CAPULE VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONG.R. NO. 90653. NOVEMBER 12, 1990 GANCAYCO, J. FACTS 1.

Private respondent company is engaged in the manufacture of cultures milk which is sold under the brand name "Yakult".2.Petitioners were hired to cut cogon grass and weeds at the back of the factory building used by private respondents.3.They were not required to work on fixed schedule and they worked on any day of the week on their own discretion and convenience.4.The services of the petitioners were terminated by the private respondent on July 13,1987.5.Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The latter rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ruling that they were illegally dismissed and ordered their reinstatement with full bakwages and without loss of seniority rights . ISSUE Whether or not petitioners are regular employees of private respondent HELD NO. the usual business or trade of private respondents is the manufacture of cultured milk. The cutting of the cogon grasses in the premises of its factory is hardly necessary or desirable in the usual business of the private respondents, indeed, it is alien thereto. Thus, petitioners are casual employees who cannot be considered regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Nevertheless, they maybe considered regular employees if they have rendered services for at least one (1) year when, as in this case, they were dismissed from their employment before the expiration of the one-year period. They cannot lawfully claim that their dismissal was illegal. Indeed, private respondent had shown that the services of the petitioners were found to be unsatisfactory, so, their termination.

years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. ISSUE Whether or not Alegre was lawfully terminated and that he is entitled to reinstatement. HELD NO. Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable. distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers' using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. Article 280 does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period, provided the same is entered into by the parties without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employees duties.

DOSCH VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONG.R. NO. L-51182 JULY 5, 1983PONENTE: GUERRERO, J. FACTS 1.Petitioner Helmut Dosch, an American citizen married to a Filipina, was the resident Manager of Northwest Airlines, Inc. in the Philippines.2.Sometime in 1975, he received an inter-office communication from R.C. Jenkins, Northwests Vice President, promoting him to the position of Director of International Sales and transferring him to Northwests General Office in Minneapolis, USA.,effective on the same day.3.Petitioner, acknowledging the receipt, expressed his appreciation for the promotion and at the same time regretted that for personal reasons and reasons involving my family, I am unable to accept a transfer from the Philippines.4.The Vice President advised petitioner that in view of the foregoing, your status as an employee of the company ceased on the close of business, and the company considers your letter to be a resignation without notice.5.Northwest filed a Report on resignation of Managerial Employee before the Department of Labor.6.The Report was contested by the petitioner and was thus certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.7.The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering Northwest to reinstate petitioner. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision. ISSUE 1.Whether or not the transfer was a valid exercise of management prerogative.2.Whether or not the refusal of petitioner to accept the letter of Northwest constitutes insubordination which is a valid cause for his dismissal. HELD 1.NO. The Jenkins letter directing the promotion of the petitioner from his position as Philippine manager to Director

BRENT SCHOOL VS. ZAMORA G.R. NO. 48494, FEBRUARY 5, 1990 FACTS 1.In virtue of an employment contract Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000 .00.2.The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18,1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17,1976.3.Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.4.When the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre(before the Labor Code was Passed) it was perfectly valid for them to enter into stipulations fixing the duration thereof.5.Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20, 1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was, "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment."6.However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report o f termination of his services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17,1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five

of International Sales in Minneapolis, USA is not a mere transfer order alone but it is more in the nature of a promotion, the former being merely incidental to such promotion. A transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in the service. Promotion, on the other hand, is the advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties andr esponsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary. Whereas a promotion denotes a scalar ascent of a senior officer or employee to another position, higher either in rank or salary, transfer refers to lateral movement from one position to another, of equivalent rank, level or salary.There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion, as is in the natureof a gift or a reward, which a person has a right to refuse. When petitioner refused toaccept his promotion, he was exercising a right and cannot be punished for it as qui jure suo utitur neminem laedit. He who uses his own legal right injures no one. There can be no dispute that the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure mandated under the Constitution applies to all employees and laborers, whether inthe government service or in the private sector. The fact that petitioner is a managerial employee does not by itself exclude him from this protection. Even a manager in a private concern has the right to be secure in his position, to decline a promotion where, although the promotion carries an increase in his salary and rank but results in his transfer to a new place of assignment or station and away from his family. Such an order constitutes removal without just cause and is illegal. Nor canthe removal be justified on the ground of loss of confidence as now claimed by private respondent, insisting that by petitioners alleged contumacious refusal to obey the transfer, said petitioner was guilty or insubordination.2.NO. Neither is the other ground alleged by Northwest in dismissing petitioner which is loss of confidence, supported by evidence. The fact that Northwest wanted to promote petitioner to Director of International Sales indicated that Northwest had full confidence in petitioner. The outright dismissal of petitioner from his position as Manager-Philippines of Northwest is much too severe, considering the length of service that petitioner rendered for eleven years. While a managerial employee may be dismissed merely on the ground of loss ofconfidence, the matter of determining whether the cause for dismissing an employees justified on ground of loss of confidence, cannot be left entirely to the employer. The charges against petitioner were not fully substantiated, and there can be no valid reason for said loss of confidence. Justice and equity call for petitionersreinstatementThe decision of NLRC is reversed and set aside and the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the petitioners reinstatement to his former position with full back wages, is reinstated.

allegedly dismissed from their employment.3.Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners' complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular employees and instead averred that she engaged their services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their"mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane production, after which they would be free to render services to other farm owners who need their services.4.Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their services would be available to any other farm owner.5.The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance to petitioners. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners employment that continued for so many years could be considered regular and permanent by express provision of Article 280. HELD NO. The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied in their case presents an opportunity to clarify the afore-mentioned provision of law. The first paragraph of Article 280 answers the question of who are employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the usual business or trade ofthe employer, except for project employees. A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for aspecific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or

where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season as inthe present case. The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees, all other employees who do not fan under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous orbroken.Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their case and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is without merit.

MERCADO SR. VS. NLRCG.R. NO 79869, SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 PADILLA, J. FACTS 1.Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were agricultural workers utilized byprivate respondents in all the agricultural phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of ace land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned by the Aurora L. Cruz, Francisco Borja,Leticia C. Borja and Sto. Nio Realty Incorporated.2.Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and the rest ofthe petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all

VIERNES VS. NLRC AND BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BENECO) G.R. NO. 108405. APRIL 4, 2003. AUSTRIA- MARTINEZ, J. FACTS 1.Petitioners services as meter readers were contracted for hardly a months duration, from October 8 to 31, 1990.2.The said term notwithstanding, petitioners were allowed to work until January 2, 1991.3.On January 3, 1991, they were each served their identical notices of termination.4.On the same date, they filed complaints for

illegal dismissal. They contended that they were not apprentices but regular employees whose services were illegally and unjustly terminated in a manner that was whimsical and capricious.5.On the other hand, private respondent BENECO invoked Article 283 of the Labor Code in defense of the questioned dismissal.6.The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. However, it orderedBENECO to extend to the petitioners the contract of temporary employment that the former had offered, with the exception of Jaime Viernes. Also, the Labor Arbiter directed BENECO to pay each the amount equivalent to their monthly salary as indemnity for its failure to give complainants the 30-day notice mandated under Article 283 of the Labor Code.7.Modifying the Arbiters decision, the NLRC rendered that the dismissal was illegal. It ordered petitioners reinstatement to their former position as meter readers or to any equivalent position with payment of backwages limited to one year deleting the award of indemnity. ISSUES 1.Whether or not the petitioners should be reinstated to their former position as meter readers on probationary status despite the finding that they are regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.2.Whether or not the petitioners should be awarded indemnity pay.

HELD 1.YES. Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. In case of probationary employment, Article 281 of the Labor Code requires the employer to make known to his employee at the time of the latters engagement of the reasonable standards under which they may qualify as aregular employee.In the case at bar, there is nothing on the letter of appointment that their employment as meter readers was on probationary basis. It was not shown that they were informed either, at the time of their appointment, the reasonable standards underwhich they could qualify as regular employees. Instead, they were initially engaged to perform their job for a limited period, their employment being fixed for a definiteperiod.The principle enunciated in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora applies only to fixed term employments. While it is true that the petitioners were initially employed on a fixedterm basis as their employment contracts were only for a month, they were allowed to continue working in the same capacity as meter readers without the benefit of anew contract or without the term of their employment being fixed a new. After October 31, 1991, the employment of petitioners is no longer on a fixed term basis. The complexion of the employment relationship is totally changed for the petitioners have attained the status of regular employees. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, there are two instances whereby it is determined that an employee is regular: (1) the particular activity performed by theemployee is necessary or desirable to the usual trade or business of the employer; or (2) if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year. Thepetitioners fall under the first category. The job of a meter reader is necessary to the business of BENECO since unless the meter reader records the electric consumption of the subscribing public, there could not be a valid basis for billing the customers of BENECO. The fact that the petitioners were allowed to continue working after the expiration of their employment is evidence of the necessity and desirability of their service to BENECOs business. Since petitioners are alreadyregular employees at the time of their illegal dismissal from employment, they are entitled to be reinstated

to their former position as regular employees, not merelyprobationary.Moreover, under Article 279, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation waswithheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Therefore, petitionersbackwages should not be limited to one year only.2.YES. An employer becomes liable to pay indemnity to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The indemnity is in the form of nominal damages intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right of procedural due process which was violated by the employer. Indemnity is not incompatible with the award of backwages since they are awards based on different considerations. Backwages are granted on the grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On the other hand, indemnity is meant to vindicate the right of an employee to due process which has been violated by the employer. In the case at bar, BENECO failed to comply with the provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires an employer to server a notice of dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated and to the Department of Labor, at least one month before the intended date of termination. Therefore, it was held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of indemnity.

GLOBE- MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION VS. NLRC G.R. NO. 82511. MARCH 3, 1992. ROMERO, J. FACTS 1.Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar weremissing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities.2.The report prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara,indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of EleconEngineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended bySaldivar.3.The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recoveredonly after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.4.Moreover, it appeared in the investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the companys interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.5.Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, GMCR placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984,thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984, Salazar fileda complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, after petitioner notified her in

writing that effective November 8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings."6.After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.7.On appeal, the NLRC in its resolution affirmed the said decision with respect to the reinstatement of Salazar but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. ISSUES 1.Whether or not the suspension of Salazar was illegal.2.Whether or not Salazar was entitled to reinstatement and two (2) years' backwages with respect to her subsequent dismissal. HELD 1.YES. The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely associated with Saldivar.The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missingairconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar.Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due processwhen she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.2.YES. Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended: Security of Tenure.-In casesof regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rightsand other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to hisother benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensationwas withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement."In the case at bar, there was no evidence which clearly showed an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages. The intendmentof the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment ofbackwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status beforeshe lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate is "to restore to a state, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of

unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."The Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement ... and to his full backwages . . ." Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. An exception to the rule is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between theemployer and the employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employeeconcerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of hisemployer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy andantagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivityof the employee concerned. The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting ones right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer andemployee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. As asystem analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of supplies.In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As has been held before, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is avalid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established. An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions andsuppositions. While the Court should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should it dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences. To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazars dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally Saldivars alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazars special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge ofSaldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records. Thus, she was illegally dismissed. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. NLRC GR. NO. 99266 MARCH 2, 1999 PURISIMA, J.: FACTS 1.In July 1990, San Miguel Corporation, alleging the need to streamline its operations due to financial losses, shut down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant, listed as follows: seventeen (17) employees in the Business LogisticsDivision ("BLD"), seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), andeighteen (18) in the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station ("Magnolia-MBS").2.Consequently, the private respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said

employees tothe other divisions of the company.3.Grievance proceedings were conducted. However, most of the employees wereredeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the grievanceprocedure.4.In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed private respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed; their services would be terminated on November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union, declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock. ISSUE 1.Whether or not San Miguel Corporation exercised a management prerogative.2.Whether or not San Miguel Corporation violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement. HELD 1.YES. Abolition of departments or positions in the company is o ne of the recognized management prerogatives. Noteworthy is the fact that the private respondent doesnot question the validity of the business move of petitioner. In the absence of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is presumed that petitioner San Miguel Corporation acted in good faith. In fact, petitioner acceded to the demands of theprivate respondent union by redeploying most of the employees involved; such that from an original 17 excess employees in BLD, 15 were successfully redeployed. InAOC, out of the 17 original excess, 15 were redeployed. In the Magnolia - Manila Buying Station, out of 18 employees, 6 were redeployed and only 12 wereterminated2.NO, alleged violation of the CBA, is chargeable against the private respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the CBA, private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate" This situation, is non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3), of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives each from the company and the union, to decide the conflict, private respondent union declared a deadlock, and thereafter, filed a notice of strike. The main purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to prevent a strike. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is to achieve its objective. strikes held in violation of the terms contained in the collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. Agabon vs NLRC (2004) G.R. 158693 Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements,Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installingornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon

asgypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissedfor abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28,1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent topay the monetary claims. Issue: benefits. Held: The dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits.Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissal based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article279.If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give theemployee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or anopportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and(2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes underArticles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause underArticle 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process wasobserved; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) thedismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, itshould not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead arguedthat sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside thereanymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates thetwin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for noncompliance with the procedural requirements of due process.The service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation. Clearly, as additional income, the13th month pay is included in the definition of wage underArticle 97(f) of the Labor Code.

PLDT V NLRC ROMERO; July 23, 1997 NATURE Petition for certiorari to revoke NLRCs Nov. 16, 1992 decision a f f i r m i n g t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f L a b o r A r b i t e r Jose De Vera a n d denying petitioners motion for reconsideration FACTS - Private respondent Lettie Corpuz was employed a s t r a f f i c operator at the Manila International Traffic Division (MITD) byP L D T f o r 1 0 y e a r s 9 m o n t h s f r o m S e p t . 1 9 , 1 9 7 8 u n t i l h e r dismissal on June 17, 1989. She was tasked with facilitating requests for incoming and outgoing international calls using a digital switchboard.- Sometime in Dec. 1987, PLDTs rank-and-file employees wenton strike, prompting MITD to discharge the formers duties to p r e v e n t a s h u t d o w n o f i t s o p e r a t i o n s . I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r assignments, 2 supervisors received 2 overseas calls bound forthe Middle East, both callers reporting the same calling number( 98-68-16). It was shown that the number had been permanently disconnected on Sept. 1987 but 439 overseas calls had been made through it from May to Nov. 1987.- It was further found that among the 235 telephone operatorswho handled those calls (averaging 1.8% calls each), private respondent had handled 12.8% of the total calls. Some calls, t h o u g h r e g i s t e r e d a s p a r t l y u n a v a i l a b l e o r b u s y , y i e l d e d unusually long operator call durations. Private respondent also used said number to make several personal calls. Based on t h e s e f i n d i n g , MITD Manager Erlinda Kabigting directed respondent to explain these allegations.instead of complying, respondent requested a f o r m a l investigation to confront and rebut the witnesses allegations. On grounds of misconduct and breach of trust, respondent wasterminated.- In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondent, Labor A r b i t e r Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of private respondent, later affirmed by NLRC. ISSUE WON the NLRC erred in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent HELD NO. Although the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer, the right to discharge employees is regulated by theStates police power in line with its duty to preserve its citizensrights. Petitioner insists that respondent was guilty of defrauding them b y taking several calls through the disconnected n u m b e r . However, records show that these calls were neither unusual nor made in connivance with certain subscribers as other operators shared similar experiences. Although it is quite certain that therewere certain PLDT personnel who tampered with the line, the ultimate blame cannot be set solely on private respondent basedo n m e r e s u s p i c i o n , b u t o n l y w i t h c o n c r e t e a n d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence.- In the instant case, the petitioner failed to establish valid basesof the alleged misconduct, thus denying private respondent her right to due process. The requirement of notice and hearing affords the worker ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself.- A r t . 4 o f

the Labor Code states that all doubts in t h e implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor, that is, the workers welfare is of paramount importance. The Constitution furthers that the State shall afford full protection to labor, promote full employmento p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a l l a n d g u a r a n t e e t h e r i g h t t o s e c u r i t y o f tenure. Disposition instant petition is DISMISSED and the decision dated Nov. 16, 1992 is AFFIRMED

CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V. CA AND DIANA BELO 437 SCRA 171 (2004) FACTS: In 1992, Ms. Diana Belo, a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek College since 1977, a p p l i e d f o r a l e a v e o f a b s e n c e for the school year 1992-1993. Upon submitting h e r application, she was informed of the school policy that if she takes a leave of absence,she is not assured of a teaching load upon her return. She was likewise informed that o n l y teachers in active service may enjoy the p r i v i l e g e a n d b e n e f i t s p r o v i d e d b y t h e school, such as free tuition for the teachers children.Ms. Belo, nonetheless, took her leave of absence. In May 1993, she attempted to returnto CKSC and signified her readiness to teach for the coming school year. However, shewas not allowed to return. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, amongothers, against CKSC.T h e Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the N L R C d i s a g r e e d . T h e C o u r t o f Appeals upheld the NLRCs ruling. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON private respondent Belo enjoys security of t e n u r e a s a f u l l t i m e teacher HELD: Yes. It must be noted at the outset that Ms. Belo had been a full-time teacher inpetitioner CKSC continuously for fifteen years or since 1977 until she took a leave of absence for the school year 1992-1993. Under the Manual of Regulations for PrivateS c h o o l s , f o r a private school teacher to acquire a permanent status o f employment and, therefore, be entitled to a security of tenure, the f o l l o w i n g requisites must concur:(a)the teacher is a full -time teacher;(b)the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and(c)such service must have been satisfactory. Since Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys security of tenure. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate thatno worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law andafter due notice and hearing. NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Ms. Belo w a s constructively dismissed when the petitioners, in implementing their policies, effectivelybarred her from teaching for the school year 1993 -1994. The three policies are (1) then o n - a s s u r a n c e o f a t e a c h i n g l o a d t o a t e a c h e r who took a leave of absence; (2) theh i r i n g o f non-permanent teachers in April to whom t e a c h i n g l o a d s w e r e a l r e a d y assigned when Ms. Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach; and (3)

the non-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the free tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service.Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued e m p l o y m e n t is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is ademotion in rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a c l e a r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.W h e n i n t h e school year 1992-1993, the petitioners already a p p l i e d t o M s . B e l o s children the policy of extending free tuition fee benefits only to children of teachers inservice, Ms. Belo was clearly discriminated by them. True, the policy was made knownt o M s . B e l o i n a l e t t e r d a t e d 9 June 1992, but, this only additionally and s u c c i n c t l y reinforced the clear case of discrimination. Holiday Inn Manila vs NLRC Facts: Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991,accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. 1. For her services, she received food and transportation allowance. 2. On May 13, 1992,after completin g her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a periodof six months ending November 12, 1991. 3. Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationaryemployment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job; (b) to faithfully observe and comply withthe hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.O n N o v e m b e r 8 , 1 9 9 1 , f o u r days before the expiration of the s t i p u l a t e d d e a d l i n e , Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had notcome up to the standards of the Hotel. 4. Honasan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure. Issue: Honasan was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, which was made 4 days days before the expiration of the probation period. Held: We find in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumventthe plain mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees evena f t e r they shall have already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time t o summarily terminate Honasan's services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory.The employer has absolute discretion in hiring his employees in accordance with hisstandards of competence and probity. This is his prerogative. Once hired, however, theemployees are entitled to the protection of the law even during the probation period and more so after they have become members of the regular force. The employer does not have the same freedom in the hiring of his employees as in their dismissal.

Honasan was placed by the petitioner on probation twice, first during her on-the- j o b t r a i n i n g f o r t h r e e w e e k s , a n d n e x t d u r i n g a n o t h e r p e r i o d o f s i x m o n t h s , ostensibly in accordance with Article 281. Her probation clearly exceeded theperiod of six months prescribed by this article. Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continuedafter this training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to be a regular employee. Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If h e r services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that period. But she was not. On the contrary, her services w e r e c o n t i n u e d , presumably because they were acceptable, although she was formally placed this timeon probation.Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three week period of on -the-job training, there is still no reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated six-month period of probation. Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991. Assuming that her probation could be extended beyond that date, it nevertheless could continue only up to October 15, 1991, after the end of six months f r o m t h e earlier date. Under this more lenient approach, s h e h a d b e c o m e a r e g u l a r employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of tenure as of October 15, 1991.The consequence is that she could no longer be summarily separated on the ground invoked by the petitioners. As a regular employee, she had acquired the protection of Article 279 of the Labor Code SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs NLRC (1988) FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation ( S M C ) sponsored an Innovation Program which grant cash rewards to all SMC employees who submit to thec o r p o r a t i o n i d e a s a n d s u g g e s t i o n s f o u n d t o beneficial to the corporation. Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain defects in the quality and tasteof the product San Miguel Beer Grande. Petitioner Corporation did not accept the said p r o p o s a l a n d r e f u s e d M r . V e g a s s u b s e q u e n t demands f o r c a s h a w a r d u n d e r t h e i n n o v a t i o n program. Hence, Vega filed a complaint with thethen Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that his proposal had been accepted bythe methods analyst and was implemented by the S M C a n d i t f i n a l l y s o l v e d t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e Corporation in the production of Beer Grande. Petitioner denied of having approved Vegas proposal. It stated that said proposal was turned down for lack of originality and the same, even if implemented, could not achieve the desire result.Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of Vega is not a necessary

incident of his employment and does not fall under Article 217 of the Labor Code.However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the governments concern for the working man, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Vega P 2 , 0 0 0 a s financial assistance. Both parties assailed said d e c i s i o n o f t h e L a b o r A r b i t e r . T h e NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiterand ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60,000 Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim filed by private respondent HELD: NO. The Labor Arbiter and the C o m m i s s i o n h a s n o jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega. T h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e m o n e y c l a i m o f p r i v a t e respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vegas money claim within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the CAB, the undertaking of petitioner SMC to grant cash awards to employees could ripen into an enforceable contractual obligation on the p a r t o f petitioner SMC under certain circumstances. Hence, the issue whether an enforceable contract had arisen b e t w e e n S M C a n d V e g a , a n d w h e t h e r i t h a s b e e n breached, are legal questions that labor legislations cannot resolved because its recourse is the law on contracts. Where the claim is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or acollective bargaining agreement B UT by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to t h e r e g u l a r c o u r t s o f j u s t i c e a n d n o t t o t h e L a b o r Arbiter and NLRC. WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED BRENT SCHOOL, INC vs. ZAMORA (1990) FACTS: Respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was en gaged asathletic director by Brent School, Inc. for a fixed andspecific term of five (5) years, Subsequent subsidiary agreements reiterated thes a m e t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e e x p i r y date, as those contained in the original contract. 3 months before the expiration of the stipulated p e r i o d , A l e g r e was terminated on the ground of completion of c o n t r a c t a n d e x p i r a t i o n o f d e f i n i t e period of employment Alegre protested that since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his ER, and his employment had lasted for 5 years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and c ould not be removed except for valid cause. Issue: Whether Alegre was lawfully teminiated? HELD: YES. A r t i c l e 2 8 0 d o e s n o t p r o s c r i b e o r p r o h i b i t employment contract with a fixed period, PROVIDED the same is entered into by the parties without any

force,d u r e s s o r i m p r o p e r p r e s s u r e u p o n t h e E E a n d i n t h e absence of vitiating consent Reason: C o n t r a c t s o f e m p l o y m e n t g o v e r n t h e relationship of the parties. Any s t i p u l a t i o n i n t h e contract, not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, is valid, binding an d must be respected.***This practice is however legally questionable if donein a more or less continuous basis with the objective of avoiding regularization as it in effect circumvents the lawon security of tenure of the workers. In the CAB, the employment contract is valid, binding, and must be respected BUSTAMANTE vs. NLRC (1996) Pines City

FACTS: Evergreen Farms claimed that petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their probationary employment was not converted to permanent employment; and assuming that p e t i t i o n e r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o b a c k w a g e s , c o m p u t a t i o n thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere( d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f i l l e g a l d i s m i s s a l ) s h o u l d b e deducted from the award of such backwages. HELD: The full backwages amendment by RA 6 715 has NOR E T R O A C T I V E E F F E C T ; i t a p p l i e s o n l y p r o s p e c t i v e l y . Hence, the rule is: where the illegal dismissal happened before the effectivity of RA 6715 (3/21/89), the award of backwages is limited to 3 years without deduction or qualification. BUT if the illegal dismissal happened on or after the effectivity of RA 6715, the award of backwages should be computed from the time of illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement without any deductions VIERNES vs. NLRC (2003) EE entitled to full backwages because he was illegally dismissed; He is also entitled to indemnification becausedue process was not observed FACTS: Complainants worked as meter readers with Benguet Electric Cooperative when they were serveda notice of termination because of retrenchment. According to the company, they need to retrench itspersonnel because they are already over staffed. T h e c o m p l a i n a n t s f i l e d f o r i l l e g a l dismissal contending that they were not a p p r e n t i c e s b u t regular employees whose services were illegally and unjustly terminated in a manner that was whimsical and capricious. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n v o k e s Article 283 of the LC in defense of the questioned ismissal. LA: dismissed the complaints for lack of merit b u t o r d e r e d t h e E R t o p a y t h e E E s t h e a m o u n t representing underpayment of their wages, and to pay indemnity and attorneys fees. NLRC: m o d i f i e d o r d e r e d t h e L A a n d reinstatement of the

complainants with payment of b a c k w a g e s l i m i t e d t o o n e y e a r a n d d e l e t i n g t h e award of indemnity and attorneys fees. Issue: Whether NLRC committed grave abuse o f discretion in deleting the award of indemnity HELD: YES. An ER becomes liable to pay indemnity to a dismissed EEif the ER fails to comply with the requirements of d ue process. The indemnity is in the form of n o m i n a l damages intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the employees right to procedural due process which was violated by the employer. W e do not agree with the ruling of the N L R C t h a t indemnity is incompatible with the award of backwages. These two awards are based on different considerations. Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. On the other hand, the awar d of indemnity is meant to vindicate or recognize the right of an employee to dueprocess which has been violated by the employer. In the CAB, the ER failed to comply with the provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires an employer to serve a notice of dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated and to the Department of Labor, at leasto n e m o n t h b e f o r e t h e i n t e n d e d d a t e o f t e r m i n a t i o n . Hence, it is liable to pay indemnity to petitioners. Thus, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of indemnity.

date of termination. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time their employment was terminated. Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without the employers compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code? Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. In all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.

THE FOUR FOLD TEST: 1. Whether or not employer conducted the selection and engagement of the employee. 2. Whether or not there is payment of wages to the employee by the employer. 3. Whether or not employer has the power to dismiss employee. 4. Whether or not the employer has the power of control over the employee. RETRENCHMENT;NOTICEREQUIREMENT;SEPARATION PAY JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB. G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005 Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended

UNIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; STRIKES; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL STAMFORD MARKETING CORP., ET AL. VS. JOSEPHINE JULIAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004 Facts: On November 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWUTUCP), sent a letter to Rosario Apacible, treasurer and general manager of Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio Marketing Corporation, Clementine Marketing Corporation and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. The letter informed her that the rank-and-file employees of the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises Employees Union-PACIWUTUCP and demanded that it be recognized. After such notice, the following three cases arose: In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and Jecina Burabod, a Board Member and a member of the said union, were dismissed. They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter alleging that their employer had not paid them with their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day premium, 13th month pay for the year 1994 salaries for services actually rendered, and that illegal deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond. Stamford alleged that the three were dismissed for not reporting for work when required to do so and for not giving notice or explanation when asked. In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50

employees allegedly dismissed illegally for union membership by the petitioners, a case for unfair labor practice against GSP which denied such averments. GSP countered that the BLR did not list Apacible Enterprises Employees Union as a local chapter of PACIWU or TUCP. Thus, the strike that said union organized after the GSP refused to negotiate with them was illegal and that they refused to return to work when asked. The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees dismissed in the second case. Petitioner corporations, however, maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by the private respondents. The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent corporations were under one management. First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was ordered to reinstate the complainants as well as pay the backwages and other benefits claimed. It was held that the reassignment and transfer of the complainants were forms of interference in the formation and membership of a union, an unfair labor practice. Stamford also failed to substantiate their claim that the said employees abandoned their employment. It also failed to prove the necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and failed to furnish written notice of dismissal to any complainants. Further, it failed to prove payments of the amounts being claimed. Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the union have lost their employment status, thus terminating their employment with GSP. GSP is however ordered to reinstate the complainants who were members of the union without backwages, save some employees specified. It was established that the union was not registered, and thus had staged an illegal strike. The officers of the union should be liable and dismissed, but the members should not, as they acted in good faith in the belief that their actions were within legal bounds. Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant their claims, as computed by each individual. All other claims were dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary differentials and other monetary claims for petitioners failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the same to complainants as required by law. It was also ordered to return the cash deposits of the complainants, citing the same reasons as in the First Case. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and Third Cases, but set aside the judgment of the Second Case for further proceedings in view of the factual issues involved. On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal was filed which was decided in favor of Stamford, upholding the dismissal of the union officers. The officers made no prior notice to strike, no vote was taken among union members, and the issue involved was nonstrikable, a demand for salary increases On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the officers should be given separation pay, and that Jacina Burabod and the rest of the members should be reinstated without loss of seniority, plus backwages. It provided for the payment of the backwages despite the illegality of the strike because the dismissals were done prior to the strike. Such is considered an unfair labor practice as there was lack of due process and valid cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled to backwages and reinstatement, with exception to the union officers who may be given separation pay due to strained relations with their employers. Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismisses from employment considering the illegality of the strike. (2) Whether or not the respondents union officers were entitled to backwages, separation pay and reinstatement, respectively. Held:

(1) The termination of the union officers was legal under Article 264 of the Labor Code as the strike conducted was illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. Holding a strike is a right that could be availed of by a legitimate labor organization, which the union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements of following the procedures in conducting a strike under paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 were not followed by the union officers. Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal strike, as well as the distinction between officers and members who participated therein. Knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a sufficient ground to terminate the employment of a union officer but mere participation is not sufficient ground for termination of union members. Thus, absent clear and substantial proof, rank-and-file union members may not be terminated. If he is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement. The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal dismissal of the union members, as there was non-observance of due process requirements and union busting by management. It also affirmed that the charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada were without credence. It reversed the ruling that the dismissal was unfair labor practice as there was nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were discouraged from joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for participation in an illegal strike was upheld. However, union officers also must be given the required notices for terminating employment, and Article 264 of the Labor Code does not authorize immediate dismissal of union officers participating in an illegal strike. No such requisite notices were given to the union officers. The Court upheld the appellate courts ruling that the union members, for having participated in the strike in good faith and in believing that their actions were within the bound of the law meant only to secure economic benefits for themselves, were illegally dismissed hence entitled to reinstatement and backwages. (2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union officers as valid hence, the award of separation pay was deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with the notice requirements for a lawful termination, backwages were awarded to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed until the final entry of the judgment. National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC 327 SCRA 158 (2000) Facts: Private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager andowner, Patalon Coconut Estate, was forced to sell their estate, when congresspassed, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Law (CARL), Operation was ceased and employees were laid off without separation pay. Issue: The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease itsoperation because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land forpurposes of agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees. Held: The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateraland voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment asmay be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to.The use of the word "may,"in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. 10 The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.Note Bene: Employees were claiming separation pay

10

on the basis of Art. 283 Labor Codewhich states that e mployer MAY also terminate the employment of an employee forreasons therein by serving notice thereof and paying separation pay to affectedemployees There was compulsory acquisition by the government of the employers land(Patalon Coconut Estate) for purposes of agrarian reform which forced the employerto cease his operation Issue: whether or not employer is liable for separation pay? Held: NO, employer is not liable for separation pay!o It is a unilateral and voluntary act by the employer if he wants to give separationpayo This is gleaned from the wording MAY in the statuteo MAY denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive onlyo Plain-meaning rule is applicableo To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, tolegislate and not interpreto Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum dangerous constructionwhich is against the text

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING VS PACOT GARCIE, J.: FACTS: Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was in dire financial straits. It was not disputed that they were terminated without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination. ISSUE: Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule. RULING: The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install laborsaving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program. Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: 1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee; 2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative. Thu s, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. San Miguel Corp v NLRC 297 SCRA 277 July 23, 1998 Facts: Edmundo Torres Jr. et al allege that respondent company notified them that it will exercise their option to retire them from service, that will not be allowed to work March

14, 1984 onwards but will still receive their compensation up to April 15, 1984. They havent reached the compulsory retirable age of 60 years old when the company terminated their services. They claim that the corporation violated their security of tenure when in fact they dont have any bad record. They also stated in their complaint that they were threatened to accept the companys decision. Complainants also allege that they were discriminated upon by the company since their separation pay was much lower than the other retiring stoppels. They said that the other employees also granted wage increases. Complainants claim that their unlawful retirement amount to constructive dismissal. Respondent company on the other hand says that the complainants applied for voluntary retrenchment under the companys retrenchment program. They aver that each complainant received retirement pay, financial assistance, and 13th month pay and executed a release and receipt acknowledging the given amounts. The company contends that the complainants voluntarily severed their employment through stoppels so as to avail of more financial benefits (compared to being retrenched or dismissed). (retrench = reduce costs or spending in response to economic difficulty) Labor Arbiter ruled in the companys favor. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Issues: a. Does the companys actions amount to constructive dismissal? b. Was the respondents retirement voluntary? Held: Yes, it does. No, the intention to retire wasnt clearly established. Ratio: They complainants were made to understand that they had no choice but to leave the company. They were forced to swallow the bitter pill of dismissal but afforded a chance to sweeten their separation from employment. The complainants were offered a choice as to the method of terminating their services but never were they asked if they still wanted to work for the company. The receipt of separation pay nor their negotiating for more monetary benefits didnt amount to stoppels from questioning and challenging the legal of the nature of their separation from service. Respondent company states that it was stated in their CBA that the optional retirement was reduced to 15 years of service in the company. However, it was clearly stated that the positions held by the complainants were excluded from the coverage of said agreement. Hacienda Fatima v National Federation of Sugarcane Workers Food and General Trade Facts: It appeared that Hacienda Fatima et al did not want the workers organizing themselves into a union Hence when the complainant union was certified, Hacienda et al refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement Moreover, workers including complainants herein were not given work for more than one month

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In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement, where one of the stipulations is that themanagement will provide fifteen (15) wagons for the workers and that existing workforce prior to the actual strike will be given priority. But in case the said workforcewould not be enough, the management can hire additional workers to supplement them Alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons, Hacienda Fatima et al retracted from its commitment to sit down and bargain collectively. Instead, HaciendaFatima et al employed all means including the use of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises Respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike but due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed reinstating only some of the workers upon availability of work, and not considering others as worke When Hacienda Fatima et al again retracted from its commitment, complainants filed the present complaint But complainants in an ironic twist of fate found themselves being accused of 'refusing to work and being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform' Issues WON the complainants are regular workers WON Hacienda Fatima et al are guilty of unfair labor practice Held and Ratio Yes. Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states: "Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrarynotwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for aspecific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season."An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and hisemployment shall continue while such activity exist."

The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation tothe scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is notcontinuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensabilityof that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists Petitioners' eventual refusal to use their services even if they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these were available andhiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter. Changes were implemented immediately after respondents had organized themselves into a union and started demanding collective bargaining. Those who wereunion members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Such are justified and amount to violation of the Labor Code. Yes From Hacienda Fatima et als refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the useof armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want aunion in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization. SAN MIGUEL CORP V. NLRC J. Purisima FACTS: SMC alleges its need to streamline its operations due to financial losses it shut down some plants and declared 55 positions redundant Private respondent union filed several grievance cases for retrenched employees Grievance proceedings were conducted in accordance to Secs 5 and 8, Art 8 of 1990 CBA Step 1 take up grievances orally with immediate supervisor; then file in writing with the Department Manager

For complainants to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. Theymust have also been employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition. The fact that respondents with the exception of Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva repeatedly worked as sugarcane workersfor petitioners for several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable. In Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission The test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee: reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.

Step 2 elevate or appeal in writing to the Plant Manager/Director which will determine if grievance meetings should be conducted Step 3 appeal to Conciliation Board Conciliation Board composed of 5 representatives each from Company and the Union If still not satisfied, submit the grievance to arbitration During the proceedings, employees were redeployed while others accepted early retirement so 17 remained when they reached step 3 Oct 26 - SMC informed the union that if by Oct 30, the 17 remaining employees could not be redeployed, they will be terminated

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Nov 7 Union filed with Natl Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike for bargaining deadlock, union busting, violation of CBA, failure to providelist of vacant positions and defiance of voluntary arbitration SMC filed a complaint with NLRC praying for dismissal of notice of strike, to compel union to submit to grievance and arbitration and recovery of expenses NLRC dismissed SMCs complaint for lack of merit ISSUE: WON Notice of Strike should be dismissed HELD: Yes RATIO: Strikes or lockouts may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices; violation of the CBA shall not be considered unfair labor practice andshall not be strikeable (yes its a word in the Labor Code) Grounds relied upon by union are non-strikeable; collective bargaining deadlock are illusory Collective Bargaining Deadlock situation between the labor and the management of the company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiationsresulting in a stalemate this situation is nonexistent since there is a Board assigned in Step 3 to resolve the conflicting views of the parties Union failed to exhaust all steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration proceedings provided in CBA Main purpose of CBA on procedure to settle grievance prevent a strike! NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint of SMC for the dismissal of notice of strike Petition granted; SMC and union directed to complete step 3 of the grievance procedure

presumed to have been performed regularly unless the contrary is proven. In administrative proceedings, due process simple means the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action complained of. Petitioners were able to file an appeal before the NLRC of the Labor Arbiters decision and a party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot claim to have been denied due process. The Court also ruled that M was constructively dismissed when he was accused of tampering with the vale sheet and prevented from going to work. The assertion of petitioner that M abandoned his work is also without merit as it is highly illogical for an employee to abandon his employment and thereafter file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Even assuming that there was abandonment, there was non-compliance with the statutory requirement of notice; therefore M is entitled to separation pay and backwages. Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL) G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009 Facts: Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees herein petitioners for allegedly caughtin the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided th e PAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section .After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing companys Code of Discipline prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision nruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the judgment, SEC placed P AL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who subsequently replaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said decision and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. Subsequently, LA issued a Wr it of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the v a l i d i t y o f t h e W r i t a n d t h e N o t i c e i s s u e d b y LA but suspended and referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action. On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the petition and effectively reinstated the NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed theCourt that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings. Issue: Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between the LAs Order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the LA, now that P AL has exited from rehabilitation proceedings. Ruling: A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive w a g e s p e n d i n g a p p e a l upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the o r d e r o f r e i n s t a t e m e n t a n d i t i s mandatory on the employer to comply there with. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the LAis reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the LAs order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and

MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc. v. CA, 311 SCRA 784, August 5, 1999- Labor Law Q: M was employed by petitioner as a truck driver. One day, he was accused of tampering with the vale sheet and he was subsequently barred from entering company premises. M filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against private respondent before the NLRC. A copy of the summons was sent to petitioners by registered mail and was duly received and signed. The petitioner was also notified of the hearing date by registered mail but no one appeared for the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter deemed petitioners non-appearance as a failure to controvert the facts as claimed by M and decided the case ex-parte. The petitioners allege that they never received copies of summons or notices and that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over them, as there was no valid service of summons. Were the petitioners denied due process? A: No. The bare assertion of petitioner that the persons who signed the summons which were sent by registered mail were impostors or persons unknown to them requires substantiation by competent evidence. In quasi-judicial proceedings of the NLRC, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed and substantial compliance is therefore sufficient. Further, official duty is

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conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that filing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employees salaries. When reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive. Rivera vs Espiritu GR 135547 Facts: PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998. PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998. Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA. Issue: WON negotiations may be suspended for 10 years. Held: YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years. The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure. There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a twofold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLINGCORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO MANGUBAT G.R. No. 146728 February 11, 2004 FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day

before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal. On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longerexisted, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. Inanswer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massivedisaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, statingthat they had not withdrawn from the union.NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP. ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective bargaining with the union HELD: The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuseto negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair laborpractice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. ART. 253-A Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreementthat the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such fiveyear term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; Under Article 252 above cited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3

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New Pacific Timber vs NLRC 328 scra 404 FACTS: The NFL was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for the rank and file employees of petitioner. NFL started to negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment; which were met with resistance by Petitioner Company. The NFL filed a complaint for ULP on the ground of refusal to bargain collectively. LA issued an order declaring the company guilty of ULP and ordering the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between parties. Later, 186 of private respondents claiming they were wrongfully excluded from the benefits under the CBA filed a petition for relief. Petitioner asserts that private respondents are not parties to the agreement and may not claim benefits thereunder. As for the CBA, petitioner maintains that the force and effect of the CBAs terms are limited to only three years and cannot extend to terms and conditions which ceased to have force and effect. ISSUES: 1. W/N the terms of an existing CBA as to its economic provisions can be extended beyond the period stipulated therein, even beyond the three year period prescribed by law, in the absence of a new agreement. 2. W/N the rank and file employees hired after the term of the CBA, considering their subsequent membership in the bargaining unit, are parties to the agreement and may claim benefits thereunder. HELD: 1. Yes. It is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has been executed by and between the parties; they are duly bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. In the case at bar, no new agreement was entered between the parties pending appeal of the decision in the NLRC. Consequently, the employees from to the year 1985 (after expiration of the CBA) onwards would be deprived of a substantial amount of monetary benefits if the terms and conditions of the CBA were not to remain in force and effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Cod to curb labor unrest and promote industrial peace. 2. Yes. When a CBA is entered into by the union representing the employees and the employer, even the non-union members are entitled to the benefits of the contract. A laborer can claim benefits from a CBA entered into the company and the union of which he is a member at the time of the conclusion of the agreement even after he has resigned from said union. Therefore, the benefits under the CBA should be extended to those who only became such after it expired; to exclude them would constitute undue discrimination.

for that purpose. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under preventive suspension; only some of them were eventually allowed to return to work. Petitioners thus filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the DOLE, charging private respondent of ULP, in the form of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression. Private respondent's defense was that the strike was illegal for itwas marred by violence. ISSUE: WON the strike should be declared illegal on account of violence committed during the strike. HELD: No, where both parties are responsible for the violence committed during the strike, the strike cannot be declared illegal since the strike cannot be attributed to the striking employees only. This is an exception to the general rule that the strike shall be declared illegal where it ismarred by violence on the part of the employees.In the case at bar, the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must beremembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreedthat there were violent incidents . . . resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management. The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to thestriking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers.With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violencecannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.

Mla Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC G.R. 108556 November 19, 1996 FACTS: The Union filed with NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint on wage distortions. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Union while the NLRC Commissioner Zapanata reversed the same. The Union contends that the Mandarin hotel file its appeal three days beyond the reglementary period. ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of Mandarins appeal from Labor Arbiter? RULING: The court rules that the Commission acted correctly in accepting and acting on Mandarins appeal. The employe e who was authorized to receive payment so the respondent was allowed to pay docketing fee on the next business day which was February 4, 1991. In review of the considerations and in the interest of justice was quite served when Mandarins appeal was given due course despite delayed payment of fees the reglementary period confers a directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal.

MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M GREENFIELD VS RAMOS 326 SCRA428 [2000] FACTS: Petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG) is a localunion. Private respondent M. Greenfield is the employer of petitioner's members. Membersof petitioner conducted a strike, which was marred by violence. Private respondentattempted to quell the same by hiring persons

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