HOME GUARANTY v.

R-II BUILDERS Facts: R-II Builders was in the middle of a corporate controversy (sought the nullification of a Deed of Assignment of Conveyance transferring their asset pool in favour of petitioner); they filed their action in the RTC Manila. o Originally: was filed in RTC Manila per se; incapable of pecuniary estimation o Raffled later to Branch 24 as it was supposedly an intra-corporate controversy (Branch 24 had special jurisdiction to exclusively handle such cases) o Branch 24 said it was not an intra-corporate dispute o Court said that they lost jurisdiction over the case as they evaded the payment of proper docket fees, as the case was a real action where docket fees would be computed based on assessed value o Respondents claimed that court never lost jurisdiction when the case was reraffled Case elevated directly to SC (error of law, question of jurisdiction of lower court)

Issues: Whether or not the RTC Manila had jurisdiction over the case. Held/Ratio: NO! Courts acquire jurisdiction over a case upon payment of filing and docket fees. In this case, the docket fees would be based on the assessed value of the asset pool. First, on the matter of the case: where the subject of an annulment or rescission of contract leads to the recovery of possession or ownership (de Leon, Serrano, Ruby Shelter), there exists a real action. Effect: Docket fees would be computed based on assessed value of the property (here, the asset pool). Apparently, the respondents have not yet paid the full filing fees. Effect: No jurisdiction pursuant to Manchester Devt. o Exception to Manchester Rule: No intent to defraud government o There seemed to be bad faith on the part of R-II, or at least a huge risk factor, as the move could have affected government housing programs. o So when they re-raffled, they would have kept the jurisdiction had he paid the filing fees?

ASCUE v CA/ANTONIO/SALENGA/FERNANDEZ Facts: Jul 25 1986: Respondents file complaint for consignation at the CFI Manila (~5625 pesos) based on the fact that petitioner, their landlord, refused to collect their rentals. Petitioners filed motion to dismiss: RTC had jurisdiction as the subject matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation. THIS WAS DENIED. AMOUNT CONSIGNED WAS SUBJECT MATTER (20k / 50k rule). Petitioners now try to appeal the order to RTC Manila; it was dismissed for prematurity and improper action (not appeal, but special civil action for certiorari). Petitioners file a direct appeal to the SC; Court resolved to refer the case to the CA (concurrent jurisdiction; rule of hierarchy of courtsneed a special reason to allow SC to take cognizance). MR denied. CA dismissed petition. (and finally, petition for review on certiorari) o Jurisdiction in consignment cases depends on amount consigned. (payment) o RTCs dismissal was proper based on procedural grounds: important here is where the complaint was filed.

Issues: Whether or not the MTC should have had jurisdiction. Held/Ratio: YES! The subject matter in a consignation case is the amount due; hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation, and would allow the amount to be determinative of jurisdiction (amount of claim). Consignation requires a debt and tender to court. o Amount due is determinable based on the existing debt. o Hence, the amount of debt is determinative of jurisdiction. <20k = MTC

BAITO v SARMIENTO Facts: Petitioner claims support from respondent (demanded P720); filed at CFI Samar (RTC). CFI dismissed suit; no jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether or not the CFI had jurisdiction. YES! Held/Ratio: An action of support does not have the amount as subject matter; this would be the relation of the parties, determination of rights, needs, and resourcesthese are incapable of pecuniary estimation. o Hence, the amount demanded is immaterial. This would place it squarely within the jurisdiction of the CFI/RTC. Reyes added: also claiming past support as well as future support, making it even more incapable of estimation

MATLING v. COROS Facts: Respondent was VP for Finance and Admin for Matling. He was allegedly dismissed by petitioners, leading to a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal in the NLRC. o Petitioners moved to dismiss: SEC had jurisdiction as respondent was a member of Board of Directors AND VP. Was intra-corporate. o Respondent opposed: place in BOD was doubtful (no proper election, no share of stock except a mere undated indorsement which was retaken by Matling). Further, he was removed as the VP (based on notice of termination). LA granted motion; was a corporate officer and this would be an SEC case. NLRC reversed; was not a corporate officer as his position was not listed as such in the constitution and by-laws of Matling. Remanded to LA for further proceedings. MR denied. CA dismissed certio; corporate officers were either listed in by-laws, created by directors, or elected (Tabang, Ongkingco, de Rosal). VP-FA did not fall in any of theseit was an ordinary office, although high-ranking and managerial. NLRC did have jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether or not the VP-FA post was a corporate position, placing this case under the jurisdiction of the SEC. Held/Ratio: NO! First, the jurisdiction of the courts must be noted. o The NLRC, under the LC, has jurisdiction over termination disputes and claims re: employee-employer relations. It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the LA. o The SEC, on the other hand, has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes pursuant to Sec. 5.2 of RA 8799. (formerly under RTC) It must then be determined if the VP-FA position was a corporate office that would place this case under the SEC. o The by-laws of the petitioner corporation said that the President had power to create new offices. Petitioners use this as central argument. o However, the respondents note that the by-laws did not list the VP-FA as a corporate officer (Pres, Exec VP, Sec, Treas). These should be distinguished from each other. o Sec. 25 of the Corpo Code states that a position must be expressly mentioned in the by-laws for it to be considered a corporate office. Creating new offices pursuant to the by-laws does not make it a corporate office (unless the new

post is designated as such through an amendment of the by-laws). Why? May circumvent security of tenure. o Effect: Was an employee. But what about his status as director? o The Tabang ruling stressed that intra-corporate controversies involve stockholders and corporations. o Tabang was considered too sweeping; the Court instead adopted Viray: status and relationship, and nature of question were matters to consider in determining if a case was an intra-corpo case. o The creation of office was important here. Based on the work history of the respondent, he was promoted several times before becoming VP-FA. His status as stockholder was unrelated to his promotion. In fact, it would not affect his dismissalhe would still be a director/stockholder. o This was similar to Prudential v Reyes, where the court still held that even an employee of this status would still place termination cases under the NLRC.

UST v. SANCHEZ Facts: Respondent filed a complaint against UST (performance+damages) for their unjustified refusal to release his TOR. (RTC Bataan) o Graduated from UST, and included in candidates for graduation. Attended graduation ceremonies. o Did all matters for acquiring his ToR, but UST refused to release his ToR (even after showing class cards, etc.). o Such made him unable to take the nursing boards, preventing him from making a living. UST filed motion to dismiss on the basis that he was not a registered student, was not enrolled in the past semesters, and that he did not enrol during 2Sem 2000-2001. Further, he had no cause of action based on the complaint (conflict on how the records should be released) o Further, UST added in their motion to dismiss an allegation that CHED had primary jurisdiction on school controversies. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies must be applied. RTC DENIED THE MOTION TO DISMISS (examination of evidence required; must put on trial); MR DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.

Issues: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the matter. Held/Ratio: YES! The doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies requires that the petitioners show that the recourse to the administrative agency is mandatory or possible given the case. o This case is one for mandamus and damages. This requires a handling of facts and evidence, some of which may not be under the quasi-judicial powers of the CHED. In fact, the CHED does not have judicial/quasi-judicial power, which is another requirement in the doctrineit cannot award damages, pursuant to Regino v Pangasinan. o Further, purely legal questions can place the case under the purview of the trial court. o The invocation of the manual for private schools is improper. The case at bar does not involve the fact of graduation; it revolves around damages. Forum shopping inapplicable as CHED did not have quasi-judicial power. And there was indeed a cause of action. (Test: Whether based on the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer.) o The cause of action was an intentional tort under Arts. 19-21 of the Civil Code, for the unlawful actions and claims of UST (re: graduation).

o o

The statements did not relate to enrolment, but the facts showing intimidation would actually gravitate against UST. These all show that evidence must be gathered and presented. This is best handled by the trial court.