Collective Responsibility

Royal Institute of Philosophy
Collective Responsibility Author(s): H. D. Lewis Source: Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 84 (Jan., 1948), pp. 3-18 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3747383 . Accessed: 12/11/2013 08:20
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PHILOSOPHY
THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
VOL. XXIII. No. 84 JANUARY I948
COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
I
H. D. LEWIS, M.A., B.Litt.
IF I were I considered askedto putforward an ethical which principle to be especially it be no one be would that can responsible, certain, in the properly ethicalsense,forthe conductof another. Responsiof this to the individual. The implications bilitybelongsessentially than is evidentat first, and are muchmorefar-reaching principle reflection the assentwhich upon themmaylead manyto withdraw be veryreadyto accord to this view of retheymightotherwise But if the difficulties do appear to be insurmountable, sponsibility. and that,verycertainly, does not seemto me to be the case, then notion the proper willbe, not to revert to the barbarous procedure of collective or groupresponsibility, the but to give up altogether in anydistinctively moralsense. viewthatwe are accountable I should On thismatter morewillbe said below.In themeantime of like to insistthatthe belief in "individual," as againstany form is quite fundamental to our ordinary "collective,"responsibility is literally ethicalattitudes.For if we believe that responsibility it becomes are hard that to there maintain shared, anyproperly very moraldistinctions to be drawnbetweenone courseof action and another. All willbe equallygood,orequallyevil,as thecase maybe. and the For we shallbe directly in one another's actions, implicated or discrimination. for must fall us all without them blame praise upon do believe,and it is veryhard This,in fact,is what manypersons of traditionalist on any otherbasis. to upholdany form theology Oflate thishas beenveryopenly affirmed noted who, theologians by iftheyseemto do verygreatviolence to common have,at any sense, the implications to acknowledge rate, the courageand consistency half-hearted and of their and do to them not seek disguise view, by 3
PHILOSOPHY confused formulations. We have thuswitnessed somevery recently affirmations of the belief in sin" or the "universal uncompromising "collectiveguilt of man." This does not implythat thereare no ethical distinctions of any kind whichwe may draw. Judgments be may passed upon the outwardcourseof our conductwithout prejudiceto the view that guilt itselfis "universal,"and this is whoseinfluence on religious Niebuhr, whyReinhold thinking today is verypronounced, is able to combinewith his assertion of the doctrine of universal sin an accountof the "relativemoralachievementsofhistory."' One actionmaybe muchmoreregrettable than it may be uglierin some ways,or it may do muchmore another, harmto our fellows, and thuswe have "the less and more"of our to but wherepropermoralestimation is conday day judgments, cernedthereis not "a big sinner and a littlesinner."We are all involved in thesinsofall. But thisis not at all what we normally think.The distinction between what is outwardly and the right properestimationof the worthof personsis not, one mustadmit,alwaysveryclearly drawnin our ordinary ethicalthinking. And thisis veryfrequently a sourceof greatconfusion. Thereis less excuseforthisconfusion have thrown the distoday than in the past, sinceethicalwriters in question tinction intomuchprominence and stressed its extensive on matters ofpractice. It has beenshown, forexample, that bearing the factsofmoralperplexity, and thediversities in ourviewsabout theproblems ofpractice, admitof no reasonable unless explanation we allow that a personmay do what is wrongin some outward sense without being morallyto blame, and vice versa.For moral is not itselfa moral defect.But whilethis showsthat ignorance is perfectly Niebuhr in arguing thatthe "historical" justified judgments we pass on the effects ofactionshave littledirect on bearing of properly moralworth, it givesno solid support to his questions viewthatthere is "no lessand more"where thelatter are concerned. On the contrary, the moreplainlywe drawthe distinction between therightness ofthe act and theworth oftheagent, themorewillit also be evidentthat the main reasonforstressing this distinction and the mainconsideration which men be induced to draw by may to thedistinctions we drawbetween the ethical it,is thatin addition qualitiesof actionsin their"material"or outward aspectthereare even moreimportant distinctions to be drawnin respectof their moralvalue.We wantto be surethatourestimation ofmoralworth is notprejudiced to considerations outward action, by relating only and it is theformer thatis usuallyuppermost in ourordinary ethical It seemstherefore we judgments. plain that, however prone may be to confuse thetwosorts ofethical which havejustbeen judgments
I
The Nature and Destinyof Man, p. 234.
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RESPONSIBILITY
we normally havelittledoubtthatsomeofouractions distinguished, or in someother not merely in their are better thanothers, effects, "material"regard,but in themselves and morally.All our usual ethicalthinking this.And if it is to be arguedthat,in presupposes to choosebetween to moral there is nothing worth, respect properly thenit mustbe made veryplain the lives of variousindividuals, to thatthisis diametrically think, opposedto all thatwe normally main and the we adopt from to to the attitudes body of day day, the has been on for latter reflection ethical questions; philosophical what conditions with the under concerned may problem mainly moral qualities of conduct be distinctions betweenthe strictly we ask if the questions drawn.If thereare no such distinctions, of the then about themare without substance, part ethical greater will o' thewisp. of a has a vain been peculiarly pursuit controversy II of to thefurther without This maybe affirmed question prejudice of one reliable estimates in to form it is whether possible practice it seemsto me moralworth. another's limitations, Subjectto certain of another conduct to assessthemoralworth notimpossible person's not is in order, where censure and there appearto be someoccasions or as a meansof inducing to outward as directed conduct, merely of the coursepursued,but as of the rightfulness reconsideration But if this is denied,and if it to the moralchoiceitself. directed to appraise one theattempt is also heldthatthedifficulties attending of success,it by moralqualitiesrule out everyprospect another's are suspect.We themselves that the distinctions no meansfollows is moralcensure can knowin a general way underwhatconditions how far those conditions withoutneedingto determine incurred to cases. There is nothing very disconcerting apply in particular in havingto admit,shouldthat appear necessary, ethicaltheory moralstruggles intothestrictly thatwe have no appreciable insight and in the of our friends even cases ofother acquaintances, persons, of the factorsinvolvedas would lead to or such understanding It may even be urgedthat the incertainconclusions. reasonably of the "Judge not, that ye be not judged," Scriptures, junction and that it is none of our businessto holds withoutexception, howany man faresin his innermorallife.For theseare determine without we mayholdvarious aboutwhich matters seriously opinions of value are differences whether there the affecting question really kindsoflife.Andwhatwe needmostto upholdis different between not our abilityto of the moraldistinctions the reality themselves, in of cases. substance them to the particular penetrate
PHILOSOPHY Some comment of the estimay be added hereon the reliability of our own moralworth. mateswe form Is fallibility in thisregard to thequestion alsoirrelevant whether there aremoral qualities really ofconduct? Thisappearsto meto be a mostimportant but question, I willonlyventure hereto maketwoobservations. the view Firstly, whichis commonly held, namelythat we are usuallywide of the markin attempts to assess our ownworth, seemsto me verymistaken.To substantiate thisin detail I shouldhave to consider the mainways in whichmoralworth has been conceived. But it must suffice to note the two mainalternatives. We mayhold thatmoral distinctions or we dependmainlyon our motivesand characters, effort of willnot determined mayrelatethemto somechoiceor free If we adopt thelatteralternative it seemsimpossible by character. that anyoneshouldbe in doubtabout his own moralworth, forno one can reallydoubtwhether he is making an effort to follow the coursewhichhis conscience But if we adopt the former requires. of oneself in so far as we alternative thereis roomfordeception aboutourownmotives. But howfaris suchdelusion maybe deluded how farmay a personpersuadehimself that he is contripossible, to a hospital from benevolent whenhe is reallymore motives buting concerned to ensurethe esteemand gratitude of his fellows? It is thatwe maybe seriously often about ourmotives mistaken thought in suchcases,and thatit is the business ofthe preacher and moral to inducea deepersearching mentor of heartand ensurea better of our own characters. Literature seemsto bear this understanding ofthefacts account out,but I am notsurethatan alternative usually adducedin thisconnection ifthematter wouldnotbe possible were if is But is if it held that this and we denied, investigated. carefully can be widelyastrayin our understanding of the motiveswhich moveus to action,it seemsto me thatwe have herea veryformidable argument to advanceagainstthefirst ofthetwomainalternatives noted above, namelythe view that moral worthqualifies character andmotives. For,andhereI cometomysecond observation, the natureof properly moralvalue seemsto be such thatit would be verystrange to ascribeit to features ofourconduct we do which not fullyunderstand To affirm that our control. and bringwithin therecan be seriousdelusionabout our own moralattainments is thus in effect to cast verygrave doubt on the validityof moral and thereality distinctions ofmoralresponsibility. The beliefthat we can be mistaken about our own moralworth in no small measureto failure owes its prevalence to distinguish between about the "material" of effectively questions rightness actionand thequestion oftheworth ofthe agent.In respect ofthe weareindeed former to much error andperplexity, subject frequently and persons ofsensitive a greatdeal conscience have often incurred 6
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of mentalpain because the veryproperconcern whichthey have oftheir act" becamethecause ofmisgiving feltaboutthe"rightness also about theirown moralworth.But when the issue is clearly and it is understood that unavoidableignorance confronted, may to the agent,it is hardto see howwe can entertain not be imputed or blamelessness in respectto doubts about our own culpability recent for us to retain clear ofthe conduct a sufficiently impression we to what to be a Nor own seemed our is responded way duty. in in of this sort of dimmed the course matters impression easily time. It is in respect to other thatappraisement ofmoralworth persons For the factors involved are not easilyaccessible is difficult. to the But thereis no cause formisgiving here.For even outsideobserver. ourassurance thattheir ifwe neverknewhowothers actions, fared, likeourown,are subjectto moraldistinctions, wouldnotbe a whit But ifwesurrender theviewthatthere are suchdistinctions, affected. and substitute for it the notion of some uniform moral quality thewholeofhumanity, or eventhewholeofa particular pervading we are left withnothing which we can recognize as ourworkagroup, ethical has suffered transformation. a ideas; day morality complete We seemin factto have, not morality at all, but the repudiation of it. III does thiscomeabout? Partlyas a resultofconfusions How,then, which affectour ideas about value in general. We hypostatize and make themthe bearersof value, forgetting abstractions that devices make for which of or succinctness linguistic expression poetic and rhetorical are not to be divestedof theirmetaphorical effect and ellipticalmeanings, and taken as literaltruth.We speak for of in the of a nation,or we take pride example sharing greatness in belonging to a musicalor scholarly even wherewe have family claims no conspicuous to distinction in thoseregards ourselves. No objectioncan be takento thisprovidedwe are clear what we are about. For the excellencegenerally attainedby members of our nationor family warrants thepresumption thatwe ourselves, having been subjectedto the same influences, are not without a measure for ofthequalities which ofourgroupare noted.The achieveothers mentsof a relative, and especially of a son or daughter, may again reflect creditupon us, even when we have no part in what they have actuallyaccomplished, to the extent thattheir successmaybe to the devotionand discernment attributed with whichwe have furthered theirefforts. There is also the presumption that close association withpersonsof outstanding parts will have developed 7
PHI IOSOPHY
ourownpropensities, where general qualitiesof character especially Mentakelegitimate are concerned. associapridein thiswayin their of a famous school tionwiththe great,or in erstwhile membership in thosewithwhomwe have specialties of or college.Our interest affection will also enable us to followtheirsuccesswitha glow of as if it were our own. In these,and otherways, we satisfaction in of others. But thisdoes not meanthat participate the excellence forwhat othershave becomeor we can ever take creditdirectly of musicdoes not becomemine The worthwhileness accomplished. the brother or musican if I have no parentof a gifted by mybeing Whatwe are or achieveis affected ear formusicmyself. by ourrelain their and we are emotionally tionsto others, involved lives,but what worthour actionsand experiences have dependsdirectly on theirownnature.So thatalthough we maybe proudor ashamedof we add not a cubit to our stature;neither do we shrink, others, association them in our with the measure that we through except their ourselves under influence. change in the case of This holdsofall values.But it is peculiarly evident moralvalue. For failure hometo theindividual mayherebe brought in a veryspecialway in blameand remorse. And thisbrings us to a further way in whichmen are apt to lose sightof the dependence ofmoralvalue on theindividual.
IV
This turnson the definition of responsibility. The etymology of this wordsuggests that it means"liabilityto answer,"this being, of course, to answerto a charge, withthe implication that liability if the answeris not satisfactory a penaltywillbe incurred. This is of responsibility in the legal sense,and there the meaning certainly can be littledoubtthat the original of the wordmustbe meaning for similar men have not lines, soughtalong always distinguished between law and morality-in lifebothare merged clearly primitive in communal custom.But we do distinguish between them sharply is It to be and and innocent, possible today. legallyguilty morally viceversa.The question thelegal meaning whether arises, therefore, ofresponsibility in oftheterm provides anyanalogyto themeaning theethicalsense.I do notthink thatit does. It would,no doubt,be whichsocieties members easy to pointto sanctions imposeon their outsidethe sphereof State enactment, some of them,forexample certainkindsof ostracism, and thereare takingverysubtleforms, also penaltieswhichindividuals are apt to imposeon themselves, as recent has shownso well. But thesemay also be out psychology of accordwithethicalrequirements. is morally No enactment fool8
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guiltyin respectof conductto proof.A man may thusbe morally out whichno sortof penaltyattaches.And thisonlyhelpsto bring where in cases fact evident what in in an indirect is way equally withthemorallaw,namely coincide legalor quasi-legal requirements a penalty is fartoo incidento factofourliability suffer thatthemere Even if moralresponsibility. of conductto constitute tal a feature ofpunishment, we hold,as do theadvocatesoftheretributive theory of pain on the guilty that wickedness calls forinfliction agent,this about moralevil and responsiis something whichwe affirm further presupposes bility,and not the essenceof them.Such punishment it is appropriate. We maythusrejecttheretributive theevilto which of punishment, as I wouldcertainly do, without impugning theory the validityof moraldistinctions. What, then,does responsibility to be a moralagent,and thismeansto be mean? It meanssimply in the sensein which or wrongly an agentcapable of actingrightly such conductis immediately bad, as the good or morally morally and moralworth, case maybe. But whatdo we meanby rightness, To this no answeris possible.For herewe are theircorrelatives? to natural not reducible dealingwithultimateethicalconceptions is an ethicalconfact. And the sum of this is that responsibility to ideas whichare not themnot to be defined ception by reference be conceivedin ethical. It cannot therefore selves distinctively and our liability naturalistic termssuch as a threatof punishment to of moral come conceive and it. But ifwe overlook to suffer this, accountour from different in not substantially responsibility ways we come how to see it is our then before the law of State, easy ability at any rate,whenwe also to hold that thereare some occasions, withothers and are immediately shareourresponsibility implicated in their wrongdoing. served the purpose This happensin the following way. Normally, to be inflicted the of penaltiesrequire penalties by the imposition and on no others.For if to have offended, on personspresumed its deterrent were meted out withoutdiscrimination, punishment for most the lessenedand, would be substantially effect part, rebe as sheer would thenhave to versed.For punishment regarded to our own volitions, and, injuryor as "an act of God" unrelated them. it wouldoften whilethuslittleable to hinder crimes, provoke cases where But there are,however, requires expediency exceptional to be takenagainsta groupas if it werean individual proceedings of No accountwill thenbe takenof the guiltor innocence entity. members of the group.It is in this way that a teacher individual whenhe is not able to discover a class of unruly children punishes ofblameis or whena meticulous the real offenders, apportionment in twoways,either notpracticable. Such procedure mayhave effect the or (b) by inducing the mainoffenders deterring (a) by directly 9
PHILOSOPHY fortheteacher himself. class to deal withthemin waysnotfeasible the is had to suchmeasures bothfrom The less recourse thebetter, of and of view from to effective the ill-effects discipline regard point But theremay also be some comof a lingering senseof injustice. of the senseof community, such as a deepening factors, pensating if we were concerned with whichwe mightprofitably investigate or the of Suffice educational general question punishment. problems to note that,as a deviceforthe achievement of it forthe present we to have sometimes collective ends, responsibility. accept practical in law, wherea parentmay in some This is fullyacknowledged be held to accountforthe conductof children, or where respects or corporation be a a society as entity against may proceeded single ourcanvasstillwider, we have theimposition or person. Extending of international of sanctions againsta wholenationin the interest it is that this involves as order, although plain quite muchsuffering as forthe guilty, theformer, forthe innocent in a case of thissort, in a and similar beingprobably Reparations verygreatmajority. an measures adoptedagainst aggressor amongnationsmay also be here.Such measures mentioned maybe neededbothin the interest and of immediate and as a part of politicaleducation, discipline, But theymay providemeans of redressto victimsof aggression. a greatdeal ofsuffering for whocouldnot, persons theywillinvolve be held accountable forthe culpable by any streakof imagination, and babes in the case of infants acts of the nation,mostobviously of this natureis, in fact,unavoidablein most unborn.Something ofpunishment and presents us withsomeof its mostformidforms withhis individualism, tried able problems. Locke, in consistency to showI that it could be avoided. He urgedthat,whilethe parbe punishedwith death, ticipantsin an unjust war could fairly forthatwould withtheirproperty, thereshouldbe no interference the But apart from involvea loss to theirwivesand dependents. of for guilt well-nigh question apportioning impossible participation have in an unjust war, once the leadersand authorsof atrocities is a notoriously with(and that in itself been reckoned complicated more it is obvious thata man'sfamily seriously maybe much matter), of the deeper even at the economic level, to say nothing affected, personalloss, by the death of a parentor husbandthan by conin most of property. is therefore Punishment fiscation verylikely, well as the in innocent as on the to some measure, fall, cases, guilty. and the fact that But this unfortunate featureof punishment, suchas thosementioned above, has, in someinstances, punishment a without to be deliberately discrimination, inflicted, upon whole of the show the limitations to serves expedientsby group, only its ends. Perfectjustice is not attainable whichsocietyfurthers
Of Civil Government,Part II, Section 182. I0
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in practice,and even if measureswhich we normally consider in the the and in of innocent their spite involving expedient just, than we are fateof the guilty, more avoidable prove usually easily ofjustice to think, willalwaysbe someintermingling there disposed we can with injusticein human relationsunder any conditions that innocent But what does this Does it the prove anticipate. prove? sharein the wickedness of the guilty, that the former are morally forthe ill deeds ofthelatter?Surelynot. The question answerable needsonlyto be statedplainly it is to allow forus to see howfoolish in our view of moralresponsibility to be affected by imperfections of society the waysin whichmembers mustdeal withone another. And yet that is precisely what happensin a greatmanywritings on ethics and jurisprudence, where the ideas ofsocialand collective are forward as ethical notionsunder responsibility put properly coverofa falseanalogywithsocialenactments suchas the enforcementoflaw. An excellent instance of this may be foundin two papers' by to the Professor Gomperzwhere the writercomes very frankly of the idea of collective defence along the linesjust responsibility in out what is implicit described.But Gomperzis only bringing in recenttimes. From Bradley's most accountsof responsibility in celebrated chapteron "The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility" on the problem of responsibility EthicalStudiesto the symposium at a recent"JointSessionof the Mindand Aristotelian Societies,"' in is to define responsibility tendency by farthe mostpredominant ofa "liability to answer"and to incurblameor punishment. terms is able to This is how Bradley,like Rashdall,and otherthinkers, For blame and punishreconcile with determinism. responsibility mentwouldhave significance evenifourconduct couldnotbe other other it to certain conformed thanit is in the last resort, provided while And in the symposium to whichI have referred, conditions. and second an unambiguously naturalisthefirst contributors eschew a man ofethics, that both from view tic theory the they pass easily is responsible because"he can be calleduponto answer"(thesecond blameor moraldisapproval"3-aview writer adding,"by incurring reversesthe proper which,even if it avoids being naturalistic, forthe latteris priorto the relationof blame and responsibility, forthe former-) to cases whereone persontakes responsibility Minister in Mr.Falk's example4 thecase ofa Prime actionofanother, fortheactionsofhisChief ofStaff by declaring taking responsibility
I "Some Simple Thoughts on Freedom and Responsibility" (Philosophy, January, 1937) and "Individual, Collective, and Social Responsibility" (Ethics,Vol. XLIX). 2 Proceedings VolumeXIX. of theAristotelian Society,Supplementary 3 Op. cit., p. 249. Op. cit., p. 249. II
PHIL
OSOPHY
his "readinessto take the blame." But this particular example servesto show verywell on what a misleading coursewe are set whenwe conceive in the way described. For a Prime responsibility Minister can neverbe morally of a colleague, for the act responsible he simply cannot"take theblame"morally. It maybe necessary for theconduct ofa war,orfor of thenormal functioning Parliamentary at least, joint Cabinetresponwhere,in our country government to allowtheactionof seemsto be established, fora minister sibility to be treatedas if it werehis own. But his willingness another to sharethe blame in thissense,especially ifhe putshis ownposition as and careerin seriousjeopardy, inducesus to esteemhimhighly his to overthrow a moralperson evenifit is also a reasonfor seeking or misdeeds of in the follies For his "implication" administration. a of his colleaguesis not a moral one, but requirement certain ofit,at personal and his loyalacceptance governmental procedures, redoundsto his credit.It would, of course,be a inconvenience, or condonedthe wrongful different matterif he had encouraged or if he were sheltering a colleaguefor personal policy himself, ofthe public.He reasonsor wereretaining himagainstthe interest ofhis ownaction. wouldthenbe morally but in respect responsible, to But to accept responsibility for othersforpracticalpurposes, has done,is one incurcertain forwhatanother consequences person to be morally is another;and in thislast regard accountable thing, we cannotanswerforone anotheror share each other'sguilt (or worse forthat wouldimplythat we could becomedirectly merit), do-and others elect to what that persons better) (or morally by seemsplainlypreposterous.
V
also The belief thatguiltmaybe sharedderivessomeplausibility serveour turnwhenwe the loose expressions whichnormally from to a jointunderofseveral to thecontributions needto refer persons whoactually the thieves have first Take of We case a taking. burglary. a confirmed carriedit out. One of thesemay be the primemover, to somewhat novice a another criminal reluctantly pressed perhaps, in been the have be hisaccomplice. The temptation put way of may who an thesetwo,and the opportunity acquaintance provided, by but takes no part in the actual robbery bears the victima grudge information. Yet another useful mayhave person beyondsupplying the coveredthe escape of the criminals or, by hindering workof after thefact.Finally,we may have become an detection, accessory have a "receiver"who disposedof the stolengoods.Each of these in the crime, and theymaythus is in someway implicated persons
12
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be said to sharethe responsibility forit. But it wouldbe a great mistaketo supposethat we have herea singlecriminal operation Even the law the blame forwhichrestsequally on all concerned. the heaviest would discriminate sharplyin such a case, imposing as well as in case on his own the habitual but, criminal, penalty of in the thatoftheothers, the extenuating light reviewing judgment who proetc. The instigator circumstances, previousconvictions of the the toils vided the original inducement mighteasily escape factors law altogether. But at theproperly morallevelmanyfurther mustbe takenintoaccount,severalof them,as has been stressed, And in thisreckoning not easilyaccessibleto the outsideobserver. the roles be the reversed, proving possibly, instigator, many may is that the guiltof each is worstoffender. What has to be stressed It is not to his part in the jointundertaking. strictly proportionate onecrime thatwe havebut many. It is just as This seemsveryevident in thesimplecase described. as such in to social.and matters, true,however, respect complicated economic where thelureofvaguecollectivist explanations injustices, us that we need, not is stronger. Reformers have oftenreminded the causes of remove to to also but hinder the criminal, merely maintained thatsociety in it is and, thisconnection, frequently crime, case of a the sharesthe guilt of the criminal. Gomperzinstances and he children, poorwomanwho stealsa loafto feedherstarving as the womanherself, thatsociety is reallyas responsible contends in as muchas society failedto provideforherneeds.He evengoes But that,it so faras to speak of blamingthe social "structure." sense and as a in a figurative seems evident,is only meaningful social is to be arousedat distressful rhetorical devicewhenconcern If taken in the literalsense, as Gomperzappears to conditions. cannotbe thebearer For "a structure" it is verymisleading. intend, of moralresponsibility; neither can "societyin general,"forthese not to hypostatize. are bothabstractions whichwe mustbe careful is this.The guiltof Whatshouldbe said, ifwe are to speak exactly, the poor womanis lessened,if not eliminated altogether, by her is to be, for But she alone is to blame,ifblamethere circumstances. are also to blame,butfor whatsheherself has done. Others something else,namelyfortheirpart in allowingher to remainin desperate and strictly forthisas individuals, need. But theyare responsible or indirectly, have done,directly to whateach might in proportion herlot. to ameliorate herethatthereare severelimitations It has also to be emphasized fornorsocial conditions, to modify on the powerof the individual and concerted so concerted he can do action, action, only by mally on of a consensus which complicated moreover, opinion highly requires to look It is thusveryfoolish socialand economic simply questions.
I3
PHILOSOPHY about us, as we are proneto do, and, havingnotedgraveand perand war, social ills,suchas poverty, sistent waste,unemployment, For to take theseas a measure of humanwickedness. straightway the morallifeof ills ofthissort,whiletheydo in somewaysreflect and providethe basis forsomegeneralisations, can a community, as an indication of intentional evil untilwe have not be regarded considered just what could have been expectedof the carefully whenconfronted withthem.Allowance mustbe averageindividual fortheneedforleadership, and forthepeculiar madeforignorance, foreffective effort whichattendthe corporate difficulties required This does not implythat the individual mustsimply socialreform. or acquiescepassively in thepolicies ofevents, to thedrift surrender ofleaders.Thereis muchthathe can do, but ultimate of a handful success will depend on a great many factorswhollyoutsidehis And no less in a democratic thanin a totalitarian control, country. notto form we needto be careful therefore conceptions exaggerated be not to what could reasonably of humandepravity by looking, as a the but to of individual, entity society corporate expected forsocialand economic ills. accountable directly Thisquestion, on theproblem ofwarguilt. Thishas a closebearing is of one the be it should stressed, only generalquestionof aspect nations. For factors besidesthat of the treatment aggressor many far as theproperly But so into the latter enter ofmoral problem. guilt to the we do veryserious moralissueis concerned, damage prospect of if we allow a distorted of eventual reconciliation conception are which moralguiltto complicate alreadybewildering questions a wrong form as we shall not merely the moreespecially enough, butalso encourage we should ofthecourse estimate ourselves, pursue those pathologicalconditionsto which vanquishedpeoples are prone,and which,howevertheymay accord withour mood and if onlyby are certain, of a situation, the immediate requirements rational to unrelated condition an assurance, any unhealthy being at a later date in ways verylittleamenableto rational to emerge the precise directionthey take. What we control-whatever is notwhatis the ofGermany, needto ask, in thecase, forexample, orlater-or our intheinter-war as a nation ofGermany record period of that-but just whatcould have been forthe matter own record tide of the citizenin the swirling expectedof the averageGerman vortex in the others him and eventswhich deep eventually engulfed of war. This is not to suggestthat he was helplessand mustbe and that questionsof guilt concernonly exonerated altogether, There were of powerand authority. those who were in positions have citizen the which might ordinary things many undoubtedly in due courseto done,and I can onlyleave it hereforthehistorian whattheywere.But allowancemustclearly to determine attempt
I4
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forthe difficulty be made fortradition, and environment, outlook, ofanticipating thecourseofevents(and it is easy forus afterwards, and fromoutside,to be wise about these), for the very limited whichthe individual, influence even if he is of a heroicmould,can have on of the totalitarian government, normally policies a ruthless and forthe determined to warlike and despotic measures opposition which a certainproportion, at any rate, of the Germanpeople of demoshowed.Let us seek,by all means,to extendtheinfluence to give ofhis best whichwillenable theindividual craticprinciples let us be fairto him,wherever to his State. But in the meantime, the he is found, by relating questionof guilt,not to someabstract in but to what which individuals are merged, he and all other entity we can reasonablyestimate could have been expected of the in theparticular ofguiltand merit, whois thesolebearer individual, situation him. confronting I shouldlike to stressagain what has alreadybeen noted,that to someconductwhich no one is morally guiltyexceptin relation This he himself be seems considered to wrong. plain enoughin our one from with encounter another day to day, forcircumordinary relait moresharply stancesforce upon us in close and immediate whenwe But it needsto be bornein mindverycarefully tionships. about a vast concourseof are seekingto formethicaljudgments ties are slight. Otherwise and personal peoplewithwhomindividual we shall be inclinedto arraignotherpeoples forfolliesand misthe measuresthey may warrant which,whatever understandings in practice, of moralculpability. are, I repeat,no directindication all is to excuseall." But AgainI do notimplythat"to understand and thenwe can have some I insistthatwe mustfirst understand, of guilt.But to understand it calls is verymuchharder, indication and patience, whendealingwithmenin the mass formorewisdom than when we have to do with individualsin relativeisolation, of our imagination the more especiallyas the normalworking in which us with a the nationor group simplified picture presents is personified, and, havingbeen givena mindand willof its own, than the actual stageof is set to act on a stage verymuchsimpler history. of complicated We are mostproneto thesefalse simplifications For in and changesuch as the present. issuesin timesof confusion ethical of primitive such timesthereis apt to be a recrudescence so well.Andprimitive as therecent ofEuropeshows attitudes, history the unitis forthemthe little to the heed individual; peoplespay the betweenthe tribe or the family.But reflection affinity upon "ethic and the of collective doctrine undiscriminating responsibility theformer. ofthetribe"shouldgo a longway to discredit willnot onlydistort Failureto take due accountofthesematters I5
PHILOSOPHY ourvisionin thisor thatparticular and poisonourrelationregard, will It also us in of an give misleading general utterly ships. picture man and "the humansituation."Of this thereis ample evidence intheprevailing ofgloomy ofall human fashion denunciation already an indulgence whichmay showitself before endeavour, longto be a moreserious thanwe are inclined business to realise. Its immediate are despairand its twin,irresponsibility. But worsemay progeny follow. VI How farthesereactionary owe their estimates ofhumanactivity to not views is determine. mistaken to persistence easy philosophical But they have obviouslyderivedmuch supportfrom"organic" of society,such as the celebrated theories Idealist Theoryof the State and the cruderforms of totalitarian whichprevail theories today.Theselatterhave notyettakenverydeep rootin democratic and although whoseauthoritarian the idealistdoctrines, countries, in important aspect was, incidentally, qualified ways,werein the in Western ascendancy towards the close of the nineteenth century in Eurothought, theydo not accordwellwiththemaintendencies and tradiand civilization, muchless withthe temper pean culture distionsof the Britishpeople. They have been veryextensively is concerned. It is creditedtoday so far as philosophical thought therefore well to remindourselvesthat the ideas of a pervasive theobverse aresimply communal and ofcollective guilt responsibility of the above of the tendency to set someabstract good community a tendency whosenatural of its individual the wellbeing members, which is theruthless and totalitarianism terminus against oppression Most of the countries. our face is so resolutely set in democratic to demolish been used so effectively which have recently arguments a as terms those and the ideas of "a common will," "general good" in philosophy, holdwithundiminished are usually understood force, ofcommunal mutatis mutandis, guilt. againstanytheory of society, whether theories The advocatesof collectivist theybe of humangood or of humanevil, are apt to hold their theories on the score of an alleged individualism. in contempt opponents and making at random, a case ofhitting But thisis verylargely play Individualism word. of a highly withthe meaning ambiguous may mean several things.It may mean that the good whichhuman beingsoughtto pursueis always a privateone, or it may mean, this and inalienable have unlimited rights, again, that individuals or in Western its main meaning latterbeing,I think, philosophy, to appreciate of the dependence failure it may indicatethe general I6
COLLECTIVE
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the In all thesemeanings on his social environment. the individual whichhave also, and theories termstands formistaken theories, wroughtvery serious havoc in our thoughtand unfortunately, practicein the past, and whichcontinueat the presenttime to in these But individualism reforms. obstruct positive verynecessary with the view connection senses,has no necessary reprehensible ofvalue.We mayinsist, and the is thesolebearer thattheindividual needto do so is as greatin manyregards todayas in the past,that he hasalso interests ofhisownunless no onecan haveproper interests of one another"even withregard in others, thatwe are "members of or failure in so faras the attainment moralstruggles to properly who are to that to his neighbours of concern is a matter one person No one livesin a or failure. in his moralattainment involved extent ofothers. destinies the no oneis,orshould be,unaffected vacuum, by welfare or where the reach their Andwhere natural limit, sympathies of welfare it to the as inmany ofoneis opposed, others, be, ways may of othersinthe wellbeing thereyet remainour dutiesto further no one is of any advantage to ourselves.Although dependently forthe answerable he is that in sense for" others the "responsible our for" conduct of others,we are all extensively "responsible them-mostofour in the sensethatwe have dutiestowards fellows dutiesare of this sort.But all this may be fullyallowedwithout and that to theindividual theprinciple thatvalue belongs affecting moral of who is the sole bearer it is the individual responsibility. is incompatible in anywaywhich is notindividualistic Thisprinciple It is not of our essentialsocial relationships. witha trueestimate sense. "atomic"in any objectionable "But," it may be argued,"what of the individual's dependence on his society;is not our conductshaped by our environment?" My answerhere is that anyonewho holds that the individualis neverfreeto choosehis actionin a way not determined by factors moralresponthe idea ofproperly shouldsurrender outsidehimself ourresponsibility be savedby extending theposition cannot sibility; reductio to do so is an excellent and theattempt to ourenvironment, with deteris compatible ad absurdum of the view that morality of discussion wouldrequirecareful To bring minism. thisout fully which cannotbe matters theuniqueness ofmoralvalue and ofother hereto note the scope of thispaper. It mustsuffice within brought makes no as "self-determination" that the doctrineof freedom issue. For the factthat deterto the present substantial difference is of a special kind,and involvesa peculiarassimilation mination whichaffect intothe character of the agentof the forces him,still outsideourfrom withthe viewthatfactors leaves the determinist selves have gone to the shapingof conduct.And if the notionof at all in sucha case, it is hardto see is to be retained responsibility
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PHILOSOPHY howwe can avoidextending an embarrassit to thesefurther factors', mentthatdoes notarisein connection withnon-moral valueswhich do not carrywiththemthe notionof guiltand a correlative merit. The determinist thusfinds the blame for himself extending wrongful actionsto our environment, to the wholeof reality. and eventually ofevil in the uniTherearisesin thisway the notionofa principle at the present verseat large; and thisnotionhas a wide currency ofthefindings time.It derives much accounts from uncritical support of recentpsychology, and it also encourages play with capricious to the the mythologies of primitive also contributes This religion. of irrationaland despondentestimatesof human dissemination attainment. But it seemsevident thatthequietusto suchreactionary turn tendencies cannot be finally given until moral philosophers to the muchneglected withmuchgreater resolution thanat present This is the crucialproblemtoday for problemof moralfreedom. for well as and But hereagainI am touching as ethics religion politics. the compass on matters whichcannotbe effectively within brought on of thispaper.Neither has it been possibleto comment the more religiousaspects of the problemof collectiveguilt, specifically theseare in many although waysthemostimportant.
1 Sir David Ross, for example, argues that a person's "responsibility for acts is divided" because "other people by teaching and example, the writers of the books he has read, and so on, have all helped to mould his character into that form of which his action is the expression." Foundations of Ethics, p. 248.
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Royal Institute of Philosophy

H. D. LEWIS, M.A., B.Litt.

The Nature and Destinyof Man, p. 234.

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