th 4onday of -uly, the President delivers the State of the Gation *ddress, which contains his proposals for legislation. Through this speech, he can influence the course of legis$ lation that .ongress can ta(e during the regular session. 4,5 P$e8a$e a d "#,&it t'e ,#d)et A$t. 9II, Sec. 11. The President shall submit to .ongress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of e'penditures and sources of financing, including receipts from e'isting and proposed revenue measures. EThe budget is the plan indicating the (a# e'penditures of the government, (b# sources of financing, and (c# receipts from revenue$raising measures. This budget is the upper limit of the appropriations bill to be passed by .ongress. Through the budget, therefore, the President reveals the priorities of the government. 4c5 9eto 8owe$ A$t. 9I, Sec. 10 (1# 2very bill passed by the .ongress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. +f he approves the same, he shall sign it& otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his ob/ection to the 6ouse where it originated, which shall enter the ob/ections at large in its -ournal and proceed to reconsider it. +f, after such reconsideration, two$thirds of all the 4embers of such 6ouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the ob/ections, to the other 6ouse by which it shall li(ewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two$thirds of all the 4embers of that 6ouse, it shall become a law. +n such cases, the votes of each 6ouse shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the 4embers voting for or against shall be entered in its -ournal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the 6ouse where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. ("# The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not ob/ect. E*s a general rule, all bills must be approved by the President before they become law, e'cept when (i# the veto of the President is overridden by ",1 vote, and (ii# the bill passed is the special law to elect the President and Dice$President. This gives the President an actual hand in legislation. 6owever, his course of action is only to approve it or veto it as a whole. (See Legislative Power of .ongress# 4d5 E&e$)e c( Powe$ A$t. 9I, Sec. 17. ''' ("# +n times of war or other national emergency, the .ongress, may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period, and sub/ect to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to e'ercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. ?nless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the .ongress, such powers shall cease upon the ne't ad/ournment thereof. 4e5 *i+i ) of ta$iff $ate" A$t. 9I, Sec. 1/. ''' The .ongress may, by law, authorize the President to fi' within specified limits, and sub/ect to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and e'port )uotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framewor( of the national development program of the Iovernment. EThe reason for the delegation is the highly technical nature of international commerce, and the need to constantly and with relative ease adapt the rates to prevailing commercial standards.

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4-75 I&&# it( f$o& "#it Ca$illo %". Ma$co" The President as such cannot be sued, en/oying as he does immunity from suit, but the validity of his acts can be tested by an action against the other e'ecutive officials or such independent constitutional agencies as the .ommission on 2lections and the .ommission on *udit. I Re !e$&#de= The petition see(s clarification as to whom the .onsti refers to as the incumbent Pres and Dice Pres. Prescinding from the petitioner7s lac( of capacity to sue, it is elementary that this .ourt assumes no /urisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. 4ore importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent Pres. *)uino and it is e)ually elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. E* related doctrine is the President7s 3immunity from liability3. +n the ?S case of Ni+o % *it=)e$ald, an employee of the *ir 5orce was laid off due to an adverse decision of a Senate .ommittee made upon the insistence of Pres. Gi'on, but which decision was later found to be baseless, the S. ruled that the President, whether in office or not, is absolutely immune from liability for his official acts. The .ourt gave three reasons for such immunity% 1. The singular importance of the Presidency and his high visibility. ". The distraction that suits would bring to such an important official laden with enormous responsibility. 1. The conse)uence that the President might hesitate at the moment of greatest peril to the nation if he (nows that he would be held liable later on. 62L>% The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the e'ercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the .hief 2'ecutive is a /ob that, aside from re)uiring all of the office$holder7s time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invo(ed only by the holder of the office& not by any other person in the President7s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case where the President is a complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against the accused. 4oreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court7s /urisdiction. The choice of whether to e'ercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President7s prerogative. +t is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by another person. J% >oes the President7s immunity from suit e'tend even beyond his termF *% Pes. So long as the act was done during his term. 4-B5 E+ec#ti%e P$i%ile)e US %" Ni+o , President Gi'on refused to release information concerning the @atergate scandal, claiming what he called 3e'ecutive privilege.3 The ?S S. held his refusal invalid, declaring that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high$level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, un)ualified Presidential privilege of immunity from /udicial process under all circumstances. The President7s need for complete candor and ob/ectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. 6owever, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arise. *bsent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for inspection with all the protection that the court will be obliged to provide. !. 9ICE PRESIDENT 4-5 E#alificatio ", electio , te$& a d oat' A$t. 9II, Sec. 7. There shall be a Dice$ President who shall have the same )ualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. 6e may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. The Dice$President may be appointed as a 4ember of the .abinet. Such appointment

J% >oes the President7s immunity from suit e'tend to his alter egosF *% Go. Soli%e %" Ma@a"ia$M !elt$a %" Ma@a"ia$

5*.TS% This is the libel case involving Beltran7s allegations that President *)uino was hiding under her bed. Hne of the issues was whether the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint$affidavit. *ccording to Beltran, the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. 6e contended that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President7s filing of her complaint$affidavit, she may subse)uently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the T.7s /urisdiction. This would be an indirect way of defeating her privilege of immunity from suit, since by testifying on the witness stand, she would be e'posing herself to possible contempt of court or per/ury.

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re)uires no confirmation. Id., Sec. B. The President and the Dice$ President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of si' years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of -une ne't following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date si' years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. Go person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be )ualified for election to the same office at any time. Go Dice$President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Doluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected. ?nless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Dice$President shall be held on the second 4onday of 4ay. The returns of every election for President and Dice$ President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each provinces or city, shall be transmitted to the .ongress, directed to the President of the Senate. ?pon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of election (w,c is the "nd Tuesday of -une#, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and 6ouse of :epresentatives in /oint public session, and the .ongress, upon determination of the authenticity and due e'ecution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass (i.e., tally the certificates of canvass# the votes. The persons having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an e)ual and highest number of votes (tie#, one of them shall forth with be chosen by the vote of a ma/ority of all the members of .ongress, voting separately. The .ongress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. lifications of the President, or Dice$President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. Id., Sec. 2. Before they enter on the e'ecution of their office, the President, the Dice$President or the *cting President shall ta(e the following oath or affirmation% 3+ do solemnly swear (or affirm# that + will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Dice$President or *cting President# of the Philippines, preserve and defend its .onstitution, e'ecute its laws, do /ustice to every man, and consecrate to myself to the service of the Gation. So help me Iod.3 (+n case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.# 415 P$i%ile)e a d "ala$( A$t. 9II, Sec. 3. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Dice$President shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. Go increase in said compensation shall ta(e effect until after the e'piration of the term of the incumbent during which such increased was approved. They shall not received during their tenure any other emolument Iovernment or any other source. from the

A$t. :9III, Sec -0. ''' the Dice$President, ''' P"98,888 475 P$o'i,itio " A$t. 9II, Sec. -7. The President, Dice$ President, the 4embers of the .abinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this .onstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$ owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, or the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, or as Secretaries, ?ndersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. A$t. 9II, Sec. 7. '''The Dice$President may be appointed as member of the .abinet. Such appointment re)uires no confirmation. 4B5 S#cce""io A$t. 9I, Sec. .. @henever there is a vacancy in the Hffice of the Dice$ President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Dice$President from among the members of the Senate and the 6ouse of :epresentatives, who shall assume office upon confirmation by a ma/ority vote of all the members of both houses, voting separately. EGote that in case the vacancy occurs in both the offices of President and Dice$President, there is no *cting Dice$President spo(en of. The reason is that the Dice$President does not have real functions when the President is around. @hen a vacancy occurs in both offices, the Dice$President is elected in a special election. +f the vacancy occurs only in the Dice$ Presidency, the successor is not elected anymore, but merely chosen from the .ongress. 425 Re&o%al A$t. :I, Sec. 1. The President, the Dice$ President, the 4embers of the Supreme .ourt, the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and the Hmbudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal or public trust. *ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

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Id., Sec. 7. 41# The 6ouse of :epresentatives shall have the e'clusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. ("# * verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any 4ember thereof, which shall be included in the Hrder of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper .ommittee within three session days thereafter. The .ommittee, after hearing, and by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers, shall submit its report to the 6ouse within si'ty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the 6ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof. (1# * vote of at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the *rticles of +mpeachment of the .ommittee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each 4ember shall be recorded. (9# +n case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one$third of all the 4embers of the 6ouse, the same shall constitute the *rticles of +mpeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (<# Go impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.(!# The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. @hen sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. @hen the President of the Philippines is on trial, the .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt shall preside, but shall not vote. Go person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two$thirds of all the 4embers of the Senate. (0# -udgment in cases of impeachment shall not e'tend further than removal from office and dis)ualification to hold any office under the :epublic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub/ect to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. 435 *# ctio " 4a5 Ri)'t of "#cce""io A$t. 9II, Sec. /. +n case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Dice$President shall become the President to serve the une'pired term. +n case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Dice$President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, shall then act as President until the President or Dice$President shall have been elected and )ualified. The .ongress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the *cting President. 6e shall serve until the President or the Dice$ President shall have been elected and )ualified, and be sub/ect to the same restrictions of powers and dis)ualifications as the *cting President. Id., Sec. --. @henever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Dice$President as *cting President. @henever a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .abinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Dice$President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as *cting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives his written declaration that no inability e'ists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. 4eanwhile, should a ma/ority of all the 4embers of the .abinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the .ongress shall decide the issue. 5or that purpose, the .ongress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty$eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. +f the .ongress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or if not in session, within twelve days after it is re)uired to assemble, determines by a two$thirds vote of both 6ouses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Dice$President shall act as President& otherwise, the President shall continue e'ercising the powers and duties of his office. 4,5 Me&,e$"'i8 i Ca,i etA$t. 9II, Sec. 7. ''' The Dice$President may be appointed as member of the .abinet. Such appointment re)uires no confirmation.

III. >UDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. THE SUPREME COURT Barlongay% Hf the three departments of government, two departments (2'ecutive and Legislative# are considered as active. Hn the other hand, the -udiciary is considered as passive. +t is passive in the sense that it has to wait for a case to be filed before it can act. .ruz% To maintain the independence of the -udiciary, the following safeguards have been embodied in the .onsti% (1# The S. is a constitutional body. +t cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 9 (1#R ("# The members of the /udiciary are not sub/ect to confirmation by the .*. (1# The members of the S. may not be removed e'cept by impeachment. (*rt. +C, Sec. ".# (9# The S. may not be deprived of its

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minimum original and appellate /urisdiction as prescribed in *rt. C, Sec. < of the .onsti. (*rt. D+++, Sec. ".# (<# The appellate /urisdiction of the S. may not be increased by law w,o its advice and concurrence. (*rt. D+, Sec. 18.# (!# The S. now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel. (*rt. D+++, Sec. !.# (0# The S. has e'clusive power to discipline /udges of lower courts. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 11.# (;# The members of the S. and all lower courts have security of tenure, w,c cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the /udiciary. (+d.# ( # They shall not be designated to any agency performing )uasi$/udicial or administrative functions. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 1".# (18# The salaries of /udges may not be reduced during their continuance in office. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 18.# (11# The /udiciary shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 1.# (1"# The S. alone may initiate rules of court. S*rt. D+++, Sec. < (<#.R (11# Hnly the S. may order the temporary detail of /udges. S*rt. D+++, Sec. < (1#R (19# The S. can appoint all officials and employees of the /udiciary. S*rt. D+++, Sec. < (!#R 4-5 Co&8o"itio A$t. 9III, Sec. B. (1# The Supreme .ourt shall be composed of a .hief -ustice and fourteen *ssociate -ustices. +t may sit en banc or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven 4embers. *ny vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. ("# *ll cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or e'ecutive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme .ourt, en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (1# .ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such 4embers. @hen the re)uired number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc% Provided, that no doctrine or principle or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. EThe Supreme .ourt is a constitutional body. *s such it cannot be abolished by the .ongress for the power to destroy only resides in the one who has the power to create. The lower courts (.ourt of *ppeals, :egional Trial .ourts, 4unicipal Trial .ourts, 4etropolitan Trial .ourts, 4unicipal .ircuit Trial .ourts#, on the other hand, are established by law, and so could be abolished by law, provided the security of tenure is not undermined. 9a$)a" % Rillo$a=a, 5*.TS% Pet. Dargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People7s .ourt *ct w,c provides that any /ustice of the S. who held any office or position under the Phil 2'ec. .ommission or under the govt called Phil. :epublic, may not sit and vote in any case brought to that court under sec. 11 hereof in w,c the accused is a person who held any office or position under either both the Phil. 2'ec. .ommission and the Phil. :epublic or any branch, instrumentality or agency thereof. +f on account of such dis)ualification, or bec. of any of the grounds of dis)ualification of /udges, in : 1"!, sec. 1 of the :H., or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the re)uisite number of /ustices necessary to constitute a )uorom in any case is not present, the Pres. may designate such no. of /udges of the .5+, /udges at large of .5+, cadastral /udges, having none of the dis)ualification set forth in the above law, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as /ustice of the S. in order to form a )uorom. 62L>% (1# .ongress does not have the power to add to the e'isting grounds for dis)ualification of a /ustice of the S.. To dis)ualify any of these constitutional component member of the court$ especially as in this case, a ma/ority of them$$ in a treason case, is nothing short of depriving the court itself of its /urisdiction as established by the fundamental law. >is)ualification of a /udge is a deprivation of his /udicial power. +t would seem evident that if .ongress could dis)ualify members of S. in ta(ing part in the hearing and determination of certain 3collaboration3 cases, it could e'tend the dis)ualification to other cases. ("# The designation provided (a .5+$ /udge to sit as a S. /ustice if the S. does not have the re)uired )uorum# is repugnant to the constitutional re)uirement that members be appointed by the Pres. w, the consent of the .*. (This was under the 1 1< .onstitution w,c re)uired confirmation from the .ommission on *ppointments.# +t will result in a situation wherein ! members sitting will not be appointed and confirmed in accordance w, the .onsti. (1# 6owever brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a /udge designated, there is no escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the S. and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as any regular /ustice. Mode of Sitti ) +t may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of 1, < or 0 members (or <, 1 or " divisions#. SA$t. 9III, Sec. B4-5N +n 1 1<, the rule was that the S. may sit en banc or in " divisions, 3unless otherwise provided by law.3 .ongress decided against allowing the S. to sit in " divisions on the theory that there is only one Supreme .ourt. *nd so, it provided in the -udiciary *ct of 1 9; the rule that the S. may only sit en banc. But the reality

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was that the doc(ets were crowded. This prompted the framers to eliminate one phrase 3unless otherwise provided by law3 in 1 <!, and in effect leave the decision to the S. on whether to sit en banc or in " divisions, if it sat on divisions. +n 1 ;0, not only was the discretion retained, but also the divisions were increased. There may be <, 1 or " divisions made up of 1, < or 0 members, respectively. *t present, the S. sits either en banc or in 1 divisions. O e S#8$e&e Co#$t @hen the S. sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a 3one Supreme .ourt3 because, according the U ited State" % Li&"io )co, the divisions of the S. do not diminish its authority, because although it sits in divisions, it remains and co$functions as one body. This 3one Supreme .ourt3 doctrine is strengthened by the provision that 3when the re)uired number (in a division# is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc% provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. SA$t. 9III, Sec. B47#R St$ict Co&8o"itio +n 9a$)a" % Rillo$a=a, the S. held that the temporary designation of /udges of the .5+ and the .ourt of *ppeals in the Supreme .ourt to constitute a )uorum due to dis)ualification of some of the /ustices, is unconstitutional. There is but one Supreme .ourt whose membership appointments are permanent. 415 A88oi t&e t a d <#alificatio " A$t. 9III, Sec. 0. (1# Go person shall be appointed 4ember of the Supreme .ourt or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural$born citizen of the Philippines. * member of the Supreme .ourt must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a /udge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. ''' (1# * member of the /udiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence Sec. /. (<# The council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the /udiciary. +t may e'ercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme .ourt may assign to it. Sec. .. The memners of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar .ouncil for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. ''' 475 Sala$( A$t. 9III, Sec. -G. The salary of the .hief -ustice and of the *ssociate -ustices of the Supreme court and of /udges of lower courts shall be fi'ed by law. >uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. A$t. :9III, Sec. -0. ?nless the .ongress provides otherwise, '''& the .hief -ustice shall receive an annual salary of P "98,888 and the *ssociate -ustices shall receive P "89,888 each& ''', the *ssociate -ustices of the Supreme .ourt, ''', P"89,888 each& '''. E*lthough the salaries may not be decreased, they may be increased by law, to ta(e effect at once. @hy% (1# the .onstitution does not prohibit it& ("# the -udiciary plays no part in the passage of the law increasing their salary unli(e the .ongress and the 2'ecutive, and so there can be no conflict of interest& and (1# this will promote the independence of the -udiciary. +s the imposition of income ta' on the salary of the -ustices and -udges a diminution of their salary as prohibited by the .onstitutionF ?nder the -.72 Co "tit#tio 4A$t. 9III, Sec. .#, it was provided that the members of the -udiciary 3shall receive such compensation as may be fi'ed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.3 Pe$fecto % Mee$, Salaries of /udges were not sub/ect to income ta', for such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the .onstitution. This happened after -ustice Perfecto refused to pay the assessment of income ta' made upon him by the .ollector. E:esponding to this, .ongress passed a law providing that the constitutional provision against the diminution of salaries of members of the /udiciary should not be interpreted to mean an e'emption from income ta'. 4Sec. -7, RA 2.G.5 But the .ourt struc( this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previous case, -udge 2ndencia refused to pay his ta'es& thereby giving the S. an opportunity to ma(e the pronouncement in the case of E de cia % Da%id. The S. ruling invalidating the statute was based on the reason that the legislature had no power to interpret the .onstitution, such power being lodged in the /udicial branch, and so when it did, it violated the separation of powers under the .onstitution.
Co&8a$e t'e -.07 Co "tit#tio , A$t. :9, Sec. 3

*ware of this ruling, the framers of the 1 01 .onstitution clearly provided in *rt. CD, Sec. ! that% A$t. :9. Sec. 3. Go salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be e'empt from the payment of income ta'. Thereby avoiding a S. contrary, self$ defensive ruling. This provision in the 1 01 .onstitution, however, is not found in the 1 ;0 .onstitution,

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prompting some /udges including Gitafan, to contend that the old ruling in Perfecto and 2ndencia is thereby deemed revived. But the S. this time did not uphold the old ruling. Not e+e&8t f$o& i co&e ta+ Nitafa % Co&&i""io e$ of I te$ al Re%e #e The .ourt ruled that under the 1 ;0 .onstitution, the salaries of members of the -udiciary are not e'empt from ta'es. +t anchored its decision on the deliberation of the .onstitutional .ommission, that is, on the legislative history of the present *rt. D+++, Sec. 18. * draft of the present *rt. D+++, Sec. 18 when originally presented to the body, e'pressly e'empted the salary of /udges from ta'ation. But when this draft was discussed on second reading, the sentiment was against the e'emption, the reason being that li(e any other citizen, /udges and /ustices must pay their share in the burden of maintaining the government. So this e'press e'emption was deleted from *rt. D+++, Sec. 18 and so it was when the draft was adopted by the body. There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in *rt. CD, Sec. ! of 1 01, but through oversight, the constitutional commission failed to insert one. Pet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must be read into the .onstitution, the S. concluded. (B5 Sec#$it( of Te #$e A$t. 9III, Sec. --. The members of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme .ourt en banc shall have the power to discipline /udges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Id., Sec. 1. +++ Go law shall be passed reorganizing the -udiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its 4embers. Reo$)a i=atio +t is highly doubtful if this provision applies to the S.. The power to reorganize involves the power to create and destroy. Since the S. is a creation of the .onstitution and not of .ongress, it may not be created nor destroyed, and ultimately reorganized by .ongress. De la Lalla a %". Al,a, 5*.TS% Sec. 199 of BP 1" replaced the e'isting court system, w, the e'ception of the S. and the SB, w, a new one and provided that upon the completion of the reorganization by the Pres., the courts affected 3shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.3 Petitioner, /udge of the city court of Hlongapo, and 0 members of the Bar )uestioned the validity of the *ct in an action for prohibition, on the ground that it contravened the security of tenure of /udges. They sought to bolster their claim by imputing lac( of I5 in the enactment of the *ct and by characterizing it as an undue delegation of legislative power bec. of Sec. 91, w,c authorizes the Pres. to fi' the compensation of those who would be appointed under it 3along the guidelines set forth in LH+ Go. 1, pursuant to P> ;<, as amended by P> 1< 0.3 62L>% The imputation of lac( of I5 disregards the fact that the *ct was the product of careful study and deliberation not only by the BP but also by a Presidential study committee (composed of the .hief -ustice and 4inister of -ustice as co$chairmen, w, members drawn from the S. and 4inistry of -ustice.# The study group called attention to the clogged doc(ets of the courts and the possible worsening of the situation as a result of population growth and rising e'pectations, and the adverse effect of this on the developmental programs of the govt. +t was this problem w,c the *ct see(s to solve. ''' STRhe abolition of an office is w,in the competence of a legislative body if done in I5. The test is whether the abolition is in I5. *s that element is present in the enactment of BP 1" , the lac( of merit of the petition becomes apparent. ("# 6owever, while there can be no claim to security of tenure where the office no longer e'ists, in their effect there is no difference bet. removal and the abolition of office. +n either case, the effect on the incumbent is one of separation. *ccordingly, in the implementation of the law it would be in (eeping w, the spirit of the .onsti. that, as far as incumbent /ustices and /udges are concerned, the S. be consulted and that its view be accorded fullest consideration. This is not rendering advisory opinion bec. there is no )uestion of law involved. Geither is there intrusion into the appointing process bec. only incumbents are involved. (1# *s to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 91 that the Pres. should fi' the compensation of those who will be appointed to the new courts 3along the guidelines set forth in LH+ Go. 1, pursuant to P> ;<, as amended by P> 1< 03 constitutes a sufficient ground. 99. 425. Re&o%al A$t. 9III, Sec. --. The members of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme .ourt en banc shall have the power to discipline /udges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. A$t. :I, Sec. 1. The ''' 4embers of the Supreme .ourt ''' may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. *ll other public officers

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and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. E4embers of the S. cannot be removed e'cept by impeachment. Thus, a S. /ustice cannot be charged in a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding, because the ultimate effect of either is to remove him from office, and thus circumvent the provision on impeachment. *ppellate /urisdiction may be e'ercised in two ways% 1.# Hrdinary appeal This is obligatory on the courts, so the appellant possesses this 3as a matter of right3. ?nder this mode, the S. can pass on both )uestions of fact and law. Hrdinary appeal to the S. is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion (to ensure uniformity of decision#. (Sec. 10, -udiciary *ct of 1 9;#. The other case is the automatic review by the S. of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed. This is unli(e the ordinary appeal ta(en where the penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the review is automatic. The reason why it is not automatic in the first case (reclusion perpetua# is that on ap$ peal, the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial court (to death# so that the convict must first waive his right against double /eopardy, precisely by voluntarily ma(ing the appeal, before the S. can reopen the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the /udgment is af$ firmed. Gaturalization and denaturalization cases under the -udiciary *ct of 1 9; (Sec. 10# used to be directly appealable to the S.. But this is deemed to have been amended by the -udiciary :eorganization *ct of 1 ;8 (BP 1" # which, in Sec. <(1#, ma(es all cases decided by the :T., appealable to the .*, e'cept those made directly appealable to the S. by (i# the .onstitution, (ii# BP 1" and (iii# Sec. 10 S1(i#R and Sec. 10 S9(9#Rof the -udiciary *ct of 1 9;. Gaturalization and denaturalization cases do not fall under any of the e'ceptions. ".# Petition for review on certiorari This is not discretionary on the S.. +t has the authority not to give due course to the petition, if the petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode provided for in :ule 9<, is limited to pure )uestions of law. *ll other cases can be appealed to the S. using this mode. The .onstitution now provides that 3no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.3 (*rt. D+++, Sec. 19, par. "# The four other cases falling under the appellate /urisdiction of the S. (viz, constitutionality, ta', /urisdiction and pure )uestions of law#, are appealable to the S. by petition for review on certiorari. 6owever, in cases involving constitutionality, ta', or /urisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue depends on a controverted )uestion of fact, the case must be appealed to the .* on both, )uestions of fact and law, and the decision of the .* is then raised to the S. by petition for review on certiorari on pure )uestions of law.

435 *i"cal A#to o&( A$t. 9III, Sec. 7. The -udiciary shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. *ppropriations for the -udiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. 405 >#$i"dictio T'e S#8$e&e Co#$tO" >#$i"dictio *# Hriginal /urisdiction JA$t. 9III, Sec. 24-5N (1# .ases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. ("# Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, )uo warranto and habeas corpus. (1# Sufficiency of factual basis of proclamation of martial law and suspension of privilege of writ of 6. EGote that the S. does not have /urisdiction over declaratory relief cases, which must be filed with the :T. (+n :e Bermudez said so too, and yet gave due course to the petition.# The first case (ambassadors, etc.# is made concurrent with :T.s by law (-udiciary *ct of 1 9;#. The second case (special civil actions# is concurrent with the .* and the :T., with re$ spect to inferior bodies. B# *ppellate -urisdiction The Supreme .ourt shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on (i# ordinary appeal, or (ii# petition for review on certiorari, as the law or the :ules of .ourt may provide, final /udgment and orders of lower courts in the following cases% (1# .ases )uestioning the constitutionality or validity of any (a# treaty, (b# international and e'ecutive agreement, (c# law or statute, (d# presidential decree, (e# proclamation, (f# order, (g# instruction, (h# ordinance, or (i# regulation. ("# .ases )uestioning the legality of an (a# ta', (b# impost, (c# assessment, or (d# toll, or (e# any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (1# .ases in which the /urisdiction of lower courts is in issue. (9# .riminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. (<# .ases in w,c only an error or )uestion of law is involved. (!# Hrders of the .onstitutional .ommissions.

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(Sec. 10 of the -udiciary *ct of 1 9;# .ertiorari The certiorari referred to in <(1# (when the S. e'ercises original /urisdiction# is the special civil action of certiorari under :ule !<, where the )uestion raised is a 3/urisdictional )uestion,3 that is, (a# lac( of /urisdiction, (b# e'cess of /urisdiction, or (c# grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( of /urisdiction. The certiorari referred to in <("# (when the S. e'ercises appellate /urisdiction# is certiorari as an ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is 3error of /udgment3 or error of law. EThe /udicial power shall be vested in one Supreme .ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (A$t. 9III, Sec. -, 8a$. -.5 Scope of the -udicial Power A see discussion under -udicial :eview >#$i"dictio o%e$ c$i&i al ca"e" w'e$e 8e alt( i&8o"ed i" $ecl#"io 8e$8et#a A$t. 9III, Sec. 2. The Supreme .ourt shall have the following powers% ''' ("# :eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the :ules of .ourt may provide, final /udgments and orders of lower courts in% (d# *ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. Peo8le % Da iel,& Peo8le % Ra&o", Both are rape cases where the trial court imposed lesser penalties because of misappreciation of the aggravating and )ualifying circumstances and on appeal the penalty was increased. The ma/ority opinion held that 3henceforth, should the .* be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua, the said .ourt, with comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved (should# render /udgment e'pressly and e'plicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering /udgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereto to this .ourt for review.3 .hief -ustice .astro, for the ma/ority, e'plained% *rt. C, Sec. < ("# (d# Snow *rt. D+++, Sec. < ("# (d#R provides that the S. shall have appellate /urisdiction over 3final /udgements and decrees of inferior courts3 in criminal in w,c the 3penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.3 ?nless the .* renders /udgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua, there would be no /udgment for S. to review. +ndeed, Section 19 of the -udiciary *ct of 1 9; and the present :ule 1"9, Sec. 11 provide that, whenever the .* should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, 3the said court shall refrain from entering /udgment thereon, and shall forthwith certify the case brought before it on appeal,3 which that it is not prohibited from rendering /udgment. +n other words, the .* is not prohibited from rendering /udgment but from 3entering /udgment.3 The distinction bet. the two is well established. The phrase 3entering /udgment3 is not to be e)uated w, an 3entry of /udgment3 as the latter is understood in :1! in relation to Sec. ;, : 1"1 and Sec. 1!, : 1"9, :H.. 32ntry of /udgment3 presupposes a final /udgment$$ final in the sense that no appeal was ta(en from the decision of the trial court or appellate court w,in the reglamentary period. * /udgment in a crim. case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the def. has e'pressly waived in writing his right to appeal. +t is only then that there is a /udgment w,c is to be entered or recorded in the boo( of entries of /udgments. R#le -1B, Sec. -7. ''' @henever the .ourt of *ppeals should be of the opinion that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher should be imposed in a case, the .ourt after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render /udgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering /udgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme .ourt for review. A$t. 9II, Sec. -/. ''' The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the e'tension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A$t. 9II, Sec. B. ''' The Supreme .ourt, sitting en banc, shall be the sole /udge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and )ualifications of the President, Dice$President, and may promulgate its rule for the purpose. Lo8e= %". Ro+a" 5*.TS% +n 1 !<, the " 6ouses of .ongress in /oint session proclaimed petitioner 5ernando Lopez elected to the Hffice of the Dice$President of the Philippines. 6is closest opponent, resp. Ierardo :o'as, then filed with the Presidential 2lectoral Tribunal (P2T# an election protest contesting the election of petitioner herein as DP upon the ground that it was not he, but said resp., who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez then instituted this Hriginal *ction to prevent the P2T from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that :.*. Go. 10 1, creating said Tribunal, is 3unconstitutional3 and that, 3all proceedings ta(en by it are a nullity3. +SS?2% @hether :.*. 10 1 is unconstitutional 62L>% GH. Section 1, *rt. D+++ of the .onstitution vests in the /udicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited /udicial power, but the entirety or 3all3 of said power, e'cept, only, so much as the .onstitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to 3/udge all contests relating

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to the election, returns and )ualifications7 of members of the Senate and those of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, which is vested by the .onstitution solely in the Senate 2lectoral Tribunal and the 6ouse 2lectoral Tribunal, respectively. :.* 10 1, creating the P2T, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate the legal right to contest /udicially the election of the President$elect or the DP$elect. By providing that the P2T 3shall be composed of the .hief -ustice and the other 18 4embers of the S.3, :.*. 10 1 has conferred upon such court an additional e'clusive original /urisdiction. +t has not created a new and separate court. +t has merely conferred upon the S. the functions of a P2T. The P2T is not inferior to the S. since it is the same court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the S. in the e'ercise of its ordinary functions. The authority of the P2T to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge constitutional tenure. +f the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected is the protestant, not the person declared elected by .ongress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgment thereof. 4oreover, in the imposition of new duties upon the S., the .ongress has not, through :.*. 10 1, encroached upon the appointing power of the 2'ecutive. +t constitutes neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is constitutional. Ada8ted. A$t. I:, A, Sec. 0. 2ach .ommission shall decide by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers any case or matter brought before it within si'ty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum re)uired by the rules of the .ommission or by the .ommission itself. ?nless otherwise provided by this .onstitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each .ommission may be brought to the Supreme .ourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of the copy thereof. 4/5 Co )$e""io al Powe$ >#$i"dictio of t'e S#8$e&e Co#$t o%e$ A$t. 9I, Sec. 7G. Go law shall be passed increasing the appellate /urisdiction of the Supreme .ourt as provided in this .onstitution without its advice and concurrence. 1. +t can increase the original /urisdiction of the S. (pursuant to its general power#. 9. +t can ma(e the /urisdiction of the S. concurrent with lower courts (pursuant to its general power#. Thus, under the :ules of .ourt, the original /urisdiction of the S. is concurrent with the :T. and in the case of the special civil actions, with the .*. <. +t cannot pass a law reorganizing the /udiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members. (*rt. D+, Sec. ", par. "# Ma t$#"te S("te&", I c. %" CA 5*.TS% 4antruste (4S+# entered into an interim lease agreement w, >BP, owner of Bayview Plaza 6otel wherein the former would operate the hotel for a minimum of 1 mos. or until such time that the said properties are sold to 4S+ or other third parties by >BP. Subse)uently, the Pres. issued Procl. <8 w,c sought to the e'peditious privatization of government assets. The Bayview 6otel properties were among the govt assets identified for privatization and were conse)uently transferred from >BP to the *sset Privatization Trust (*PT# for disposition. '''. The properties were subse)uently awarded to the 4a(ati$*gro Trading and La 5ilipina .orp. 4S+ filed a complaint for the issuance of a restraining order en/oining *PT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners and from e/ecting 4S+ from the property or from terminating the contract of lease. The .* nullified the lower court7s decision for being violative of Sec. 11 of Procl. <8$*. 62L>% Section 11 of Proclamation Go. <$* prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any restraining order or in/unction against the *sset Privatization Trust in connection with the ac)uisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from ta(ing possession of any assets purchased by him. Said Section does not infringe any provision of the .onstitution. +t does not impair the inherent power of the courts 3to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt.3 The President, in the e'ercise of her legislative power under the 5reedom .onstitution, issued said Proclamation to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge of the 2'ecutive >epartment of its tas( of carrying out the e'peditious disposition and privatization of certain govt. corporations and,or the assets thereof, absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to e'cess or lac( of /urisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the .onstitution and not having been repealed or revo(ed by .ongress, has remained

A$t. 9III, Sec. 1. The .ongress shall have the power the define, prescribe and apportion the /urisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme .ourt of its /urisdiction over cases enumerated in Section < hereof. ''' EBut while the /urisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative apportionment, the .onstitution sets certain limitations on this prerogative% 1. +t cannot decrease the constitutionally set /urisdiction of the Supreme .ourt. (+t may not deprive the Supreme .ourt of its /urisdiction over cases enumerated in Section < hereof.# ". +t cannot increase the constitutionally set appellate /urisdiction of the Supreme .ourt.

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operative. @hile the /udicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation or powers, the powers of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of government is limited to the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction in the e'ercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tas(s. .ourts may not substitute their /udgment for that of the *PT, nor bloc(, by an in/unction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the ac)uisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it. Ada8ted. ''' (!# *ppoint all officials and employees of the -udiciary in accordance with the .ivil Service Law. 4-B5 R#le &a@i ) A$t. 9III, Sec. 2. The Supreme .ourt shall have the following powers% ''' (<# Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the +ntegrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and ine'pensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. :ights of procedure of special courts and )uasi$ /udicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme .ourt. Power of .ongress to repeal :ules of .ourt $ A$ticle :9III, Sec. -G. *ll courts e'isting at the time of the ratification of this .onstitution shall continue to e'ercise their /urisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the e'isting :ules of .ourt, /udiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this .onstitution shall remain operative unless amended or repealed by the Supreme .ourt or the .ongress. .o$-udicial powers *side from the /urisdiction of the Supreme .ourt mentioned above the following are its other powers related to, though not e'actly constituting, its /udicial function% 1. Hrder a change of venue or place of trial, in order to avoid a miscarriage of /ustice. *rt. D+++, Sec. <(9#R ". :ule ma(ing $ Promulgate rules concerning (a# the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, (b# pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, (c# the administration to the practice of law, (d# the +ntegrated Bar, and (e# legal assistance to the underprivileged. Limitations to this power% Such rules shall (i# provide simplified and ine'pensive procedure, for the speedy disposition of cases, (ii# be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and (iii# not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. :ules of procedure of special courts and )uasi$/udicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the S.. S*rt. D+++, Sec. <(<#R +t is on the basis of this power, that the :ules of .ourt, the Bar, +BP, Legal *id Hffice were adopted. +n 1 1<, as affirmed in the case of +n re .unanan, the .ongress was given the power to alter, supplement or modify the :ules of .ourt. Thus, if the S. set the passing grade in the bar at 0<V, .ongress could lower it to 08V, provided this has no retroactive effect. This is no longer true in 1 ;0. :ule$

Ad&i i"t$ati%e 8owe$" 4.5 S#8e$%i"io of lowe$ co#$t"

A$t. 9III, Sec. 3. The Supreme .ourt shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. No,leDa" % Tee'a @ee, the S. held that although the .ommissioner of Land :egistration is given the ran( of /udge of the .5+, he is still an administrative official, hence outside the /urisdiction of the S. and cannot be investigated by it as if he were a lower court /udge. Htherwise, the S. would be performing a non$ /udicial wor(. 4-G5 Te&8o$a$il( a""i) D#d)e" to ot'e$ "tatio " i t'e 8#,lic i te$e"t A$t. 9III, Sec. 2. The Supreme .ourt shall have the ''' power (to# ''' (1# *ssign temporarily /udges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may re)uire. Such temporary assignment shall not e'ceed si' months without the consent of the /udge concerned. 4--5 O$de$ a c'a )e of %e #e o$ 8lace of t$ial to a%oid &i"ca$$ia)e of D#"tice JA$t. 9III, Sec. 2 4B5N 4-15 D#d)e" A$t. 9III, Sec. --. ''' The Supreme .ourt en banc shall have the power to discipline /udges of lower courts, or order their dismissal, by a vote of a ma/ority of the members who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. 4-75 A88oi t&e t of official" a d e&8lo(ee" of e ti$e D#dicia$( A$t. 9III, Sec. 2. The Supreme .ourt shall have the ''' power (to# Di"ci8li e of lowe$ co#$t

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ma(ing power and the corollary power of amending the rules are now lodged e'clusively on the S.. those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating /ail congestion and improving local /ail conditions. *mong the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, /ail warden, fiscal or /udge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for proper action, to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed pre/udicial to the proper administration of criminal /ustice. -udge 4anzano, 2'ecutive -udge Hf +locos Gorte was appointed as member of said .ommittee. Before accepting the appointment, it sought the opinion of the S. as to the propriety of such appointment. 62L>% Such committee performs administrative functions. *dministrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its e'istence. ?nder the .onstitution, the members of the courts shall not be designated to any agency performing )uasi$/udicial or administrative functions. .onsidering that membership of -udge 4anzano in such committee, will violate the .onstitution, the Supreme .ourt is constrained to deny his re)uest that he be allowed to serve therein. 6e can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said committee, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of his /udicial duties. Ada8ted. E2'ceptions% .onstitutionally appointed non$/udicial functions of the Supreme .ourt a. *ct as Presidential 2lectoral Tribunal @hile .ongress acts as the Gational Board of .anvassers for the Presidential election, the Supreme .ourt acts as the 2lectoral Tribunal for such election. The .onstitution provides% 3The Supreme .ourt, sitting en banc, shall be the sole /udge of all contests relating to election, returns, and )ualifications of the President or Dice$President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.3 (*rt. *rt. D++, Sec. 9, last par.# This means that before the proclamation by the .ongress of the winner, .ongress is the /udge of any electoral issue, but the proclamation, when there is an electoral contest already, then the S. becomes the sole /udge. The 1 1< .onstitution did not provide this power. *nd so :* 10 1 gave the S. the power to act as /udge in presidential electoral contests. +t was challenged in the case of Lopez v :o'as, 10 S.:* 0<! (1 !!#, but the S. upheld the law, reasoning that it did not constitute the S. as a separate body but only added to its powers the power to be the /udge of election contests. @ith the e'press provision in *rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. 0, this is no longer a problem. b. .hief -ustice as presiding officer in impeachment trial of the President. S*rt. C+, Sec. 1(!#R c. .hief -ustice as .hairman of the -udicial and Bar .ouncil.

Practice of Professions A$t. :II, Sec. -B. ''' The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to 5ilipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. 4artial Law A$t. 9II, Sec. -/. The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of 4artial Law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the e'tension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days form its filing. (par. 1 thereof.# 4-25 No <#a"i6D#dicial ad&i i"t$ati%e wo$@ of D#d)e" a d

Ienerally% Go non$/udicial wor( for /udges& Go )uasi$ /udicial and administrative wor( for /udges. *s a general rule, members of the /udiciary shall only have /udicial functions, in line with the separation of powers principle of the .onstitution. Thus% A$t. 9III, Sec. -1. The members of the Supreme .ourt and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing )uasi$/udicial or administrative function. Me$alco % Pa"a( T$a "8o$tatio Co The issue concerns the legal right of the members of the S., sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a ma/ority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. 62L>% The S. and its members should not and cannot be re)uired to e'ercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected w, the administering of /udicial functions. RAM. Aa$cia % Maca$ai) The S. said that it did not loo( with favor at the practice of long standing of /udges being detailed with the >epartment of -ustice to assist the Secretary, even if it were only in connection with his wor( of e'ercising administrative authority over courts. The basis of this rule is the separation of powers. +n this case, resp. 4acaraig was appointed to one of the newly$created .5+ branches w, station at .alamba Laguna. *t the time of his appointment, resp. was the chief of Technical Staff of the >H- and concurrently member of the Board of Pardons and Parole. '''

I Re : Rodolfo Ma =a o 5*.TS% 2H Go. ;<! created the Provincial,.ity .ommittees on -ustice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly

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4-35 Re8o$t o t'e D#dicia$( Sec. 9(1#R !. *dministrative disciplinary cases involving /udges of lower courts. (+d., Sec. 11.# 0. *ctions instituted by citizen to test the validity of a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. (*rt. D++, Sec. 1;.# ;. The court sitting as Presidential 2lectoral Tribunal. (*rt. D++, Sec. 9, par. 0.# R#le 23 Sec. --. Procedure if opinion is e)ually divided.$$ @here the court en banc is e)ually divided in opinion, or the necessary ma/ority cannot be had, the case shall be re$ heard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court& in appealed cases, the /udgement or order appealed from shall stand affirmed& and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. R#le -12, Sec. 7. >ecision if opinion is e)ually divided.$$ @hen the court en banc is e)ually divided in opinion, or the necessary ma/ority cannot be had, the case shall be re$ heard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the /udgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused ac)uitted 4-05 Re<#i$e&e t a" to deci"io " >eliberations A$t. 9III, Sec. -7. The conclusions of the Supreme .ourt in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the .ourt. * certification to this effect signed by the .hief -ustice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. *ny 4ember who too( no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same re)uirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. EThe reason for the re)uirement that the decision must be reached 3in consulta3 (i.e., after deliberations by the group# is to emphasize that the S. is one body, albeit collegiate, so that the decision of the case is by the court itself and not the ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spo(esman of the body. Co "i ) 9 CA +SS?2% @,G absence of certification by the .ourt of *ppeals renders that decision invalid. 62L>% GH. The certification re)uirement imposed by the 1 ;0 constitution was meant to ensure the implementation of the constitutional re)uirement that decisions of the Supreme .ourt and lower collegiate courts, such as the .*, Sandiganbayan and .T*, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing. The absence would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being

A$t. 9III, Sec. -3. The Supreme .ourt shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the .ongress, submit to the President and the .ongress an annual report on the operations and activities of the -udiciary. (-05 $e<#i$ed Ma e$ of "itti ) a d %ote"

A$t. 9III, Sec. B. (1# The Supreme .ourt shall be composed of a .hief -ustice and fourteen *ssociate -ustices. +t may sit en banc or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven 4embers. *ny vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. ("# *ll cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or e'ecutive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme .ourt, en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (1# .ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such 4embers. @hen the re)uired number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc% Provided, that no doctrine or principle or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. EThe Supreme .ourt may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 1, <, or 0 members. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 9(1#R

The following cases shall be heard by the S. en banc% 1. .ases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or e'ecutive agreement or law. S+d., Sec. 9("#R ". .ases involving the (a# constitutionality, (b# application, or (c# operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations. S+d., Sec. 9("#R 1. *ll other cases which under the :ules of .ourt are re)uired to be heard by the S. en banc. S+d., Sec. 9("#R 9. .ases or matters heard by a division where the re)uired number of votes to decide or resolve (the ma/ority of those who too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case less than 1 members# is not met. S+d., Sec. 9(1#R <. To modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division. S+d.,

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assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed. The lac( of certification serves as an evidence of failure to observe the certification re)uirement but it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision. A$t. 9III, Sec. -B. Go decision shall be rendered by any court without e'pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Go petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Doting Dotes re)uired to 3render a decision or resolution3 *# 2n banc $ .oncurrence of a ma/ority of the members who (i# actually too( part in the deliberations (i.e., the consultation# on the issues in the case, and (ii# voted thereon. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 9("# and Sec. 11.R a.# The lowest possible votes needed to render a decision is <, since )uorum of 1< is ;, and ma/ority of ; is <. This number may increase as the number of /ustices present increase& b.# Hne who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the ma/ority vote needed. 5or an abstention is really a form of casting a vote with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case. c.# Hne who was present but (ept silent during the deliberations and did not vote is still included in the counting for the purpose of determining the ma/ority. 5or it may happen that he has already made up his mind on how to decide and influence the outcome of the case. d.# But one who e'pressly inhibited or is dis)ualified from ta(ing part (for instance because of conflict of interest# is not included. e.# There must be a )uorum before a valid decision can be made. @ithout a )uorum, there can be no valid business to begin with. f.# +n case, the necessary ma/ority cannot be mustered, then there is no decision rendered. (See effect of failure to reach a ma/ority below.# EThis provision thus, overrules the re)uirement of (a# 18 votes (",1# to declare a law unconstitutional under 1 01 (a constitutional re)uirement#, and (b# 18 votes to impose or affirm the death penalty (by internal rules of the S., although constitutionally ; votes were enough#. The presumption of constitutionality of laws under the -udiciary *ct of 1 9;, however, remains valid. B# +n divisions $ .ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved (a# with the concurrence of a ma/ority of the members who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and (b# in no case without the concurrence of at least 1 of such members. @hen the re)uired number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc. Go doctrine or principle of law laid by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 9(1#R a. +n a division of 0 members, the ma/ority if all are present is 9. +f only ! are present, 9. +f only < or 9, 1. +f only 1, no )uorum. b. +n a division of < members, 1 votes are needed regardless of whether <, 9, or 1 are present. c. +n division of 1 members, 1 votes are needed. d. +n any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be raised to the court en banc. 2ffect of ma/ority% failure to muster the necessary

+f the necessary ma/ority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. +f upon rehearing, no ma/ority is still had, the following are the effects% a.# +f a case is on appeal, the /udgment appealed from is deemed affirmed e'cept% (i# .riminal cases where the /udgment is that of conviction% the conviction is reversed, and the accused is ac)uitted. (ii# .ases where the lower court declared a law, etc. unconstitutional% the /udgment is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality under Sec. of the -udiciary *ct of 1 9;. (+f the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, this /udgment is deemed affirmed pursuant to the general rule above.# (Thus, if 1" are present, < voted the law unconstitutional, 9 voted for its validity, and 1 abstained, there is no decision and so the law remains valid.# b.# +f the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed. @riting of the decision Go decision shall be rendered by any court without e'pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 19.# +n the case of the S. and lower collegiate court, this rule is addressed to the one to whom the writing of the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. +n the case by other courts, this rule is addressed to the /udge. >ecisions on the merit. The rule re)uiring statement of the relevant facts, the issues, the ruling, and the reasoned opinion in support of the ruling, applies only to decisions on the merit by a court of record, based on the following rulings of the S.% 9alladolid % I cio ), it was held that the Hrder of the >eputy

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4inister of Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional re)uirement because it is not a decision of a court of record, the 4inistry of Labor being an administrative agency with )uasi$/udicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non$litigious, summary and non$ technical. Sectio -B, C'a8te$ 7, !oo@ 9II, Ad&i i"t$ati%e Code of -./0. >ecision.$$ 2very decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. ''' !acolod M#$cia Milli ) Co. % He a$e", The S. ruled that orders of a court on an incidental matter (in this case, the order imposing the payment of attorney7s fees# need not state the legal basis of the ruling. 4inute :esolution .ruz% +n /ustifying the so$called minute resolution, the S. said in Borromeo v. .*, 3The S. disposes of the bul( of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and e'ecutory, as where a case is patently w,o merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord w, the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early e'ecution of /udgment and for non$compliance w, the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. ' ' ' ' The .ourt is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. +t has ample discretion to formulate decisions and, or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.3 *nd neither does the rule apply to administrative cases decided by the S. itself, as it held in P$#de tial !a @ %. Ca"t$o, thus% 3Go constitutional provision is disregarded in the S.7s 4inute :esolution denying a motion for reconsideration 7for lac( of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon. +n an administrative case, the constitutional mandate that 7no EEE motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be EEE denied without stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. *nd even if it were, said resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the constitutional re)uirement. 7Lac( of merit,7 as a ground for denial is legal basis. Petitions for reconsideration review and motions for 8a$. 1.# This rule applies to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a 3decision on the merits3, said the S. in Me do=a % C*I,#. +t does not apply, as in this case, to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a previous dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus. (The dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus is not a decision on the merits, but is similar to a dismissal of a petition for review, which is a decision not to give due course to the petition.# The past practice used to be that when the appellate court denied a petition for review, or denied a 45:, it simply did so in a 4inute :esolution, stating that the case was dismissed for lac( of basis. This aggrieved many a lawyer, specially those who would spend days preparing pages of briefs, only to find out that all their effort was answered by a one$liner 3>ismissed for lac( of basis3. This prompted the framers of the 1 ;0 .onstitution to force the .ourt to at least write down the legal basis for the denial. This means that while a fully detailed decision is not re)uired, neither is a s(impy one$liner is allowed. The legal reason for the dismissal must be written. >issenters and *bstainers +n the case of a decision on the merits, if a member (a# too( no part, or (b# dissented, or (c# abstained from a decision or resolution, he must state his reason therefor. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 11.# Before, only those who dissented were re)uired to write an opinion. Gow, even those who too( no part in the deliberations but were present, and those who abstained are re)uired to write their reasons for these are really forms of casting their vote. Those who inhibited themselves are, of course, not re)uired to vote, since they did not really participate. Procedurally, the purpose is to enable the party to find out the reason for the action ta(en. 5or courts lower than the S., and even the S. itself, this is important for appeal or motion for reconsideration purposes, as the basis for the assignment of error. Theoretically, since the S. is not an elective branch it must e'plain the reason being its ultimate source of authority. .ongress need not e'plain its action since it has been delegated the legislative power by the people. 4-/5 Ma dato$( 8e$iod fo$ decidi ) ca"e" A$t. 9III, Sec. -2. 41# *ll cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this .onstitution must be decided or resolved within twenty$four months from the date of submission for the Supreme .ourt, and, unless reduced by the Supreme .ourt, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. ("# * case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum re)uired by the :ules of .ourt or by the court

Go petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied, without stating the legal basis therefor. (A$t. 9III, Sec. -B,

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itself. (1# ?pon the e'piration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the .hief -ustice or the presiding /udge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (9# >espite the e'piration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without pre/udice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in conse)uence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. A$t. 9II, Sec. -/. ''' The Supreme .ourt may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the e'tension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. ''' (par. 1 thereof.# A$t. :9III, Sec. -1. The Supreme .ourt shall, within one year after the ratification of this .onstitution, adopt a systematic plan to e'pedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme .ourt or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this .onstitution. * similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and )uasi$/udicial bodies. Id., Sec. -7. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this .onstitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for ad/udication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme .ourt as soon as practicable. Id., Sec. -B. The provisions of paragraphs (1# and (9#, Section 1< of *rticle D+++ of this .onstitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this .onstitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. *# .ases filed after 5ebruary ", 1 ;0 *ll cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this .onstitution must be decided within twenty$four months counted from the date of submission.3 S*rt. D+++, Sec. 1<(1#R * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum re)uired by the :ules of .ourt or by the court itself. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 1<("#R 4andatory period in the Supreme .ourt% "9 months S*rt. D+++, Sec. 1<(1#R 2'cept% * proper case )uestioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege which must be decided 18 days from filing. (*rt. D++, Sec. 1;, par. 1.# But what happens if the /udge or court fails to meet the deadline anywayF The .onstitution provides% ?pon the e'piration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the .hief -ustice or the presiding -udge shall forthwith be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has been rendered or issued within said period. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 1< (1#R >espite the e'piration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without pre/udice to such responsibility (administrative disciplinary action against the /udge or /ustices# shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination without further delay. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 1<(9#R +n other words, failure to decide the case Sfor reasons other than the inability to reach the necessary ma/orityR has no conse)uence on the case. Thus, a certification is re)uired that the period has lapsed without any decision being made, stating the reason for such inaction. Then the court must decide without any further delay. The conse)uences are on the /udge% (a# he could not draw out his salary, since he would not be able to certify that he has resolved all cases submitted to him in 8 days and (b# he is sub/ect to administrative sanctions. B# .ases filed before 5ebruary ", 1 ;0 but e'pire after this date The provisions of *rt. D+++, Sec, 1<(1# $ (9# shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this .onstitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. (*rt. CD+++, Sec. 19# +n other words, it is as if these cases were filed after 5ebruary ", 1 ;0. .# .ases that e'pired before 5ebruary ", 1 ;0 The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this .onstitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for ad/udication by the courts, shall be determined by the S. as soon as practicable. (*rt. CD+++, Sec. 11.# The Supreme .ourt shall, within 1 year from 5ebruary ", 1 ;0 adopt a systematic plan to e'pedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the S. or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this .onstitution. * similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and )uasi$/udicial bodies. (*rt. CD+++, Sec. 1".# !. LOWER COURTS 4-5 E#alificatio " a d a88oi t&e t A$t. 9III, Sec. 0. (1# Go person shall be appointed 4ember of the Supreme .ourt or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural$born citizen of the Philippines. * member of the Supreme .ourt must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a /udge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. ("# the .ongress shall prescribe the )ualifications of /udges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed /udge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

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Id., Sec. /. 4<# The (-udicial and Bar# .ouncil shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the -udiciary. +t may e'ercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme .ourt may assign to it. Id., Sec. .. The 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at list three nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar .ouncil for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. 5or the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. .omposition The composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the -udiciary *ct of 1 9; and BP 1" . Jualifications Lower .ollegiate .ourt (.ourt of *ppeals# (1# Go person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural$born citizen. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 0(1#R and a member of Philippine Bar. ("# The .ongress shall prescribe )ualifications of /udges of lower courts. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 0("#R (1# * member of the /udiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 0(1#R Lower .ourts (1# The .ongress shall prescribe )ualifications of /udges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed /udge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine bar. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 0("#R ("# 6e must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. S*rt. D+++, Sec. 0(1#R 415 Sala$( A$t. 9III, Sec. -G. The salary of the .hief -ustice and of the *ssociate -ustices of the Supreme court and of /udges of lower courts shall be fi'ed by law. >uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 475 Co )$e""io al 8owe$ $eo$)a i=e a d "ec#$it( of te #$e to reorganizing the -udiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its 4embers. EThe power of .ongress to reorganize lower courts has been upheld by the S. prior to 1 ;0. Oca&8o % Sec$eta$( of >#"tice, The S. by failing to muster the ",1 vote re)uired then to declare a law unconstitutional in effect sustained the validity of the law passed by .ongress abolishing the offices of 3/udges$at$ large3 and 3cadastral /udges3 and the conse)uent removal of /udges occupying these posts. Goting that the purpose of the law was to promote the independence of the /udiciary (by avoiding forum$shopping#, it held that an abolition of an office made in good faith does not violate security of tenure. Security of tenure presupposes the continued e'istence of the office from which one was removed not removal from an office that has been abolished in good faith and not merely partisan political reasons. De La Lla a % Al,a, The S. again upheld the :eorganization *ct of 1 ;8 (BP 1" #, on the ground that the abolition of an office, is within the competence of the legislature if done in good faith. That there was good faith was shown by the fact that the *ct was the product of careful study and deliberation by the Batasan and the Presidential study committee, the membership of which includes S. /ustices, and was the means to upgrade the administration of /ustice in the Philippines. The S. reiterated that there can be no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer e'ists, and that the abolition of office is not removal, although their effects may be the same. +t is doubtful whether these rulings remain valid in toto in view of the new e'press provision prohibiting a reorganization law that undermines the security of tenure of the -udiciary. Hne compromise view is that .ongress has the power to pass a reorganization law concerning the lower courts, but it can only ta(e effect until the post has been vacated by the incumbent /udge. 4B5 Re&o%al A$t. 9III, Sec. --. The members of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme .ourt en banc shall have the power to discipline /udges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. .ruz% 3-udges of lower court,3 as here used, includes /ustices of the Sandiganbayan. This rule casts much doubt on the legality of the presidential decree ma(ing them removable only by the legislature through the process of impeachment.

A$t. 9III, Sec. --. The members of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme .ourt en banc shall have the power to discipline /udges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a ma/ority of the 4embers who actually too( part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Id., Sec. 1. ''' Go law shall be passed

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425 >#$i"dictio A$t. 9III, Sec. -. -udicial power shall be vested in one Supreme .ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law. -udicial power includes the duty of the courts of /ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac( or e'cess of /urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Iovernment. >.M. T#a"o P Co. % CA& Y ot % IAC, There is in effect a 3 constitutional conferment of original /urisdiction on the lower courts in those five cases for which the Supreme .ourt is granted appellate /urisdiction in <("#.3 ?nder the provision granting the S. /urisdiction 3to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or :ules of .ourt may provide, /udgments of lower courts,3 lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. 435 Re<#i$e&e t" a" to 8$e8a$atio of deci"io " A$t. 9III, Sec. -B. Go decision shall be rendered by any court without e'pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Go petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. 4anner of sitting The .ourt of *ppeals sits in divisions when it hears cases& the only time it convenes as one body is to ta(e up matters of administration. The trial and inferior courts, of course, do not have this problem since there is only one /udge. >eliberations The same re)uirements (for consulta# shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (*rt. D+++, Sec. 11# 5or obvious reasons, this re)uirement does not apply to the trial and inferior courts. Doting 5or collegiate courts, li(e the .ourt of *ppeals, the law provides that it sits only in divisions when deciding cases. 5or trial and inferior courts, no problem arises since only one /udge is involved. 2ffect of failure to muster the necessary ma/ority .ourt of *ppeals.$$ The same rules apply, e'cept that the decision can now be appealed to the S.. +nferior .ourts.$$ 5ailure to decide has no conse)uence on the decision of the court. The .ourt is not ousted of its /urisdiction, but the /udge suffers administrative conse)uences. 405 Ma dato$( 8e$iod fo$ decidi )

A$t. 9III, Sec. -2. (1# *ll cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this .onstitution must be decided or resolved within twenty$four months from the date of submission for the Supreme .ourt, and, unless reduced by the Supreme .ourt, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. ("# * case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum re)uired by the :ules of .ourt or by the court itself. (1# ?pon the e'piration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the .hief -ustice or the presiding /udge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (9# >espite the e'piration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without pre/udice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in conse)uence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay. A$t. :9III, Sec. -1. The Supreme .ourt shall, within one year after the ratification of this .onstitution, adopt a systematic plan to e'pedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme .ourt or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this .onstitution. * similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and )uasi$/udicial bodies. Id., Sec. -7. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this .onstitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for ad/udication by the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme .ourt as soon as practicable. Id., Sec. -B. The provisions of paragraphs (1# and (9#, Section 1< of *rticle D+++ of this .onstitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this .onstitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. 4andatory Period Lower collegiate courts% 1" months, unless reduced by the S. Hther lower courts% 1 months, unless reduced by the S. Hverruled % The .onstitution now e'plicitly provides in Sec. 1< (1# that the periods are mandatory, aside from using the word 3must3 (not 3shall3 as in 1 01# in Sec. 1< (1#. The case of Ma$celi o % C$#=, which held that the periods in the 1 01

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.onstitution were only directory, is thus now, overruled. .ruz% +t should be noted that, although decision within the ma'imum period is now mandatory, failure to arrive at the same will not divest the court of /urisdiction, without pre/udice to any responsibility that may attach to the /udge. The court must still resolve the case w,o further delay, unli(e the old rule when the decision appealed was deemed automatically affirmed and the petition was deemed automatically dismissed as a result of the inaction of the court. ''' Ma$celi o %". C$#= 5*.TS% -udgement in a criminal case was rendered before the cler( of court within ;< days after the case was concluded. But /udgement was promulgated after lapse of 8 days from the day the case was submitted for decision. +SS?2% @,G trial court lost /urisdiction over the case for failure to decide the same within 8 days from submission thereof. @,G constitutional provision is mandatory. 62L>% Go to both. The constitutional provision refers to rendition of /udgement which refers to the filing of the signed decision with the cler( of court. By the phrase 3unless reduced by the Supreme .ourt,3 it is evident that the period prescribed is sub/ect to modification by the S. under its prerogative power to promulgate rules concerning procedure in all courts. .onstitutional provisions are directory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. But failure to decide a case within 8 days constitute a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting /udge. Ada8ted. De Ro&a %" CA The .* decided the case beyond the 1" month period prescribed by the 1 01 .onstitution. Said provision in the .onstitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of /urisdiction or render their decisions invalid. shall be the Secretary e' officio of the .ouncil and shall (eep a record of its proceedings. (9# The regular 4embers of the .ouncil shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme .ourt. The Supreme .ourt shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the .ouncil. (<# The .ouncil shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the -udiciary. +t may e'ercise such other function and duties as the Supreme .ourt may assign to it. 2'$officio members S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(1#R (1# .hief -ustice as e'$officio .hairman ("# Secretary of -ustice (1# :epresentative of .ongress :egular members S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(1#R (9# (<# (!# (0# :epresentative of the +ntegrated Bar Professor of Law :etired member of the S. :epresentative of private sector

Secretary e'$officio S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(1#R .ler( of the S., who shall (eep a record of its proceedings *ppointment, Tenure, Salary 2'$officio members $ 5or obvious reasons this does not apply since the position in the .ouncil is good only while the person is the occupant of the office. :egular members S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;("#R $ The regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments. The term of the regular members is 9 years. But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create continuity in the council% +BP representative $ 9 years Law professor $ 1 years :etired /ustice $ " years Private sector $ 1 year :egular members shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the S.. The S. shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the .ouncil. S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(9#R 5unctions 1. :ecommend appointees to the -udiciary S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(<#R ". :ecommend appointees to the Hffice of the Hmbudsman and his < deputies. (*rt. C+, Sec. # 1. Such other functions and duties as the S. may assign S*rt. D+++, Sec. ;(<#R Id., Sec. .. The 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and /udges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar

C. >UDICIAL AND !AR COUNCIL A$t. 9III, Sec. /. * -udicial and Bar .ouncil is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme .ourt composed of the .hief -ustice as e' officio .hairman, the Secretary of -ustice, and a representative of the .ongress as e' officio 4embers, a representative of the +ntegrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired 4ember of the Supreme .ourt, and a representative of the private sector. ("# The regular members of the .ouncil shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments. Hf the 4embers first appointed, the representative of the +ntegrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired -ustice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (1# The .ler( of the Supreme .ourt

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.ouncil for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. 5or the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. D. AUTOMATIC RELEASE APPROPRIATION *OR THE >UDICIARY O* predecessor. +n no case shall any 4ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Transitional terms Hf the first appointment, the .hairman shall serve for 0 years, without reappointment. Hf the .ommissioners, the following periods apply% 1 .ommissioner for < years& another for 1 years without reappointment CSC 475 A88oi t&e t of 8e$"o el of

A$t. 9III, Sec. 7. The -udiciary shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. *ppropriations for the -udiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

A$t. I:, A, Sec. B. The .onstitutional .ommissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. 4B5 Sala$( A$t. :9III, Sec. -0. ?ntil the .ongress provides otherwise ''' the .hairmen of the .onstitutional .ommissions (shall receive an annual salary of# two hundred four thousand pesos each& and the 4embers of the .onsti$ tutional .ommissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. A$t. I:, A, Sec. 7. The salary of the .hairman and the .ommissioners shall be fi'ed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. EThe salary, of course, can be increased and the increase can ta(e effect at once, since, li(e the -udiciary, the .onstitutional .ommissions have not part in the passage of such a law. 425 Di"<#alificatio " A$t. I:, A, Sec. 1. Go 4ember of a .onstitutional .ommission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Geither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Iovernment, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. EGo members of a .onstitutional .ommission shall during his 3tenure3 % a. 6old any other office or employment. $ This is similar to the prohibition against e'ecutive officers. +t applies to both public and private offices and employment. b. 2ngage in the practice of any profession. c. 2ngage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office. d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by, the Iovernment, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including IH..s or their

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS I. CI9IL SER9ICE COMMISSION

I de8e de t Co "tit#tio al Co&&i""io " A$t. I:, A, Sec. -. The .onstitutional .ommissions, which shall be independent, are the .ivil Service .ommission (.S.#. the .ommission on 2lections and (.H42L2.#, and the .ommission on *udit (.H*#. A. CI9IL SER9ICE COMMISSION 4-5 Co&8o"itio of Co&&i""io e$" a d <#alificatio "

A$t. I:, !, Sec. -. (1# The civil service shall be administered by the .ivil Service .ommission composed of a .hairman and two .ommissioners who shall be natural$born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty$five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. A$t. 9II, "ec. -7. ''' The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, or the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, or as Secretaries, ?ndersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (15 A88oi t&e t a d te$& of Office of Co&&i""io e$" A$t. I:, !, Sec. -. ''' ("# The .hairman and the .ommissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Hf those first appointed, the .hairman shall hold office for seven years, a .ommissioner for five years, and another .ommissioner for three years, without reappointment. *ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for the une'pired term of the

72
subsidiaries. 435 I&8eac'&e t A$t. :I, Sec. 1. ''' STRhe members of the .onstitutional .ommissions ''' may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and cor$ ruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. ''' 405 *# ctio " of t'e CSC A$t. I:, !, Sec. 7. The .ivil Service .ommission, as the central personnel agency of the Iovernment, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. +t shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ran(s, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. +t shall submit to the President and the .ongress an annual report on its personnel program. A$t. I:, A, Sec. 0. 2ach .ommission shall decide by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers any case or matter brought before it within si'ty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum re)uired by the rules of the .ommission or by the .ommission itself. ?nless otherwise provided by this .onstitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each .ommission may be brought to the Supreme .ourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. Id., Sectio /. 2ach .ommission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 4/5 Sco8e of t'e Ci%il Se$%ice A$t. I:, !, Sec. 1 (1# The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Iovernment, including government$owned or controlled corporations with original charters. A$t. :II, Sec. -3. '''. Iovernment$owned controlled corporations may be created established by special charters in the interest the common good and sub/ect to the test economic viability. or or of of service of IH.., the 1 ;0 .onsti star(ly differs from the 1 01 consti where G6. v -uco was based. +t provides that the 3civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Iovernment, including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter.3 Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include IH.. which are organized as subsidiaries of IH.. under the general corporation law. Ada8ted. T$ade U io " of t'e P'ili88i e" a d Allied Se$%ice" 4TUPAS5 9S. NHA, The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w, original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of .ongress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the wor(ers of G6. for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor .ode, the G6. being a govt owned and, or controlled corp. w,o an original charter Allia ce of Ao%e$ &e t Wo$@e$" % Mi i"te$ of La,o$ a d E&8lo(&e t *I@ is a registered labor federation. Sec1, *rt C++$B, 1 01 .onsti was intended to correct the situation where more favored employees of the govOt could en/oy the best of " worlds, as they are not only protected by thelaws governing govOt employment, but they can alsi engage in collective bargaining and /oin in stri(es to secure higher wages and fringe benefits. The salaries and fringe benefits of those covered by the .ivil Service are fi'ed by law. HD2::?L2>% Natio al Ho#"i ) Co$8. %. >#co, G6* was greated as a IH... +ts employees are governed by the .ivil Service Law and the .ivil Service :ules and :egulations. The fact that Private corps owned or controlled by the govOt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps not created by special laws are not covered by .ivil Service E#i&8o %. Ta od,a(a , 2mployees of IH..s are within the /urisdiction of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan. Petrophil was not created by special law but became a subsidiary of PGH. (a IH..#. 6ence, it shed its private status abd hence cannot be covered by .ivil Service Law. a. Terms, conditions of employment in the .ivil Service 4a5 Oat' of alle)ia ce to t'e Co "tit#tio A$t. I:, !, Sec. B. *ll public officers and employees shall ta(e an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the .onstitution. A$t. :I, Sec. -/. Public officers and employees owe the State and this .onstitution allegiance at

Natio al Se$%ice Co$8. %. NLRC, The holding in G6. v -uco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of -an 10, 1 ;<. To do otherwise would be oppressive to .redo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1 01 .onsti but prior to the ruling in G6. v -uco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor /urisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in IH..7s, among them G*S2.H. +n the matter of coverage by the civil

73
all times, and any public officer or employee who see(s to change his citizenship or ac)uire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. 4,5 Me$it S("te& (a# *ppointment of lame duc(s A$t. I:, !, Sec. 3. Go candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Iovernment, or any government$owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. -ustice, as e' officio .hairman, the Secretary of -ustice and a representative of the .ongress as e' officio 4embers, a representative of the +ntegrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired 4ember of the Supreme .ourt, and a representative of the private sector. ''' (1# The .ler( of the Supreme .ourt shall be the Secretary e' officio of the .ouncil and shall (eep a record of its proceedings. Id., Sec. -1. The 4embers of the Supreme .ourt and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing )uasi$/udicial or administrative functions. .L? v 2'ecutive Secretary, 1 9 S.:* 110 (1 1# Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the .abinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when e'pressly authorized by the .onsti. itself. ''' 6owever, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under *rt. D++, Sec. 11 must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the 2'ecutive officials specified therein w,o addition compensation in an e'$officio capacity as provided by law and as re)uired by the primary functions of said official7s office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise 3any other office3 w,in the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials. Ada8ted. *lo$e" %. D$ilo , +n the case at bar, the sub/ect proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e. 4ayor of Hlongapo .ity, to other governmental post. Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription see(s to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 0, 1st par of *rt +C$B. @hile the second par. authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive position, there is no e'ception to the first paragraph e'cept as are particularly recognized in the .onstitution itself. 5uthermore, the proviso is a legislative encroachment on appointing authority to only one eligible i.e. the incumbent 4ayor of Hlongapo .ity. The conferment of the appointing power is a perfectly valid legislative act but the proviso limiting his choice to one is an encroachment to his prerogative. Thus, 4ayor Iordon is ineligible for appointment throughout his tenure but may resign first from his elective office before he may be considered for appointment. 6e has a choice. Sec. 11 par (d# is declared unconstitutional and the appointment of 4ayor Iordon is invalid but his previous acts as .hairman of SB4* shall be considered that of a de facto officer. Ada8ted.

(b# Ban on holding multiple positions A$t. I:, !, Sec. 0. Go elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. ?nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. A$t. 9II, Sec. -7. The President, Dice$ President, the 4embers of the .abinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this .onstitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government$ owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, or the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, or as Secretaries, ?nder$ secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. A$t. 9I, Sec. -7. Go Senator or 4ember of the 6ouse of :epresentatives may hold any other office or employment in the Iovernment, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Geither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. A$t. 9III, Sec. /. (1# * -udicial and Bar .ouncil is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme .ourt composed of the .hief

74
part in any election e'cept to vote, but it does not e' vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. *s Section 911 of the 2lection Law, as amended dis)ualifies from voting only members in the active service of the Philippine *rmy and no claim is made that this discrimination is violative of the .onstitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not dis)ualified from voting. The respondent being a )ualified elector and the possession by him of the other )ualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected. The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would lead to widespread dis)ualification of the ma/ority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon. :aison d7 etre for the dis)ualification% 4embers of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the agents of any political group. Sa to" %. Yatco, This is petition for prohibition see(ing to en/oin the enforcement of the order of -udge Patco disallowing then Secretary of >efense *le/o Santos from campaigning personally for Iovernor Tomas 4artin in the province of Bulacan. The petition was granted for the ff. reasons% The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the .ivil Service& @hen Santos, a Gacionalista campaigned for Iov. 4artin, a candidate of the Gacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the .abinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the *dministration to which he belongs& The )uestion of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of Gational >efense and who are often called upon by the .H42L2. to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is not /usticiable by the court.

4c5 Sta da$di=atio do#,le co&8e "atio Standardization of pay

of 8a( a d ,a

A$t. I:, !, Sec. 2. The .ongress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government$owned or controlled corporations with original charters, ta(ing into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the )ualifications re)uired for their positions. Ban on double compensation A$t. I:, !, Sec. /. Go elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the .ongress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any (ind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. Sec. 23. *dditional or >ouble .ompensation.$$ Go elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor accept without the consent of the President, any present, emolument, office, or title of any (ind from any foreign state. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. 4!oo@ 9, Title I, C'a8te$ /, Ad&i i"t$ati%e Code of -./0.5 4d5 acti%itie" !a o 8a$ti"a 8olitical

A$t. I:, !, Sec. 1. ''' (9# Go officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. .ompare with *rt. CD+, Sec. <. ''' (1# Professionalism in the armed forces and ade)uate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. Go member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity e'cept to vote. Caille" %. !o ifacio, 5*.TS% This is a )uo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial Iovernor of Laguna. +t is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office, respondent was a .aptain in the Philippine *rmy and for this reason, is ineligible to that office. 62L>% Section ", *rt. C+ of the 1 1< .onst. (similar to the 1 ;0 provision# prohibits members of the *rmed 5orces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise ta(ing

4f5 Re&o%al o$ "#"8e "io ca#"e

o l( fo$

A$t. I:, !, 1. +' (1# Go officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended e'cept for cause provided by law. De lo" Sa to" % Malla$e, The provision of Sec. "<9< of the :ev. *dmin. .ode that the Pres. may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers is incompatible w, the constitutional inhibition that 3Go officer or employee in the .ivil Service shall be removed or suspended e'cept for cause as provided by law.3 @e therefore declare Sec.

75
"<9< of the :*. as repealed by the .onsti. and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument came into effect. 5or cause as provided by law.$$ The phrase 3for cause3 in connection w, removals of public officers has ac)uired a well$defined concept. 3+t means for reasons w,c the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes w,c the appointing power in the e'ercise of discretion may deem sufficient. +t is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested w, the power of removal, or w,o any cause. 4oreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.3 Three specified classes of positions$$ policy$determining, primarily confidential and highly technical$$ are e'cluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the .onsti. ''' The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy$determining, nor highly technical. Primarily confidential.$$ The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy w,c insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Policy$determining.$$ Gor is the position of city engineer policy$determining. * city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the govt or any of its subdivisions. 6is /ob is to e'ecute policy, not to ma(e it. 6ighly technical.$$ 5inally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. * city engineer is not re)uired nor is he supposed to posses a technical s(ill or training in the supreme or superior degree, w,c is the sense in w,c 3highly technical3 is, we believe, employed in the .onsti. RAM. Co$8#" %. C#ade$ o, +SS?2% @,G the removal of :espondent by resolution of the 4onetary Board on the ground of loss of confidence was valid despite the fact that the committee which investigated the charges against him found no basis for his removal 62L>% GH. The removal of respondent on the ground of loss of confidence is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges sub/ect matter of the investigation were not proved or substantiated. +t was a mere prete't to cure the inability to substantiate the charges upon which the investigation proceeded. The court therefore dismissed the reason of 3loss of confidence3 for the dismissal of .orpus. That being so, the constitutional mandate that Go officer in the .ivil Service shall be removed or suspended e'cept for cause as provided by law must be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly technical in nature must be afforded the .onstitutional safeguard re)uiring removal to be for cause as provided by law, and if the dismissal for 3loss of confidence3 be allowed, it must have basis in fact, which does not e'ist in the case at bar. The e'emption of the three positions adverted to earlier from the rule re)uiring *PPH+GT42GTS to be made on the basis of 4erit and fitness >H2S GHT 2C24PT such positions from the operation of the rule that no officer in the .ivil Service shall be removed e'cept for cause as provided for by law. This rule is absolute, in fact, the .B .harter provided for the same absolute rule. 5urthermore, the .ivil Service Law which classified .orpus7 position as non$competitive provides that such positions are protected by the .ivil Service Law and that his removal must only be for cause recognized by law (Iarcia v 2'ec. Secretary.# @hile the tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, the tenure of officials holding highly technical posts does not end upon mere loss of confidence. The .onsti. clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation e'pressly made by our fundamental charter. Hfficers holding highly$ technical positions hold office on the basis of their special s(ills and )ualifications. The court also said that if mechanics and engineers en/oy security of tenure with more reason should a highly technical officer, as :espondent .orpus, be protected by the .onstitutional provision on security of tenure. RAM.

I )le" %. M#t#c, "! S.:* 101 (1 !;# The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the 3president7s Private Hffice3 under subdivision entitled 3private secretaries3 and that they handled 3confidential 4atters3 even if they only performed clerical wor( do not ma(e them officers and employees occupying highly confidential offices. There is nothing in the items of the plaintiffs (who were cler(s and secretaries# to indicate that their respective positions are 3primarily confidential3 in nature. The fact that they handled at times 3confidential matters3 does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential. Go officer or employee in the .ivil Service shall be removed or suspended e'cept for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were protected by this provision, their removal without cause was therefore illegal. Ada8ted. Hfficer holding position primarily confidential in nature& Statement in >e los Santos v. 4allare declared as mere obiter.$$ The assumption that an officer holding a position w,c is primarily confidential in nature is 3sub/ect to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power,3 is inaccurate. This assumption is evidently based upon a statement in >e los Santos v. 4allare to the effect that 3three specified classes of positions$$ policy$determining, primarily confidential and highly technical$$ are e'cluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the .onsti. '''. This was, however,

76
a mere obiter, bec., the office involved in said case $$ that of .ity 2ngineer of Baguio $$ did not belong to any of the e'cepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. @hat is more, said obiter, if detached from the conte't of the decision of w,c it forms part, would be inconsistent w, the constitutional command to the effect that 3no officer or employee in the .ivil Service shall be removed or suspended e'cept for cause as provided by law3 and it is conceded that one holding in the Iovt a primarily confidential position is 3in the .ivil Service.3 4eaning of 3term merely e'pires3& >istinguished from 3removal3 and 3dismissal.3$$ @hen an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not 3removed3 or 3dismissed3 from office$$ his term merely 3e'pires,3 in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon e'piration of the fi'ed term for w,c he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed 3removed3 or 3dismissed3 therefrom, upon the e'piration of said term. The main difference bet. the former$$ primarily confidential officer$$ and the latter is that the latter7s term is fi'ed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre$fi'ed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fi'ed and determined when the appointing power e'presses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. @hen this event ta(es place, the latter is not 3removed3 or 3dismissed3 from office$$ his term merely 3e'pired.3 RAM. SGHT2% The .ourt in this case ruled that the one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is 3in the .ivil Service3 and that 3officers in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service3 are protected by the provision in the organic law that 3no officer shall be removed from office without cause as provided by law3. @hile incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not 3removed or dismissed3 but that his term, merely e'pires.R C$i"to,al %. Melc'o$ .ristobal is not guilty of laches. 6e sought reconsideration of his separation from the service and although he did not /oin in the +ngles court action, he continued to press his re)uest for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. +n fact Secretary 4utuc assured him that he would wor( for his reinstatement. The continued promise not only of 4utuc but of the subse)uent Secretaries led .ristobal to wait but depite waiting for such a long time, his reinstatement never came about. +t would be the height of ine)uity if after .ristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former 2'ec. Secretaries, the court would rule that he had lost his right to see( relief because of the lapse of time. .ristobal, /ust li(e the Plaintiffs in the +ngles v 4utuc case, was not holding an office characterized as 3highly confidential3, he was performing purely clerical wor( although he handled 3confidential matters3 occasionally. 6e is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without /ust cause. 6e is entitled to bac(wages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine years, applying by analogy the award of bac(wages in cases of unfair labor practice. Ada8ted. 4)5 Ri)'t of Self6O$)a i=atio A$t. III, Sec. /. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. A$t. I:, !, Sec. 1. '''(<# The right to self$ organization shall not be denied to government employees. Sec. 7/. .overage.$$ (1# *ll government employees, including those in government$ owned or controlled corporations with original charters, can form, /oin or assist employees7 organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in con/unction with appropriate government authorities, labor$ management committees, wor( councils and other forms of wor(ers7 participation schemes to achieve the same ob/ectives. ("# The provisions of this .hapter shall not apply to the members of the *rmed 5orces of the Philippines, including police officers, policemen, firemen and /ail guards. 4!oo@ 9, Title I, S#,title A, C'a8te$ 3, Ad&i i"t$ati%e Code of -./0.5 Allia ce of Ao%e$ &e t Wo$@e$" % Mi i"te$ of La,o$, The dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that wor(ers in govt$owned or controlled corporations or in state colleges and universities may not en/oy freedom of association. These wor(ers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. But they may not /oin associations w,c impose the obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from those provided by law and regulation. TUPAS % NHA, +SS?2% @,G employees of G6. have undoubtedly the right to form unions. 62L>% The right to unionize is now e'plicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both governmental and the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among the wor(ers of G6. for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor .ode, for G6. is a IH.. without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the .onsti (par < sec " art +C$B# is found in *rt "99 of the Labor .ode. Ada8ted.

77
4'5 Ri)'t to "t$i@e SSS E&8lo(ee" A""ociatio % CA, 2mployees in the .ivil Service may not resort to stri(es, wal(outs and other temporary wor( stoppages, li(e wor(ers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Iovt. to accede to their demands. *s now provided under Sec. 9, :ule +++ of the :ules and :egulations to Iovern the 2'ercise of the :ight of Iovt. 22s to Self$Hrganization which too( effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the Iovt, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations with original charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not stri(e for the purpose of secur$ ing changes thereof. The statement of the court in *lliance of Iovt @or(ers v. 4inister of Labor and 2mployment (1"9 S.:* 1# is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. wor(ers in the private sector and govt employees w, regard to the right to stri(eF Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fi'ed by law, govt. wor(ers cannot use the same weapons employed by wor(ers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. :elations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Sub/ect to the minimum re)uirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. +n govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w,c fi' the terms and conditions of employment. *nd this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through .B*7s. 2H 1;8, w,c provides guidelines for the e'ercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, rela'ed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fi'ed by law. Iovt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the .ongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are w,in the ambit of legislation or negotiate w, the appropriate govt agencies for the improvement of those w, are not fi'ed by law. +f there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor$4anagement .ouncil for appropriate action. RAM. +SS?2% @,G the :T. can en/oin the SSS2* from stri(ing. 62L>% Pes. 2H 1;8 vests the Public Sector Labor$4anagement .ouncil with /urisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees. .learly, the GL:. has no /urisdiction over the dispute. The :T. was not precluded, in the e'ercise of its general /urisdiction under BP 1" , as amended, from assuming /urisdiction over the SSS7s complaint for damages and issuing the in/unctive writ prayed for therein. ?nli(e the GL:., the PSL4 .ouncil has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of in/unction in labor disputes within its /urisdiction. Thus, since it is the .ouncil and the GL:. that has /urisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of in/unction to en/oin the stri(e is appropriate. Ada8ted. Ma ila P#,lic Sc'ool Teac'e$" A""ociatio %. La)#io 5*.TS% Hn September 10,1 8, 4onday, at least ;88 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of the >2.S and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the wee( despite the >2.S Secretary7s :2T?:G TH @H:Q order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the )uestioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. 6e dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to wor( order and his decisions in the administrative proceeding. +SS?2% @62T62: H: GHT T62 4*SS *.T+HGS *:2 .HGS+>2:2> *S ST:+Q2SF 62L>% Pes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from wor(, which it was the teachers7 duty to perform, underta(en for essentially economic reasons. +SS?2% @62T62: H: GHT P?BL+. S.6HHL T2*.62:S .*G ST:+Q2F 62L>% Go. 2mployees of the public service do not have the right to stri(e although they have the right to self organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of wor(ing conditions. +SS?2% @62T62: H: GHT >?2 P:H.2SS @*S HBS2:D2> >?:+GI T62 *>4+G+ST:*T+D2 P:H.22>+GISF 62L>% This court is a court of last resort. +t resolves )uestions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. +t is not a trier of facts. +t can not resolve the issue which re)uires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the administrative proceedings. +f they lost, they may appeal to the .ivil Service .ommission. +f pending said administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to /udicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the :T. where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts. CSC 4.5 Re%iew of t'e deci"io " of t'e

A$t. I:, A, Sec. 0. 2ach .ommission shall decide by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers any case or matter brought before it within si'ty

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days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum re)uired by the rules of the .ommission or by the .ommission itself. ?nless otherwise provided by this .onstitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each .ommission may be brought to the Supreme .ourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 4-G5 *i"cal A#to o&( A$t. I:, A, Sec. 2. The .ommissions shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. *pproval of appointments by the .S. !a$$o=o %. CSC, 5% Hn 11,18,;;, >avid Bor/a retired as .ity 2ngineer of Baguio. *t that time, petitioner Teodoro Barrozo was a Senior .ivil 2ngineer of >P@6 assigned to the office of the .ity 2ngineer of Baguio and resp. D. -ulian was the *sst. .ity 2ngineer of Baguio. Hn 1","0,;;, 4ayor Labo e'tended to Barrozo a permanent appointment as .ity 2ngineer of Baguio. Hn ",1!,; , after his protest was re/ected by 4ayor Labo, pvt. resp. -ulian appealed to the 4SPB of the .S., claiming that as a )ualified ne't$in$ran( officer, he had a pre$emptive right over Barrozo. The .S. .ordillera *dmin. :egion, to w,c the appeal was referred, declared Barrozo7s appointment void for being violative of .ivil Service promotion rules. 45: was denied. .S., on appeal, affirmed the decision. Ada8ted. 62L>% The .S. has no power of appointment e'cept over its own personnel. Geither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other officers e'cept only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the re)uired )ualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory )ualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the .S.. +t cannot disallow an appointment bec. it believes another person is better )ualified and mush less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. The law does not absolutely re)uire that the person who is ne't in ran( shall be promoted to fill a vacancy. +n fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but 3by transfer of present employees in the govt service, by reinstatement, by re$employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons w, the civil service eligibility appropriate to the position. @hat the .ivil Service *ct provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding that position ne't$in$ran( thereto 3shall be considered for promotion.3 1. ". 1 .hairman ! .ommissioners

Jualifications A *rt. +C$., Z1 1. Gatural$born citizens ". *t least 1< years old at the time of appointment 1. 6olders of college degrees 9. Got candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections <. 4a/ority of the .ommission, including the .hairman must be% a. 4embers of the Philippines Bar b. 2ngaged in the practice of law for at least 18 years Y Practice of law $ any activity in or out of court, which re)uires the application of law, legal procedure, (nowledge, training and e'perience (.ayetano v. 4onsod# Ca(eta o %. Mo "od The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. +t embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other wor(s where the wor( done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. 4onsod, who passed the bar in 1 !8, wor(ed with the @orld Ban( Iroup from 1 !1$ 1 08, then wor(ed for an investment ban( till 1 ;!, became member of the .HG.H4 in 1 ;!, and also became a member of the >avide .ommission in 1 8, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer$ economist, lawyer$manager, lawyer$ entrepreneur, etc 1. A88oi t&e t a d te$& of office of Co&&i""io e$". R#le a)ai "t $ea88oi t&e t Term% 0 years without reappointment 1. *ppointed by the President with consent of the .* ". *ppointment to any vacancy shall only be for une'pired term of predecessor. 1. +n no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. 9. The choice of temporary chairman falls under the .H42L2.Os discretion. Nacio ali"ta Pa$t( %. A )elo !a#ti"ta President Juirino designated the Solicitor$ Ieneral as *cting member of the .omelec The Gacionalista Party filed for prohibition. The court held that the designation was not valid. By the nature of the .omelec7s functions, the .omelec must be independent. 4embers are not allowed to perform other functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The Solicitor$Ieneral7s duties also re)uire an undivided time and attention for efficiency. 5urthermore, when there is a vacancy, appointment is preferred to designation. +t was also held that the case is not one for prohibition but rather, )uo warranto. *lthough there is no other party who claims a right over the position occupied nor will the SI file a case against himself, the court must grant the remedy of a )uo warranto proceeding because the SI7s continued occupancy as

II. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

-. Co&8o"itio Co&&i""io e$" .omposition% a d E#alificatio " of

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member of the .omelec is illegal. !$illa te" %. Yo$ac *ssociate .ommissioner 6aydee Porac was appointed by Pres. *)uino as *cting .hairman of the .ommission on 2lections, in place of .hairman 6ilario >avide, who had been named chairman of the fact$finding commission to investigate the >ec. 1 ; coup d7^tat attempt. The appointment was not unconstitutional. *rt. +C$*, Section 1, of the .onstitution e'pressly describes all the .onstitutional .ommissions as 3independent3. *lthough essentially e'ecutive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. 2ach of these .ommissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the e'ercise of its own discretion. +ts decisions, orders and rulings are sub/ect only to review on certiorari by the S. as provided by the .onstitution in *rt. +C$*, Section 0. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be e'ercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. NP %. 9e$a Gacionalista Party brought an action against >e Dera on the ground that his appointment as .hairman of the .H42L2. is a violation of the .onstitution particularly *rt. C, Sec. 1 of the 1 1< .onstitution which provides that the mem$ bers of the .H42L2. shall hold office for nine years without reappointment. The court held that the prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the re)uirement that the .ommission shall hold office for a term of nine years. :eappointment is not prohibited provided his term will not e'ceed nine years in all. +n this case, de Dera7s appointment was by virtue of the death of the .hairman, he was promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the .ommission for the une'pired term only. Thus, this is not offensive to the .onstitution because it does not increase de Dera7s term of office to more than nine years nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon the e'pira$ tion of the first term of three years. Re8#,lic %. I&8e$ial This is a )uo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of +mperial as .hairman and Perez as member of .H42L2.. @hen .hairman de Dera died in *ugust 1 <1, before the e'piration of the ma'imum term of nine years of the .hairman of the .ommission, +mperial was appointed .hairman to succeed de Dera. 6is appointment provided for a term e'piring -uly 1", 1 !8. The SI contended that the term for which he will legally serve as .hairman legally e'pired on -uly 1", 1 <9, the e'piration of the year term for which the first .hairman was appointed. .omelec member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of years e'piring on "9 Govember 1 <;. The SI contended that his term legally e'pired on -uly 1", 1 <1, the e'piration of the term of ! years for which .ommissioner 2nage, his predecessor was appointed. 6eld% The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in -uly 1", 1 9< but from the date of the organization of the .H42L2. under .* !<0 on -une "1, 1 91. Thus, the term of office of the first .hairman, Lopez Dito began on -une "1, 1 91 and ended -une "8, 1 <8. That of member 2nage began on -une "1, 1 91 to -une "8, 1 99 (but this was not filled#. Since the first 1 year term had already e'pired in 1 99, the appointment of >e Dera on -une 1", 1 9< must be for the full term of nine years (-une 1 99 to -une 1 <1#. The first vacancy occurred by the e'piration of the term of 2nage. 6is successor, Perez, was named for a full year term which shall have started on -une 1 90 to -une 1 <!. The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Dito on 4ay 1 90. To succeed him, de Dera appointed and lasted only up to -une 1 <8, the une'pired period of Lopez Dito7s term. Thus, on -une 1 <8, a vacancy occurred which >e Dera could no longer fill because his appointment was e'pressly prohibited by the .onstitution. Thus, the ne't .hairman was respondent +mperial whose term of years must be deemed to have began on -une "1, 1 8 to e'pire on -une "8, 1 < . 7. A88oi t&e t of 8e$"o el ART I: A, Sectio B The .onstitutional .ommissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. B. Sala$( *rt. +C, *, Sec. 1. The salary of the .hairman and the .ommissioners shall be fi'ed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. *rt. CD+++, Sec. 10. ?ntil the .ongress provides otherwise ' ' ' the .hairmen of the .onstitutional .ommissions (shall receive#, two hundred four thousand pesos each& and the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. The salary can be increased and the increase can ta(e effect at once, since, li(e the -udiciary, the .onstitutional .ommissions have not part in the passage of such a law. 2. Di"<#alificatio " Go members of a .onstitutional .ommission shall during his 3tenure3 % (+C, D, "# a. 6old any other office or employment. This is similar to the prohibition against e'ecutive officers. +t applies to both public and private offices and employment. b. 2ngage in the practice of any profession. c. 2ngage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office. d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by, the Iovernment, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including IH..s or their subsidiaries. 3. I&8eac'&e t

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*rt. C+, Sec. ". The members of the .onstitutional .ommissions may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 0. Powe$" a d *# ctio " of t'e COMELEC a. E fo$ce electio law" :ecommend to the .ongress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies. on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or e'clusion of voters& investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. O& i,#" Electio Ri)'t to 9ote The right to vote may be challenged in the 4T. by% a# a proceeding challenging the right of a voter to be registered& b# an action instituted by a voter for reinstatement& c# proceeding filed by an individual to e'clude any voter whose name appears in the list of voters. There are dates which the law allots for the registration of voters. *ny person, under 11!, during this period may challenge the registration of voters on the grounds of the )ualifications and dis)ualifications in the e'ercise of the right of suffrage. Jualifications (*rticles <, 110# a# 5ilipino citizen b# 1; years old c# :esident of the Phils., for one year and of the municipality where he proposes to vote for ! months. >is)ualifications (*rt. 11;# a# Those convicted by final /udgment and have been sentenced to imprisonment for at least one year and such dis)ualifications has not been removed by absolute pardon or amnesty. This dis)ualification lasts for < years unless restored by absolute pardon or amnesty. (.ristobal v Labrador# b# Those convicted of crimes involving the national security, or disloyalty to the government, rebellion, sedition, subversion, etc. c# +nsanity or incompetency +nclusion Proceedings +f the Board of :egistration cancels the name of a voter, he can file in the 4T. a petition for an order to include his name in the list of voters or to reinstate him. *ction must be filed within "8 days form the last day of registration. *ppeal can be made to the :T. within < days, and the decision shall be final and unappealable and no motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. 2'clusion Proceedings (*rticles 11;, 11 , 19"# * petition for e'clusion must be filed with the 4T. within "8 days from the last day of registration. d, P$o"ec#te electio law %iolato$" 1. .H42L2. has e'clusive /urisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases for violations of Code

Sa c'e= %. Co&elec Sanchez, the losing mayoralty candidate, filed with the .omelec a petition to nullify the said elections due to large scale terrorism, which too( place after the people had cast their votes. The .omelec, after hearing, issued the resolution which ordered the nullification of the elections and the certification of the failure of elections. The court held that the .omelec has the power to nullify the elections on such ground. The .omelec is now the sole /udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and )ualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials. +n line with its duty to protect and preserve the integrity of the elections, the .omelec must be deemed possessed of the authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. The fact that the failure of elections was due to terrorism after the votes were cast is not material. +t was also held in this case that the .omelec, being the sole /udge of elections, returns and )ualifications, has the power to call special elections. >uring the time the .omelec was not the sole /udge, the president, upon certification to him by the .omelec of a failure of elections, had the power to call special elections. The .omelec has the duty to ta(e necessary steps to complete the elections, that is, to see to it that the real winners are proclaimed. But when the winners cannot be determined from the elections, which was marred by massive and pervasive terrorism, the .omelec must call for a special election in order to proclaim the real winners. ,. Decide ad&i i"t$ati%e <#e"tio " 8e$tai i ) to electio e+ce8t t'e $i)'t to %ote Power to decide, e'cept those involving the right to vote, all )uestions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters. $Juestions involving the right to vote fall within the /urisdiction of the ordinary courts. c. Petitio fo$ i cl#"io o$ e+cl#"io of %ote$ *rt. +C, ., Sec. ". ''' (!# 5ile, upon a verified complaint, or

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election laws. ". .H42L2. can deputize prosecutors for this purpose. The actions of the prosecutors are the actions of the .H42L2.. BP ;;1 sec. "!< Prosecution.$$ The .ommission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the e'clusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this .ode, and to prosecute the same. The .ommission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government% Provided, however, That in the event that the .ommission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing the complaint, he may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the 4inistry of -ustice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. 2H 119, Sec. 11, 5ebruary "0, 1 ;0 Prosecution.$$ The .ommission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have e'clusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the same% Provided, That in the event that the .ommission fails to act on any complaint within two ("# months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Hffice of the 5iscal or with the >epartment of -ustice for proper investigations and prosecution, if warranted. The .ommission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. De >e"#" %. Peo8le * government official (.H42L2. :egistrar# who violated the election law ( tampering with returns to ma(e it appear that there were more registered voters# must be prosecuted by the .H42L2., before the :T., not the Sandiganbayan. The 1 0; 2lection .ode is clear that the .H42L2. shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigations of all election offenses, and that the :T. has e'clusive original /urisdiction to try and decide such cases. +t is not the character or personality of the offender (public official# but the crime committed (violation of election law# that determines /urisdiction. This provision of the 1 0; 2lection .ode has been integrated in the 1 ;0 .onstitution. Co$8#" %. Ta od,a(a There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either e'plicitly or implicitly, authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. +nstead the constitution granted such power e'clusively to the .omelec in order to insure a free, orderly and honest elections. +t is the nature of the offense that determines the e'clusive /urisdiction of the .omelec regardless of who the offender is, whether a private individual or a public officer. Peo8le %. !a"ilia *lthough the .omelec is granted the e'clusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses, it is also authorized by the Hmnibus 2lection .ode to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government. To ensure credible elections, the .omelec may deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities, whether before or after elections. Pursuant to such authority granted by law, the .omelec issued :esolution no 1;!" providing that fiscals may conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses. Peo8le %. I ti ) The 1 ;0 .onstitution mandates the .H42L2. not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the .H42L2. is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the /udge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is e'clusive with the .H42L2.. The Prov7l 5iscal assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. +f the 5iscal files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the .H42L2.. 6e does not do so under the sole authority of his office. +t is only after a preliminary e'amination conducted by the .H42L2. through its officials or its deputies that Sec. ", *rt. +++ of the 1 ;0 .onstitution comes in. This is so, because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the /udge will then determine whether or not a probable cause e'ists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Peo8le %. Del)ado
The .omelec has the following functions% (1# enforcement of election laws& ("# decision of election contests& (1# decision of administrative )uestions& (9# deputizing law enforcement agencies& (<# registration of political parties& and (!# improvement of elections. @hat are reviewable on certiorari by the S. are those orders, decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the .omelec in the e'ercise of its ad/udicatory or )uasi$ /udicial powers. Thus decisions of the .omelec on election contests or on administrative )uestions are sub/ect to /udicial review only by the S.. +n this case, no .omelec ad/udicatory power is e'ercised. *s a public prosecutor, the .omelec has the e'clusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election code before the competent court. But when the .omelec files the information, the subse)uent disposition of the case is sub/ect to the court7s approval. The .omelec can7t conduct reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation.

e. Reco&&e d 8a$do , a& e"t(, 8a$ole o$ "#"8e "io of "e te ce of electio law %iolato$" *rt. +C, ., Sec. <. Go pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the .ommission.

f. De8#ti=e law e fo$ce&e t a)e t" a d $eco&&e d t'ei$ $e&o%al Power to deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Iovernment, including

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the *rmed 5orces of the Philippines, for the e'clusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 1. Got limited to the election period ". *pplies to both criminal and administrative cases :ecommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard or, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. ). Re)i"t$atio of 8olitical 8a$tie", o$)a i=atio " a d coalitio " a d acc$editatio of citi=e "; a$&" 1. The political parties etc. must present their platform or program of government. ". There should be sufficient publication. 1. Iroups which cannot be registered% i. :eligious denominations,sects Political parties with religious affiliation or which derive their principles from religious beliefs are registerable. ii. Iroups which see( to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means iii. Iroups which refuse to uphold and adhere to the .onstitution iv. Iroups which are supported by any foreign government. 5inancial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs. +f accepted, it is an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the .ommission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law. :egistration under the party list system *rt. +C, ., Sec. 0. Go votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, e'cept for those registered under the party$list system as provided in this .onstitution. *rt. CD+++, Sec. 0. ?ntil a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph ", Section < of *rticle D+ of the .onstitution. '. Re)#latio of 8#,lic #tilitie" a d &edia of i fo$&atio *rt. +C, ., Sec. 9. The .ommission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the en/oyment of utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation or transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government$owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure e)ual opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, e)ual rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the ob/ective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure (i# e)ual opportunity, time and space, (ii# the right to reply, including reasonable e)ual rates therefor, for public information campaigns and from among candidates, in connection with the ob/ect of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Re)#latio of *$a c'i"e": :egulation of 5ranchises% 1. @hat can .H42L2. supervise or regulate a. The en/oyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information. b. Irants, special privileges or concessions granted by the Iovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any IH.. or its subsidiary ". @hen can .H42L2. e'ercise this power a. >uring the election period i. 2lection period commences 8 days before the day of the election and ends 18 days thereafter. ii. +n special cases, .H42L2. can fi' a period. b. *pplies not /ust to elections but also to plebiscites and referenda. Z Plebiscite $ submission of constitutional amendments or important legislative measures to the people ratification Z :eferendum $ power of the electorate to approve or re/ect legislation through an election called for that purpose. Natio al P$e"" Cl#, %. Co&elec The .omelec has been e'pressly authorized by the .onstitution to supervise or regulate the en/oyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure 3e)ual opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,3 as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such

*rt. +C, ., Sec. ;. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party$list systems, shall not be presented in the voters7 registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. 6owever, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law. *rt. D+, Sec. <. ''' ("# The party$list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. 5or three consecutive terms after the ratification of this .onstitution, one$half of the seats allocated to the party$list representatives shall be filled, as provided bylaw, by selection or election from labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, e'cept the religious sector.

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media facilities, in connection with 3public information campaigns and forums among candidates.3 6owever, the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the ob/ective set out in the .onstitution. 5or it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are li(ely to ma(e a crucial difference. i. Decide electio ca"e" a. 2'clusive original /urisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and )ualifications of all elective% i. :egional ii. Provincial iii. .ity officials b. *ppellate /urisdiction over all contests involving% i. 2lective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general /urisdiction ii. 2lective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited /urisdiction. >ecisions, final orders, or rulings of the .ommission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, e'ecutory, and not appealable. c. .ontempt powers 1. .H42L2. can e'ercise this power only in relation to its ad/udicatory or )uasi$ /udicial functions. +t cannot e'ercise this in connection with its purely e'ecutive or ministerial functions. ". +ts /urisdiction over pre$proclamation controversies is in e'ercise of its )uasi$ /udicial,administrative powers. 1. +ts /urisdiction over NcontestsO (after proclamation# is in e'ercise of its /udicial functions. d. The .H42L2. may issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in e'ercise of its appellate /urisdiction. This is not an inherent power. of the Batasang Pambansa must be >ecided by the .H42L2. en banc. Some definitions discussed in the case% .ontests.$$ The word 3contests3 should not be given a restrictive meaning& on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the .onsti. should be interpreted liberally. *s employed in the 1 01 .onsti., the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made bef. or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. 2lections, returns and )ualifications.$$ The phrase 3elections, returns and )ualifications3 should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee7s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, holding of electoral campaign, and casting and counting of votes. 3returns3 to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including )uestions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns& and 3)ualifications3 to matters that could be raised in a )uo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty, or ineligibility, or the inade)uacy of his certificate of candidacy. Pi&e tel %. Co&elec .omelec has no /urisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus ()uestioning an interlocutory order issued by the .5+# involving election cases filed w, the .5+. -urisdiction is conferred only by the .onstitution or the law. Thus, it cannot be conferred by the :ules of .ourt w,c are neither constitutional provisions nor legislative enactments but mere procedural rules promulgated by the S. in the e'ercise of its power to prescribe 3rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures in all courts.3 Sec. 9, :ule !< of the :H., cannot be construed as a grant of /urisdiction to the .ourt of *ppeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it. 4uch less can such provision be interpreted, by analogy, as a grant to the .H42L2. of /urisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the .5+ and appealable to said .ommission. @hile it is true that the .* has /urisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it, the grant of /urisdiction is not by virtue of the :H., but by e'press legislative fiat, namely, Sec. 18 of the -udiciary *ct. Go such legislative grant of /urisdiction e'ists in the case of the .H42L2.. Aa$cia %. de >e"#" +n the absence of any specific conferment upon the .H42L2., either by the .onstitution or by legislative fiat, the .H42L2. is bereft of /urisdiction to issue @rits of .ertiorari, Prohibition and 4andamus in electoral contests. @hat the .onstitution granted the .H42L2. was appellate /urisdiction. The .onstitution ma(es no

RA 0-33, Sec. 11 Sec. "". 2lection .ontests for 4unicipal Hffices.$$ *ll election contests involving municipal offices with the :egional Trial .ourt shall be decided e'peditiously. The decision may be appealed to the .ommission within five (<# days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The .ommission shall decide the appeal within si'ty (!8# days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than si' (!# months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable, and e'ecutory. 4unicipal $ original with the :T.& appeal to the .H42L2. Barangay $ original with inferior court& appeal to .H42L2. >a%ie$ %. Co&elec ?nder the 1 01 .onstitution, even Pre$ Proclamation .ontroversies +nvolving 4embers

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mention of any power given the .H42L2. to e'ercise original /urisdiction over Petitions for .ertiorari, Prohibition and 4andamus unli(e in the case of the S. which was specifically conferred such authority. The immutable doctrine being that /urisdiction is fi'ed by law, the power to issue such @rits can not implied from the mere e'istence of appellate /urisdiction. The .H42L2. is bereft of authority to deprive :T.s of the competence to order e'ecution pending appeal. 5or one, it is essentially a /udicial prerogative. 5or another, it is a pronouncement of the .H42L2. alone in its procedural rules, w,o benefit of statute, unli(e in the past. There is no e'press provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing e'ecutions pending appeal, and the .H42L2., in its procedural rules alone, should not be allowed to divest :T.s of that authority. +t deprives the prevailing party of a substantive right to move for such relief contrary to the constitutional mandate that those :ules cannot diminish nor modify substantive rights. 9elo$ia %. Co&elec .H42L2. has not been given, by the .onstitution nor by law, /urisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. @hat the .onstitution granted the .H42L2. was appellate /urisdiction. The .onstitution ma(es no mention of any power given the .H42L2. to e'ercise original /urisdiction over petitions for .ertiorari, Prohibition and 4andamus. The immutable doctrine being that /urisdiction is fi'ed by law, the power to issue such writs cannot be implied from the mere e'istence of appellate /urisdiction '''.3 (Iarcia v. de -esus#. +n view of such pronouncement, an original special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a :T. in an election contest may be filed in the .ourt of *ppeals or in the S. being the only courts given such original /urisdiction under the .onstitution and the law. D. R#le Ma@i ) *rt. +C, *, Sec. !. 2ach .ommission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. *rt. +C, ., Sec. 1. The .ommission on 2lections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedures in order to e'pedite disposition of election cases, including pre$proclamation controversies. *ll such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the .ommission en banc. +t has the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure in order to e'pedite disposition of election cases, including pre$election controversies. @. Ot'e$ f# ctio " *rt. +C, *, Sec. ;. 2ach .ommission shall perform such other provided by law. functions as may be

l. Act a" Natio al !oa$d of Ca %a""e$" fo$ "e ato$" 2H 199, Sec. ", 4arch ", 1 ;0 Sec. ". Board of .anvassers.$$ The .hairman and 4embers of the .ommission on 2lections sitting en banc shall be the Gational Board of .anvassers for the election of Senators. +t shall canvass all certificates of canvass coming from and prepared by the district, provincial, and city boards of canvassers (of those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts.# 5urthermore, there shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and district of 4etropolitan 4anila, as follows% (a# Provincial board of canvassers.$$ The provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the provincial election supervisor or a senior lawyer in the regional office of the .ommission, as chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice$chairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools, as members. This board shall canvass certificates of canvass from the municipalities and the cities which do not comprise at least one legislative district. +t shall proclaim as elected the candidates for the 6ouse of :epresentatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the respective legislative districts. @ith respect to the election of senators, the provincial board of canvassers shall prepare in duplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each municipality, city, and transmit the first copy thereof to the .ommission on 2lections for canvassing. The second copy shall be (ept by the provincial election supervisor. (b# .ity Boards of .anvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts.$$ The city board of canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall be composed of the city election registrar or lawyer of the .ommission, as chairman, the city fiscal, as vice$chairman, and the city superintendent of schools as member. This board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within the /urisdiction of the city, and shall proclaim as elected the candidate or candidates for the 6ouse of :epresentatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the legislative district or respective legislative districts. @ith respect to the election of senators, this board shall prepare in duplicate certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy to the .ommission on 2lections for canvassing. The second copy shall be (ept by the city election registrar. (c# >istrict Board of .anvassers.$$ The district board of canvassers shall be composed of a lawyer of the .ommission, as chairman, and a ran(ing fiscal in the district, as vice$chairman, and the most district school supervisor in the district, as member, to be appointed by the .ommission upon consultation with the >epartment of -ustice and the >epartment of 2ducation, .ulture and Sports respectively.

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This board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within the /urisdiction of the district and shall proclaim as elected the candidate for the 6ouse of :epresentatives who obtained the highest number of votes in the legislative district. @ith respect to the election for senators, the same procedure shall be followed by this board as that observed by the city board of canvassers for cities comprising one or more legislative districts. (d# .ity, 4unicipal Board of .anvassers.$$ The city (for cities not comprising at least one legislative district# or municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the city, municipal election registrar, as chairman, the city fiscal, municipal treasurer, as the case may be, as vice$chairman, and the city superintendent, district supervisor or in his absence any public school principal, as the case may be, as member. The board shall canvass election returns coming from the polling places within its /urisdiction, but shall not proclaim any winner in the election for 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives or for Senators. This board shall prepare in triplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place, and transmit the first copy thereof to the provincial board of canvassers for canvassing. The second copy shall be transmitted to the .ommission for record purposes and the third copy shall be (ept by the city, municipal election registrar. provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay case should be appealed to the :T. was declared unconstitutional. The court considered the petitionerOs appeal to the :T. as an appeal made to the .omelec since at that time, the law was presumed to be valid. >ecisions of the .H42L2. on election contests involving municipal = barangay officer shall be final = unappealable with respect to )uestions of fact = not of law. *rt +C$! Sec "("# of the .onsti was not intended to divert the S. of its authority to resolve )uestions of law as inherent in the /udicial power conferred upon it by the .onsti. Aalido %. Co&elec The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the .H42L2. in contests involving e'ecutory = not appealable does not preclude a recourse to the S. by way of a special civil action of certiorari. (however, in this case, the S. held that .H42L2. committed GH grave abuse of discretion in rendering the )uestioned decision.#. Ri%e$a %. Co&elec Same ruling as case above. -G. *i"cal A#to o&( *rt. +C, *, Sec. <. The .ommission shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

III. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

-. Co&8o"itio a d E#alificatio "H

.. Re%iew of COMELEC deci"io ", o$de$" a d $e"ol#tio " *rt. +C, ., Sec. ". ''' ("# 2'ercise e'clusive original /urisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and )ualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate /urisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general /urisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited /urisdiction. >ecisions, final orders, or rulings of the .ommission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, e'ecutory, and not appealable. *rt. +C, *, Sec. 0. 2ach .ommission shall decide by a ma/ority of all its 4embers any case or matter brought before it within si'ty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum re)uired by the rules of the .ommission or by the .ommission itself. ?nless otherwise provided by this .onstitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each .ommission may be brought to the Supreme .ourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. *lo$e" %. Co&elec Sec. of :* !!0 (locgov code# insofar as it

A$t. I:6D, I-4-5: There shall be a .ommission on *udit composed of a .hairman and two .ommissioners, who shall be natural$born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty$five years of age, .ertified Public *ccountants with not less than ten years of auditing e'perience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. *t no time shall all 4embers of the .ommission belong to the same profession. .omposition% 1. 1 .hairman ". " .ommissioners Jualifications% 1. Gatural$born citizens ". *t least 1< years old at the time of their appointment 1. 2ither% a. .P*Os with at least 18 years auditing e'perience b. 4embers of the Philippine Bar with 18 years of practice 4embers cannot all belong to the same profession.

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9. 4ust not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. a d Te$& of office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. *ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. 3. I&8eac'&e t A$t. :I, "ec. 1: The President, the Dice$ President, the 4embers of the Supreme .ourt, the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and the Hmbudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the .onstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. *ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. 0. Te$&: 0 years without reappointment *ppointed by the President with consent of the .* *ppointment to any vacancy shall only be for une'pired term of predecessor. +n no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. 7. A88oi t&e t of COA 8e$"o el Powe$" a d *# ctio "

1. A88oi t&e t co&&i""io e$"

A$t. I:, D, "ec. -415: The .hairman and the .ommissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the .ommission on *ppointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Hf those first appointed, the .hairman shall hold office for seven years, one .ommissioner for five years, and the other .ommissioner for three years, without reappointment. *ppointment to any vacancy shall be only for the une'pired portion of the term of the predecessor. +n no case shall any 4ember be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

A$t. I:, A, "ec. B% The .onstitutional .ommissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. B. Sala$(

A$t. I:, A, "ec. 7: The salary of the .hairman and the .ommissioners shall be fi'ed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. A$t. :9III, "ec. -0:?ntil the .ongress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos& the Dice$President, the President of the Senate, the Spea(er of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, and the .hief -ustice of the Supreme .ourt, two hundred forty thousand pesos each& the Senators, the 4embers of the 6ouse of :epresentatives, the *ssociate -ustices of the Supreme .ourt, and the .hairmen of the .onstitutional .ommissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each& and the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. 2. Di"<#alificatio " A$t. :I, "ec. 1: The President, the Dice$ President, the 4embers of the Supreme .ourt, the 4embers of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and the Hmbudsman may be removed from

A$t. I:6D, I1:4 1# The .ommission on *udit shall have the power, authority, and duty to e'amine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and e'penditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Iovernment, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government$owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post$ audit basis% (a# constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this .onstitution& (b# autonomous state colleges and universities& (c# other government$owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries& and (d# such non$governmental entities receiving subsidy or e)uity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Iovernment, which are re)uired by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or e)uity. 6owever, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inade)uate, the .ommission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre$audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. +t shall (eep the general accounts of the Iovernment and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. ("# The .ommission shall have e'clusive authority, sub/ect to the limitations in this *rticle, to define the scope of its audit and e'amination, establish the techni)ues and methods re)uired therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, e'cessive, e'travagant, or unconscionable e'penditures or uses of government funds and properties. A$t. I:6D, "ec. 7: Go law shall be passed e'empting any entity of the Iovernment or its subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the /urisdiction of the .ommission on *udit.

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A$t. 9I, "ec. 1G: The records and boo(s of accounts of the .ongress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such boo(s shall be audited by the .ommission on *udit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and e'penses incurred for each 4ember. 1. 2'amine, audit, and settle accounts pertaining to% *. :evenue and receipts of funds or property B. 2'penditures and uses of funds or property Hwned or held in trust by, or pertain to% A. The Iovernment B. *ny of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities C. +ncluding IH..Os with original charters .onduct post$audit with respect to the following% A. .onstitutional bodies, commissions, and offices granted fiscal autonomy B. *utonomous state colleges and universities C. IH..Os and their subsidiaries incorporated under the .orporation .ode D. Gon$governmental entities receiving subsidies or e)uity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are re)uired by law of the granting of institution to submit to such audit +f .H* finds internal control system of audited agencies as inade)uate, .H* may adopt measures, including temporary or special pre$audit, as may be necessary. Qeep the general accounts of the government, preserving vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. 2'clusive authority to define the scope of .H*Os audit and e'amination and to establish the techni)ues and methods re)uired therefor. Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. +ncluding those for the prevention or disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, e'cessive, e'travagant, or unconscionable e'penditures or uses of government funds and properties. Co$olla$ie": .H* can settle only li)uidated accounts or those accounts which may be ad/usted simply by arithmetic process. @here the following re)uirements are complied with, it becomes the ministerial duty of the .H* to approve and pass in audit vouchers for payment% 1. There is a law appropriating funds for a particular purpose. ". There is a contract, made by the proper officer, entered into in conformity with the above$ mentioned law. 1. The goods or services covered by such contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance to such contract, as attested by the proper officer. 9. Payment has been authorized by officials of the corresponding department or bureau. Prosecutors may still review accounts already settled and approved by .H* for the purpose of determining possible criminal liability. This is because .H*Os interest in such accounts is merely administrative. .H* has the power to determine the meaning of Npublic biddingO and what constitutes failure when regulations re)uire public bidding for the sale of government property. Go law shall be passed e'empting any entity of the Iovernment or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the /urisdiction of the .ommission on *udit.

".

/.

R#le6&a@i )

A$t. I:, A, "ec. 3:2ach .ommission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. .. Ot'e$ *# ctio "

1.

A$t. I:, A, "ec. /:2ach .ommission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law. -G. Re%iew of Deci"io " of COA A$t. I:, A, "ec. 0: 2ach .ommission shall decide by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers, any case or matter brought before it within si'ty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. * case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum re)uired by the rules of the .ommission or by the .ommission itself. ?nless otherwise provided by this .onstitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each .ommission may be brought to the Supreme .ourt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. --. *i"cal A#to o&( A$t. I:, A, "ec. 2: The .ommission shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. -1. P$o'i,itio A)ai "t E+e&8tio f$o& >#$i"dictio -7. A$t. I:6D, I7:Go law shall be passed e'empting any entity of the Iovernment or its subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the /urisdiction of the .ommission

9. <.

!.

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on *udit. -7. A #al Re8o$t been overcome. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no way of scrutinizing whether the )uantum of evidence re)uired for conviction in criminal cases have been satisfied.

A$t. I:6D, IB:The .ommission shall submit to the President and the .ongress, within the time fi'ed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Iovernment, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government$owned or controlled corporations, and non$ governmental entities sub/ect to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. +t shall submit such other reports as may be re)uired by law.

9. O**ICE O* THE OM!UDSMAN

See al"o PD -3G7, >#l( -/, -.0. RA 300G, No%. -0, -./. -. Co&8o"itio A$t. :I, Sec. 2. There is hereby created the independent Hffice of the Hmbudsman, composed of the Hmbudsman to be (nown as Tanodbayan, one overall >eputy and at least one >eputy each for Luzon, Disayas, and 4indanao. * separate >eputy for the military establishment may li(ewise be appointed. 1. E#alificatio " A$t. :I, Sec. /. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies shall be natural$born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Hmbudsman must have for ten years or more been a /udge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. >uring their tenure, they shall be sub/ect to the same dis)ualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section " of *rticle +C$* of this .onstitution. 7. A88oi t&e t a d Te$& *ppointment A$t. :I, Sec. .. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least si' nominees prepared by the -udicial and Bar .ouncil, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall re)uire no confirmation. *ll vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. Term Id., Sec. --. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be )ualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

I9. SANDIAAN!AYAN
A$t. :I, Sec. B. The present anti$graft court (nown as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and e'ercise its /urisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. PD -3G3, a" a&e ded ,( Re8#,lic Act 0.02 N# e= %. Sa di)a ,a(a , (1# The claim that P> 1!8! deprives petitioner of the e)ual protection of the law is hardly convincing considering that the >ecree is based on a valid classification. The .onsti. provides for the creation of a special court, (nown as Sandiganbayan (SB#, and the rule is settled that the general guarantees of the Bill of :ights, among w,c are the due process and e)ual protection clauses, must give way to specific provisions, such as the provision on the creation of the SB. ("# +t hardly can be argued that a particular mode of procedure provided in a statute can become the vested right of any person. 3*n accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation ta(e from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the .onsti., as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and w,c he en/oyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him. @ould the omission of the .* as an intermediate tribunal, deprive those, li(e the petitioner, who are charged in the SB, of a right that is vital to the protection of their libertyF +ts answer must be in the negative. The innocence of guilt of the accused is passed upon by a 1$ /udge division of the SB. 4oreover, a unanimous vote is re)uired, otherwise, the Presiding -ustice designates two other -ustices from among the members of the SB to sit temporarily in a division of < until a decision is rendered w, the concurrence of 1 -ustices. +f convicted, the accused can see( a review in the S. on a )uestion of law or the substantiality of the evidence. Petitioner ma(es much of the facts that there is no review by the S. of facts. @hat cannot be too strongly emphasized is that the S., in determining whether to give due course to a petition for review of a decision of the SB, must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has

B. Ra @ a d "ala$( Id., Sec. -G. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies shall have the ran( of .hairman and 4embers, respectively, of the .onstitutional .ommissions, and they shall receive the same salary, which shall not be decreased during their term of office.

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2. Di"<#alificatio " A$t. I:, Sec. /. ''' they shall be sub/ect to the same dis)ualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section " of *rticle +C$* of this .onstitution. A$t. I:, A, Sec. 1. Go 4ember of a .onstitutional .ommission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Geither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Iovernment, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government$owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. A$t. :I, Sec. -3. Go loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly by any government owned or controlled ban( or financial institution to the President, Dice President, the 4embers of the .abinet, the .ongress, the Supreme .ourt, and the .onstitutional .ommissions, the Hmbuds$ man, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. 3. >#$i"dictio Id., Sec. -1. The Hmbudsman and his >eputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action ta(en and the result thereof. E#i&8o %. Ta od,a(a , 5% 5. Juimpo filed a complaint w, the Tanodbayan (TB# charging Ireg >imaano and >anny :emo, manager and analyst of Petrophil, w, viol. of :* 181 for their refusal to pay Juimpo7s fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his /urisdiction e'tended only to govt owned corps organized under a special law. P2T:HP6+L is a corp. organized under the Ien. .orp. .ode& it was ac)uired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Juimpo filed a petition for certiorari, )uestioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed /udgment. 62L>% (1# +n G6* v. -uco, 119 S 10" (1 ;9#, it was held that for purposes of coverage in the .ivil Service, employees of govt owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the .S law, not the Labor .ode, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the .ivil Service. (This ruling has since been overruled.# ("# The meaning thus given to 3govt$ owned or controlled corps.3 for purposes of the .S S*rt. +C, B, Sec. " (1#R provision should li(ewise apply for purposes of the TB and the SB provisions S*rt. C+, secs. 9 and 1"R, otherwise, incongruity would result& and a govt$owned corp. could create as many subsidiary corps. under the .orp. .ode as it wishes, w,c would then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided for by law. ''' STRhere can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its ac)uisition by the Iovt, utilizing public funds, P2T:HP6+L, while retaining its own corporate e'istence, became a govt$owned or controlled corp. w,in the constitutional precept. +ts employees, therefore are public servants falling w,in the investigatory and prosecutory /urisdiction of the TB for purposes of the :* 181 . 99. 0. Powe$" a d f# ctio " A$t. :I, Sec. -7. The Hffice of the Hmbudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties% (1# +nvestigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, un/ust, improper, or inefficient ("# >irect, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Iovernment, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government$owned or controlled corporation with original charter& to perform and e'pedite any act or duty re)uired by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (1# >irect the officer concerned to ta(e appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (9# >irect the officer concerned in any appropriate case, and sub/ect to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the .ommission on *udit for appropriate action. (<# :e)uest any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to e'amine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents. (!# Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence. (0# >etermine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Iovernment and ma(e recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency. (;# Promulgate its rules of procedure and e'ercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. Barlongay% The functions of the Hmbudsman may be divided into four% (1# +nvestigatory& ("# Prosecutory& (1# >isciplinary& and (9# *ssistory.

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Re"ol#tio o t'e Motio fo$ Reco "ide$atio , Ma( -., -.// (1# The power of investigation conferred on the Hmbudsman covers both administrative and crim. offenses. *ccordingly, the Sp Pros. cannot claim that he retains the specific power of prel. investigation while conceding the general power of investigation to the Hmbudsman. The greater power embraces the lesser. ("# The fact that the informations filed by the resp. from 5eb. ", 1 ;0, were invalid bec. they were not authorized by the Hmbudsman, is not a /urisdictional defect. The +nformations could have been challenged in a motion to )uash under : 110, :H. on the ground of lac( of authority on the part of the officer filing the same. +f this ground was not invo(ed, it is deemed waived under Sec. ; of the same :ule. ''' *t any rate, to settle this )uestion, we hereby rule that the decision of this .ourt in this case shall be given prospective application only from *pril "0, 1 ;;. ''' To recapitulate, the .ourt holds that, in the interest of /ustice, its ruling in 9,"0,;; shall apply prospectively to cases filed in .ourt prior to said resolution and pending trial nor to convictions or ac)uittals pronounced therein. The e'ception is where there has been a timely ob/ection and a specific challenge, as in this case, where the .ourt ordered the nullification of the +nfo. filed for lac( of authority on the part of resp. Ionzales. 99. PD No. -37G Sec. -G. Powers.$$ The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers% (a# 6e may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government owned or controlled corporations& (b# 6e may prescribe the methods by which complaints are to be made, received, and acted upon& he may determine the scope and manner of investigations to be made& and, sub/ect to the re)uirements of this >ecree, he may determine the form, fre)uency, and distribution of his conclusions and recommendations& (c# 6e may re)uest and unless as herein provided for he shall be given by each administrative agency the assistance and information he deems necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities& he may e'amine the records and documents of all administrative agencies& and he may enter and inspect premises within any administrative agency7s control, provided, however, that, where the President in writing certifies that such information, e'amination or inspection might pre/udice the national interest or violate e'isting law, the Tanodbayan shall desist. *ll information so obtained shall be confidential, unless the President, in the interest of public service, decides otherwise& (d# 6e may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the

/. *i"cal A#to o&( Id., Sec. -B. The Hffice of the Hmbudsman shall en/oy fiscal autonomy. +ts approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly release. .. A88oi t&e t of 8e$"o el

Id., Sec. 3. The officials and employees of the Hffice of the Hmbudsman, other than the >eputies, shall be appointed by the Hmbudsman according to the .ivil Service Law.

9I. O**ICE O* THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Id., Sec. 0. The e'isting Tanodbayan shall hereafter be (nown as the Hffice of the Special Prosecutor. +t shall continue to function and e'ercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, e'cept those conferred on the Hffice of the Hmbudsman created under this .onstitution. Qaldi%a$ %. Sa di)a ,a(a , 5% Petitioner, governor of *nti)ue, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to restrain the Sandiganbayan = Tanodbayan :aul Ionzales from proceeding with the prosecution = hearing of criminal cases against him on the ground that said cases were filed by the Tanodbayan w,o legal = constitutional authority since under the 1 ;0 .onsti., it is only the Hmbudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. 62L>% (1# @e find the petitions impressed w, merit. ?nder *rt. C+, Sec. 11, par. 1 of the .onsti., the Hmbudsman (as distinguished w, the incumbent TB# is charged w, the duty to% 3+nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, un/ust, improper or inefficient.3 Hn the other hand, *rt. C+, Sec. 0 of the .onsti. provides that 3The e'isting Tanodbayan shall hereafter be (nown as the Hffice of the Special Prosecutor. +t shall continue to function and e'ercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, e'cept those conferred on the Hffice of the Hmbudsman created under this .onstitution.3 Gow, then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Hmbudsman, the incumbent TB (now called Sp. Pros.# is clearly without authority to conduct prel. investigations and to direct the filing of crim. cases, e'cept upon orders of the Hmbudsman. This right to do so was lost effective 5eb. ", 1 ;0

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Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his in)uiry& (e# +f after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the case& (f# 6e may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government$owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office& (g# 6e may underta(e, participate in, or cooperate with general studies or in)uiries, whether or not related to any particular administrative agency or any particular administrative act, if he believes that they may enhance (nowledge about or lead to improvements in the functioning of administrative agencies. +n carrying out his functions, the Tanodbayan may with the approval of the President, deputize or call upon any official or employee of the government or any agency or office and during such deputation the official or employee concerned shall be under the supervision and control of the Tanodbayan. Sec. -1. 4atters appropriate for +nvestigation.$$ (a# +n selecting matters for his attention, the Tanodbayan should also address himself to an administrative act that might be$$ 1. contrary to law or regulation& ". unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or inconsistent with the general course of an administrative agency7s functioning& 1. mista(en in law or arbitrary in ascertainment of facts& 9. improper in motivation or based on irrelevant considerations& <. unclear or inade)uately e'plained when reasons should have been revealed& !. inefficiently performed& or 0. otherwise ob/ectionable (b# The Tanodbayan may concern himself also with strengthening procedures and practices which lessen the ris( of occurrence of any ob/ectionable administrative acts. Sec. -7. *ction on .omplaints.$$ (a# The Tanodbayan may receive a complaint from any source concerning an administrative act. *t no e'pense to the complainant, he may conduct a suitable investigation into the things complained of. (b# *fter completing his consideration of a complaint, whether or not it has been investigated, the Tanodbayan shall suitably inform the complainant and, when appropriate, the administrative agency or agencies involved. (c# * letter to the Tanodbayan from a person in a place of detention or in a hospital or other institution under the control of an administrative agency shall be immediately forwarded, unopened to the Tanodbayan. Sec. -B. .onsultation with *gency.$$ Before announcing a conclusion or recommendation that criticizes an administrative agency or any person, the Tanodbayan shall consult with that agency or person. Sec. -2. Reco&&e datio ".66 (a# +f, having considered a complaint and whatever material he deems pertinent, the Tanodbayan is of the opinion that an administrative agency should (1# consider the matter further, ("# modify or cancel an administrative act, (1# alter a regulation or ruling, (9# e'plain fully the administrative act in )uestion, or (<# ta(e any other step, he shall state his recommendations to the administrative agency. +f the Tanodbayan so re)uests, the agency shall, within the time he has specified, inform him about the action ta(en on his recommendations or the reasons for not complying with them. (b# +f the Tanodbayan believes that an administrative action has been dictated by laws whose results are unfair or otherwise ob/ectionable, he shall bring to the of the President and the Gational *ssembly (.ongress# his views concerning desirable statutory change. Sec. -0. +nvestigation and Prosecution of .ases.$$ The Hffice of the Tanodbayan shall have the e'clusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to file information therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases. The Tanodbayan may utilize the personnel of his office and, or with the approval of the President, designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist him in the investigation and prosecution of said cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. Go publicity shall be allowed during the pendency of such preliminary investigation and the name of the complainant and the accused shall not be made public until an information is filed by the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan, his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have the authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and, or to bring boo(s, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having /urisdiction of the place where the witnesses or evidence is found. The resolutions and actions of the Tanodbayan shall not be sub/ect to review by any administrative agency.

9II. CENTRAL AUTHORITY

MONETARY

-. Co&8o"itio a d <#alificatio " *rt. C++ Section "8. The .ongress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be 1. natural$born 5ilipino citizens, ". of (nown probity, integrity, and patriotism, 1. the ma/ority of whom shall come from the private sector.

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They shall also be sub/ect to such other )ualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. 1. *# ctio " The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, ban(ing, and credit. +t shall have supervision over the operations of ban(s and e'ercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. ?ntil the .ongress otherwise provides, the .entral Ban( of the Philippines operating under e'isting laws, shall function as the central monetary authority. A$t. :II. Sec. 1G. The .ongress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be natural$born 5ilipino citizens, of (nown probity, integrity, and patriotism, the ma/ority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall also be sub/ect to such other )ualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, ban(ing, and credit. +t shall have supervision over the operations of ban(s and e'ercise such regulatory powers as may be provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions. ?ntil the .ongress otherwise provides, the .entral Ban( of the Philippines operating under e'isting laws, shall function as the central monetary authority.

9III. ECONOMIC AND PLANNINA AAENCY

*rt. C++ Section . The .ongress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President. 5unctions% *fter consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend to .ongress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development. ?ntil the .ongress provides otherwise, the Gational 2conomic and >evelopment *uthority shall function as the independent planning agency of the government. Section 18. The .ongress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least si'ty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as .ongress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The .ongress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by 5ilipinos. +n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to )ualified 5ilipinos. The State shall regulate and e'ercise authority over foreign investments within its national /urisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

1. Powe$" a d *# ctio " A$t. :III. Sec. -/. The .ommission on 6uman :ights shall have the following powers and functions% (1# +nvestigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights& ("# *dopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the :ules of .ourt& (1# Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as 5ilipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under$privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection& (9# 2'ercise visitorial powers over /ails, prisons, or detention facilities& (<# 2stablish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights& (!# :ecommend to .ongress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families& (0# 4onitor the Philippine Iovernment7s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights& (;# Irant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority& ( # :e)uest the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions& (18# *ppoint its officers and employees in accordance with law& and (11# Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. Sec. -.. The .ongress may provide for other

I:. NATIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. Co&&i""io o H#&a Ri)'t"

-. Co&8o"itio

a d E#alificatio "

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cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the .ommission, ta(ing into account its recommendations. 7. *i"cal A#to o&( A$t. :III. Sec. -04B5. The approved annual appropriations of the .ommission shall be automatically and regularly released. !. Natio al La )#a)e Co&&i""io A$t. :I9. Sec. .. The .ongress shall establish a national language commission composed of representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall underta(e, coordinate, and promote researches for the development, propagation, and preservation of 5ilipino and other languages. C. Natio al Police Co&&i""io A$t. :9I. Sec. 3. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local e'ecutives over the police units in their /urisdiction shall be provided by law. D. Co&&i""io Co&&# itie" o I di)e o#" C#lt#$al W'at &a( ,e alie ated: Hnly agricultural lands. *ll other natural resources shall not be alienated. (alienation to 5ilipinos only# E+8lo$atio , de%elo8&e t, a d #tili=atio of at#$al $e"o#$ce" 1. under the full control and supervision of the State ". The State may directly underta(e such activities, or 1. it may enter into co$production, /oint venture, or production$sharing agreements 9. with 5ilipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least si'ty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens <. *greements may be for a period not e'$ ceeding twenty$five years, renewable for not more than twenty$five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law La$)e6"cale E+8lo$atio , de%elo8&e t a d #tili=atio of &i e$al", 8et$ole#&, a d ot'e$ &i e$al oil" 1. The President may enter into agreements with foreign$owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance ". according to the general terms and conditions provided by law 1. based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country 9. +n such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. <. The President shall notify the .ongress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its e'ecution. 1. minerals 9. coal <. petroleum and other mineral oils !. all forces of potential energy 0. fisheries ;. forests or timber . wildlife, flora and fauna 18. other natural resources

A$t. :9I. Sec. -1. The .ongress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the ma/ority of the members of which shall come from such communities.

NATIONAL PATRIMONY

ECONOMY

AND

A. Aoal The goals of the national economy are% (1# * more e)uitable distribution opportunities, income, and wealth. of

("# * sustained increased by the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people& and (1# *n e'panding productivity as the (ey to raising the )uality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. ++ Bernas% Three basic directions may be gleaned from Sec. 1% (1# it sets the goal of dynamic productivity and a more e)uitable distribution of what is produced& ("# it see(s complementarity bet. industrialization and agricultural devt& (1# it is protective of things 5ilipino. ''' !. Nat#$al Re"o#$ce" -. Citi=e "'i8 Re<#i$e&e t A$t. :II, Sec. 1. R#le": Ow ed ,( t'e State: 1. *ll lands of the public domain ". waters

++ Bernas% +f natural resources, e'cept agricultural land, cannot be alienated, how can they be e'plored, developed or utilizedF ''' * distinction must be made bet. alienable lands and inalienable lands. *lienable lands may be the sub/ect of lease, and the rules are found in Sec. 1. ''' +nalienable lands, however, can only be developed and utilized directly by the State or in con/unction w, )ualified individuals or corps. through 3co$production, /oint venture, or production$sharing3$$ and thus 3full control and supervision of the State3 is preserved. 6owsoever natural resources might be e'ploited or developed, the right to do so is reserved for 35ilipino citizens, or corps., or associations at least si'ty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens

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Id., Sec. 0. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed e'cept to individuals, corporations, or associations )ualified to ac)uire or hold lands of the public domain. Ta(ing into account the re)uirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and sub/ect to the re)uirements of agrarian reform, the .ongress shall determine by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be ac)uired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. E+8lo$atio , De%elo8&e t, a d Utili=atio a. *ll (a# lands of the public domain, (b# waters, (c# mineral oils, (d# all forces of potential energy, (e# fisheries, (f# forest or timber, (g# wildlife, (h# flora and fauna, and (i# other natural resources are owned by the State. (This is the :egalian >octrine.# b. *ll natural resources, with the e'ception of agricultural lands, shall not be alienated. c. The e'ploration, development, and utilization or natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State ( as the owner thereof.# d. +n so e'ploring, developing or utilizing its natural resources, the State has two options% Hne, it may underta(e such activities directly, or Two, it may enter into (a# co$ production, (b# /oint venture, or (c# production sharing agreement with 5ilipino citizens, or corporations or associations with at least !8V 5ilipino capital. +n the case of the second option, any such agreements are sub/ect to the following limitations and )ualifications% (*# *s to Terms and .onditions (i# Such agreements ( for the e'ploration, development or utilization of natural resources e'cluding water rights other than the development of water power# may be for a period not more than "< years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. (ii# But in cases of water rights for (a# irrigation, (b# water supply, (c# fisheries, or (d# industrial uses other than the development of water power. Beneficial use may be the meas$ ure and limit of the grant. (B# *s to who may grant what privileged to whom (i# The State shall protect the nation7s (marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and e'clusive economic zone, and shall reserve its use and en/oyment 3e'clusively3 to 5ilipino citizens. (.orporations, even though owned by 5ilipinos are not included.# @ho $ State @hat $ 4arine @ealth @hom $ 5ilipino .itizens only (ii# The .ongress may, by law, allow small scale utilization of natural resources by 5ilipino citizens. +t may also allow cooperative fish farming with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishwor(ers in rivers, la(es, bays, and lagoons. @ho $ .ongress @hat $ small scale utilization of the natural resources @hom $ 5ilipino .itizens only Rla$)e "caleR e+8lo$atio , de%elo8&e t a d #tili=atio The President may enter into agreements with foreign$owned corporations involving either 3technical or financial assistance3 for 3large scale3 e'ploration, development and utilization of (a# minerals, (b# petroleum, (c# other mineral oils, according to the general terms and conditions provided by law. Such agreements shall (i# be based on 3real3 contributions to economic growth and the general welfare of the country, and (ii# promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the .ongress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision within 18 days from its e'ecution. @ho $ President @hat $ minerals, petroleum, other mineral oils& @hom $ foreign owned corporations This is really 3service contracts3 over again. 3Technically3, this provision 3falls3 under the general rule that the State may enter into co$production, /oint venture or production$ sharing agreements only which 5ilipino citizens or !8V 5ilipino corporations, since what in involved here is only 3technical or financial assistance3 for the e'ploration, development and utilization of these specific natural resources, and not the e'ploration, development, and utilization themselves. +n reality, however, it is an e'ception to the general rule. Got more than 1" hectares thereof by (i# purchase, (ii# homestead or (iii# grant, (*rt. C++, Sec. 1, par +.# The manner of ac)uiring alienable lands of the public domain is governed by .om. *ct Go. 191 (Public Land *ct#, which prescribes < ways of ac)uiring such lands.

95
6omestead This is available to citizens, at least 1; years of age (or less if a head of the family# resident of the Philippines, and not the owner of "9 (now 1"# hectares in the Philippines. under Sec. " and in the manner prescribed by Sec. ". P#,lic La d" a. .lassification Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national par(s. *gricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to which they may be devoted. b. *lienability @ith the e'ception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources are owned by the State. (*rt. C++, Sec. "# *lienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. (*rt. C++, Sec. 1.# +f the public land is non$alienable which is the case if it is forest or timber, mineral land, or national par(s, then it cannot be held by anyone. The general rule on natural resources applies and that is, that the State can only enter into co$production, /oint$ventures or production sharing agreements with 5ilipino citizens or !8V 5ilipino owned corporations for the e'ploitation, development and utilization of these lands. But if the public land is alienable, that is, agricultural, then it may be held by a private person, natural or /uridical, in accordance with the following rules. c. @ho 4ay 6old *lienable Lands of the Public >omain (1# .orporations% Lease Private corporation or associations may not hold alienable lands of the public domain e'cept by lease. Limitations% i. Period% Got more than "< years, renewable for not more than "< years. ii. Size% Got to e'ceed 1,888 hectares in area. *s worded, it would seem that even foreign corporations may become the lessees of alienable lands of the public domain, because (*rt. C++, Sec. 1# does not specify the !8V $ 5ilipino owned re)uirement. +t is unli(e the case for the e'ploration, development and utilization of natural resources other than public agricultural lands, in which the .onstitution specifies the ownership re)uirement. @hether this is a mere oversight in a valid )uestion, considering the nationalists intent of the .on$ stitution, on the one hand, and the presence of anti nationalist farmers, on the other hand. ("# 5ilipino .itizens% *c)uire or Lease .itizens of the Philippines may (a# lease no more than <88 hectares, (sub/ect to the same

Public Lands Ta(ing into account the re)uirements or conservation, ecology and development are sub/ect to the re)uirements of agrarian reform, the .ongress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be ac)uired, developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefore. (*rt. C++, Sec. 1, par "# 4arine @ealth The State shall protect the nation7s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and e'ecutive economic zone. (*rt. C++, Sec. ". par ".# 1. Cla""ificatio , Si=e, Co ditio " fo$ A$a t of P#,lic La d" A$t. :II, Sec. 7. Lands of the public domain are classified into 1. agricultural ". forest or timber 1. mineral lands and 9. national par(s. ++ Bernas% The first rule established in Sec. 1 is that only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. The second rule is that only )ualified individuals may ac)uire alienable lands of the public domain. The third rule establishes the size of the land w,c may be ac)uired by individuals or leased by individuals or corps. The fourth rule limits the discretion of .ongress to open public lands for lease or ac)uisition. Di"<#alificatio of 8$i%ate co$8o$atio ".66 Hne purpose of this constitutional prohibition is to e)uitably diffuse land$ownership or to encourage owner cultivatorship and economic family size farms and thereby prevent the recurrence of huge land holdings by corps. or private persons. +t was also aimed against undue e'ploitation of our public lands and natural resources by large corps. No citi=e "'i8 li&itatio L66 The impression might be given that Sec. 1 opens utilization of alienable lands to foreign individuals or foreign corps. bec. Sec. 1 ma(es no mention of citizenship re)uirement. But alienable lands are part of the natural resources and the gen. rule on the utilization of all natural resources can be found in Sec. ". ''' Thus, the utilization of alienable lands is open only to those )ualified a d

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conditions as in 5ilipino corporations# or (b# not more than 1" hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant. Me$alco %. Ca"t$o6!a$tolo&e .orporations 4ay Lease But Got *c)uire Public Lands 4eralco, applied for the confirmation of its title to " residential lots (sub/ect lot was previously owned by a 5ilipino individual#. 4eralco filed the application under the Public Land law provision which grants certificates of title to 5ilipino citizens who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have held agricultural public lands for 18 years. The court held that as bet. the State and 4eralco, the land is still public land. +t would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the cert. of title under Sec. 9; (b# of the Public Land Law. Since 4eralco is a /uridical person, it is dis)ualified to apply for its registration. The ruling in Susi v. :azon, to the effect that an open, continuous and adverse possession of the land from time immemorial confers on the individual and his precedessor in interest effective title does not apply here since 4eralco and its predecessors in interest have not been in possession of the land since time immemorial. The argument that if 4eralco7s predecessor$in$interest can apply under Sec. 9; (b#, so can the corp do the same in representation, is untenable bec. 4eralco7s predecessors$in$interest did not ac)uire a vested right as they did not file an applic., w,c is a condition precedent. Re8#,lic %. 9illa #e%a :eligious .orporations *re >is)ualified from *c)uiring Public Lands The +glesia Gi Qristo, as a corp. sole or a /uridical person, is dis)ualified to ac)uire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, li(e the lots in )uestion, bec. of the consti. prohibition mentioned and bec. the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of Sec. 9; (b# w,c applies only to 5ilipino citizens of natural persons. * corp. sole has no nationality. Di$ecto$ of La d" %. IAC Public Lands Possessed 2'clusively Becomes Private By 4ere Lapse of at Least 18 Pears. The court held that the ma/ority ruling in 4eralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor$in$interest openly, continuously and e'clusively for the prescribed statutory period (18 yrs. under the Public Land *ct, as amended# is converted to pvt. prop. by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso /ure. The land sub/ect of this appeal was already private property at the time it was ac)uired from the +nfiels by *cme. *cme ac)uired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corp7s holding or owning private. land. Re8#,lic %. CA +t is true that under both the 1 01 and 1 ;0 .onsti, a private. corp. (even if a domestic one# cannot ac)uire (and therefore cannot register# lands of the public domain, but in the present case, the land involved, at the time it was ac)uired by the corp. in 1 09, was no longer part of the public domain& long years of e'clusive, continuous, and adverse possession of the same by its predecessors$in$interest had given ownership thereof ipso /ure to said predecessors, enabling the latter to convey title to said corp. True, the .orp.7s ac)uisition was in 1 09, or after the 1 01 .onsti was already in effect. But then as of that time, the land was no longer public land. +t was private land. 7. Co "e$%atio atio al 8a$@" of fo$e"t la d" a d

A$t. :II, Sec. B. The .ongress shall, as soon as possible determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and national par(s, mar(ing clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national par(s shall be conserved and may not be increased nor decrease e'cept by law. The .ongress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas. B. P$otectio of a ce"t$al la d" of i di)e o#" c#lt#$al co&&# itie" A$t. :II, Sec. 2. The State, sub/ect to the provisions of this .onstitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well$ being. The .ongress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property tights or relations in determining the ownership and e'tent of ancestral domain.

++ Bernas% The ancestral lands referred to in Sec. < include both those outside ant those inside autonomous regions. ''' C. P$i%ate La d" -. Citi=e "'i8 $e<#i$e&e t @ho may ac)uire private lands by transfer or conveyanceF A$t. :II, Sec. 0. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed e'cept to individuals, corporations, or associations )ualified to ac)uire or hold lands of the public domain. ++ Bernas% 4ay a 5ilipino private corp. ac)uire private landF The answer must be that pvt. corps. can still ac)uire private land since Sec. 0 ma(es capacity to ac)uire private land dependent on capacity to 3ac)uire or hold lands of the public domain.3 The provision uses the

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dis/unctive 3or.3 2ither capacity to ac)uire lands of the public domain or capacity otherwise to hold such land confers capacity to ac)uire private land. 4irasol Gotes% *lienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain e'cept by lease....itizens of the Philippines may lease...or ac)uire...(*rt. C++, Sec. 1, par 1.# Gotwithstanding the provisions of section 0, a natural$born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippines citizen$ ship, may be a transferee of private lands, sub/ect to limitations provided by law. (*rt. C++, Sec. ;.# Ae e$al $#le: the ac)uisition of private lands is limited to individuals or corporations (and associations who are )ualified to ac)uire or holds land of the public domain#. These are% a. .itizens of the Philippines $ because they are )ualified to both ac)uire and leases (hold# alienable lands under sec. 1. b. 3Private .orporations3 $ because they are )ualified to hold alienable public lands under sec. 1 by way of lease. The issue is whether the term 3private corporation3 is limited to !8V 5ilipino owned corporation, which should be the intent of the .onstitution, as in the case of other natural resources. +f not, then even foreign corporations can purchase private lands, not only lease alienable public lands. All ot'e$", i cl#di ) alie ", ca ot ,e t'e t$a "fe$ee o$ co %e(ee o$ 8$i%ate la d" e+ce8t: a. *liens in cases of hereditary succession (*rt. C++, Sec. 0.# This is limited to compulsory and legal succession and does not include testamentary succession, as ruled in :amirez v. :amirez. b. * natural born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. (*rt. C++, Sec. ;.# The law provides that they may own not more than " lots of 1888 s). m. if urban or "888 s). m. if rural. Status of contract of sale of private land to those who are not )ualified to hold them. The rulings of the S. on the issue can be summarized thus% *lthough the sale of private lands to aliens not allowed to ac)uire them is void, the vendor or his successors$in$ interest can no longer see( recovery if in the meantime the land has fallen into the hands of one who is not dis)ualified to ac)uire them. Aodi e" %. Pa@ L#e Land sold to an alien cannot be recovered if he had sold +t to a filipino or he has become a citizen. Ya8 %. A$aDeda * subse)uently naturalized citizen, is constitutionally )ualified to own land. There would no longer be any public policy to be served in allowing recovery of property. +f the ban on aliens from ac)uiring not only agricultural but also urban lands ''' is to preserve the nation7s land for future generations of 5ilipinos, that aim or purpose would not be wasted but achieved by ma(ing lawful the ac)uisition of real estate by aliens who became 5ilipino citizens by naturalization.3 ". 2'ceptions (a# *c)uisition by L2I*L Succession P> 901 The ma'imum period allowable for the duration of leases or private lands to aliens or alien$owned corporations, associations, or entities not )ualified to ac)uire private lands in the Philippines shall be twenty$five years, renewable for another period of twenty$five years upon mutual agreement of both lessor and lessee. (b# *c)uisition citizens by former G*T?:*L$BH:G

A$t. :II, Sec. /. Gotwithstanding the provisions of Section 0 of this *rticle, a natural$ born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, sub/ect to limitations provided by law. BP 1;< a natural$born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence up to a ma'imum area of one thousand s)uare meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. O8e$atio of 8#,lic #tilitie"

A$t. :II, Sec. --. Go franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted e'cept to 1. citizens of the Philippines or ". corporations or associations a. organized under the laws of the Philippines b. at least si'ty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens franchise, certificate, or authorization 1. not e'clusive in character ". not granted for longer period than fifty years. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the e'ecutive and managing officers of such corporations or association must be citizens of the Philippines. ++ Bernas% 5or the purpose of this provision, a

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corp. or association is considered a 5ilipino if% (1# it is organized under Phil. laws and ("# at least !8 V of its capital is owned by 5ilipino citizens. ''' +t should be noted ''' that the .onsti. does not prohibit the mere formation of a public utility corp. w,o the re)uired proportion of 5ilipino capital. ''' @hat it does prohibit is the granting of a franchise or other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility already in e'istence but w,o the re)uisite proportion of 5ilipino capital. Ma"" Media a d Ad%e$ti"i ) I d#"t$( Sec. --. 4-5 The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly$owned and managed by such citizens. ++ Bernas% 34ass media3 in Sec. 11 (1# includes radio, television and the printed media. +t does not include commercial telecommunications w,c are governed as public utilities under *rt. C++, Sec. 11. Id., 415 Hnly 5ilipino citizens or corporations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the e'ecutive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. P$actice of 8$ofe""io " A$t. :II, Sec. -B. The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to 5ilipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. fourths of all its 4embers& or ("# * constitutional convention. .ruz% The choice of the method of proposal lies in the e'clusive discretion of the legislature. Sec. 1. *mendments to this .onstitution may li(ewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Go amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this .onstitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The .ongress shall provide for the implementation of the e'ercise of this right. Ao =ale" %. COMELEC 5*.TS% Hn 1,1!,!0, the Senate and the 6:eps. passed the ff. resolutions% (1# :.B.6. (:esolution of Both 6ouses# Go. 1 proposing that Sec. <, *rt D+ of the .onsti. be amended so as to increase the membership of the 6:eps from a ma'imum of 1"8 to a ma'imum of 1;8, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have at least 1 member& ("# :.B.6. Go. ", calling a convention to propose amendments to said .onsti., the convention to be composed of " elective delegates from each representative district, to be 3elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tues. of Gov., 1 01&3 and (1# :.B.6 Go. 1 proposing that Sec. 1!, *rt. D+ of the same .onsti. be amended as to authorize the Senators of the 4embers of the 6:eps to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional conventions, w,o forfeiting their respective seats in .ongress. Subse)uently, .ongress passed a bill, w,c, upon approval of the Pres., on !,10,!0, became :* 9 11, providing that the amendments to the .onsti. proposed in the aforementioned :esolutions Gos. 1 and 1 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections w,c shall be held on 11,19,!0. +SS?2 GH. 1% *lternatives *vailable to .ongress.$$ *tty. -uan >avid, as amicus curiae, maintains that .ongress may either propose amendments to the .onsti. or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. 62L>% This theory is based upon the fact that the " alternatives are connected in the .onsti. by the dis/unctive 3or.3 Such basis is, however, a wea( one, in the absence of other circumstances supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae +SS?2 GH. "% 4ay .onstitutional *mendments be submitted for ratification in a general electionF 62L>% Pes. The 1 1< .onsti. provides% *rt. CD, Sec. 1. The .ongress in /oint session assembled, by a vote of three$fourths of all the 4embers of the Senate and of the 6ouse of :epresentatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this .onstitution or call

AMENDMENT AND RE9ISION

.ruz, Philippine Political (hereinafter .ruz#% Law, 1 1 ed.

A&e d&e t a d Re%i"io .66 *rt. CD++ provides that the .onsti. may be changed either by amendment or revision. *mendment refers to isolated or piece$ meal change only, as distinguished from revision, which is a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument. P$oced#$e.66 Two steps are involved in the amendment or revision of the .onsti. The first is the proposal and the second is the ratification.

I. PROPOSAL
A$t. :9II, Sectio -. *ny amendment to, or revision of, this .onstitution may be proposed by% (1# The .ongress, upon a vote of three$

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a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this .onstitution when approved by a ma/ority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the 3election3 therein referred to is a 3special,3 not general election. The circumstance that 1 previous amendments to the .onsti. had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that .ongress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. +t does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. +SS?2 GH. 1% @ould the submission now of the .ontested *mendments to the People Diolate the Spirit of the .onstitutionF 62L>% Go. ''' * legislation cannot be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. +ts constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those e'isting at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that ta(e place subse)uently to the passage or approval of the law. ''' The determination of the conditions under w,c the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter w,c falls w,in the legislative sphere. @e do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that .ongress has e'ceeded the limits thereof in enacting :* 9 11. ''' -. !( Co )$e"" A$t. 9II, Section 1. *ny amendment to, or revision of, this .onstitution may be proposed by% (1# The .ongress, upon a vote of three$ fourths of all its 4embers& or ("# * constitutional convention. -.72 Co "tit#tio , A$t. :9 A$t. :9, Sec. -. The .ongress in /oint session assembled, by a vote of three$fourths of all the 4embers of the Senate and of the 6ouse of :epresentatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this .onstitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this .onstitution when approved by a ma/ority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. 1. !( Co "tit#tio al Co %e tio Sec. 7. The .ongress may, by a vote of two$ thirds of all its 4embers, call a constitutional convention, or by a ma/ority vote of all its 4embers, submit to the electorate the )uestion of calling such a convention. 7. !( T'e Peo8le t'$o#)' I itiati%e Sec. 2. :e)uirements.$$ ''' (b# * petition for an initiative on the 1 ;0 .onstitution must have at least twelve per centum (1"V# of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (1V# of the registered voters therein. +nitiative on the .onstitution may be e'ercised only after five (<# years from the ratification of the 1 ;0 .onstitution and only once every five (<# years thereafter. Sec. .. 2ffectivity of +nitiative or :eferendum Proposition.$$ ''' (b# The proposition in an initiative on the .onstitution approved by a ma/ority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

II. RATI*ICATION
-. I Ca"e of A&e d&e t P$o8o"ed ,( Co )$e"" o$ Co %e tio A$t. :9II, Sec. B. *ny amendment to, or revision of, this .onstitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a ma/ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than si'ty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. 1. I Ca"e of A&e d&e t P$o8o"ed t'$o#)' I itiati%e Sec. B. ''' *ny amendment under Section " hereof shall be valid when ratified by a ma/ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than si'ty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the .ommission on 2lections of the sufficiency of the petition. 7. Ple,i"cite to !e Called ,( Co )$e"" A d S#8e$%i"ed ,( COMELEC !#t T'e I itiati%e o Co "tit#tio Will !e Called !( COMELEC.

III. THEORIES REAARDINA THE POSITION O* THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON9ENTION IN OUR SYSTEM O* AO9ERNMENT
.ruz% Po"itio of t'e Co "tit#tio al Co %e tio .66 There are 1 theories on the relative position of the constitutional convention vis$_$vis the regular departments of the government% 1. Theory of .onventional Sovereignty.$$ The first holds that the constitutional convention is supreme over the other departments of the govt bec. the powers it e'ercises are in the nature of sovereign powers. ". The second theory considers the constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the govt since it is merely a creation of the legislature. (Legislative .ontrol Theory.# 1. The third declares that as long as it e'ists and confines itself w,in the sphere of its

RA 3072

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/urisdiction, the constitutional convention must be considered independent of and co$e)ual w, the other departments of the govt. (.o$e)uality Theory.# Tole ti o %. COMELEC 5*.TS% This is a petition for prohibition principally to restrain the resp. .H42L2. from underta(ing to hold a plebiscite on 11,;,01 at w,c the proposed constitutional amendment reducing the voting age in Sec. 1 of *rt D of the 1 1< .onsti. to 1; yrs. shall be submitted for ratification by the people pursuant to Hrganic :esolution Go. 1 of the .on .on of 1 01 and the subse)uent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be w,o the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the resp. .H42L2. performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid .on .on to be null and void, for being violative of the .onsti. The main thrust of the petition is that Hrganic :esolution Go. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subse)uently approved by the .on .on have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co$incident w, the election of ; senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on 11,;,01, hence all of the .omelec7s acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the .onsti., a power lodged e'clusively in .ongress, as a legislative body, and may not be e'ercised by the .onvention, and that, under Sec. 1, *rt. CD of the 1 1< .onsti., the proposed amendment in )uestion cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the .onvention. +SS?2% +n the case at bar, the ultimate )uestion is% +s there any limitation or condition in Sec. 1, *rt. CD of the .onsti. w,c is violated by the act of the convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Hrganic :esolution Go. 1F 62L>% The .ourt holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same .onvention must be submitted to the people in a single 3election3 or plebiscite. +n order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the .onsti. may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the .onsti. w, w,c it has to form a harmonious whole. +n the conte't of the present state of things, where the .onvention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the e'isting .onsti., to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply w, this re)uirement. ?nder Sec. 1, *rt. CD of the .onsti., a proposal to amend the .onsti., should be submitted to the people not separately from but together w, all the other amendments to be proposed by this present .onvention. Limits to the power of a constitutional convention.$$ *s to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned missions to propose amendments to the .onsti., the convention and its officers and members are all sub/ect to all the provisions of the e'isting .onsti. Gow we hold that even as to its latter tas( of proposing amendments to the .onsti., it is sub/ect to the provisions of Sec. 1 of *rt. CD. This must be so, bec. it is plain to us that the framers of the .onsti. too( care that the process of amending the same should not be underta(en w, the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. RAM.

I9. >UDICIAL RE9IEW O* THE AMENDINA PROCESS

Ionzales v. .H42L2., supra. The issue w,n a :esolution of .ongress$$ acting as a constituent assembly$$ violates the .onstitution is essentially a /usticiable, not political ()uestion#, and hence, sub/ect to /udicial review. Gature of Power to *mend the .onstitution.$$ The power to amend the .onsti. or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to .ongress. +t is a part of the inherent powers of the people$$ as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours$$ to ma(e, and hence, to amend their own fundamental law. .ongress may propose amendments to the .onsti. merely bec. the same e'plicitly grants such power. 6ence, when e'ercising the same, it is said that Senators and 4embers of the 6:eps. act, not as members of .ongress but as competent elements of a constituent assembly. @hen acting as such, the members of .ongress derive their authority from the .onsti., unli(e the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the .onsti.$$ they are the very source of all powers of govt, including the .onstitution itself. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the .onsti., the members of .ongress derive their authority from the 5undamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on w,n their acts are w,in or beyond constitutional limits. Htherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a govt of laws and not of men, and to the rigid nature of our .onsti. ''' -udicial power to nullify e'ecutive or legislative acts, not violative of principle of separation of powers.$$ The system of chec(s and balances underlying the /udicial power to stri(e down acts of the 2'ecutive or of the .ongress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental law is not in derogation of powers, pursuant to w,c each dept. is supreme w,in its own sphere. Tole ti o %. COMELEC, "#8$a. +SS?2% @,G S. has /urisdiction over acts of .onstitutional .onventionF 62L>% P2S.

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The courts may review the validity of an act of the .onstitutional .onvention proposing a particular amendment to the .onsti. ''' Power to review acts of the constitutional convention.$$ * constitutional convention is supreme w,in the domain of its legitimate authority. * revolutionary convention w,c drafts the first .onsti. of an entirely new govt born either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an e'isting govt or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d7 etat is completely w,o restraint and omnipotent. The 1 01 .on .on, however, came into being only by virtue of the provisions of the 1 1< .onsti. True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed w, e'traordinary powers generally beyond the control of any dept of the e'isting govt, but the compass of such powers can be can be co$e'tensive only with the purpose for which it was called and as the amendments it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the .onsti. until the same are ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of the .onvention, its officers and members, are not immune from attac( on constitutional grounds. The present .onsti is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone and its parts, the e'istence of the .onvention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. *s the .onsti .onvention is sub/ect to the .onstitution and the rule of law, thus upon principle, reason of authority, it is within the power, as it is the solemn duty of the court, under the e'isting .onsti (1 1<# to resolve the issues in this case. :ationale for the power of /udicial review.$$ +n upholding the /urisdiction of the .ourt over the case at bar, it is not bec. the .ourt is superior to the .on .on or that the .onvention is sub/ect to the control of the .ourt, but simply bec. both the .on .on and the .ourt are sub/ect to the .onsti. and the rule of law, and 3upon principle, reason and authority,3 per -. Laurel, it is w,in the power, as it is the solemn duty of the .ourt under the e'isting .onsti., to resolve the issues in w,c petitioner, respondents and intervenors have /oined in this case. RAM. >a%ella a %. E+ec#ti%e Sec$eta$( By virtue of the ma/ority of si' votes w, four dissenting votes, all the cases were dismissed. This being the vote of the ma/ority, there is no further /udicial obstacle to the Gew .onstitution being considered in force and effect. A$t. 9III, Sec. -. The /udicial power shall be vested in one Supreme .ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law. ''' of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than si'ty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. *ny amendment under Section " hereof shall be valid when ratified by a ma/ority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than si'ty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the .ommission on 2lections of the sufficiency of the petition. A$t. :9III, Sec. 10. This .onstitution shall ta(e effect immediately upon ratification by a ma/ority of the votes case in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous .onstitutions.''' :ecall De Leo % E")#e$$a, 1<1 S.:* !8" (1 ;0# which held that% The 1 ;0 .onstitution too( effect on 5ebruary ", 1 ;0, the date of the plebiscite not on 5ebruary 11, 1 ;0, the date of Proclamation Go. <;, which proclaimed that the .onstitution was ratified by the people.

9. WHEN WILL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TAFE E**ECTL

.ompare *rt. CD++, Sec. 9 with *rt. CD+++, Sec. "0 A$t. :9II, Sec. B. *ny amendment to, or revision of, this .onstitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a ma/ority