When Does Negativity Demobilize?

Tracing the Conditional Effect of Negative Campaigning on Voter Turnout

Yanna Krupnikov
Indiana University

Do negative campaign advertisements affect voter turnout? Existing literature on this topic has produced conflicting empirical results. Some scholars show that negativity is demobilizing. Others show that negativity is mobilizing. Still others show that negativity has no effect on turnout. Relying on the psychology of decision making, this research argues and shows that this empirical stalemate is due to the fact that existing work ignores a crucial factor: the timing of exposure to negativity. Two independent empirical tests trace the conditional effect of negativity. The first test relies on data from the 2004 presidential campaign. The second test considers the effect of negativity over a broader period of time by considering elections 1976 to 2000. Taken together, both tests reinforce that negativity can only demobilize when two conditions are met: (1) a person is exposed to negativity after selecting a preferred candidate and (2) the negativity is about this selected candidate.

ver the past several decades, negative campaign advertisements have become a staple of political campaigns. From shocking accusations to more mundane criticisms, the use of negativity has become a ubiquitous part of candidates campaign strategies.1 As the use of negativity has grown, so have the criticisms. Franz et al. note that many critics of negativity argue that negative campaigning serves to corrupt and debase democratic discourse, to mislead and confuse citizens, to shrink and polarize the electorate, and to constrain elected representatives in their efforts to promote good public policy (2008, 262). Of these critiques, the most consistent claim has been that negativity decreases voter turnout. Despite the vocal criticisms of negativity, the relationship between negativity and turnout has proven difficult to specify. While some scholars show that negativity decreases voter turnout (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), others show that negativity increases turnout (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Wattenberg and Brians 1999). Still others, however, show that negativity has no effect on turnout at all (Finkel

and Geer 1998; Krasno and Green 2008). In short, over the last decade, the relationship between negativity and turnout has emerged as one of the most enduring debates in political science. Directly addressing this debate, this research suggests that existing literature has reached an empirical stalemate on negativity and turnout because scholars have yet to consider a key factor: the timing of an individuals exposure to negativity. Specifically, the key argument of this research is that the relationship between negativity and turnout will depend on when in the campaign a person is exposed to negative ads. Relying on individual decision-making processes as a foundation, this research argues and shows that negativity will only be demobilizing when an individual is exposed to it at a certain time: after an individual selects which candidate he prefers, but before he has the chance to act on this selection with a vote. Through this focus on timing, this research identifies the conditions under which negativity can make a person less likely to vote, and the conditions under which negativity will have no effect on turnout.

Yanna Krupnikov is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 210 Woodburn Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405 (ykrupnik@indiana.edu). I would like to thank John Geer for sharing his advertising data. I also thank Rebecca Jones of the American National Election Studies for her help in obtaining 2000 and 2004 ANES geographic data. I thank Nathaniel Birkhead, Ted Brader, Bryce Corrigan, Carolina de Miguel Moyer, Erika Fowler, John Jackson, Shanna Kirschner, Richard Lau, Adam Seth Levine, Arthur Lupia, Spencer Piston, David Peterson, David Redlawsk, Travis Ridout, Nicholas Valentino, Frank Yates, and the three anonymous reviewers for their feedback.
1

Data for replication of the analyses presented in this article, including the appendixes, are available here: mypage.iu.edu/ykrupnik. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2011, Pp. 796812
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2011, Midwest Political Science Association

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00522.x

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WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

797 It is simple and straightforward: negativity is any criticism leveled by one candidate against another during a campaign. Under this definition there is no gray area. An appeal in a campaign either raises doubts about the opposition (i.e., negative) or states why the candidate is worthy of your vote (i.e., positive). There is no middle category. Note that this definition does not speak to whether the criticism is about policy or about traits. Any type of criticism counts as negativity. (2006, 23) This is a tonal definition that makes a clear distinction between negative and positive ads.3 Relying on Geers definition, I will be able to discern whether a negative tone regardless of the ads substantive contentcan have an effect on an individuals likelihood of turning out to vote.

This research makes a key step in resolving the current empirical conflict surrounding the relationship between negativity and turnout. More than simply being a missing variable or an additional mechanism, accounting for the timing of exposure leads to predictions about the relationship between negativity and turnout that are different from those currently made in literature. In doing so, this work suggests that existing literature has obtained conflicting results because scholars have assumed that negativity will be equally demobilizing at any randomly selected point in a campaign. Breaking with this assumption, this research shows that to find a consistent demobilizing relationship between negativity and turnout, it is important to understand when to look. Analyses of negativity and turnout, for example, where much of the exposure happens early in the campaign prior to selection will lead to different results than analyses where much of the exposure happens at a later point in time. Applied more broadly, this research suggests that timing is crucial to understanding the role campaign information plays in electoral behavior: while informational content is crucial, behavioral outcomes depend on the relationship between content and timing of exposure. What follows is a two-part approach. The first section explores the psychological determinants that underlie the power of negativity leading to the focal hypothesis of this research. The second section offers empirical tests of this hypothesis. The first test focuses on the 2004 presidential campaign, and the second test looks at the effect of negativity in presidential elections 1976 through 2000. Each of these two tests underscores the importance of timing to the effect of negativity on voter turnout. As both of the main tests presented here rely on observational data, a brief discussion of the role experimental evidence can play in support of the main hypothesis follows the key empirical results.

The Psychology of Negativity and Turnout

The first step to understanding why negativity may have the capacity to affect voter turnout is considering how negativity interacts with an individuals decision process during a campaign. Considering the individuals decision process is critical for two reasons. First, recent findings about the nuances of an individuals decision process suggest that this process will have important consequences for an individuals ultimate voting behavior (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). Second, understanding why and under what conditions negativity may affect an individuals decision process in such a way as to discourage the individual from voting will be helpful when searching for empirical evidence of this demobilizing power. While many scholars have applied a process-based approach to analyses of individual political decision making, many such approaches have focused on attitudes and choice, rather than action (Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Taber and Lodge 2006). Relying on the psychology of decision making, this section explores the decision process in full, continuing past choice to action. An individuals decision process has two parts: selection and action (Svenson 1992). In the first phase, an
3

Theory and Hypotheses

Defining Negativity
The theory of negativity and turnout presented here relies on Geers definition of a negative ad; this definition focuses on explicit criticisms of opponents:2
2

Geers definition is at its conceptual clearest for explicit criticisms. It is less clear for implicit criticismsones where the opposing candidate is not directly mentioned, but criticism of this candidate is implied by the ad. The reliance on Geers definition means that empirically, this research speaks more directly to explicit, rather than implicit ads. Nonetheless, it is likely that implicit critiques would have the theorized effect on voter turnout, though this effect would be conditioned by an individuals political sophistication and ability to understand the implicit critique.

Definitions of negativity can be divided into two categories substantive and tonalalthough many scholars do offer definitions that combine both categories. On the substantive side, scholars have focused on the informational content of the ads. Freedman, Wood, and Lawton (1999), for example, distinguish between personal attacks or issue appeals. Jamieson, Waldman, and Sheer (2000) argue for a distinction between attack and contrast appeals. It is important to acknowledge the trade-offs made in taking on Geers definition. A tonal definition, cannot discern which substantive elements of negativity have the greatest effect on turnout.

798 individual considers his alternatives, determines which alternative is best, and makes his selection. In the second part of the decision process, an individual works to translate his selection into a tangible action (Dholakia and Bagozzi 2002; Svenson 1996). Thus, in a given campaign process an individual will first select which candidate he prefers. Then, he will begin the second phase of decision making: acting on his selection with a vote. Here the first part of the decision process will be referred to as the selection phase and the second part of the decision process as the post-selection phase. This research focuses on the post-selection phase, as negativity is most likely to be demobilizing in this second phase. Nonetheless, it is important to first briefly discuss the selection phase as a means of contrasting the role of negativity in the two parts of a decision process. Selection Phase. The two parts of the decision process have different end-goals. During the first part selectionan individual seeks to discover the best alternative. Not only that, but as Svenson writes, the goal of [the first part of the decision process] is not only to select the best alternative, but an alternative that is sufficiently differentiated from its closest competitor (1992, 150). Thus, in order to complete selection, an individual must reach a place where he believes one alternative is sufficiently better than the other. Moreover, reaching selection also often leads the individual to develop a dislike for the unselected alternativefurther ensuring that the ultimate selection stands out as the better of the two choices (Simon et al. 2001; Svenson 1992). During the first phase of decision making, negativity can be useful for reaching a selection. Negativity may be especially useful to voters in developing their images (i.e., mental pictures) of candidates, and in differentiating or discriminating between those candidate images(Garramone et al. 1990, 301). Further, negativity is more diagnostic than positivity and can work to ease the differentiation process (Riskey and Birnbaum 1974; Skowronski and Carlston 1989; Yzerbyt and Leyens 1991). Finally, it is usually negativityrather than positivity that leads an individual to believe that he has enough information to make a selection (Skowronski and Carlson 1989).4
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YANNA KRUPNIKOV

The fact that negativity can aid in choice has notable implications for the relationship between negativity and turnout. If individuals only act so long as they have made selections (Downs 1957), then by helping individuals make choices, negativity also makes them more likely to take action. Indeed, this is an outcome that is consistent with arguments that negativity can be informative for voters (Geer 2006), and empirical findings that show that negativity can increase voter turnout (Goldstein and Freedman 2002).

Post-selection Phase. Negativity will not always be helpful. In particular, the role of negativity changes after a selection is made. Once a selection is made, the individual moves to the second part of the decision process: the post-selection phase. Much of the existing research on voting decision processes stops at the end of the selection, assuming that a choice signifies the end of the decision process. While some scholars do consider how individuals evaluate their selections, existing research on political decision making has yet to understand the centrality of the post-selection phase to individual behavior. The approach used here, however, brings this post-selection phase to the forefront by focusing on the crucial role negativity plays after a person has already made a selection. The post-selection phase focuses on action. While the purpose of the first phase was to consider the available alternatives and differentiate to select the most attractive one, the purpose of the post-selection phase is to enact the selection (Gollwitzer 1996). It is during this second phase of a decision process, then, that individuals begin to consider how they might actually implement their selections (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999; Sheeran 2002). As a result, it is during this second phase that the costs and benefits of action come into sharp focus (Busemeyer and Towensend 1993). As Busemeyer and Towensend write, as the possibility of action increases, the attention to its consequences increases (1993, 442). As a result, the outcome of a decision process may be such that a person will prefer one alternative to another, will make a selection, but will never actually implement his selection with an action. Indeed, evidence shows that this is the case in numerous decision contexts (Orbell and Sheeran 2000). During this post-selection phase, exposure to new negativity about his selected candidate can lead an individual to believe that his selected candidate is no different and no better than the candidate he already knows he dislikes. Since an individual selected one alternative over another because he considered it superior to the unselected alternative, negativity can place that perception of superiority in doubt (Svenson 1992). Once an individual no longer believes that the candidate he selected is any different or better than the candidate he dislikes, he has no reason to turn out and vote (Downs 1957). In other words, an individual still prefers one candidate over the otherbut not enough to actually turn out and vote. Thus, negativity will be demobilizing under two conditions: (1) if an individual is exposed to negativity after he has already made a selection and (2) if the negativity is about his selected alternative. The structure of the voting decision is particularly conducive for this process. In a voting decision, an individual can make a selection at any point in the campaign,

WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

799 point is important, it is nonetheless helpful to translate the main theoretical prediction to the broader dynamics of a campaign, where measures of selection time may be less precise. Doing so will increase the generalizability and usability of this approach to identifying the relationship between negativity and turnout. A way to translate the psychological process described above to observe broad patterns in a campaign setting is by considering when during the duration of a campaign the majority of individuals make their candidate selections. Holbrook (1996) finds that over the years 1952 to 1992, by early October most voters have already selected which candidate they prefer. While Holbrooks data come from surveys of individuals who turned out to vote, more recent data confirm that even those who did not end up turning out to vote also made their selections at a similar time. Data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) reinforce this point. During a round of interviews conducted in late September 2000, around 67% of respondents indicated that they had selected a candidate. During a different interview wave, conducted in early October 2000, the percentage of respondents who made selections grew to nearly 75%.6 Also strengthening this argument are Hillygus and Jackman (2003), who rely on a panel dataset from Knowledge Networks. Their results show that in the 2000 election, there was little change in candidate preference after the first presidential debatewhich took place on October 3 of that campaign.7 If negativity is indeed most demobilizing after an individual has made a selection, and any given individual has a higher likelihood of having made a selection by the beginning of October, translating the psychology of decision making to the campaign setting leads to the following prediction: Negativity will be most demobilizing under two conditions: (1) if it is about the individuals
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but he may not be able to act on this selection by casting a vote until weeks later. This institutionalized temporal gap between selection and action creates an extended postselection phase that allows the voter to receive new information after the voter has selected a candidate, but before the voter has had the chance to act on that selection with an irreversible action. Even states that allow no-excuse early voting may create this temporal gap between selection and action, as even early voting is only allowed at a predetermined date prior to the election.5 Psychologically, this is a simple processone that does not require a lot of cognitive effort on the part of the individual. Attention to new information even after selection is quite natural, especially when an individual has yet to implement the selection with an irreversible action (Frey and Rosch 1984). Furthermore, it is likely that after selection, much of the individuals focus will be on ads about the selected candidate, as evidence shows that individuals generally look for incoming information about their selections, rather than the alternatives they did not select (Johnson and Russo 1984; also Campbell and Keller 2003). Finally, candidates frequently rely on negative ads, suggesting that an individual does not have to work particularly hard to observe this form of campaigning. In short, the voting decision has a built-in opportunity for a person to receive negativity after he or she has made a selection and a person will be exposed to new negative ads during a campaign without exerting much effort.

Predictions
In its initial state, the theory presented here relies on a precise measure of an individuals selection time. This is something scholars can control and obtain in an experimental setting. While measuring this precise selection
5

Currently 23 states allow no-excuse early voting. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota (only in certain counties), Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia (information from the National Conference of State Legislatures). Early voting is different from absentee voting in that a voter does not need an excuse to cast an early ballot. In a large number of states where early voting is available, however, such ballots are only cast 1014 days prior to Election Day; thus, even if a voter opts for the early voting approach, he may still need to wait before casting a ballot. Moreover, studies of voting patterns show that most early voting happens close to Election Day, rather than far in advance (Gronke 2004). Studies of early voting, however, often conflate early and absentee ballots. As a result, it is unclear how many ballots are cast early because individuals want to implement their selections versus the early ballots cast because voters are voting in absentee. In addition, it is unclear (outside of states like Oregon which have mainstream early voting policies) how many voters know that they can vote early even if they do not have an excuse for doing so.

Selecteds and unselecteds were determined through a twoquestion process. First, individuals were asked if they had decided which candidate they supported; then, they were asked if there was still any chance they would vote for the other candidate. Those who said there is still a chance were coded as unselecteds; those who said there is no chance were coded as selecteds.
7

The American National Election Study (ANES) also reinforces the October date. In the post-election survey, the ANES asks individuals who report having voted when in the campaign they made their candidate selections. Relying on this question, in 2000 (ANES variable v001251) 79.9% of respondents made selections by October 1; in 2004 (ANES variable v045207 ) 85.5% of respondents made selections by October 1. However, to ensure the robustness of the results, key models are reestimated with the late negativity point one week before and after October 1; the results remain substantively similarlate negativity about the selected candidate is the only significantly demobilizing form of negativity.

800 selected candidate and (2) it is aired in October of an election year. Undoubtedly, considering the precise point of selection is the most direct way to analyze the demobilizing role of negativity in later points of an individuals decision process; however, focusing on the timing of the ads also has some benefits. First, a prediction based on the timing of ads makes this approach applicable to a wide variety of observational dataeven data that are not precise in measuring a respondents selection state.8 Second, considering the role of negativity in this way will allow for a more direct comparison between the approach used in this research and those of past studies.

YANNA KRUPNIKOV

Presidential Election 2004

Data about individual characteristics in the 2004 presidential election come from the NAES.9 Data about advertisements aired during the 2004 campaign come from the Wisconsin Advertising Project (Goldstein and Rivlin 2007).10 This dataset was built using advertising tracking data provided by the Campaign Media Advertising Group (CMAG) and coded for content at the University of Wisconsin. In total, CMAG tracked the top media markets in America in 2004. The data provide information about the content of the advertisement, the date the advertisement was aired, the media market in which the advertisement was aired, as well as the number of times each advertisement aired. In short, the Wisconsin data are the most thorough compendium of advertisements aired in 2004. The NAES data and the Wisconsin data were merged by the respondents media market, meaning the combined dataset can offer an estimate of the amount of negativity aired in each respondents media market. Key Variables Negativity. The Wisconsin Advertising Project codes all ads for content. Following Franz et al. (2007), ads are considered negative if they are characterized by the Wisconsin researchers as containing a negative appeal. This approach to negativity also follows from both the theoretical argument and Geers (2006) definition: even if an advertisement contains some promotion of the sponsoring candidate, so long as the advertisement also contains a direct criticism of the opposing candidate it is still offering negativity. The test of the timing prediction specified above relies on two categories of variables. These two categories of
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Negativity and Timing in Presidential Elections

Two tests explore the way timing affects the relationship between negativity and turnout. The first test focuses on the 2004 election and merges the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) with advertising data for the same campaign from the Wisconsin Advertising Project. These data can produce estimates of the amount of negativity in each individuals media market, making it well suited for estimating an individuals potential for exposure to negativity. The second test combines the American National Election Study (ANES) with John Geers ad data to consider negativity over elections 1976 to 2000. Relying on a different data combination, this second test acts both as a complement to and a check on the analysis of the 2004 election and offers a direct comparison to existing research on negativity and turnout. Together these two tests consider the relationship between negativity, timing, and turnout under different electoral conditions, yet lead to the same conclusion: negativity is most likely to demobilize after selection. As the two tests presented in detail here are observational, the empirical section concludes with a discussion of the role experimental work can play in the analysis of timing and negativity.

The data come from the NAES General Election Panel, as it provides postelection respondent interviews. Respondents were initially interviewed in the 15 weeks prior to the election as part of the rolling cross-section; subsequently, some of these respondents were reinterviewed in the eight weeks after the election. Not all questions were asked of all respondents, which is reflected in the N in Table 2. The NAES is a study commissioned by the Annenberg School for Communication and the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania (Romer et al. 2004).
10

There is a lack of consistent selection measures in most surveys. The ANES, for example, varies the way the selection question is asked over the years. In most recent cases, the selection question is asked only in the post election study, and it is only asked of individuals who report that they voted. In other cases, the approach to measuring selection is more conducive to considering how selection affects turnout, but these are usually specialized panel studies that do not allow for the consideration of broad patterns over numerous election years.

Use of the Wisconsin Advertising Project data requires the following acknowledgment: The data were obtained from a joint project of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law and Professor Kenneth Goldstein of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and includes media tracking data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, DC. The Brennan Center-Wisconsin project was sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Brennan Center, Professor Goldstein, or The Pew Charitable Trusts.

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TABLE 1 Key Negativity Variables, Model Specification, and Predictions

Category Overall Negativity Description Negativity aired over the entire duration of campaign Does not account for target or timing of negativity (Var 1) Overall Negativity about Disliked Candidate (Var 2) Overall Negativity about Liked Candidate Accounts for target, does not account for timing (Var 1) Late Negativity about Disliked Candidate (Var 2) Late Negativity about Liked Candidate Negativity aired after Oct. 1 of a campaign Accounts for timing and target of negativity Model Specification Model 1: Overall Negativity, Controls Predicted Outcome Null effect (Finkel and Geer 1998); Mobilizing effect (Goldstein and Freedman 2002) Null effect (Finkel and Geer 1998); Mobilizing effect (Goldstein and Freedman 2002)

Overall Targeted Negativity

Model 2: (1) Overall Neg. about Disliked Cand., (2) Overall Neg. about Liked Cand., Controls

Late Targeted Negativity

Model 3: (1) Late Neg. about Disliked Cand., (2) Late Neg. about Liked Cand., Controls

Late Negativity, Disliked Candidate: Null Effect Late Negativity, Liked Candidate: Demobilizing Effect

variables are described below and are further summarized in Table 1. Category 1: Overall Negativity: The first category of measures does not account for timing. This set of measures takes two forms. The firstoverall negativityis simply the total percentage of negative ads aired over the course of the campaign. This variable does not consider the timing of airing, nor the candidate targeted in each ad. In this way, it serves as an initial contrast to the conditional approach. The second form of the overall measureoverall targeted negativitydoes take the target of the ads into account, producing two variables: (1) percentage of negativity over the course of the campaign about the respondents preferred candidate and (2) the percentage of negativity over the course of the entire campaign about the other candidate. Category 2: Late Negativity: The second category of measures is late targeted negativity. This is the amount of negativity shown after October 1, 2004, about both the respondents preferred candidate and the other candidate, where the respondents preferred candidate is determined through a candidate preference measure in the NAES. The late targeted negativity measure is composed of two separate variables: (1) the percentage of all ads shown after October 1 that contained negativity about the respon-

dents preferred candidate and (2) the percentage of all ads shown after October 1 that contained negativity about the other candidate. These variables combine both the timing and target conditions of the main prediction. In fact, following the main prediction, only negativity about the respondents preferred candidate should have a significant demobilizing effect on voter turnout. When relying on these late negativity variables, controls are included to account for early negativity.11 Taken together, both categories serve to offer a complete test of the main prediction of this research. The variables in the first category are designed to ensure that a significant relationship between negativity and turnout is observed only when the key specified conditions for demobilization are met, while the second category actually tests the key prediction. Controls. In addition to the measures of negativity, controls include the traditional determinants of turnout, using Rosentone and Hansen (1993) as a
11

The individuals liked/disliked candidate is determined through an answer to an intended vote question. However, I also estimate a result using partisanship to determine like/dislike. I use partisanship to ensure that those interviewed at earlier points in the campaign would not lead to measurement error. The results are substantively similar for both versions of the measure.

802 foundation. These variables include a set of demographic characteristics (age, race, education, income, gender, employment status, church attendance, and years at current residence) and political characteristics (strength of partisanship and efficacy). The Rosentone and Hansen (1993) model is modified to include measures of interest, attentiveness, and other political involvement. A detailed listing of all control variables is included in Appendix A. In addition to these traditional control variables, several sets of controls are specific to the task at hand: (1) state competitiveness, (2) exposure to advertising, and (3) volume of advertising. The measure of state competitiveness comes from Shaw (2006). Shaw considers campaign strategy and predicts state competitiveness using interviews with operatives from both the Kerry and Bush campaigns. Relying on these interviews, he classifies each state as a battleground, a possible leaner, solidly Republican, or solidly Democrat. Shaws classification produces the following controls: states that both campaigns classified as battleground are coded as 1; states that one of the campaigns classified as battleground are coded as 0.75; states that both campaigns classified as possible leaners are coded as 0.5; states that one of the campaigns classified as possible leaners are coded as 0.25; states that both campaigns agreed are solidly one party or the other are coded as 0. As Shaw (2006, Table 4.5) shows, states classified as 1 are receiving the most attention from the candidates and states classified as 0 are receiving the least. Controlling for exposure is a more complicated task. Relying on previous approaches to negativity, exposure is estimated using an individuals media use habits, the percentage of negativity, and the volume of negativity. Volume in this case is the total number of ads shown in a particular media market, under the assumption that the more total ads, the more likely is an individual to have been exposed to advertising. This approach follows from Finkel and Geer (1998), who include the proportion of negativity and control for television habits, as well as Brader and Corrigan (2006), who estimate volume as the total number of ads in each media market. Although this is a useful approach, it is not the only approach to measuring exposure. Therefore, in order to ensure that this result is robust to changes in measurement of exposure, a separate model conceives of exposure in a different manner. Specifically, this additional model uses the measure of exposure discussed in Franz et al. (2007), a measure which relies on a combination of ad volume and estimates of individual viewing habits for specific TV programs . I discuss this additional conception of exposure in

YANNA KRUPNIKOV

greater detail when I discuss the overall robustness of my results. Method The key dependent variable is reported turnout. Although this variable is susceptible to various errorsin particular overreportsas Hillygus notes, although it is important to recognize such overreporting, research has largely concluded that it is of little consequence (2005, 56). Moreover, the key factors that lead individuals to misrepresent their voting behavior have little relationship to the hypothesis tested here (see Vavreck 2007 for a discussion of factors that affect overreporting). As a result, it is quite unlikely that the relationships observed in this study are a function of errors in the turnout variable. Indeed, it is more likely that the observed effects may even grow stronger if all voters reported their behavior truthfully. For a discussion of the usefulness of self-reported turnout measures, see Hillygus (2005).12 The key prediction of this research is analyzed through a three-part test that follows from the models laid out in Table 1. Each part of the test relies on a model estimated using logistic regression with clustered standard errors. The clustered standard errors serve to deal with any differences in state campaign experiences left unaccounted for by control variables.

Results
Estimating Model 1 shows that overall negativity has a null effect on turnout in the 2004 presidential election (Table 2, Model 1). While the coefficient on the overall negativity variable is negative, it does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. These results are in line with Finkel and Geer (1998), as well as Lau and Pomper (2004), and show that increases in the negativity in a respondents media market over the entire duration of the campaign did not have any effect on his likelihood of turning out to vote in 2004. The rest of the control variables perform in a manner similar to other studies of voter turnout. The similarity of the rest of the model to previous results suggests that the null effect of negativity
12

Hillygus (2005) notes that generally studies of vote validation find that the percentage of overreports in surveys generally ranges from 8 to 14%. These are the respondents who report that they voted, when they actually never turned out to vote (Traugott 1989). Hillygus further notes that studies of vote validation have many errors (Sigelman 1982) and concludes that research has found that replacing self-reported voter turnout with validated voter turnout in multivariate analyses does not change the substantive conclusions (Sigelman 1982) (56).

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TABLE 2 2004 Presidential Election: Varying Effects of Negativity

Model 1: No Target, No Timing Coeff. Overall Neg. Neg. Disliked Cand. Neg. Liked Cand. Late Neg. Disliked Cand. Late Neg. Liked Cand. Income Education Age Unemployed Partisanship Affect for Candidate Years at Home Church Attendance Employed State Conditions Contact from Campaign Discussion TV Newspaper Internet Late Night Talk Radio Campaign Interest Black Hispanic Gender Married Children Volume Control 1 Volume Control 2 Volume Control 3 Early Neg. Control Constant N

Model 2: Target, No Timing Coeff. Stand. Errors

Model 3: Target, Timing Coeff. 0.197 1.646 0.153 0.375 0.039 0.892 0.416 0.130 0.351 0.379 0.504 0.419 0.402 0.068 0.014 0.081 0.010 0.013 0.043 0.508 1.361 0.752 0.183 0.250 0.017 0.957 0.000 0.041 0.934 775 Stand. Errors (1.011) (0.837) (0.076) (0.145) (0.014) (0.792) (0.221) (0.044) (0.201) (0.136) (0.369) (0.699) (0.179) (0.048) (0.055) (0.044) (0.076) (0.085) (0.068) (0.179) (0.389) (0.420) (0.295) (0.334) (0.089) (0.398) (0.000) (0.293) (1.466)

Stand. Errors (0.276)

0.228 0.152 0.368 0.037 0.899 0.250 0.133 0.352 0.364 0.465 0.337 0.398 0.063 0.003 0.088 0.016 0.014 0.042 0.533 1.257 0.757 0.181 0.204 0.048 0.733 0.000 0.772 775

Negativity 0.364 (0.384) 0.401 (0.695) Resources (0.074) 0.149 (0.072) (0.143) 0.372 (0.139) (0.014) 0.037 (0.014) (0.843) 0.862 (0.823) Evaluation of Parties and Candidates (0.187) 0.362 (0.224) (0.043) 0.132 (0.044) Social Involvement (0.199) 0.352 (0.204) (0.130) 0.364 (0.132) (0.366) 0.444 (0.368) Mobilization (0.720) 0.350 (0.727) (0.175) 0.395 (0.174) Interest and Exposure (0.048) 0.066 (0.046) (0.054) 0.002 (0.053) (0.043) 0.089 (0.044) (0.078) 0.019 (0.077) (0.086) 0.009 (0.086) (0.070) 0.043 (0.070) (0.181) 0.531 (0.181) Other Demographics (0.402) 1.207 (0.386) (0.428) 0.766 (0.429) (0.294) 0.201 (0.294) (0.326) 0.205 (0.327) (0.098) 0.050 (0.100) Volume (0.308) 0.714 (0.318) (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) (1.426) 0.996 775 (1.602)

p < 0.01; p < 0.05; p < 0.01, logistic regression, clustered by media market.

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TABLE 3 Change in Probability of Turnout Due to Increases in Negativity, 2004 Election

Increase in Negativity 0 to 20% 0 to 40% 0 to 60%

ity, these changes in likelihood of turnout are statistically significant.13

Robustness
The robustness of these results is considered in several ways. The first reconsideration takes on exposure. As discussed earlier, there are numerous ways to measure exposure. While the model above relies on an approach which separates the proportion of negativity and the volume of negativity, another approach is to combine the two in a measure of exposure. This conception of exposure follows from Franz et al. (2007). In order to consider an individuals likelihood of seeing ads, Franz et al. measure the number of ads shown during particular programs and then consider whether an individual reported watching the program. The result is a measure where the number of ads shown during a specific program is multiplied by an individuals self-reported viewing of said program. The number of days a week a respondent viewed Jeopardy , for example, is multiplied by the number of ads shown during Jeopardy . The various program estimates are then added together to form one exposure measure. This conception relies on fine-grained measures of television viewing habits. While the 2004 NAES does not provide such measures, the 2000 ANES (the dataset which Franz et al. 2007 use in their analyses) provides a rich set of viewer-pattern measures, including the frequency with which the respondent watches programs such as Jeopardy, Wheel of Fortune , morning news, daytime programs, evening news, late-night programs, and network news. As a result, the 2000 ANES data are used to reestimate the key models relying on the same exposure measure as Franz et al. (2007). Specifically, I calculate the number of negative ads shown either over the entire course of the campaign or late in the campaign during specific programs and multiply these numbers by the individuals reported television habits. The results, which are shown in Appendix B, are consistent with the main hypothesis. The coefficient on late negativity about the selected candidate is negative, and this is the only coefficient on a negativity variable to reach statistical significance (p 0.05); in contrast, overall negativity does not have a significant effect on voter turnout. In sum, it is late negativity about the selected candidate that is significant and demobilizing.14

Election 2004 Late Neg. Like Cand. 0.039 0.087 0.145 Late Neg. Dislike Cand. 0.005 0.007 0.006 Overall Negativity 0.0051 0.0106 0.0165 Elections 1976 to 2000 0.037 0.063 Late Neg. Like Cand. 0.016 Late Neg. Dislike Cand. 0.012 0.028 0.047 Overall Negativity 0.022 0.035 0.039
p < 0.1; p < 0.05; p < 0.01. Results obtained using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

is not simply an issue of model specification or a function of the particular data used in this analysis. Model 2 offers a refinement of Model 1 by considering the target of negativity, though it still does not account for the timing of the negativity (Table 2, Model 2). Even when considered by target, negativity does not have a significant effect on voter turnout. Reinforcing this first set of results are the substantive effects of these estimates, shown in Table 3. Here, changes in turnout as a function of increases in overall negativity are statistically indistinguishable from 0. In short, these results show that negativity without timing does not have an effect on turnouteven when this negativity is distinguished by target. These results set the stage for a comparison to Model 3, which considers both timing and target. The results of estimating Model 3 show that only late negativity about a persons preferred candidate has a statistically significant, negative effect on turnout. Negativity about the other candidate, however, has a null effect on a persons likelihood of turnout. As predicted, it is not negativity in general that has an effect on turnoutbut negativity under two specific conditions: (1) negativity after a selection and (2) negativity about an individuals selected candidate. All results are shown in Table 2. Table 3 reinforces the results above, showing the change in likelihood of turnout due to an increase in negativity. When negativity increases from 0% of all late ads to 40% of all late ads in a media market, for example, likelihood of turnout decreases by 0.087. An increase to 60% negativity in a media market will decrease the likelihood of turnout by 0.145. In contrast to the changes in likelihood that result from increases in overall negativ-

13

These levels of 40% and 60% negativity are reasonable, as a number of battleground media markets in 2004 had levels of negativity higher than 60%.
14

A reader may ask if campaign strategy may also work to clarify the relationship between negativity and turnout. As this theory deals

WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

805 (Rosentone and Hansen 1993). Further, in addition to altering the variable specifications, a robustness check also includes using alternative estimation techniques. Extrapolating from Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon (1999), for example, I estimate a two-stage model that first predicts the likelihood of a media market receiving advertising and then estimates the effect of that advertising. Finally, a model relying on random effects accounts for the possibility of different campaigning techniques within different media markets. The tests are detailed in Appendix 1W.15 All six additional tests point to the same conclusion as Table 2: negativity about the selected candidate matters late in the campaign.16

Another consideration is the specification of the models. More precisely, since different approaches to estimating campaign effects and turnout patterns rely on different sets of controls, the goal is to ensure that the results are robust to changes in control variables. To address questions of specification, the key models are reestimated with different specifications found in existing literature. These new specifications stem from models that estimate the effect of negativity on turnout (Finkel and Geer 1998; Kahn and Kenney 1999), analyze the effect of advertising in general (Franz et al. 2007), or focus on participation
with individual-level psychological dynamics, the translation from individual decision-making processes to aggregate-level campaign dynamics is somewhat complicated. Nonetheless, to consider the role of campaign dynamics, I consider patterns of negativity in 2004 on an aggregate level by counties. This is done in two steps. Since it is difficult to control for numerous individual-level dynamics, in order to account for individual-level factors, this test measures turnout as a proportion of the registered voter population of a county. Following Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin (2005), who suggest that post registration turnout speaks to the ease with which individuals who at some point in the election do intend to vote actually end up casting ballots, it is the percentage of registered voters that speaks to whether the campaign environment was conducive to voting. Here, in the absence of individual-level controls, the proportion of registered voters who do not turn out due to negative ads proxies the mechanism of individuals making selections and failing to act on these selections with votes. The first way to consider this issue is to focus on states where some counties were located in media markets receiving the bulk of negativity early in the campaign while other counties were located in media markets that received the bulk of ads late in the campaign. This strategy allows me to control for state-level campaign dynamics while comparing the effect of negativity. Specifically, in four states some counties received only early ads, while others received only late ads: Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. In three other states, some counties received more than twice the number of early ads as late ads, while other counties (within the same states) received twice as many late ads as early negative ads: Arkansas, Missouri, and Texas. For five of the seven states where counties differed in the timing of negativity, the results follow from my prediction. The turnout difference for counties that received the majority of ads late in the campaign is as follows: Arkansas = 8%, Missouri = 12%, Nebraska = 7%, Tennessee = 2%, Virginia = 6%. There were no clear differences in Texas and North Carolina. Further, comparing across statesrather than within statesin counties that received all early negative ads and no late negative ads, turnout was higher, on average, by 5% than in counties that received no early ads and all late ads. The same pattern is observed in comparisons of counties that received more than twice more early ads than negative ads and counties that received more than twice more late negative ads than early ads. Taking this a step further, the research uses the aggregate data to estimate an aggregate-level model that includes all states and counties. The dependent variable is the percent of registered voters who turned out to vote (by county); the independent variables depending on the model are (1) percentage of late negativity and (2) percentage of overall negativity. Controls are previous turnout patterns by county and county-level economic conditions. The results again support the original hypothesis; the coefficient on late negativity is negative and significant at 0.05. The coefficient on overall negativity is positive and does not reach significance (p 0.346).

Presidential Elections 1976 to 2000

The next step in testing the conditional relationship between negativity and turnout is to consider the postselection effect of negativity using a different combination of observational data. In this section, Finkel and Geers (1998) study will serve as a foundation for an analysis of seven presidential elections from 1976 to 2000. In their original analysis, Finkel and Geer set out to reconsider previous empirical results on the demobilizing effect of negativity (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995), arguing that there is little theoretical reason to expect a powerful, systematic relationship between advertising tone and voter turnout (1998, 575). Focusing on elections 1960 to 1992, the authors find that negative advertisements have no demobilizing effect on voter turnout. Following Finkel and Geer, this next test relies on a combination of the ANES and John Geers ad data to reconsider Finkel and Geers findings by accounting for the timing and target of negative ads. While this new dataset brings its own set of advantages and disadvantages (both of which are discussed in more detail below), it acts as an important check for two reasons. First, the broader time period of elections 1976 to 2000 works to ensure that the results observed above are not unique to the 2004 election. Second, the negativity estimates in this second analysis are based on Geers coding of campaign ads, which will ensure that the results obtained in the first section of this article are not a function of the Wisconsin Advertising Projects specific coding mechanism.
15 16

Appendix 1W is located at mypage.iu.edu/ykrupnik.

As mentioned earlier, another robustness question concerns the October 1 date. As discussed earlier, (footnote 7), after moving the late negativity point one week before and after October 1, the results remain substantively similarlate negativity is the only significantly demobilizing form of negativity.

806 Data and Methods . The ad data used in this analysis come from John Geers database of presidential campaign advertisements.17 These advertisements are coded for various characteristics, including negativity. This is the same data that Finkel and Geer (1998) use in their analysis. While Finkel and Geer look at elections 1960 to 1992, this analysis focuses on years 1976 to 2000 as Geers dataset has dates18 for advertisements aired during these years. Data about individual behavior during these elections come from the ANES. Geers data and the ANES are merged by year of election. It is important to note that this combination of data does not allow for estimates of the number of ads aired in each media marketestimates that can be obtained using the earlier combination of NAES and Wisconsin ad data. As a results, estimates of exposure will be less precise than in the first analysis, leading to potentially statistically weaker results. While this is limiting, this second analysis is nonetheless helpful in three ways. First, as mentioned above, it works as a complement to and a check on my first analysis. Second, it serves to compare the approach used here directly to previous research on negativity and turnout. Finally, due to the lack of media marketlevel estimation, this second analysis serves as an extraordinarily conservative test of my hypothesis. Ads are considered negative following the same approach as applied to the Wisconsin dataif they include any negativity. Further, this second analysis relies on the same key variables as the 2004 analysisonly now recreated with Geers data. These variables are detailed in Table 1. Again these variables focus on overall negativity, negativity by target, and, finally, negativity that considers both timing and target. Once again, late negativity is coded as negativity aired after the majority of the electorate have made selectionsafter October 1 of the particular election year. The rest of the controls in this model are similar to those used to analyze the 2004 campaign, allowing for differences in questions between the NAES and the ANES. In particular, the ANES did not include questions about late-night comedy and Internet usage over the years used in this analysis. In addition, as there are a number of different years included in this analysis, there are more election-contextual variables to control for various differences in the political (and survey) environment.

YANNA KRUPNIKOV

Following the 2004 analysis, this second test again relies on three models: Model 1 looks at overall negativity, Model 2 divides negativity by target without considering timing, and Model 3 accounts for both timing and target.19 If these results follow from predictionsand if these results are similar to those observed earliernegativity will only have a significant effect on turnout when the two focal conditions for demobilization are met. Results . The results of this second test follow the same pattern as those obtained with the 2004 data. First, the control variables behave in a similar manner to the control variables in both Finkel and Geer (1998) and Rosentone and Hansen (1993). Turning to the focal variables of this analysis, negativity over the duration of the campaign does not have a statistically significant effect on voter turnout (Table 4, Model 1). Moreover, even when the target of the negativity is considered (Table 4, Model 2), negativity still does not lead to a significant effect on turnout. Finally, as predicted, negativity still only has a significant negative effect on turnout when timing and target are jointly considered (Table 4, Model 3). Much like the coefficient estimates, the substantive results reinforce the conclusion that it is late negativity that targets the individuals preferred candidate that leads to significant changes in the likelihood of turnout (Table 3). Increases in negativity about the preferred candidate decrease turnout likelihood by as much as 6 percentage points; even more importantly, the decrease in turnout is statistically significant. In contrast, the substantive effects of negativity about the other candidate, as well as overall negativity, are statistically indistinguishable from 0. Looking at Table 3, however, it is clear that the results of this analysis are marginally weaker in the differentiation of negativity by target than the results of first analysis and lead to smaller substantive effects. This is likely due to the structure of the data, which relies on lower geographic precision than the 2004 analysis. Nevertheless, these results still showcase the same important pattern: negativity is only demobilizing under certain specific conditions.20
19

Models estimated using a logit with robust standard errors. Robust standard errors are used as data only include seven elections and does not include specific measures of media markets. This means there are not enough clusters to safely rely on a random effects or clustering approach (Leoni 2005).
20

Geer, John. Presidential TV Ads 1960-2000. These data are also discussed and used in Geer (2006).
18 Geers dates are dates of the creation of the advertisement, rather than its airing. However, according to discussions by Mark (2007), dates of creation and airing are highly similar.

17

I conduct robustness checks using these data; these checks are shown in Appendix 2W, mypage.iu.edu/ykrupnik. Due to the structure of the data, however, I am only able to conduct robustness checks on the included variables; I cannot conduct the two tests of alternative specifications that are conducted for the 2004 data. In total, four additional models are estimated to check on the robustness of the results.

WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

807

TABLE 4 Presidential Elections 1976 to 2000: Varying Effects of Negativity

Model 1: No Target, No Timing Coeff. Overall Negativity Neg. Disliked Cand. Neg. Liked Cand. Late Neg. Disliked Cand. Late Neg. Liked Cand. Income Education Age Unemployed PID Strength Affect for PID Care Affect for Cand. Years Church Homeowners Employed Contacted External Efficacy Internal Efficacy Interest Media Married Black Southern Hispanic Gender Closeness Governors Primaries Volume 1 Volume 2 1988 2000 1992 1996 Constant N

Model 2: Target, No Timing Coeff. Stand. Errors

Model 3: Target, Timing Coeff. 1.108 1.352 0.831 1.719 0.0248 0.119 0.466 0.444 0.125 0.554 0.0833 0.867 0.477 0.157 0.753 0.260 0.316 0.321 0.390 0.205 0.149 0.460 0.00638 0.0852 0.187 0.296 0.0848 0.334 0.0790 0.324 0.822 0.308 3.011 6214 Stand. Errors (0.772) (0 .785) (0.205) (0.201) (0.00356) (0.179) (0.143) (0.255) (0.104) (0.203) (0.0388) (0.117) (0.103) (0.111) (0.122) (0.114) (0.115) (0.0706) (0.103) (0.0983) (0.139) (0.0951) (0.195) (0.0912) (0.100) (0.121) (0.104) (0.381) (0.157) (0.248) (0.404) (0.244) (0.934)

Stand. Errors (2.948)

0.443 0.745 1.850 0.0222 0.0281 0.757 0.333 0.465 0.661 0.107 0.837 0.501 0.275 0.723 0.504 0.180 0.514 0.457 0.160 0.156 0.445 0.0514 0.0445 0.174 0.111 0.146 0.000238 0.194 0.270 0.141 0.314 5.858 8494

Negativity 0.614 (0.518) 0.00454 (0.517) Resources (0.146) 0.830 (0.206) (0.141) 1.703 (0.201) (0.00239) 0.0246 (0.00356) (0.136) 0.130 (0.179) Evaluation of Parties and Candidates (0.102) 0.561 (0.180) (0.189) 0.463 (0.256) (0.0690) 0.114 (0.104) (0.154) 0.553 (0.203) Social Involvement (0.0273) 0.0837 (0.0390) (0.0812) 0.860 (0.117) (0.0714) 0.472 (0.103) (0.0795) 0.159 (0.111) Mobilization (0.0842) 0.754 (0.122) Interest, Exposure, and Efficacy (0.0811) 0.245 (0.114) (0.0801) 0.320 (0.115) (0.0501) 0.328 (0.0704) (0.0716) 0.395 (0.103) Other Demographics (0.0700) 0.201 (0.0985) (0.104) 0.153 (0.141) (0.0680) 0.462 (0.0952) (0.148) 0.00463 (0.194) (0.0653) 0.0869 (0.0916) State Conditions (0.0732) 0.220 (0.0993) (0.121) (0.0892) 0.289 (0.0745) 0.0821 (0.104) Volume and Year Controls (0.00170) 0.00271 (0.00224) (0.114) 0.0561 (0.155) (0.244) 0.0599 (0.167) (0.144) (0.139) 0.240 (0.319) 0.103 (0.190) (1.565) 4.595 6208 (0.456)

p < 0.01;

p < 0.05;

p < 0.01, logistic regression. PID = Partisan Identification.

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Experimental Evidence
The observational data presented above show that negativity plays a key role at a late point in a campaign. This finding speaks to the broader theoretical argument: negativity is most likely to be demobilizing after a selection is made. Although observational data are a key part of the negativity and turnout debate (Goldstein and Freedman 2002), an additional way to consider the relationship between negativity, selection, and turnout is through an experimental approach. Existing experimental research in psychology already suggests that negativity can dissuade individuals from acting on their selections. In these experimental and field studiesranging in focus from health behavior to purchasing intentions scholars of marketing and psychology asked participants to make choices or commit to taking certain actions (Dholakia and Bagozzi 2003; Orbell and Sheeran 2000; Simon et al. 2001). The results of these studies are consistent: encountering direct negativityor other day-to-day events which created obstaclesdecreased the chance for action. In fact, as Bagozzi and Dholakia note, in many cases, especially when there is a time gap between intention formation and action initiation, impediments to the enaction of the action . . . may occur (1999, 29). Following this approach, a study which varies the timing of exposure while keeping content of ads constant could shed light on the relationship between timing, negativity, and turnout. Elsewhere, I conducted just such a study relying on a national sample of adults. This study showed that individuals assigned to receive negative campaign statements post-selection were less likely to report that they would turn out and vote than those who received the same negativity pre-selection. More detail on this study is available in Krupnikov (2009). Further, a check on this initial experiment shows that only postselection negativity leads to this type of demobilization. In a second national study, individuals were offered positive statements after selection; these positive statements had little effect on reported likelihood of turnout (Krupnikov 2009).

is transmitted late in the campaign (after most people have likely made selections) and when it is about the candidate the individual prefers. Acting as a check on the 2004 results, the analysis of elections 1976 through 2000 shows a similar pattern: negativity can be demobilizing, but only under certain conditions. The fact that relying on two very different sources of data leads to the same pattern further reinforces the highly conditional effect of negativity.21

Conclusions
This research examined the role of negativity, showing that exposure to negativity after selection can derail action by convincing individuals that their selection is no better than the alternative they already know they do not like. In clarifying the conditions under which negativity can demobilize voters, this research works to resolve the existing empirical conflict in the negativity and turnout literature. The reanalysis of Finkel and Geer (1998) stands as an example of this resolution. While using an overall measure of negativity replicates Finkel and Geers initial null findings, incorporating timing into the model suggests that negativity does have a demobilizing effect. In short, accounting for the conditions under which negativity can demobilize clarifies previous results.22 While this finding helps shed important light on a decade-long disagreement in political science, it has broader implications than negativity and turnout. As research on general campaign effects has shown, some individuals make candidate selections early on in the campaign process (Holbrook 1996). As a result, scholars have suggested that while a campaign may not have wide influence over the entire voter population, candidates efforts
21

Discussion
Relying on a theory that incorporates the psychology of decision making with patterns in campaign dynamics, this research shows that negativity cannot be expected to have the same effect over the duration of a campaignnegativity is most likely to be demobilizing at a certain time. As the analysis of the 2004 election shows, negativity is most likely to demobilize when it

A reader may ask if the effects may differ for nonpresidential elections. As Lau and Redlawsk write, Voter decision making cannot be much different from most other decisions people make in their daily lives. There is nothing special about the political environment that should cause people to overcome magically the limitations of human cognition (2006, 21; italics in original). What makes election times different, Lau and Redlawsk argue, is the higher likelihood of exposure to political information. Thus, so long as an individual is exposed to negativity after selection, negativity will have a demobilizing effect. While the saturation of negativity may change depending on the election, this will affect the likelihood of exposure, not the psychological decision mechanism.
22

In Krupnikov (2009), this temporal approach is used to revisit previous research on negativity and shows that incorporating timing clarifies the empirical results. Specifically, this work shows that scholars who do not consider timing are most likely to find a demobilizing effect when their analyses involve situations where individuals are exposed to negative ads at late points.

WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

809 Age: cwa02, continuous, age of respondent in years. Unemployed: cwb01, coded as 1 if R answered temporarily laid off or unemployed, else 0. Partisanship: based on cma01, variable ranges from 1 (identified partisan) to 4 (non-partisan). Affect for Candidate: Bush affect caa01, Kerry affect cAB01; On a scale of zero to 10, how would you rate [Bush/Kerry]? Zero means very unfavorable, and 10 means very favorable. Variable is the absolute value of the difference between Bush and Kerry affect. Years in Home: cwc07 , continuous; natural log following Rosentone and Hansen (1993). Church Attendance: cwd01, coded 1 (More than once a week) to 5 (never). Employed: cwb01, coded as 1 if R answered Working full time or Part time, else 0. State Conditions: Based on discussion in Shaw (2006, Table 4.5), as explained in text. Contact: cdf09 1, Did any political party, or other group or individual come to your house to remind you to vote on Nov. 2? As this is an unusual question, it was tested with two versions of coding to ensure robustness. V1: separate categories for each type of contact (party, individual, interest group), 0 if no contact at all. V2: 1 if any contact at all (regardless of source), 2 if no contact at all. Discussion: ckb01,How many days in the past week did you discuss politics with your family or friends? coded 0 to 7. TV: Mean of cea06, cea01, cea03. Newspaper: cea10 , How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper? coded 0 to 7. Internet: cea22, How many days in the past week did you access information about the campaign for president online? coded 0 to 7. Late-Night Shows: cea18, How many days in the past week did you watch late-night comedy programs like the Late Show with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, or The Daily Show with Jon Stewart? coded 0 to 7. Talk Radio: cea15 , How many days in the past week did you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues, or politics? coded 0 to 7. Campaign Interest: cka04, How closely are you following the campaign for president over the past year? coded 1 (very closely) to 4 (not closely at all). Black: cwc03, coded 1 if R identified as Black, 0 otherwise. Hispanic: cwc01, coded 1 if R identified as Hispanic, 0 otherwise.

may work best to influence the undecidedsor voters who, according to polls, still have not chosen their preferred candidate. This focus on the undecideds is not simply a theoretical argument; during a campaign the mainstream media devotes a great deal of attention to this group of voters (Rohter and Zeleny 2008). While there is no doubt that the undecideds are an important part of an electoral outcome, the theoretical framework presented here suggests that the decidedsthe voters who may initially seem immovablemay be just as malleable as the undecideds. Simply making a selection does not mean that an individual will act on this selection; indeed, the malleability of the decideds comes from the demobilizing power of information after election. More broadly, however, the theoretical framework and the findings presented here have important implications for analyses of the relationship between political communication and political behavior. In particular, the effect new political information has on individual behavior may be considered in two ways: (1) the effect of information on choice and (2) its effect on action. While negativity provides a crucial example, the psychological work cited in this research extends to other forms of political information. Countless political actors, candidates for office, government agencies, interest groups, media outlets, and even friends and neighbors in individuals networks consistently seek to change individual behavior by providing new information. Sometimes the goal is to encourage limited, one-time actions (a small donation, a form letter to a senator); other times the goal is to create broad political action (becoming an active political volunteer). When will new information create the desired effect? While some information may lead individuals to form opinions or preferences, it may serve no purpose in ensuring that these individuals act on these preferences. In contrast, while some information may do little to strengthen preferences, it may dramatically increase the likelihood of action if presented after a preference is formed. In this way, this study of the way negativity leads individuals away from voting sets the foundation for a broader analysis of the role political communication plays in translating individual political preferences into political action.

Appendix A: Variables and Measures

National Annenberg Election Survey 2004: Income: cwa04, coded 1 (lowest: less than $10,000) to 9 (highest: more than $150,000). Education: cwa03, coded 1(lowest: grade 8 or below) to 5 (highest level of education).

810 Gender: cwa01, 0 if male, 1 if female. Married: cwf07 , 1 if R identifies as married, 0 otherwise. Children: cwf03, number of children. Turnout: crc28, 1 if voted, 0 if did not vote. Choice: crc14; question is used to determine voter preference for either Bush or Kerry to calculate the negativity about the liked/disliked candidate. To ensure robustness, negativity about liked /disliked candidate was also calculated using the respondents partisanship. American National Election Studies, 1976 to 2000 (using the ANES cumulative data file): Income: VCF0114, coded 0 (0 to 33 percentile) to 1 (96 to 100 percentile). Education: VCF0140 , coded 0 (grade 8 or less) to 1 (college and advanced degree). Age: VCF0101, continuous, age of respondent in years. Unemployed: VCF0150 , coded 1 if R answered either temporarily laid off or unemployed, 0 otherwise. Strength of Partisanship: VCF0301, coded 1 if R identifies as strong. Affect for Party: Democrats thermometer VCF0201, Republicans thermometer VCF0202; variable is the absolute value of the difference between the two thermometers. Care about Outcome: VCF0311, Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you dont care very much which party wins? coded 1 if R reports that he or she cares a good deal. Affect for Candidate: Democratic candidate affect thermometer VCF0424, Republican candidate affect thermometer VCF0426 ; variable is the absolute value of the difference between the two thermometers. Years at Current Residence Area: VCF9001, continuous natural log following Rosentone and Hansen (1993). Church: VCF0130 , coded 0 (never) to 1 (every week). Homeowner: VCF0146 , coded 1 if R owns home, 0 otherwise. Employed: VCF0150 , coded 1 if R is employed, 0 otherwise. Contacted: VCF9030a, 1 if contacted, 0 otherwise. External Efficacy: VCF0609 , response to I dont think public officials care much what people like me think, coded 0 (agree) to 1 (disagree). Internal Efficacy: VCF0614, response to Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cant really understand whats going on, coded 0 (agree) or 1 (disagree).

YANNA KRUPNIKOV

Media: Index containing television habits (VCF0724), radio habits (VCF0725), and newspaper habits (VCF0724). Married: VCF0147 , 1 if married, 0 otherwise. Black: VCF0106a, 1 if R identifies as Black, 0 otherwise. Hispanic: VCF0106a, 1 if R identifies as Hispanic, 0 otherwise. Southern: 1 if Rs state is identified by the ANES as being in the South: Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas. Gender: VCF0104, 1 if male, 2 if female. Perceived Closeness: VCF0714, Do you think it [the presidential race] will be a close race or will [Rs predicted winning candidate] win by quite a bit? coded 0 (win by quite a bit) to 1 (close race). Governors Race and Competitiveness of Primary: coded from The Almanac of States. Year Controls: Created using year of survey variable, VCF0004. Turnout: VCF0702, 1 if voted, 0 if did not vote.

Appendix B: ANES 2000 Exposure Analysis

As the 2000 American National Election Study asked a number of detailed questions about television use, I can replicate the full exposure measure from Franz et al. (2007). The measure was created as follows: (# of neg. ads aired during Jeopardy in Rs media marketJeopardy views) +(# of neg. ads aired during Wheel of Fortune in Rs media market/3Wheel of Fortune views) +(# of neg. ads aired during morning news in Rs media market/3morning news views) +(# of neg. ads aired during talk shows in Rs media markettalk shows views) +(# of neg. ads aired during network news in Rs media market/3network news views) +(# of neg. ads aired during evening news in Rs media market/3evening news views) +(# of neg. ads aired during all other shows in Rs media marketavg. television views) For the overall measure, ads over the entire duration were used. For the late measure, ads after October 1, 2000, were used. Controls are identical to the original model in Table 2; only the key variables are shown in Table 5.

WHEN DOES NEGATIVITY DEMOBILIZE?

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TABLE 5 ANES 2000: Three Models, Full FFGR Exposure Measure

Model 1: No Target, No Timing Coeff. Overall Negativity Neg. Disliked Cand. Neg. Liked Cand. Late Neg. Disliked Cand. Late Neg. Liked Cand. N

Model 2: Target, No Timing Coeff. Negativity 0.0004 0.0006 Stand. Errors (0.0005) (0.0005) 267

Model 3: Target, Timing Coeff. 0.0006 0.0011 Stand. Errors (0.0006) (0.0006) 267

Stand. Errors (0.0002) 267

0.0001

p < 0.01; p < 0.05; p < 0.01, logistic regression. FFGR = Frans, Freedman, Goldstein and Ridout (2007).

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Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article: Appendix 1W: 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey Robustness Checks Appendix 1WA: Changes in Specifications of Controls Appendix 1WB: National Annenberg Election Survey Replication: Changes in Estimation Techniques Appendix 1WC: Full Replication Appendix 2W: American National Election Study Replication: Changes in Control Variables Appendix 2WA: Late Negativity Model Appendix 2WB: Full Replication Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.