Paredes Notes CrimLaw2

Criminal Law Review 2008
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
Criminal Law Review

(BOOK II) JUDGE PAREDES and PROF. ORTEGAs Lecture Fusion (with UPDATES IN SUPREME COURT RULINGS)
MARIA IODINE TIROL ANDAN CARLOS G. REYNES JR. C. Ang A. Blanc J. Cali!a"an C. C#a R. Mang#$at
COLLEGE OF LAW
MILITIS LEX FRATERNITY

(C%&#'&a()in* an! E!i)in* !%ne "#$ EdLER )
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Im&%r)an) N%)e$ The (RT)*! +,PP-).)/T #in smaller font% may merely repeat the discussion of 0udge Paredes #for exam purposes, in case of conflict +ARE,ES n%)e( +REVAILS%
TITLE I
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

Crimes against national security 1. Treason (Art. 114); 2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art. 115); 3. Misprision of treason (Art. 11 ); and 4. !spionage (Art. 11"). Crimes against t#e la$ of nations 1. %nciting to $ar or gi&ing moti&es for reprisals (Art. 11'); 2. (iolation of neutrality (Art. 11)); 3. Corresponding $it# #ostile country (Art. 12*); 4. +lig#t to enemy,s country (Art. 121); and 5. -iracy in general and mutiny on t#e #ig# seas (Art. 122). The crimes under this title can be prosecuted even if the criminal act or acts were committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction. However, prosecution can proceed only if the offender is within Philippine territory or brought to the Philippines pursuant to an extradition treaty. This is one of the instances where the Revised Penal Code may be given extra territorial application under !rticle " #$% thereof. &n the case of crimes against the law of nations, the offender can be prosecuted whenever he may be found because the crimes are regarded as committed against humanity in general. !lmost all of these are crimes committed in times of war, except the following, which can be committed in times of peace'
Militis Lex Fraternity 09 (by EDLER)
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)spionage, under !rticle 112 3 This is also covered by Commonwealth !ct /o. 414 which punishes conspiracy to commit espionage. This may be committed both in times of war and in times of peace. &nciting to 5ar or *iving .otives for Reprisals, under !rticle 116 3 This can be committed even if the Philippines is not a participant. )xposing the 7ilipinos or their properties because the offender performed an unauthori8ed act, li9e those who recruit 7ilipinos to participate in the gulf war. &f they involve themselves to the war, this crime is committed. Relevant in the cases of 7lor Contemplacion or !bner !fuang, the police officer who stepped on a +ingaporean flag. ;iolation of /eutrality, under !rticle 11< 3 The Philippines is not a party to a war but there is a war going on. This may be committed in the light of the .iddle )ast war.
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Chapter One CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

5hen we say national security, it should be interpreted as including rebellion, sedition and subversion. The Revised Penal Code does not treat rebellion, sedition and subversion as crimes against national security, but more of crimes against public order because during the time that the Penal Code was enacted, rebellion was carried out only with bolos and spears= hence, national security was not really threatened. /ow, the threat of rebellion or internal wars is serious as a national threat. !e"ti#n $ne% & 'reas#n an( es)i#nage *R'+CLE , 'RE*!$A. Elements 1. .ffender o$es allegiance to t#e /o&ernment of t#e -#ilippine %slands; 0 .ffender may 1e a citi2en or resident alien 0 allegiance may 1e permanent or temporary 0 treason 1y +ilipino citi2en can 1e committed outside t#e -#ilippines. 2. T#at t#ere is a $ar in $#ic# t#e -#ilippines is in&ol&ed; 3. T#e offender eit#er3 a) le&ies $ar against t#e /o&ernment4 or b) ad#eres to t#eir enemies4 gi&ing t#em aid or comfort $it#in t#e -#ilippine %slands or else$#ere. !. Terms De"#ne$ 1. Treason Treason is a 1reac# of allegiance to a go&ernment4 committed 1y a person $#o o$es allegiance to it. Allegiance is meant t#e o1ligation of fidelity and o1edience t#e indi&iduals o$es to t#e go&ernment or so&ereign under $#ic# #e li&e or to t#eir so&ereign4 in return for t#e protection t#ey recei&e. 5e&ying 6ar
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5e&ying of $ar re7uires t#e concurrence of t$o t#ings3 (1) t#at t#ere 1e an actual assem1ling of men4 (2) for t#e purpose of e8ecuting a treasona1le design 1y force. A formal declaration of $ar is not necessary. Actual #ostilities determine t#e date of t#e commencement of t#e $ar. 5e&ying of $ar must 1e in colla1oration $it# a foreign enemy. 3. A$heren%e t& the Enem' Means intent to 1etray. T#ere is 9ad#erence to t#e enemy: $#en a citi2en intellectually or emotionally fa&ors t#e enemy and #ar1ors sympat#ies or con&ictions disloyal to #is country;s policy or interest. Ad#erence alone $it#out aid and comfort does not constitute treason4 alt#oug# it may 1e inferred from t#e o&ert acts of treason committed. A#$ &r %&m"&rt Means an act $#ic# strengt#ens or tends to strengt#en t#e enemy in t#e conduct of $ar against t#e traitor;s country and an act $#ic# $ea<ens or tends to $ea<en t#e po$er of t#e traitor;s country to resist or to attac< t#e enemy. (e.g. /i&ing information to4 or commandeering foodstuffs for4 t#e enemy is e&idence of 1ot# ad#erence and aid or comfort4 +urnis#ing t#e enemy $it# arms4 troops4 supplies4 information4 or means of transportation.) T#e aid and comfort must 1e gi&en to t#e enemy 1y some <ind of action. %t must 1e a deed or p#ysical acti&ity4 not merely a mental operation. %t must 1e an act t#at #as passed from t#e realm of t#oug#t into t#e realm of action. T#e aid or comfort gi&en to t#e enemies must 1e after t#e declaration of $ar. T#e enemies must 1e t#e su1=ect of a foreign po$er.
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C. D#st#n%t#&ns 'reas#n (isting.is/e( 0r#m Rebelli#n An act le&ying $ar to #elp t#e foreign enemy is treason; ot#er$ise4 it $ould 1e re1ellion. %n treason4 t#e purpose is to deli&er t#e go&ernment to t#e enemy or to pa&e t#e $ay for t#e coming of t#e enemy4 $#ereas in re1ellion4 t#e purpose is to su1stitute t#e go&ernment $it# t#eir o$n. 2. 'reas#n (isting.is/e( 0r#m !e(iti#n Treason is t#e &iolation 1y a su1=ect of #is allegiance to #is so&ereign or t#e supreme aut#ority of t#e state4 $#ereas sedition is t#e raising of commotions or distur1ances in t#e state. 3. 'reas#n (isting.is/e( 0r#m Es)i#nage !spionage is a crime not conditioned 1y t#e citi2ens#ip of t#e offender. T#is is also true as regards treason4 in &ie$ of t#e amendment to Art. 114. >ut treason is committed only in time of $ar $#ile espionage may 1e committed 1ot# in time of peace and in time of $ar. Treason is limited in t$o $ays committing t#e crime3 le&ying $ar4 and ad#ering to t#e enemy gi&ing t#em aid or comfort4 $#ile espionage may 1e committed in many $ays. (Com. Act. ?o. 1 ). 1. D. E(#$en%es re)*#re$ "&r %&n(#%t#&n &" treas&n 1. testimony of at least t$o $itnesses to t#e same o&ert act (t#e t$o0$itness rule)4 or 2. on confession of t#e accused in open court E. De"enses t& the %har+e &" treas&n 1. .1edience to a de facto go&ernment 2. @uress or uncontrolla1le fear There m*st ,e an a%t*al assem,l#n+ &" men.
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T#e actual enlistment of men to ser&e against t#e go&ernment does not amount to le&ying of $ar4 1ecause t#ere is no actual assem1ling of men. >ut if a 1ody of men 1e actually assem1led for t#e purpose of effecting 1y force a treasona1le design4 all t#ose $#o perform any part4 #o$e&er minute4 or #o$e&er remote from t#e scene of action4 and $#o are actually leagued in t#e general conspiracy4 are to 1e considered as traitors. H. The -ar m*st ,e $#re%te$ a+a#nst the +&(ernment. T#e le&ying of $ar must 1e $it# t#e intent to o&ert#ro$ t#e go&ernment as suc#4 not merely to resist a particular statute or repel a particular officer. Mem1ers#ip in t#e police force during occupation is not treason; 1ut acti&e participation $it# t#e enemies in t#e appre#ension of guerillas and infliction of ill0treatments ma<e suc# mem1er lia1le for treason. A$heren%e ma' ,e pr&(e$ (1) 1y one $itness4 (2) from t#e nature of t#e act itself4 or (3) form t#e circumstances surrounding t#e act. %t seems o1&ious t#at ad#erence to t#e enemy4 in t#e sense of a disloyal state of mind4 cannot 1e4 and is not re7uired to 1e4 pro&ed 1y deposition of t$o $itness 1ecause $#at is designed in t#e mind of t#e accused ne&er is suscepti1le of proof 1y direct testimony. A++ra(at#n+ %#r%*mstan%es #n treas&n. (1) Cruelty and (2) %gnominy.
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*R'+CLE 2 C$-!P+R*C3 *-D PR$P$!*L '$ C$MM+' 'RE*!$H&- C&mm#tte$ *% C#ns)ira"y t# "#mmit treas#n is "#mmitte( 6#en in time of $ar4 t$o or more person come to an agreement to le&y $ar against t#e go&ernment or to ad#ere to t#e enemies and to gi&e t#em aid or comfort4 and decide to commit it. 4% Pr#)#sal t# "#mmit treas#n is "#mmitte( 6#en in time of $ar4 a person $#o #as decided to le&y $ar against t#e go&ernment or to ad#ere to t#e enemies and to gi&e t#em aid or comfort4 proposes its e8ecution to some ot#er person or persons. N.!. o %f actual acts of treason are committed after t#e conspiracy or after t#e proposal is accepted4 t#e crime committed $ill 1e treason4 and t#e conspiracy or proposal is considered as a means in t#e commission t#ereof o T#e t$o $itness rule does not apply to t#ese felonies 1ecause t#ey are separate and distinct from treason. C% C#ns)ira"y #r )r#)#sal as a 0el#ny% Alt#oug# t#e general rule is t#at conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony is not punis#a1le (Art. '4 A-C)4 under Art. 115 t#e mere conspiracy to commit
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treason is a felony. T#e mere proposal to commit treason is also a felony. >ot# are punis#a1le under Art. 115. T#e reason is t#at in treason t#e &ery e8istence of t#e state is endangered. *R'+CLE 5 M+!PR+!+$- $F 'RE*!$A. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender must 1e o$ing allegiance to t#e /o&ernment4 not a foreigner4 2. Be #as <no$ledge of any conspiracy (to commit treason) against /o&ernment4 3. T#at #e conceals or does not disclose and ma<e <no$n t#e same4 as soon as possi1le to t#e go&ernor or fiscal of t#e pro&ince4 or t#e mayor or fiscal of t#e city in $#ic# #e resides. !. Reas&n -h' Art. 01 $&es n&t appl' 1. T#is is a special application 2. T#e security of t#e Ctate is more paramount t#an mere relations#ip 3. %t is a separate and distinct offense C. Misprision of treason cannot 1e committed 1y a resident alien. T#e offender must 1e o$ing allegiance to t#e /o&ernment4 $it#out 1eing a foreigner. @. T#e conspiracy is one to commit treason. T#e p#rase 9#a&ing <no$ledge of any conspiracy against t#em: #as reference to conspiracy to commit treason defined in Art. 115. !. Art. 11 does not apply $#en t#e crime of treason is already committed 1y someone and t#e accused does not report its commission to t#e proper aut#ority. T#is is so 1ecause Art. 11 spea<s of 9<no$ledge of treason actually committed 1y anot#er. +. T#e offender in misprision of treason is punis#ed as an accessory to treason. Bo$e&er4 t#e offender under Art. 11 is a principal in t#e crime of misprision of treason. Misprision of treason is a separate and distinct offense from t#e crime of treason. /. Art. 11 is an e8ception to t#e rule t#at mere silence does not ma<e a person criminally lia1le. T#e pro&ision of Art. 11 is an e8ception to t#e general rule laid do$n in connection $it# Art. 1)4 A-C t#at a person $#o <eeps silent as to $#at #e <no$s a1out t#e perpetration of an offense is not criminally lia1le4 eit#er as a principal4 or as an accomplice4 or as an accessory. B. Ta<e note of -@ 1'2) .1struction of Dustice. 5hile in treason, even aliens can commit said crime because of the amendment to the article, no such amendment was made in misprision of treason. .isprision of treason is a crime that may be committed only by citi8ens of the Philippines. The essence of the crime is that there are persons who conspire to commit treason and the offender 9new this and failed to ma9e the necessary report to the government within the earliest possible time. 5hat is re>uired is to report it as soon as possible. The criminal liability arises if the treasonous activity was still at the conspiratorial stage. ?ecause if the treason already erupted into an overt act, the implication is that the government is already aware of it. There is no need to report the same. This is a felony by omission although committed with dolo, not with culpa.
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The persons mentioned in !rticle 114 are not limited to mayor, fiscal or governor. !ny person in authority having e>uivalent jurisdiction, li9e a provincial commander, will already negate criminal liability. 5hether the conspirators are parents or children, and the ones who learn the conspiracy is a parent or child, they are re>uired to report the same. The reason is that although blood is thic9er than water so to spea9, when it comes to security of the state, blood relationship is always subservient to national security. !rticle "@ does not apply here because the persons found liable for this crime are not considered accessories= they are treated as principals. &n the 1<<2 bar examination, a problem was given with respect to misprision of treason. The text of the provision simply refers to a conspiracy to overthrow the government. The examiner failed to note that this crime can only be committed in times of war. The conspiracy adverted to must be treasonous in character. &n the problem given, it was rebellion. ! conspiracy to overthrow the government is a crime of rebellion because there is no war. ,nder the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of misprision of rebellion. *R'+CLE 6 E!P+$-*7E A. De"#n#t#&n !spionage is t#e offense of gat#ering4 transmitting4 or losing information respecting t#e national defense $it# intent or reason to 1elie&e t#at t#e information is to 1e used to t#e in=ury of t#e Aep of t#e -#il. or to t#e ad&antage of any foreign nation. !. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. >y entering4 $it#out aut#ority t#erefore4 a $ars#ip4 fort4 or na&al or military esta1lis#ment or reser&ation to o1tain any information4 plans4 p#otograp#s4 or ot#er data of a confidential nature relati&e to t#e defense of t#e -#ilippine Arc#ipelago; or !lements3 (a) T#at t#e offender enters any of t#e places mentioned t#erein; (1) T#at #e #as no aut#ority t#erefore; (c) T#at #is purpose is to o1tain information4 planes4 p#otograp#s or ot#er data of a confidential nature relati&e to t#e defense of t#e -#ilippines. 2. >eing in possession4 1y reason of t#e pu1lic office #e #olds4 of t#e articles4 data4 or information referred to in t#e preceding paragrap#4 discloses t#eir contents to a representati&e of a foreign nation. !lements3 (a) T#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer; (1) T#at #e #as in #is possession t#e articles4 data or information referred to in paragrap# ?o. 1 of Art. 11"4 1y reason of t#e pu1lic office #e #olds; (c) T#at #e discloses t#eir contents to a representati&e of a foreign nation. T#e penalty ne8t #ig#er in degree s#all 1e imposed if t#e offender 1e a pu1lic officer or employee. C. To 1e lia1le under par. 14 t#e offender must #a&e t#e intention to o1tain information relati&e to t#e defense of t#e -#ilippines. -%4% %t is not necessary t#at information4 etc. is o1tained.
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D. 2ers&ns l#a,le #n t-& -a's &" %&mm#tt#n+ esp#&na+e. Ender par. 1 of Art. 11"4 t#e offender is any person4 $#et#er a citi2en or a foreigner4 a pri&ate indi&idual or a pu1lic officer. Ender par. 24 t#e offender must 1e a pu1lic officer $#o #as in #is possession t#e article4 date4 or information 1y reason of t#e pu1lic office #e #olds. E. A%ts p*n#sha,le *n$er CA 343 1. Enla$fully o1taining or permitting to 1e o1tained information affecting national defense; 2. T#e unla$ful disclosing of information relati&e to t#e defense of t#e -#ilippines4 committed in time of peace or in time of $ar; 3. @isloyal acts in time of peace li<e causing insu1ordination4 disloyalty or mutiny in t#e armed forces of t#e -#ilippines; 4. @isloyal acts in time of $as li<e con&eying false reports $it# intent to interfere $it# t#e operation of t#e armed forces of t#e p#ilippines or $illful o1struction to t#e recruitment or enlistment of ser&ices; 5. Conspiracy to &iolate any of t#e said acts; 6. #ar1oring or concealing &iolators of t#e la$; and 7. -#otograp#ing from an aircraft &ital military information. !e"ti#n 'w#% & Pr#v#8ing war an( (isl#yalty in "ase #0 war 6#at are t#e crimes classified as pro&o<ing $ar and disloyalty in case of $arF T#ey are3 1. %nciting to $ar or gi&ing moti&es for reprisals. 2. (iolation of neutrality. 3. Correspondence $it# #ostile country. 4. +lig#t to enemy;s country. *R'+CLE 8 +-C+'+-7 '$ 9*R $R 7+:+-7 M$'+:E! F$R REPR+!*L! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender performs unla$ful or unaut#ori2ed acts; 2. T#at suc# acts pro&o<e or gi&es occasion for a $ar in&ol&ing or lia1le to in&ol&e t#e -#ilippines or e8poses +ilipino citi2ens to reprisals on t#eir persons or property. ?.>. T#is is committed in times of peace. T#e crime is aggra&ated if committed 1y any pu1lic officer or employee. T#e %ntention of t#e offender is immaterial. *R'+CLE 9 :+$L*'+$- $F -E;'R*L+'3 A. ?eutrality defined A nation or po$er $#ic# ta<es no part in a contest of arms going on 1et$een ot#ers is referred to as neutral. B. !lements 1. T#ere is a $ar in $#ic# t#e -#ilippines is not in&ol&ed;
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T#ere is a regulation issued 1y competent aut#ority for t#e purpose of enforcing neutrality; T#e offender &iolates suc# regulation.
C. T#ere must 1e a regulation issued 1y competent aut#ority for t#e enforcement of neutrality. %t is t#e &iolation of suc# regulation $#ic# constitutes t#e crime. *R'+CLE 20 C$RRE!P$-CE 9+'< <$!'+LE C$;-'R3 A. !lements 1. %t is in time of $ar in $#ic# t#e -#ilippines is in&ol&ed; 2. .ffender ma<es correspondence $it# an enemy country or territory occupied 1y enemy troops; 3. T#e correspondence is eit#er3 a. pro#i1ited 1y t#e /o&ernment; b. carried on in cip#ers or con&entional signs; and c. containing notice or information $#ic# mig#t 1e useful to t#e enemy ?.>. T#e crime is aggra&ated if t#e offender intended to aid t#e enemy 1y gi&ing suc# notice or information. *R'+CLE 2 FL+7<' '$ E-EM3! C$;-'R3 A. !lements 1. T#ere is a $ar in $#ic# t#e -#ilippines is in&ol&ed; 2. T#e offender o$es allegiance to t#e -#ilippines; 3. .ffender attempts to flee or go to an enemy country 4. T#at going to t#e enemy country is pro#i1ited 1y competent aut#ority.
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T#is felony may also 1e committed 1y an alien resident as #e o$es allegiance to t#e /o&ernment e&en t#oug# temporary in nature.
!e"ti#n '/ree% & Pira"y an( m.tiny #n t/e /ig/ seas &n crimes against the law of nations, the offenders can be prosecuted anywhere in the world because these crimes are considered as against humanity in general, li9e piracy and mutiny. Crimes against national security can be tried only in the Philippines, as there is a need to bring the offender here before he can be made to suffer the conse>uences of the law. The acts against national security may be committed abroad and still be punishable under our law, but it can not be tried under foreign law. *R'+CLE 22 P+R*C3 +- 7E-ER*L *-D M;'+-3 $- '<E <+7< !E*! A. Terms $e"#ne$ 1. Piracy
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-iracy is ro11ery or forci1le depredation on t#e #ig# seas4 $it#out la$ful aut#ority and done animo furandi and in t#e spirit and intention of uni&ersal #ostility. 2. Mutiny Mutiny is unla$ful resistance to a superior officer4 as t#e raising of commotion and distur1ances on1oard a s#ip against t#e aut#ority of t#e commander. 3. High Seas Any part of t#e sea coast $#ic# are $it#out t#e 1oundaries of t#e lo$0 $ater mar<4 alt#oug# suc# $aters may 1e in t#e roadstead or $it#in =urisdictional limit of a foreign go&ernment. !. M&$es &" %&mm#tt#n+ p#ra%' *n$er R2C 1. >y attac<ing or sei2ing a &essel on t#e #ig# seas. 2. >y sei2ing in t#e &essel $#ile on t#e #ig# seas t#e $#ole or part of its cargo4 its e7uipment or personal 1elongings of its competent passengers. C. Elements 1. T#e &essel is on t#e #ig# seas; 2. .ffenders are not mem1ers of its complement or passengers of t#e &essel; 3. T#at t#e offender (1) attac<s or sei2es t#at &essel4 or (2) sei2es t#e $#ole or part of its cargo4 its e7uipment or personal 1elongings of its competent passengers. D% Pira"y (isting.is/e( 0r#m R#bbery #n t/e <ig/ !eas 6#en t#e offender is a mem1er of t#e complement or a passenger of t#e &essel and t#ere is &iolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon t#ings in ta<ing t#e property in t#e &essel4 it is common ro11ery4 if t#e offender is an outsider4 it $ill 1e piracy. E% Pira"y (isting.is/e( 0r#m M.tiny >ot# are against t#e la$ of nations. %n piracy4 t#e attac< of t#e &essel comes from t#e outside. T#e offenders are strangers to t#e &essel4 t#at is4 neit#er passenger nor mem1ers of t#e cre$. .t#er$ise t#e felony is mutiny. %ntent to gain is material in piracy and immaterial in mutiny. .utiny is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotions and disturbances aboard a ship against the authority of its commander. ,i()in )i%n "e)ween m-)in# an! &ira # (ORTEGA) #1% !s to offenders .utiny is committed by members of the complement or the passengers of the vessel. Piracy is committed by persons who are not members of the complement or the passengers of the vessel. !s to criminal intent &n mutiny, there is no criminal intent. &n piracy, the criminal intent is for gain. F% PD 212 *-'+=P+R*C3 *-D <+7<9*3 R$44ER3 L*9 $F 96, Cec. 2. @efinition of Terms. 0 T#e follo$ing terms s#all mean and 1e understood4 as follo$s3 a. -#ilippine 6aters. 0 %t s#all refer to all 1odies of $ater4 suc# as 1ut not limited to4 seas4 gulfs4 1ays around4 1et$een and connecting eac# of t#e %slands of
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t#e -#ilippine Arc#ipelago4 irrespecti&e of its dept#4 1readt#4 lengt# or dimension4 and all ot#er $aters 1elonging to t#e -#ilippines 1y #istoric or legal title4 including territorial sea4 t#e sea01ed4 t#e insular s#el&es4 and ot#er su1marine areas o&er $#ic# t#e -#ilippines #as so&ereignty or =urisdiction. 1. (essel. 0 Any &essel or $atercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to anot#er t#roug# -#ilippine 6aters. %t s#all include all <inds and types of &essels or 1oats used in fis#ing. d. -iracy. 0 Any attac< upon or sei2ure of any &essel4 or t#e ta<ing a$ay of t#e $#ole or part t#ereof or its cargo4 e7uipment4 or t#e personal 1elongings of its complement or passengers4 irrespecti&e of t#e &alue t#ereof4 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon t#ings4 committed 1y any person4 including a passenger or mem1er of t#e complement of said &essel4 in -#ilippine $aters4 s#all 1e considered as piracy. T#e offenders s#all 1e considered as pirates and punis#ed as #ereinafter pro&ided. Cec. 4. A#$#n+ pirates or #ig#$ay ro11ersG1rigands &r a,ett#n+ piracy or #ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandage. 0 Any person $#o <no$ingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or #ig#$ay ro11ersG1rigands4 suc# as gi&ing t#em information a1out t#e mo&ement of police or ot#er peace officers of t#e go&ernment4 or ac7uires or recei&es property ta<en 1y suc# pirates or 1rigands or in any manner deri&es any 1enefit t#erefrom; or any person $#o directly or indirectly a1ets t#e commission of piracy or #ig#$ay ro11ery or 1rigandage4 s#all 1e considered as an accomplice of t#e principal offenders and 1e punis#ed in accordance $it# t#e Aules prescri1ed 1y t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %t s#all 1e presumed t#at any person $#o does any of t#e acts pro&ided in t#is Cection #as performed <no$ingly4 unless t#e contrary is pro&en. 2p ( CATANTAN G.R. N&. 445167 Sept. 78 4996 Accused Catantan $as c#arged $it# &iolation of -@ 532 for assaulting t#e -ilapil 1rot#ers ($#o $ere fis#ing) and sei2ing t#eir 1oat. Catantan claimed t#at t#e crime $as gra&e coercion. T#e Cupreme Court ruled t#at t#e act of t#e accused in using force and intimidation in sei2ing t#e fis#ing 1oat of -ilapil and t#ereafter lea&ing t#e passengers at sea $as in &iolation of -@ 532 and not gra&e coercion 7% R* 5212 *C'! +-+M+C*L '$ C+:+L *:+*'+$Cec. 1. %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person to compel a c#ange in t#e course or destination of an aircraft of -#ilippine registry4 or to sei2e or usurp t#e control t#ereof4 $#ile it is in flig#t. An aircraft is in flig#t from t#e moment all its e8ternal doors are closed follo$ing em1ar<ation until any of suc# doors is opened for disem1ar<ation. %t s#all li<e$ise 1e unla$ful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign registry to land in -#ilippine territory or to sei2e or usurp t#e control t#ereof $#ile it is $it#in t#e said territory. Cec. 3. %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person4 natural or =uridical4 to s#ip4 load or carry in any passenger aircraft operating as a pu1lic utility $it#in t#e -#ilippines4 and e8plosi&e4 flamma1le4 corrosi&e or poisonous su1stance or material. (riginally, the crimes of piracy and mutiny can only be committed in the high seas, that is, outside Philippine territorial waters. ?ut in !ugust 1<A2, Presidential Becree /o. $:" #The !nti Piracy and !nti Highway Robbery -aw of 1<A2% was issued, punishing piracy, but not mutiny, in Philippine territorial waters. Thus came about two 9inds of piracy' #1% that which is punished under the Revised Penal Code if committed in the high seas= and #"% that which is punished under Presidential Becree /o. $:" if committed in Philippine territorial waters.
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!mending !rticle 1"", Republic !ct /o. A4$< included therein piracy in Philippine waters, thus, pro tanto superseding Presidential Becree /o. $:". !s amended, the article now punishes piracy, as well as mutiny, whether committed in the high seas or in Philippine territorial waters, and the penalty has been increased to reclusion perpetua from reclusion temporal. ?ut while under Presidential Becree /o. $:", piracy in Philippine waters could be committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of a vessel, under the amended article, piracy can only be committed by a person who is not a passenger nor member of the complement of the vessel irrespective of venue. +o if a passenger or complement of the vessel commits acts of robbery in the high seas, the crime is robbery, not piracy. /ote, however, that in +ection 2 of Presidential Becree /o. $:", the act of aiding pirates or abetting piracy is penali8ed as a crime distinct from piracy. +aid section penali8es any person who 9nowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates, such as giving them information about the movement of the police or other peace officers of the government, or ac>uires or receives property ta9en by such pirates, or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom= or who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy. !lso, it is expressly provided in the same section that the offender shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders and punished in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. This provision of Presidential Becree /o. $:" with respect to piracy in Philippine water has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code. /either may it be considered repealed by Republic !ct /o. A4$< since there is nothing in the amendatory law is inconsistent with said section. !pparently, there is still the crime of abetting piracy in Philippine waters under Presidential Becree /o. $:". Considering that the essence of piracy is one of robbery, any ta9ing in a vessel with force upon things or with violence or intimidation against person is employed will always be piracy. &t cannot co exist with the crime of robbery. Robbery, therefore, cannot be committed on board a vessel. ?ut if the ta9ing is without violence or intimidation on persons of force upon things, the crime of piracy cannot be committed, but only theft. Cuestions D !nswers Could theft be committed on board a vesselE Fes. The essence of piracy is one of robbery. *R'+CLE 21 >;*L+F+ED P+R*C3 A. Cpecial Hualifying circumstances 1. Cei2ure of a &essel 1y 1oarding or firing upon t#e same; 2. A1andonment of t#eir &ictims $it#out means of sa&ing t#emsel&es; or 3. Crime is accompanied 1y murder4 #omicide4 p#ysical in=uries or rape. B. Aelated Cpecial 5a$s
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1. 2.
AA 235 An Act -ro#i1iting Certain Acts %nimical to Ci&il A&iation. (Bi=ac<ing) -@ 532 -iracy in -#ilippine 6aters
C. Any person $#o aids or protects pirates or a1ets t#e commission of piracy s#all 1e considered as an accomplice. &f any of the circumstances in !rticle1": is present, piracy is >ualified. Ta9e note of the specific crimes involve in number 2 c #murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape%. 5hen any of these crimes accompany piracy, there is no complex crime. &nstead, there is only one crime committed 3 >ualified piracy. .urder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere circumstances >ualifying piracy and cannot be punished as separate crimes, nor can they be complexed with piracy. !lthough in !rticle 1": merely refers to >ualified piracy, there is also the crime of >ualified mutiny. .utiny is >ualified under the following circumstances' #1% #"% 5hen the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves= or 5hen the mutiny is accompanied by rape, murder, homicide, or physical injuries.
/ote that the first circumstance which >ualifies piracy does not apply to mutiny.
Re&-"li A ) N%. /012 (The An)i 3i'4a 5in* Law)

!nti hi jac9ing is another 9ind of piracy which is committed in an aircraft. &n other countries, this crime is 9nown as aircraft piracy. 7our situations governed by anti hi jac9ing law' #1% usurping or sei8ing control of an aircraft of Philippine registry while it is in flight, compelling the pilots thereof to change the course or destination of the aircraft= usurping or sei8ing control of an aircraft of foreign registry while within Philippine territory, compelling the pilots thereof to land in any part of Philippine territory= carrying or loading on board an aircraft operating as a public utility passenger aircraft in the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance= and loading, shipping, or transporting on board a cargo aircraft operating as a public utility in the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance if this was done not in accordance with the rules and regulations set and promulgated by the !ir Transportation (ffice on this matter.
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#2%
?etween numbers 1 and ", the point of distinction is whether the aircraft is of Philippine registry or foreign registry. The common bar >uestion on this law usually involves number 1. The important thing is that before the anti hi jac9ing law can apply, the aircraft must be in flight. &f not in flight, whatever crimes
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committed shall be governed by the Revised Penal Code. The law ma9es a distinction between aircraft of a foreign registry and of Philippine registry. &f the aircraft subject of the hi jac9 is of Philippine registry, it should be in flight at the time of the hi jac9ing. (therwise, the anti hi jac9ing law will not apply and the crime is still punished under the Revised Penal Code. The correlative crime may be one of grave coercion or grave threat. &f somebody is 9illed, the crime is homicide or murder, as the case may be. &f there are some explosives carried there, the crime is destructive arson. )xplosives are by nature pyro techni>ues. Bestruction of property with the use of pyro techni>ue is destructive arson. &f there is illegally possessed or carried firearm, other special laws will apply. (n the other hand, if the aircraft is of foreign registry, the law does not re>uire that it be in flight before the anti hi jac9ing law can apply. This is because aircrafts of foreign registry are considered in transit while they are in foreign countries. !lthough they may have been in a foreign country, technically they are still in flight, because they have to move out of that foreign country. +o even if any of the acts mentioned were committed while the exterior doors of the foreign aircraft were still open, the anti hi jac9ing law will already govern. /ote that under this law, an aircraft is considered in flight from the moment all exterior doors are closed following embar9ation until such time when the same doors are again opened for disembar9ation. This means that there are passengers that boarded. +o if the doors are closed to bring the aircraft to the hangar, the aircraft is not considered as in flight. The aircraft shall be deemed to be already in flight even if its engine has not yet been started.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. The pilots of the Pan !m aircraft were accosted by some armed men and were told to proceed to the aircraft to fly it to a foreign destination. The armed men wal9ed with the pilots and went on board the aircraft. ?ut before they could do anything on the aircraft, alert marshals arrested them. 5hat crime was committedE The criminal intent definitely is to ta9e control of the aircraft, which is hi jac9ing. &t is a >uestion now of whether the anti hi jac9ing law shall govern. The anti hi jac9ing law is applicable in this case. )ven if the aircraft is not yet about to fly, the re>uirement that it be in flight does not hold true when in comes to aircraft of foreign registry. )ven if the problem does not say that all exterior doors are closed, the crime is hi jac9ing. +ince the aircraft is of foreign registry, under the law, simply usurping or sei8ing control is enough as long as the aircraft is within Philippine territory, without the re>uirement that it be in flight. /ote, however, that there is no hi jac9ing in the attempted stage. This is a special law where the attempted stage is not punishable. ". ! Philippine !ir -ines aircraft is bound for Bavao. 5hile the pilot and co pilot are ta9ing their snac9s at the airport lounge, some of the armed men were also there. The pilots were followed by these men on their way to the aircraft. !s soon as the pilots entered the coc9pit, they pulled out their firearms and gave instructions where to fly the aircraft. Boes the anti hi jac9ing law applyE
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/o. The passengers have yet to board the aircraft. &f at that time, the offenders are apprehended, the law will not apply because the aircraft is not yet in flight. /ote that the aircraft is of Philippine registry. :. 5hile the stewardess of a Philippine !ir -ines plane bound for Cebu was waiting for the passenger manifest, two of its passengers seated near the pilot surreptitiously entered the pilot coc9pit. !t gunpoint, they directed the pilot to fly the aircraft to the .iddle )ast. However, before the pilot could fly the aircraft towards the .iddle )ast, the offenders were subdued and the aircraft landed. 5hat crime was committedE The aircraft was not yet in flight. Considering that the stewardess was still waiting for the passenger manifest, the doors were still open. Hence, the anti hi jac9ing law is not applicable. &nstead, the Revised Penal Code shall govern. The crime committed was grave coercion or grave threat, depending upon whether or not any serious offense violence was inflicted upon the pilot. However, if the aircraft were of foreign registry, the act would already be subject to the anti hi jac9ing law because there is no re>uirement for foreign aircraft to be in flight before such law would apply. The reason for the distinction is that as long as such aircraft has not returned to its home base, technically, it is still considered in transit or in flight. !s to numbers : and 2 of Republic !ct /o. 4":$, the distinction is whether the aircraft is a passenger aircraft or a cargo aircraft. &n both cases, however, the law applies only to public utility aircraft in the Philippines. Private aircrafts are not subject to the anti hi jac9ing law, in so far as transporting prohibited substances are concerned. &f the aircraft is a passenger aircraft, the prohibition is absolute. Carrying of any prohibited, flammable, corrosive, or explosive substance is a crime under Republic !ct /o. 4":$. ?ut if the aircraft is only a cargo aircraft, the law is violated only when the transporting of the prohibited substance was not done in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the !ir Transportation (ffice in the matter of shipment of such things. The ?oard of Transportation provides the manner of pac9ing of such 9ind of articles, the >uantity in which they may be loaded at any time, etc. (therwise, the anti hi jac9ing law does not apply. However, under +ection A, any physical injury or damage to property which would result from the carrying or loading of the flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance in an aircraft, the offender shall be prosecuted not only for violation of Republic !ct /o. 4":$, but also for the crime of physical injuries or damage to property, as the case may be, under the Revised Penal Code. There will be two prosecutions here. (ther than this situation, the crime of physical injuries will be absorbed. &f the explosives were planted in the aircraft to blow up the aircraft, the circumstance will >ualify the penalty and that is not punishable as a separate crime for murder. The penalty is increased under the anti hi jac9ing law. !ll other acts outside of the four are merely >ualifying circumstances and would bring about higher penalty. +uch acts would not constitute another crime. +o the 9illing or explosion will only >ualify the penalty to a higher one.
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Cuestions D !nswers 1. &n the course of the hi jac9, a passenger or complement was shot and 9illed. 5hat crime or crimes were committedE The crime remains to be a violation of the anti hi jac9ing law, but the penalty thereof shall be higher because a passenger or complement of the aircraft had been 9illed. The crime of homicide or murder is not committed. ". The hi jac9ers threatened to detonate a bomb in the course of the hi jac9. 5hat crime or crimes were committedE !gain, the crime is violation of the anti hi jac9ing law. The separate crime of grave threat is not committed. This is considered as a >ualifying circumstance that shall serve to increase the penalty.
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TITLE TWO
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

?.TA >!?!3 H3 $#at are t#ese crimesF T#ere are 1* crimes3 A3 1. ar1itrary detention 2. delay in t#e deli&ery of detained persons to t#e proper =udicial aut#ority 3. delaying release 4. e8pulsion 5. &iolation of domicile . searc# $arrants maliciously o1tained and a1use in t#e ser&ice of t#ose legally o1tained ". searc#ing domicile $it#out $itnesses '. pro#i1ition4 interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings ). interruption of religious $ors#ip 1*. offending t#e religious feelings ?.TA >!?!3 A55 TB! !?EM!AAT!@ CA%M!C4 !IC!-T offending religious feelings4 CA? .?5J >! C.MM%TT!@ >J A -E>5%C .++%C!A .A !M-5.J!!. H3 $#y are t#ese considered as crimes against t#e fundamental la$s of t#e stateF A3 1ecause t#ese acts are (%.5AT%.?C .? C!ATA%? -A.(%C%.?C C.?CT%TET%.? specifically TB! >%55 .+ A%/BTC .+ TB!
Crimes under this title are those which violate the ?ill of Rights accorded to the citi8ens under the Constitution. ,nder this title, the offenders are public officers, except as to the last crime 3 offending the religious feelings under !rticle 1::, which refers to any person. The public officers who may be held liable are only those acting under supposed exercise of official functions, albeit illegally. &n its counterpart in Title &G #Crimes !gainst Personal -iberty and +ecurity%, the offenders are private persons. ?ut private persons may also be liable under this title as when a private person conspires with a public officer. 5hat is re>uired is that the principal offender must be a public officer. Thus, if a private person conspires with a public officer, or becomes an accessory or accomplice, the private person also becomes liable for the same crime. ?ut a private person acting alone cannot commit the crimes under !rticle 1"2 to 1:" of this title.
Chapter One AR!ITRARY DETENTION8 ETC

!e"ti#n $ne% & *rbitrary (etenti#n an( ex).lsi#n
Classes &" ar,#trar' $etent#&n

1. Ar1itrary detention 1y detaining a person $it#out legal grounds (Art. 124) 2. @elay in t#edeli&ery of detained persons to t#e proper =udicial aut#orities. (Art. 125) 3. @elaying release. (Art. 12 )
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*R'+CLE 2, *R4+'R*R3 DE'E-'+$-. A. Terms $e"#ne$ % *rbitrary Detenti#n @epri&ation 1y a pu1lic officer of t#e li1erty of person $it#out legal ground. %f t#e offender is a pri&ate indi&idual t#e offense illegal detention. >ut $#en a pri&ate indi&idual conni&es $it# a pu1lic officer4 t#e crime is ar1itrary detention due to conspiracy and t#e #ig#er penalty is imposed. T#e crime of illegal detention is a1sor1ed in ar1itrary detention. 2% Detenti#n 6#en t#ere is a restra#nt on #is person not restraint of mo&ement. 1% 9arrant #0 arrest A document issued 1y t#e court directing a police officer to put into custody t#e person $#ose name appears t#erein. An officer armed $it# a $arrant of arrest cannot 1e c#arged under t#is pro&ision. A $arrant of arrest $ill not e8pire unli<e a searc# $arrant $#ic# $ould prescri1e $it#in 1* days. ,% +n /is )resen"e Cense of sig#t is not re7uired. .t#er senses can 1e used. 0 6#en t#e arresting officer sees at a distance, or hears t#e distur1ance created near1y and proceeds at once to t#e scene t#ereof. 2% Pers#nal 8n#wle(ge Arrest not necessarily 1e done immediately after t#e commission of t#e crime 1ut may 1e done later. >ut t#e arresting officer must #a&e $itnessed t#e commission of t#e crime. !.g. 6#ile manning traffic4 t#e arresting officer (-) sa$ A snatc# t#e nec<lace of >. - c#ased A 1ut $as left 1e#ind 1ecause #e $as slo$. 5ater in t#e afternoon - sa$ A $al<ing and t#us arrested #im. T#e arrest is considered &alid 1ecause t#e time lapsed did not e8ceed one day or 24 #ours. !. Elements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or employee (a person $#o #as t#e aut#ority to detain t#e person) 2. Be detains a person 3. T#e detention is $it#out legal grounds C. Warrantless Arrests -hen la-"*l 1. 6#en4 in #is presence4 t#e person to 1e arrested #as committed4 is actually committing4 or is attempting to commit an offense; 2. 6#en t#e offense #as in fact 1een committed and #e #as personal <no$ledge of t#e facts t#at t#e person to 1e arrested #as committed it; and 3. 6#en t#e person to 1e arrested is an escaped prisoner D. Le+al +r&*n$s "&r $etent#&n 1. T#e commission of a crime; 2. (iolent insanity or ot#er ailment re7uiring compulsory confinement of t#e patient in a #ospital e.g leprosy.
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?.TA >!?!3 H3 6#at is t#e criminal design in article 124F A3 detaining a person 6%TB.ET 5!/A5 /A.E?@C H3 Are t#ere instances or e8amples $#ere t#ere is no ar1itrary detention alt#oug# t#ere is detentionF A3 yes 1. %n unla$ful arrest4 a person is detained $it#out legal grounds 1ut t#e purpose of t#e detention is to 1ring #im to t#e police station. T#e crime committed #ere is not ar1itrary detention 1ut E?5A6+E5 AAA!CT 1ecause t#e detention is incidental to some ot#er crime. 2. in forci1le a1duction4 t#ere is also detention 1ut 6%TB 5!6@ @!C%/?
1.
%n gra&e coercion4 t#ere is detention forcing t#e detained person to do
somet#ing against #is $ill. T#ere is no ar1itrary detention 1ecause detention $as merely incidental to some ot#er crime. ,i()in )i%n "e)ween ar"i)rar# !e)en)i%n an! ille*al !e)en)i%n 1. &n arbitrary detention The principal offender must be a public officer. Civilians can commit the crime of arbitrary detention except when they conspire with a public officer committing this crime, or become an accomplice or accessory to the crime committed by the public officer= and The offender who is a public officer has a duty which carries with it the authority to detain a person. ". &n illegal detention The principal offender is a private person. ?ut a public officer can commit the crime of illegal detention when he is acting in a private capacity or beyond the scope of his official duty, or when he becomes an accomplice or accessory to the crime committed by a private person. The offender, even if he is a public officer, does not include as his function the power to arrest and detain a person, unless he conspires with a public officer committing arbitrary detention. /ote that in the crime of arbitrary detention, although the offender is a public officer, not any public officer can commit this crime. (nly those public officers whose official duties carry with it the authority to ma9e an arrest and detain persons can be guilty of this crime. +o, if the offender does not possess such authority, the crime committed by him is illegal detention. ! public officer who is acting outside the scope of his official duties is no better than a private citi8en.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. ! janitor at the Cue8on City Hall was assigned in cleaning the menHs room. (ne day, he noticed a fellow urinating so carelessly that instead of urinating at the bowl, he was actually urinating partly on the floor. The janitor
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resented this. He stepped out of the menHs room and loc9ed the same. He left. The fellow was able to come out only after several hours when people from the outside forcibly opened the door. &s the janitor liable for arbitrary detentionE /o. )ven if he is a public officer, he is not permitted by his official function to arrest and detain persons. Therefore, he is guilty only of illegal detention. 5hile the offender is a public officer, his duty does not include the authority to ma9e arrest= hence, the crime committed is illegal detention. ". ! municipal treasurer has been courting his secretary. However, the latter always turned him down. Thereafter, she tried to avoid him. (ne afternoon, the municipal treasurer loc9ed the secretary inside their office until she started crying. The treasurer opened the door and allowed her to go home. 5hat crime was committedE &llegal detention. This is because the municipal treasurer has no authority to detain a person although he is a public officer. &n a case decided by the +upreme Court a ?arangay Chairman who unlawfully detains another was held to be guilty of the crime of arbitrary detention. This is because he is a person in authority vested with the jurisdiction to maintain peace and order within his barangay. &n the maintenance of such peace and order, he may cause the arrest and detention of troublema9ers or those who disturb the peace and order within his barangay. ?ut if the legal basis for the apprehension and detention does not exist, then the detention becomes arbitrary. 5hether the crime is arbitrary detention or illegal detention, it is necessary that there must be an actual restraint of liberty of the offended party. &f there is no actual restraint, as the offended party may still go to the place where he wants to go, even though there have been warnings, the crime of arbitrary detention or illegal detention is not committed. There is either grave or light threat. However, if the victim is under guard in his movement such that there is still restraint of liberty, then the crime of either arbitrary or illegal detention is still committed.
Cuestion D !nswer The offended party was brought to a place which he could not leave because he does not 9now where he is, although free to move about. 5as arbitrary or illegal detention committedE )ither arbitrary detention or illegal detention was committed. &f a person is brought to a safe house, blindfolded, even if he is free to move as he pleases, but if he cannot leave the place, arbitrary detention or illegal detention is committed. ,i()in )i%n "e)ween ar"i)rar# !e)en)i%n an! -nlaw6-l arre() #1% !s to offender
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&n arbitrary detention, the offender is a public officer possessed with authority to ma9e arrests. &n unlawful arrest, the offender may be any person. #"% !s to criminal intent &n arbitrary detention, the main reason for detaining the offended party is to deny him of his liberty. &n unlawful arrest, the purpose is to accuse the offended party of a crime he did not commit, to deliver the person to the proper authority, and to file the necessary charges in a way trying to incriminate him. 5hen a person is unlawfully arrested, his subse>uent detention is without legal grounds.
Cuestion D !nswer ! had been collecting tong from drivers. ?, a driver, did not want to contribute to the tong. (ne day, ? was apprehended by !, telling him that he was driving carelessly. Rec9less driving carries with it a penalty of immediate detention and arrest. ? was brought to the Traffic ?ureau and was detained there until the evening. 5hen ! returned, he opened the cell and told ? to go home. 5as there a crime of arbitrary detention or unlawful arrestE Ar"i)rar# !e)en)i%n. The arrest of ? was only incidental to the criminal intent of the offender to detain him. ?ut if after putting ? inside the cell, he was turned over to the investigating officer who boo9ed him and filed a charge of rec9less imprudence against him, then the crime would be unlawful arrest. The detention of the driver is incidental to the supposed crime he did not commit. ?ut if there is no supposed crime at all because the driver was not charged at all, he was not given place under boo9ing sheet or report arrest, then that means that the only purpose of the offender is to stop him from driving his jeepney because he refused to contribute to the tong.
;)(ates in *R4+'R*R3 DE'E-'+$- (2005)

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are: 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the detention is without legal grounds. o That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. ence, the first element of !rbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present. o !lso, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. "n the contrary, he admitted that his acts were moti#ated by his $instinct for self%preser#ation$ and the feeling that he was being $singled out.$ The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated abo#e. o &hat remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained. 'n the case of (eople #. !costa, which in#ol#ed the illegal detention of a child, we found the accused%appellant therein guilty of )idnapping despite the lac) of e#idence to show that any
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physical restraint was employed upon the #ictim. owe#er, because the #ictim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to lea#e until his godmother, the accused%appellant, had returned, he was practically a capti#e in the sense that he could not lea#e because of his fear to #iolate such instruction. o 'n the case of (eople #. *orte+, we held that, in establishing the intent to depri#e the #ictim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be )ept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. !t the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside tal)ing to the owner of the house where she had been ta)en. She e,plained that she did not attempt to lea#e the premises for fear that the )idnappers would ma)e good their threats to )ill her should she do so. &e ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the )idnappers )new where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in loo)ing for her cousin was to )ill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been )nown to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an indi#idual, such as by threats to )ill or similar threats, are e-ui#alent to the use of actual force or #iolence.
The pre#ailing .urisprudence on )idnapping and illegal detention is that the
curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will. o 'n the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is e#ident. 'nspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was -uic)ly followed by the call for and arri#al of almost a do+en $reinforcements,$ all armed with military%issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. /i#en such circumstances, we gi#e credence to S("1 *apo-uian0s statement that it was not $safe$ to refuse Mayor !storga0s orders. 't was not .ust the presence of the armed men, but also the e#ident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which pro#es that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the e,tent that they felt compelled to stay in 1rgy. 2ucob%2ucob. The intent to pre#ent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear. The determinati#e factor in !rbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. !fter a careful re#iew of the e#idence on record, we find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the pri#ate offended parties. o 'ndeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of S("1 3ufo *apo-uian, the police officer who escorted the D453 Team during their mission. "n the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely e,tended his hospitality and entertained the D453 Team in his house. The testimonial e#idence li)ewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private offended parties. S("1 *apo-uian in fact testified that they were free to lea#e the house and roam around the barangay. 6urthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. ence, it is possible that petitioner pre#ented the team from lea#ing the island because it was unsafe for them to tra#el by boat (reconsideration ruling in same 2006 case above)
*R'+CLE 22 DEL*3 +- '<E DEL+:ER3 $F DE'*+-ED PER!$-! '$ '<E PR$PER ?;D+C+*L *;'<$R+'+E! A. Elements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or employee; 2. Be #as detained a person for some legal ground; 3. Be fails to deli&er suc# person to t#e proper =udicial aut#ority $it#in3 a. 12 #ours for lig#t penalties; 1. 1' #ours for correctional penalties; c. 3 #ours for afflicti&e penalties. (As amended 1y !... ?os. 5) and 2"24 ?o&. "4 1)' and Duly 254 1)'"4 respecti&ely) ?.>. o T#is article does not apply if t#e arrest is made $it# a $arrant and it is la$ful. T#is is a felony 1y omission.
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4% *rt 22 (isting.is/e( 0r#m *rt% 2, %n ar1itrary detention under Art. 1244 t#e detention is illegal from t#e 1eginning; in ar1itrary detention under Art. 1254 t#e detention is legal in t#e 1eginning 1ut t#e illegality of t#e detention starts from t#e e8piration of any of t#e periods of time specified in Art. 1254 $it#out t#e person detained #a&ing 1een deli&ered to t#e proper =udicial aut#ority. C% Peri#( 0#r (elivery T#e num1er of #ours mentioned $ill start to run at t#e moment t#e police officers placed into custody t#e arrested person and $ill not stop e&en $#en filed at t#e prosecutor;s office. T#is is a prescripti&e period of t#e custody of t#e custody and t#e time $ill stop $#en t#e information is filed in court. T#erefore4 if an accused is arrested on 3 pm4 suc# period $ill not stop at 5 pm (closing time) 1ut $ill continue to run until t#e follo$ing day. >ut if t#e accused $as arrested on 5 pm4 t#e period $ill run at ' am t#e follo$ing day. T#is is 1ecause circumstances are considered in determining t#e lia1ility of t#e officer detaining t#e accused for more t#en t#e time prescri1ed. T#ese circumstances are3 (1) t#e means of communication as $ell as t#e (2) t#e #our of t#e arrest and (3) ot#er circumstances suc# as t#e material possi1ility for t#e fiscal to ma<e t#e in&estigation and file in time t#e necessary information. D% 9aiver #0 *rt 22 >efore t#e filing of a complaint or information t#e person may as< for preliminary in&estigation 1ut first #as to sign a $ai&er of Art. 125 $it# t#e assistance of a la$yer. ?ot$it#standing #is application for 1ail and t#e in&estigation must 1e terminated $it#in 15 days from its inception. ?.TA >!?!3 T#is article applies only in 5A6+E5 6AAAA?T5!CC AAA!CT %f arrest is $it# a $arrant4 article 125 does not apply 6#en a person is arrested $it#out a $arrant4 it is t#e duty of t#e pu1lic officer or employee arresting #im to 1ring #im to t#e nearest police station. H3 $#at is 9deli&ery: contemplated in t#is articleF A3 deli&ery #ere is construed not as p#ysical deli&ery of #is person ,*t t#e ma<ing of t#e c#arge or causation4 or t#e filing of case or information against t#e arrested person $it# t#e corresponding =udge or court. Ender our criminal procedure4 t#ere $ill 1e in7uest in&estigation. %f in case of $arrantless arrest4 detained person s#ould 1e 1roug#t to t#e fiscal for in7uest in&estigation. %n7uest in&estigation is different from preliminary in&estigation 1ecause in preliminary in&estigation t#e respondent is gi&en a c#ance to ans$er 1y filing a counter0 affida&it or any e&idence $it#in 1* days in in7uest in&estigation4 t#e complainant or t#e police officer $ill ma<e a compliant or an affida&it4 t#e fiscal $ill conduct an in7uest in&estigation4 and if t#ere pro1a1le cause4 t#en file an information in court. Exemptions here are: 1. $#en t#e arrest is 1y &irtue of a &alid $arrant 2. in Cayo &s. C#ief of -olice3 a. means of communication 1. #our of arrest c. ot#er circumstances suc# as t#e time of surrender and t#e material possi1ility of t#e fiscal to ma<e t#e in&estigation and file t#e necessary information ?.TA >!?!3
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Aeason $#y t#e article $as incorporated in t#e A-C 1ecause under t#e old rule4 a person $#o is not yet c#arged cannot post 1ail4 #e must 1e c#arged first 1efore #e can post 1ail. >ut Ender t#e ne$ rules of procedure4 e&en if t#e person detained #as not yet 1een c#arged $it# a crime (no case filed yet) #e can post 1ail na. T#erefore4 t#e effect is t#at t#e reason 1e#ind article 125 does not e8ist anymore 1ecause of t#is ne$ rule. %n article 1244 t#e detention is illegal from t#e &ery 1eginning %n article 1254 t#e detention is legal at t#e inception 1ut t#e illegality starts from t#e e8piration of any of t#e periods of time specified t#erein $it#out t#e person detained #a&ing 1een deli&ered to t#e proper =udicial aut#ority. %llegality of detention is not cured 1y t#e filing of t#e information in court. +iscal not generally lia1le unless #e ordered or induced t#e arresting officer to #old and not release t#e prisoner after t#e e8piration of sadi period. C!!3 AA "43' Act @efining Aig#ts of -ersons Ender Custodial %n&estigation This is a form of arbitrary detention. !t the beginning, the detention is legal since it is in the pursuance of a lawful arrest. However, the detention becomes arbitrary when the period thereof exceeds 1", 16 or :4 hours, as the case may be, depending on whether the crime is punished by light, correctional or afflictive penalty or their e>uivalent. The period of detention is 1" hours for light offenses, 16 hours for correctional offences and :4 hours for afflictive offences, where the accused may be detained without formal charge. ?ut he must cause a formal charge or application to be filed with the proper court before 1", 16 or :4 hours lapse. (therwise he has to release the person arrested. /ote that the period stated herein does not include the nighttime. &t is to be counted only when the prosecutorHs office is ready to receive the complaint or information. This article does not apply if the arrest is with a warrant. contemplated here is an arrest without a warrant. The situation
Cuestion D !nswer 5ithin what period should a police officer who has arrested a person under a warrant of arrest turn over the arrested person to the judicial authorityE There is no time limit specified except that the return must be made within a reasonable time. The period fixed by law under !rticle 1"$ does not apply because the arrest was made by virtue of a warrant of arrest. 5hen a person is arrested without a warrant, it means that there is no case filed in court yet. &f the arresting officer would hold the arrested person there, he is actually depriving the arrested of his right to bail. !s long as there is no charge in the court yet, the arrested person cannot obtain bail because bail may only be
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granted by the court. The spirit of the law is to have the arrested person delivered to the jurisdiction of the court. &f the arrest is by virtue of a warrant, it means that there is already a case filed in court. 5hen an information is filed in court, the amount of bail recommended is stated. The accused person is not really denied his right to bail. )ven if he is interrogated in the police precinct, he can already file bail. /ote that delivery of the arrested person to the proper authorities does not mean physical delivery or turn over of arrested person to the court. &t simply means putting the arrested person under the jurisdiction of the court. This is done by filing the necessary complaint or information against the person arrested in court within the period specified in !rticle 1"$. The purpose of this is for the court to determine whether the offense is bailable or not and if bailable, to allow him the right to bail. ,nder the Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, the arrested person can demand from the arresting officer to bring him to any judge in the place where he was arrested and post the bail here. Thereupon, the arresting officer may release him. The judge who granted the bail will just forward the litimus of the case to the court trying his case. The purpose is in order to deprive the arrested person of his right to post the bail. ,nder the Revised Rules of Court, when the person arrested is arrested for a crime which gives him the right to preliminary investigation and he wants to avail his right to a preliminary investigation, he would have to waive in writing his rights under !rticle 1"$ so that the arresting officer will not immediately file the case with the court that will exercise jurisdiction over the case. &f he does not want to waive this in writing, the arresting officer will have to comply with !rticle 1"$ and file the case immediately in court without preliminary investigation. &n such case, the arrested person, within five days after learning that the case has been filed in court without preliminary investigation, may as9 for preliminary investigation. &n this case, the public officer who made the arrest will no longer be liable for violation of !rticle 1"$.
Cuestion D !nswer The arrest of the suspect was done in ?aguio City. (n the way to .anila, where the crime was committed, there was a typhoon so the suspect could not be brought to .anila until three days later. 5as there a violation of !rticle 1"$E There was a violation of !rticle 1"$. The crime committed was arbitrary detention in the form of delay in the delivery of arrested person to the proper judicial authority. The typhoon or flood is a matter of defense to be proved by the accused, the arresting officer, as to whether he is liable. &n this situation, he may be exempt under paragraph A of !rticle 1". ?efore !rticle 1"$ may be applied, it is necessary that initially, the detention of the arrested person must be lawful because the arrest is based on legal grounds. &f the arrest is made without a warrant, this constitutes an unlawful arrest. !rticle "4<, not !rticle 1"$, will apply. &f the arrest is not based on legal grounds, the arrest is pure and simple arbitrary detention. !rticle 1"$ contemplates a situation
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where the arrest was made without warrant but based on legal grounds. This is 9nown as citi8enHs arrest. *R'+CLE 25 DEL*3+-7 RELE*!E A. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. >y delaying t#e performance of a =udicial or e8ecuti&e order for t#e release of a prisoner. 2. >y unduly delaying t#e ser&ice of t#e notice of suc# order to said prisoner 3. >y unduly delaying t#e proceedings upon any petition for t#e li1eration of suc# person. e.g. #a1eas corpus !. Elements 1. T#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee. 0 usually4 $ardens and =ailers are t#e offenders 2. T#ere is a =udicial or e8ecuti&e order for t#e release of a prisoner or detention prisoner4 or t#at t#ere is a proceeding upon a petition for t#e li1eration of suc# person. 3. T#e offender $it#out good reason delays3 a. t#e ser&ice of t#e notice of suc# order to t#e prisoner4 or b. t#e performance of suc# =udicial or e8ecuti&e order for t#e release of suc# prisoner4 or c. t#e proceedings upon a petition for t#e release of suc# person. ?.TA >!?!3 !8ample3 .nce t#e court issues or renders =udgement4 a court employee $ill furnis# t#e =ail $arden a copy of t#e =udgment. .nce =ail $arden recei&es t#e order of release of t#e accused4 it is #is duty to release t#e accused 1ecause t#ere is already a =udgement aut#ori2ing t#e same. %t s#ould 1e t#e court employee $#o must ser&e or deli&er t#e order4 not anyone else. T#is is to a&oid incon&enience and delay. ?.TA >!?!3 %n t#e rules of court4 a $rit or #a1eas corpus s#ould 1e gi&en priority. All courts can issue it4 e&en t#e Municipal trial court $#ere t#ere is no ATC.
*R'+CLE 26 E@P;L!+$A. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. >y e8pelling a person from t#e -#ilippines 2. >y compelling a person to c#ange #is residence !. Elements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or employee 2. Be e8pels any person form t#e -#ilippines4 or compels a person to c#ange #is residence 3. .ffender is not aut#ori2ed to do so 1y la$ ?.TA >!?!3 %n t#e -#ilippines4 it is only t#e president $#o can deport or e8pel an undesira1le alien. %t is an act of state.
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H3 $#at are legal grounds or e8pelling or compelling a person to c#ange residenceF A3 1. e=ectment cases 2. e8propriation cases 3. emergency reasons4 li<e if t#ere is a state of calamity 4. e8ecution of a $rit of possession 5. $rit of demolition The essence of this crime is coercion but the specific crime is IexpulsionJ when committed by a public officer. &f committed by a private person, the crime is grave coercion. &n ;illavicencio v. -u9ban, :< Phil AA6, the mayor of the City of .anila wanted to ma9e the city free from prostitution. He ordered certain prostitutes to be transferred to Bavao, without observing due processes since they have not been charged with any crime at all. &t was held that the crime committed was expulsion.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. Certain aliens were arrested and they were just put on the first aircraft which brought them to the country so that they may be out without due process of law. 5as there a crime committedE Fes. )xpulsion. ". committedE &f a 7ilipino citi8en is sent out of the country, what crime is
*rave coercion, not expulsion, because a 7ilipino cannot be deported. This crime refers only to aliens. !e"ti#n 'w#% & :i#lati#n #0 (#mi"ile *R'+CLE 28 :+$L*'+$- $F D$M+C+LE A. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. >y entering t#e d$elling against t#e $ill of t#e o$ner 2. >y searc#ing papers or ot#er effects found t#erein $it#out t#e pre&ious consent of suc# o$ner e&ent#oug# t#e entry $as $it# t#e consent of t#e latter 3. >y refusing to lea&e t#e premises after #a&ing 1een surreptitiously entered said d$elling and after #a&ing 1een re7uired to lea&e t#e same. !. Elements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or employee 0 if committed 1y a pri&ate person4 crime is trespass to d$elling 2. Be is not aut#ori2ed 1y =udicial order to enter t#e d$elling and Gor to ma<e a searc# t#erein for papers or ot#er effects C% Cir".mstan"es >.ali0ying $00ense 1. %f committed at nig#ttime
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2.
%f any papers and effects not constituting e&idence of a crime are not returned immediately after t#e searc# made 1y t#e offender
D% *gainst t/e will (i00erent 0r#m wit/#.t "#nsent% T#e entrance of t#e pu1lic officer must 1e against t#e $ill of t#e o$ner eit#er e8pressly or impliedly. ?o crime if only $it#out t#e consent. E% Rig/t #0 #00i"er t# brea8 int# b.il(ing #r en"l#s.re i0 re0.se( a(mittan"e t/eret#% %n order to #a&e t#at rig#t4 t#e officer must #a&e a &alid $arrant of arrest or #as one of t#e grounds enumerated in Cec. 54 A.C4 and #e #as announced #is aut#ority and purpose. There are )hree wa#( %6 %mmi))in* )he vi%la)i%n %6 Ar)i le 708$ #1% ?y simply entering the dwelling of another if such entering is done against the will of the occupant. &n the plain view doctrine, public officer should be legally entitled to be in the place where the effects were found. &f he entered the place illegally and he saw the effects, doctrine inapplicable= thus, he is liable for violation of domicile. #"% #:% Public officer who enters with consent searches for paper and effects without the consent of the owner. )ven if he is welcome in the dwelling, it does not mean he has permission to search. Refusing to leave premises after surreptitious entry and being told to leave the same. The act punished is not the entry but the refusal to leave. &f the offender upon being directed to eave, followed and left, there is no crime of violation of domicile. )ntry must be done surreptitiously= without this, crime may be unjust vexation. ?ut if entering was done against the will of the occupant of the house, meaning there was express or implied prohibition from entering the same, even if the occupant does not direct him to leave, the crime of is already committed because it would fall in number 1.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. &t was raining heavily. ! policeman too9 shelter in one personHs house. The owner obliged and had his daughter serve the police some coffee. The policeman made a pass at the daughter. The owner of the house as9ed him to leave. Boes this fall under !rticle 1"6E /o. &t was the owner of the house who let the policeman in. The entering is not surreptitious. ". ! person surreptitiously enters the dwelling of another. 5hat crime or crimes were possibly committedE The crimes committed are #1% >ualified trespass to dwelling under !rticle "6@, if there was an express or implied prohibition against entering. This is tantamount to entering against the will of the owner= and #"% violation of domicile in the third form if he refuses to leave after being told to.
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*R'+CLE 29 !E*RC< 9*RR*-'! M*L+C+$;!L3 $4'*+-EDA *-D *4;!E +- '<E !ER:+CE $F '<$!E LE7*LL3 $4'*+-ED A. A%ts p*n#sha,le 1. >y procuring a searc# $arrant $it#out =ust cause. 2. >y e8ceeding #is aut#ority or 1y using unnecessary se&erity in e8ecuting a searc# $arrant legally procured. B. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee. 2. T#at #e procures a searc# $arrant. 3. T#at t#ere is no =ust cause. ?.TA >!?!3 H3 $#at is t#e meaning of =ust causeF A3 pro1a1le cause4 t#is is t#e legal term %f t#e applicant lies in order to o1tain a $arrant4 #e is lia1le for3 1. article 12) 2. per=ury Cee STONEHILL ( DIO/NO8 01 SCRA 47 :4936; enunciating t#at a searc# $arrant or a $arrant of arrest must specify only one (4; spe%#"#% &""ense. A )( &-ni(he! 1. Procuring a search warrant without just cause= )lements 1. (ffender is a public officer or employee= ". He procures a search warrant= :. There is no just cause. )xceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally procured. )lements 1. (ffender is a public officer or employee= ". He has legally procured a search warrant= :. He exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same.
".
*R'+CLE 10 !E*RC<+-7 D$M+C+LE 9+'<$;' 9+'-E!!E! A. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee. 2. T#at #e is armed $it# searc# $arrant legally procured. 3. T#at #e searc#es t#e domicile4 papers or ot#er 1elongings of any person. 4. T#at t#e o$ner4 or any mem1er of #is family4 .A if none4 2 residents of t#e same locality. Crimes under !rticles 1"< and 1:@ are referred to as vi%la)i%n %6 !%mi ile. &n these articles, the search is made by virtue of a valid warrant, but the warrant notwithstanding, the liability for the crime is still incurred through the following situations'
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#1%
+earch warrant was irregularly obtained 3 This means there was no probable cause determined in obtaining the search warrant. !lthough void, the search warrant is entitled to respect because of presumption of regularity. (ne remedy is a motion to >uash the search warrant, not refusal to abide by it. The public officer may also be prosecuted for perjury, because for him to succeed in obtaining a search warrant without a probable cause, he must have perjured himself or induced someone to commit perjury to convince the court. The officer exceeded his authority under the warrant 3 To illustrate, let us say that there was a pusher in a condo unit. The P/P /arcotics *roup obtained a search warrant but the name of person in the search warrant did not tally with the address stated. )ventually, the person with the same name was found but in a different address. The occupant resisted but the public officer insisted on the search. Brugs were found and sei8ed and occupant was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court. The +upreme Court ac>uitted him because the public officers are re>uired to follow the search warrant to the letter. They have no discretion on the matter. Plain view doctrine is inapplicable since it presupposes that the officer was legally entitled to be in the place where the effects where found. +ince the entry was illegal, plain view doctrine does not apply. 5hen the public officer employs unnecessary or excessive severity in the implementation of the search warrant. The search warrant is not a license to commit destruction. (wner of dwelling or any member of the family was absent, or two witnesses residing within the same locality were not present during the search.
#"%
#:%
#2%
!e"ti#n '/ree% & Pr#/ibiti#nA interr.)ti#n an( (iss#l.ti#n #0 )ea"e0.l meetings *R'+CLE 1 PR$<+4+'+$-A +-'ERR;P'+$-A *- D+!!$L;'+$- $F PE*CEF;L MEE'+-7! A. Acts punis#a1le 1. >y pro#i1iting or 1y interrupting4 $it#out legal ground4 t#e #olding of a peaceful meeting 4 or 1y dissol&ing t#e same. 2. >y #indering any person from =oining any la$ful association or from attending any of its meetings. 3. >y pro#i1iting or #indering any person from adressing 4 eit#er alone or toget#er $it# ot#er4 any petition to t#e aut#orities for t#e correction of a1uses or redress of grie&ances. ?.TA >!?!3 T#ere is a parallel pro&ision in -@ 1'2) .>CTAECT%.? .+ DECT%C! (see t#is special la$) .ffender #ere must 1e a stranger not a participantGmem1er of t#e meeting. Cee 2p (s. Calera8 CA8 <7 O.G. 0763. Bere t#e accused4 A -.5%C! .++%C!A4 is a participant in t#e meeting4 #e is not guilty of article 131 1ut guilty of article 2'" for un=ust &e8ation. %f you disrupt t#e meeting of a municipal council4 and you are a pu1lic officer4 t#e crime is against t#e legislati&e 1ody4 not article 131.
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A pri&ate indi&idual cannot commit t#is crime. %f #e commits any of t#e acts enumerated in t#is section4 t#e crime is disturbance of public order defined in article 153. The government has a right to re>uire a permit before any gathering could be made. !ny meeting without a permit is a proceeding in violation of the law. That being true, a meeting may be prohibited, interrupted, or dissolved without violating !rticle 1:1 of the Revised Penal Code. ?ut the re>uiring of the permit shall be in exercise only of the governmentHs regulatory powers and not really to prevent peaceful assemblies as the public may desire. Permit is only necessary to regulate the peace so as not to inconvenience the public. The permit should state the day, time and the place where the gathering may be held. This re>uirement is, therefore, legal as long as it is not being exercised in as a prohibitory power. &f the permit is denied arbitrarily, !rticle 1:1 is violated. &f the officer would not give the permit unless the meeting is held in a particular place which he dictates defeats the exercise of the right to peaceably assemble, !rticle 1:1 is violated. !t the beginning, it may happen that the assembly is lawful and peaceful. &f in the course of the assembly the participants commit illegal acts li9e oral defamation or inciting to sedition, a public officer or law enforcer can stop or dissolve the meeting. The permit given is not a license to commit a crime. There are two criteria to determine whether !rticle 1:1 would be violated' #1% #"% Bangerous tendency rule 3 applicable in times of national unrest such as to prevent coup dHetat. Clear and present danger rule 3 applied in times of peace. +tricter rule.
Bistinctions between prohibition, interruption, or dissolution of peaceful meetings under !rticle 1:1, and tumults and other disturbances, under !rticle 1$: #1% !s to the participation of the public officer &n !rticle 1:1, the public officer is not a participant. !s far as the gathering is concerned, the public officer is a third party. &f the public officer is a participant of the assembly and he prohibits, interrupts, or dissolves the same, !rticle 1$: is violated if the same is conducted in a public place. #"% !s to the essence of the crime &n !rticle 1:1, the offender must be a public officer and, without any legal ground, he prohibits, interrupts, or dissolves a peaceful meeting or assembly to prevent the offended party from exercising his freedom of speech and that of the assembly to petition a grievance against the government. &n !rticle 1$:, the offender need not be a public officer. The essence of the crime is that of creating a serious disturbance of any sort in a public office,
Page 10
public building or even a private place where a public function is being held.
Page 1
!e"ti#n F#.r% & Crimes against religi#.s w#rs/i) *R'+CLE 12 +-'ERR;P'+$- $F REL+7+$;! 9$R!<+P !. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee 2. T#at religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are a1out to ta<e place or are going on . 3. T#at t#e offender pre&ents or distur1 t#e same . B. Cpecial 7ualifying aggra&ating circumstances 1. &iolence ; and 2. t#reats *R'+CLE 11 $FFE-D+-7 '<E REL+7+$;! FEEL+-7! !. !lements 1. T#at t#e acts complained of $ere performed a) in a place de&oted to religious $ors#ip 4 or 0 in t#is instance4 it is not necessary t#at t#ere is a religious ceremony going on b) during t#e cele1ration of any religious ceremony . 2. T#at t#e acts must 1e notoriously offensi&e to t#e feelings of t#e fait#ful.
?.TA >!?!3 H3 6#o may 1e lia1leF A3 Any person may 1e lia1le. H3 6#at are religious ceremoniesF A3 t#ey are ceremonies performed outside t#e c#urc# li<e procession4 prayer meeting. T#e nature of t#e act must 1e directly related or connected $it# t#e religious 1elief of t#e offended party. Cee3 %/5!C%A ?% CA%CT. & CA4 25) CCAA 52) (Duly 2 4 1)) )
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TITLE III
CRIMES AGAINST 2U!LIC ORDER

?.TA >!?!3 H3 $#at are t#ese crimesF T#ere are 24 crimes3 A3 1. re1ellion or insurrection 2. conspiracy and proposal to commit re1ellion 3. disloyalty of pu1lic officers and employees 4. inciting to re1ellion 5. sedition . conspiracy to commit sedition ". inciting to sedition '. acts tending to pre&ent t#e meeting of congress or similar 1odies ). distur1ance of proceedings of congress and similar 1odies 1*. &iolation of parliamentary immunity 11. illegal assem1lies 12. illegal associations 13. direct assaults 14. indirect assaults 15. @iso1edience to summons issued 1y congress4 its committees4 etc.4 1y t#e constitutional commissions4 its committees4 etc. 1 . resistance and diso1edience to a person in aut#ority or t#e agents of suc# persons 1". tumults and ot#er distur1ances 1'. unla$ful use of means of pu1lication an unla$ful utterances 1). alarms and scandals 2*. deli&ering prisoners form =ails 21. e&asion of ser&ice of sentence 22. e&asion on occasion of disorder 23. &iolation of conditional pardon 24. Commission of anot#er crime during ser&ice of penalty imposed for anot#er pre&ious offense.
Chapter One RE!ELLION8 SEDITION AND DISLOYALTY

*R'+CLE 1, RE4ELL+$- $R +-!;RREC'+$A. Elements 1. T#at t#ere 1e a) pu1lic uprising AND b) ta<ing arms against t#e /o&ernment 2. T#at t#e purpose of t#e uprising or mo&ement is eit#er a) to remo&e from t#e allegiance to said /o&ernment or its la$s i) t#e territory of t#e -#ilippines or any part t#ereof 4 or ii) any 1ody of land4 na&al or ot#er armed forces ; b) to depri&e t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e or Congress 4 $#olly or partially 4 or any of t#eir po$ers or prerogati&es . ?.TA >!?!3 re1ellion is a political crime 1ecause it is directed against political aut#ority
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H3 is t#ere a comple8 crime of re1ellion $it# murder and ot#er common crimesF A3 n&8 re,ell#&n %ann&t ,e %&mple= -#th &ther %r#mes. T#ere is none 1ecause t#e common crimes are a1sor1ed in re1ellion as long as committed in furt#erance of political o1=ecti&esGre1ellion. .t#er$ise4 one may 1e guilty of ot#er crimes. Cee 2p (s. Hernan$e> and Enr#le (s. Sala>ar %ases Chara%ter#st#%s &" re,ell#&n 1. al$ays in&ol&e t#e use of arms 2. is a political crime 3. a crime of t#e masses or multitude 4. continuous or it is a continuing offense . it cannot be complexed !ith other crimes Actual clas# of arms $it# t#e forces of t#e go&ernment is not necessary to con&ict e accused if #e conspires $it# t#ose $#o actually carry on #ostilities 1y means of arms against t#e go&;t. .ne may 1e a contri1utor and t#e contri1ution is used in furt#erance of re1ellion4 so you can 1e c#arged $it# re1ellion. %t is not necessary for t#e purpose of re1ellion 1e accomplis#ed. @istinction 1et$een re1ellion and treason3
Re,ell#&n T#e le&ying of $ar against t#e go&;t during peacetime for any of t#e purpose mentioned in art. 134 t#e crime is re1ellion treas&n T#e le&ying of $ar $ould 1e treason if t#e purpose is to aid t#e enemy gi&ing t#em aid and comfort
T#is al$ays in&ol&es t#e ta<ing up arms against t#e go&;t (rising pu1licly A?@ ta<ing up arms). HE!AJ3 %f use 1olos or stones4 is it re1ellionF T#e la$ does not specify. T#is is t#e 7uestion yet to 1e decided 1y t#e CC T#is can 1e committed in times of $ar or peace. Ae1ellion may 1e committed 1y A?J -!AC.?
Mere Ad#erence to t#e enemy gi&ing t#em aid and comfort (t#e t$o must go toget#er)
6ar crime. t#is can only 1e committed in times of $ar T#is can 1e committed 1y a +ilipino citi2en or an alien
The essence of this crime is a public uprising with the ta9ing up of arms. &t re>uires a multitude of people. &t aims to overthrow the duly constituted government. &t does not re>uire the participation of any member of the military or national police organi8ation or public officers and generally carried out by civilians. -astly, the crime can only be committed through force and violence. Rebellion and insurrection are not synonymous. Rebellion is more fre>uently used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government= while insurrection is more commonly employed in reference to a movement which see9s merely to effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters of subjects #Reyes, citing :@ !m. 0r. 1%.
Page 1,
Rebellion may be committed even without a single shot being fired. /o encounter needed. .ere public uprising with arms enough. !rticle 1:$, as amended, has two penalties' a higher penalty for the promoters, heads and maintainers of the rebellion= and a lower penalty for those who are only followers of the rebellion. ,i()in )i%n( "e)ween re"elli%n an! (e!i)i%n #1% !s to nature &n rebellion, there must be ta9ing up or arms against the government. &n sedition, it is sufficient that the public uprising be tumultuous. #"% !s to purpose &n rebellion, the purpose is always political. &n sedition, the purpose may be political or social. )xample' the uprising of s>uatters against 7orbes par9 residents. The purpose in sedition is to go against established government, not to overthrow it. 5hen any of the objectives of rebellion is pursued but there is no public uprising in the legal sense, the crime is direct assault of the first form. ?ut if there is rebellion, with public uprising, direct assault cannot be committed.
;)(ates in RE4ELL+$- (2002=2008)

Rebellion under !rticle 137 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is committed 8 91:y rising publicly and ta)ing arms against the /o#ernment for the purpose of remo#ing from the allegiance to said /o#ernment or its laws, the territory of the 3epublic of the (hilippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, na#al, or other armed forces or depri#ing the *hief 4,ecuti#e or the 2egislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogati#es. The elements of the offense are: 1. That there be a ;a< public uprising and ;b< ta)ing arms against the /o#ernment= and 2. That the purpose of the uprising or mo#ement is either 8 ;a< to remo#e from the allegiance to said /o#ernment or its laws: ;1< the territory of the (hilippines or any part thereof= or ;2< any body of land, na#al, or other armed forces= or ;b< to depri#e the *hief 4,ecuti#e or *ongress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogati#es.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes in#ol#ing
crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. o The e#idence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the in-uest of 1eltran for 3ebellion consisted of the affida#its and other documents attached to the *'D/ letters. &e ha#e gone o#er these documents and find merit in 1eltran0s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for 3ebellion. The bul) of the documents consists of affida#its, some of which were sworn before a notary public, e,ecuted by members of the military and some ci#ilians. o 6or his part, *achuela stated that he was a former member of the *(( and that ;1< he attended the *((0s $1>th (lenum$ in 1??2 where he saw 1eltran= ;2< he too) part in criminal acti#ities= and ;3< the arms he and the other *(( members used were purchased partly from contributions by *ongressional members, li)e 1eltran, who represent party%list groups affiliated with the *((.
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o o
The allegations in these affida#its are far from the proof needed to indict
1eltran for ta)ing part in an armed public uprising against the go#ernment. &hat these documents pro#e, at best, is that 1eltran was in 1ucal, (adre /arcia, 1atangas on 2> 6ebruary 2>>@ and that 17 years earlier, he was present during the 1??2 *(( (lenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the D"A 3esolution of 2B 6ebruary 2>>@. 5one of the affida#its alleged that 1eltran is a leader of a rebellion. 1eltran0s alleged presence during the 1??2 *(( (lenum does not automatically ma)e him a leader of a rebellion. 'n fact, *achuela0s affida#it stated that 1eltran attended the 1??2 *(( (lenum
as $*hairman, Cilusang Mayo Dno ;CMD<.$ !ssuming that 1eltran is a member of the *((, which 1eltran he does not ac)nowledge, mere membership in the *(( does not constitute rebellion. !s for the alleged funding of the *((0s military e-uipment from 1eltran0s congressional funds, *achuela0s affida#it merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. o 'n his *omment to 1eltran0s petition, the Solicitor /eneral points to 6uentes0 affida#it, dated 2E 6ebruary 2>>@, as basis for the finding of probable cause against 1eltran as 6uentes pro#ided details in his statement regarding meetings 1eltran and the other petitioners attended in 2>>E and 2>>@ in which plans to o#erthrow #iolently the !rroyo go#ernment were allegedly discussed, among others.
!ssuming them to be true, what the allegations in 6uentes0 affida#it ma)e out is
a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 13 of the Revised !enal Code, not Rebellion under Article 13" . ttendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting !ebellion under rticle "#$% 4#en the prosecution ac)nowledged this, since the felony charged in the 'nformation against 1eltran and San Auan in *riminal *ase 5o. >@%7E2 is *onspiracy to *ommit 3ebellion and not 3ebellion. The 'nformation merely alleged that 1eltran, San Auan, and others conspired to form a $tactical alliance$ to commit 3ebellion. Thus, the 3T* Ma)ati erred when it ne#ertheless found probable cause to try 1eltran for 3ebellion based on the e#idence before it.
To repeat, none of the affida#its alleges that 1eltran is promotin#,
maintainin#, or headin# a 3ebellion. The 'nformation in *riminal *ase 5o. >@%7E2 itself does not ma)e such allegation. Thus, e#en assuming that the 'nformation #alidly charges 1eltran for ta)ing part in a 3ebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the 'nformation that he is a leader or promoter of the 3ebellion. owe#er, the 'nformation in fact merely charges 1eltran for $conspiring and confederating$ with others in forming a $tactical alliance$ to commit rebellion. !s worded, the 'nformation does not charge 1eltran with 3ebellion but with *onspiracy to *ommit 3ebellion, a bailable offense. $%A$ $%& CR'(& )A* !+,'$'CA,,- (+$'.A$&D N+$ */B*$AN$'A$&D. 8 !s regards the argument that the crime was politically moti#ated and that conse-uently, the charge should ha#e been rebellion and not )idnapping, we find the same li)ewise to be without merit. !s held in "ffice of the (ro#incial (rosecutor of Famboanga Del 5orte #s. *!, the political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to 0ustify findin# the crime committed to be rebellion . Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro 'slamic 2iberation 6ront or of the Moro 5ational 2iberation 6ront does not necessarily mean that the crime of )idnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. ere, the e#idence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was politically moti#ated. 5either ha#e the appellants sufficiently pro#en their allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has in#ariably #iewed the defense of frame%up with disfa#or. 2i)e the defense of alibi, it can be .ust as easily concocted. "li#a0s contention that he should ha#e been charged with and tried for rebellion lac)s factual and legal basis, hence, bereft of merit. &rue, one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and 'idnapping were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion% (orollarily, offenses which were
Page 15
not committed in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives, are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts . 'n the instant case, there was no e#idence at all to show that the )illing of Aacinto Magbo.os Ar. was in connection with or in furtherance of their rebellious act. 1esides, it was not indubitably pro#ed that "li#a was indeed a member of the 5ew (eople0s !rmy.
*R'+CLE 1,=* C$;P DE'*'

1. Re,ell#&n Bo$ is t#e crime committed 3 1y rising pu1licly A?@ ta<ing up arms against t#e go&;t -urpose3 to remo&e from t#e allegiance of go&;t or its la$s territory of t#e -#ilippine islands or any part t#ereof any 1ody of land4 na&al4 or ot#er armed forces depri&ing t#e c#ief e8ec4 or legislati&e4 $#olly or partially of any of its po$ers or prerogati&es participants3 masses4 t#is is considered as t#e crime of t#e multitude4 a mass mo&ement 1. C&*p $? etat s$ift attac< accompanied $it# &iolence4 intimidation4 t#reat4 strategy or stealt# sei2ing or diminis#ing state po$er
2.
2.
3.
3.
-eople from t#e top4 usually go&ernment officials $it# or $it#out ci&ilian participation K 91y any person or persons 1elonging to t#e military or police #olding any pu1lic office or employment..: not a crime of t#e multitude 1ecause of t#e p#rase 9singly or simultaneously: 4. military camp or installation4 communications net$or<4 pu1lic utilities or ot#er facilities needed for t#e e8ercise and continued possession of po$er
4.
target3 territory4 1ody of land4 na&al or ot#er armed forces
@istinction of re1ellion and insurrection (t#ey are not synonymous)3 5!/A5 @%CT%?CT%.? Re,ell#&n Ins*rre%t#&n
T#e o1=ect or purpose of t#e mo&ement is C.M-5!T!5J T. .(!ATBA.6 A?@ CE-!AC!@! TB! !I%CT%?/ /.(!A?M!?T T#is is a mo&ement $#ic# see<s M!A!5J T. !++!CT C.M! CBA?/! .+ M%?.A %M-.ATA?C!4 or to -A!(!?T TB! !I!AC%C! .+ /.(!A?M!?TA5 AETB.A%TJ 6%TB A!C-!CT T. -AAT%CE5AA MATT!AC .A CE>D!CTC Bere4 no use of arms
?.?05!/A5 @%CT%?CT%.? T#ere is A56AJC TB! EC! .+ AAMC
The essence of the crime is a swift attac9 upon the facilities of the Philippine government, military camps and installations, communication networ9s, public utilities and facilities essential to the continued possession of governmental powers. &t may be committed singly or collectively and does not re>uire a multitude of people. The objective may not be to overthrow the government but only to destabili8e or paraly8e the government through the sei8ure of facilities and utilities essential to the continued possession and exercise of governmental powers. &t re>uires as principal offender a member of the !7P or of the P/P
Page 16
organi8ation or a public officer with or without civilian support. 7inally, it may be carried out not only by force or violence but also through stealth, threat or strategy. +er(%n( lia"le 6%r re"elli%n9 in(-rre )i%n %r %-& !: e)a) -n!er Ar)i le 712 1. The leaders 3 a. !ny person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection= or b. !ny person who leads, directs or commands others to underta9e a coup dK etat= The participants 3 a. !ny person who participates or executes the commands of others in rebellion, insurrection or coup dK etat= b. !ny person not in the government service who participates, supports, finances, abets or aids in underta9ing a coup dK etat.
".
*R'+CLE 12 PE-*L'3 F$R RE4ELL+$-A +-!;RREC'+$- $R C$;P DE'*' A. Nat*re T#e nature of t#e crime of re1ellion or of inciting is a crime of t#e masses 4 or a multitude . %t is a &ast mo&ement of men and a comple8 or intrigue and plots. %t e&o<es not merely a c#allenge to t#e constituted aut#orities 1ut also ci&il $ar on a 1igger or lesser scale . B. D#st#n%t#&ns 1. Ae1ellion and sedition 6#at distinguis#ed re1ellion from sedition is not t#e e8tent of t#e territory 1ut rat#er t#e o1=ect at $#ic# t#e uprising aims . %n re1ellion4 t#e purpose is purely political $#ile in sedition 4 it is eit#er political or social . T#e political purpose of re1ellion is to $it#dra$ from t#e allegiance of t#e go&ernment on its la$s part or t#e $#ole of t#e -#ilippine territory4 or a 1ody of t#e armed forces4 or to depri&e t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e or Congress 4 of t#eir po$ers and prerogati&es. Any ot#er political purpose of an uprising li<e t#e pre&ention of t#e e8ecution of t#e la$s or t#e #olding of an election constitutes sedition . -olitical crimes and common crimes -olitical crimes are t#ese directly aimed against t#e political order 4 as $ell as suc# common crimes as may1e committed to ac#ie&e a political purpose. T#e decisi&e factor is t#e intent or moti&e . %f a crime usually regarded as common 4 li<e #omicide 4 is perpetrated for t#e purpose of remo&ing from t#e allegiance 9 to t#e /o&ernment t#e territory of t#e -#ilipp=ines or any part t#ereof 9 4 t#en said offense 1ecomes stripped of its common comple8ion 4 inasmuc# as 4 1eing part and parcel of t#e crime of re1ellion 4 t#e former 4 ac7uired t#e political c#aracter of t#e latter . 2. *R'+CLE 15 C$-!P+R*C3 *-D PR$P$!*L '$ C$MM+' C$;P DE'*'A RE4ELL+$+-!;RREC'+$A. H&- %&mm#tte$ 1. C#ns)ira"y t# "#mmit rebelli#n
Page 18
T#ere is conspiracy to commit re1ellion $#en t$o or more persons come to an agreement to rise pu1licly and ta<e arms against t#e go&ernment for any of t#e purposes of re1ellion and decide to commit it. Pr#)#sal t# "#mmit rebelli#n T#ere is proposal to commit re1ellion $#en t#e person $#o #as decided to rise pu1licly and ta<e arms against go&ernment4 for any of t#e purposes of re1ellion proposes its e8ecution to some ot#er person or persons. 2. *R'+CLE 16 D+!L$3*L'3 $F P;4L+C $FF+CER! $R EMPL$3EE! ?ote3 one guilty of t#e offense is also a &iolator of t#e articles of $ar so you #a&e to report to t#e court Mars#all. A. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. >y failing to resist a re1ellion 1y all t#e means in t#eir po$er4 2. >y continuing to disc#arge t#e duties of t#eir offices under t#e control of t#e re1els4 3. >y accepting appointment to office under t#em !. O""en$ers m*st n&t ,e #n %&nsp#ra%' -#th the re,els .t#er$ise4 #e $ill 1e guilty of re1ellion not merely disloyalty4 1ecause t#e act of one is t#e act of all. *R'+CLE 18 +-C+'+-7 '$ RE4ELL+$- $R +-!;RREC'+$?ote3 if you incite plus you ta<e up arms and are in open #ostilities against t#e go&;t4 t#e crime is not inciting o re1ellion or insurrection4 1ut re1ellion or insurrection4 as t#e case may 1e A. Elements 1. .ffender does not ta<e arms or is not in open #ostility against t#e go&ernment; 2. Be incites ot#ers to t#e e8ecution of any of t#e acts of re1ellion; 3. T#e inciting is done 1y means of speec#es4 proclamations4 $ritings4 em1lems4 1anners or ot#er representations tending to t#e same end B. D#st#n+*#she$ "r&m re,ell#&n an$ #ns*rre%t#&n 1. %n 1ot# crimes4 t#e offender induces anot#er to commit re1ellion. 2. %n proposal4 t#e person $#o proposes #as decided to commit re1ellion; in inciting to re1ellion4 it is not re7uired t#at t#e offender #as decided to commit re1ellion. 3. %n proposal4 t#e person $#o proposes t#e e8ecution of t#e crime uses secret means; in inciting to re1ellion4 t#e act of t#e inciting is done pu1licly. *R'+CLE 19 !ED+'+$A. Elements 1. T#e offender rise3 a. -u1licly4 and b. Tumultuously; 2. T#at t#ey employ force4 intimidation4 or ot#er means outside of legal met#od;
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3.
T#at t#e offender employs any of t#ose means to attain any of t#e follo$ing o1=ects3 a. -re&enting t#e promulgation or e8ecution of any la$ or t#e #olding of any popular election; b. -re&enting t#e ?ational /o&ernment4 or any pro&incial or municipal go&ernment or any pu1lic officer t#ereof from freely e8ercising its or #is functions4 or pre&ent t#e e8ecution of any administrati&e order; c. %nflicting any act of #ate or re&enge upon t#e person or property of any pu1lic officer or employee; d. Committing any acts of #ate or re&enge against pri&ate persons or any social class for any political or social end; e. @espoiling any person4 municipality or pro&ince4 or t#e ?ational /o&ernment4 of all its property or any part t#ereof4 for any political or social end.
?.TA >!?!3 T#ere are 5 o1=ects of t#e crime of sedition. %f one of t#e 5 o1=ects are committed 1ut $it#out ta<ing up of arms4 t#e crime is direct assault. Distin"ti#n between rebelli#n an( se(iti#nB
Re,ell#&n -urpose of t#e offenders3 it is al$ays political since re1ellion is Al$ays a political crime Bo$ carried or committed3 1y rising pu1licly and ta<ing up arms se$#t#&n -urpose may 1e political or social
>y rising pu1licly and tumultuously in order to attain 1y L force intimidation ot#er means outside legal met#ods to create distur1ance or commotion only
Aims to completely o&ert#ro$ t#e go&;t
Distin"ti#ns between treas#n an( se(iti#n Treas&n se$#t#&n May 1e committed 1y one person only Cannot 1e committed 1y one person. Cause 1y more t#an 3 persons .1=ect is political .1=ect is political or social
The crime of sedition does not contemplate the ta9ing up of arms against the government because the purpose of this crime is not the overthrow of the government. /otice from the purpose of the crime of sedition that the offenders rise publicly and create commotion ad disturbance by way of protest to express their dissent and obedience to the government or to the authorities concerned. This is li9e the so called civil disobedience except that the means employed, which is violence, is illegal. *R'+CLE ,0 PE-*L'3 F$R !ED+'+$A. -ersons 5ia1le
Page ,0
1. 2.
T#e leaders of t#e sedition .t#ers persons participating
*R'+CLE , C$-!P+R*C3 '$ C$MM+' !ED+'+$?.TA >!?!3 T#ere is no suc# crime as proposal to commit sedition. T#is is a non0e8isting crime. *R'+CLE ,2 +-C+'+-7 '$ !ED+'+$A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. %nciting ot#ers to t#e accomplis#ment of any of t#e acts $#ic# constitute sedition4 1y means of speec#es4 proclamations4 $ritings4 em1lems4 cartoons4 1anners4 or ot#er representations tending to t#e same end; 2. Ettering seditious $ords or speec#es $#ic# tend to distur1 t#e pu1lic peace; 3. 6riting4 pu1lis#ing4 or circulating scurrilous li1els against t#e /o&ernment of t#e -#ilippines4 or any of t#e duly constituted aut#orities t#ereof4 or $#ic# tend to distur1 t#e pu1lic peace. 4. Mno$ingly conceal suc# e&il practices B. !lements 1. .ffender does not ta<e direct part in t#e crime of sedition. 2. Be incites ot#ers to t#e accomplis#ment of any of t#e acts $#ic# constitute sedition. 3. T#e inciting is done 1y means of speec#es4 proclamations4 $ritings4 em1lems4 cartoons4 1anners4 or ot#er representations tending to t#e same end. (nly non participant in sedition may be liable. Considering that the objective of sedition is to express protest against the government and in the process creating hate against public officers, any act that will generate hatred against the government or a public officer concerned or a social class may amount to &nciting to sedition. !rticle 12" is, therefore, >uite broad. The mere meeting for the purpose of discussing hatred against the government is inciting to sedition. -ambasting government officials to discredit the government is &nciting to sedition. ?ut if the objective of such preparatory actions is the overthrow of the government, the crime is inciting to rebellion.
Chapter T-& CRIMES AGAINST 2O2ULAR RE2RESENTATION

!e"ti#n $ne% & Crimes against legislative b#(ies an( similar b#(ies *R'+CLE ,1 *C'! 'E-D+-7 '$ PRE:E-' '<E MEE'+-7 $F '<E *!!EM4L3 (C$-7RE!! $F '<E P<+L+PP+-E!) *-D !+M+L*R 4$D+E!
Page ,
!. Elements 1. T#at t#ere 1e a pro=ected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or su1committees4 constitutional commissions or committees or di&isions t#ereof4 or of any pro&incial 1oard or city or municipal council or 1oard; 2. T#e offender $#o may 1e any person pre&ents suc# meeting 1y force or fraud. ?.TA >!?!3 T#is crime is committed in 2 $ays3 1. 1y force 2. 1y fraud T#is is also called crimes against legislati&e 1odies3 1. congress 2. any of its committees 3. su1committees 4. sanguniang panlala$igan 5. sanguniang panlungsod . sanguniang 1ayan *R'+CLE ,, D+!';R4*-CE $F PR$CEED+-7! A. Elements 1. T#at t#ere 1e a meeting of Congress or any of its committees or su1committees4 constitutional commissions or committees or di&isions t#ereof4 or of any pro&incial 1oard or city or municipal council or 1oard; 2. T#at t#e offender does any of t#e follo$ing acts3 a. Be distur1s any of suc# meeting b. Be 1e#a&es $#ile in t#e presence of suc# 1odies in suc# a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair t#e respect due it. ?.TA >!?!3 T#e offender may also 1e #eld for contempt #ere. H3 Bo$ committedF A3 1. Be @%CTEA>C any of suc# meetings 2. Be >!BA(!C $#ile in t#e presence of any of suc# 1odies in suc# a manner as to 0 interrupt its proceedings or 0 To impair t#e respect due it.
!e"ti#n 'w#% & :i#lati#n #0 )arliamentary imm.nity *R'+CLE ,2 :+$L*'+$- $F P*RL+*ME-'*R3 +MM;-+'3 A. A%ts p*n#sha,le 1. >y using force4 intimidation4 t#reats4 or fraud to pre&ent any mem1er of Congress from3
Page ,2
2.
attending t#e meetings of Congress or any of its committees or su1committees4 constitutional commissions or committees or di&isions t#ereof4 b. from e8pressing #is opinions or c. casting #is &ote >y arresting or searc#ing any mem1er t#ereof $#ile Congress is in regular or special session4 e8cept in case suc# mem1er #as committed a crime punis#a1le under t#e Code 1y a penalty #ig#er t#an prision mayor. a. T#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee4 b. Be arrest or searc#es any mem1er of Congress4 c. T#at Congress is in special or regular session4 d. T#at t#e mem1er arrested or searc#ed #as not commited a crime punis#a1le under t#e Code 1y a penalty #ig#er t#an prision mayor. a. of t#e 1)'" constitution
?.TA >!?!3 T#is $as amendedGmodified 1y section 114 article
6#ile congress is in regularGspecial session4 a mem1er commits a crime $#ic# carries $it# it a penalty of years or prision correctional4 so #e cannot 1e arrested. %f #e commits a crime $it# a penalty of more t#an years4 #e cannot en=oy t#is parliamentary immunity. Parliamentary imm.nityB 1. complete freedom to e8press t#emsel&es $it#out fear of ci&il or criminal prosecution or lia1ility 2. pri&ilege from arrest 1y attendance to a regular or special meeting sessions unless t#ey #a&e committed a crime punis#a1le under A-C $it# a penalty of more t#an years
Chapter Three ILLEGAL ASSEM!LIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

*R'+CLE ,5 +LLE7*L *!!EM4L+E! :sh&*l$ ,e rea$ as MEETINGS; A. A%ts 2*n#sha,le 1. Any meeting attended 1y armed persons for t#e purpose of committing any of t#e crimes punis#a1le under t#e Code. a. T#at t#ere is a meeting4 a gat#ering or group of persons4 $#et#er in a fi8ed place or mo&ing; b. T#e meeting is attended 1y armed persons4 c. T#e purpose is to commit any of t#e crimes punis#a1le under t#e Code. 2. Any meeting in $#ic# t#e audience is incited to t#e commission of t#e crime of treason4 re1ellion or insurrection4 sedition or assault upon a person in aut#ority or #is agents. a. T#at t#ere is a meeting4 a gat#ering or group of persons4 $#et#er in a fi8ed place or mo&ing4 b. T#e audience4 $#et#er armed or not4 is incited to t#e commission of t#e crime of treason4 re1ellion or insurrection4 sedition or direct assault.
B. 2ers&ns L#a,le
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1. 2.
T#e organi2er or leader of t#e meeting -ersons present at t#e meeting.
C. A person may 1e e8empt from criminal lia1ility if t#ere is an a1sence of a common intent to commit a felony punis#a1le under t#is Code. T#us4 if a person attends a meeting out of curiosity4 #e is not lia1le. D. Pres.m)ti#n i0 a )ers#n is "arrying an .nli"ense( 0irearm a. %t is presumed t#at t#e purpose of t#e meeting is to commit acts punis#a1le under t#is Code b. Be is considered a leader or organi2er of t#e meeting ?.TA >!?!3 T#ere must 1e a meeting #ere. %t is t#e attendance of suc# meeting t#at is punis#ed 1y la$. T#ere are 2 forms #ere3 1. %n t#e "#rst "&rm4 t#ere must 1e armed persons for t#e purpose of committing any of t#e crimes punis#a1le *n$er th#s %&$e. >ut not all persons present in t#e first form must 1e armed. Cituation3 if t#ere is a meeting of 2* persons for t#e purpose of distri1uting s#a1u or mari=uana to -asil4 Ta1uno< and -ardo4 t#e crime committed is not illegal assem1ly or meeting >!CAEC! %? 5!/A5 ACC!M>5J TB! -EC-.C! %C T. C.MM%T A CA%M! E?@!A TB! 2ENAL CODE (referring to t#e A-C) 2. %n t#e 0n$ "&rm t#ere may 1e armed persons or no persons may 1e armed as long as t#ey are incited to t#e commission of t#e crime of TA!AC.?4 A!>!55%.?4 %?CEAA!CT%.?4 C!@%T%.?.A ACCAE5T E-.? TB! -!AC.? %? AETB.A%TJ .A B%C A/!?TC. &f any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm, it is presumed that the purpose of the meeting insofar as he is concerned is to commit acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and he is considered a leader or organi8er of the meeting. The gravamen of the offense is mere assembly of or gathering of people for illegal purpose punishable by the Revised Penal Code. 5ithout gathering, there is no illegal assembly. &f unlawful purpose is a crime under a special law, there is no illegal assembly. 7or example, the gathering of drug pushers to facilitate drug traffic9ing is not illegal assembly because the purpose is not violative of the Revised Penal Code but of The Bangerous Brugs !ct of 1<A", as amended, which is a special law. *R'+CLE ,6 +LLE7*L *!!$C+*'+$-! A. "inds of #llegal $ssociation 1. Association totally or partially organi2ed for t#e purpose of committing any of t#e crimes punis#a1le *n$er th#s C&$e :R2C;. 2. Associations totally or partially organi2ed "&r s&me p*rp&se %&ntrar' t& p*,l#% m&rals (refers to spe%#al la-s $#ic# aims to protect pu1lic morals) Bere4 it is not necessary t#at t#ere 1e a meeting. %t is enoug# t#at you are a mem1er. B. Persons %iable
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1. 2.
+ounders4 directors and president of t#e association Mere mem1ers of t#e association
,i()in )i%n "e)ween ille*al a((em"l# an! ille*al a((% ia)i%n &n illegal assembly, the basis of liability is the gathering for an illegal purpose which constitutes a crime under the Revised Penal Code. &n illegal association, the basis is the formation of or organi8ation of an association to engage in an unlawful purpose which is not limited to a violation of the Revised Penal Code. &t includes a violation of a special law or those against public morals. .eaning of public morals' inimical to public welfare= it has nothing to do with decency., not acts of obscenity. 1. &n illegal association, it is not necessary that there be an actual meeting. &n illegal assembly, it is necessary that there is an actual meeting or assembly or armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code, or of individuals who, although not armed, are incited to the commission of treason, rebellion, sedition, or assault upon a person in authority or his agent. &n illegal association, it is the act of forming or organi8ing and membership in the association that are punished. &n illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that are punished. &n illegal association, the persons liable are #1% the founders, directors and president= and #"% the members. &n illegal assembly, the persons liable are #1% the organi8ers or leaders of the meeting and #"% the persons present at meeting.
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Chapter F&*r ASSAULT U2ON8 AND RESISTANCE AND DISO!EDIENCE TO8 2ERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS
*R'+CLE ,8 D+REC' *!!*;L' A. A%ts p*n#sha,le 1. 6it#out pu1lic uprising4 1y employing force or intimidation for t#e attainment of any of t#e purpose enumerated in defining t#e crimes of re1ellion or sedition. a. T#e offender employs force or intimidation4 b. T#e aim of t#e offender is to attain any of t#e purposes of t#e crime of re1ellion or any of t#e o1=ects of t#e crime of sedition c. T#at t#ere is no pu1lic uprising. 2. 6it#out pu1lic uprising4 1y attac<ing4 employing force4 or 1y ser#&*sl' intimidating or resisting any person in aut#ority or any of #is agents4 $#ile engaged in t#e performance of official duties4 or on occasion of suc# performance. a. T#at t#e offender3 a.1 ma<es an attac< a.2 employs force
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a.3 ma<es serious intimidation4 or a.4 ma<es serious resistance b. T#at t#e person assaulted is a person of aut#ority or #is agent c. T#at at t#e time of t#e assault t#e person in aut#ority or #is agent3 c.1 is engaged in t#e actual performance of official duties4 or t#at #e is assaulted c.2 1y reason of t#e past performance of official duties d. T#e offender <no$s t#at t#e one #e is assaulting is a person in aut#ority or #is agent in t#e e8ercise of #is duties e. T#ere is no pu1lic uprising. B. #ndirect assault can be committed only !hen a direct assault is also committed. C. Art 1524 as amended4 pro&ides t#at person $#o comes to t#e aid of a -%A4 suc# person is considered as an agent of a person in aut#ority. T#erefore4 if one assaults suc# person t#e crime committed is direct assault and not indirect assault. ?.TA >!?!3 !ssence of t#is article3 J.E MECT E-B.5@ TB! MAD!CTJ .+ TB! 5A6 %n t#e study of direct assault4 you refer 1ac< to t#e o1=ects of re1ellion and t#e o1=ects of sedition4 1ecause if t#ere is no pu1lic uprising4 no ta<ing of arms and you attac< a person in aut#ority4 you are lia1le for direct assault. T#ere are t$o $ays of committing t#e crime3 1. +ormula3 5!CC .>D!CTC .+ A!>!55%.?GC!@%T%.? -E>5%C E-A%C%?/ NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN @%A!CT ACCAE5T 2. T#e intimidation or resistance #ere is ser#&*s $#et#er t#e person or offended party is a person is aut#ority or #is agent %n direct assault4 t#e officer or t#e person in aut#ority may 1e in t#e performance of #is official duty or #e may 1e attac<ed &n the &%%as#&n &" s*%h per"&rman%e. T#is means t#at t#e impelling moti&e of t#e attac< is t#e performance of an official duty. T# $ords 9on occasion: signifies t#e O1ecause; or O1y reason of; t#e past performance of t#e duty e&en if at t#e &ery time of t#e attac< or assault no official duty $as 1eing disc#arged. %n indirect assault4 person assault must 1e in t#e ACTEA5 performance of #is official duty T#ere is self0defense in direct assaults3 $#en t#e officer or t#e person in aut#ority or #is agents $ere t#e ones $#o pro&o<ed. Be acts in legitimate defense. .ne important element to consider #ere3 Mno$ledge t#at t#e person is a person in aut#ority 5ac< of <no$ledge or good fait# is a good defense #ere.
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%n a case li<e t#is4 t#e prosecution s#ould present e&idence on $#at is t#e moti&e for t#e attac<3 $as it personal or $as it due to t#e past performance of an official dutyF %f only personal4 t#en t#e crime is only p#ysical in=uries. %n direct assaults4 p#ysical in=uries may 1e inflicted 1y t#e offender. %f it is slig#t p#ysical in=uries only4 t#ere is only one crime $#ic# is direct assault 1ecause slig#t p#ysical in=uries is a1sor1ed or in#erent in t#e crime of direct assault. >ut if t#e in=ury is less serious or serious p#ysical in=uries4 t#e crime is comple8ed @%A!CT ACCAE5T 6%TB 5!CC C!A%.ECGC!A%.EC -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C. The crime is not based on the material conse>uence of the unlawful act. The crime of direct assault punishes the spirit of lawlessness and the contempt or hatred for the authority or the rule of law. To be specific, if a judge was 9illed while he was holding a session, the 9illing is not the direct assault, but murder. There could be direct assault if the offender 9illed the judge simply because the judge is so strict in the fulfillment of his duty. &t is the spirit of hate which is the essence of direct assault. +o, where the spirit is present, it is always complexed with the material conse>uence of the unlawful act. &f the unlawful act was murder or homicide committed under circumstance of lawlessness or contempt of authority, the crime would be direct assault with murder or homicide, as the case may be. &n the example of the judge who was 9illed, the crime is direct assault with murder or homicide. The only time when it is not complexed is when material conse>uence is a light felony, that is, slight physical injury. Birect assault absorbs the lighter felony= the crime of direct assault can not be separated from the material result of the act. +o, if an offender who is charged with direct assault and in another court for the slight physical &njury which is part of the act, ac>uittal or conviction in one is a bar to the prosecution in the other. )xample of the first form of direct assault' Three men bro9e into a /ational 7ood !uthority warehouse and lamented sufferings of the people. They called on people to help themselves to all the rice. They did not even help themselves to a single grain. The crime committed was direct assault. There was no robbery for there was no intent to gain. The crime is direct assault by committing acts of sedition under !rticle 1:< #$%, that is, spoiling of the property, for any political or social end, of any person municipality or province or the national government of all or any its property, but there is no public uprising. Person in authority is any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission. ! barangay chairman is deemed a person in authority.
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!gent of a person in authority is any person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as a barangay councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of a person in authority. &n applying the provisions of !rticles 126 and 1$1, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recogni8ed private schools, colleges and universities and lawyers in the actual performance of their duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed a person in authority. &n direct assault of the first form, the stature of the offended person is immaterial. The crime is manifested by the spirit of lawlessness. &n the second form, you have to distinguish a situation where a person in authority or his agent was attac9ed while performing official functions, from a situation when he is not performing such functions. &f attac9 was done during the exercise of official functions, the crime is always direct assault. &t is enough that the offender 9new that the person in authority was performing an official function whatever may be the reason for the attac9, although what may have happened was a purely private affair. (n the other hand, if the person in authority or the agent was 9illed when no longer performing official functions, the crime may simply be the material conse>uence of he unlawful act' murder or homicide. 7or the crime to be direct assault, the attac9 must be by reason of his official function in the past. .otive becomes important in this respect. )xample, if a judge was 9illed while resisting the ta9ing of his watch, there is no direct assault. &n the second form of direct assault, it is also important that the offended party 9new that the person he is attac9ing is a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority, performing his official functions. /o 9nowledge, no lawlessness or contempt. 7or example, if two persons were >uarreling and a policeman in civilian clothes comes and stops them, but one of the protagonists stabs the policeman, there would be no direct assault unless the offender 9new that he is a policeman. &n this respect it is enough that the offender should 9now that the offended party was exercising some form of authority. &t is not necessary that the offender 9nows what is meant by person in authority or an agent of one because ignorantia legis non excusat.
;)(ate in D+REC' *!!*;L' (2005)

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition= and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attac), employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Dn-uestionably, petitioner0s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggra#ated when: ;a< the assault is committed with a weapon=
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or ;b< when the offender is a public officer or employee= or ;c< when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. o 't is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, 2t. 2eygo was engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. e was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truc) unloading chic)en manure. 1ecause the unloading of chic)en dung was a #iolation of 2a Trinidad Municipal "rdinance 5o. 1%?1, the lieutenant ordered the truc) dri#er to return from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truc) dri#er to return to Shilan, the place where the truc) was first intercepted, and on being informed that the same truc) had returned, the lieutenant had e#ery reason to assume it did return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chic)en dung, thus stopped it from doing so. Dnder the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that 2t. 2eygo was not in the performance of his lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.
*R'+CLE ,9 +-D+REC' *!!*;L' !. !lements 1. T#at a person in aut#ority or #is agent is t#e &ictim of any of t#e forms of direct assault 2. T#e person comes to t#e aid of suc# aut#ority or #is agent 3. T#at t#e offender ma<es use of force or intimidation upon suc# person coming to t#e aid of t#e aut#ority or #is agent. ?.TA >!?!3 T#ere is no indirect assault if t#ere is no direct assault. T#e offended party in indirect assault may 1e a pri&ate person. The victim in indirect assault should be a private person who comes in aid of an agent of a person in authority. The assault is upon a person who comes in aid of the person in authority. The victim cannot be the person in authority or his agent. There is no indirect assault when there is no direct assault. Ta9e note that under !rticle 1$", as amended, when any person comes in aid of a person in authority, said person at that moment is no longer a civilian 3 he is constituted as an agent of the person in authority. &f such person were the one attac9ed, the crime would be direct assault. Bue to the amendment of !rticle 1$", without the corresponding amendment in !rticle 1$@, the crime of indirect assault can only be committed when assault is upon a civilian giving aid to an agent of the person in authority. He does not become another agent of the person in authority. *R'+CLE 20 D+!$4ED+E-CE '$ !;MM$-! +!!;ED 43 '<E -*'+$-*L *!!EM4L3 (C$-7RE!!)A +'! C$MM+''EE! $R !;4C$MM+''EE! $R D+:+!+$-!% A. Acts punis#ed 1. >y refusing4 $it#out legal e8cuse4 to o1ey t#e summons issued 1y t#e Congress or any of its committees or su1committees. 2. >y refusing to 1e s$orn or placed under affirmation $#ile 1eing 1efore suc# legislati&e or constitutional 1ody or official. 3. >y refusing to ans$er any legal in7uiry or to produce any 1oo<s4 papers4 documents4 or records in #is possession4 $#en re7uired 1y t#em to do so in t#e e8ercise of t#eir functions
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4. 5.
>y restraining anot#er from attending as a $itness in suc# legislati&e or constitutional 1ody. >y inducing diso1edience to a summons or refusal to 1e s$orn 1y any suc# 1ody or official.
*R'+CLE 2 RE!+!'*-CE *-D D+!$4ED+E-CE '$ * PER!$- +- *;'<$+R'3 $R *7E-'! $F !;C< PER!$-! A. Elements &" res#stan%e an$ ser#&*s $#s&,e$#en%e 1. T#at a person in aut#ority or #is agent is engaged in t#e performance of official duty or gi&es a la$ful order to t#e offender 2. T#at t#e offender resists or seriously diso1eys suc# persons in aut#ority or #is agent 3. T#at t#e act of t#e offender is not included in t#e pro&isions of Art . 14' 4 14) 4 and 15* . B. Elements &" s#mple $#s&,e$#en%e 1. T#at an agent of a person in aut#ority is engaged in t#e performance of official duty or gi&es a la$ful order to t#e offender . 2. T#at t#e offender diso1eys suc# agent of a person in aut#ority . 3. T#at suc# diso1edience is not a serious nature. C. Disting.is/e( 0r#m (ire"t assa.lt 1. %n direct assault 4 t#e offended party is assaulted $#ile in t#e performance of #is duties or 1y reason t#ereof . %n resistance or diso1edience 4 t#e officer must 1e in t#e disc#arge of #is duties. 2. %n direct assault 4 t#e resistance must 1e serious. %n resistance or diso1edience 4 t#e resistance is not serious 4 t#at is 4 $it#out manifest intention to defy t#e aut#ority of t#e la$. @irect assault (2nd form) is committed in four $ays a. 1y attac<ing 4 b. 1y employing force 4 c. 1y seriously intimidating 4 and d. 1y seriously resisting a person in aut#ority or #is agent; resistance or serious diso1edience is committed only 1y resisting or seriously diso1eying a person in aut#ority or #is agent
3.
?.TA >!?!3 T#ere is a parallel pro&ision in -@ 1'2) .>CTAECT%.? .+ DECT%C! (see t#is special la$) ,i()in )i%n "e)ween re(i()an e %r (eri%-( !i(%"e!ien e an! !ire ) a((a-l) 1. &n resistance, the person in authority or his agent must be in actual performance of his duties. &n direct assault, the person in authority or his agent must be engaged in the performance of official duties or that he is assaulted by reason thereof. ". Resistance or serious disobedience is committed only by resisting or seriously disobeying a person in authority or his agent.
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Birect assault #the second form% is committed in four ways, that is, #1% by attac9ing, #"% by employing force, #:% by seriously intimidating, and #2% by seriously resisting a persons in authority or his agent. :. &n both resistance against an agent of a person in authority and direct assault by resisting an agent of a person in authority, there is force employed, but the use of force in resistance is not so serious, as there is no manifest intention to defy the law and the officers enforcing it. The attac9 or employment of force which gives rise to the crime of direct assault must be serious and deliberate= otherwise, even a case of simple resistance to an arrest, which always re>uires the use of force of some 9ind, would constitute direct assault and the lesser offense of resistance or disobedience in !rticle 1$1 would entirely disappear. ?ut when the one resisted is a person & authority, the use of any 9ind or degree of force will give rise to direct assault. &f no force is employed by the offender in resisting or disobeying a person in authority, the crime committed is resistance or serious disobedience under the first paragraph of !rticle 1$1. *R'+CLE 22 PER!$-! +- *;'$R+'3 *-D *7E-'! $F PER!$-! +- *;'<$R+'3 A. @efinition 1. -ersons in Aut#ority any person directly &ested $it# =urisdiction 2. Agent in -erson in Aut#ority any person $#o4 1y direct pro&ision of la$ or 1y election or 1y appointment 1y competent aut#ority4 is c#arged $it# t#e maintenance of pu1lic order and t#e protection and security of life and property. ?.TA >!?!3 ?ot all pu1lic officers or employees are persons in aut#ority 1. treasurer 2. secretaries 3. auditors ?ot all persons in aut#ority are pu1lic officersGemployees
7.
teac#ers or professors in duly recogni2ed in pri&ate sc#ools
Chapter F#(e 2U!LIC DISORDERS
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*R'+CLE 21 TUMULTS AND OTHER DISTUR!ANCES OF 2U!LIC ORDER@@@ ';M;L';$;! D+!';R4*-CE $R +-'ERR;P'+$- L+*4LE D+!';R4*-CE!
'$
C*;!E
A. Acts punis#a1le 1. causing any serious distur1ance in a pu1lic place4 office or esta1lis#ment 0 9serious distur1ance: must 1e planned or intended4 ot#er$ise not punis#a1le under t#is article 2. distur1ance or interruption of pu1lic performances4 functions4 gat#erings or peaceful meetings4 if t#e act is not included in Art 131 and 132 3. Ma<ing an outcry (meaning to s#out su1&ersi&e and pro&ocati&e $ords) tending to incite re1ellion or sedition in any meeting4 association or pu1lic place 4. @isplaying placards or em1lems $#ic# pro&o<e a distur1ance of pu1lic order in suc# place 5. >urying $it# pomp t#e 1ody of a person $#o #as 1een legally e8ecuted ?.TA >!?!3 C%TEC .+ TB! CA%M! %T MAJ >! A -A%(AT! .A -E>5%C -5AC!. o %f committed in a pri&ate place4 t#ere s#ould 1e a pu1lic function or performance. o %f committed in a pu1lic place4 art 153 is &iolated pro&ided t#at t#e distur1ance does not amount to interruption of religious $ors#ip or offending religious feelings. o Bere t#ere $as really no intention to incite re1ellion sedition 1ut t#e effect of t#e outcry incites t#e people to commit t#e crimes mentioned.
Di00eren"e between $.t"ry an( Dis)laying #0 emblems #r )la"ar(s .n(er *rt 18 (+n"iting t# rebelli#nCse(iti#n) *-D *rt 21A )ar ,% 0 Ender Art 13'4 it is necessary t#at t#e offender s#ould #a&e done t#e act $it# t#e idea aforet#oug#t of inducing #is #earers or readers to commit t#e crime of re1ellion or sedition. 0 Ender Art 1534 outcry is more or less unconscious out1urst $#ic#4 alt#oug# re1ellious or seditious in nature4 is not intentionally calculated to induce ot#ers to commit. &isturbance or #nterruption of a tumultuous character 'ualifies the offense. '.m.lt.#.s (e0ine( Caused 1y more t#an t#ree persons $#o are armed or pro&ided $it# means if &iolence The essence is creating public disorder. This crime is brought about by creating serious disturbances in public places, public buildings, and even in private places where public functions or performances are being held. 7or a crime to be under this article, it must not fall under !rticles 1:1 #prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings% and 1:" #interruption of religious worship%.
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&n the act of ma9ing outcry during speech tending to incite rebellion or sedition, the situation must be distinguished from inciting to sedition or rebellion. &f the spea9er, even before he delivered his speech, already had the criminal intent to incite the listeners to rise to sedition, the crime would be inciting to sedition. However, if the offender had no such criminal intent, but in the course of his speech, tempers went high and so the spea9er started inciting the audience to rise in sedition against the government, the crime is disturbance of the public order. The disturbance of the pubic order is tumultuous and the penalty is increased if it is brought about by armed men. The term IarmedJ does not refer to firearms but includes even big stones capable of causing grave injury. &t is also disturbance of the public order if a convict legally put to death is buried with pomp. He should not be made out as a martyr= it might incite others to hatred. *R'+CLE 2, ;-L*9F;L ;!E $F ME*-! $F P;4L+C*'+$- *-D ;-L*9F;L ;''ER*-CE! A. A%ts p*n#sha,le 1. Any person $#o 1y means of printing4 lit#ograp#y4 or any ot#er means of pu1lication s#all pu1lis# or cause to 1e pu1lis#ed as ne$s any false ne$s $#ic# may endanger t#e pu1lic order4 or cause damage to t#e interest or credit of t#e Ctate; 2. Any person $#o 1y t#e same means4 or 1y $ords4 utterances or speec#es s#all encourage diso1edience to t#e la$ or to t#e constituted aut#orities or praise4 =ustify4 or e8tol any act punis#ed 1y la$; 3. Any person $#o s#all maliciously pu1lis# or cause to 1e pu1lis#ed any official resolution or document $it#out proper aut#ority4 or 1efore t#ey #a&e 1een pu1lis#ed officially; or 4. Any person $#o s#all print4 pu1lis#4 or distri1ute or cause to 1e printed4 pu1lis#ed4 or distri1uted 1oo<s4 pamp#lets4 periodicals4 or leaflets $#ic# do not 1ear t#e real printer,s name4 or $#ic# are classified as anonymous. ?.TA >!?!3 %f t#is crime is committed 1y a pu1lic officer or employee4 #e is also lia1le for A.A. "134 pu1lic officers or employees are not allo$ed to disclose confidential matters or matters confidential in nature. *R'+CLE 22 *L*RM! *-D !C*-D*L! !. A%ts p*n#sha,le 1. @isc#arging any firearm4 roc<et4 firecrac<er4 or ot#er e8plosi&e $it#in any to$n or pu1lic place4 calculated to cause ($#ic# produces) alarm or danger. 2. %nstigating4 or ta<ing an acti&e part in any c#ari&ari or ot#er disorderly meeting offensi&ely to anot#er or pre=udicial to pu1lic tran7uility. 3. @istur1ing t#e pu1lic peace $#ile $andering a1out at nig#t or $#ile engaged in any ot#er nocturnal amusements. 4. Causing any distur1ance or scandal in pu1lic places $it# into8icated or ot#er$ise4 pro&ided Art. 153 is not applica1le.
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?.>. -urpose of Art. 155 3 Maintenance of pu1lic tran7uility @isc#arge of firearm s#ould not 1e aimed at a person4 ot#er$ise it $ould 1e @%CCBAA/! .+ +%A!AAM (pro&ided t#ere is no intent to <ill) %h&n a !&'( n )i(cha'g&( a *i'&a'+ in !#$lic, th& act +a" c n(tit#t& an" * th& ! ((i$l& c'i+&( #n)&' th& R&-i(&) P&nal C )&' #1% #"% #:% !larms and scandals if the firearm when discharged was not directed to any particular person= &llegal discharge of firearm under !rticle "$2 if the firearm is directed or pointed to a particular person when discharged but intent to 9ill is absent= !ttempted homicide, murder, or parricide if the firearm when discharged is directed against a person and intent to 9ill is present.
&n this connection, understand that it is not necessary that the offended party be wounded or hit. .ere discharge of firearm towards another with intent to 9ill already amounts to attempted homicide or attempted murder or attempted parricide. &t can not be frustrated because the offended party is not mortally wounded. &n !raneta v. Court of !ppeals, it was held that if a person is shot at and is wounded, the crime is automatically attempted homicide. &ntent to 9ill is inherent in the use of the deadly weapon. The crime alarms and scandal is only one crime. Bo not thin9 that alarms and scandals are two crimes. +candal here does not refer to moral scandal= that one is grave scandal in !rticle "@@. The essence of the crime is disturbance of public tran>uility and public peace. +o, any 9ind of disturbance of public order where the circumstance at the time renders the act offensive to the tran>uility prevailing, the crime is committed. Charivari is a moc9 serenade wherein the supposed serenaders use bro9en cans, bro9en pots, bottles or other utensils thereby creating discordant notes. !ctually, it is producing noise, not music and so it also disturbs public tran>uility. ,nderstand the nature of the crime of alarms and scandals as one that disturbs public tran>uility or public peace. &f the annoyance is intended for a particular person, thecrime is unjust vexation. )ven if the persons involved are engaged in nocturnal activity li9e those playing patintero at night, or selling balut, if they conduct their activity in such a way that disturbs public peace, they may commit the crime of alarms and scandals. *R'+CLE 25 DEL+:ER+-7 PR+!$-ER! FR$M ?*+L !. !lements 1. T#at t#ere is a person confined in a =ail or penal esta1lis#ment 2. T#at t#e offender remo&es t#erefrom suc# person or #elps t#e escape of suc# person ?.TA >!?!3
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%f t#e person (=ail $arden4 =ail guard4 or custodian) $#o #elps in t#e escape of a prisoner $#o is under #is custody4 t#e crime is %nfidelity in t#e custody of prisoners. %f t#e same person is relie&ed from t#e =o14 li<e if #is s#ift is o&er and #e #elped in escaping t#e prisoner4 t#e crime is under article 15 and n&t infidelity in t#e custody of prisoners 1ecause #e $as no longer in custody of t#e prisoner. Be is off duty. &n relation to infidelity in the custody of prisoners, correlate the crime of delivering person from jail with infidelity in the custody of prisoners punished under !rticles "":, ""2 and ""$ of the Revised Penal Code. &n both acts, the offender may be a public officer or a private citi8en. Bo not thin9 that infidelity in the custody of prisoners can only be committed by a public officer and delivering persons from jail can only be committed by private person. ?oth crimes may be committed by public officers as well as private persons. &n both crimes, the person involved may be a convict or a mere detention prisoner. The only point of distinction between the two crimes lies on whether the offender is the custodian of the prisoner or not at the time the prisoner was made to escape. &f the offender is the custodian at that time, the crime is infidelity in the custody of prisoners. ?ut if the offender is not the custodian of the prisoner at that time, even though he is a public officer, the crime he committed is delivering prisoners from jail. -iability of the prisoner or detainee who escaped 3 5hen these crimes are committed, whether infidelity in the custody of prisoners or delivering prisoners from jail, the prisoner so escaping may also have criminal liability and this is so if the prisoner is a convict serving sentence by final judgment. The crime of evasion of service of sentence is committed by the prisoner who escapes if such prisoner is a convict serving sentence by final judgment. &f the prisoner who escapes is only a detention prisoner, he does not incur liability from escaping if he does not 9now of the plan to remove him from jail. ?ut if such prisoner 9nows of the plot to remove him from jail and cooperates therein by escaping, he himself becomes liable for delivering prisoners from jail as a principal by indispensable cooperation. &f three persons are involved 3 a stranger, the custodian and the prisoner 3 three crimes are committed' #1% #"% #:% &nfidelity in the custody of prisoners= Belivery of the prisoner from jail= and )vasion of service of sentence.
Chapter S#= EAASION OF SERAICE OF SENTENCE

*R'+CLE 26 E:*!+$- $F !ER:+CE $F !E-'E-CE
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A. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender is a con&ict 1y final =udgment. 2. T#at #e is ser&ing #is sentence $#ic# consists in depri&ation of li1erty. 3. T#at #e e&ades t#e ser&ice of #is sentence 1y escaping during t#e term of #is sentence. P Applies also to a person sentenced to distierro B. Cir".mstan"es D.ali0ying t/e #00ense 1. >y means of unla$ful entry (t#is s#ould 1e 91y scaling:); 2. >y 1rea<ing doors4 $indo$s4 gates4 $alls4 roofs or floors; 3. >y using pic<loc<s4 false <eys4 disguise4 deceit4 &iolence or intimidation; or 4. T#roug# conni&ance $it# ot#er con&icts or employee of t#e penal institution. ?.TA >!?!3 TB! .++!?@!A .A -A%C.?!A 6B. !CCA-!@ MECT >! A -A%C.?!A >J +%?A5 DE@/!M!?T. %t is 7ualified e&asion if t#e escape #as ta<en place 1y means of unla$ful entry4 1rea<ing doors..etc (see pro&ision.) E-a(i n #1% #"% * (&'-ic& * (&nt&nc& ha( th'&& * '+(.
#:%
?y simply leaving or escaping from the penal establishment under !rticle 1$A= 7ailure to return within 26 hours after having left the penal establishment because of a calamity, conflagration or mutiny and such calamity, conflagration or mutiny has been announced as already passed under !rticle 1$6= ;iolating the condition of conditional pardon under !rticle 1$<.
&n leaving or escaping from jail or prison, that the prisoner immediately returned is immaterial. &t is enough that he left the penal establishment by escaping therefrom. His voluntary return may only be mitigating, being analogous to voluntary surrender. ?ut the same will not absolve his criminal liability. *R'+CLE 28 E:*!+$- $F !ER:+CE $F !E-'E-CE $- '<E $CC*!+$- $F D+!$RDER!A C$-FL*7*R*'+$-!A E*R'<>;*EE!A $R $'<ER C*L*M+'+E!% !. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender is a con&ict 1y final =udgment4 $#o is confined in a penal institution. 2. T#at t#ere is disorder4 resulting from a. conflagration; b. eart#7ua<e; c. e8plosion; or d. similar a catastrop#e; or e. mutiny in $#ic# #e #as not participated. 3. T#at t#e offender e&ades t#e ser&ice of #is sentence 1y lea&ing t#e penal institution $#ere #e is confine on t#e occasion of suc# disorder or during t#e mutiny . 4. T#at t#e offender fails to gi&e #imself up to t#e aut#orities $it#in 4' #ours follo$ing t#e issuance of a proclamation 1y t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e announcing t#e passing a$ay of suc# calamity .
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?.TA >!?!3 %t is t#e +A%5EA! T. A!TEA? t#at is punis#ed4 and if you return4 you are gi&en credit. %f you refuse to return4 you are gi&en or punis#ed an additional 1G5 >ut if you return4 you are gi&en 1G5 as deduction of your sentence. The leaving from the penal establishment is not the basis of criminal liability. &t is the failure to return within 26 hours after the passing of the calamity, conflagration or mutiny had been announced. ,nder !rticle 1$6, those who return within 26 hours are given credit or deduction from the remaining period of their sentence e>uivalent to 1L$ of the original term of the sentence. ?ut if the prisoner fails to return within said 26 hours, an added penalty, also 1L$, shall be imposed but the 1L$ penalty is based on the remaining period of the sentence, not on the original sentence. &n no case shall that penalty exceed six months. Those who did not leave the penal establishment are not entitled to the 1L$ credit. (nly those who left and returned within the 26 hour period. The mutiny referred to in the second form of evasion of service of sentence does not include riot. The mutiny referred to here involves subordinate personnel rising against the supervisor within the penal establishment. (ne who escapes during a riot will be subject to !rticle 1$A, that is, simply leaving or escaping the penal establishment. .utiny is one of the causes which may authori8e a convict serving sentence in the penitentiary to leave the jail provided he has not ta9en part in the mutiny. The crime of evasion of service of sentence may be committed even if the sentence is destierro, and this is committed if the convict sentenced to destierro will enter the prohibited places or come within the prohibited radius of "$ 9ilometers to such places as stated in the judgment. &f the sentence violated is destierro, the penalty upon the convict is to be served by way of destierro also, not imprisonment. This is so because the penalty for the evasion can not be more severe than the penalty evaded. *R'+CLE 29 $'<ER C*!E! $F E:*!+$- $F !ER:+CE $F !E-'E-CE A. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender $as a con&ict. 2. T#at #e $as granted a conditional pardon 1y t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e. 3. T#at #e &iolated any of t#e conditions of suc# pardon. ?.TA >!?!3 CE--.C! Anyone $#o #a&e 1een granted conditional pardon 1y t#e president of t#e -#ilippines s#all &iolate t#e conditional pardon4 may t#at person 1e arrested 1y t#e presidentF Jes. >ut is #e lia1le under 15)F %55ECTAAT%.?GHE!AJ3 Bere is a con&ict gi&en conditional pardon4 #e committed anot#er crime. .ne of t#e conditions contained in t#e conditional pardon ($#ic# is actually a contract 1et$een t#e c#ief
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e8ecuti&e G president and t#e con&ict) is not to commit anot#er crime. 5ater4 t#e said person committed anot#er crime4 say TB!+T. Can #e 1e prosecuted and con&icted anot#er article 15) 1efore #e is con&icted of t#e crime of t#eftF A?C6!A3 ?.. %t is a Cupreme Court decision. T#e reason is t#at suppose t#e crime of t#eft (2 nd offense A55!/!@5J committed 1y #im) is not true4 t#at it $as a trun< up c#arge4 so B! MECT >! C.?(%CT!@ +%ACT .+ TB! 2 ?@ .++!?C! .A CA%M! >!+.A! B! CA? -A.C!CET!@ .A C.?(%CT!@ .+ .TB!A CAC!C .+ A(C%.? .+ C!A(%C! .+ C!?T!?C!. (Cee notes and commentaries of A!(%C!@ -!?A5 C.@! A??.TAT!@ 1y M%A%AM @!+!?C.A0CA?T%A/. and t#e cases t#ereof.) T#e pro&isions e8tend to special la$s.
TORRES (s. GONBALES8 !OARD OF 2ARDONS AND 2AROLE8 an$ !UREAU OF 2RISONS G.R. N&. 63560. .*l' 0C8 4956 T#e status of our case la$ on t#e matter under consideration may 1e summed up in t#e follo$ing propositions3 1. T#e grant of pardon and t#e determination of t#e terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely e8ecuti&e acts $#ic# are not su1=ect to =udicial scrutiny. 2. T#e determination of t#e occurrence of a 1reac# of a condition of a pardon4 and t#e proper conse7uences of suc# 1reac#4 may 1e eit#er a purely e8ecuti&e act4 not su1=ect to =udicial scrutiny under Cection 4 (i) of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code; or it may 1e a =udicial act consisting of trial for and con&iction of &iolation of a conditional pardon under Article 15) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. 6#ere t#e -resident opts to proceed under Cection 4 (i) of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code4 no =udicial pronouncement of guilt of a su1se7uent crime is necessary4 muc# less con&iction t#erefor 1y final =udgment of a court4 in order t#at a con&ict may 1e recommended for t#e &iolation of #is conditional pardon. 3. >ecause due process is not semper et u1i7ue =udicial process4 and 1ecause t#e conditionally pardoned con&ict #ad already 1een accorded =udicial due process in #is trial and con&iction for t#e offense for $#ic# #e $as conditionally pardoned4 Cection 4 (i) of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code is not afflicted $it# a constitutional &ice. 6e do not 1elie&e $e s#ould depart from t#e clear and $ell understood rules and doctrine on t#is matter. %t may 1e emp#asi2ed t#at $#at is in&ol&ed in t#e instant case is not t#e prosecution of t#e parolee for a su1se7uent offense in t#e regular course of administration of t#e criminal la$. 6#at is in&ol&ed is rat#er t#e ascertainment of $#et#er t#e con&ict #as 1reac#ed #is underta<ing t#at #e $ould Qnot again &iolate any of t#e penal la$s of t#e -#ilippinesQ for purposes of reimposition upon #im of t#e remitted portion of #is original sentence. T#e conse7uences t#at $e #ere deal $it# are t#e conse7uences of an ascertained 1reac# of t#e conditions of a pardon. A con&ict granted conditional pardon4 li<e t#e petitioner #erein4 $#o is recommitted must of course 1e con&icted 1y final =udgment of a court of t#e su1se7uent crime or crimes $it# $#ic# #e $as c#arged 1efore t#e criminal penalty for suc# su1se7uent offense(s) can 1e imposed upon #im. Again4 since Article 15) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code defines a distinct4 su1stanti&e4 felony4 t#e parolee or con&ict $#o is regarded as #a&ing &iolated t#e pro&isions t#ereof must 1e c#arged4
Page 28
prosecuted and con&icted 1y final =udgment 1efore #e can 1e made to suffer t#e penalty prescri1ed in Article 15). Cuccinctly put4 in proceeding against a con&ict $#o #as 1een conditionally pardoned and $#o is alleged to #a&e 1reac#ed t#e conditions of #is pardon4 t#e !8ecuti&e @epartment #as t$o options3 (i) to proceed against #im under Cection 4 (i) of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code; or (ii) to proceed against #im under Article 15) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code $#ic# imposes t#e penalty of prision correccional4 minimum period4 upon a con&ict $#o Q#a&ing 1een granted conditional pardon 1y t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e4 s#all &iolate any of t#e conditions of suc# pardon.Q Bere4 t#e -resident #as c#osen to proceed against t#e petitioner under Cection 4 (i) of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code. T#at c#oice is an e8ercise of t#e -resident,s e8ecuti&e prerogati&e and is not su1=ect to =udicial scrutiny. &n violation of conditional pardon, as a rule, the violation will amount to this crime only if the condition is violated during the remaining period of the sentence. !s a rule, if the condition of the pardon is violated when the remaining unserved portion of the sentence has already lapsed, there will be no more criminal liability for the violation. However, the convict maybe re>uired to serve the unserved portion of the sentence, that is, continue serving original penalty. The administrative liability of the convict under the conditional pardon is different and has nothing to do with his criminal liability for the evasion of service of sentence in the event that the condition of the pardon has been violated. )xception' where the violation of the condition of the pardon will constitute evasion of service of sentence, even though committed beyond the remaining period of the sentence. This is when the conditional pardon expressly so provides or the language of the conditional pardon clearly shows the intention to ma9e the condition perpetual even beyond the unserved portion of the sentence. &n such case, the convict may be re>uired to serve the unserved portion of the sentence even though the violation has ta9en place when the sentence has already lapsed. &n order that the conditional pardon may be violated, it is conditional that the pardonee received the conditional pardon. &f he is released without conformity to the conditional pardon, he will not be liable for the crime of evasion of service of sentence. Cuestion D !nswer I( )he vi%la)i%n %6 %n!i)i%nal &ar!%n a (-"()an)ive %66en(e; ,nder !rticle 1$<, there are two situations provided' There is a penalty of prision correccional minimum for the violation of the conditional pardon= #"% There is no new penalty imposed for the violation of the conditional pardon. &nstead, the convict will be re>uired to serve the unserved portion of the sentence. &f the remitted portion of the sentence is less than six years or up to six years, there is an added penalty of prision correccional minimum for the violation of the conditional pardon= hence, the violation is a substantive offense if the remitted portion of the sentence does not exceed six years because in this case a new penalty is imposed for the violation of the conditional pardon. #1%
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?ut if the remitted portion of the sentence exceeds six years, the violation of the conditional pardon is not a substantive offense because no new penalty is imposed for the violation. &n other words, you have to >ualify your answer. The +upreme Court, however, has ruled in the case of !ngeles v. 0ose that this is not a substantive offense. This has been highly critici8ed.
Chapter Se(en COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERAICE OF 2ENALTY IM2OSED FOR ANOTHER 2REAIOUS OFFENSE
*R'+CLE 50 C$MM+!!+$- $F *-$'<ER CR+ME D;R+-7 !ER:+CE $F PE-*L'3 +MP$!ED $- $'<ER PRE:+$;! $FFE-!E% A. Elements 1. T#at t#e offender $as already con&icted 1y final =udgment of one offense . 2. T#at #e committed a ne$ felony 1efore 1eginning to ser&e suc# sentence or $#ile ser&ing t#e same P 1st crime need not 1e a felony4 2nd crime must 1e a felony ?.TA >!?!3 T#is is also called HEAC%0A!C%@%(%CM4 a special aggra&ating circumstance. H3 a person is con&icted of a crime. After final =udgement4 #e committed anot#er crime a &iolation of >- 22.is #e a 7uasi0recidi&ist or notF A3 ?. 1ecause t#e 2nd crime4 in order for article 1 * to 1e applica1le4 must 1e a crime punis#a1le under t#e A!(%C!@ -!?A5 C.@!. %t must 1e a +!5.?J (A FEL$-3 %C A? ACT .A .MM%CC%.? (%5AT%(! .+ TB! A-C). >ET TB! +%ACT CA%M! E-.? 6B%CB B! 6AC C.?(%CT!@ >J +%?A5 DE@/!M!?T ?!!@ ?.T >! A +!5.?J. %t may 1e a &iolation of a special la$.
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TITLE FOUR CRIMES AGAINST 2U!LIC INTEREST

?.TA >!?!3 Crimes against pu1lic interest is a crime against t#e pu1lic in general. %t is fraud directed against t#e pu1lic. %f t#e crime or fraud is directed against an indi&idual4 t#e crime is !CTA+A (usually in estafa t#e pri&ate person is t#e offended party)
Chapter One FORGERIES

!e"ti#n $ne% & F#rging t/e seal #0 t/e 7#vernment #0 t/e P/ili))ine +slan(sA t/e signat.re #r stam) #0 t/e C/ie0 Exe".tive *R'+CLE 5 C$;-'ERFE+'+-7 '<E 7RE*' !E*L $F '<E 7$:' $F '<E P<+L%A F$R7+-7 '<E !+7-*';RE $R !'*MP $F '<E C<+EF E@EC;'+:E% A. Acts punis#a1le 1. +orging t#e /reat Ceal of t#e /o&ernment of t#e -#ils. 2. +orging t#e signature of t#e -resident . 3. +orging t#e stamp of t#e -resident . ?.TA >!?!3 T#is is a special crime of forgery. T#is is not any ordinary forgery. %f you forge t#e signature of t#e president purportedly in #is official capacity4 you $ill ?.T 1e c#arge $it# +.A/!AJ. T#e crime is +.A/%?/ TB! C%/?ATEA! .+ TB! -A!C%@!?T. T#at is t#e correct designation of t#e crime. 1ut if you forge t#e signature of t#e president purportedly done in #is pri&ate capacity(not in #is official capacity as c#ief e8ecuti&e)4t#e crime is falsification4 not forgery4 ma<ing it appear t#at a person participated in an act or procedure $#en #e did not in fact so participated. /..@ +A%TB is a defense. *R'+CLE 52 ;!+-7 F$R7ED !+7-*';RE $R C$;-'ERFE+' !E*L $R !'*MP A. !lements 1. T#at t#e /reat Ceal of t#e Aepu1lic is counterfeited or t#e signature or stamp of t#e C#ief !8ecuti&e $as forged 1y anot#er person . 2. T#at t#e offender <ne$ of t#e counterfeiting or forgery . 3. T#at #e used t#e counterfeit seal or forged signature or stamp . !e"ti#n 'w#% & C#.nter0eiting C#ins *R'+CLE 51 M*E+-7A+MP$R'+-7 *-D ;''ER+-7 F*L!E C$+-! A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere 1e false or counterfeited coins 2. T#at t#e offender eit#er made4 imported or uttered suc# coins 3. T#at in case of uttering suc# false or counterfeited coins4 #e conni&ed $it# t#e counterfeiter or importers ?.TA >!?!3
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%n uttering t#ere MECT 1e C.??%(A?C! $it# counterfeiters or importers. .t#er$ise4 t#ere is no crime under article 1 3. >ut t#ere is anot#er crime in t#e ot#er pro&isions of t#e A-C 1ut not article 1 3. (ta<e note t#at it is &ery important t#at in an information for uttering false coins t#ere 1e an allegation t#at t#ere is conni&ance $it# counterfeiters or importers ot#er$ise4 case $ill 1e dismissed 1ecause t#ere is no crime.) T#e meaning of import is to 1ring in to t#e port false coins To utter is to pass4 to circulate or to deli&er counterfeited coins *R'+CLE 5, M;'+L*'+$- $F C$+-! A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. Mutilating coins of legal currency4 $it# intent to damage or defraud anot#er 2. %mporting or uttering mutilated coins4 in conni&ance $it# t#e mutilator or importer in case of uttering ?.TA >!?!3 Aemem1er t#at t#e coins mutilated must 1e a coin of 5!/A5 T!?@!A. %f you mutilate coins $#ic# are not -#ilippine coins4 no crime Bere t#ere must also 1e conni&ance $it# counterfeiters andGor importersGmutilator. Coins of foreign currency is ?.T %?C5E@!@. Mutilation is ta<ing off part of t#e metal eit#er 1y filing it or su1stituting it for anot#er metal of inferior 7uality. The 6ir() a )( %6 6al(i6i a)i%n %r 6al(i)# are < #1% #"% #:% Counterfeiting 3 refers to money or currency= Forgery 3 refers to instruments of credit and obligations and securities issued by the Philippine government or any ban9ing institution authori8ed by the Philippine government to issue the same= Falsification 3 can only be committed in respect of documents.
&n so far as coins in circulation are concerned, there are two crimes that may be committed' #1% C #nt&'*&iting c in( This is the crime of rema9ing or manufacturing without any authority to do so.
&n the crime of counterfeiting, the law is not concerned with the fraud upon the public such that even though the coin is no longer legal tender, the act of imitating or manufacturing the coin of the government is penali8ed. &n punishing the crime of counterfeiting, the law wants to prevent people from trying their ingenuity in their imitation of the manufacture of money. &t is not necessary that the coin counterfeited be legal tender. +o that even if the coin counterfeited is of vintage, the crime of counterfeiting is committed. The reason is to bar the counterfeiter from perfecting his craft of counterfeiting. The law punishes the act in order to discourage people from ever attempting to gain expertise in gaining money. This is because if people could counterfeit money with impunity just because it is no longer legal tender, people would try to counterfeit non legal tender coins. +oon, if they develop the expertise to ma9e
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the counterfeiting more or less no longer discernible or no longer noticeable, they could ma9e use of their ingenuity to counterfeit coins of legal tender. 7rom that time on, the government shall have difficulty determining which coins are counterfeited and those which are not. &t may happen that the counterfeited coins may loo9 better than the real ones. +o, counterfeiting is penali8ed right at the very start whether the coin is legal tender or otherwise.
Cuestion D !nswer X has in his possession a coin which was legal tender at the time of Magellan and is considered a collectors item. He manufactured several pieces of that coin. Is the crime committed? Fes. &t is not necessary that the coin be of legal tender. The provision punishing counterfeiting does not re>uire that the money be of legal tender and the law punishes this even if the coin concerned is not of legal tender in order to discourage people from practicing their ingenuity of imitating money. &f it were otherwise, people may at the beginning try their ingenuity in imitating money not of legal tender and once they ac>uire expertise, they may then counterfeit money of legal tender. #"% M#tilati n * c in( This refers to the deliberate act of diminishing the proper metal contents of the coin either by scraping, scratching or filling the edges of the coin and the offender gathers the metal dust that has been scraped from the coin.
Re>uisites of mutilation under the Revised Penal Code #1% #"% #:% Coin mutilated is of legal tender= (ffender gains from the precious metal dust abstracted from the coin= and &t has to be a coin.
.utilation is being regarded as a crime because the coin, being of legal tender, it is still in circulation and which would necessarily prejudice other people who may come across the coin. 7or example, G mutilated a P ".@@ coin, the octagonal one, by converting it into a round one and extracting 1L1@ of the precious metal dust from it. The coin here is no longer P".@@ but only P 1.6@, therefore, prejudice to the public has resulted. There is no expertise involved here. &n mutilation of coins under the Revised Penal Code, the offender does nothing but to scrape, pile or cut the coin and collect the dust and, thus, diminishing the intrinsic value of the coin. .utilation of coins is a crime only if the coin mutilated is legal tender. &f the coin whose metal content has been depreciated through scraping, scratching, or filing the coin and the offender collecting the precious metal dust, even if he would use the coin after its intrinsic value had been reduced, nobody will accept the same. &f it is not legal tender anymore, no one will accept it, so nobody will be defrauded. ?ut if the coin is of legal tender, and the offender minimi8es or decreases the precious metal dust content of the coin, the crime of mutilation is committed.
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&n the example, if the offender has collected 1L1@ of the P ".@@ coin, the coin is actually worth only P 1.6@. He is paying only P1.6@ in effect defrauding the seller of P ."@. Punishment for mutilation is brought about by the fact that the intrinsic value of the coin is reduced. The offender must deliberately reduce the precious metal in the coin. Beliberate intent arises only when the offender collects the precious metal dust from the mutilated coin. &f the offender does not collect such dust, intent to mutilate is absent, but Presidential Becree /o. "2A will apply. +re(i!en)ial ,e ree N%. 0=> (,e6a emen)9 ?-)ila)i%n9 Tearin*9 B-rnin* %r ,e()r%#in* Cen)ral Ban5 N%)e( an! C%in() &t shall be unlawful for any person to willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn, or destroy in any manner whatsoever, currency notes and coins issued by the Central ?an9. .utilation under the Revised Penal Code is true only to coins. &t cannot be a crime under the Revised Penal Code to mutilate paper bills because the idea of mutilation under the code is collecting the precious metal dust. However, under Presidential Becree /o. "2A, mutilation is not limited to coins.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. he people playing cara y cru!" #efore they throw the coin in the air would ru# the money to the sidewal$ there#y diminishing the intrinsic value of the coin. Is the crime of mutilation committed? .utilation, under the Revised Penal Code, is not committed because they do not collect the precious metal content that is being scraped from the coin. However, this will amount to violation of Presidential Becree /o. "2A. %. &hen the image of 'ose (i!al on a five)peso #ill is transformed into that of (andy *antiago" is there a violation of +residential ,ecree -o. %./? Fes. Presidential Becree /o. "2A is violated by such act. 0. *ometime #efore martial law was imposed" the people lost confidence in #an$s that they preferred hoarding their money than depositing it in #an$s. Former +resident Ferdinand Marcos declared upon declaration of martial law that all #ills without the 1agong 2ipunan sign on them will no longer #e recogni!ed. 1ecause of this" the people had no choice #ut to surrender their money to #an$s and e3change them with those with the 1agong 2ipunan sign on them. However" people who came up with a lot of money were also #eing charged with hoarding for which reason certain printing presses did the stamping of the 1agong 2ipunan sign themselves to avoid prosecution. &as there a violation of +residential ,ecree -o. %./? Fes. This act of the printing presses is a violation of Presidential Becree /o. "2A.
Page 5,
.. 4n old woman who was a cigarette vendor in 5uiapo refused to accept one)centavo coins for payment of the vendee of cigarettes he purchased. hen came the police who advised her that she has no right to refuse since the coins are of legal tender. 6n this" the old woman accepted in her hands the one) centavo coins and then threw it to the face of the vendee and the police. &as the old woman guilty of violating +residential ,ecree -o. %./? +he was guilty of violating Presidential Becree /o. "2A because if no one ever pic9s up the coins, her act would result in the diminution of the coin in circulation. 7. 4 certain customer in a restaurant wanted to show off and used a + %8.88 #ill to light his cigarette. &as he guilty of violating +residential ,ecree -o. %./? He was guilty of arrested for violating of Presidential Becree /o. "2A. !nyone who is in possession of defaced money is the one who is the violator of Presidential Becree /o. "2A. The intention of Presidential Becree /o. "2A is not to punish the act of defrauding the public but what is being punished is the act of destruction of money issued by the Central ?an9 of the Philippines. /ote that persons ma9ing bracelets out of some coins violate Presidential Becree /o. "2A. The primary purpose of Presidential Becree /o. "2A at the time it was ordained was to stop the practice of people writing at the bac9 or on the edges of the paper bills, such as Mwanted' pen palM. +o, if the act of mutilating coins does not involve gathering dust li9e playing cara y cru8, that is not mutilation under the Revised Penal Code because the offender does not collect the metal dust. ?ut by rubbing the coins on the sidewal9, he also defaces and destroys the coin and that is punishable under Presidential Becree /o. "2A. *R'+CLE 52 !ELL+-7 $F F*L!E $R M;'+L*'ED C$+-! 9+'<$;' C$--+:*-CE A. Elements 1. -ossession of coin4 (counterfeited or mutilated) a. -ossession b. 6it# intent to utter4 and c. Mno$ledge t#at coin is false 2. Actually uttering suc# false or mutilated coin a. Actually uttering4 and b. Mno$ledge t#at coin is false
Pdoes not re7uire t#at t#e counterfeited coin is legal tender ?.TA >!?!3 Acts punis#ed3 1. -ossession of coins mutilated or counterfeited 1y anot#er person $it# intent to utter t#e same <no$ing t#at it is mutilated. 2. Actually uttering suc# false or mutilated coins <no$ing t#e same to 1e false or mutilated
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3.
4. Ta<e note3 a coin collector cannot 1e #eld lia1le under article 1 4 and 1 5.
+orging treasury or 1undles4 o1ligations and securities4 importing and uttering ports4 notes o1ligations and securities.
!e"ti#n '/ree% & F#rging treas.ry #r ban8 n#tesA et" *R'+CLE 55 F$R7+-7 'RE*!;R3 $R 4*-E -$'E!A #r $'<ER D$C;ME-'! P*3*4LE '$ 4E*RERF +MP$R'+-7 *-D ;''ER+-7 !;C< F*L!E $R F$R7ED -$'E! *-D D$C;ME-'! T#ree acts punis#ed3 1. forging or falsification of treasury or 1an< notes or ot#er documents paya1le to 1earer 2. importation of suc# false or forged o1ligations or notes 3. uttering of suc# false or forged o1ligations or notes in conni&ance $it# t#e forgers or importers *R'+CLE 56 C$;-'ERFE+'+-7A +MP$R'+-7A P*3*4LE '$ 4E*RER $R ;''ER+-7 +-!'R;ME-'! -$'
A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere 1e an instrument paya1le to order or ot#er document of credit not paya1le to 1earer 2. T#at t#e offender eit#er forged 4 imported or uttered suc# instrument 3. T#at in case of uttering 4 #e conni&ed $it# t#e forger or importer *R'+CLE 58 +LLE7*L P$!!E!!+$- *-D ;!E $F F*L!E 'RE*!;R3 $R 4*-E -$'E! *-D $'<ER +-!'R;ME-'! $F CRED+' A. !lements 1. T#at any treasury or 1an< note of certificate or ot#er o1ligation and security paya1le to 1earer 4 or any instrument paya1le to order or ot#er document of credit not paya1le to 1earer is forged or falsified 1y anot#er person 2. T#at t#e offender <no$s t#at any of t#ose instruments is forged or falsified 3. T#at #e performs any of t#ese acts a. using any of suc# forged or falsified instruments ; or b. possessing $it# intent to use any of suc# forged or falsified instruments. Any person $#o s#all <no$ingly use or #a&e in #is possession4 6%TB %?T!?T T. EC!4 any of t#e false or falsified documents referred to in t#is section is punis#ed Aemem1er t#at in possession t#ere must 1e intent to use4 1ecause intent to possess is not intent to use. *R'+CLE 59 <$9 F$R7ER3 +! C$MM+''ED 1. >J /%(%?/ T. A TA!ACEAJ .A >A?M ?.T! .A A?J %?CTAEM!?T -AJA>5! T. >!AA!A .A T. .A@!A M!?T%.?!@ TB!A!%?4 TB! A--!AAA?C! .+ A TAE! A?@ /!?E%?! @.CEM!?T
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2.
>J !AAC%?/4 CE>CT%TET%?/4 C.E?T!A+!%T%?/4 .A A5T!A%?/ >J A?J M!?AC TB! +%/EA!C4 5!TT!AC4 6.A@C4 .A C%/? C.?TA%?!@ TB!A!%?.
F%r*er# under the Revised Penal Code applies to papers, which are in the form of obligations and securities issued by the Philippine government as its own obligations, which is given the same status as legal tender. *enerally, the word IcounterfeitingJ is not used when it comes to notes= what is used is Iforgery.J Counterfeiting refers to money, whether coins or bills. The Revised Penal Code defines forgery under !rticle 14<. /otice that mere change on a document does not amount to this crime. The essence of forgery is giving a document the appearance of a true and genuine document. /ot any alteration of a letter, number, figure or design would amount to forgery. !t most, it would only be frustrated forgery. 5hen what is being counterfeited is obligation or securities, which under the Revised Penal Code is given a status of money or legal tender, the crime committed is forgery. Cuestions D !nswers 1. Instead of the peso sign 9+:" some#ody replaced it with a dollar sign 9;:. &as the crime of forgery committed? /o. 7orgery was not committed. The forged instrument and currency note must be given the appearance of a true and genuine document. The crime committed is a violation of Presidential Becree /o. "2A. 5here the currency note, obligation or security has been changed to ma9e it appear as one which it purports to be as genuine, the crime is forgery. &n chec9s or commercial documents, this crime is committed when the figures or words are changed which materially alters the document. %. 4n old man" in his desire to earn something" scraped a digit in a losing sweepsta$es tic$et" cut out a digit from another tic$et and pasted it there to match the series of digits corresponding to the winning sweepsta$es tic$et. He presented this tic$et to the +hilippine Charity *weepsta$es 6ffice. 1ut the alteration is so crude that even a child can notice that the supposed digit is merely superimposed on the digit that was scraped. &as the old man guilty of forgery? ?ecause of the impossibility of deceiving whoever would be the person to whom that tic9et is presented, the +upreme Court ruled that what was committed was an impossible crime. /ote, however, that the decision has been critici8ed. &n a case li9e this, the +upreme Court of +pain ruled that the crime is frustrated. 5here the alteration is such that nobody would be deceived, one could easily see that it is a forgery, the crime is frustrated because he has done all the acts of execution which would bring about the felonious conse>uence but nevertheless did not result in a consummation for reasons independent of his will. 0. 4 person has a twenty)peso #ill. He applied toothache drops on one side of the #ill. He has a mimeograph paper similar in te3ture to that of the currency note and placed it on top of the twenty)peso #ill and put some weight on top of the paper. 4fter sometime" he removed it and the printing on the twenty) peso #ill was reproduced on the mimeo paper. He too$ the reverse side of the +%8 #ill" applied toothache drops and reversed the mimeo paper and pressed it to the paper. 4fter sometime" he removed it and it was reproduced. He cut it out"
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scraped it a little and went to a sari)sari store trying to #uy a cigarette with that #ill. &hat he overloo$ed was that" when he placed the #ill" the printing was inverted. He was apprehended and was prosecuted and convicted of forgery. &as the crime of forgery committed? The +upreme Court ruled that it was only frustrated forgery because although the offender has performed all the acts of execution, it is not possible because by simply loo9ing at the forged document, it could be seen that it is not genuine. &t can only be a consummated forgery if the document which purports to be genuine is given the appearance of a true and genuine document. (therwise, it is at most frustrated. !e"ti#n F#.r% & Falsi0i"ati#n #0 legislativeA ).bli"A "#mmer"ialA an( )rivate (#".mentsA an( wirelessA telegra)/A an( tele)/#ne message% The crime of falsification must involve a writing that is a document in the legal sense. The writing must be complete in itself and capable of extinguishing an obligation or creating rights or capable of becoming evidence of the facts stated therein. ,ntil and unless the writing has attained this >uality, it will not be considered as document in the legal sense and, therefore, the crime of falsification cannot be committed in respect thereto. Five la((e( %6 6al(i6i a)i%n$ #1% #"% #:% #2% #$% 7alsification 7alsification 7alsification individual= 7alsification 7alsification of legislative documents= of a document by a public officer, employee or notary public= of a public or official, or commercial documents by a private of a private document by any person= of wireless, telegraph and telephone messages.
,i()in )i%n "e)ween 6al(i6i a)i%n an! 6%r*er#$ 7alsification is the commission of any of the eight acts mentioned in !rticle 1A1 on legislative #only the act of ma9ing alteration%, public or official, commercial, or private documents, or wireless, or telegraph messages. The term forgery as used in !rticle 14< refers to the falsification and counterfeiting of treasury or ban9 notes or any instruments payable to bearer or to order. /ote that forging and falsification are crimes under 7orgeries. *R'+CLE 60 F*L!+F+C*'+$- $F LE7+!L*'+:E D$C;ME-'! A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere 1e a 1ill 4 resolution or ordinance enacted or appro&ed or pending appro&al 1y t#e Congress of any pro&incial 1oard or municipal council 2. T#at t#e offender alters t#e same 3. T#at #e #as no proper aut#ority t#ereof 4. T#at t#e alteration #as c#anged t#e meaning of t#e document
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?.TA >!?!3 T#is is also a special <ind of falsification4 as distinguis#ed from falsification of pu1lic4 official4 commercial and pri&ate documents. %n falsification of legislati&e documents4 t#e documents s#ould 1e genuine. Jou cannot falsify a fa<e legislati&e document 1ut it does not mean t#at t#ere is no crime committed4 t#ere is. it is ordinary falsification. %t false under feigning or imitating. H3 @%CT%?/E%CB +.A/!AJ +A.M +A5C%+%CAT%.? A3 %n +.A/!AJ used in article 1 ) refers to t#e falsification and counterfeiting of treasury and 1an< notes or any instruments paya1le to 1earer or order %n falsification4 it is t#e commission of any of t#e ' acts mentioned in article 1"1 on legislati&e4 pu1lic4 official4 commercial4 or pri&ate documents or $ireless or telegrap# messages. *R'+CLE 6 F*L!+F+C*'+$- 43 P;4L+C ECCLE!+!'+C*L M+-+!'ER
$FF+CERA
EMPL$3EEF
$R
-$'*R3
$R
!. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer 4 employee 4 or notary or ecclesiastical minister 2. T#at #e too< ad&antage of #is official position 3. T#at #e falsifies a document 1y committing any of t#e follo$ing acts 3 a. Counterfeiting or imitating any #and$riting4 signature or ru1ric; b. Causing it to appear t#at persons #a&e participated in any act or proceeding $#en t#ey did not in fact so participate; c. Attri1uting to persons $#o #a&e participated in an act or proceeding statements ot#er t#an t#ose in fact made 1y t#em; d. Ma<ing untrut#ful statements in a narration of facts; e. Altering true dates; f. Ma<ing any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document $#ic# c#anges its meaning; g. %ssuing in an aut#enticated form a document purporting to 1e a copy of an original document $#en no suc# original e8ists4 or including in suc# a copy a statement contrary to4 or different from4 t#at of t#e genuine original; or h. %ntercalating any instrument or note relati&e to t#e issuance t#ereof in a protocol4 registry4 or official 1oo<. T#is s#ould 1e read toget#er $it# AAT%C5! 1"2 +A5%C%+%CAT%.? >J -A%(AT! %?@%(%@EA5C A?@ EC! .+ +A5C%+%!@ @.CEM!?TC. H3 $#o are t#e offenders G persons penali2ed #ereF A3 1. pu1lic officers 2. pu1lic employees 3. notary 4. ecclesiastical minister ?ote3 in t#e case of a pu1lic officer4 #e must ta<e ad&antage of #is official position. %f #e falsified t#e document $it#out ta<ing ad&antage of #is official position4 it is not falsification under article 1"1 1ut falsification under article 1"2. H3 $#at is t#e meaning of 9ta<ing ad&antage of official positionF
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A3 t#e offender ta<es ad&antage of #is official position $#en #e #as t#e duty to ma<e or to prepare or ot#er$ise inter&ene in t#e preparation of a document of #e #as t#e official custody of t#e document $#ic# #e falsifies. H; must t#ere 1e a genuine document in falsificationF A3 yes4 in t$o cases only3 1. ma<ing alteration or intercalation or 2. including in a copy different statements %n falsification t#e documents may 1e simulated or fa1ricated; t#e falsification of a pu1lic document need not 1e made in an official form. %t is sufficient t#at t#e document is gi&en t#e appearance of4 or made to appear similar to4 t#e official form. Meaning you can ma<e your o$n document $#ic# is false. As a matter of fact t#is is t#e essence of falsification. 7or example, a customer in a hotel did not write his name on the registry boo9, which was intended to be a memorial of those who got in and out of that hotel. There is no complete document to spea9 of. The document may not extinguish or create rights but it can be an evidence of the facts stated therein. /ote that a chec9 is not yet a document when it is not completed yet. somebody writes on it, he ma9es a document out of it. &f
The document where a crime was committed or the document subject of the prosecution may be totally false in the sense that it is entirely spurious. This notwithstanding, the crime of falsification is committed. &t does not re>uire that the writing be genuine. )ven if the writing was through and through false, if it appears to be genuine, the crime of falsification is nevertheless committed.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. ! is one of those selling residence certificates in Cuiapo. He was brought to the police precincts on suspicion that the certificates he was selling to the public proceed from spurious sources and not from the ?ureau of Treasury. ,pon verification, it was found out that the certificates were indeed printed with a boo9let of supposed residence certificates. 5hat crime was committedE Crime committed is violation of !rticle 1A4 #manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification%. ! cannot be charged of falsification because the boo9let of residence certificates found in his possession is not in the nature of IdocumentJ in the legal sense. They are mere forms which are not to be completed to be a document in the legal sense. This is illegal possession with intent to use materials or apparatus which may be used in counterfeitingLforgery or falsification. ". Public officers found a traffic violation receipts from a certain person. The receipts were not issued by the .otor ;ehicle (ffice. 7or what crime should he be prosecuted forE &t cannot be a crime of usurpation of official functions. &t may be the intention but no overt act was yet performed by him. He was not arrested while performing such overt act. He was apprehended only while he was standing on
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the street suspiciously. /either can he be prosecuted for falsification because the document is not completed yet, there being no name of any erring driver. The document remains to be a mere form. &t not being completed yet, the document does not >ualify as a document in the legal sense. 2. Can the writing on the wall be considered a documentE
Fes. &t is capable of spea9ing of the facts stated therein. 5riting may be on anything as long as it is a product of the handwriting, it is considered a document. $. &n a case where a lawyer tried to extract money from a spinster by typing on a bond paper a subpoena for estafa. The spinster agreed to pay. The spinster went to the prosecutorHs office to verify the exact amount and found out that there was no charge against her. The lawyer was prosecuted for falsification. He contended that only a genuine document could be falsified. Rule. !s long as any of the acts of falsification is committed, whether the document is genuine or not, the crime of falsification may be committed. )ven totally false documents may be falsified. There are 6%-r 5in!( %6 !% -men)($ #1% #"% #:% #2% Public document in the execution of which, a person in authority or notary public has ta9en part= (fficial document in the execution of which a public official ta9es part= Commercial document or any document recogni8ed by the Code of Commerce or any commercial law= and Private document in the execution of which only private individuals ta9e part.
Public document is broader than the term official document. ?efore a document may be considered official, it must first be a public document. ?ut not all public documents are official documents. To become an official document, there must be a law which re>uires a public officer to issue or to render such document. )xample' ! cashier is re>uired to issue an official receipt for the amount he receives. The official receipt is a public document which is an official document. 7or example, a customer in a hotel did not write his name on the registry boo9, which was intended to be a memorial of those who got in and out of that hotel. There is no complete document to spea9 of. The document may not extinguish or create rights but it can be an evidence of the facts stated therein. /ote that a chec9 is not yet a document when it is not completed yet. somebody writes on it, he ma9es a document out of it. &f
The document where a crime was committed or the document subject of the prosecution may be totally false in the sense that it is entirely spurious. This notwithstanding, the crime of falsification is committed.
Page 6
&t does not re>uire that the writing be genuine. )ven if the writing was through and through false, if it appears to be genuine, the crime of falsification is nevertheless committed.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. ! is one of those selling residence certificates in Cuiapo. He was brought to the police precincts on suspicion that the certificates he was selling to the public proceed from spurious sources and not from the ?ureau of Treasury. ,pon verification, it was found out that the certificates were indeed printed with a boo9let of supposed residence certificates. 5hat crime was committedE Crime committed is violation of !rticle 1A4 #manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification%. ! cannot be charged of falsification because the boo9let of residence certificates found in his possession is not in the nature of IdocumentJ in the legal sense. They are mere forms which are not to be completed to be a document in the legal sense. This is illegal possession with intent to use materials or apparatus which may be used in counterfeitingLforgery or falsification. ". Public officers found a traffic violation receipts from a certain person. The receipts were not issued by the .otor ;ehicle (ffice. 7or what crime should he be prosecuted forE &t cannot be a crime of usurpation of official functions. &t may be the intention but no overt act was yet performed by him. He was not arrested while performing such overt act. He was apprehended only while he was standing on the street suspiciously. /either can he be prosecuted for falsification because the document is not completed yet, there being no name of any erring driver. The document remains to be a mere form. &t not being completed yet, the document does not >ualify as a document in the legal sense. 2. Can the writing on the wall be considered a documentE
Fes. &t is capable of spea9ing of the facts stated therein. 5riting may be on anything as long as it is a product of the handwriting, it is considered a document. $. &n a case where a lawyer tried to extract money from a spinster by typing on a bond paper a subpoena for estafa. The spinster agreed to pay. The spinster went to the prosecutorHs office to verify the exact amount and found out that there was no charge against her. The lawyer was prosecuted for falsification. He contended that only a genuine document could be falsified. Rule. !s long as any of the acts of falsification is committed, whether the document is genuine or not, the crime of falsification may be committed. )ven totally false documents may be falsified. There are 6%-r 5in!( %6 !% -men)($ #1% Public document in the execution of which, a person in authority or notary public has ta9en part=
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#"% #:% #2%
(fficial document in the execution of which a public official ta9es part= Commercial document or any document recogni8ed by the Code of Commerce or any commercial law= and Private document in the execution of which only private individuals ta9e part.
Public document is broader than the term official document. ?efore a document may be considered official, it must first be a public document. ?ut not all public documents are official documents. To become an official document, there must be a law which re>uires a public officer to issue or to render such document. )xample' ! cashier is re>uired to issue an official receipt for the amount he receives. The official receipt is a public document which is an official document. ID COUNTERFEITING OR IMITATING :FEIGNING; ANY HANDWRITING8 SIGNATURE OR RU!RIC Ae7uisites of counterfeiting3 1. intent to imitate or attempt to imitate 2. t#e t$o signatures or #and$ritings4 t#e genuine and t#e forged4 1ear some resem1lance to eac# ot#er IID CAUSING IT TO A22EAR THAT A 2ERSON HAS 2ARTICI2ATED IN ANY ACT OR 2ROCEEDING WHEN THEY DID NOT IN FACT SO 2ARTICI2ATED %llustration3 a la$yer prepares a deed of sale $#ere I sold a parcel of land to J $#ere in fact t#ere $as no sale. %n falsification under article 1"1 (2)4 t#e document need not 1e an aut#entic official paper and t#e signatures t#ereof need not necessarily 1e forged. Cimulation is t#e essence of falsification in t#is section. NIBURTADO (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 416C5C. De%em,er 68 499< -etitioner $as a1le to encas# t#e c#ec< on 1' .cto1er 1)'' on t#e 1asis of a resolution of t#e >arangay Council4 su1mitted to t#e MMM Cecretariat4 to t#e effect t#at a li&eli#ood pro=ect4 i.e.4 QT0s#irt manufacturing4Q #ad already 1een identified 1y t#e council. T#e money4 #o$e&er4 instead of its 1eing used for t#e pro=ect4 $as later lent to4 along $it# petitioner4 t#e mem1ers of t#e >arangay Council. Endou1tedly4 t#e act constituted QmisappropriationQ $it#in t#e meaning of t#e la$. Accused0appellant $as c#arged $it# #a&ing committed t#e crime t#roug# t#e falsification of a pu1lic document punis#a1le under paragrap# 2 of Article 1"1 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %n falsification under Art 1"14 par 24 t#e document need not 1e an aut#entic official paper since its simulation4 in fact4 is t#e essence of falsification. Co4 also4 t#e signatures appearing t#ereon need not necessarily 1e forged. %n concluding t#at t#e >arangay Council resolution4 !8#i1it Q@4Q $as a falsified document for $#ic# petitioner s#ould 1e #eld responsi1le4 t#e Candigan1ayan ga&e credence to t#e testimonies of >arangay Councilman Cantos A. /ome2 and >arangay Treasurer Manuel -. Aomero. T#e t$o testified t#at no meeting #ad actually ta<en place on 25 August 1)'34 t#e date $#en QT0s#irt
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manufacturingQ $as allegedly decided to 1e t#e 1arangay li&eli#ood pro=ect. T#e Candigan1ayan concluded t#at ?i2urtado #ad induced Aomero and /ome2 to sign t#e 1lan< resolution4 !8#i1it QDQ on t#e representation t#at Aomero,s proposal to 1uild a 1arangay ser&ice center $ould so later 1e indicated in t#at resolution as t#e 1arangay li&eli#ood pro=ect. %n falsification under article 1"1 (2)4 t#e document need not 1e an aut#entic official paper and t#e signatures t#ereof need not necessarily 1e forged. IIID ATTRI!UTING TO 2ERSONS WHO HAAE 2ARTICI2ATED IN ANY ACT OR 2ROCEEDING STATEMENTS OTHER THAN IN FACT MADE !Y THEM C!! case of E.C. &s CA-E5! IAD MA/ING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS Bere t#e offender #as a legal o1ligation to disclose t#e trut# of t#e facts narrated 1y #im. T#e facts narrated 1y t#e offender are a1solutely false and t#at t#e per&ersion of trut# in t#e narration of facts $as made $it# $rongful intent of in=uring a t#ird person. Case in Candigan1ayan $#ic# reac#ed t#e CC3 a municipal mayor $#o issued a certification to t#e effect t#at t#ere is a&aila1le funds for a certain position in t#at municipality $#en in fact t#ere $ere no funds appropriated for t#e purpose and $#en in fact also t#e position did not e8ist (so all t#e re7uisites under paragrap# 4 are present). Certification is a statement in t#e narration of facts. T#e mayor #as an o1ligation to disclose t#e facts. 6#at #e did $as falsification 1ecause t#ere $as ?o position and no funds a&aila1le 1ecause t#ere $as no appropriation for t#e purpose 1y t#e council. H3 $#at is legal o1ligationF A3 t#ere is a la$ $#ic# re7uires t#e disclosure of t#e trut# of facts narrated. !8ample3 if you apply for a position in t#e police force4 you #a&e to state t#at you #a&e no criminal record4 eit#er con&iction or pending. T#e person ma<ing t#e narration must 1e a$are of t#e falsity of t#e facts narrated 1y #im. in t#at case of t#e municipal mayor #e $as a$are of t#e falsity of t#e facts narrated in t#e certification $#ic# $as a1solutely false. H3 $#y is it t#at 6A.?/+E5 %?T!?T is not essential $#en t#e document falsified is a pu1lic documentF Aeason3 >ecause it is t#e interest of t#e community $#ic# is intended to 1e guaranteed 1y t#e strictest fait#fulness of officials. 2e&ple sh&*l$ tr*st a p*,l#% $&%*ment. There sh&*l$ ,e "*ll "a#th an$ %re$#t &n p*,l#% $&%*ments. ?o +alsification if t#e correction is done to spea< t#e trut# and pro&ided t#at t#ere is no legal o1ligation to disclose t#e same CA!IGAS (s. 2EO2LE G.R. N&. L@36<60. .*l' C8 4956 EThe )*est#&n n&- #s8 -h& %a*se$ the alterat#&ns an$ -hat -as the p*rp&se ,eh#n$ them.E
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%t is a settled doctrine t#at in falsification 1y an employee under par. ?o. 4 of Article 1"14 $#ic# reads R Q1y ma<ing untrut#ful statements in a narration of facts4Q R t#e follo$ing elements must concur R (a) T#at t#e offender ma<es in a document untrut#ful statements in a narration of facts; (1) T#at #e #as a legal o1ligation to disclose t#e trut# of t#e facts narrated 1y #im; (c) T#at t#e facts narrated 1y t#e offender are a1solutely false; and (d) T#at t#e per&ersion of trut# in t#e narration of facts $as made $it# t#e $rongful intent of in=uring a t#ird person. Berein petitioner contends t#at t#e foregoing elements are not present in t#e case at 1ar. T#e correction of t#e figure from 1453) to 14533 pieces to conform to t#e actual num1er of treasury under custody is not falsification 1ecause it $as made to spea< t#e trut#. T#e placing of an asteris< sign after t#e figure Q14533Q and $riting t#e $ords4 QAd=ustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3G*)G'2Q as legend of t#e asteris< sign4 contrary to t#e ruling of t#e respondent court4 $as not effected to #ide or conceal t#e fact t#at t#e missing treasury 1ills $ere lost. %t $ould 1e far more difficult to detect or disco&er t#e loss if t#ere $as no asteris< or footnote in t#e @A C@EC4 !8#. /. %n fact4 t#e e&idence discloses t#at immediately upon disco&ery of t#e loss on Marc# 2)4 1)'24 petitioner reported t#e matter to #is immediate super&isor4 !stela 5. !spiritu and >ranc# Manager of t#e Cecurities Cection4 Aurora -igram. T#is s#o$s good fait# and lac< of moti&e on t#e part of petitioner to conceal t#e said loss. T#e Bonora1le Colicitor /eneral recommends t#at t#e accused 1e ac7uitted 1ecause R QT#ere is not#ing to s#o$ t#e @A C@EC dated Marc# 3*4 1)'24 !8#. /4 for t#e alleged falsification of $#ic# petitioner $as con&icted in Criminal Case ?o. )3' is a form t#e su1mission of $#ic# $as or is re7uired 1y la$. %n t#e petition for re&ie$4 petitioner points out t#at as testified 1y #im t#e form $as not an official form of t#e 5and >an<. T#e form $as #is o$n initiati&e adopted ,for our o$n con&enience and also for reference purposes., -etitioner t#erefore4 $as not under legal o1ligation to disclose or re&eal t#e trut# 1y said @A C@EC. %n t#e a1sence of suc# o1ligation and of t#e alleged $rongful intent4 defendant cannot 1e legally con&icted of t#e crime of falsification of pu1lic document $it# $#ic# #e is c#arged. CC ac7uitted t#e accused. !rroneous conclusion of la$ cannot 1e considered as falsification in a narration of facts 2EO2LE (s. TUG!ANG an$ SETIAS G.R. N&. 63040. Apr#l 038 4994 +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ C.MM!AC%A5 @.CEM!?TC; 6.A@ QCTAT!M!?TCQ %? AAT%C5! 1"1 .+ A!(%C!@ -!?A5 C.@! A!+!AC T. CTAT!M!?T MA@! %? @.CEM!?TC. R Article 1"2 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code punis#es any pri&ate indi&idual $#o s#all commit any of t#e falsification enumerated in Article 1"1 in any pu1lic or official document or letter of e8c#ange or any ot#er <ind of commercial document. .ne of t#e acts of falsification enumerated in Article 1"1 under $#ic#4 1ased on t#e a1o&e 7uoted portion of t#e decision4 t#e accused $ere con&icted of is 1y ma<ing Quntrut#ful statements in a narration of facts.Q T#e $ord QstatementsQ under t#e Article4 #o$e&er4 refers to statements made in a document and not oral recitations of facts.
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T#is is clear enoug# from t#e $ordings of Article 1"2 $#en it mentions falsifications in Qpu1lic or official documentQ or Qletter of e8c#angeQ or in Qcommercial document.Q >eing so4 it is erroneous to consider t#e failure of t#e accused to disclose to /loria de los Cantos t#at #er money $as to 1e in&ested at Aoc#el /eneral Merc#ant and not at Cout#6est @e&elopment Corporation as constituting falsification 1y false narration of facts. @AA6%?/ CB!CMC 6B%CB BA(! ?. C.AA!C-.?@%?/ @!-.C%T T. C.(!A %T %C ?.T +A5C%+%CAT%.?. R !7ually clear is t#e error of t#e trial court to consider t#e act of t#e accused in dra$ing c#ec<s $#ic# #a&e no corresponding deposit to co&er it in t#e dra$ee 1an< as falsification. T#e amount $ritten on a c#ec< is not a narration of facts made 1y t#e dra$er representing t#at #e #as money in t#e 1an< 1ut rat#er a c#ec< is an order in $riting addressed to t#e dra$ee 1an< to pay t#e Q#olderQ of t#e c#ec< t#e amount $ritten t#ereon (Cee Cections 12 and 1'54 ?egotia1le %nstruments 5a$). T#e untrut#ful statement must refer to a narration of facts and 1y narration of facts is meant a recital of t#ings accomplis#ed4 of deeds4 occurrence or #appening. T#us4 a statement e8pressing an erroneous conclusion of la$ cannot 1e considered as falsification and more certainly4 as in t#is case4 neit#er is an QorderQ to pay a narration of facts. AD ALTERING TRUE DATES %n altering true dates t#e date altered must 1e essential.
AID MA/ING ALTERATION OR INTERCALATION IN GENUINE DOCUMENT WHICH CHANGES ITS MEANING T#ere is falsification if t#e intention is for t#e document to spea< false#ood. %f t#e purpose of t#e person is to spea< t#e trut#4 t#ere is no falsification. +ll.strati#n3 if you #a&e a residence certificate4 t#e date of 1irt# $as mista<enly placed t#erein4 you c#anged it4 and it is not falsification 1ecause you $ant t#e trut# to 1e reflected on your ta8 certificate. %t is falsification and not correction4 $#ic# t#e la$ punis#es. +alsification carries $it# it t#e elements of @!C!%T A?@ +AAE@ upon t#e pu1lic. %t is falsification and not correction t#at t#e la$ punis#es. T#e intention of falsification is for t#e document to spea< falsely and t#is is an essential element of t#e act of falsification. AIID ISSUING IN AUTHENTICATED FORM A DOCUMENT 2UR2ORTING TO !E A CO2Y OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WHEN NO SUCH ORIGINAL EXISSTS8 OR INCLUDING IN SUCH A CO2Y A STATEMENT CONTRARY TO8 OR DIFFERENT FROM8 THAT OF THE GENUINE ORIGINAL. %ntent to gain or pre=udice is not necessary. %t $ill 1e noted t#at in article 1"1 #t #s the &""#%#al %hara%ter &" the &""en$er -h#%h ma' ,e taFen #nt& %&ns#$erat#&n8 the #$ea &" +a#n &r #ntent t& %a*se $ama+e t& an&ther pers&n #s n&t ne%essar' ,e%a*se #t #s the #nterest &" the %&mm*n#t' -h#%h #s #nten$e$ t& ,e +*arantee$ ,' the str#%test "a#th"*lness ,' the &""#%#al %har+e$ -#th the preparat#&n an$ the preser(at#&n &" the a%ts #n -h#%h the' #nter(ene.
*R'+CLE 62 F*L!+F+C*'+$D$C;ME-'!
43
PR+:*'E
+-D+:+D;*L!
*-D
;!E
$F
F*L!+F+ED
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T#ere are 3 acts punis#ed3
7.
falsification of public, official or commercial document by a pri(ate indi(idual ( t#is
can also 1e committed 1y a pu1lic officer or employee $#o did t#e act of falsification in #is pri&ate or personal capacity4 meaning #e did it in #is o$n capacity and #e did not ta<e ad&antage of #is official position. 6#at is punis#ed #ere is t#e &iolation of pu1lic fait#. As said 1efore $e s#ould rely more on pu1lic documents. T#e destruction of t#e trut# as t#erein solemnly proclaimed is penali2ed. Co lac< of malice or criminal intent is a defense of falsification of a pu1lic document. Co if t#e offender is not a$are of t#e falsified c#aracter of t#e document t#en #e is not lia1le. Aemem1er t#at t#is is t#e Ae&ised -enal Code and not a special la$Gmala pro#i1ita $#ere intent is not necessary or it is material4 in A-C intent is necessary. in mala pro#i1ita4 $#at is necessary or material is intent to perpetrate t#e crime) 2. falsification of pri(ate documents by any person (re7uirement3 a. t#at t#e offender committed any of t#e acts of falsification e8cept t#ose in paragrap# " enumerated in article 1"1 1. t#e falsification is committed in a pri&ate document
$as committed $it# intent to cause suc# damage) Bere %?T!?T T. CAEC! @AMA/! is necessary. mere falsification is not enoug#. H3 $#at is meant 1y 9$it# intent to cause suc# damage:F A3 it means t#at t#e offender performs some ot#er independent act in order to ma<e use of it4 an act $#ic# $#ile it does not cause pre=udice to a t#ird party4 #as 1een done ne&ert#eless $it# t#e intention to cause suc# damage or pre=udice. %t is not necessary t#at t#e offender profited or #oped to profit from suc# falsification. +alsification may 1e a necessary means to commit t#e crime of estafa4 t#eft4 or mal&ersation. T#e t$o crimes form a comple8 crime under article 14'4 $#ere one crime is a necessary means of committing t#e anot#er crime. 1ut t#e document in t#is comple8 crime must 1e pu1lic4 official or commercial document. T#e falsification of a pu1lic4 official or pri&ate document may 1e a means of committing estafa 1ecause 1efore t#e falsified document $as actually utili2ed to defraud anot#er t#e crime of falsification #as already 1een consummated. @amage or intent to cause damage not 1eing an element of t#e crime of falsification of pu1lic4 official or commercial document. >ut if t#e falsified document is a pri&ate document4 t#ere is no crime4 unless anot#er fact independent of t#at falsifying t#e document4 is pro&ed0@AMA/! .A %?T!?T T. CAEC! @AMA/!. ?.TA >!?!3 TAM! ?.T!3 (!AJ %M-.ATA?T3 TB!A! AA! C.M-5!I CA%M!C CECB AC3 1. !CTA+A TBAE +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ A -E>5%C @.CEM!?T 2. TB!+T TBAE +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ .++%C%A5 @.CEM!?T 3. !CTA+A TBAE +A5C%+%CAT%.?.+ C.MM!AC%A5 @.CEM!?T >J A!CM5!CC %M-AE@!?C! 4. MA5(!ACAT%.? TBAE +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ -E>5%C @.CEM!?T >ET TB!A! %C NO COM2LEX CA%M! .+ ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION
t#at t#ere is intent to cause damage to a 3rd party or at least t#e falsification
OF A 2RIAATE DOCUMENT 1ecause the #mme$#ate e""e%t &"
"als#"#%at#&n &" a pr#(ate $&%*ment #s the same as that &" esta"a. Militis Lex Fraternity 09 (by EDLER)
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The "als#"#%at#&n &" a pr#(ate $&%*ment %ann&t ,e sa#$ t& ,e a means &" %&mm#tt#n+ esta"a ,e%a*se the "ra*$*lent +a#n &,ta#ne$ thr* $e%e#t #n esta"a #s n&th#n+ m&re than the (er' $ama+e %a*se$ ,' the "als#"#%at#&n &" s*%h $&%*ment.
!stafa t#ru falsification of pu1lic document (notari2ed C-A) A#llal&n (ers*s De G*>man G.R. N&. <C379. De%em,er 048 4991 T#e falsification of a pu1lic document may 1e a means of committing estafa 1ecause 1efore t#e falsified document is actually utili2ed to defraud anot#er4 t#e crime of falsification #as already 1een consummated4 damage or intent to cause damage not 1eing an element of t#e crime of falsification of pu1lic4 official or commercial documents. T#e damage to anot#er is caused 1y t#e commission of estafa4 not 1y t#e falsification of t#e document4 #ence4 t#e falsification of t#e pu1lic4 official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit t#e estafa. 8 8 8 T#e document $#ic# $as allegedly falsified $as a notari2ed special po$er of attorney registered in t#e Aegistry of @eeds of @agupan City on +e1ruary 134 1) 4 aut#ori2ing pri&ate respondent to mortgage a parcel of land co&ered 1y Transfer Certificate of Title ?o. 4" '2 in order to secure a loan of -'45**.** from t#e -eople,s >an< and Trust Company. T#e information for estafa t#ru falsification of a pu1lic document $as filed only on Marc# 2)4 1)"4. 6e re=ect petitioner,s claim t#at t#e ten0year period commenced $#en complainant supposedly disco&ered t#e crime in Danuary4 1)"2 1y reason of t#e e=ectment suit against #im. 3. use of falsified document Mere 1lan< form of an official document is not in itself a document. %t 1ecomes a document only $#en it is accomplis#ed or filled up. DAAA (s. 2EO2LE8 ET AL G.R. N&. 6C917 Septem,er C18 4994 CA%M%?A5 5A6; EC! .+ +A5C%+%!@ @.CEM!?TC; !5!M!?TC. R T#e elements of t#e crime of using a falsified document in any transaction (ot#er t#an as e&idence in a =udicial proceeding) penali2ed under t#e last paragrap# of Article 1"2 are t#e follo$ing3 (a) t#e offender <ne$ t#at a document $as falsified 1y anot#er person; (1) t#e false document is em1raced in Article 1"1 or in any of su1di&isions ?os. 1 and 2 of Article 1"2; (c) #e used suc# document (not in =udicial proceedings)4 and (d) t#e use of t#e false document caused damage to anot#er or at least it $as used $it# intent to cause suc# damage. @A%(!A,C 5%C!?C! C.?C%@!A!@ -E>5%C @.CEM!?T. R A dri&er,s license is a pu1lic document $it#in t#e pur&ie$ of Articles 1"1 and 1"2. T#e 1lan< form of t#e dri&er,s license 1ecomes a pu1lic document t#e moment it is accomplis#ed. T#us4 $#en dri&er,s license ?o. 2"* ''" $as filled up $it# petitioner,s personal data and t#e signature of t#e registrar of t#e Can +ernando 5TC agency $as affi8ed t#erein4 e&en if t#e same $as simulated4 t#e dri&er,s license 1ecame a pu1lic document. %?T!?T T. CAEC! @AMA/!; %MMAT!A%A5. R T#e dri&er,s license 1eing a pu1lic document4 proof of t#e fourt# element of damage caused to anot#er person
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or at least an intent to cause suc# damage #as 1ecome immaterial. %n falsification of pu1lic or official documents4 t#e principal t#ing 1eing punis#ed is t#e &iolation of t#e pu1lic fait# and t#e destruction of t#e trut# proclaimed t#erein. %ntroduction of falsified document in =udicial proceedings K t#e offender introduces in e&idence t#e falsified document in any =udicial proceedings4 #ere must 1e an element of damage or intent to cause damage. %f use in any ot#er proceedings ot#er t#an =udicial4 t#ere must 1e also an element of damage or intent to cause damage. Cuppose you are prosecuted for falsification of pu1lic document4 you cannot 1e c#arged of EC! of falsified pu1lic document. >ut if a person is c#arged $it# a pu1lic or commercial document and #e is ac7uitted4 #e can no$ 1e c#arged of Ese of +alsified document if #e $as a$are at t#e time $#en #e use t#e document t#at suc# document is falsified. %f you falsify a document for t#e purpose of o1structing t#e prosecution of a criminal offender4 you can also 1e lia1le under -@ 1'2) .>CTAECT%.? %? TB! -A.C!CET%.? .+ CA%M%?A5 .++!?@!AC PPPPPPPPPPP T#ere is a principle in =urisprudence t#at t#e possessor of a falsified document is presumed to 1e t#e aut#or of t#e falsification.
Al&n>& (s.IAC G.R. N&. L@3530<. .*ne C18 4956 T#e fact t#at t#e petitioner prepared t#e &ouc#er4 considering it $as #is official duty to prepare t#e payroll4 &ouc#ers4 and ot#er documents assigned to #im is not a sufficient reason for t#e respondent court to conclude t#at Qt#ere is no dou1t t#at t#e forgery or falsification $as effected 1y t#e appellant.Q Enfortunately4 t#e respondent court mista<enly applied t#e rule t#at3 Qone found in possession of and $#o used a forged document is t#e forger or t#e one $#o caused t#e forgery and4 t#erefore4 is guilty of falsification. T#e accused is entitled to t#e constitutional presumption of innocence especially $#ere t#e e&idence on t#e alleged forged &ouc#er is e8tremely dou1tful. 2ECHO (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 444C99. N&(em,er 4<8 499< 8 8 8 T#ere $as no direct proof t#at t#e petitioner and #is co0conspirator4 Dose Catre4 $ere t#e aut#ors of t#e falsification. Ne(ertheless4 since it $as s#o$n $it# moral certainty from t#e testimony of t#e Calicas t#at t#e petitioner and Catre $ere in possession of t#e falsified documents and personally deli&ered t#em to @ennis Calica and t#at t#ey s#o$ed e8traordinary personal interest in securing t#e release of t#e cargoes for a fictitious importer4 t#en t#e petitioner and Catre are presumed to 1e t#e aut#ors of t#e falsified documents. A rule4 $ell01uttressed upon reason4 is t#at in t#e a1sence of satisfactory e8planation one found in possession of and $#o used a forged document is t#e forger and t#erefore guilty of falsification. %t is4 #o$e&er4 essential t#at t#e use must 1e so closely connected in time $it# t#e forging suc# t#at t#e utterer or user may 1e pro&ed to #a&e t#e capacity of forging4 or suc# close connection $it# t#e forger t#at it 1ecomes4 $#en so accomplis#ed4 pro1a1le proof of complicity in t#e forgery. 8 8 8 %n -eople &s. Cendaydiego4 t#is Court reiterated t#e rule t#us3 QT#e rule is t#at if a person #ad in #is possession a falsified document and #e made use of it (uttered it)4 ta<ing ad&antage of it and profiting t#ere1y4 t#e presumption is t#at #e is t#e material aut#or of t#e falsification. T#is is especially true if t#e use or uttering of t#e forged documents $as so closely connected in time $it# t#e forgery t#at t#e user or possessor may 1e pro&en to #a&e t#e capacity of committing t#e forgery4 or to #a&e close connection $it# t#e forgers4 and4 t#erefore4 #ad complicity in t#e forgery.
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%n t#e a1sence of a satisfactory e8planation4 one $#o is found in possession of a forged document and $#o used or uttered it is presumed to 1e t#e forger CAU!ANG (s. 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 303C<. .*ne 038 4990 CA%M%?A5 5A6; +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ -E>5%C @.CEM!?TC; -.CC!CC.A A?@ EC!A TB!A!.+; -A!CEM!@ TB! +.A/!A TB!A!.+. R 6e are satisfied t#at t#e court a 7uo and t#e respondent court did not err in relying upon t#e presumption t#at t#e possessor and user of a falsified document is presumed to 1e t#e forger. T#e e&idence conclusi&ely s#o$s t#at t#e statement of assets and lia1ilities $as net among t#ose 1roug#t 1y t#e petitioner from @a&ao to Manila. T#e statement $as not an aut#entic representation of t#e assets and lia1ilities of t#e >CACC%. %t $as surreptitiously signed 1y someone $#o imitated t#e signature of >alta2ar -agaduan. %ndeed4 no forger could e&er do t#is in t#e open. +orgery could easily 1e consummated only 1y t#e forger alone or in t#e confidence of persons in conni&ance $it# #im. T#e filing of t#e pre&iously ine8istent document su1=ects t#e accused0petitioner to t#e inference t#at #e used it as part of t#e registration papers. %n t#e a1sence of a credi1le and satisfactory e8planation of #o$ t#e document came into 1eing and t#en filed $it# t#e C!C4 t#e accused is presumed to 1e t#e forger of t#e signature of -agaduan4 and t#e one $#o prepared dou1tful information on t#e financial status of t#e proposed corporation T#e Court #as similarly ruled in E.C. &. Castillo4 -#il. 453 S1)* T regarding t#e utterance of a c#ec<3 QT#e utterance of suc# an instrument4 $#en une8plained is strong e&idence tending to esta1lis# t#e fact t#at t#e utterer eit#er #imself forged t#e instrument or caused it to 1e forged4 and t#at t#is e&idence4 ta<en toget#er $it# t#e furt#er e&idence set out . . . and 1roug#t out on t#e trial of t#e case esta1lis#es t#e guilt of t#e accused $it# $#ic# #e $as c#arged 1eyond a reasona1le dou1t.Q %n t#e case at 1ar4 t#e filing of t#e statement of assets and lia1ilities remained une8plained. T#is fact4 toget#er $it# ot#er proofs presented 1y t#e prosecution4 is strong e&idence tending to s#o$ t#at t#e accused Adolfo Cau1ang eit#er #imself forged t#e statement or caused it to 1e forged 1y someone else. 6ort#y of note is t#e $illingness of t#e accused to accomplis# all t#at $ere necessary to ac7uire a certificate of incorporation. +A5C! !?TA%!C %? TB! @.CEM!?T; ?.T MAT!A%A5 T. TB! -A.C!CET%.? TB!A!.+. R T#e petitioner contends t#at t#ere $ere a1solutely no false entries in t#e statement of assets and lia1ilities as to ma<e its e8ecution in=urious or damaging to t#e go&ernment or t#ird parties. T#e claim is $it#out merit. %n t#e falsification of a pu1lic document suc# as !8#i1it Q>02Q4 it is immaterial $#et#er or not t#e contents set fort# t#erein $ere false. 6#at is important is t#e fact t#at t#e signature of anot#er $as counterfeited. %?T!?T T. /A%? .A T. %?DEA!; %MMAT!A%A5 T. TB! -A.C!CET%.? TB!A!.+. R T#is is not to say t#at !8#i1it Q>02Q is a pu1lic document t#e falsification of $#ic# must #a&e t#e effect of damage t#at must first 1e pro&en. T#e Court is of t#e &ie$ t#at mere falsification 1y forging t#e signature of >alta2ar -agaduan as to cause it to appear t#at -agaduan #as participated in t#e e8ecution of !8#i1it Q>024Q $#en #e did not in fact so participate4 ma<es t#e accused0 petitioner criminally lia1le. %n a crime of falsification of a pu1lic or official document4 t#e principal t#ing punis#ed is t#e Q&iolation of t#e pu1lic fait# and t#e destruction of t#e trut# as t#erein solemnly proclaimed.Q T#us4 intent to gain or to in=ure is immaterial. !&en more so4 t#e gain or damage is not necessary. SA!INIANO (s. CA an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 63<91. O%t&,er 38 4997 CA%M%?A5 5A6; !CTA+A TBAE +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ -E>5%C @.CEM!?TC; M!A! C%/?ATEA! .+ A--A.(A5 A--!AA%?/ .? A (.ECB!A4 CB!CM .? 6AAAA?T ?.T !?.E/B T. CECTA%? A +%?@%?/ .+ C.?C-%AACJ; CAC! AT >AA. R Apart from petitioner,s signature on t#e treasury $arrant4 not#ing else of real su1stance $as su1mitted to s#o$ petitioner,s alleged complicity in t#e crime. A mere signature or appro&al appearing on a &ouc#er4 c#ec< or $arrant is not enoug# to sustain a finding of conspiracy among pu1lic officials and employees c#arged $it# defraudation. -roof4 not mere con=ectures or assumptions4 s#ould 1e proffered to indicate t#at t#e accused #ad ta<en part in4 to use t#is Court,s $ords in Arias &s. Candigan1ayan4 t#e Qplanning4 preparation and perpetration of t#e alleged conspiracy to defraud t#e go&ernmentQ for4 ot#er$ise4 any Qcareless use of t#e conspiracy t#eory (can) s$eep into =ail e&en innocent persons $#o may #a&e (only) 1een made un$itting tools 1y t#e criminal mindsQ really responsi1le for t#at irregularity. %n t#e recent case of Magsuci (. Candigan1ayan4 (24* CCAA 13) in&ol&ing an accusation for estafa t#roug# falsification of pu1lic documents4 $#ere t#e accused not only co0signed a c#ec< 1ut also noted an accomplis#ment report and signed t#e
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dis1ursement &ouc#er $it# t#e usual certification on t#e la$ful incurrence of t#e e8penses to 1e paid4 t#e Court #eld3 Q+airly e&ident4 #o$e&er4 is t#e fact t#at t#e actions ta<en 1y Magsuci in&ol&ed t#e &ery functions #e #ad to disc#arge in t#e performance of #is official duties. T#ere #as 1een no intimation at all t#at #e #ad fore<no$ledge of any irregularity committed 1y eit#er or 1ot# !ngr. !nri7ue2 and Ancla. -etitioner mig#t #a&e indeed 1een la8 and administrati&ely remiss in placing too muc# reliance on t#e official reports su1mitted 1y #is su1ordinate (!ngineer !nri7ue2)4 1ut for conspiracy to e8ist4 it is essential t#at t#ere must 1e a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not t#e product of negligence 1ut of intentionality on t#e part of co#orts.Q Bere4 in fact4 t#e t$o &ouc#ers supporting t#e treasury $arrant 1ore $#at appeared to petitioner to 1e t#e legitimate signatures of 1ot# Cresencio T. >alas1as4 t#e Assistant C#ief of t#e Administrati&e Cer&ices @i&ision of t#e >ureau of 5ands4 and 5aureano Aomero4 in t#e office of t#e Cecretary of Agriculture and ?atural Aesources. -etitioner #ad no reason to dou1t t#e aut#enticity of t#e aut#ori2ation gi&en 1y t$o senior officials imprinted on t#e &ouc#ers. Conforma1ly $it# 5ands Memorandum .rder ?o. 2 105 on t#e routing of &ouc#ers for payment eit#er 1y cas#4 -?> c#ec< or treasury $arrant4 #e signed t#e $arrant after t#e c#ief accountant and t#e auditor #ad affi8ed t#eir o$n signatures. A>C!?C! .+ CAT%C+ACT.AJ !I-5A?AT%.? .+ -.CC!CC%.? A?@ EC! .+ +.A/!@ @.CEM!?T; AA%C!C -A!CEM-T%.? .+ /E%5T; CAC! AT >AA. R %t is settled t#at in t#e a1sence of satisfactory e8planation4 one $#o is found in possession of4 and $#o #as used4 a forged document is t#e forger and t#erefore guilty of falsification. -etitioner,s self0ser&ing allegation t#at4 after encas#ing t#e $arrant4 #e turned t#e money o&er to >alas1as4 #as not 1een corro1orated4 let alone independently esta1lis#ed. +alsification and not correction t#at t#e la$ punis#es ?ot necessary t#at intent to gain is present /ood fait# is a defense SARE2 (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN G.R. N&. 3501C. Septem,er 4C8 4959 CA%M%?A5 5A6; +A5C%+%CAT%.? .+ -E>5%C @.CEM!?T; /..@ +A%TB4 A @!+!?C!; ?!/AT!@ >J +ACTC .? A!C.A@. R T#e Court does not accept petitioner,s defense of good fait#. Be admitted t#at #e <ne$ t#at @irector -a#m $as not only uninclined to e8tend #im a permanent appointment due to #is lac< of ci&il ser&ice eligi1ility 1ut #e also did not aut#ori2e #im (Carep) to follo$ up #is appointment $it# t#e Ci&il Cer&ice Commission in Manila. More importantly4 #e <ne$ t#at if t#e falsified document #ad 1een presented 1efore t#e CCC Aegional .ffice4 it $ould #a&e surely 1een attested as temporary only. Bence4 #e purposely a&oided filing t#e appointment paper $it# t#e CCC Aegional .ffice4 $#ic# is t#e practice and standard procedure in t#e regional office of t#e >ureau of Coils and4 instead4 personally 1roug#t it to Manila $#ere some#o$ #e $as a1le to #a&e it stamped appro&ed as permanent. +A5C%+%CAT%.?4 ?.T C.AA!CT%.?4 !CC!?C! .+ TB! CA%M!. R 6e agree $it# t#e respondent court t#at Q(%)t is falsification4 and not a correction4 $#ic# t#e la$ punis#es (-eople &s. Mateo4 25 -#il. 324 Arriola &s. Aepu1lic4 1*3 -#il. "3*).Q %?T!?T T. /A%?4 ?.T A? !5!M!?T; AAT%.?A5!. R (%)n t#e falsification of pu1lic or official documents4 $#et#er 1y pu1lic officials or 1y pri&ate persons4 it is not necessary t#at t#ere 1e present t#e idea of gain or t#e intent to in=ure a t#ird person4 for t#e reason t#at4 in contradiction to pri&ate documents4 t#e principal t#ing punis#ed is t#e &iolation of t#e pu1lic fait# and t#e destruction of t#e trut# as t#erein solemnly proclaimed -.CC!CC%.? .+ +A5C%+%!@ @.CEM!?T /%(!C A%C! T. A -A!CEM-T%.? .+ AETB.ACB%- .+ +A5C%+%CAT%.?. R Cince petitioner is t#e only person $#o stood to 1enefit 1y t#e falsification of t#e document t#at $as found in #is possession4 it is presumed t#at #e is t#e material aut#or of t#e falsification. -etitioner #as failed to con&ince t#e Court t#at a person ot#er t#an #imself made t#e erasures4 alterations and superimpositions on t#e 7uestioned appointment paper. GAMIDO (s. CA an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&s. 444930@60. De%em,er 58 4997 -etitioner $as accused in 11 cases of forging t#e signature of t#e -resident of t#e -#ilippines in t#e follo$ing documents and ma<ing it appear t#at t#e documents $ere genuine official documents of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines. 8 8 8
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-etitioner said t#at #e $as t#e !8ecuti&e @irector of t#e -residential Aegional Assistant Monitoring Cer&ices4 or -AAMC4 #a&ing 1een appointed 1y t#en -resident Marcos and t#at #is appointment and t#e related documents4 su1=ect of t#e prosecution4 #ad 1een signed 1y t#e former -resident in petitioner,s presence. 8 8 8 Bo$e&er4 t#e @irector of t#e MalacaUang Aecords .ffice4 testified t#at #is office did not #a&e a record of t#e documents. +or #is part !8ecuti&e Cecretary Duan C. Tu&era declared t#e -residential Aegional Assistant Monitoring Cer&ices as none8istent and its alleged !8ecuti&e @irector4 #erein petitioner4 as not in any capacity connected $it# t#e .ffice of t#e -resident. +rom t#ese premises it is rational to conclude t#at t#e documents in 7uestion4 $#ic# purport to #a&e 1een signed 1y t#en -resident Marcos4 are 1ogus documents. T#e trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to 1e t#e aut#or of t#e forgery. T#e presumption is t#at t#e possessor and user of a falsified document is t#e forger t#ereof.
%f a person sign for anot#er 1ut t#e former is aut#ori2ed 1y t#e latter t#ere is no falsification. T#e crime of falsification carries t#e elements deceit and fraud upon t#e pu1lic. %f t#e act done in t#e instrument is to spea< t#e trut# or correct4 t#ere is no crime of falsification. %f t#e accused acted in good fait# and t#ere is no damaged caused nor pre=udice4 alt#oug# t#e accused altered t#e document4 t#ere is no crime. T#e e8istence of an unla$ful intent to in=ure anot#er is not necessary if t#e falsified document is a pu1lic document. T#e principle is t#at in falsification of a pu1lic or official document $#et#er 1y a pu1lic officer or a pri&ate person4 intent and damage not necessary. T#is is 1ecause t#e principal t#ing punis#ed is t#e &iolation of t#e pu1lic fait# and t#e destruction of t#e trut# as t#erein proclaimed. T#e act of falsification itself in a pri&ate or official document is penali2ed to maintain fait# to t#ose documents. Aeason also is t#at pu1lic interest is in&ol&ed. %n pri&ate document4 unla$ful intent and damage and in=ury to anot#er is necessary. Co #a&e to pro&e damage 1ecause it is an essential element % prosecuting falsification of a pri&ate document. -ri&ate interest is in&ol&ed. 6#en $e spea< of counterfeiting4 $e refer to money. 6#en $e spea< of forgeries4 $e refer to o1ligations and securities or credit H3 #o$ do $e distinguis# forgeries and falsificationF A3 - T#ere are t$o $ays of committing forgeries and eig#t $ays of committing falsifications. - +orgeries refer to treasuries and 1an< notes or similar instruments $#ile falsification apply to pu1lic4 pri&ate4 commercial or official documents. H3 is t#ere estafa t#roug# falsification of pri&ate documentF A3 ?.V Aemem1er t#at in falsification of pri&ate documents4 t#ere is an element of damage. %n estafa4 also t#ere is an element of damage. Co you can see t#at in 1ot# crimes4 in falsification of a pri&ate document and in estafa t#ere is a common element $#ic# is damage4 it is $ell settled in =urisprudence t#at you cannot use 1 element in t$o crimes4 you can only use 1 element in 1 crime. .t#er$ise4 you $ill 1e &iolating t#e pro&isions on dou1le =eopardy.
;)(ates in F*L!+F+C*'+$- (2001=2008)

Dnder !rticle 1B1, par. 2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. "n the other hand, falsification under par. 7 of !rticle 1B1 is
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perpetrated by a person who, ha#ing a legal obligation to disclose the truth, ma)es in a document statements in a narration of facts which are absolutely false with the wrongful intent of in.uring a third person. o 'n order that petitioner may be con#icted of falsification under par. 2 of !rticle 1B1, it is essential that it be pro#ed beyond reasonable doubt that he had caused it to appear that Mr. Gicente 2iwag had authori+ed the issuance of said certification, when in truth, Mr. 2iwag did not parta)e in said issuance of the certificate. Stated differently, for petitioner to be con#icted of falsification under par. 2, the allegation in the 'nformation that he $willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a certification dated Auly 1>, 1?H@, by stating and ma)ing it appear in said document . . . that the same was e,ecuted and signed by the (resident of Titan *onstruction *orporation, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well )new that said certification was not issued nor authori+ed to be issued by Titan *onstruction *orporation . . . and that the signature appearing in said certification as being that of Titan *onstruction *orporation0s (resident, . . .$ must be clearly established. o The threshold issue then is whether the signature of Mr. Gicente 2iwag was forged. *ontrary to the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, this *ourt deems that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, !tty. Aaime 2insangan and Aose *aneo, failed to pro#e with moral certainty that Mr. 2iwag did not authori+e the issuance of the certification. o 1y and large, there was no competent e#idence to pro#e the allegation of the officers of Titan *onstruction *orporation that the signature affi,ed on the certification was not that of Gicente 2iwag, thus ma)ing the issuance of the certification unauthori+ed. The prosecution did not present Mr. Gicente 2iwag, or any other )nowledgeable witness to testify whether the signature appearing on said certification was indeed not by Mr. 2iwag, thus establishing the fact that the certification was falsified by ma)ing it appear that the issuance was actually consented to by the president of Titan *onstruction *orporation. !bsent clear proof that Gicente 2iwag did not sanction the issuance of said certification, the 'nformation that petitioner has committed falsification of pri#ate document under !rticle 1B2, in relation to par. 2, !rticle 1B1, cannot be considerably pro#ed. &ith respect to par. 7 of !rticle 1B1, what is sought to be penali+ed is the act of ma1in# in a document of utterly false narration of facts by a person who has a le#al obli#ation to disclose the truth of said facts, thereby causin# in0ury to a third party. !nd in the case at bar, in order that petitioner may be penali+ed under par. 7, it is necessary that the allegations in the 'nformation that $. . . accused, with intent to damage Titan *onstruction *orporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously prepare a document, to wit: a certification dated Auly 1>, 1?H@, by stating and ma)ing it appear in said document that the 6irst Dnited *onstruction *orporation has underta)en building construction, sewage, water, and other ci#il wor)s when in truth and in fact, as said accused well )new . . . that it is false because 6irst Dnited *onstruction *orporation ne#er had any participation of the pro.ects listed therein which were underta)en by Titan *onstruction *orporation . . ., to the damage and pre.udice of Titan *onstruction *orporation$ be pro#ed.
o
o
The trial court concluded that the elements of the crime of falsification under par. 7 of !rticle 1B1 necessary to con#ict petitioner, particularly that a) the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts; b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; c) that the fact narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and d) that the perversion of the truth in the narration of fact was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person are present in the instant case. This *ourt is not con#inced. 'n the case at bar, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court do not lead to an inference e,clusi#ely consistent with the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to pro#e that it was indeed petitioner who prepared the document nor that he was the one who pro#ided the facts contained in the certification. 4#en from the admissions of both petitioner and his father, what can only be established is that petitioner re-uested his father to secure a certification that they had done some construction wor) for Titan *onstruction *orporation. 5othing in said testimony indicates that petitioner had as)ed his father to commit any falsification. (etitioner did not pro#ide nor e#en suggest what detailed information will be included in said certification.
'n *riminal *ase 5o. 3@2B, the trial court con#icted petitioner 1atulanon for falsifying Dennis 1atulanon0s signature in the cash #oucher based on the 'nformation charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, howe#er, re#eal that in *ash Goucher 5o. 3B7!, petitioner 1atulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. &hat she did was to sign: $by: lbatulanon$ to indicate that she recei#ed the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of falsification under !rticle 1B1 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representati#e of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from (**'. The essence of falsification is the act of ma)ing untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. !s to whether, such representation in#ol#es fraud which caused damage to (**' is a different matter which will ma)e her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. ence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner 1atulanon is also guilty of falsification of pri#ate document with respect to *riminal *ase 5o. 3@2B in#ol#ing the cash #oucher of Dennis.
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The offender under !rticle 1B2 must be a pri#ate indi#idual or may be a public officer, employee or notary public who does not $ta)e ad#antage of his official position.$ Dnder !rticle 1B1, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be committed by a public officer, employee or notary who 2ta1es advanta#e of his official position32
The offender "takes advantage of his official position" in falsifying a document when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or ( ) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
!+**&**+R +4 4A,*'4'&D D+C/(&N$ '* !R&*/(&D $+ B& $%& (A$&R'A, A/$%+R +4 $%& 4A,*'4'CA$'+N '4 %& '* $%& +N,- !&R*+N )%+ *$++D $+ B& B&N&4'$&D B- $%& 4A,*'4'CA$'+N = *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate court. (etitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is without merit. Dnder the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. !s )eenly obser#ed by the Solicitor /eneral, $the -uestioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was re-uested by the 51' for e,amination. *learly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not *aridad Dorol who merely #erified the -uestioned sale with the (ro#incial !ssessor0s "ffice of Sorsogon.$ 'n other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the sub.ect land from the pri#ate complainant to him. /i#en this factual bac)drop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct e#idence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. !s it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any gra#e abuse of discretion on the part of the *ourt of !ppeals. /*& +4 4A,*'4'&D D+C/(&N$*5 &,&(&N$*5 !&R*+NA, DA$A *%&&$* AR& +44'C'A, D+C/(&N$* R&6/'R&D 'N C+NN&C$'+N )'$% !R+(+$'+N $+ %'7%&R !+*'$'+N AND C+N$&ND&R* 4+R !R+(+$'+N %A.& ,&7A, +B,'7A$'+N $+ D'*C,+*& $%& $R/$%. 8 !ll the elements of falsification through the ma)ing of untruthful statements in a narration of facts are present: ;a< That the offender ma)es in a document statements in a narration of facts= ;b< That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him= ;c< That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false= and, ;d< That the per#ersion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of in.uring a third person. 'n (eople #. (o /io) To the *ourt held that $in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by pri#ate persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to in.ure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to pri#ate documents, the principal thing punished is the #iolation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.$ ence, the last re-uisite need not be present. !lso, petitioners themsel#es ha#e affirmed in their petition that their (ersonal Data Sheets were not sworn to before any administering officer thereby ta)ing their case away from the confines of per.ury. 5onetheless, they argue that they ha#e no legal obligation to disclose the truth in their (DS since these are not official documents. &e disagree. 'n 'nting #. Tanodbayan the *ourt held that $the accomplishment of the (ersonal Data Sheet being a re-uirement under the *i#il Ser#ice 3ules and 3egulations in connection with employment in the go#ernment, the ma)ing of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment . . . $ The filing of a (ersonal Data Sheet is re-uired in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion ha#e the legal obligation to disclose the truth. "therwise, enhancing their -ualifications by means of false statements will pre.udice other -ualified aspirants to the same position.
*R'+CLE 61 F*L!+F+C*'+$- $F 9+RELE!!A C*4LEA 'ELE7R*P< *-D 'ELEP<$-E ME!!*7E! *-D ;!E $F !*+D F*L!+F+ED ME!!*7E! T#e pu1lic officer to 1e lia1le must 1e engaged in t#e ser&ice of sending or recei&ing $ireless ca1le telegrap# and telep#one messages. !e"ti#n Five% & Falsi0i"ati#n #0 me(i"al "erti0i"atesA "erti0i"ates #0 merit #r servi"es an( t/e li8e% *R'+CLE 6, F*L!E MED+C*L CER'+FC*'E!A F*L!E CER'+F+C*'E! $F MER+' $R !ER:+CEA E'C%
Page 8,
A. -ersons 5ia1le3 1. -#ysician or surgeon $#o4 in connection $it# t#e practice of #is profession4 s#all issue a false certificate. 2. -u1lic officer $#o s#all issue a false certificate of merit or ser&ice4 good conduct or similar circumstances. (e8ample4 certificate of good conduct) 3. -ri&ate indi&idual $#o falsified a certificate falling in t#e classes mentioned in 1 W 2. *R'+CLE 62 ;!+-7 F*L!E CER+'F+C*'E! A. !lements 1. -erson (lia1le under Art. 1"4) issued t#e certificate 2. .ffender <ne$ t#at t#e certificate is false 3. T#at #e used t#e same %llustration3 if a doctor issues a false certificate4 t#e patient $#o uses t#e false certificate is lia1le under t#is article4 <no$ing t#e same to 1e falsified.
!e"ti#n !ix% & Man.0a"t.ringA im)#rting an( )#ssessi#n #0 instr.ments #r im)lements inten(e( 0#r t/e "#mmissi#n #0 0alsi0i"ati#n% *R'+CLE 65 M*-;F*C';R+-7 *-D P$!!E!!+$- $F +-!'R;ME-'! $R +MPLEME-'! F$R F*L!+F+C*'+$-! A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. Ma<ing or introducing into t#e -#ilippines any stamps4 dyes4 mar<s or ot#er instruments for counterfeiting or falsification 2. -ossessing $it# intent to use t#e instruments for counterfeiting or falsification made or introduced into t#e -#ilippines 1y anot#er person
Chapter T-& OTHER FALSIFICATIONS

!e"% $ne% & ;s.r)ati#n #0 a.t/#rityA ran8A titleA an( im)r#)er .se #0 namesA .ni0#rms an( insignia% *R'+CLE 66 ;!;RP*'+$- $F *;'<$R+'3 $R $FF+C+*L F;-C'+$-! A. Acts -unis#ed 1. >y <no$ingly and falsely representing oneself to 1e an officer4 agent or representati&e of any department or agency of t#e -#ilippine /o&t or any +oreign /o&t. 2. >y performing any act pertaining to any person in aut#ority or pu1lic officer of t#e -#ilippine /o&t or of a +oreign /o&t under t#e pretense of official position4 and $it#out 1eing entitled to do so. %mportant $ords to ta<e note3 M?.6%?/5J and +A5C!5J
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/..@ +A%TB or lac< of intent to commit t#e crime is a defense #ere 1ecause supposed a person really t#oug#t #e $as &ested $it# aut#ority. Cee Aepu1lic Act ?o. "5 Aepu1lic Act no. 1* is o1solete. RE2U!LIC ACT NO. 67 AN ACT TO 2ENALIBE ACTS WHICH WOULD IM2AIR THE 2RO2ER O!SERAANCE !Y THE RE2U!LIC AND INHA!ITANTS OF THE 2HILI22INES OF THE IMMUNITIES8 RIGHTS8 AND 2RIAILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN DI2LOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE 2HILI22INES Cec. 1. Any person $#o s#all falsely assume and ta<e upon #imself to act as a diplomatic4 consular4 or any ot#er official of a foreign go&ernment duly accredited as suc# to t#e /o&ernment of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines $it# intent to defraud suc# foreign go&ernment or t#e /o&ernment of t#e -#ilippines4 or any person4 or in suc# pretended c#aracter s#all demand or o1tain4 or attempt to o1tain from any person or from said foreign go&ernment or t#e /o&ernment of t#e -#ilippines4 or from any officer t#ereof4 any money4 paper4 document4 or ot#er t#ing4 of &alue4 s#all 1e fined not more t#an fi&e t#ousand pesos4 or s#all 1e imprisoned for not more t#an fi&e years4 or 1ot#4 in addition to t#e penalties t#at may 1e imposed under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Cec. 2. Any person4 ot#er t#an a diplomatic or consular officer or attac#e4 $#o s#all act in t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines as an agent of a foreign go&ernment $it#out prior notification to4 and registration $it#4 t#e Cecretary of +oreign Affairs s#all 1e fined not more t#an fi&e t#ousand pesos4 or imprisoned not more t#an fi&e years4 or 1ot#4 aside from ot#er penalties t#at may 1e imposed 1y la$. Cec. 3. Any person4 $#o $it# intent to decei&e or mislead4 $it#in t#e =urisdiction of t#e Aepu1lic4 $ear any na&al4 military4 police4 or ot#er official uniform4 decoration4 or regalia of any foreign Ctate4 nation or go&ernment $it# $#ic# t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines is at peace4 or any uniform4 decoration or regalia so nearly resem1ling t#e same as to 1e calculated to decei&e4 unless suc# $earing t#ereof 1e aut#ori2ed 1y suc# Ctate4 nation4 or go&ernment4 s#all4 upon con&iction4 1e punis#ed 1y a fine not e8ceeding t$o #undred pesos or imprisonment not e8ceeding si8 mont#s4 or 1y 1ot# suc# fine and imprisonment. Cec. 4. Any $rit or process sued out or prosecuted 1y any person in any court of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines4 or 1y any =udge or =ustice4 $#ere1y t#e person of any am1assador or pu1lic minister of any foreign Ctate4 aut#ori2ed and recei&ed as suc# 1y t#e -resident4 or any domestic or domestic ser&ant of any suc# am1assador or minister is arrested or imprisoned4 or #is goods or c#attels are distrained4 sei2ed4 or attac#ed4 s#all 1e deemed &oid4 and e&ery person 1y $#om t#e same is o1tained or prosecuted4 $#et#er as party or as attorney4 and e&ery officer concerned in e8ecuting it4 s#all4 upon con&iction4 1e punis#ed 1y imprisonment for not more t#an t#ree years and a fine of not e8ceeding t$o #undred pesos in t#e discretion of t#e court. Cec. 5. T#e pro&isions of section four #ereof s#all not apply to any case $#ere t#e person against $#om t#e process is issued is a citi2en or in#a1itant of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines4 in t#e ser&ice of an am1assador or a pu1lic minister4 and t#e process is founded upon a de1t contracted 1efore #e entered upon suc# ser&ice; nor s#all t#e said section apply to any case $#ere t#e person against $#om t#e process is issued is a domestic ser&ant of an am1assador or a pu1lic minister4 unless t#e name of t#e ser&ant #as4 1efore t#e issuing t#ereof4 1een registered in t#e @epartment of +oreign Affairs4 and transmitted 1y t#e Cecretary of +oreign Affairs to t#e C#ief of -olice of t#e City of Manila4 $#o s#all upon receipt t#ereof post t#e same in some pu1lic place in #is office. All persons s#all #a&e resort to t#e list of names so posted in t#e office of t#e C#ief of -olice4 and may ta<e copies $it#out fee. Cec. . Any person $#o assaults4 stri<es4 $ounds4 imprisons or in any ot#er manner offers &iolence to t#e person of an am1assador or a pu1lic minister4 in &iolation of t#e la$ of nations4 s#all 1e imprisoned not more t#an t#ree years4 and fined not e8ceeding t$o #undred
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pesos4 in t#e discretion of t#e court4 in addition to t#e penalties t#at may 1e imposed under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Cec. ". T#e pro&isions of t#is Act s#all 1e applica1le only in cases $#ere t#e country of t#e diplomatic or consular representati&e ad&ersely affected #as pro&ided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular representati&es of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines 1y prescri1ing li<e or similar penalties for li<e or similar offenses #erein contained. *R'+CLE 68 ;!+-7 F+C'+'+$;! -*ME *-D C$-CE*L+-7 'R;E -*ME !5!M!?TC %3 1. TB! .++!?@!A EC!C A ?AM! .TB!A TBA? B%C A!A5 ?AM! 2. B! EC!C TBAT +%CT%T%.EC ?AM! -E>5%C5J 3. -EA-.C! .+ TB! .++!?@!A %C3 A. T. C.?C!A5 A CA%M! >. T. !(A@! TB! !I!CET%.? .+ A DE@/!M!?T
C.
T. CAEC! &$M$)E T. -E>5%C %?T!A!CT 0 damage means pu1lic damage
!lement of ).bli"ity is important in terms of using t#e fictitious name. !5!M!?TC %%3 1. TBAT TB! .++!?@!AC C.?C!A5C0 A. B%C TAE! ?AM!4 A?@ >. A55 .TB!A -!AC.?A5 C%ACEMCTA?C!C 2. TBAT TB! -EA-.C! %C .?5J T. C.?C!A5 B%C %@!?T%TJ (!AJ %M-.ATA?TVVV 2D 4509 O,str*%t#&n &" .*st#%e Cec. 1 8 8 8 any person $#o <no$ingly or $ilfully o1structs4 impedes4 frustrates or delays t#e appre#ension of suspects and t#e in&estigation and prosecution of criminal cases 1y committing any of t#e follo$ing acts3 8 8 8 (d) pu1licly using a fictitious name for t#e purpose of concealing a crime4 e&ading prosecution or t#e e8ecution of a =udgment4 or concealing #is true name and ot#er personal circumstances for t#e same purpose or purposes; 8 8 8 A person $#o uses a fictitious name or conceals a true name for t#e purpose of pre&enting t#e appre#ension and prosecution of criminal offender is not only lia1le under t#e re&ised penal code 1ut also under -@ 1'2) (d). C&mm&n-aelth A%t N&. 4<0 ANTI@ALIAS LAW8 as amen$e$ ,' RA 3157 Cec. 1. !8cept as a pseudonym solely for literary4 cinema4 tele&ision4 radio or ot#er entertainment purposes and in at#letic e&ents $#ere t#e use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice4 no person s#all use any name different from t#e one $it# $#ic# #e $as registered at 1irt# in t#e office of t#e local ci&il registry4 or $it# $#ic# #e $as 1apti2ed for t#e
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first time4 or4 in case of an alien4 $it# $#ic# #e $as registered in t#e 1ureau of immigration upon entry; or suc# su1stitute name as may #a&e 1een aut#ori2ed 1y a competent court3 -ro&ided4 T#at persons4 $#ose 1irt#s #a&e not 1een registered in any local ci&il registry and $#o #a&e not 1een 1apti2ed4 #a&e one year from t#e appro&al of t#is act $it#in $#ic# to register t#eir names in t#e ci&il registry of t#eir residence. T#e name s#all comprise t#e patronymic name and one or t$o surnames. Cec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias s#all apply for aut#ority t#erefor in proceedings li<e t#ose legally pro&ided to o1tain =udicial aut#ority for a c#ange of name4 and no person s#all 1e allo$ed to secure suc# =udicial aut#ority for more t#an one alias. T#e petition for an alias s#all set fort# t#e person,s 1aptismal and family name and t#e name recorded in t#e ci&il registry4 if different4 #is immigrant,s name4 if an alien4 and #is pseudonym4 if #e #as suc# names ot#er t#an #is original or real name4 specifying t#e reason or reasons for t#e use of t#e desired alias. T#e =udicial aut#ority for t#e use of alias t#e c#ristian name and t#e alien immigrant,s name s#all 1e recorded in t#e proper local ci&il registry4 and no person s#all use any name or names ot#er4 t#an #is original or real name unless t#e same is or are duly recorded in t#e proper local ci&il registry. Cec. 3. ?o person #a&ing 1een 1apti2ed $it# a name different from t#at $it# $#ic# #e $as registered at 1irt# in t#e local ci&il registry4 or in case of an alien4 registered in t#e 1ureau of immigration upon entry4 or any person $#o o1tained =udicial aut#ority to use an alias4 or $#o uses a pseudonym4 s#all represent #imself in any pu1lic or pri&ate transaction or s#all sign or e8ecute any pu1lic or pri&ate document $it#out stating or affi8ing #is real or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym #e is or may #a&e 1een aut#ori2ed to use. Cec. 4. Ci8 mont#s from t#e appro&al of t#is act and su1=ect to t#e pro&isions of section 1 #ereof4 all persons $#o #a&e used any name andGor names and alias or aliases different from t#ose aut#ori2ed in section one of t#is act and duly recorded in t#e local ci&il registry4 s#all 1e pro#i1ited to use suc# ot#er name or names andGor alias or aliases. Cec. 5. Any &iolation of t#is Act s#all 1e punis#ed $it# imprisonment of from one year to fi&e years and a fine of -54*** to -1*4***. URSUA ( CA AND 2p G.R. N&. 440461. Apr#l 418 4993 Accused is a client of Atty. -almones. T#e latter re7uested t#e accused to as< for a document in t#e .ffice of t#e .m1udsman 1ecause t#e la$ firm;s messenger $as on lea&e. Epon reac#ing t#e office4 t#e accused $as ad&ised to register in t#e log1oo< and instead of $riting #is o$n name4 t#e latter $rote t#e messenger;s name. T#e trut# $as later found out and t#e accused $as c#arged and con&icted 1y t#e trial court of &iolating Cec. 1 of CA 142. CA affirmed t#e decision. Bo$e&er4 t#e Cupreme Court re&ersed t#e decision of t#e trial court4 to $it3 8 8 8 F&r a ,#t &" h#st&r'8 the ena%tment &" C.A. N&. 4<0 as amen$e$ -as ma$e pr#mar#l' t& %*r, the %&mm&n pra%t#%e am&n+ the Ch#nese &" a$&pt#n+ s%&res &" $#""erent names an$ al#ases -h#%h %reate$ tremen$&*s %&n"*s#&n #n the "#el$ &" tra$e. S*%h a pra%t#%e alm&st ,&r$ere$ &n the %r#me &" *s#n+ "#%t#t#&*s names -h#%h "&r &,(#&*s reas&ns %&*l$ n&t ,e s*%%ess"*ll' ma#nta#ne$ a+a#nst the Ch#nese -h&8 r#+htl' &r -r&n+l'8 %la#me$ the' p&ssesse$ a th&*san$ an$ &ne names. C.A. N&. 4<0 th*s penal#>e$ the a%t &" *s#n+ an al#as name8 *nless s*%h al#as -as $*l' a*th&r#>e$ ,' pr&per G*$#%#al pr&%ee$#n+ an$ re%&r$e$ #n the %#(#l re+#ster. Clearl' there"&re an al#as #s a name &r names *se$ ,' a pers&n &r #nten$e$ t& ,e *se$ ,' h#m ).bli"ly an( /abit.ally .s.ally in b.siness transa"ti#ns #n a$$#t#&n t& h#s real name ,' -h#%h he #s re+#stere$ at
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,#rth &r ,apt#>e$ the "#rst t#me &r s*,st#t*te name a*th&r#>e$ ,' a %&mpetent a*th&r#t'. A manHs name #s s#mpl' the s&*n$ &r s&*n$s ,' -h#%h he #s %&mm&nl' $es#+nate$ ,' h#s "ell&-s an$ ,' -h#%h the' $#st#n+*#sh h#m ,*t s&met#mes a man #s Fn&-n ,' se(eral $#""erent names an$ these are Fn&-n as al#ases. Hen%e8 the *se &" a "#%t#t#&*s name &r a $#""erent name ,el&n+#n+ t& an&ther pers&n #n a s#n+le #nstan%e -#th&*t an' s#+n &r #n$#%at#&n that the *ser #nten$s t& ,e Fn&-n ,' th#s name #n a$$#t#&n t& h#s real name "r&m that $a' "&rth $&es n&t "all -#th#n the pr&h#,#t#&n %&nta#ne$ #n C.A. N&. 4<0 as amen$e$. Th#s #s s& #n the %ase at ,en%h. %t is not disputed t#at petitioner introduced #imself in t#e .ffice of t#e .m1udsman as Q.scar -ere24Q $#ic# $as t#e name of t#e messenger of #is la$yer $#o s#ould #a&e 1roug#t t#e letter to t#at office in t#e first place instead of petitioner. Be did so $#ile merely ser&ing t#e re7uest of #is la$yer to o1tain t#e copy of t#e complaint in $#ic# petitioner $as a respondent. T#ere is no 7uestion t#en t#at Q.scar -ere2Q is not an alias name of petitioner. T#ere is no e&idence s#o$ing t#at #e #ad used or $as intending to use t#at name as #is second name in addition to #is real name. The *se &" the name EOs%ar 2ere>E -as ma$e ,' pet#t#&ner #n an #s&late$ transa%t#&n -here he -as n&t e(en le+all' re)*#re$ t& e=p&se h#s real #$ent#t'. +or4 e&en if #e #ad identified #imself properly at t#e .ffice of t#e .m1udsman4 petitioner $ould still 1e a1le to get a copy of t#e complaint as a matter of rig#t4 and t#e .ffice of t#e .m1udsman could not refuse #im 1ecause t#e complaint $as part of pu1lic records #ence open to inspection and e8amination 1y anyone under t#e proper circumstances. 6#ile t#e act of petitioner may 1e co&ered 1y ot#er pro&isions of la$4 suc# does not constitute an offense $it#in t#e concept of C.A. ?o. 142 as amended under $#ic# #e is prosecuted. T#e confusion and fraud in 1usiness transactions $#ic# t#e anti0alias la$ and is related statutes see< to pre&ent are not present #ere as t#e circumstances are peculiar and distinct from t#ose contemplated 1y t#e legislature in enacting C.A. ?o. 142 as amended. *R'+CLE 69 +LLE7*L ;!E $F ;-+F$RM $R +-!+7-+* A. !lements 1. T#e offender ma<es use of t#e insignia4 uniform4 or dress 2. T#e insignia4 uniform4 or dress pertains to3 a. an office not #eld 1y t#e offender or 1. to a class of person of $#ic# #e does not 1elong 3. T#e insignia4 uniform or dress is used pu1licly or improperly !e"ti#n 'w#% & False testim#ny *R'+CLE 80 F*L!E 'E!'+M$-3 *7*+-!' * DEFE-D*-' A. !lements 1. T#ere is a criminal proceeding 2. .ffender testifies falsely under oat# against t#e defendant 3. .ffender <no$s t#at t#e testimony is false 4. @efendant against $#om t#e false testimony is gi&en is eit#er ac7uitted or con&icted in a final =udgement
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+A5C! T!CT%M.?J K committed 1y a person $#o4 1eing under oat# and re7uired to testify as to t#e trut# of a certain matter at a #earing 1efore a competent aut#ority4 s#all deny t#e trut# or say somet#ing contrary to it. T#ree forms of false testimony3 1. false testimony in criminal cases 2. false testimony in ci&il cases 3. false testimony in ot#er cases ( also called -!ADEAJ in C.5!M? A++%AMAT%.?) *R'+CLE 8 F*L!E 'E!'+M$-3 F*:$R*4LE '$ '<E DEFE-D*-' A. !lements 1. T#ere is a criminal proceeding 2. .ffender testifies falsely under oat# in fa&or of t#e defendant 3. .ffender <no$s t#e testimony is false ?.TA >!?!3 T#e accused #imself may 1e #eld lia1le under t#is article +alse testimony 1y negati&e statement is in fa&or of t#e defendant. Aemem1er3 con&iction or ac7uittal of t#e accusedGdefendant in t#e principal case is not necessary *R'+CLE 82 F*L!E 'E!'+M$-3 +- C+:+L C*!E! A. !lements 1. T#e testimony must 1e gi&en in a ci&il case 2. T#e testimony must relate to t#e issue presented in t#e said case 3. %t must 1e false 4. .ffender <no$s t#at t#e testimony is false 5. Testimony must 1e malicious and gi&en $it# an intent to affect t#e issues presented in t#e ci&il case T#e testimony gi&en in t#e ci&il case must 1e false t#en t#e testimony must 1e gi&en 1y t#e defendant <no$ing t#e same to 1e false and malicious and gi&en $it# t#e intent to affect t#e issues presented in t#e ci&il case. .t#er$ise4 no criminal lia1ility. T#is does not apply in false testimony in special proceedings. H3 distinguis# ci&il action and special proceedings3 A3 Ci&il action K t#ere is a cause of action Cpecial proceeding K do not tal< a1out cause of action. T#e purpose is to esta1lis# t#e status or rig#t of a person. *R'+CLE 81 F*L!E 'E!'+M$-3 *FF+RM*'+$+$'<ER C*!E! *-D PER?;R3 +!$LEM-
A. T$o $ays of committing3 1. falsely testifying under oat# 2. ma<ing a false affida&it. >. !lements
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1. T#e accused made a statement under oat# or e8ecuted an affida&it upon a material matter 2. T#e statement or affida&it $as made 1efore a competent aut#ority aut#ori2ed to recei&e and administer oat# 3. T#e accused made a deli1erate and $illful assertion of false#ood 0 t#erefore4 no per=ury t#roug# negligence or imprudence 4. T#e s$orn statement containing t#e falsity is re7uired 1y la$ /..@ +A%TB is a good defense #ere. Jou mig#t #onestly 1elie&e t#at $#at you said or testified $as4 for you4 t#e real trut# $#en in fact it $as not. /..@ +A%TB. H3 6#at is a material matterF A3 Main fact $#ic# is t#e su1=ect of t#e in7uiry or any circumstance $#ic# tends to pro&e t#at fact4 or any fact or circumstance $#ic# tends to corro1orate or strengt#en t#e testimony relati&e of t#e su1=ect of in7uiry4 or $#ic# legitimately affects t#e credit of any $itness $#o testifies H3 are t$o contradictory statements sufficient to con&ict forgeryF A3 ?.. TB! C.EAT MECT ACC!ATA%? 6B%CB .+ TB! T6. C.?TAA@%CT.AJ CTAT!M!?TC .A T!CT%M.?J %C +A5C!.
!*r+&s (s A)*#n& A.M. N&. 2@9<@4154. O%t&,er 078 4997 6#et#er or not t#e immoral relations#ip still su1sist is no longer material. @ocuments su1mitted 1y a go&ernment employee to form part of #isG#er personal file are official documents. $ny alteration or material changes in the content thereof !ithout a (alid *ustification is tantamount to, falsification $#ic# is li<e$ise penali2ed 1y @%CM%CCA5 from t#e ser&ice. %t could 1e added t#at in t#ese official documents4 t#e employee declares under t#e penalty of per=ury t#at all statements gi&en in t#e document are true and correct to t#e 1est of #is <no$ledge and 1elief. %t appears from t#ese documents and in t#e record of t#e case t#at no dou1t4 #erein respondent is guilty of immorality and committed an act of falsifying #er o$n records and t#erefore4 guilty of per=ury4 $#ic# merit a se&ere punis#ment.Q 8 8 8 5i<e$ise4 t#e records re&eal t#at $#en respondent applied in t#e =udiciary s#e filled up t#e prescri1ed personal information s#eet4 Ci&il Cer&ice +orm 2124 dated .cto1er 2 4 1)'2 and did not disclose the existence of her daughter . T#e form itself gi&es t#is $arning3 Q% declare under penalties of per=ury t#at t#e ans$ers gi&en a1o&e are true and correct to t#e 1est of my <no$ledge and 1elief. Q@espite t#e $arning4 s#e professed t#at #er statements $ere true. Ender Article 1'3 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 per=ury is t#e deli1erate ma<ing of untrut#ful statements upon any material matter 1efore a competent person aut#ori2ed to administer an oat# in cases in $#ic# t#e la$ so re7uires. T#e re7uired Ci&il Cer&ice +orm 212 su1mitted 1y respondent to form part of #er personal file is an official document. Her deliberate omission to disclose her child !ithout a (alid *ustification ma+es her liable for per*ury.
?.ris)r.(ential tren( in PER?;R3 (2001=2006)

!s can be gleaned from the foregoing, the elements of per.ury are as follows: ;a< That the accused made a statement under oath or e,ecuted an affida#it upon a material matter. ;b< That the statement or affida#it was made before a competent officer, authori+ed to recei#e and administer oath. ;c< That in the statement or affida#it, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. ;d< That the sworn statement or affida#it containing the falsity is re-uired by law or made for a legal purpose.
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The third element of per.ury re-uires that the accused had willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood. ! mere assertion of a false ob.ecti#e fact is not sufficient. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. 'n the instant case, the petitioners failed to establish the fact that the pri#ate respondents made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in their counter%affida#its dated 11 Aune 1??H. (ri#ate respondent 3amon . Monfort had sufficiently and reasonably e,plained the
circumstances surrounding the preparation and his signing of the erroneous statements in the 1??@ /'S of the M !D*. e narrated that as Gice%(resident of the M !D*, he signed and certified the same under oath= that he was not, howe#er, aware of the erroneous statements therein at the time when he signed it= that it was 2D! as M !D*0s corporate accountant which had solely prepared the 1??@ /'S of the M !D*= that he always relied on the accuracy of 2D!= that he hastily signed it since, at that time, the 2D! representati#e was in a hurry to beat the deadline in submitting the same to the S4*= that after being informed of the erroneous statements, the 2D! sent a letter to the S4* informing the latter of the mista)es and supplying the correct informations therein= that the erroneous statements were due to the o#ersight of the 2D!= and, that he admitted that he was negligent in not carefully reading and analy+ing the statements therein.
The naI#e reliance of the pri#ate respondents on the foregoing circumstances in e,ecuting their respecti#e counter%affida#its dated 11 Aune 1??H negates willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. (er.ury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. &illfully means intentionally, with e#il intent and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged per.urious statement is false with the intent that it should be recei#ed as a statement of what was true in fact. 't is e-ui#alent to$ )nowingly.$ $Deliberately$ implies $meditated$ as distinguished from $inad#ertent acts.$ 't must appear that the accused )nows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.
!er0ury is an obstruction of .ustice= its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made.
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! mere assertion of a false ob.ecti#e fact, a falsehood, is not enough. $he assertion must be deliberate and willful. (er.ury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the accused. &illfully means intentionally= with e#il intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged per.urious statement is false with the intent that it should be recei#ed as a statement of what was true in fact. 't is e-ui#alent to $)nowingly.$ $Deliberately$ implies meditated as distinguished from inad#ertent acts. 't must appear that the accused 1nows his statement to be false or as consciously i#norant of its truth3 (er.ury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or con#iction as to its truth. ! false statement of a belief is not per.ury. 1ona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an ade-uate defense. ! false statement which is ob#iously the result of an honest mista)e is not per.ury. There are two essential elements of proof for per.ury: ;1< the statement made by the defendants must be pro#en false= and ;2< it must be pro#en that the defendant did not belie#e those statements to be true. Cnowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. 't may be pro#ed by his admissions or by circumstantial e#idence. The state of mind of the accused may be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a moti#e to lie and of the ob.ecti#e falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really )new the things he claimed not to )now. ! con#iction for per.ury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must pro#e which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other e#idence than the contradicting statement. The rationale of this principle is thus: . . . (roof that accused has gi#en contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as per.ury, for this would lea#e simply one oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutrali+e each other= there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such
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corroboration, howe#er, may be furnished by e#idence aliunde tending to show per.ury independently of the declarations of testimony of the accused. The term $material matter$ is the main fact sub.ect of the in-uiry, or any circumstance which tends to pro#e that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the sub.ect of the in-uiry, or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified. 'n this case, a matter is material if it has a material effect or tendency to influence the *ommission in resol#ing the motion of T* one way or the other. $he effects of the statement are wei#hed in terms of potentiality rather than probability. The prosecution need not pro#e that the false testimony actually influenced the *ommission. +n the &lement of (ateriality 'n prosecutions for per.ury, a matter is material if it is the 2main fact which was the sub0ect of the in8uiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact . . . .$ To hold pri#ate respondents liable, there must be e#idence that their assailed statements in "M1%!DM%1%??%>3HB were the sub.ect of in-uiry in that case. (etitioner has presented no such e#idence. o &hat is before the *ourt is a portion of respondent (ascua0s counter%affida#it in that case as -uoted by public respondent in his 7 !pril 2>>> 3esolution. !dmittedly, some inference is possible from this -uoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner0s complaint in "M1%!DM%1%??%>3HB is that respondent (ascua pre#ented her from ta)ing part in the 1@ Auly 1??H meeting. owe#er, it would be improper for the *ourt to rely on such inference because the element of materiality must be established by e#idence and not left to inference. o !t any rate, petitioner0s complaint for per.ury will still not prosper because respondent (ascua0s statement 8 that "M1%!DM%1%??%>3HB is significantly the same as petitioner0s and Jabut0s administrati#e complaint against respondent (ascua before the D4*S 8 is immaterial to the inferred issue. +n the &lement of Deliberate Assertion of 4alsehood The third element of per.ury re-uires that the accused willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. /ood faith or lac) of malice is a #alid defense. ere, the *ourt finds that respondent (ascua0s statement in his counter%affida#it in "M1%!DM%1%??%>3HB that he called the 1@ Auly 1??H meeting does not constitute a deliberate assertion of falsehood. &hile it was Jabut and some unidentified !*5TS personnel who re-uested a dialogue with respondent (ascua, it was respondent (ascua0s consent to their re-uest which led to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent (ascua0s statement in -uestion is not false much less malicious. 't is a good faith interpretation of e#ents leading to the holding of the meeting. !&R9/R-5 &,&(&N$*= (34S45T '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 !ll these elements are present in the instant case. (etitioner willfully and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his $residence$ and $moral character$ in his petition for naturali+ation. This was sufficiently pro#en by the prosecution, as succinctly noted by the *ourt of !ppeals in its assailed Decision. The petition for naturali+ation was duly subscribed and sworn to by petitioner before 5otary (ublic 6ilomino 1. Tan, Ar., a person competent and authori+ed by law to recei#e and administer oath. !lso, petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before the trial court. The allegations in the petition regarding $residence$ and $moral character$ are material matters because they are among the #ery facts in issue or the main facts which are the sub.ect of in-uiry and are the bases for the determination of petitioner0s -ualifications and fitness as a naturali+ed 6ilipino citi+en. The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the $residence$ and $moral character$ in the petition for naturali+ation has been underscored by this *ourt in *hua Cian 2ai #s. 3epublic. 6ully cogni+ant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his #erified petition for naturali+ation that $he has all the -ualifications and none of the dis-ualification under *.!. 5o. 7B3.$ *learly, he willfully asserted falsehood under oath on material matters re-uired by law.
)'$%DRA)A, +4 !&$'$'+N C+N$A'N'N7 4A,*& (A$&R'A, *$A$&(&N$* D'D N+$ &:$'N7/'*% C/,!AB','$- 4+R !&R9/R- A,R&AD- C+(('$$&D= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 &e cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the Solicitor /eneral that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for per.ury in #iew of the withdrawal of the petition for naturali+ation containing his false material statements. 'n this .urisdiction, it is not necessary that the proceeding in which the per.ury is alleged to ha#e been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said crime is commenced. !t the time he filed his petition for naturali+ation, he had committed per.ury. !s discussed earlier, all the elements of the crime were already present then. e )new all along that he wilfully stated material falsities in his #erified petition. Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without e#en stating any reason therefor. 1ut such withdrawal only
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terminated the proceedings for naturali+ation. 't did not e,tinguish his culpability for per.ury he already committed. 'ndeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a moc)ery not only of the (hilippine naturali+ation law but the .udicial proceedings as well. !nd the petition for naturali+ation tainted with material falsities can be used as e#idence of his unlawful act.
*R'+CLE 8, $FFER+-7 F*L!E 'E!'+M$-3 +- E:+DE-CE A. !lements 1. T#e offender offered in e&idence a false $itness or false testimony 2. T#at t#e accused <ne$ t#at t#e $itness or t#e testimony $as false 3. T#e offer $as made in a =udicial or official proceeding Bere4 no inducement. TB! .++!A %C (.5E?TAA%5J @.?!. T#e offender #ere M?.6%?/5J offered in e&idence a +A5C! 6%T?!CC or a +A5C! T!CT%M.?J in any =udicial or official proceeding.
Chapter Three FRAUDS

!e"ti#n $ne% & Ma"/inati#nsA m#n#)#lies an( "#mbinati#ns *R'+CLE 82 M*C<+-*'+$-! +- P;4L+C *;C'+$-! A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. Coliciting any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from ta<ing part in any pu1lic auction a. T#ere is a pu1lic auction 1. T#e accused solicited any gift or promise from any of t#e 1idders c. T#at suc# gift or promise $as t#e consideration for #is refraining from ta<ing part in t#at pu1lic auction d. T#at t#e accused #ad intent to cause t#e reduction of t#e price of t#e t#ing auctioned 2. >y attempting to cause 1idders to stay a$ay from an auction 1y t#reats4 gifts4 promise or any ot#er artifice (artifice3 cunning4 ingenuity) a. T#ere is a pu1lic auction 1. T#e accused attempted to cause t#e 1idders to stay a$ay from t#e pu1lic auction c. T#at it $as done 1y t#reats4 gifts4 promise or any ot#er artifice d. T#at t#e accused #ad intent to cause t#e reduction of t#e price of t#e t#ing auctioned T#e purpose is to re$*%e the pr#%e. Mac#inations0 purpose is to reduce t#e price. %f t#e purpose is to increase t#e price4 t#ere is no crime T#e crime is consummated 1y mere act of solicitation of gift or promise. Mere attempt is punishable. CAC!3
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OUANO (s. CA an$ ECHAAEB G.R. N&. <101C. A*+*st 048 4991 8 8 8 T#ese acts constitute a crime4 as t#e Trial Court #as stressed. .uano and !c#a&e2 #ad promised to s#are in t#e property in 7uestion as a consideration for .uano,s refraining from ta<ing part in t#e pu1lic auction4 and t#ey #ad attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in causing anot#er 1idder to stay a$ay from t#e auction in order to cause reduction of t#e price of t#e property auctioned. %n so doing4 t#ey committed t#e felony of mac#inations in pu1lic auctions defined and penali2ed in Article 1'5 of t#e A-C. *R'+CLE 85 M$-$P$L+E! *-D C$M4+-*'+$-! +- RE!'R*+-' $F 'R*DE A. Acts -unis#ed 1. Com1ination to pre&ent free competition in t#e mar<et 2. Monopoly to restrain free competition in t#e mar<et 3. Manufacturer4 producer4 or processor or importer com1ining4 conspiring or agreeing $it# any person to ma<e transaction pre=udicial to la$ful commerce or to increase t#e mar<et price of t#e merc#andise H3 6#at is t#e essence of t#e la$F A3 t#e o1=ect is to #n%rease the pr#%eV -lease ta<e note t#at t#is is an e8ception to t#e general rule t#at conspiracy is not punis#a1le 1y la$4 1ut #ere4 mere conspiracy is punis#a1le. H3 6#at is t#e t#eory of t#e la$ in penali2ing monopolies and com1inationF A3 Competition and not com1ination s#ould 1e t#e la$ of trade. !e"ti#n 'w#% & Fra.(s in "#mmer"e an( in(.stry *R'+CLE 86 +MP$R'*'+$- *-D D+!P$!+'+$- $F F*L!EL3 M*REED *R'+CLE! $R MERC<*-D+!E $F 7$LDA !+L:ERA $R $'<ER PREC+$;! ME'*L! $R '<E+R *LL$3! A. !lements 1. T#e offender imports4 sells or disposes of any of t#ose articles or merc#andise 2. T#e stamps4 1rands or mar<s of t#ese article fails to indicate t#e actual fineness or 7uality of t#e said metal or alloy 3. T#e offender <no$s t#at t#e stamps4 1rands4 or mar<s fail to indicate t#e actual fineness or 7uality of t#e metals or alloys Ta<e note t#at t#e metals are specified. *R'+CLE 88 G *R'+CLE 89 S*,st#t*t#&n &r alter#n+ tra$emarFs8 tra$e names an$ ser(#%e marFs AND Un"a#r %&mpet#t#&n8 "ra*$*lent re+#strat#&n &" tra$emarF8 tra$ename et%. Aepealed 1y t#e A!-E>5%C ACT '2)3 t#e %?T!55!CTEA5 -A.-!ATJ C.@! .+ TB! -B%5%--%?!C
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R.A. 509C INTELLECTUAL 2RO2ERTY CODE OF THE 2HILI22INES C!CT%.? 155. Aemedies; %nfringement. R Any person $#o s#all4 $it#out t#e consent of t#e o$ner of t#e registered mar<3 155.1. Ese in commerce any reproduction4 counterfeit4 copy4 or colora1le imitation of a registered mar< or t#e same container or a dominant feature t#ereof in connection $it# t#e sale4 offering for sale4 distri1ution4 ad&ertising of any goods or ser&ices including ot#er preparatory steps necessary to carry out t#e sale of any goods or ser&ices on or in connection $it# $#ic# suc# use is li<ely to cause confusion4 or to cause mista<e4 or to decei&e; or 155.2. Aeproduce4 counterfeit4 copy or colora1ly imitate a registered mar< or a dominant feature t#ereof and apply suc# reproduction4 counterfeit4 copy or colora1le imitation to la1els4 signs4 prints4 pac<ages4 $rappers4 receptacles or ad&ertisements intended to 1e used in commerce upon or in connection $it# t#e sale4 offering for sale4 distri1ution4 or ad&ertising of goods or ser&ices on or in connection $it# $#ic# suc# use is li<ely to cause confusion4 or to cause mista<e4 or to decei&e4 s#all 1e lia1le in a ci&il action for infringement 1y t#e registrant for t#e remedies #ereinafter set fort#3 -ro&ided4 T#at t#e infringement ta<es place at t#e moment any of t#e acts stated in Cu1section 155.1 or t#is su1section are committed regardless of $#et#er t#ere is actual sale of goods or ser&ices using t#e infringing material. (Cec. 224 A.A. ?o 1 a) 8 8 8 C!CT%.? 1 '. Enfair Competition4 Aig#ts4 Aegulation and Aemedies. R 1 '.1. A person $#o #as identified in t#e mind of t#e pu1lic t#e goods #e manufactures or deals in4 #is 1usiness or ser&ices from t#ose of ot#ers4 $#et#er or not a registered mar< is employed4 #as a property rig#t in t#e good$ill of t#e said goods4 1usiness or ser&ices so identified4 $#ic# $ill 1e protected in t#e same manner as ot#er property rig#ts. 1 '.2. Any person $#o s#all employ deception or any ot#er means contrary to good fait# 1y $#ic# #e s#all pass off t#e goods manufactured 1y #im or in $#ic# #e deals4 or #is 1usiness4 or ser&ices for t#ose of t#e one #a&ing esta1lis#ed suc# good$ill4 or $#o s#all commit any acts calculated to produce said result4 s#all 1e guilty of unfair competition4 and s#all 1e su1=ect to an action t#erefor. 1 '.3. %n particular4 and $it#out in any $ay limiting t#e scope of protection against unfair competition4 t#e follo$ing s#all 1e deemed guilty of unfair competition3 (a) Any person4 $#o is selling #is goods and gi&es t#em t#e general appearance of goods of anot#er manufacturer or dealer4 eit#er as to t#e goods t#emsel&es or in t#e $rapping of t#e pac<ages in $#ic# t#ey are contained4 or t#e de&ices or $ords t#ereon4 or in any ot#er feature of t#eir appearance4 $#ic# $ould 1e li<ely to influence purc#asers to 1elie&e t#at t#e goods offered are t#ose of a manufacturer or dealer4 ot#er t#an t#e actual manufacturer or dealer4 or $#o ot#er$ise clot#es t#e goods $it# suc# appearance as s#all decei&e t#e pu1lic and defraud anot#er of #is legitimate trade4 or any su1se7uent &endor of suc# goods or any agent of any &endor engaged in selling suc# goods $it# a li<e purpose; (1) Any person $#o 1y any artifice4 or de&ice4 or $#o employs any ot#er means calculated to induce t#e false 1elief t#at suc# person is offering t#e ser&ices of anot#er $#o #as identified suc# ser&ices in t#e mind of t#e pu1lic; or (c) Any person $#o s#all ma<e any false statement in t#e course of trade or $#o s#all commit any ot#er act contrary to good fait# of a nature calculated to discredit t#e goods4 1usiness or ser&ices of anot#er. 1 '.4. T#e remedies pro&ided 1y Cections 15 4 15" and 1 1 s#all apply mutatis mutandis. (Cec. 2)4 A.A. ?o. 1 a) 8 8 8
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C!CT%.? 1 ). +alse @esignations of .rigin; +alse @escription or Aepresentation. R 1 ).1. Any person $#o4 on or in connection $it# any goods or ser&ices4 or any container for goods4 uses in commerce any $ord4 term4 name4 sym1ol4 or de&ice4 or any com1ination t#ereof4 or any false designation of origin4 false or misleading description of fact4 or false or misleading representation of fact4 $#ic#3 (a) %s li<ely to cause confusion4 or to cause mista<e4 or to decei&e as to t#e affiliation4 connection4 or association of suc# person $it# anot#er person4 or as to t#e origin4 sponsors#ip4 or appro&al of #is or #er goods4 ser&ices4 or commercial acti&ities 1y anot#er person; or (1) %n commercial ad&ertising or promotion4 misrepresents t#e nature4 c#aracteristics4 7ualities4 or geograp#ic origin of #is or #er or anot#er person,s goods4 ser&ices4 or commercial acti&ities4 s#all 1e lia1le to a ci&il action for damages and in=unction pro&ided in Cections 15 and 15" of t#is Act 1y any person $#o 1elie&es t#at #e or s#e is or is li<ely to 1e damaged 1y suc# act. 8 8 8 C!CT%.? 1"*. -enalties. R %ndependent of t#e ci&il and administrati&e sanctions imposed 1y la$4 a criminal penalty of imprisonment from t$o (2) years to fi&e (5) years and a fine ranging from +ifty t#ousand pesos (-5*4***) to T$o #undred t#ousand pesos(-2**4***)4 s#all 1e imposed on any person $#o is found guilty of committing any of t#e acts mentioned in Cection 1554 Cection 1 ' and Cu1section 1 ).1. (Arts. 1'' and 1')4 Ae&ised -enal Code) Cee A!-E>5%C ACT 455 E?5A6+E5 %M-.ATAT%.? .+ M!ACBA?@%C! (TAA%++ A?@ CECT.MC C.@!) Sm*++l#n+I -hen #mp&rtat#&n ,e+#ns RODRIGUEB8 ET AL (s. CA an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 447045. Septem,er 458 4997 Ender Cection 3 *1 of t#e Tariff and Customs Code4 smuggling is committed 1y any person $#o3 (1) fraudulently imports or 1rings into t#e -#ilippines or assists in importing or 1ringing into t#e -#ilippines any article4 contrary to la$; or (2) recei&es4 conceals4 1uys4 sells4 or in any manner facilitates t#e transportation4 concealment or sale of suc# article after importation4 <no$ing t#e same to #a&e 1een imported contrary to la$. %mportation 1egins $#en t#e carrying &essel or aircraft enters t#e =urisdiction of t#e -#ilippines $it# intention to unload and is deemed terminated upon payment of t#e duties4 ta8es and ot#er c#arges due upon t#e articles and t#e legal permit for $it#dra$al s#all #a&e 1een granted. %f t#e articles are free of duties4 ta8es and ot#er c#arges4 importation is terminated until t#e articles s#all #a&e legally left t#e =urisdiction of t#e customs. After importation4 t#e act of facilitating t#e transportation4 concealment or sale of t#e unla$fully imported article must 1e $it# t#e <no$ledge t#at t#e article $as smuggled. Bo$e&er4 if upon trial t#e defendant is found to #a&e 1een in possession of suc# article4 t#is s#all 1e sufficient to aut#ori2e con&iction unless t#e defendant e8plains #is possession to t#e satisfaction of t#e court.
TITLE FIAE CRIMES RELATIAE TO O2IUM AND OTHER 2ROHI!ITED DRUGS Militis Lex Fraternity 09 (by EDLER)
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*R'+CLE! 90= 9, CR+ME! REL*'ED '$ $P+;M *-D $'<ER PR$<+4+'ED DR;7! RE2EALED !Y RE2U!LIC ACT 3<078 as amen$e$ THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 4960 as amen$e$ Se%. 0. De"#n#t#&ns (a) QA$m#n#sterQ refers to t#e act of introducing any dangerous drug into t#e 1ody of any person4 -#th &r -#th&*t h#s Fn&-le$+e4 1y in=ection4 ingestion or ot#er means or of committing any act of indispensa1le assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to #imself; 8 8 8 (d) QC*lt#(ate &r %*lt*reQ means t#e act of <no$ingly planting4 gro$ing4 raising or permitting t#e planting4 gro$ing or raising of any plant $#ic# is t#e source of a pro#i1ited drug; (e) QDan+er&*s $r*+sQ refers to eit#er3 (1) Q2r&h#,#te$ $r*+4Q $#ic# includes opium and its acti&e components and deri&ati&es4 suc# as #eroin and morp#ine; coca leaf and its deri&ati&es4 principally cocaine4 alp#a and 1eta eucaine4 #allucinogenic drugs4 suc# as mescaline4 lysergic acid diet#ylamide (5C@) and ot#er su1stances producing similar effects; %ndian #emp and its deri&ati&es; all preparations made from any of t#e foregoing; and ot#er drugs and c#emical preparations4 $#et#er natural or synt#etic4 $it# t#e p#ysiological effects of a narcotic or a #allucinogenic drug; orQ (As amended 1y >- 1")) (2) QRe+*late$ $r*+Q $#ic# includes self0inducing sedati&es4 suc# as seco1ar1ital4 p#eno1ar1ital4 pento1ar1ital4 amo1ar1ital and any ot#er drug $#ic# contains a salt or a deri&ati&e of a salt of 1ar1ituric acid; any salt; isomer or salt of anisomer4 of amp#etamine4 suc# as 1ensedrine or de8edrine4 or any drug $#ic# produces a p#ysiological action similar to amp#etamine; and #ynotic drugs4 suc# as met#a7ualone4 nitra2epam or any ot#er compound producing similar p#ysiological effects; (As amended 1y -@ 1 '3) (f) QDel#(erQ refers to a person,s act of Fn&-#n+l' passing a dangerous drug to anot#er4 personally or ot#er$ise4 and 1y any means4 -#th &r -#th&*t %&ns#$erat#&n; (g) QDr*+ $epen$en%eQ means a state of psyc#ic or p#ysical dependence4 or 1ot#4 on a dangerous drug4 arising in a person follo$ing administration or use of t#at drug on a periodic or continuous 1asis; (#) QEmpl&'eeQ of a pro#i1ited drug den4 di&e or resort includes t#e careta<er4 #elper4 $atc#man4 loo<out and ot#er persons employed by the operator of a pro#i1ited drug den4 di&e or resort $#ere any pro#i1ited drug is administered4 deli&ered4 distri1uted4 sold or used4 $it# or $it#out compensation4 in connection $it# t#e operation t#ereof; 8 8 8 (=) QMan*"a%t*reQ means t#e production4 preparation4 compounding or processing of a dangerous drug eit#er directly or indirectly or 1y e8traction from su1stances of natural origin4 or independently 1y means of c#emical synt#esis or 1y a com1ination of e8traction and c#emical synt#esis4 and shall include any pac<aging or repac<aging of suc# su1stance or la1eling or rela1eling of its container; e8cept t#at suc# term does not include t#e preparation4 compounding4 pac<aging4 or la1eling of a drug or ot#er su1stance 1y a duly aut#ori2ed practitioner as an incident to #is administration or dispensing of suc# drug or su1stance in t#e course of #is professional practice; 8 8 8 (m) Q2*sherQ refers to any person $#o sells4 administers4 deli&ers4 or gi&es a$ay to anot#er4 on any terms $#atsoe&er4 or distri1utes4 dispatc#es in transit or transports any dangerous drug or $#o acts as a 1ro<er in any of suc# transactions4 in &iolation of t#is Act; 8 8 8
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(o) QSellQ means t#e act of gi&ing a dangerous drug4 $#et#er "&r m&ne' &r an' &ther mater#al %&ns#$erat#&n; (p) QUseQ refers to t#e act of in=ecting4 intra&enously or intramuscularly4 or of consuming4 eit#er 1y c#e$ing4 smo<ing4 sniffing4 eating4 s$allo$ing4 drin<ing4 or ot#er$ise introducing into t#e p#ysiological system of t#e 1ody4 any of t#e dangerous drugs. NOTA !ENE C#a1u (met#ylamp#etamine #ydroc#loride) is a regulated drugV %n drugs cases t#ere is no need to esta1lis# t#e negati&e element 1ecause as a general rule4 no one is aut#ori2ed to sell drugs !IC!-T%.?3 in order to 1e ac7uitted4 you must pro&e t#at you are aut#ori2ed to sell drugs. Jou must fall under t#e mantle of protection. Ta<e note also t#at in sale4 t#ere must 1e e8c#ange of t#e drug for a material consideration or for money. .t#er$ise4 t#ere is no sale. >ut t#e accused #ere may 1e c#arged for deli&ery. >arter is included in t#e definition of sale. H3 $#at is drug dependenceF A3 a state of psyc#ic or p#ysical dependence4 or 1ot#4 on a dangerous drug4 arising in a person follo$ing administration or use of t#at drug on a periodic or continuous 1asis @angerous drugs are classified into t$o3 1. pro#i1ited drugs 2. regulated drugs CC ruling3 -ro#i1ited drugs are distinguis# from regulated drugs in t#at t#e former 1eing pro#i1ited are in t#emsel&es 1eing interdicted $#ereas t#e latter are merely controlled or directed 1y t#e rule in order to systemati2ed t#eir use. -ro#i1ition necessarily em1races or contemplates regulation 1ut regulation does not necessarily results in pro#i1ition. .n t#e ot#er #and4 regulation may refer to 1ot# permissi&e use and pro#i1ition.
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2ROHI!ITED DRUG
Imp&rtat#&n :Se% C; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all import or 1ring into t#e -#ilippines any pro#i1ited drug. Sale8 A$m#n#strat#&n8 Del#(er'8 D#str#,*t#&n an$ Transp&rtat#&n &" 2r&h#,#te$ Dr*+s :Se% <; Acts punis#a1le3 1. sale 2. administration 3. deli&ery 4. distri1ution 5. transportation . acting as 1ro<er
-enalty of deat# is imposed if3 1. minor is in&ol&ed in t#e sale4 admin4 deli&ery4 etc. 2. a person dies and it is t#e pro8imate
cause of deat#
Ma#ntenan%e &" a Den8 D#(e &r Res&rt "&r Dr*+ Users :Se%. 7; Any person or group of persons $#o s#all maintain a den4 di&e or resort $#ere any pro#i1ited drug is used in any form or $#ere suc# pro#i1ited drugs in 7uantities specified in Cection 2*4 -aragrap# 1 of t#is Act are found. -enalty of deat# is imposed if3 1. minor is in&ol&ed in t#e sale4 admin4 or deli&ery 2. a person dies and it is t#e pro8imate
cause of deat#
Empl&'ees an$ A#s#t&rs &" 2r&h#,#te$ Dr*+ Den :Se%. 3; -ersons lia1le3 (a) Any employee (see Cec. 2 (#)) of a pro#i1ited drug den4 di&e or resort; and (1) Any person $#o4 not 1eing included in t#e pro&isions of t#e ne8t preceding4 paragrap#4 s#all +no!ingly &isit any pro#i1ited drug den4 di&e or resort. Man*"a%t*re &" Dr*+s (Se%. 6; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all engage in t#e manufacture of any pro#i1ited drug. 2&ssess#&n &r Use &" Dr*+s (Se%. 5; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all possess or use any pro#i1ited drug su1=ect to t#e pro&isions of Cection 2* #ereof.
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REGULATED DRUG
Imp&rtat#&n :Se% 4<; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all import or 1ring any regulated drug in t#e -#ilippines. Sale8 A$m#n#strat#&n8 D#spensat#&n8 Del#(er'8 Transp&rtat#&n an$ D#str#,*t#&n &" Re+*late$ Dr*+s :Se%. 47; Acts punis#a1le3 1. sale 2. administration 3. dispensation 4. deli&ery 5. distri1ution . transportation -enalty of deat# is imposed if3 1. minor is in&ol&ed in t#e sale4 admin4 deli&ery4 etc. 2. a person dies and it is t#e pro8imate
cause of deat#
Ma#ntenan%e &" a $en8 $#(e &r res&rt "&r $r*+ *sers :Se%. 47@A; Any person or group of persons $#o s#all maintain a den4 di&e or resort $#ere any regulated drugs is used in any form4 or $#ere suc# regulated drugs in 7uantities specified in Cection 2*4 paragrap# 1 of t#is Act are found. -enalty of deat# is imposed if3 1. minor is in&ol&ed in t#e sale4 admin4 deli&ery4 etc. 2. a person dies and it is t#e pro8imate
cause of deat#
:N& %&*nterpart pr&(#s#&n; Man*"a%t*re &" Dr*+s :Se%. 4<@A; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all engage in t#e manufacture of any regulated drug. 2&ssess#&n &r Use &" Dr*+s :Se%. 43; Any person $#o s#all possess or use any regulated drug $it#out t#e corresponding license or prescription4 su1=ect to t#e pro&isions of Cection 2* #ereof. C*lt#(at#&n &" 2lants -h#%h are S&*r%es &" 2r&h#,#te$ Dr*+s :Se%. 9; Any person $#o s#all plant4 culti&ate or culture any medium %ndian #em(mari=uana)4 opium poppy4 or any ot#er plant $#ic# is or may #ereafter 1e classified as dangerous drug or from $#ic# any dangerous drug may 1e manufactured or deri&ed. T#e land or portions #ereof4 andGor green#ouses on $#ic# any of said plants is culti&ated or cultured s#all 1e confiscated and escheated to the State4 *nless t#e o$ner t#ereof can pro&e t#at #e did not <no$ suc# culti&ation or culture despite t#e e8ercise of due diligence on #is part.
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-enalty of deat# is imposed if it is done on pu1lic domain. Re%&r$s &" 2res%r#pt#&ns8 Sales8 2*r%hases8 A%)*#s#t#&ns an$J&r Del#(er#es :Se%. 41; Any p#armacist4 p#ysician4 dentist4 &eterinarian4 manufacturer4 $#olesaler4 importer4 distri1utor4 dealer or retailer $#o &iolates or fails to comply $it# t#e pro&isions of Cection 25 of t#is Act4 if t#e &iolation or failure in&ol&es a pro#i1ited drug. Additional penalty3 1. practitioner 0 re&ocation of license 2. proprietor (manufacturer4 $#olesaler4 etc) 0 re&ocation of 1usiness license
Unla-"*l 2res%r#pt#&n :Se%. 44; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all ma<e or issue a prescription or any ot#er $riting purporting to 1e a prescription for any pro#i1ited drug. Unne%essar' 2res%r#pt#&n :Se%. 40; A. -ersons lia1le Any3 1. p#ysician4 or 2. dentist 0 $#o s#all prescri1e any pro#i1ited drug for any person $#ose p#ysical or p#ysiological conditions does not re7uire t#e use t#ereof >. -enalty imposed 1. imprisonment 2. re&ocation of license to practice 2&ssess#&n &" Op#*m 2#pe an$ Other 2araphernal#a "&r 2r&h#,#te$ Dr*+s :Se%. 4C; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all possess or #a&e under #is control any opium4 pipe4 e7uipment4 instrument4 apparatus or ot#er parap#ernalia fit or intended for smo<ing4 consuming4 administering4 in=ecting4 ingesting or ot#er$ise using opium or any ot#er pro#i1ited drug. :N& %&*nterpart pr&(#s#&n; Re%&r$s &" 2res%r#pt#&ns8 Sales8 2*r%hases8 A%)*#s#t#&ns an$J&r Del#(er#es :Se%. 46; Any p#armacist4 p#ysician4 dentist4 &eterinarian4 manufacturer4 $#olesaler4 importer4 distri1utor4 dealer or retailer $#o &iolates or fails to comply $it# t#e pro&isions of Cection 25 of t#is Act4 if t#e &iolation or failure in&ol&es a regulated drug. Unla-"*l 2res%r#pt#&n :Se%. 45; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all ma<e or issue a prescription for any regulated drug. Unne%essar' 2res%r#pt#&n :Se%. 49; A. -ersons lia1le
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Any3 1. p#ysician4 or 2. dentist 0 $#o s#all prescri1e any pro#i1ited drug for any person $#ose p#ysical or p#ysiological conditions does not re7uire t#e use t#ereof >. -enalty imposed 1. imprisonment 2. re&ocation of license to practice :N& %&*nterpart pr&(#s#&n; ?.>. >ut if in parap#ernalia for regulated drug (e.g. toter) t#e t#ing #as traces of s#a1uGdrugs4 t#en possessor may 1e c#arged of EC! of regulated drug. Imp&rtat#&n &" 2r&h#,#te$ Dr*+s :Se%. C an$ Se% 4<; Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all import or 1ring into t#e -#ilippines any pro#i1ited drug. H3 $#at is t#e act punis#edF A3 any person $#o unless authori,ed by la!4 s#all import into t#e -#ilippines any pro#i1ited drugs. H3 $#en is importation aut#ori2edF 6#en is it legalF A3 under section 3 4 t#e dangerous drugs 1oard is empo$ered to aut#ori2ed t#e importation of dangerous drugs of suc# <ind and 7uantity as it may deem necessary according to t#e medical and researc# needs of t#e country. %t is also t#e po$er of t#e @@> to determine t#e 7uantity to 1e imported. (C!! C!CT%.? 3 letter 5) ?ote3 an aut#ori2ed importer s#ould get aut#ority or aut#ori2ation from @@> MA?%5A not in t#e Aegion4 ot#er$ise4 according to Dudge -aredes4 t#e said importer mig#t 1e prosecuted for illegal importation. %mportation of pro#i1ited drugs aut#ori2ed 1y la$ must t#erefore 1e understood to mean importation aut#ori2ed 1y t#e3 1. dangerous drugs 1oard 2. a person so aut#ori2ed 1y t#e 1oard 3. A person so aut#ori2ed must #a&e complied $it# t#e registration and fee re7uirement. 4. %t must 1e according to t#e medical and researc# needs of t#e country as determined 1y t#e @@> %f t#e 7uantity of t#e aut#ori2ed importation e8ceeds t#e 7uantity so aut#ori2ed or allo$ed4 you $ill 1e c#arged for t#e illegal importation for t#e e8cess. %f you are aut#ori2ed 1ut t#e aut#ority #as lapsedGe8pired or #as 1een cancelled and you still import4 you $ill 1e c#arged of illegal importation. H3 $#at is t#e meaning of importationGelements of importationF A3 1. importation or 1ringing into t#e -#ilippines any pro#i1ited or regulated drugs 2. $it#out aut#ority of la$
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H3 $#at constitutes importationF A3 t#e $ord import connotes t#e 1ringing into t#e -#ilippines SALE :Se% < an$ Se% 47; %n sale4 o$ners#ip is not a defense 2p (s.Ma$aran+ G.R. N&. 61739. .an*ar' 68 4956 T#at t#e mari=uana lea&es may #a&e 1elonged to Duan is of no moment. .$ners#ip and possession are not indispensa1le elements of t#e crime under consideration. T#e mere act of selling or e&en acting as 1ro<er in a sale of mari=uana and ot#er pro#i1ited drugs consummates t#e crime under Cection 4. 6#en Madarang negotiated t#e sale $it#out aut#ority of Duan,s mari=uana lea&es to (illoria $#o posed as a 1uyer4 #e too< a direct and acti&e part in t#e crime. Bis guilt #as 1een esta1lis#ed 1eyond reasona1le dou1t. 2EO2LE AS. MARCOS G.R. N&. 5CC07. Ma' 58 4991 %t must 1e pointed out t#at o$ners#ip and possession are not indispensa1le elements of t#e crime. T#e mere act of selling or e&en acting as 1ro<er in t#e sale of mari=uana and ot#er pro#i1ited drugs consummates t#e crime. %?CT%/AT%.? A?@ !?TAA-M!?T @%CT%?/E%CB!@; !?TAA-M!?T 5!/A5; %t must 1e noted t#at in instigation4 $#ere t#e officers of t#e la$ or t#eir agents incite4 induce4 instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense4 $#ic# #e ot#er$ise $ould not commit and #as no intention of committing4 t#e accused cannot 1e #eld lia1le. >ut in entrapment4 $#ere t#e criminal intent or design to commit t#e offense c#arged originates from t#e mind of t#e accused and la$ enforcement officials merely facilitate t#e commission of t#e offense4 t#e accused cannot =ustify #is conduct. %nstigation is a Qtrap for t#e un$ary innocent.Q !ntrapment is a trap for t#e un$ary criminal %n entrapment4 t#e entrapper resorts to $ays and means to trap and capture a la$1rea<er $#ile e8ecuting #is criminal plan. .n t#e ot#er #and4 in instigation t#e instigator practically induces t#e $ould01e defendant into committing t#e offense4 and #imself 1ecomes a co0principal. !ntrapment is no 1ar to prosecution and con&iction $#ile in instigation4 t#e defendant $ould #a&e to 1e ac7uitted T#e difference in t#e nature of t#e t$o lies in t#e origin of t#e criminal intent. %n entrapment4 t#e means originates from t#e mind of t#e criminal. T#e idea and t#e resol&e to commit t#e crime come from #im. %n instigation4 t#e la$ enforcer concei&es t#e commission of t#e crime and suggests to t#e accused $#o adopts t#e idea and carries it into e8ecution. T#e legal effects of entrapment do not e8empt t#e criminal from lia1ility. %nstigation does. T#e mere fact t#at t#e aut#orities decei&ed t#e appellants into 1elie&ing t#at t#e former $ere 1uyers of #eroin does not e8culpate t#e latter from lia1ility for selling t#e pro#i1ited drugs. T#e police can legitimately feign solicitation to catc# criminals $#o #a1itually engage in t#e commission of t#e offense CAC! AT >AA; T#e mere fact t#at t#e aut#orities decei&ed t#e appellants into 1elie&ing t#at t#e former $ere 1uyers of #eroin does not e8culpate t#e latter from lia1ility for selling t#e pro#i1ited drugs. T#e police can legitimately feign solicitation to catc# criminals $#o
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#a1itually engage in t#e commission of t#e offense (-p. &. ?atipra&at4 145 CCAA 4'3 S1)' T). SC3 in sale of pro#i1ited drugs contemplated under section 44 o$ners#ip of t#e drugs 1y t#e seller is not indispensa1le for t#e consummation of #er committing t#e pro#i1ited transaction. %n pro&ing sale4 t#e prosecution must present e&idence of t#e e8c#ange of t#e pro#i1ited or regulated drugs for money or for any material consideration. -artering Prohibited &rug !ith thing .f /alue 2EO2LE AS.2ERIODICA .R G.R. N&. 6C113. Septem,er 098 4959 T#e la$ does not e8pressly mention 1arter as a pro#i1ited transaction 1ut in a case $#ere t#e accused #ad in fact deli&ered to t#e -C informer a 1o8 containing mari=uana lea&es in return of a 45 cali1er pistol found in #is possession4 and t#is not 1eing refuted 1y t#e accused. T#e con&iction for sale must stand. 2EO2LE AS. FIDER G.R. N&. 417057. .*ne C8 499C CAC! AT >AA. R %n t#e case at 1ar4 t#e e&idence for t#e Ctate consisted solely of t#e testimony of t#e arresting ?>% agents (i.e.4 t#e t$o S2T ?>% agents $#o #ad $aited outside t#e #ouse of Ma. Cara# +./. @omondon) and t#e ?>% +orensics specialist. T#e t$o (2) #andguns $#ic# $ere allegedly 1artered or e8c#anged for 1** grams of Qs#a1uQ4 and $#ic# $ere supposedly o1tained from t#e ?>% itself4 $ere not presented in e&idence 1y t#e prosecution; no e8planation $as offered for t#is o1&ious #iatus in t#e prosecution,s case. +or reasons $#ic# also do not appear on t#e record of t#is case4 t#e t$o (2) ?>% agents $#o #ad acted as poseur01uyers $ere not presented 1efore t#e trial court. T#e result $as t#at important 7uestions 1earing upon t#e specific culpa1ility of appellant Aenato +ider &is0a0&is t#e ot#er accused Ma. Cara# @omondon4 remained unans$ered3 e.g.4 $as appellant Aenato +ider actually present in t#e room during t#e consummation of t#e guns0for0s#a1u transactions 1et$een co0accused Ma. Cara# @omondon and t#e poseur01uyersF 6#at $as t#e precise participation of appellant +ider in respect of t#e guns0for0s#a1u transactionsF @id #e p#ysically recei&e t#e gunsF @id #e #and o&er t#e Qs#a1uQ to t#e poseur01uyersF .r $as appellant +ider4 al1eit a drug user4 essentially an innocent #ouse guest of co0accused Ma. Cara# @omondon4 1eing merely in t#e $rong place at t#e $rong timeF -A..+ .+ +ACT .+ CA5! .A -.CC!CC%.? .+ -A.B%>%T!@ .A A!/E5AT!@ @AE/; 6B!? T!CT%M.?J .+ -.C!EA0>EJ!A >!C.M!C MAT!A%A5 A?@ 6!550 ?%/B %?@%C-!?CA>5!. R 6e #a&e #eld in many cases t#at t#e testimony of t#e poseur01uyer 1ecomes material and $ell0nig# indispensa1le $#en t#e accused denies #a&ing committed t#e pro#i1ited act. 6it#out t#e testimony of t#e poseur01uyer4 more often t#an not4 t#ere is not con&incing e&idence t#at t#e accused did sell or possess t#e pro#i1ited or regulated drug. PMotorcycle for s#a1u $as also #eld as sale. !8c#ange of drugs for anyt#ing of &alue is sale.
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ADMINISTRATION :Se% < an$ Se% 47; Aefers to t#e act of introducing into t#e 1ody of any person4 any dangerous drug4 $it# or $it#out <no$ledge 1y %?D!CT%.?4 %?/!CT%.?4 or any ot#er means of committing any act of indispensa1le assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to #imself. DELIAERY :Se% < an$ Se% 47; H3 6BAT %C T. @!5%(!AF A3 a person;s act of <no$ingly passing a dangerous drug to anot#er personally or ot#er$ise $it# or $it#out consideration. >AA e8am3 t#ere $as a 1uy01ust operation4 t#e posseur 1uyer said O% $anna score ice; so #e $as gi&en s#a1u4 after #e got t#e s#a1u #e ran a$ay #e did not pay. T#e person $as c#arged $it# sale of pro#i1ited drug #e $as con&icted 1ut #e appealed to t#e CC. T#e CC said t#ere $as no sale 1ut #e is still con&icted not 1y t#e act of selling 1ut con&iction is for deli&ery of pro#i1ited drug. %t is t#e gi&ing or passing drugs $it#out consideration. >AA e8am3 a person is =ust $al<ing on t#e street4 #e sa$ and pic<ed up " pac<s of s#a1u. Be #ad no intention to use4 no intention to possess 1ut #e 1roug#t it4 and #e sa$ #is friend $#o is an addict so #e ga&e t#e pac<s to #is friend. 5ia1leF Jep4 for deli&eryV DISTRI!UTION AND TRANS2ORTATION :Se% < an$ Se% 47; %n t#e Act4 t#ere is no definition of 9 to transport: 1ut t#ere is a =udicial definition $#ic# says t#at to transport is to carry or con&ey from 1 place to anot#er4 and t#e fact t#at t#ere is con&eyance suffices to support t#at t#e act of transporting #as 1een committed. :2EO2LE (s. LO HO WING;. %n t#is case4 #e said t#ere $as no transportation 1ecause #e did not reac# #is destination 1ut t#e CC said ?.V %t does not matter if you did or did not reac# your destination. %n transporting4 t#ere is t#e use of a con&eyance4 li<e certain &e#icle4 airplane4 or ta8i. . %n deli&ery4 none4 it is done manually. >A.M!A%?/ is punis#a1le; o$ners#ip is not a defense. MAINTENANCE OF A DEN8 DIAE OR RESORT :Se% 7 an$ Se% 47@A; A penalty of reclusion perpetua to deat# s#all 1e imposed on any person or group of persons $#o s#all maintain a den4 di&e or resort $#ere any pro#i1ited drug is used in any form or $#ere suc# pro#i1ited drugs in 7uantities specified in section 2*paragrap# 1 of t#e Act EM2LOYEES AND AISITORS OF 2ROHI!ITED DRUG DEN :Se%. 3; (T#ere is no counterpart pro&ision in articles %%% in regulated drug) H3 $#o are employeesF A3 it includes careta<er4 #elper4 $atc#men4 loo<out4 and ot#er persons employed >J TB! .-!AAT.A (not employed 1y t#e user) of a pro#i1ited drug den4 di&e4 resort $#ere any pro#i1ited drug is administered4 deli&ered4 distri1uted sold or used $it# or $it#out compensation4 in connection $it# t#e operation t#ereof. SBere4 note t#at t#e employee must 1e employed 1y t#e operator. +ll.strati#nB you and your personal 1odyguard $ent to t#e drug den4 you entered4 and you told t#e 1odyguard to stay and 1e t#e loo< out for me. %s t#e personal 1odyguard lia1leF ?.4 B! %C ?.T 5%A>5! >!CAEC! TB! 5A6 CAJC TBAT TB! 9!M-5.J!!: MECT >! A -!AC.? !M-5.J!@ >J TB! .-!AAT.A4 ?.T TB! EC!A. Bere4 t#e personal 1odyguard $as not
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employed 1y t#e operator 1ut 1y t#e user. TB! 5A6 CB.E5@ >! CTA%CT5J C.?CTAE!@. TB! 5A6 %C 5%M!6%C! C5!AA4 TB!A! %C ?. A..M +.A %?T!A-A!TAT%.?.T
A?J -!AC.? 6B.4 ?.T >!%?/ %?C5E@!@ %? TB! T!AM !M-5.J!! CBA55 E-$9+-7L3 :+!+' A?J -A.B%>%T!@ @AE/ @!?4 @%(! .A A!C.AT CBA55 A5C. >! -!?A5%X!@.
TA/E NOTE3 if you &isit a drug den di&e or resort for s#a1u users4 J.E AA! ?.T 5%A>5!. 6#yF >ecause t#ere is ?. 5A6 $#ic# punis#es it. 5oo< at article %%%4 t#ere is none. MANUFACTURE :Se%. 6 an$ Se%. 4<@A; Committed 1y any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed 1y la$4 s#all engaged in t#e manufacture of any pro#i1ited drug. H3 $#y is it t#at in t#e la$4 you al$ays find t#e p#rase 9E?5!CC AETB.A%X!@ >J 5A6:F A3 let us re&ie$ our criminal procedureY 7E-ER*L R;LEB if a negati&e allegation is an ingredient of a criminal offence it must 1e alleged in t#e information. !8ample in illegal possession of firearm4 it must 1e allege t#at t#e accused #as no permit or aut#ority form t#e go&;t (firearms and e8plosi&e section). %t must 1e alleged and it must 1e pro&ed. !&en if it is allege 1ut it is not pro&ed4 t#en t#e accused must 1e ac7uitted for +ailure to pro&e t#e negati&e element. E@CEP'+$-! '$ '<E 7E-ER*L R;LEB 6#ere t#e negati&e allegation $ill not 1e 1uttress 1y t#e e&idence. %n t#e case of illegal possession of firearm4 t#e general rule is present e&idence of lac< of license. >ut in many cases t#e CC said t#at if t#e firearm is importing an armalite t#e prosecution need not pro&e t#at t#is guy #as no aut#ority 1ecause no ci&ilian is allo$ed to possess t#is <ind of firearm. T#erefore4 t#e defense #as to pro&e t#at t#e person falls $it#in t#e e8ception. T#e same is true in dangerous drug cases. T#e prosecution need not pro&e t#at t#e person #as no aut#ority from t#e dangerous drugs 1oard 1ecause it is no$ incum1ent upon t#e accused t#at #e falls under t#e e8ception4 t#at #e is an aut#ori2ed importer4 or aut#ori2ed to prescri1ed and aut#ori2ed to administer li<e doctor4 p#armacists etcY @efinition 3 AA 4254 Cec 2. 8 8 8 (=) QMan*"a%t*reQ means t#e production4 preparation4 compounding or processing of a dangerous drug eit#er directly or indirectly or 1y e8traction from su1stances of natural origin4 or independently 1y means of c#emical synt#esis or 1y a com1ination of e8traction and c#emical synt#esis4 and shall include any pac+aging or repac+aging of such substance or labeling or relabeling of its container; !IC!-T t#at suc# term does not include t#e preparation4 compounding4 pac<aging4 or la1eling of a drug or ot#er su1stance 1y a duly aut#ori2ed practitioner as an incident to #is administration or dispensing of suc# drug or su1stance in t#e course of #is professional practice; 2OSSESSION AND USE :Se%. 5 an$ Se% 43; !lements of possession3 1. actual or constructi&e possession 2. Animus possidendi or intent to possess (t#is is important 1ecause it may 1e a set0up or a planted e&idence. T#is is a defense 0 no intent to possess.)
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4. 0. C.
DEFENSES #n Dan+er&*s Dr*+s %ases @efense of frame0up in cases falling under t#e pro&isions of @@A must 1e pro&ed 1y strong and con&incing e&idence. @efense of lac< of intent to posses or lac< of animus possidendi may 1e used as a defense @efense of lac< of <no$ledge or a$areness of t#e pro#i1ited nature of t#e drug.
Alt#oug# as a general rule4 in acts mala pro#i1ita criminal intent is not re7uired4 1ut in ot#er cases 1y =urisprudence4 lac< of <no$ledge or animus possedendi is a defense. H$wners/i) is n#t a (e0ense A person c#arged $it# use of a pro#i1ited drug $ill not 1e c#arged $it# possession 1ecause possession is in#erent in use4 you cannot use if you do not possess t#e drug -A.(%@!@ it is t#e same drug. +ll.strati#nB >AA !IAM3 1uy01ust operation3 Mr. 8 #as in #is #ands s#a1u and anot#er pac< found in #is poc<et. Be sells t#e one in #is #ands. B!5@3 t#ere are t$o crimes t#at #a&e 1een committed. CA5! and -.CC!CC%.? of illegal drugs. 6#yF >ecause t#e su1=ect of t#e sale is different from t#e su1=ect of possession. Co t$o crimes. >ut it is different if only 1 and t#e same drug is in&ol&ed 1ecause only one crime4 e.g. if you are c#arged $it# selling4 you $ill no longer 1e c#arged $it# possession. CASES 2EO2LE AS. DE .ESUS G.R. N&s. 649<0@<C. N&(em,er 4C8 4953 T#e essence of t#ese cases3 t#e acts punis#ed are t#e acts of possession and use. Ese necessarily a1sor1s possession. Bo$e&er4 possession does not necessarily include use. -ossession incident to sale of pro#i1ited drug is not a separate offense from t#e sale t#ereof. -ossession is in#erent in t#e sale. Cince possession of pro#i1ited drugs is in#erent in t#e crime of selling t#em4 it is to 1e assumed t#at4 in punis#ing selling4 t#e legislature too< into account t#e need to possess t#em first. T#e penalty for selling 0 life imprisonment to deat# R is already 7uite #ars#. 2EO2LE AS. ANDIBA G.R. N&s. L@64953@56. A*+*st 498 4955 -ossession of mari=uana is in#erent in t#e crime of selling t#em. 2EO2LE AS. RAMOS G.R. N&s. 57<14@10. .*ne <8 4991 -.CC!CC%.? .+ -A.B%>%T!@ @AE/C; -A.(!@ >!J.?@ A!AC.?A>5! @.E>T %? CAC! AT >AA. R T#is Court 7uotes $it# appro&al t#e follo$ing arguments of t#e Colicitor0/eneral3 QAppellant,s defense falls against t#e categorical testimony of t#e ?AAC.M agents t#at t#e tras# can $as found under t#e ta1le $#ere #er legitimate $ares $ere 1eing sold. T#is fact $as not denied 1y appellant. T#erefore4 s#e $as t#e only person $#o #ad access to t#e tras# can. T#e same $as under #er immediate p#ysical
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control. C#e #ad complete c#arge of t#e contents of t#e tras# can under t#e ta1le to t#e e8clusion of all ot#er persons. %n la$4 actual possession e8ists $#en t#e t#ing is in t#e immediate occupancy and control of t#e party. >ut t#is is not to say t#at t#e la$ re7uires actual possession. %n criminal la$4 possession necessary for con&iction of t#e offense of possession of controlled su1stances $it# intent to distri1ute may 1e constructi&e as $ell as actual. %t is only necessary t#at t#e defendant must #a&e dominion and control o&er t#e contra1and. T#ese re7uirements are present in t#e situation descri1ed4 $#ere t#e pro#i1ited drugs $ere found inside t#e tras# can placed under t#e stall o$ned 1y appellant. %n fact4 t#e ?AAC.M agents $#o conducted t#e searc# testified t#at t#ey #ad to as< appellant to stand so t#at t#ey could loo< inside t#e tras# can under t#e papag, of t#e appellant. Bence t#e tras# can $as positioned in suc# a $ay t#at it $as difficult for anot#er person to use t#e tras# can. T#e tras# can $as o1&iously not for use 1y #er customers. QAppellant,s arguments are in#erently $ea< and impro1a1le and cannot stand against t#e clear e&idence pointing to #er actual possession of t#e pro#i1ited drug. T#e ra$ facts testified to 1y t#e ?AAC.M agents $ere corro1orated 1y appellant and t#eir conclusion R t#at s#e #ad possession of t#e mari=uana stic<s found in t#e tras# can R is consistent $it# la$ and reason. 2EO2LE AS. CATAN G.R. N&. 90905. .an*ar' 048 4990 CA%M%?A5 5A6; @A?/!A.EC @AE/C ACT; -.CC!CC%.? .+ MAA%DEA?A4 %?B!A!?T %? TB! CA%M! .+ C!55%?/ TB!M; HEA5%+%CAT%.?. R -ossession of mari=uana is generally in#erent in t#e crime of selling t#em and t#at con&iction for 1ot# offenses is not feasi1le. Bo$e&er4 as #eld also in -eople &. Manalansan4 50" 3 )0"*4 14 Ceptem1er 1))*4 t#e rule t#at t#e possession of mari=uana is a1sor1ed in t#e sale t#ereof is true only $it# respect to t#e mari=uana deli&ered to t#e poseur 1uyer and not to t#e mari=uana found in t#e seller,s possession4 not co&ered 1y t#e sale and pro1a1ly intended for a different purpose li<e anot#er sale4 or its direct use 1y t#e possessor. Conse7uently4 Appellant can 1e con&icted separately of t#e offense of sell#n+ a pro#i1ited drug in connection $it# t#e mari=uana sold 1y #im to t#e poseur01uyers *n$er Se%t#&n < of Aep. Act ?o. 4254 as amended4 an$ of t#e crime of p&ssess#&n of mari=uana *n$er Se%t#&n 5 of t#e same la$4 $it# respect to t#e mari=uana found in #is premises after t#is arrest. Cale a1sor1s possession if 1ot# refer to t#e same drug 1ut if $#at $as sold $as different from $#at $as found in t#e accused;s possession t#en t#ere are t$o offenses. CULTIAATION OF 2LANTS WHICH ARE SOURCES OF 2ROHI!ITED DRUGS :Se% 9; 6#at is punis#ed #ere is t#e culti&ation or culture of plants $#ic# are sources of pro#i1ited drugs. Co t#at if t#e person culti&ates or cultures plant $#ic# are sources of regulated drugs4 #e is not penali2ed4 co2 t#ere is no la$ $#ic# punis#es it. (TAM! ?.T! >!CAEC! J.E M%/BT >! C.?+EC!@ !C-!C%A55J %+ /%(!? A -A.>5!M %? TB! >AA) Culti&ate or culture means t#e act of <no$ingly planting4 gro$ing4 raising or permitting t#e planting gro$ing4 or raising of any plant $#ic# is t#e source of a pro#i1ited drug. (Ta<e note of t#e $ord M?.6%?/5J) ill.strati#n +B if you sa$ a plant and li<e it a lot so you place it on a pot and place on your ta1le as ornamental plant4 and you #a&e no <no$ledge t#at suc# plant is a source of a pro#i1ited drug. Jou cannot 1e con&icted. +ll.strati#n ++3 $#en you #a&e say 5 #ectares of land
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and you plant t#ere also 5 #ectares $ort# of plants $#ic# are sources of pro#i1ited drugs4 t#at cannot 1e ta<en as ornamental4 it mig#t 1e t#at it is for commercial purposes. H3 6#at is penali2ed #ereF A3 any person $#o s#all plant4 culti&ate4 or culture on any medium %ndian #emp4 opium poppy or any ot#er plant $#ic# is or may #ereafter 1e classified as dangerous drug or from $#ic# any dangerous drug may 1e manufactured or deri&ed. H3 $#at #appens if t#e land upon $#ic# t#ey are planted is a pu1lic landF A3 t#e penalty $ill 1e t#e ma8imum co2 it cannot 1e confiscated co2 t#e su1=ect land 1elongs to t#e go&ernment. RECORDS OF 2RESCRI2TION8 SALES8 2URCHASES8 ACKUISITIONS ANDJOR DELIAERIES :Se% 41 an$ Se% 46; Aefer to Cection 25 A!C.A@C A!HE%A!@ .+ -BAAMAC%CTC4 .BJC%C%A?C4 (!T!A%?AA%A?C4 .A @!?T%CTC @%C-!?C%?/ .A -A!CCA%>%?/ @A?/!A.EC @AE/C A?@ .+ %M-.AT!AC4 MA?E+ACTEA!AC4 6B.5!CA5!AC4 @%CTA%>ET.AC4 @!A5!AC4 A?@ A!TA%5!AC .+ @A?/!A.EC @AE/C. T#ey s#ould <eep t#eir records as re7uired 1y and in accordance $it# la$ ot#er$ise4 t#ey $ill 1e c#arged for &iolation of section 1*. T#e license of t#e p#armacists4 p#ysician etc $#o is found to #a&e &iolated t#is pro&ision $ill 1e re&o<ed. UNLAWFUL 2RESCRI2TION OF DRUGS :Se% 44 an$ Se% 45; !lements of Enla$ful -rescription3 1. T#e ma<ing or issuance of any prescription or any ot#er $riting purporting to 1e a prescription for pro#i1ited drug. 2. T#e ma<er or issuer is not aut#ori2ed 1y la$. UNNECESSARY 2RESCRI2TION OF DRUGS :Se% 40 an$ Se% 49; %f t#e sic<ness is mild and you prescri1e a dangerous drug4 you $ill 1e lia1le for unnecessary prescription. 6#o are lia1leF 1. -#ysician or 2. @entist 6#o s#all prescri1e any pro#i1ited drug for any person $#ose p#ysical and p#ysiological condition does not re7uire t#e use of suc#. !lements of Ennecessary -rescription3 1. T#e prescription is made 1y a p#ysician or a dentist. 0 %f prescri1ed 1y ot#er persons4 it $ill not 1e unnecessary prescription4 1ut unla$ful prescription. 2. T#at t#e p#ysical or p#ysiological condition of t#e person to $#om t#e prescription is gi&en does not re7uire t#e use of pro#i1ited drug.
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%f t#e sic<ness is mild and you prescri1e a dangerous drug4 you $ill 1e lia1le for unnecessary prescription. 2OSSESSION OF O2IUM 2I2E AND OTHER 2ARA2HERNALIA F$R PR$<+4+'ED DR;7! (!e" 1) 0 x x x any person !ho, unless authori,ed by la!, shall possess or ha(e under his control any opium pipe, e'uipment, instrument, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smo+ing, consuming, administering, in*ecting, ingesting or other!ise using opium or any other prohibited drug. 1he possession of such opium pipe, e'uipment, instrument, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated2. shall be prima facie e(idence that the possessor has smo+ed, consumed, administered to himself, in*ected, ingested or used a prohibited drug.3 -ossession of parap#ernalia is prima facie e&idence of use. Se%. 01. Appl#%at#&n &" 2enalt#es8 C&n"#s%at#&n an$ F&r"e#t*re &" the 2r&%ee$s &r Instr*ments &" the Cr#me :SEE 2p ( MARTIN SIMON8 "&r +ra$*at#n+ &" penalt#es.; !&ery penalty imposed s#all carry $it# it t#e confiscation and forfeiture4 in fa&or of t#e /o&ernment4 of all t#e proceeds of t#e crime *nless t#ey are t#e property of a t#ird person not lia1le for t#e offense4 1ut t#ose $#ic# are not of la$ful commerce s#all 1e ordered destroyed $it#out delay. @angerous drugs and plant sources of suc# drugs as $ell as t#e proceeds or instruments of t#e crime so confiscated and forfeited in fa&or of t#e /o&ernment s#all 1e turned o&er to t#e >oard for proper disposal $it#out delay. Any appre#ending or arresting officer $#o misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account for sei2ed or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant0sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of t#e crime as are #erein defined s#all after con&iction 1e punis#ed 1y t#e penalty of reclusion perpetua to deat# and a fine ranging from fi&e #undred t#ousand pesos to ten million pesos.Q M#t/er #0 all "ases relating t# (r.gs "ases PE$PLE vers.s !+M$2EO2LE (s. MARTIN SIMON G.R. N&. 9C1051 .*l' 098 499< CA%M%?A5 -A.C!@EA!; !?TAA-M!?T; 6B!? MAJ >! A!5%!@ E-.? >J TB! C.EAT. R T#e Court is a$are t#at t#e practice of entrapping drug traffic<ers t#roug# t#e utili2ation of poseur0 1uyers is suscepti1le to mista<e4 #arassment4 e8tortion and a1use. ?onet#eless4 suc# causes for =udicial appre#ension and dou1t do not o1tain in t#e case at 1ar. Appellant,s entrapment and arrest $ere not effected in a #ap#a2ard $ay4 for a sur&eillance $as conducted 1y t#e team 1efore t#e 1uy01ust operation $as effected. ?o ill moti&e $as or could 1e attri1uted to t#em4 aside from t#e fact t#at t#ey are presumed to #a&e regularly performed t#eir official duty. Cuc# lac< of du1ious moti&e coupled $it# t#e presumption of regularity in t#e performance of official duty4 as $ell as t#e findings of t#e trial court on t#e credi1ility of $itnesses4 s#ould pre&ail o&er t#e self0ser&ing and uncorro1orated claim of appellant of #a&ing 1een framed4 erected as it is upon t#e mere s#ifting sands of an ali1i. To top it all4 appellant $as caug#t red0#anded deli&ering pro#i1ited drugs4 and $#ile t#ere $as a delimited c#ance for #im to contro&ert t#e c#arge4 #e does not appear to #a&e plausi1ly done so. (%.5AT%.? .+ @A?/!A.EC @AE/C ACT; !5!M!?T; -A!C!?T %? CAC! AA >AA. R ?ot$it#standing t#e o1=ectiona1ility of t#e aforesaid e8#i1its4 appellant cannot t#ere1y 1e e8tricated from #is predicament from #is predicament since #is criminal participation in t#e illegal sale of
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mari=uana #as 1een sufficiently pro&en. T#e commission of t#e offense of illegal sale of pro#i1ited drugs re7uires merely t#e consummation of t#e selling transaction $#ic# #appens t#e moment t#e 1uyer recei&es t#e drug from t#e seller. %n t#e present case4 and in lig#t of t#e preceding discussion4 t#is sale #as 1een ascertained 1eyond any perad&enture of dou1t. Appellant t#en asse&erates t#at it is impro1a1le t#at #e $ould sell mari=uana to a total stranger. 6e ta<e t#is opportunity to once again reiterate t#e doctrinal rule t#at drug0pus#ing4 $#en done on a small scale as in t#is case4 1elongs to t#at class of crimes t#at may 1e committed at any time and in any place. %t is not contrary to #uman e8perience for a drug pus#er to sell to a total stranger4 for $#at matters is not an e8isting familiarity 1et$een t#e 1uyer and seller 1ut t#eir agreement and t#e acts constituting t#e sale and deli&ery of t#e mari=uana lea&es. 6#ile t#ere may 1e instances $#ere suc# sale could 1e impro1a1le4 ta<ing into consideration t#e di&erse circumstances of person4 time and place4 as $ell as t#e incredi1ility of #o$ t#e accused supposedly acted on t#at occasion4 $e can safely say t#at t#ose e8ceptional particulars are not present in t#is case. A!-E>5%C ACT ?.. 4254 AC AM!?@!@ >J A!-E>5%C ACT ?.. " 5); -!?A5TJ; C.?CTAE!@; CAC! AT >AA. R -ro1a1ly t#roug# o&ersig#t4 an error on t#e matter of imposa1le penalties appears to #a&e 1een committed in t#e drafting of t#e aforesaid la$4 t#ere1y calling for and necessitating =udicial reconciliation and craftsmans#ip. As applied to t#e present case4 Cection 4 of Aepu1lic Act ?o. 4254 as no$ furt#er amended4 imposes t#e penalty of reclusion perpetua to deat# and a fine ranging from -5**4***.** to -1*4***4***.** upon any person $#o s#all unla$fully sell4 administer4 deli&er4 gi&e a$ay4 distri1ute4 dispatc# in transit or transport any pro#i1ited drug. T#at penalty4 according to t#e amendment to Cection 2* of t#e la$4 s#all 1e applied if $#at is in&ol&ed is "5* grams or more of indian #emp or mari=uana; ot#er$ise4 if t#e 7uantity in&ol&ed is less4 t#e penalty s#all range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon t#e 7uantity. %n ot#er $ords4 t#ere is #ere an o&erlapping error in t#e pro&isions on t#e penalty of reclusion perpetua 1y reason of its dual imposition4 t#at is4 as t#e ma8imum of t#e penalty $#ere t#e mari=uana is less t#an "5* grams4 and also as t#e minimum of t#e penalty $#ere t#e mari=uana in&ol&ed is "5* grams or more. T#e same error #as 1een committed $it# respect to t#e ot#er pro#i1ited and regulated drugs pro&ided in said Cection 2*. To #armoni2e suc# conflicting pro&isions in order to gi&e effect to t#e $#ole la$4 $e #ere1y #old t#at t#e penalty to 1e imposed $#ere t#e 7uantity of t#e drugs in&ol&ed is less t#an t#e 7uantities stated in t#e first paragrap# s#all range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal4 and not reclusion perpetua. T#is is also concordant $it# t#e fundamental rule in criminal la$ t#at all dou1ts s#ould 1e construed in a manner fa&ora1le to t#e accused. 3. 6#ere4 as in t#is case4 t#e 7uantity of t#e dangerous drug is only 3.' grams4 #ence co&ered 1y t#e imposa1le range of penalties under t#e second paragrap# of Cection 2*4 as no$ modified4 t#e la$ pro&ides t#at t#e penalty s#all 1e ta<en from said range Qdepending upon t#e 7uantityQ of t#e drugs in&ol&ed in t#e case. T#e penalty in said second paragrap# constitutes a comple8 one composed of t#ree distinct penalties4 t#at is4 prision correccional4 prision mayor4 and reclusion temporal. %n suc# a situation4 t#e Code pro&ides t#at eac# one s#all form a period4 $it# t#e lig#test of t#em 1eing t#e minimum4 t#e ne8t as t#e medium4 and t#e most se&ere as t#e ma8imum period. .rdinarily4 and pursuant to Article 4 of t#e Code4 t#e mitigating and aggra&ating circumstances determine $#ic# period of suc# comple8 penalty s#all 1e imposed on t#e accused. T#e peculiarity of t#e second paragrap# of Cection 2*4 #o$e&er4 is its specific mandate4 a1o&e 7uoted4 t#at t#e penalty s#all instead depend upon t#e 7uantity of t#e drug su1=ect of t#e criminal transaction. Accordingly4 1y $ay of e8ception to Article "" of t#e Code and to su1ser&e t#e purpose of Cection 2* of Aepu1lic Act ?o. " 5)4 eac# of t#e aforesaid component penalties s#all 1e considered as a principal imposa1le penalty depending on t#e 7uantity of t#e drug in&ol&ed. T#ere1y4 t#e modifying circumstances $ill not altoget#er 1e disregarded. Cince eac# component penalty of t#e total comple8 penalty $ill #a&e to 1e imposed separately as determined 1y t#e 7uantity of t#e drug in&ol&ed4 t#en t#e modifying circumstances can 1e used to fi8 t#e proper period of t#at component penalty4 as s#all #ereafter 1e e8plained. %t $ould4 t#erefore4 1e in line $it# t#e pro&isions of Cection 2* in t#e conte8t of our aforesaid disposition t#ereon t#at4 unless t#ere are compelling reasons for a de&iation4 t#e 7uantities of t#e drugs enumerated in its second paragrap# 1e di&ided into t#ree4 $it# t#e resulting 7uotient4 and dou1le or tre1le t#e same4 to 1e respecti&ely 7uotient4 and dou1le or tre1le t#e same4 to 1e respecti&ely t#e 1ases for allocating t#e penalty proportionately among t#e t#ree aforesaid periods according to t#e se&erity t#ereof. T#us4 if t#e mari=uana in&ol&ed is 1elo$ 25* grams4 t#e penalty to 1e imposed s#all 1e prision correccional; from 25* to 4)) grams4 prision mayor; and 5** to "4) grams4 reclusion temporal. -arent#etically4 fine is imposed as a con=uncture penalty only if t#e penalty is reclusion perpetua to deat#. ?o$4 considering t#e minimal 7uantity of t#e mari=uana su1=ect of t#e case at 1ar4 t#e penalty of prision correccional is conse7uently indicated 1ut4 again4 anot#er preliminary and cognate issue #as first to 1e resol&ed. AE5! +.A /AA@EAT%?/ -!?A5T%!C; A--5%CAT%.? %? C-!C%A5 5A6C4 6B!? A55.6!@; AAT%.?A5!; CAC! AT >AA. R -rision correccional #as a duration of mont#s and 1 day to years and4 as a di&isi1le penalty4 it consists of t#ree periods as pro&ided in t#e te8t of and illustrated in t#e ta1le pro&ided 1y Article " of t#e Code. T#e 7uestion is $#et#er or not in determining t#e penalty to 1e imposed4 $#ic# is #ere to 1e ta<en from t#e penalty of prision correccional4 t#e presence or
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a1sence of mitigating4 aggra&ating or ot#er circumstances modifying criminal lia1ility s#ould 1e ta<en into account. T#e Court is not una$are of cases in t#e past $#erein it $as #eld t#at4 in imposing t#e penalty for offenses under special la$s4 t#e rules on mitigating or aggra&ating circumstances under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code cannot and s#ould not 1e applied. A re&ie$ of suc# doctrines as applied in said cases4 #o$e&er4 re&eals t#at t#e reason t#erefor $as 1ecause t#e special la$s in&ol&ed pro&ided t#eir o$n specific penalties for t#e offenses punis#ed t#ereunder4 and $#ic# penalties $ere not ta<en from or $it# reference to t#ose in t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Cince t#e penalties t#en pro&ided 1y t#e special la$s concerned did not pro&ide for t#e minimum4 medium or ma8imum periods4 it $ould conse7uently 1e impossi1le to consider t#e aforestated modifying circumstances $#ose main function is to determine t#e period of t#e penalty in accordance $it# t#e rules in Article 4 of t#e Code. T#is is also t#e rationale for t#e #olding in pre&ious cases t#at t#e pro&isions of t#e Code on t#e graduation of penalties 1y degrees could not 1e gi&en supplementary application to special la$s4 since t#e penalties in t#e latter $ere not components of or contemplated in t#e scale of penalties pro&ided 1y Article "1 of t#e former. T#e suppletory effect of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code to special la$s4 as pro&ided in Article 1* of t#e former4 cannot 1e in&o<ed $#ere t#ere is a legal or p#ysical impossi1ility of4 or a pro#i1ition in t#e special la$ against4 suc# supplementary application. T#e situation4 #o$e&er4 is different $#ere alt#oug# t#e offense is defined in and ostensi1ly punis#ed under special la$4 t#e penalty t#erefor is actually ta<en from t#e Ae&ised -enal Code in its tec#nical nomenclature and4 necessarily4 $it# its duration4 correlation and legal effects under t#e system of penalties nati&e to said Code. 6#en4 as in t#is case4 t#e la$ in&ol&ed spea<s of prision correccional4 in its tec#nical sense under t#e Code4 it $ould conse7uently 1e 1ot# illogical and a1surd to posit ot#er$ise. More on t#is later. +or t#e nonce4 $e #old t#at in t#e instant case t#e imposa1le penalty under Aepu1lic Act ?o. 4254 as amended 1y Aepu1lic Act ?o. " 5)4 is prision correccional4 to 1e ta<en from t#e medium period t#ereof pursuant to Article 4 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 t#ere 1eing no attendant mitigating or aggra&ating circumstance. M.@%+J%?/ C%ACEMCTA?C!C; A--5%CAT%.? %? C-!C%A5 5A64 C.?CTAE!@; CAC! AT >AA. R 6#ile not s7uarely in issue in t#is case4 1ut 1ecause t#is aspect is in&ol&ed in t#e discussion on t#e role of modifying circumstances4 $e #a&e perforce to lay do$n t#e ca&eat t#at mitigating circumstances s#ould 1e considered and applied only if t#ey affect t#e periods and t#e degrees of t#e penalties $it#in rational limits. -refatorily4 $#at ordinarily are in&ol&ed in t#e graduation and conse7uently determine t#e degree of t#e penalty4 in accordance $it# t#e rules in Article 1 of t#e Code as applied to t#e scale of penalties in Article "14 are t#e stage of e8ecution of t#e crime and t#e nature of t#e participation of t#e accused. Bo$e&er4 under paragrap# 5 of Article 44 $#en t#ere are t$o or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggra&ating circumstance4 t#e penalty s#all 1e reduced 1y one degree. Also4 t#e presence of pri&ileged mitigating circumstances4 as pro&ided in Articles " and '4 can reduce t#e penalty 1y one or t$o degrees4 or e&en more. T#ese pro&isions of Articles 4(5)4 " and ' s#ould not apply in toto in t#e determination of t#e proper penalty under t#e aforestated second paragrap# of Cection 2* of Aepu1lic Act ?o. 4254 to a&oid anomalous results $#ic# could not #a&e 1een contemplated 1y t#e legislature. T#us4 paragrap# 5 of Article 1 pro&ides t#at $#en t#e la$ prescri1es a penalty in some manner not specially pro&ided for in t#e four preceding paragrap#s t#ereof4 t#e courts s#all proceed 1y analogy t#ere$it#. Bence4 $#en t#e penalty prescri1ed for t#e crime consists of one or t$o penalties to 1e imposed in t#eir full e8tent4 t#e penalty ne8t lo$er in degree s#all li<e$ise consist of as many penalties $#ic# follo$ t#e former in t#e scale in Article "1. %f t#is rule $ere to 1e applied4 and since t#e comple8 penalty in t#is case consists of t#ree discrete penalties in t#eir full e8tent4 t#at is4 prision correccional4 prision mayor and reclusion temporal4 t#en one degree lo$er $ould 1e arresto menor4 destierro and arresto mayor. T#ere could4 #o$e&er4 1e no furt#er reduction 1y still one or t$o degrees4 $#ic# must eac# li<e$ise consist of t#ree penalties4 since only t#e penalties of fine and pu1lic censure remain in t#e scale. T#e Court rules4 t#erefore4 t#at $#ile modifying circumstances may 1e appreciated to determine t#e periods of t#e corresponding penalties4 or e&en reduce t#e penalty 1y degrees4 in no case s#ould suc# graduation of penalties reduce t#e imposa1le penalty 1eyond or lo$er t#an prision correccional. %t is for t#is reason t#at t#e t#ree component penalties in t#e second paragrap# of Cection 2* s#all eac# 1e considered as an independent principal penalty4 and t#at t#e lo$est penalty s#ould in any e&ent 1e prision correccional in order not to depreciate t#e seriousness of drug offenses. %nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis &aleat 7uam pereat. Cuc# interpretation is to 1e adopted so t#at t#e la$ may continue to #a&e efficiency rat#er t#an fail. A perfect =udicial solution cannot 1e forged from an imperfect la$4 $#ic# impasse s#ould no$ 1e t#e concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. %?@!T!AM%?AT! C!?T!?C! 5A6; 6B!? A--5%CA>5!. R T#e final 7uery is $#et#er or not t#e %ndeterminate Centence 5a$ is applica1le to t#e case no$ 1efore us. Apparently it does4 since drug offenses are not included in nor #as appellant committed any act $#ic# $ould put #im $it#in t#e e8ceptions to said la$ and t#e penalty to 1e imposed does not in&ol&e reclusion perpetua or deat#4 pro&ided4 of course4 t#at t#e penalty as ultimately resol&ed $ill e8ceed one year of imprisonment. T#e more important aspect4 #o$e&er4 is #o$ t#e indeterminate sentence s#all 1e ascertained. %t is true t#at Cection 1 of said la$4 after pro&iding for indeterminate sentence for an offense under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 states t#at Qif t#e offense is punis#ed 1y any ot#er la$4 t#e court s#all sentence t#e accused to an
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indeterminate sentence4 t#e ma8imum term of $#ic# s#all not e8ceed t#e ma8imum fi8ed 1y said la$ and t#e minimum s#all not 1e less t#an t#e minimum term prescri1ed 1y t#e sameQ 6e #old t#at t#is 7uoted portion of t#e section indu1ita1ly refers to an offense under a special la$ $#erein t#e penalty imposed $as not ta<en from and is $it#out reference to t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 as discussed in t#e preceding illustrations4 suc# t#at it may 1e said t#at t#e Qoffense is punis#edQ under t#at la$. T#ere can 1e no sensi1le de1ate t#at t#e afore7uoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special la$s $as necessary 1ecause of t#e nature of t#e former type of penalties under said la$s $#ic# $ere not included or contemplated in t#e scale of penalties in Article "1 of t#e Code4 #ence t#ere could 1e no minimum Q$it#in t#e range of t#e penalty ne8t lo$er to t#at prescri1ed 1y t#e Code for t#e offense4Q as is t#e rule for felonies t#erein. %n t#e illustrati&e e8amples of penalties in special la$s #erein1efore pro&ided4 t#is rule applied4 and $ould still apply4 only to t#e first and last e8amples. +urt#ermore4 considering t#e &intage of Act ?o. 41*3 as earlier noted4 t#is #olding is 1ut an application and is =ustified under t#e rule of contemporanea e8positio. Aepu1lic Act ?o. 4254 as no$ amended 1y Aepu1lic Act ?o. " 5)4 #as un7ualifiedly adopted t#e penalties under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code in t#eir tec#nical terms4 #ence $it# t#eir tec#nical signification and effects. %n fact4 for purposes of determining t#e ma8imum of said sentence4 $e #a&e applied t#e pro&isions of t#e amended Cection 2* of said la$ to arri&e at prision correccional and Article 4 of t#e Code to impose t#e same in t#e medium period. Cuc# offense4 alt#oug# pro&ided for in a special la$4 is no$ in t#e effect punis#ed 1y and under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Correlati&ely4 to determine t#e minimum4 $e must apply t#e first part of t#e aforesaid Cection 1 $#ic# directs t#at Qin imposing a prison sentence for an offense punis#ed 1y t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 or its amendments4 t#e court s#all sentence t#e accused to an indeterminate sentence t#e ma8imum term of $#ic# s#all 1e t#at $#ic#4 in &ie$ of t#e attending circumstances4 could 1e properly imposed under t#e rules of said Code4 and t#e minimum $#ic# s#all 1e $it#in t#e range of t#e penalty ne8t lo$er to t#at prescri1ed 1y t#e Code for t#e offense.Q (!mp#asis ours.) A di&ergent pedantic application $ould not only 1e out of conte8t 1ut also an admission of t#e #orn1oo< ma8im t#at 7ui #aeret in litera #aeret in cortice. +ortunately4 t#is Court #as ne&er gone only s<in0deep in its construction of Act ?o. 41*3 1y a mere literal appreciation of its pro&isions. T#us4 $it# regard to t#e p#rase in Cection 2 t#ereof e8cepting from its co&erage Qpersons con&icted of offenses punis#ed $it# deat# penalty or life imprisonment4Q $e #a&e #eld t#at $#at is considered is t#e penalty actually imposed and not t#e penalty imposa1le under t#e la$4 and t#at reclusion perpetua is li<e$ise em1raced t#erein alt#oug# $#at t#e la$ states is Qlife imprisonment.Q 6#at irresisti1ly emerges from t#e preceding dis7uisition4 t#erefore4 is t#at under t#e concurrence of t#e principles of literal interpretation4 $#ic# #a&e 1een rationali2ed 1y comparati&e decisions of t#is Court; of #istorical interpretation4 as e8plicated 1y t#e antecedents of t#e la$ and related to contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation4 considering t#e interrelation of t#e penalties in t#e Code as supplemented 1y Act ?o. 41*3 in an integrated sc#eme of penalties4 it follo$s t#at t#e minimum of t#e indeterminate sentence in t#is case s#all 1e t#e penalty ne8t lo$er to t#at prescri1ed for t#e offense. T#ere1y $e s#all #a&e interpreted t#e seeming am1iguity in Cection 1 of Act ?o. 41*3 in suc# a $ay as to #armoni2e la$s $it# la$s4 $#ic# is t#e 1est mode of interpretation. C.?CTAE!@; A--5%CAT%.? %? CAC! AT >AA. R T#e %ndeterminate Centence 5a$ is a legal and social measure of compassion4 and s#ould 1e li1erally interpreted in fa&or of t#e accused. T#e QminimumQ sentence is merely a period at $#ic#4 and not 1efore4 as a matter of grace and not of rig#t4 t#e prisoner may merely 1e allo$ed to ser&e t#e 1alance of #is sentence outside of #is confinement. %t does not constitute t#e totality of t#e penalty since t#ereafter #e still #as to continue ser&ing t#e rest of #is sentence under set conditions. T#at minimum is only t#e period $#en t#e con&ict,s eligi1ility for parole may 1e considered. %n fact4 #is release on parole may readily 1e denied if #e is found un$ort#y t#ereof4 or #is reincarceration may 1e ordered on legal grounds4 e&en if #e #as ser&ed t#e minimum sentence. %t is t#us 1ot# amusing and 1emusing if4 in t#e case at 1ar4 appellant s#ould 1e 1egrudged t#e 1enefit of a minimum sentence $it#in t#e range of arresto mayor4 t#e penalty ne8t lo$er to prision correccional $#ic# is t#e ma8imum range $e #a&e fi8ed t#roug# t#e application of Articles 1 and "1 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. +or4 $it# fealty to t#e la$4 t#e court may set t#e minimum sentence at mont#s of arresto mayor4 instead of mont#s and 1 day of prision correccional. T#e difference4 $#ic# could t#ere1y e&en in&ol&e only one day4 is #ardly $ort# t#e creation of an o&errated tempest in t#e =udicial teapot.
H3 %n dangerous drugs cases4 $#at #appens to t#e s#a1u4 mari=uana4 tooter4 opium pipe4 etc.F 6#yF A3 T#e s#a1u4 etc.4 $ill 1e confiscated in fa&or of t#e go&ernment and destroyed. T#is is so to pre&ent its recycling.
Se%t#&n 01@A L Plea=4argaining Pr#visi#n
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9Any person c#arged under any pro&ision of AA 425 $#ere t#e imposa1le penalty is reclusion perpetua to deat# s#all not 1e allo$ed to a&ail of t#e pro&ision on plea0 1argaining. (as added 1y Cec. 1'4 AA " 5).): %n criminal procedure4 t#e accused s#ould plead guilty to a lesser offense. %f t#e crime is murder4 plead guilty to #omicide. %f t#e crime is frustrated #omicide4 plead guilty to less serious p#ysical in=uries. %llegal possession of firearm4 plead guilty to erasing t#e serial num1er. !*t in dangerous drugs cases4 t#ere $ill 1e ?. -5!A0>AA/A%?%?/ if t#e penalty imposa1le is reclusion perpetua to deat#. )E4E5$% 56%E in 7riminal la! 8urisprudence: Conspiracy is not punis#a1le. Attempt #s n&t p*n#sha,le. Se%t#&n 04 L Attempt an$ C&nsp#ra%' 9T#e same penalty prescri1ed 1y AA 425 for t#e commission of t#e offense s#all 1e imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to commit t#e same in t#e follo$ing cases3 (a) %mportation of dangerous drugs; (1) Cale4 administration4 deli&ery4 distri1ution and transportation of dangerous drugs; (c) Maintenance of a den4 di&e or resort for pro#i1ited drug users; (d) Manufacture of dangerous drugs; and (e) Culti&ation or culture of plants $#ic# are sources of pro#i1ited drugs.: Se%t#&n 00 L A$$#t#&nal 2enalt' #" O""en$er #s an Al#en Any alien $#o &iolates any of t#e pro&isions of Articles %% and %%% of AA 425 s#all 1e deported $it#out furt#er proceedings immediately after ser&ice of sentence. Se%t#&n 0C L Cr#m#nal L#a,#l#t' &" O""#%ers &" 2artnersh#ps8 C&rp&rat#&ns8 Ass&%#at#&ns an$ Other .*r#$#%al 2ers&nsI Criminally lia1le as a co0principal. Se%t#&n 0< L 2enalt#es "&r G&(ernment O""#%#als an$ Empl&'ees an$ O""#%ers an$ Mem,ers &" 2&l#%e A+en%#es an$ the Arme$ F&r%esI 2lant#n+ &" E(#$en%e T#e ma8imum penalties s#all 1e imposed if t#ose found guilty of any of t#e said offenses are go&ernment officials4 employees of officers including mem1ers of police agencies and t#e armed forces. Se%t#&n 0<@A @@ La,&rat&r' E=am#nat#&nJTest &n Apprehen$e$ Users &" Dan+er&*s Dr*+s Any person appre#ended or arrested for &iolating t#e pro&isions of t#is Act s#all4 immediately upon #is arrestGappre#ension4 1e su1=ected to la1oratory e8aminationsGtest4 if t#e appre#endingGarresting officer #as reasona1le ground to 1elie&e t#at t#e person arrestedGappre#ended4 on account of p#ysical signs or symptoms or ot#er &isi1le or out$ard manifestation4 is under t#e influence of dangerous drugs4 and if found to 1e positi&e of suc# drugs4
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t#e results of t#e la1oratory e8aminationGtest s#all 1e prima facie e&idence t#at suc# person #as used dangerous drugs. %f found negati&e4 t#e suspect s#all immediately 1e released4 unless t#ere 1e ot#er e&idence indicati&e of suc# &iolation. Se%t#&n 07 @@ Re%&r$s Re)*#re$ &" a. -#armacists4 1. -#ysicians4 (eterinarians or @entists @ispensing or -rescri1ing @angerous @rugs4 and %mportees4 c. Manufacturers4 6#olesalers4 @istri1utors4 @ealers and Aetailers of @angerous @rugs Se%t#&n 03 L 2enalt' "&r a 2ers&n Imp&rt#n+ Dan+er&*s Dr*+s ,' MaF#n+ Use &" D#pl&mat#% 2assp&rt Any person $#o4 unless aut#ori2ed under t#is Act4 s#all import or 1ring into t#e -#ilippines any dangerous drug 1y ma<ing use of a diplomatic passport4 diplomatic facilities4 or any ot#er means in&ol&ing #is official status intended to facilitate t#e unla$ful entry of dangerous drugs. %n addition4 t#e diplomatic passport s#all 1e confiscated and cancelled. Se%t#&n 06 L Cr#m#nal L#a,#l#t' &" 2&ssess&r &r Use &" Dan+er&*s Dr*+s D*r#n+ S&%#al Gather#n+s Any person found possessing or using any dangerous drug during a party or at a social gat#ering or in a group of at least fi&e persons possessing or using suc# drugs.
ARTICLE AI @@ Reha,#l#tat#(e C&n"#nement an$ S*spens#&n Senten%e T$o Minds of Ae#a1ilitation3 (1) Compulsory (2) (oluntary Se%t#&n C1 L A&l*ntar' S*,m#ss#&n &" a Dr*+ Depen$ent t& C&n"#nement8 Treatment an$ Reha,#l#tat#&n ,' the Depen$ent H#msel" &" Thr&*+h h#s 2arent8 G*ar$#an &r Relat#(e F#rst t#me %f a drug dependent &oluntarily su1mits #imself for confinement4 treatment and re#a1ilitation in a center and complies $it# suc# conditions t#erefore as t#e >oard may 1y rules and regulations prescri1e4 #e s#all not 1e criminally lia1le for any &iolation of Cection '4 Article %% and Cection 1 4 Article %%% of AA 425. Se%&n$ t#me C#ould t#e drug dependent4 #a&ing &oluntarily su1mitted #imself for confinement4 treatment and re#a1ilitation in4 or #a&ing 1een committed to a center upon petition of t#e proper party4 escape t#erefrom4 #e may resu1mit #imself for confinement (no prosecution) $it#in 1 $ee< from t#e date of #is escape4 or #is parent4 guardian or relati&e may4 $it#in t#e same period surrender #im for recommitment.
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%f4 #o$e&er4 t#e drug dependent does not resu1mit #imself for confinement or #e is not surrendered for recommitment4 as t#e case may 1e4 t#e >oard may apply $it# t#e court for t#e issuance of a recommitment order. Th#r$ t#me %f4 su1se7uent to suc# recommitment4 #e s#ould escape again4 #e s#all no longer 1e e8empt from criminal lia1ility for use of possession of any dangerous drugs. (oluntary Ae#a1ilitation3 %f you are a drug dependent4 you $ill file a petition $it# t#e ATC. 00 -etition for Confinement4 Treatment and Ae#a1ilitation !&en if you are already 5* or * years old4 or 3" or 2 4 it does not matter. %f you file a -etition for (oluntary Confinement4 Treatment and Ae#a1ilitation4 you $ill not 1e prosecuted for use.
Wh' #s #t that '&* sh&*l$ "#le the 2et#t#&n -#th the RTCM >ecause it is a court of general =urisdiction.
Jou must attac# to your -etition t#e &rug &ependency Examination 5eport4 issued 1y a
duly accredited @-> p#ysician. ?ote3 ?ot all p#ysicians are credited. T#en you $ill appear personally 1efore t#e court. Jou $ill 1e as<ed 7uestions3 H3 Are you a drug dependentF A3 Jes. H3 6#at dangerous drugs are you usingF !tc.
%f you escape $#ile in confinement4 one c#ance. Aecommitment. T#e t#ird time4 no more.
Se%t#&n C4 L C&mp*ls&r' S*,m#ss#&n &" a Dr*+ Depen$ent t& Treatment an$ Reha,#l#tat#&n Compulsory Ae#a1ilitation3 A person is c#arged $it# t#e commission of a crime is on trial. T#e fiscal of t#e court or counsel for accused found t#at t#e accused is a drug dependent. T#ere $ill 1e compulsory re#a1ilitation. Trial $ill 1e suspended and #e $ill stay in a re#a1ilitation center. %n some cases4 #is stay in t#e drug re#a1ilitation center is considered as sentence. considered ser&ice of sentence. %t is
Se%t#&n C0 L S*spens#&n &" Senten%e "&r F#rst O""ense &" a M#n&r %f an accused under 1' years of age at t#e time of t#e commission of t#e offense 1ut not more t#an 21 years at t#e time $#en t#e =udgment s#ould #a&e 1een promulgatedY..if found guilty4 t#en t#e sentence $ill 1e suspended 1ut upon application of t#e accusedY..
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ReB *))re/ensi#n an( )r#se".ti#n #0 vi#lat#rs #0 R* 5,22% !UY@!UST O2ERATION 2EO2LE AS. RAMOS G.R. N&s. 57<14@10. .*ne <8 4991 9Among t#e most <no$n and fre7uently employed police practice in going after suspected drug offenders is t#e so called >EJ >ECT .-!AAT%.?. A >uy01ust operation is a met#od employed 1y police aut#orities to catc# malefactors in t#e act of committing t#e crime of drug &ending. %t is essentially a form of entrapment4 a procedure not pro#i1ited 1y t#e A-C.: 2p (s. AALMORES 400 SCRA 900 9!ntrapment #as pro&en to 1e an effecti&e means of appre#ending drug peddlers.: 2p (s. DEL 2ILAR 455 SCRA C6 0$nd it has recei(ed *udicial sanction as long as it is carried out !ith constitutional and legal circumspection.3 2p (s. LAGASCA 4<5 SCRA 03< 0Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and con(iction. #t is not contrary to la!.3 2p (s. FERNANDO 4<7 SCRA 474 0-uy9bust operation is a recogni,ed means of entrapment for the apprehension of drug pushers. #t does not al!ays commend itself as the most reliable !ay to go after the (iolators of 1he &angerous &rugs $ct as it is susceptible to mista+e, as !ell as to harassment, extortion and abuse.3 Mec#anics of >EJ0>ECT .-!AAT%.?3 Esually preceded 1y an informant. Esually informants $or< clandestinely. %n t#e course of t#e trial t#eir names $ill not 1e disclosed. After information gi&en 1y t#e informant4 t#e police aut#orities (usually t#e ?AAC.M) $ill conduct a CEA(!%55A?C!. Cometimes4 a sur&eillance is follo$ed 1y a T!CT0>EJ. T#ey $ill 1uy4 1ut t#ey $ill not arrest t#e pus#er. T#en t#ey $ill send t#e stoc< to t#e -?- crime la1oratory for e8amination. T#e -?- crime la1oratory $ill issue a p#ysical science report. +indings t#at t#is is a regulated drug containing or found positi&e for met amp#etamine #ydroc#loride. After t#e test01uy4 t#ey $ill form a 1uy01ust team usually composed of 3 mem1ers. .ne $ill act as a decoy or poseur 1uyer and t#e ot#er $ill act as guard or 1ac<0up. T#e decoy or poseur 1uyer $ill 1uy from t#e pus#er or peddler.
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T#ere $ill 1e e8c#ange of money and s#a1u. consummated.
T#e transaction is
As soon as t#e transaction is consummated. T#e poseur 1uyer $ill flas# t#e prearranged signal. T#en t#ey $ill rus# to t#e suspect. T#e officers $ill get t#e s#a1u and if possi1le4 t#e 1uy money. >ut usually4 1ut not necessarily4 t#e agents $ill use mar<ed money or money laced $it# fluorescent po$der. %n accordance $it# t#e rules of court4 t#e confiscated or t#e sei2ed properties $ill 1e in&entoried and duly presented. %n many cases t#ey $ill compel t#e drug peddler to issue a receipt t#at t#ese are t#e items4 t#ese are t#e pounds of s#a1u ta<en from t#e peddler. Cupreme Court 000 Jou are &iolating #is rig#t. %t is same as custodial interrogation. 6it#out counsel you #a&e #im issue a receipt4 it is li<e ma<ing #im confess. T#e officer $#o confiscated t#e drug s#ould 1e t#e one to issue t#e receipt4 not t#at t#e peddler $ill 1e t#e one $#o $ill issue t#e receipt. T#en t#is is usually follo$ed 1ut not necessarily follo$ed 1y a +%!5@ T!CT4 among t#emsel&es. To ensure if t#e confiscated drug is really a dangerous drug. To deli&er t#e specimen to t#e c#emist or t#e forensic analyst. -?- and ?>% crime la1oratories. Cpecimen $ill 1e e8amined. T#ere $ill 1e 3 tests t#at $ill 1e conducted. %f found positi&e for t#e presence of met amp#etamine #ydroc#loride (s#a1u) or ot#er dangerous drug4 t#en t#ey $ill issue a c#emical science or p#yscal science report. T#is is a &ery important piece of e&idence 1ecause in possession and sale4 t#e corpus delicti is t#e drug itself. %f you fail to present t#e drugs in court4 t#e accused s#ould 1e ac7uitted. 6#yF >ecause you #a&e to pro&e t#at t#is is really a pro#i1ited drug or regulated drug.
%f t#e prosecution fails to present t#e 1uy money4 it does not necessarily mean t#at t#e accused s#ould 1e ac7uitted. 6BJF All t#e prosecution #as to do is to pro&e t#at t#ere $as e8c#ange of s#a1u for money. >ecause t#ere are instances $#ere t#ese drug peddlers $ill t#ro$ a$ay t#e money or e&en s$allo$ it4 1elie&ing t#at if t#ere is no 1uy money s#o$n in court4 t#ey $ill 1e ac7uitted of t#e case. %n one decision of t#e CC4 t#e accused argued t#at t#ere $as no 1uy01ust 1ecause t#ere $as no sur&eillance. CC 00 91hat is not necessary in buy9bust. :ith or !ithout sur(eillance, if the prosecution can proof sale.3
!8c#ange for money and t#e drug plus t#e corpus delicti. T#at;s all.
%n one case4 t#e accused argued 1efore t#e CC t#at t#ere $as no 1uy01ust4 t#ere $as no sale 1ecause t#ey failed to present t#e informant.
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CC 00 04o, because the testimony of the informant is only corroborati(e. #f you pro(e all the elements of sale, tapos, con(icted.3 %n anot#er CC case4 t#e accused argued4 t#ere $as no field test. -ro1a1ly t#e s#a1u deli&ered to t#e forensic c#emist is not t#e one $#ic# $as ta<en from t#e accused. CC 00 0E(en if there !as no field test, for as long as all the elements of sale are pro(en, the accused is con(icted.3
INFORMER (s. DECOY %?+.AM!A 00 is one $#o communicates <no$ledge of someone #a&ing committed or a1out to commit a crime to t#e proper aut#orities4 $#o4 1y t#emsel&es4 acting independently may o1tain t#e e&idence necessary for t#e prosecution of t#e offender. @!C.J 00 did somet#ing more. 00 #e played a su1stantial part in t#e act complained of and is in fact is claimed 1y t#e appellant as t#e real o$ner of t#e su1=ect mari=uana. 00 is one $#o participates in 1uy01ust4 an informer may or may not participate. Ae3 6#et#er or not it is indispensa1le to present t#e informer or to identify t#e $itness )E4E5$% 56%E: %t is t#erefore clear t#at in determining $#et#er a $itness; identity must 1e or must not 1e re&ealed during a trial4 2 important considerations must be considered: (2) %f t#e $itness $as merely an informer4 and #is testimony is not material to t#e accused;s defense4 t#en t#e prosecution #as t#e pri&ilege of $it##olding #is identity. (3) %f t#e $itness $as not merely an informer4 1ut $as also t#e decoy or t#e poseur 1uyer4 t#en #is identity may not 1e $it##eld in t#e face of t#e accused;s insistence t#at #is identity 1e re&ealed 1ecause t#e accused;s defense #inges on #is credi1ility and unless #is identity is re&ealed4 t#e accused $ill 1e una1le to impeac# #im.
?on presentation of an informer is a pri&ilege t#at its o$n in#erent limitation t#at of
fairness in t#e administration of criminal =ustice4 1ut $#ere t#e disclosure of t#e informer;s identity is rele&ant and #elpful to t#e defense of t#e accused4 or is essential to t#e proper disposition of t#e case4 t#e pri&ilege to $it##old #is identity must gi&e $ay. Trial courts must al$ays 1ear in mind t#at t#e rig#t to meet t#e accuser and to #a&e #im e8amined is a fundamental rig#t. T#e constitution so mandates t#at t#ey cannot do ot#er$ise especially so in instances $#ere t#e parties soug#t to 1e presented and e8amined possesses &ital information essential to t#e defense in &indicating t#e accused;s plea of innocence. Cuc# &iolation of appellant;s fundamental rig#t calls for t#e re&ersal of #is con&iction. (5ubiaro (s. 6S, 3 3 6S ;
-eople &s. Aamon C#ua Ey
Mar%h 68 0111
:re#terat#&n &" pre(#&*s SC $e%#s#&ns $e"#n#n+ the ,*'@,*st &perat#&n.;
Pe#)le vs% 7ar"ia 23 S75$ 3<= 9T#e 1uy01ust operation is a form of entrapment $#ere1y $ays and means are resorted to for t#e purpose of trapping and capturing la$01rea<ers in t#e e8ecution of t#eir criminal plan. %t is
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a procedure or operation sanctioned 1y la$ and $#ic# #as consistently pro&ed itself to 1e an effecti&e met#od of appre#ending drug peddlers. And unless t#ere is a clear and con&incing e&idence t#at t#e mem1ers of t#e 1uy01ust team $ere inspired 1y any improper moti&e4 or $ere not properly performing t#eir duty4 t#eir testimonies on t#e operation deser&e full fait# and credit.:
1here are patterns or *udicial policies on defenses set up by accused for (iolating 5$ >?2 .
1he most common defense is 0rame=.)% Pe#)le vs% De"/#s#F Pe#)le vs% C#nstantin#F Pe#)le vs% Fran"a 9T#e defense of frame0up in drugs cases re7uires strong and con&incing e&idence 1ecause of t#e presumption t#at t#e la$ enforcement agencies acted in t#e regular performance of t#eir official duties.: Pe#)le vs% La"abanesF Pe#)le vs% *legr#F Manalili vs% C*F Pe#)le vs% EnriD.eI 9Moreo&er4 t#e defense of denial or frame0up li<e ali1i #as 1een &ie$ed 1y t#e court $it# disfa&or for it cannot =ust as easily 1e concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of dangerous drugs cases.: Pe#)le #0 t/e P/ils% vs% *l0re(# RiD.eIA 4o(ember =@, =@@@ A-$5; 9T#e common defense of accused in drugs cases3 O% s#ould not 1e con&icted 1ecause t#e e&idence for t#e prosecution is not credi1le.; OT#e 1uyer is un<no$n to me.; OT#e act of selling $as done in front of a 1usy street4 in front of sari0sari stores4 etc. or Oin pu1lic places.:
According to many accused4 t#e selling of drugs is done in secrecy. >ut CC #eld 000 t#e selling of
drugs no$adays is li<e selling cigarettes.
Pe#)le vs% -ari# ( 991)F Pe#)le vs% 4las 9T#e defense li<e$ise stri&es to esta1lis# t#e innocence of accused0appellant 1y claiming t#at no drug pus#er in #is rig#t mind $ould sell to a stranger 25* grams of s#a1u on a 1usy street li<e !strella Ct. and certainly not in 1road daylig#t4 in as muc# as acti&ities suc# as t#ese are done clandestinely.: SC@@@ 96e are not persuaded. %f pus#ers peddle drugs only to persons <no$n to t#em4 t#en drug a1use $ould certainly not 1e as rampant as it is today and $ould not cause a serious t#reat to society. 6e;&e found in many cases t#at drug pus#ers sell t#eir pro#i1ited articles to any prospecti&e customer4 1e #e a stranger4 or not4 in pri&ate as $ell as in pu1lic places4 e&en in t#e daytime. %ndeed4 drug pus#ers #a&e 1ecome increasingly daring4 dangerous4 and $orse4 openly defiant of t#e la$. Bence4 $#at matters is not t#e e8isting familiarity 1et$een t#e 1uyer and seller4 or t#e time and &enue of t#e sale4 1ut t#e fact of agreement and t#e acts constituting sale and deli&ery of pro#i1ited drugs.: Pe#)le vs% *viles 9%llegal drug trade is t#e scourge of our society. @rug pus#ers are merc#ants of deat#4 <illers $it#out mercy4 $#o poison t#e mind and deaden t#e 1ody.: Pe#)le vs% Mate# 4al#(a 9T#eir pernicious commodities cause so muc# p#ysical4 mental and moral pain4 not only to t#e immediate &ictims of t#eir greed4 1ut also and most specially to t#e families of t#eir &ictims. Bence4 t#ey deser&ed no mercy.: 'w# Ein(s #0 P#ssessi#nB
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A=; $ctual A2; 7onstructi(e #f you are the o!ner of the house, dangerous drug is found therein, you are in constructi(e possession of the drug. Aationale3 #t is in the la! of e(idence. #f you possess a thing, you exercise acts of o!nership o(er the thing you are presumed to be the o!ner. Ender t#e rules of e&idence4 it is disputa1ly presumed t#at t#ings $#ic# a person possesses or o&er $#ic# #e e8ercises acts of o$ners#ip are o$ned 1y #im. Case 9T#e finding of t#e dangerous drug in t#e #ouse or $it#in t#e premises of t#e #ouse of t#e accused is prima facie e&idence of <no$ledge or A?%MEC -.CC!@!?@% and is enoug# to con&ict in t#e a1sence of satisfactory e8planation. T#e constitutional presumption of innocence $ill not apply as long as t#ere is some logical connection 1et$een t#e fact pro&ed and t#e ultimate fact presumed and t#e inference of one fact from proof of anot#er s#all not 1e so unreasona1le as to 1e purely ar1itrary mandate. T#e 1urden of e&idence is t#us s#ifted to t#e possessor of t#e dangerous drug to e8plain a1sence of animus possedendi. %n t#e case under consideration4 it is not disputed t#at appellant $as carrying a sac< containing mari=uana. Conse7uently4 to $arrant #is ac7uittal4 #e must s#o$ t#at #is act $as innocent and done $it#out intent to possess4 t#at is4 $it#out <no$ledge t#at $#at #e possesses $as a pro#i1ited drug.: Pe#)le vs% !am.el ;% :al(eI AMarch 3, =@@@; :arrantless $rrest #f a policeman belie(es that a crime has been committed and there is probable cause, he may cause the arrest or he may arrest the person himself. Arrest originating from tip0off (carrying mari=uana). (alde2 7uestioned t#e legality of #is arrest3 no personal <no$ledge on t#e part of t#e policemen $#o arrested #im and from tip0off is not personal <no$ledge. CC00 9.ur =urisprudence is replete $it# instances $#ere tipped information #as 1ecome sufficient pro1a1le cause to effect a $arrantless searc# and sei2ure. %n t#is case4 appellant $as caug#t in flagrante since #e $as carrying mari=uana at t#e time of #is arrest. A crime $as actually 1eing committed 1y t#e appellant4 t#us t#e searc# made upon #is personal effects falls s7uarely under paragrap# a of t#e foregoing pro&isions of la$ $#ic# allo$ed $arrantless searc# incident to la$ful arrest. 6#ile it is true t#at C-.1 Mariano $as not armed $it# a searc# $arrant $#en t#e searc# $as conducted o&er t#e personal effects of appellant4 ne&ert#eless4 under t#e circumstances of t#e case4 t#ere $as sufficient pro1a1le cause for said police officer to 1elie&e t#at appellant $as t#en and t#ere committing a crime. Alt#oug# t#e term pro1a1le cause eludes definition4 pro1a1le signifies a reasona1le ground of suspicion supported 1y circumstances sufficiently strong in t#emsel&es to $arrant a cautious man;s 1elief t#at t#e person accused is guilty of t#e offense $it# $#ic# #e is c#arged or t#e e8istence of suc# facts and circumstances $#ic# could lead a reasona1ly discreet and prudent man to 1elie&e t#at an offense #as 1een committed and t#at t#e items4 articles or o1=ects soug#t in connection $it# said offense or su1=ect to sei2ure and destruction 1y la$ is in t#e place to 1e searc#ed. T#e re7uired pro1a1le cause t#at $ill =ustify a $arrantless searc# and sei2ure is not determined 1y a fi8ed formula 1ut is resol&ed according to t#e facts of eac# case.: Pe#)le vs% *minn.(in 1here !as an information that these Muslims !ere coming to #loilo days before his disembar+ation from the (essel.
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1here !as plenty of time for the police officers to secure a search !arrant. So !hen $minnudin arri(ed, he !as arrested at the foot of the gangplan+. 7harged and con(icted for possession of dangerous drugs. $c'uitted by the S7 because the arrest !as illegal. 1here !as plenty of time for the police officers to secure a search !arrant. Ho!e(er, in the Pe#)le vs% !am.el ;% :al(eI case, on the other hand, it !as an emergency situation !here there !as no possibility for the police officers to secure a search !arrant. 1hey !ere time9pressed to ma+e the arrest. )uilty as charged. Pe#)le vs% *ngelita Manal# #nstigation Entrapment &efinition of -uy9-ust .peration -urden of proof Pe#)le vs% R#lan(# *ngeles 7lassifying shabu 9Met#el Amp#etamine BCl or s#a1u is a regulated drug. 6e re=ect appellant;s su1mission and #ere1y rule t#at Met#el Amp#etamine BCl4 commonly <no$n as s#a1u or poor man;s cocaine is a regulated drug. T#e term Amp#etamine is not to 1e understood in its ordinary sense4 etc.: Pe#)le vs% '/e#(#r# *ngeles 1he prosecution failed to present the mar+ed buy money. S7 B for as long as the prosecution presents e(idence of sale CexchangeD, e(en if the money !ill not be produced in court. #n some cases the accused !ill thro! a!ay the money or sometimes e(en s!allo! it. 7on(icted. Possession of mari*uana is absorbed in sale.
Pe#)le #0 t/e P/ils% vs% Martin !ime#n Jm#t/er #0 all "asesK 8uly 2@, =@@? 1he defense of 5inghop !as discussed and also the policy. 1he corpus delicti in drugs cases 999 the dangerous drug itself must be presented in court. Eailure to mar+ money bills used for entrapment 999 not fatal. #n sale, this is the policy of the Supreme 7ourt 999 t#e commission of t#e offense of illegal sale of pro#i1ited drugs re7uires merely t#e consummation of t#e selling transaction4 $#ic# #appens t#e moment t#e 1uyer recei&es t#e drug from t#e seller. 000 sale of mari=uana to a stranger is not impro1a1le. 7.i(elines in im)#sing )enaltiesB A=; -elo! 2 F grams B prision correccional A2; 2 F9?@@ grams B prision mayor A3; FF9<?@ grams B reclusion temporal Pe#)le vs% 9ats#n &ecember =@@? Eailure to present buy9bust money not fatal so long as the dangerous drug is presented and the accused is identified as the offender. 1he absence of mar+ed money does not create a hiatus in the e(idence for the prosecution so long as the dangerous drug gi(en or deli(ered by the accused !as presented before the court and the accused !as clearly identified as the offender.
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Ma+e sure you do not lose the e(idence, other!ise your case !ill collapseGGGG
+n b.y=b.st .s.ally t/ere is s.rveillan"e% !.))#se t/ere is t/e s.rveillan"eA (#es it mean t/ere was a b.y=b.stL 4.. $ prior sur(eillance is not a prere'uisite for the (alidity of an entrapment operation. 9/at is t/e )#li"y #0 t/e !.)reme C#.rt i0 t/ere is 0ail.re #0 t/e in0#rmer t# testi0yL 1estimony or identity of the informer may be dispensed !ith since narration !ould be merely corroborati(e. B Pe#)le vs% (e l#s Reyes #n the prosecution for the (iolation of the &&$, it is not necessary for the prosecution to pro(e the negati(e element.
Pe#)le vs% Rental (e l#s Reyes 8anuary 2=, =@@? Accused0appellant maintains t#at it $as incum1ent upon t#e prosecution to pro&e t#e negati&e allegations in t#e information $it#out any aut#ority of la$. T#e argument is far from persuasi&e for t#e statute AA 4254 as amended4 ot#er$ise <no$n as T#e @angerous @rugs Act of 1)"24 applies generally to all persons and prescri1es t#e sale4 administration4 deli&ery4 distri1ution4 transportation and manufacture of dangerous drugs 1y any person. And ?. -!AC.? %C -A!CEM!@ AETB.A%X!@ T. C!55 !TC CECB @AE/C4 rat#er4 any person claiming t#e 1enefit of t#e e8emption must pro&e t#at #e falls under t#e protecti&e mantle of t#e e8emption. 1he court almost al!ays gi(es the presumption of regularity of performance of duty of a peace officer. E#E%&91ES1 B !as not present in this case. Eatal or notH +ailure to present certificate of field0test is not fatal. Pe#)le vs% Cesar L."er# T#e mere act of deli&ery of t#e pro#i1ited drug is punis#a1le 1y la$. T#e 7uestion of money is immaterial 1ecause t#e dangerous drugs la$ punis#es t#e mere act of deli&ery of t#e pro#i1ited drug after t#e offer to 1uy4 t#e entrapping officer #as 1een accepted 1y t#e pro#i1ited seller. %n fact4 t#e court #as already #eld t#at t#e a1sence of mar<ed money does not create a #iatus in t#e e&idence for t#e prosecutions so long as t#e pro#i1ited drug gi&en or deli&ered 1y t#e accused $as presented 1efore t#e court and t#at it $as clearly identified as t#e offender 1y t#e prosecution eye$itnesses. T#e fact t#at t#ere is actual con&eyance suffices to support findings t#at t#e act of transporting $as pro#i1ited. Pe#)le vs% L# <# 9ing T#e term TAA?C-.AT as used under t#e @@A means to carry or con&ey from one place to anot#er. .perati(e !ords: to carry or to con(ey. Pe#)le vs% 9illiam R#bert 4.rt#n $ttempting to transport hashish #n transportation of illegal drugs, it is immaterial if the accused reached his destination.
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TITLE SIX
CRIMES AGAINST 2U!LIC MORALS

Chapter One GAM!LING AND !ETTING
ARTICLES 497@ 499 RE2EALED AND MODIFIED !Y 2.D. NOS. <<98 <5C AND 4310 AS AMENDED !Y LOI 543 -@ 1 *2 L-rescri1ing Ctiffer -enalties on %55!/A5 /AM>5%?/ Ender t#e present la$4 it is not s<ill. 6#et#er it is s<ill or #a2ard or c#ance4 if you 1et in pro#i1ited games4 you are lia1le under -@ 1 *2. %t is not c#ance4 #a2ard or s<ill4 it is 1etting. @irectly or indirectly ta<ing part in any illegal or unaut#ori2ed acti&ities. ST#ere is a long enumeration L do not memori2eVVVV Cara y cru24 1lac< =ac< etc.T ACTC %? /!?!AA5 00 -ermitting any form of gam1ling Sin t#e enumerated gamesT4 in in#a1ited or unin#a1ited places or 1uilding4 &essel4 or means of transportation4 o$ned or controlled 1y t#em
/ames e8cluded from t#e ?e$ /am1ling 5a$3 S5.% '1 T Ma#=ong -o<er if not played $it# 5 cards >ingo @omino Cua=o -ianguingue %f played in parlor games or in #ouse entertainment pro&ided suc# games are not played in places #a1itually used for gam1ling. Ender -@ 1 *24 t#e 1asis for determining $#et#er t#e game is gam1ling or not is no longer t#e element of #a2ard or c#ance4 instead4 it is $#et#er t#ere is 1etting or not. %f t#ere is 1etting4 regardless of $#et#er t#e element of s<ill out$eig#s t#e element of c#ance or #a2ard4 t#e game is a gam1ling game and t#erefore4 t#e game is a crime under -@ 1 *2. -ersons lia1le in gam1ling3 >an<er4 Conductor4 Maintainer4 or -ersons $#o directly or indirectly participate in gam1ling T#ere are gam1ling games 1ut t#e participant t#erein does not incur criminal lia1ility as long as t#ey participate only during t#ose days $#ere t#e gam1ling is legali2ed.
-@ 4'3 L -enali2ing >etting4 /ame0fi8ing or -oint0s#a&ing and Mac#inations in Cports Contests A. @efinitions a. >etting 0 1etting money or any o1=ect or article of &alue or representati&e of &alue upon t#e result of any game4 races and ot#er sports contest.
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1. /ame0fi8ing 0 any arrangement4 com1ination4 sc#eme or agreement 1y $#ic# t#e result of any game4 races or sports contests s#all 1e predicted andGor <no$n ot#er t#an on t#e 1asis of t#e #onest playing s<ill or a1ility of t#e players or participants. c. -oint0s#a&ing 0 any suc# arrangement4 com1ination4 sc#eme or agreement 1y $#ic# t#e s<ill or a1ility of any player or participant in a game4 races or sports contests to ma<e points or scores s#all 1e limited deli1erately in order to influence t#e result t#ereof in fa&or of one or ot#er team4 player or participant t#erein. d. /ame0mac#inations 0 any ot#er fraudulent4 deceitful4 unfair or dis#onest means4 met#od4 manner or practice employed for t#e purpose of influencing t#e result of any game4 races or sport contest. @istinction 1et$een game0fi8ing and point0s#a&ingF Esually in game0fi8ing4 t#e $#ole team is in&ol&ed. >ut in point0s#a&ing4 only one or t$o may 1e in&ol&ed. /AM!0+%I%?/ L any arrangement4 com1ination4 sc#eme or agreement 1y $#ic# t#e result of any game4 races or sports contests s#all 1e predicted andGor <no$n ot#er t#an on t#e 1asis of t#e #onest playing s<ill or a1ility of t#e players or participants. -.%?T0CBA(%?/ L is different 00 any suc# arrangement4 com1ination4 sc#eme or agreement 1y $#ic# t#e s<ill or a1ility of any player or participant in a game4 races or sports contests to ma<e points or scores s#all 1e limited deli1erately in order to influence t#e result t#ereof in fa&or of one or t#e ot#er team4 player or participant t#erein. -@ 44) L Coc<fig#ting 5a$ of 1)"4 T#is is no$ modified 1y t#e 5ocal /o&ernment Code. T#ere are only T6. TB%?/C T. A!M!M>!A %? C.CM+%/BT%?/VVV 6#en is it allo$edF 6#en is it not allo$edF ?.T A55.6!@ on3 @ecem1er ) Dune 12 ?o&em1er 3* Boly T#ursday /ood +riday !lection or Aeferendum @ay Aegistration @ays for suc# election or referendum. A55.6!@ .?5J in licensed coc<pits4 during3 Cundays and legal #olidays and 5ocal +iestas 00 for not more t#an 3 days. !IC!-T%.?3 Coc<fig#ting for entertainment of tourists and for c#arita1le purposes L !ntertainment of foreign dignitaries or Tourists +or returning 1ali<1ayans or +or t#e support of national fund0raising campaigns for c#arita1le purposes. Ender t#e 5/C4 t#e la$ pro#i1its esta1lis#ment of coc<pits in residential4 commercial or industrial 2ones. 5i<e$ise pro#i1its t#e esta1lis#ment of more t#an 1 coc<pit in any 1 city or municipality. All (sentenciador4 cristo etc) are licensed. T#ey #a&e -rofessional Ta8 Aeceipts (-TAs).
Page 25
Chapter T-& OFFENSES AGAINST DECENCY AND GOOD CUSTOMS

*R'+CLE 200 7R*:E !C*-D*L A. !lements 1. .ffender performs an act or acts 2. T#at suc# acts 1e #ig#ly scandalous as offending decency and good customs 3. T#e #ig#ly scandalous conduct is not e8pressly falling $it#in any ot#er article of t#is Code 4. T#e acts complained of 1e committed in a pu1lic place or $it#in pu1lic <no$ledge or &ie$ %s a catc# all pro&ision %t is a crime of last resort 1ecause t#e la$ states3 9Ynot e8pressly falling $it#in any ot#er article of t#e code:
Committing acts of lasci&iousness inside t#e mo&ie #ouse L it is gra&e scandal 1ut t#ere is anot#er pro&ision punis#ing it. Aape a person in pu1lic &ie$ L gra&e scandal 1ut t#ere $ill 1e no separate prosecution for gra&e scandal 1ecause it is already punis#ed 1y anot#er pro&ision in t#e code. Ta<e note3 %n gra&e scandal4 t#e crime is committed in a pu1lic place or $it#in pu1lic <no$ledge or &ie$. !&en if you do your 9t#ing: in a pri&ate place4 1ut it $as open to pu1lic &ie$4 it is gra&e scandal.
?.T!3 t#at t#ere are also ot#er pro&isions in t#e A-C $#ic# are catc# all pro&isions. %n C$indling4 you #a&e .t#er @eceits4 any ot#er <ind of deceit not falling under any of t#e articles on !stafa4 $ill 1e c#arged $it# .t#er @eceits. .t#er 5ig#t T#reats. @!C!?CJ L means propriety of conduct4 proper o1ser&ance of t#e re7uirements of modesty and good taste. *R'+CLE 20 +MM$R*L D$C'R+-E!A $4!CE-E P;4L+C*'+$-! *-D E@<+4+'+$-!A *-D +-DECE-' !<$9!% A. Acts -unis#ed (As amended 1y -@ ) * W ) )) 1. -u1licly e8pound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to pu1lic morals. 2. T#e a*th&r of o1scene literature4 pu1lis#ed $it# t#eir <no$ledge4 in any form; t#e e$#t&rs pu1lis#ing suc# literature; and &-nersJ&perat&rs of t#e esta1lis#ment selling t#e same 3. T#ose $#o in t#eaters4 fairs4 cinematograp#y4 or ot#er place4 s#all e8#i1it indecent or immoral plays4 scenes4 acts or s#o$s4 $#et#er li&e or on film4 $#ic#3 a. glorify criminals or condone crimes
Page 26
1. ser&e no ot#er purpose 1ut to satisfy t#e mar<et for &iolence4 lust or pornograp#y c. offend any race or religion d. tend to a1et traffic in and use or pro#i1ited drugs e. contrary to la$4 pu1lic order4 morals4 good customs4 esta1lis#ed policies4 orders4 decrees and edicts. 4. T#ose $#o s#all sell4 gi&e a$ay4 or e8#i1it prints4 engra&ings4 sculptures or $#ic# are offensi&e to pu1lic morals.
la$ful literatures
Mere possession of o1scene literature is not punis#a1le4 it does not fall under Art. 2*1. 6#at is needed is t#ere must 1e selling4 pu1lis#ing4 distri1ution.
T#e act of gi&ing one copy only of an o1scene literature is not punis#a1le 1y la$. T#ere must 1e #a1itual gi&ing of o1scene literature. T#is offense in any of t#e forms mentioned in t#e article in committed only $#en t#ere is pu1licity. %t is not t#e mind of one person $#ic# is 1eing protected4 it is t#e mind of t#e pu1lic4 so it needs to 1e many4 not one only.
2e&ple (s. T#m,*n+t*
9(3) T#ose $#o s#all sell4 gi&e a$ay or e8#i1it films4 prints4 engra&ings4 sculptures or literature$#ic# are offensi&e to morals.: T#e o1=ect of t#e la$ is to protect t#e morals of t#e pu1lic. Aemem1er3 T#ere is a special la$ on o1scenity or o1scene pu1lication for minors (AA " 1*). AA " 1* L Any person $#o s#all #ire4 employ or persuade4 induce or coerce a c#ild to perform in o1scene e8#i1itions and indecent s#o$s4 $#et#er li&e or in &ideo4 pose or model in o1scene pu1lications or pornograp#ic materials4 or to sell or distri1ute t#e said materials4 s#all suffer t#e penalty of prision correccional. Ta<e note3 Z2 (a) L Aut#ors of o1scene literature are lia1le only if t#eir articles are pu1lis#ed $it# t#eir <no$ledge.
;)(ates in $4!CE-E P;4L+C*'+$-! (2005)

To be held liable, the prosecution must pro#e that ;a< the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene= and ;b< the offender sold, e,hibited, published or ga#e away such materials. 5ecessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be pro#ed. o !lmost a century has passed since the *ourt first attempted to define obscenity in (eople #. Cottinger. 17 There the *ourt defined obscenity as something which is offensi#e to chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to determine the e,istence of obscenity is, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to depra#e or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. 1E !nother test according to Cottinger is $that which shoc)s the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.$ 1@ 1ut, Cottinger hastened to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the -uestion is to be decided by the .udgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it. 1B o Thereafter, the *ourt in (eople #. /o (in 1H and (eople #. (adan y !lo#a, et al., 1? in#ol#ing a prosecution under !rticle 2>1 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, laid the tests which did little to clearly draw the fine lines of obscenity. o 'n (eople #. /o (in, the *ourt said: o 'f such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art e,hibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be #iewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. owe#er, the pictures here in -uestion were used not e,actly for art0s sa)e but rather for commercial purposes. 'n other words, the supposed artistic -ualities of said pictures were being commerciali+ed so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. /ain and profit would appear to ha#e been the main, if not the e,clusi#e consideration in their e,hibition= and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the pri#ilege of doing so, were not e,actly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art e,hibitions and galleries to
Page 28
satisfy and impro#e their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for lo#e 9of: e,citement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themsel#es from the ill and per#erting effects of these pictures. o (eople #. (adan y !lo#a, et al. in a way reaffirmed the standards set in /o (in but with its own test of $redeeming feature.$ The *ourt therein said that: o 9!:n actual e,hibition of the se,ual act, preceded by acts of lasci#iousness, can ha#e no redeeming feature. 'n it, there is no room for art. "ne can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and e,erting a corrupting influence specially on the youth of the land. 21 o 5otably, the *ourt in the later case of /on+ales #. Calaw Catigba), 22 in#ol#ing motion pictures, still applied the $contemporary community standards$ of Cottinger but departed from the rulings of Cottinger, /o (in and (adan y !lo#a in that the *ourt measures obscenity in terms of the $dominant theme$ of the material ta)en as a $whole$ rather than in isolated passages. o 2ater, in (ita #. *ourt of !ppeals, concerning alleged pornographic publications, the *ourt recogni+ed that Cottinger failed to afford a conclusi#e definition of obscenity, and that both /o (in and (adan y !lo#a raised more -uestions than answers such as, whether the absence or presence of artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art e,hibitions and galleries to satisfy and impro#e their artistic tastes, determine what art is= or that if they find inspiration in the e,hibitions, whether such e,hibitions cease to be obscene. 23 /o (in and (adan y !lo#a ga#e too much latitude for .udicial arbitrament, which has permitted ad lib of ideas and $two%cents worths$ among .udges as to what is obscene or what is art. 27 o The *ourt in (ita also emphasi+ed the difficulty of the -uestion and pointed out how ha+y .urisprudence is on obscenity and how .urisprudence actually failed to settle -uestions on the matter. Significantly, the dynamism of human ci#ili+ation does not help at all. 't is e#ident that indi#idual tastes de#elop, adapt to wide%ranging influences, and )eep in step with the rapid ad#ance of ci#ili+ation. 2E 't seems futile at this point to formulate a perfect definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases. There is no perfect definition of $obscenity$ but the latest word is that of Miller #. *alifornia which established basic guidelines, to wit: ;a< whether to the a#erage person, applying contemporary standards would find the wor), ta)en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest= ;b< whether the wor) depicts or describes, in a patently offensi#e way, se,ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law= and ;c< whether the wor), ta)en as a whole, lac)s serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific #alue. 2@ 1ut, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is $patently offensi#e.$ 2B 5o one will be sub.ect to prosecution for the sale or e,posure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensi#e $hard core$ se,ual conduct. 2H 4,amples included ;a< patently offensi#e representations or descriptions of ultimate se,ual acts, normal or per#erted, actual or simulated= and ;b< patently offensi#e representations or descriptions of masturbation, e,cretory functions, and lewd e,hibition of the genitals. 2? &hat remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for .udicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the .udge0s sound discretion.
*R'+CLE 202 :*7R*-'! *-D PR$!'+';'E! ?.TA >!?!3 T#e follo$ing are &agrants3
1. ".
any person #a&ing no apparent means of su1sistence4 $#o #as the ph's#%al
a,#l#t' t& -&rF an$ -h& ne+le%ts t& appl' h#msel" &" hersel" t& a la-"*l %all#n+ any person found loitering a1out pu1lic or semipu1lic 1uildings or places4 or
tramping or $andering a1out t#e country or t#e streets -#th&*t (#s#,le means &r s*pp&rt 3. any idle or dissolute person $#o lodges in #ouses of ill0fame; ruffians and pimps and t#ose #a1itually associates $it# prostitutes
Page 29
4. any person $#o not 1eing included in t#e pro&isions of t#e ot#er articles of t#is code4 s#all 1e found loitering in any in#a1ited or unin#a1ited place 1elonging to anot#er $it#out any la$ful or =ustifia1le purpose 5. prostitutes P+or t#is purpose4 $omen $#o4 for profit or money4 #a1itually indulge in se8ual intercourse or lasci&ious conduct4 are deemed prostitutes. Article 2*2 (agrants and prostitutes %n prostitution4 t#e crime can only 1e committed 1y a $oman TB!A! %C BA>%TEA5%TJ T#e $oman is of age +or money or profit AA " 1* as amended C#ild a1use act Can 1e committed 1y c#ildren $#et#er male or female !&en if committed once4 offender is lia1le Ctill a c#ild or minor +or money4 profit or any ot#er consideration4 or due to coercion of any adult or syndicate or group
A?T%0M!?@%CA?CJ 5A6 (-@ 15 3) T#is special la$ #as 1een modified in part 1y AA " 1* $it# respect to c#ildren Any person $#o #as no &isi1le and legal means of support4 or la$ful employment and $#o is p#ysically a1le to $or< 1ut neglects to apply #imself to some la$ful calling and instead uses 1egging as a means of li&ing is a M!?@%CA?T. T#ere is also a crime <no$n as a1etting mendicancy K gi&ing alms directly to mendicants4 e8ploited minors or infants on pu1lic roads4 side$al<s4 par<s. Co t#at if you gi&e alms to mendicants in your #ouse4 you $ill not 1e lia1le for a1etting mendicancy.
TITLE SEAEN CRIMES COMMITTED !Y 2U!LIC OFFICERS
Page 10
The designation of th public officer, when t crim e. The public off

Chapter One 2RELIMINARY 2ROAISIONS
*R'+CLE 201 9<$ *RE P;4L+C $FF+CER! Any person $#o4 1y $#re%t pr&(#s#&n &" the la-4 p&p*lar ele%t#&n of app&#ntment 1y competent aut#ority4 s#all ta<e part in t#e performance of pu1lic functions in t#e go&ernment4 or s#all perform in said go&ernment or any of its 1ranc#es 2U!LIC DUTIES as an empl&'ee8 a+ent8 &r s*,&r$#nate &""#%#al4 of any ran< or classes4 s#all 1e deemed as pu1lic officers. -u1lic officers and employees are defined in se&eral la$s. 1. Ae&ised -enal Code (t#is article) 2. AA 3*1) (A?T% /AA+T A?@ C.AAE-T%.? -AACT%C!C ACT) Q-u1lic officerQ includes electi&e and appointi&e officials and employees4 permanent or temporary4 $#et#er in t#e classified or unclassified or e8empt ser&ice recei&ing compensation4 e&en nominal4 from t#e go&ernment as defined in t#e preceding su1paragrap#. 3. AA "13 (C.@! .+ C.?@ECT) Q-u1lic .fficialsQ includes electi&e and appointi&e officials and employees4 permanent or temporary4 $#et#er in t#e career or non0career ser&ice4 including military and police personnel4 $#et#er or not t#ey recei&e compensation4 regardless of amount. 4. AA 13") (E?!I-5A%?!@ 6!A5TB 5A6) Q-u1lic officer or employeeQ means any person #olding any pu1lic office or employment 1y &irtue of an appointment4 election or contract4 and any person #olding any office or employment4 1y appointment or contract4 in any Ctate o$ned or controlled corporation or enterprise. 5. AA "*'* (-5E?@!A ACT) -u1lic .fficer means any person #olding any pu1lic office in t#e /o&ernment of t#e Aepu1lic of t#e -#ilippines 1y &irtue of an appointment4 election or contract. (riginally, Title ;&& used the phrase Ipublic officer or employeeJ but the latter word has been held meaningless and useless because in criminal law, Ipublic officerJ covers all public servants, whether an official or an employee, from the highest to the lowest position regardless of ran9 or class= whether appointed by competent authority or by popular election or by direct provision of law. ,nder Republic !ct /o. :@1< #The !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct%, the term public officer is broader and more comprehensive because it includes all persons whether an official or an employee, temporary or not, classified or not, contractual or otherwise. !ny person who receives compensation for services rendered is a public officer. ?reach of oath of office parta9es of three forms' #1% .alfeasance when a public officer performs in his public office an act prohibited by law.
Page 1
&n som e cases, it can e a prisoner where the
)xample' bribery. #"% .isfeasance when a public officer performs official acts in the manner not in accordance with what the law prescribes.
#:% /onfeasance when a public officer willfully refrains or refuses to perform an official duty which his office re>uires him to perform.
Chapter T-& MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE

!e"ti#n $ne% & Dereli"ti#n #0 (.ty *R'+CLE 20, E-$9+-7L3 RE-DER+-7 ;-?;!' ?;D7EME-' A. !5!M!?TC 1. .ffender is a Dudge 2. Aenders a =udgment in a case su1mitted to #im for decision. 3. T#e =udgment is un=ust. 4. Dudge <no$s t#at it is un=ust. ?.TA >!?!3 In Re .&a)*#n !&rr&me&4 A.M. ?o. )3" ) 0*. +e1ruary 214 1))5. A =udge cannot 1e c#arged $it# Fn&-#n+l' rendering un=ust =udgement if t#ere is a pending appeal or t#e =udgement is not yet final. 1a+e note of the !ord "4.:#4)%I B !hen done deliberately and maliciously. A(ery important;. T#is crime cannot 1e committed 1y any mem1er of a collegiate court li<e C.EAT .+ A--!A5C4 CA?@%/A?>AJA?4 CE-A!M! C.EAT. T#is is only applica1le to a single =udge court. In Re Wen%esla& La*reta G.R. N&. 353C7. Mar%h 408 4956 QAespondents s#ould <no$ t#at t#e pro&isions of Article 2*4 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code as to Qrendering <no$ingly un=ust =udgment4Q refer to an indi&idual =udge $#o does so Qin any case su1mitted to #im for decisionQ and e&en t#en4 it is not t#e prosecutor $#o $ould pass =udgment on t#e Qun=ustnessQ of t#e decision rendered 1y #im 1ut t#e proper appellate court $it# =urisdiction to re&ie$ t#e same4 eit#er t#e Court of Appeals andGor t#e Cupreme Court. Aespondents s#ould li<e$ise <no$ t#at said penal article #as no application to t#e mem1ers of a collegiate court suc# as t#is Court or its @i&isions $#o reac# t#eir conclusions in consultation and accordingly render t#eir collecti&e =udgment after due deli1eration. %t also follo$s4 conse7uently4 t#at a c#arge of &iolation of t#e Anti0 /raft and Corrupt -ractices Act on t#e ground t#at suc# collecti&e decision is Qun=ustQ cannot prosper. The crime of 9nowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or 9nowingly issuing an unjust interlocutory order, may be committed only by a judge of a trial court and never of an
Page 12
appellate court. The reason for this is that in appellate court, not only one magistrate renders or issues the interlocutory order. !n appellate court functions as a division and the resolutions thereof are handed down only after deliberations among the members of a division so that it cannot be said that there is malice or inexcusable negligence or ignorance in the rendering of a judgment or order that is supposedly unjust as held by the +upreme Court in one administrative case. There is more injustice done in cases of judgment than mere interlocutory order that is why the penalty is higher in the first case. *R'+CLE 202 ?;D7EME-' RE-DERED '<R$;7< -E7L+7E-CE A. !5!M!?TC 1. .ffender is a Dudge 2. Aenders a =udgment in a case su1mitted 1efore #im 3. T#e =udgment is manifestly un=ust. 4. T#at it is due to ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance. Any DE@/! $#o 1y reason of ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance4 s#all render a manifestly un=ust =udgement in any case su1mitted to #im for decision s#all 1e #eld lia1le under t#is article. 9manifestly un=ust: =udgement3 MA?%+!CT5J contrary to la$4 t#at e&en a person of meager <no$ledge of t#e la$ cannot dou1t t#e in=ustice. *R'+CLE 205 ;-?;!' +-'ERL$C;'$R3 $RDER A. !lements 1. .ffender is a Dudge 2. Be performs t#e follo$ing acts a. <no$ingly renders an un=ust interlocutory order or decree. 1. Aenders a manifestly un=ust interlocutory order or decree t#roug# ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance. Any DE@/! $#o s#all <no$ingly render an un=ust interlocutory order or decree s#all 1e lia1le under t#is article. Bo$e&er4 if t#e said Dudge s#all #a&e acted >y reason of ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance an$ t#e interlocutory order or decree 1e manifestly un=ust4 #e s#all suffer t#e penalty of suspension. A final =udgement is one t#at is su1=ect to an e8ecution An interlocutory order4 t#ere is still somet#ing to 1e done still $it# t#e case. !8ample3 Preliminary *tta"/ment. T#ere are grounds to 1e o1ser&ed to ta<e into account 1efore a $rit of preliminary attac#ment can 1e ordered. %f t#e =udge4 despite a1sence of any grounds issues t#e $rit4 t#en #e is lia1le under article 2* . .t#er e8amples3 reco&ery of property $it# in=unction4 TA. *R'+CLE 206 M*L+C+$;! DEL*3 +- '<E *DM+-+!'R*'+$- $F ?;!'+CE
Page 11
A. !lements 1. .ffender is a =udge 2. T#ere is a proceeding in t#e court 3. @elays t#e administration of =ustice 4. @elay is malicious4 t#at is4 t#e delay is caused 1y t#e Dudge $it# deli1erate intent to inflict damage on eit#er party in t#e case. @elay s#ould 1e malicious. @elay is tainted $it# malice $#en calculated to cause #arm or in=ury to persons or eit#er party in t#e case.. Mere delay 6%TB.ET malice not necessarily punis#a1le *R'+CLE 208 PR$!EC;'+$- $F $FFE-!E!F -E7L+7E-CE *-D '$LER*-CE A. Acts -unis#ed 1. Maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution against &iolators of la$. 2. Maliciously tolerating t#e commission of offense. >. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or officer of t#e la$4 $#o #as t#e duty to cause t#e prosecution of4 or to prosecute offenses. 2. Mno$ing t#e commission of t#e crime4 #e does not prosecute t#e criminal or <no$ing t#at a crime is a1out to 1e committed tolerates its commission. 3. .ffender acts $it# malice and deli1erate intent to fa&or t#e &iolator of t#e la$. Any pu1lic officer or officers of t#e la$4 $#o4 in dereliction of t#e duties to #is office4 s#all maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for t#e punis#ment of t#e &iolators of t#e la$4 or s#all tolerate t#e commission of offenses. Aead case U.S. (s. Men$&>a3 T#e issue on guilt or t#e &iolation of t#e la$ is a pre=udicial 7uestion and s#all or must 1e esta1lis#ed first prior to or 1efore t#e prosecution. ?.TA >!?!3 Mista<en notion of some la$yers 000 t#ey 1elie&e t#at t#e pu1lic officer lia1le is a policeman Y ?.. only pu1lic prosecutors are lia1le. %t is not t#e tas< of a policeman or police officer to prosecute4 o<ayF Co for instance4 if a policeman caug#t a snatc#er upon compliant of t#e &ictim4 after t#e &ictim #as left t#e scene4 t#e policeman freed t#e snatc#er. T#e policeman is not lia1le for &iolation of article 2*' >ET #e can 1e lia1le as an accessory to t#e crime of t#eft or ro11ery as t#e case may 1e. .ffenders #ere3 1. pu1lic officers or 2. officers of t#e la$ ! public officer engaged in the prosecution of offenders shall maliciously tolerate the commission of crimes or refrain from prosecuting offenders or violators of the law. This crime can only be committed by a public officer whose official duty is to prosecute offenders, that is, state prosecutors. Hence, those officers who are not duty bound to perform these obligations cannot commit this crime in the strict sense.
Page 1,
5hen a policeman tolerates the commission of a crime or otherwise refrains from apprehending the offender, such peace officer cannot be prosecuted for this crime but they can be prosecuted as' #1% #"% #:% !n accessory to the crime committed by the principal in accordance with !rticle 1<, paragraph := or He may become a fence if the crime committed is robbery or theft, in which case he violates the !nti 7encing -aw= or He may be held liable for violating the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct.
However, in distant provinces or municipalities where there are no municipal attorneys, the local chief of police is the prosecuting officer. &f he is the one who tolerates the violations of laws or otherwise allows offenders to escape, he can be prosecuted under this article. This is also true in the case of a barangay chairman. They are supposed to prosecute violators of laws within their jurisdiction. &f they do not do so, they can be prosecuted for this crime. P'&-a'icaci n This used to be a crime under the +panish Codigo Penal, wherein a public officer regardless of his duty violates the oath of his office by not carrying out the duties of his office for which he was sworn to office, thus, amounting to dereliction of duty. ?ut the term prevaricacion is not limited to dereliction of duty in the prosecution of offenders. &t covers any dereliction of duty whereby the public officer involved violates his oath of office. The thrust of prevaricacion is the breach of the oath of office by the public officer who does an act in relation to his official duties. 5hile in !rticle "@6, dereliction of duty refers only to prosecuting officers, the term prevaricacion applies to public officers in general who is remiss or who is maliciously refraining from exercising the duties of his office. Ill-()ra)i%n' The offender was caught for white slavery. The policeman allowed the offender to go free for some consideration. The policeman does not violate !rticle "@6 but he becomes an accessory to the crime of white slavery. ?ut in the crime of theft or robbery, where the policeman shared in the loot and allowed the offender to go free, he becomes a fence. Therefore, he is considered an offender under the !nti 7encing -aw. Relative to this crime under !rticle "@6, consider the crime of >ualified bribery. !mong the amendments made by Republic !ct /o. A4$< on the Revised Penal Code is a new provision which reads as follows' !rticle. "11 !. Cualified ?ribery 3 &f any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an
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offender who has committed a crime punishable by Reclusion Perpetua andLor death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted. &f it is the public officer who as9s or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death. !ctually the crime is a 9ind of direct bribery where the bribe, offer, promise, gift or present has a consideration on the part of the public officer, that is refraining from arresting or prosecuting the offender in consideration for such offer, promise, gift or present. &n a way, this new provision modifies !rticle "1@ of the Revised Penal Code on direct bribery. However, the crime of >ualified bribery may be committed only by public officers Ientrusted with enforcementJ whose official duties authori8e then to arrest or prosecute offenders. !pparently, they are peace officers and public prosecutors since the nonfeasance refers to Iarresting or prosecuting.J ?ut this crime arises only when the offender whom such public officer refrains from arresting or prosecuting, has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua andLor death. &f the crime were punishable by a lower penalty, then such nonfeasance by the public officer would amount to direct bribery, not >ualified bribery. &f the crime was >ualified bribery, the dereliction of the duty punished under !rticle "@6 of the Revised Penal Code should be absorbed because said article punishes the public officer who Imaliciously refrains from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law or shall tolerate the commission of offensesJ. The dereliction of duty referred to is necessarily included in the crime of >ualified bribery. (n the other hand, if the crime was direct bribery under !rticle "1@ of the Revised Penal Code, the public officer involved should be prosecuted also for the dereliction of duty, which is a crime under !rticle "@6 of the Revised Penal Code, because the latter is not absorbed by the crime of direct bribery. This is because in direct bribery, where the public officer agreed to perform an act constituting a crime in connection with the performance of his official duties, !rticle "1@ expressly provides that the liabilty thereunder shall be Iin addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the crime shall have been committed. Ill-()ra)i%n' ! fiscal, for a sum of money, refrains from prosecuting a person charged before him. &f the penalty for the crime involved is reclusion perpetua, the fiscal commits >ualified bribery. &f the crime is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua, the crime is direct bribery. &n the latter situation, three crimes are committed' direct bribery and dereliction of duty on the part of the fiscal= and corruption of a public officer by the giver. *R'+CLE 209 4E'R*3*L $F 'R;!' 43 *- *''$R-E3 $F !$L+C+'$R M RE:EL*'+$- $F !ECRE'!
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A. Acts punis#ed3 Here, there must be damage to his 1. 1y causing damage to #is client4 eit#er client a. 1y any malicious 1reac# of professional duty 1. 1y ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance 2. 1y re&ealing any of t#e secrets of #is client learned by him in #is professional capacity 3. 1y underta<ing t#e defense of t#e opposing party in t#e same case4 -#th&*t the %&nsent of #is first client4 after #a&ing underta<en t#e defense of t#e said first client or after #a&ing recei&ed confidential information from said client. >. !lements 1. .ffender is an attorney 2. Causes damage to #is client a) 1y malicious 1reac# of professional duty. 1) 1y ine8cusa1le negligence or ignorance 3. Ae&ealing t#e secret of #is client learned 1y #im (damage is not necessary) 4. Enderta<ing t#e defense of t#e opposing party in t#e same case4 $it#out t#e consent of #is first client4 after #a&ing underta<en t#e defense of t#e first client or after recei&ed confidential information from t#e said client. ?.TA >!?!3 %n addition to t#e criminal lia1ility4 #e can also 1e #eld administrati&ely li<e suspension from t#e practice of la$ ,nder the rules on evidence, communications made with prospective clients to a lawyer with a view to engaging his professional services are already privileged even though the client lawyer relationship did not eventually materiali8e because the client cannot afford the fee being as9ed by the lawyer. The lawyer and his secretary or cler9 cannot be examined thereon. That this communication with a prospective client is considered privileged, implies that the same is confidential. Therefore, if the lawyer would reveal the same or otherwise accept a case from the adverse party, he would already be violating !rticle "@<. .ere malicious breach without damage is not violative of !rticle "@<= at most he will be liable administratively as a lawyer, e.g., suspension or disbarment under the Code of Professional Responsibility. &llustration' ?, who is involved in the crime of seduction wanted !, an attorney at law, to handle his case. ! received confidential information from ?. However, ? cannot pay the professional fee of !. C, the offended party, came to ! also and the same was accepted. ! did not commit the crime under !rticle "@<, although the lawyerHs act may be considered unethical. The client lawyer relationship between ! and ? was not yet established. Therefore, there is no trust to violate because ? has not yet actually engaged the services of the lawyer !. ! is not bound to ?. However, if ! would reveal the confidential matter learned by him from ?, then !rticle "@< is violated because it is enough that such confidential matters were communicated to him in his professional capacity, or it was made to him with a view to engaging his professional services.
note3 damage #ere is not necessary
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Here, matters that are considered confidential must have been said to the lawyer with the view of engaging his services. (therwise, the communication shall not be considered privileged and no trust is violated. &llustration' ! went to ?, a lawyerLnotary public, to have a document notari8ed. ! narrated to ? the detail of the criminal case. &f ? will disclose what was narrated to him there is no betrayal of trust since ? is acting as a notary public and not as a counsel. The lawyer must have learned the confidential matter in his professional capacity. +everal acts which would ma9e a lawyer criminally liable' #1% .aliciously causing damage to his client through a breach of his professional duty. The breach of professional duty must be malicious. &f it is just incidental, it would not give rise to criminal liability, although it may be the subject of administrative discipline= Through gross ignorance, causing damage to the client= &nexcusable negligence= Revelation of secrets learned in his professional capacity= ,nderta9ing the defense of the opposite party in a case without the consent of the first client whose defense has already been underta9en.
#"% #:% #2% #$%
/ote that only numbers 1, " and : must approximate malice. ! lawyer who had already underta9en the case of a client cannot later on shift to the opposing party. This cannot be done. ,nder the circumstances, it is necessary that the confidential matters or information was confided to the lawyer in the latterHs professional capacity. &t is not the duty of the lawyer to give advice on the commission of a future crime. &t is, therefore, not privileged in character. The lawyer is not bound by the mandate of privilege if he reports such commission of a future crime. &t is only confidential information relating to crimes already committed that are covered by the crime of betrayal of trust if the lawyer should underta9e the case of opposing party or otherwise divulge confidential information of a client. ,nder the law on evidence on privileged communication, it is not only the lawyer who is protected by the matter of privilege but also the office staff li9e the secretary. The nominal liability under this article may be constituted either from breach of professional duties in the handling of the case or it may arise out of the confidential relation between the lawyer and the client. Brea h %6 &r%6e((i%nal !-)#
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Tardiness in the prosecution of the case for which reason the case was dismissed for being non prosecuted= or tardiness on the part of the defense counsel leading to declaration of default and adverse judgment. Professional duties 3 -awyer must appear on time. ?ut the client must have suffered damage due to the breach of professional duty. (therwise, the lawyer cannot be held liable. &f the prosecutor was tardy and the case was dismissed as non prosecuted, but he filed a motion for consideration which was granted, and the case was continued, the lawyer is not liable, because the client did not suffer damage. &f lawyer was neglectful in filing an answer, and his client declared in default, and there was an adverse judgment, the client suffered damages. The lawyer is liable. Brea h %6 %n6i!en)ial rela)i%n Revealing information obtained or ta9ing advantage thereof by accepting the engagement with the adverse party. There is no need to prove that the client suffered damages. The mere breach of confidential relation is punishable. &n a conjugal case, if the lawyer disclosed the confidential information to other people, he would be criminally liable even though the client did not suffer any damage. The client who was suing his wife disclosed that he also committed acts of unfaithfulness. The lawyer tal9ed about this to a friend. He is, thus, liable. !e"ti#n 'w#% & 4ribery *R'+CLE 2 0 D+REC' 4R+4ER3 A. Acts punis#ed3 1. A/A!!%?/ T. -!A+.AM4 or 1y -!A+.AM%?/4 in consideration of any offer4 promise4 gift or present L an act constituting a crime4 %? C.??!CT%.? 6%TB TB! -!A+.AMA?C! .+ TB! pu1lic officer;s @ETJ; 2. ACC!-T%?/ a gift in consideration of t#e e8ecution of an act $#ic# does not constitute a crime4 in connection $it# t#e performance of #is duty; 3. A/A!!%?/ T. A!+AA%?4 or 1y A!+AA%?%?/4 from doing something !hich it is his official duty to do4 in consideration of a gift or promise >. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Accepts an offer or a promise or recei&es gifts or present 1y #imself or t#roug# anot#er. 3. T#e offender $as accepted in &ie$ of committing some crime4 0 in consideration of t#e e8ecution of an act $#ic# does not constitute a crime4 1ut t#e act must 1e un=ust. 0 refrain from doing $#ic# it is #is official duty to do so 4. T#e act $#ic# t#e offender agrees to perform must 1e connected $it# t#e performance of #is official duties.
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?.TA >!?!3 >ri1ery cannot 1e comple8ed $it# and cannot 1e a1sor1ed 1y ot#er crimes4 as t#e penalty of 1ri1ery is imposed as an addition to t#e penalties imposed $it# ot#er crimes. ?ota 1ene3 T#ere is no specific crime of e8tortion under t#e A-C. >ut t#ere are crimes $it# t#e c#aracter of e8tortion li<e ro11ery4 <idnapping4 1lac<mail4 gra&e or lig#t t#reats. T#ey are in t#e nature of e8tortion. T#ere must 1e C.?C%@!AAT%.? in t#e t#ree acts punis#ed 1ecause it is t#e consideration t#at ma<es it a crime. it is #o$e&er necessary t#at t#e consideration 1e ACTEA55J @!5%(!A!@ andGor ACTEA55J A!C!%(!@ 1y t#e pu1lic officer in&ol&ed. 2 persons in&ol&ed3 a. t#e corruptor or gi&er
".
t#e recei&er or pu1lic officer(remem1er
t#at t#e acceptance must 1e in consideration or in
relation to #is office.)
P%+ TB! ACT T. >! -!A+.AM!@ %C A CA%M!4 T#e moment t#at t#e agreement is definitely arri&ed at4 1ri1ery is committed. Mere a+reement :m*t*al#t' &" th#nF#n+; %&ns*mmates the %r#me &" ,r#,er' ,e%a*se e(en the NREFRAIN#n+? #tsel" #s p*n#sha,le as a %r#me . 6BJF >ecause as long as t#ere is mutuality of t#in<ing4 t#ere is e&en no need for t#e actual deli&ery of t#e consideration as long as t#e act to 1e performed is a crime. P>ET %+ TB! ACT T. >! -!A+.AM!@ @.!C ?.T C.?CT%TET! A CA%M!4 e&en if an agreement is made4 t#ere is no conspiracy4 and so t#ere is no su1=ect for t#e 1ri1ery4 unless t#e gi&er #as actually deli&ered t#e consideration and t#e pu1lic officer already e8ecuted t#e act (so #ere4 t#ere must 1e e8ecution 1ecause $it#out e8ecution of eit#er side4 you #a&e no e&idence of t#e crime of 1ri1ery) 1ri1ery is a crime from t#e &ie$point of t#e recei&er or pu1lic officer; it is corruption of pu1lic official on t#e part of t#e corruptor or gi&er. D#re%t ,r#,er' @irect 1ri1ery is soLcalled 1ecause t#e consideration or gift or present is precisely for t#e act to 1e committed or $#ic# t#e pu1lic officer s#all refrain to commit. T#ere is agreement T#e offender pu1lic officer agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing somet#ing ,e%a*se &" the +#"t &r pr&m#se In$#re%t ,r#,er' %n indirect 1ri1ery t#e consideration 4 gift4 or present is gi&en not 1ecause of an act to 1e performed or $#ic# #e $#ic# #e s#ould refrain from performing8 rather it is gi&en 1y reason of t#e of t#e office #eld 1y suc# pu1lic officer T#e corruptor simply gi&es $it#out prior agreement %t is not necessary t#at t#e offender s#ould do any act or particular act or e&en promise to do an act 1ecause #t #s en&*+h that he a%%epts +#"ts &""ere$ t& h#m ,' reas&n &" h#s &""#%e.
H3 is t#ere a distinction 1et$een 1ri1ery and ro11eryF A3 %llustration3 A policeman $ent inside t#e store and found out t#at t#e store o$ner sells li7uor $it#out license. Be said to t#e o$ner t#at if you $ill not gi&e me 5 rims of cigarettes or t$o long0nec<ed 1ottles of tanduay rum4 % $ill arrest you. so t#e o$ner ga&e #im. %s t#is 1ri1eryF ?.V t#e crime is
Page ,0
A.>>!AJ. T#ere is a mista<en notion t#at ro11ery can only 1e committed $it# t#e use of a $eapon eit#er pistol4 <nife or any $eapon. T#e essence of ro11ery is t#at due to force or intimidation4 t#e offended party deli&ers 1ecause of t#e force and intimidation. Co t#e distinction t#erefore is t#at in 1ri1ery4 t#e gift or present or consideration is (.5E?TAA%5J /%(!?. %n ro11ery4 t#ere is &iolence or intimidation. Aead 2e&ple (s.
Fran%#s%& <7 ph#l 549

H3 is t#ere frustrated 1ri1eryF A3 ?.?!. %t is eit#er attempted or consummated. %t is not 1ri1ery if t#e act done is in disc#arge of a M.AA5 @ETJ. H3 $#at is -A!(AA%CAC%.?F A3 similar $it# t#e 3rd act punis#ed in direct 1ri1ery T#e t#ird form of direct 1ri1ery is committed 1y refraining from doing somet#ing $#ic# pertains to t#e official duty of t#e officer. -A!(AA%CAC%.? (article 2*') is committed t#e same $ay. %n t#is regard4 t#e t$o felonies are similar. >ut t#ey differ in t#at >A%>!AJ t#e offender refrained form doing #is official duty in "#nsi(erati#n #0 a gi0t re"eive( #r )r#mise(. T#is element is not necessary in t#e crime of pre&aricacion (t#e element of 9consideration: is not so important in t#is crime) &t is a common notion that when you tal9 of bribery, you refer to the one corrupting the public officer. &nvariably, the act refers to the giver, but this is wrong. ?ribery refers to the act of the receiver and the act of the giver is corruption of public official. ,i()in )i%n "e)ween !ire ) "ri"er# an! in!ire ) "ri"er# ?ribery is direct when a public officer is called upon to perform or refrain from performing an official act in exchange for the gift, present or consideration given to him. &f he simply accepts a gift or present given to him by reason of his public position, the crime is indirect bribery. ?ear in mind that the gift is given Mby reason of his officeM, not Min considerationM thereof. +o never use the term Iconsideration.J The public officer in &ndirect bribery is not to perform any official act. /ote however that what may begin as an indirect bribery may actually ripen into direct bribery. &llustration' 5ithout any understanding with the public officer, a taxi operator gave an expensive suiting material to a ?-T registrar. ,pon receipt by the ?-T registrar of his valuable suiting material, he as9ed who the giver was. He found out that he is a taxi operator. !s far as the giver is concerned, he is giving this by reason of the office or position of the public officer involved. &t is just indirect bribery . &f the ?-T registrar calls up his subordinates and said to ta9e care of the taxis of the taxi operator so much so that the registration of the taxis is facilitated ahead of the others, what originally would have been indirect bribery becomes direct bribery.
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&n direct bribery, consider whether the official act, which the public officer agreed to do, is a crime or not. &f it will amount to a crime, it is not necessary that the corruptor should deliver the consideration or the doing of the act. The moment there is a meeting of the minds, even without the delivery of the consideration, even without the public officer performing the act amounting to a crime, bribery is already committed on the part of the public officer. Corruption is already committed on the part of the supposed giver. The reason is that the agreement is a conspiracy involving the duty of a public officer. The mere agreement is a felony already. &f the public officer commits the act which constitutes the crime, he, as well as the corruptor shall be liable also for that other crime. &llustrations' #1% &f the corruptor offers a consideration to a custodian of a public record to remove certain files, the mere agreement, without delivery of the consideration, brings about the crime of direct bribery and corruption of public official. &f the records were actually removed, both the public officer and the corruptor will in addition to the two felonies above, will also be liable for the crime committed, which is infidelity in the custody of the public records for which they shall be liable as principals= one as principal by inducement, the other as principal by direct participation. #"% ! party litigant approached the courtHs stenographer and proposed the idea of altering the transcript of stenographic notes. The court stenographer agreed and he demanded P ",@@@.@@. ,n9nown to them, there were law enforcers who already had a tip that the court stenographer had been doing this before. +o they were waiting for the chance to entrap him. They were apprehended and they said they have not done anything yet. ,nder !rticle "1@, the mere agreement to commit the act, which amounts to a crime, is already bribery. That stenographer becomes liable already for consummated crime of bribery and the party who agreed to give that money is already liable for consummated corruption, even though not a single centavo is delivered yet and even though the stenographer had not yet made the alterations. &f he changed the transcript, another crime is committed' falsification. The same criterion will apply with respect to a public officer who agrees to refrain from performing his official duties. &f the refraining would give rise to a crime, such as refraining to prosecute an offender, the mere agreement to do so will consummate the bribery and the corruption, even if no money was delivered to him. &f the refraining is not a crime, it would only amount to bribery if the consideration be delivered to him.
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&f it is not a crime, the consideration must be delivered by the corruptor before a public officer can be prosecuted for bribery. .ere agreement, is not enough to constitute the crime because the act to be done in the first place is legitimate or in the performance of the official duties of the public official. ,nless the public officer receives the consideration for doing his official duty, there is no bribery. &t is necessary that there must be delivery of monetary consideration. This is so because in the second situation, the public officer actually performed what he is supposed to perform. &t is just that he would not perform what he is re>uired by law to perform without an added consideration from the public which gives rise to the crime. The idea of the law is that he is being paid salary for being there. He is not supposed to demand additional compensation from the public before performing his public service. The prohibition will apply only when the money is delivered to him, or if he performs what he is supposed to perform in anticipation of being paid the money. Here, the bribery will only arise when there is already the acceptance of the consideration because the act to be done is not a crime. +o, without the acceptance, the crime is not committed. Birect bribery may be committed only in the attempted and consummated stages because, in frustrated felony, the offender must have performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a conse>uence. &n direct bribery, it is possible only if the corruptor concurs with the offender. (nce there is concurrence, the direct bribery is already consummated. &n short, the offender could not have performed all the acts of execution to produce the felony without consummating the same. !ctually, you cannot have a giver unless there is one who is willing to receive and there cannot be a receiver unless there is one willing to give. +o this crime re>uires two to commit. &t cannot be said, therefore, that one has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a conse>uence but for reasons independent of the will, the crime was not committed. &t is now settled, therefore, that the crime of bribery and corruption of public officials cannot be committed in the frustrated stage because this re>uires two to commit and that means a meeting of the minds. &llustrations' #1% &f the public official accepted the corrupt consideration and turned it over to his superior as evidence of the corruption, the offense is attempted corruption only and not frustrated. The official did not agree to be corrupted. &f the public officer did not report the same to his superior and actually accepted it, he allowed himself to be corrupted. The corruptor becomes liable for consummated corruption of public official. The public officer also becomes e>ually liable for consummated bribery. #"% &f a public official demanded something from a taxpayer who pretended to agree and use mar9ed money with the 9nowledge of the police, the crime of the public official is attempted bribery. The reason is that because the giver
Page ,1
has no intention to corrupt her and therefore, he could not perform all the acts of execution. ?e sure that what is involved is a crime of bribery, not extortion. &f it were extortion, the crime is not bribery, but robbery. The one who yielded to the demand does not commit corruption of a public officer because it was involuntary.
;)(ates in 4R+4ER3
! comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under !rticle 21> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode and those of #iolation of Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1? shows that there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses. Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1? pro#ides: Sec. 3. 'n addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penali+ed by e,isting law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: ,,, ,,, ,,, ;b< Directly or indirectly re-uesting or recei#ing any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the /o#ernment and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to inter#ene under the law. ,,, ,,, ,,, The elements of the crime penali+ed under Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1? are: ;1< the offender is a public officer= ;2< he re-uested or recei#ed a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit= ;3< he made the re-uest or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person= ;7< the re-uest or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the go#ernment and ;E< the has the right to inter#ene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a contract or transaction has the right to inter#ene. "n the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements: ;1< the offender is a public officer= ;2< the offender accepts an offer or promise or recei#es a gift or present by himself or through another= ;3< such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be recei#ed by the public officer with a #iew to committing some crime, or in consideration of the e,ecution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be un.ust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do and ;7< the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he e,ecutes is connected with the performance of his official duties. *learly, the #iolation of Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1? is neither identical nor necessarily inclusi#e of direct bribery. &hile they ha#e common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the other. &hereas the mere re-uest or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a #iolation of Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1?, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or present is re-uired in direct bribery. Moreo#er, the ambit of Section 3 ;b< of 3! 3>1? is specific. 't is limited only to contracts or transactions in#ol#ing monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to inter#ene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general scope: ;a< performance of an act constituting a crime= ;b< e,ecution of an un.ust act which does not constitute a crime and ;c< agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an act which is his official duty to do. !lthough the two charges against petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act ga#e rise to two separate and distinct offenses. 5o double .eopardy attached since there was a #ariance between the elements of the offenses charged. 33 The constitutional protection against double .eopardy proceeds from a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. o 1y analogy, reference may be made to !rticles 21> ;Direct 1ribery< and 212 ;*orruption of (ublic "fficials< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 'n Direct 1ribery, the public officer agrees to perform an act either constituting or not constituting a crime, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present recei#ed by such officer. Significantly, only the public officer may be indicted under and be held liable for Direct 1ribery under !rticle 21>, while the person who conspired with the public officer, who made the promise, offer, or ga#e the gifts or presents, may be indicted only under !rticle 212 for *orruption of (ublic "fficials, regardless of any allegation of conspiracy.
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'ndeed, it is a,iomatic that all conspirators are criminally liable as co%principals. owe#er, they may not be necessarily charged with #iolation of the same offense. The public officer may be charged under one pro#ision while the pri#ate person is indicted under a different pro#ision, although the offenses originate from the same set of acts. Thus, the public officer may be accused of Direct 1ribery while the pri#ate person may be charged with corruption of public officials.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in !rticle 21> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode consists of the following elements: ;1< that the accused is a public officer= ;2< that he recei#ed directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise= ;3< that such gift, present or promise has been gi#en in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do= and ;7< that the crime or act relates to the e,ercise of his functions as a public officer. Thus, the acts constituting direct bribery are: ;1< by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties= ;2< by accepting a gift in consideration of the e,ecution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty= or ;3< by agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise. o 'n the case under consideration, there is utter lac) of e#idence adduced by the prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner as)ing for something in e,change for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official duty. 'n fact, !tty. !urora *hiong, Gice% (resident and /eneral Manager of the *ompany, testified that the *ompany complied with all the re-uirements of the 2T" without as)ing for any inter#ention from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. 2@ 6rom the e#idence on record, petitioner cannot li)ewise be con#icted of Direct 1ribery. The crime of direct bribery as defined in !rticle 21> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode consists of the following elements: ;1< that the accused is a public officer= ;2< that he recei#ed directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise= ;3< that such gift, present or promise has been gi#en in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do= and ;7< that the crime or act relates to the e,ercise of his functions as a public officer. o There is no -uestion that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of !rticle 2>3 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, which includes all persons $who, by direct pro#ision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall ta)e part in the performance of public functions in the (hilippine /o#ernment, or shall perform in said go#ernment or any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any ran) or class.$ !t the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the 2ega+pi *ity (olice Station. e directly recei#ed the bribe money from Ju So (ong and his daughter ian ian Ju Sy in e,change for the reco#ery of the stolen cylinder tan)s, which was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of !rticle 21> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The act of recei#ing money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
*R'+CLE 2 +-D+REC' 4R+4ER3 A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a pu1lic officer 2. Accepts gifts 3. T#e gifts are offered to #im 1y reason of #is office Any pu1lic officer $#o s#all accept gifts offered to #im >J A!AC.? of #is office s#all 1e lia1le for indirect 1ri1ery. ?.TA >!?!3 T#is crime is al$ays consummated. T#is is 7uite dangerous. +ll.strati#n3 you are a commissioner of customs4 some1ody $ent inside your office and place somet#ing (gift) on you ta1le. Be t#en $ent out. HE!AJ3 6as t#ere indirect 1ri1eryF A?C6!A3
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?oV T#ere is no intention to accept4 or t#ere is no clear acceptance to s#o$ signs of ma<ing #is o$n t#e gift gi&en or left 1y t#e person.
FORMILLEBA (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. L@67431. Mar%h 458 4955 ACCE2TANCE OF GIFT OR CONSIDERATION8 ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT. O T#e essential ingredient of indirect 1ri1ery as defined in Article 211 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code is t#at t#e pu1lic officer concerned m*st ha(e a%%epte$ t#e gift or material consideration. T#ere must 1e a %lear #ntent#&n &n the part &" the p*,l#% &""#%er t& taFe the +#"t s& &""ere$ an$ %&ns#$er the same as h#s &-n pr&pert' "r&m then &n8 s*%h as p*tt#n+ a-a' the +#"t "&r sa"eFeep#n+ &r p&%Fet#n+ the same. Mere p#ysical receipt unaccompanied 1y any ot#er sign4 circumstance or act to s#o$ t#at t#e crime of indirect 1ri1ery #as 1een committed. To #old ot#er$ise $ill encourage unscrupulous indi&iduals to frame up pu1lic officers 1y simply putting $it#in t#eir p#ysical custody some gift money or ot#er property. (ot#er$ise t#ere is a danger of 1eing framed up)
Cometimes4 indirect 1ri1ery may 1e con&erted to direct 1ri1ery. %llustration3 t#ere is a person $#o deli&ers a fleet of ta8i to a transportation office officer. 6#en #e <ne$ a1out it4 #e said4 9o<ay4 prepare #is license and all necessary re7uirements t#at #e need:. Bere4 it is already direct 1ri1ery. TB!A! %C A C-!C%A5 5A63 2D 6<9 /AA?T%?/ %MME?%TJ +A.M -A.C!CET%.? T. /%(!AC .+ >A%>!C A?@ .TB!A /%+TC A?@ T. TB!%A
ACC.M-5%C!C %? >A%>!AJ A?@ .TB!A /AA+T CAC!C A/A%?CT -E>5%C .++%C!AC.
Aeason3 $#o $ill testify if no immunityF Aemem1er t#at 1ri1ery is done secretly. .nly t#e gi&er can testify man. Co -@ "4) $as decreed. Conditions3 1. t#e information must refer to consummated &iolationsG1ri1ery. 2. T#e information and testimony are necessary for con&iction 3. T#e information and testimony are not yet in t#e possession of t#e state 4. Can 1e corro1orated in eac# material points ( aside from t#e 1ri1e gi&er t#ere s#ould 1e anot#er $itness $#o s#ould corro1orate t#e former;s testimony) 5. T#e informant #as not 1een pre&iously con&icted of t#e crime in&ol&ing moral turpitude li<e t#eft4 estafa4 ro11eryY The public official does not underta9e to perform an act or abstain from doing an official duty from what he received. &nstead, the official simply receives or accepts gifts or presents delivered to him with no other reason except his office or public position. This is always in the consummated stage. There is no attempted much less frustrated stage in indirect bribery. The +upreme Court has laid down the rule that for indirect bribery to be committed, the public officer must have performed an act of appropriating of the gift for himself, his family or employees. &t is the act of appropriating that signifies acceptance. .erely delivering the gift to the public officer does not bring about the crime. (therwise it would be very easy to remove a public officer' just deliver a gift to him.
;)(ates in +-D+REC' 4R+4ER3

'ndirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in !rticle 211 2B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is that the public officer concerned must ha#e accepted the gift or material consideration. 'n the case at bar, was the prosecution able to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the *ompanyK The alleged borrowing of a #ehicle by
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petitioner from the *ompany can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law. To pro#e that petitioner borrowed a #ehicle from the *ompany for E@ times, the prosecution adduced in e#idence E@ deli#ery receipts 2H allegedly signed by petitioner0s representati#e whom the latter would send to pic) up the #ehicle. o The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly borrowed and recei#ed the #ehicles sub.ect matter of the E@ informations. The prosecution claims that petitioner recei#ed the #ehicles #ia his representati#es to whom the #ehicles were released. The prosecution relies hea#ily on the deli#ery receipts. &e, howe#er, find that the deli#ery receipts do not sufficiently pro#e that petitioner recei#ed the #ehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. 'n addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner0s representati#es who pic)ed up the #ehicles. The ac-uittal of one of the accused ;5ery Tagupa< who allegedly recei#ed the #ehicles from the *ompany further strengthens this argument. 'f the identity of the person who allegedly pic)ed up the #ehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who recei#ed the #ehicles in the end.
*R'+CLE 2 =* >;*L+F+ED 4R+4ER3 (a((e( by R* 6529) A. !lements 1. Any pu1lic officer entrusted $it# la$ enforcement 2. Aefrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender $#o #as committed a crime punis#a1le 1y A- and or deat# 3. %n consideration of any 0 offer 0 promise 0 gift or 0 present P -u1lic officer s#all suffer t#e penalty for t#e offense $#ic# $as not prosecuted. P %f it is t#e pu1lic officer $#o as<s or demands suc# gifts or present4 #e s#all suffer t#e penalty of deat#. %f any officer is entrusted $it# la$ enforcement and #e refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender $#o #as committed a crime punis#a1le 1y reclusion perpetua andGor deat# in consideration of any offer4 promise4 gift or present4 #e s#all suffer t#e penalty for t#e offense $#ic# #e $as not prosecuted. %f it is a pu1lic officer $#o as<s or demands suc# gift or present4 #e s#all suffer t#e penalty of deat#. (in t#is 2nd paragrap#4 t#e imposition of deat# penalty is mandatory) A %r#me p*n#sha,le ,' re%l*s#&n perpet*a an$J&r $eathPPP 2 officers punis#ed3 1. la$ enforcement officers 2. pu1lic prosecutors *R'+CLE 2 2 C$RR;P'+$- $F P;4L+C $FF+C+*L! A. !lements 1. T#e officer ma<es an offer or promise or gi&es gifts to a pu1lic officer 2. T#at t#e offer or promises are made or t#e gifts are gi&en to a pu1lic officer4 under t#e circumstances t#at $ill ma<e t#e pu1lic officer lia1le for direct 1ri1ery or indirect 1ri1ery. Any person $#o s#all #a&e made t#e offers or promises or gi&en t#e gifts or presents as descri1es in articles 21* (direct 1ri1ery)4 211 (indirect 1ri1ery) and 2110A (7ualified 1ri1ery) s#all 1e lia1le under t#is article.
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Aead 2RESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 6<9 /AA?T%?/ %MME?%TJ +A.M -A.C!CET%.? T. /%(!AC .+
>A%>!C A?@ .TB!A /%+TC A?@ T. TB!%A ACC.M-5%C!C %? >A%>!AJ A?@ .TB!A /AA+T CAC!C A/A%?CT -E>5%C .++%C!AC
Also Aead RE2U!LIC ACT NO. C1498 +re(i!en)ial ,e ree N%. =/
ANTI@GRAFT AND CORRU2T 2RACTICES ACT
Presidential Becree /o. 24 prohibits giving and acceptance of gifts by a public officer or to a public officer, even during anniversary, or when there is an occasion li9e Christmas, /ew Fear, or any gift giving anniversary. The Presidential Becree punishes both receiver and giver. The prohibition giving and receiving gifts given by reason of official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past or future favors. The giving of parties by reason of the promotion of a public official is considered a crime even though it may call for a celebration. The giving of a party is not limited to the public officer only but also to any member of his family. +re(i!en)ial ,e ree N%. >=@ The decree grants immunity from prosecution to a private person or public officer who shall voluntarily give information and testify in a case of bribery or in a case involving a violation of the !nti graft and Corrupt Practices !ct. &t provides immunity to the bribe giver provided he does two things' #1% #"% He voluntarily discloses the transaction he had with the public officer constituting direct or indirect bribery, or any other corrupt transaction= He must willingly testify against the public officer involved in the case to be filed against the latter.
?efore the bribe giver may be dropped from the information, he has to be charged first with the receiver. ?efore trial, prosecutor may move for dropping bribe giver from information and be granted immunity. ?ut first, five conditions have to be met' #1% #"% #:% #2% #$% &nformation must refer to consummated bribery= &nformation is necessary for the proper conviction of the public officer involved= That the information or testimony to be given is not yet in the possession of the government or 9nown to the government= That the information can be corroborated in its material points= That the information has not been convicted previously for any crime involving moral turpitude.
These conditions are analogous to the conditions under the +tate 5itness Rule under Criminal Procedure.
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The immunity granted the bribe giver is limited only to the illegal transaction where the informant gave voluntarily the testimony. &f there were other transactions where the informant also participated, he is not immune from prosecution. The immunity in one transaction does not extend to other transactions. The immunity attaches only if the information given turns out to be true and correct. &f the same is false, the public officer may even file criminal and civil actions against the informant for perjury and the immunity under the decree will not protect him. Re&-"li A ) N%. >A8A (+l-n!er) Plunder is a crime defined and penali8ed under Republic !ct /o. A@6@, which became effective in 1<<1. This crime somehow modified certain crimes in the Revised Penal Code insofar as the overt acts by which a public officer amasses, ac>uires, or accumulates ill gotten wealth are felonies under the Revised Penal Code li9e bribery #!rticles "1@, "11, "11 !%, fraud against the public treasury N!rticle "1:O, other frauds #!rticle "12%, malversation #!rticle "1A%, when the ill gotten wealth amounts to a total value of P$@,@@@,@@@.@@. The amount was reduced from PA$,@@@,@@@.@@ by Republic !ct /o. A4$< and the penalty was changed from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua to death. +hort of the amount, plunder does not arise. !ny amount less than P$@,@@@,@@@.@@ is a violation of the Revised Penal Code or the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct. ,nder the law on plunder, the prescriptive period is "@ years commencing from the time of the last overt act. Plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt acts' #1% #"% Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury= ?y receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, 9ic9bac9s or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person andLor entity in connection with any government contract or project by reason of the office or position of the public officer= ?y illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the national government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries= ?y obtaining, receiving, or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stoc9, e>uity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business or underta9ing= ?y establishing agricultural, industrial, or commercial monopolies or other combinations andLor implementations of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests= or ?y ta9ing undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
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#:%
#2%
#$%
#4%
and to the damage and prejudice of the 7ilipino people, and the Republic of the Philippines. 5hile the crime appears to be malum prohibitum, Republic !ct /o. A@6@ provides that Iin the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and aggravating circumstances shall be considered by the courtJ. Re&-"li A ) N%. 1A7@ (An)i'Gra6) an! C%rr-&) +ra )i e( A )) The mere act of a public officer demanding an amount from a taxpayer to whom he is to render public service does not amount to bribery, but will amount to a violation of the !nti graft and Corrupt Practices !ct. &llustration' ! court secretary received P$@@ .@@ from a litigant to set a motion for an early hearing. This is direct bribery even if the act to be performed is within his official duty so long as he received a consideration therefor. &f the secretary persuaded the judge to ma9e a favorable resolution, even if the judge did not do so, this constitutes a violation of !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct, +ub +ection !. ,nder the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct, particularly +ection :, there are several acts defined as corrupt practices. +ome of them are mere repetitions of the act already penali8ed under the Revised Penal Code, li9e prohibited transactions under !rticle "1$ and "14. &n such a case, the act or omission remains to be mala in se. ?ut there are acts penali8ed under the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct which are not penali8ed under the Revised Penal Code. Those acts may be considered as mala prohibita. Therefore, good faith is not a defense. &llustration' +ection : #e% of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct 3 causing undue injury to the government or a private party by giving unwarranted benefit to the party whom does not deserve the same. &n this case, good faith is not a defense because it is in the nature of a malum prohibitum. Criminal intent on the part of the offender is not re>uired. &t is enough that he performed the prohibited act voluntarily. )ven though the prohibited act may have benefited the government. The crime is still committed because the law is not after the effect of the act as long as the act is prohibited. +ection : #g% of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct 3 where a public officer entered into a contract for the government which is manifestly disadvantageous to the government even if he did not profit from the transaction, a violation of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct is committed. &f a public officer, with his office and a private enterprise had a transaction and he allows a relative or member of his family to accept employment in that enterprise,
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good faith is not a defense because it is a malum prohibitum. &t is enough that that the act was performed. 5here the public officer is a member of the board, panel or group who is to act on an application of a contract and the act involved one of discretion, any public officer who is a member of that board, panel or group, even though he voted against the approval of the application, as long as he has an interest in that business enterprise whose application is pending before that board, panel or group, the public officer concerned shall be liable for violation of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct. His only course of action to avoid prosecution under the !nti graft and Corrupt Practices !ct is to sell his interest in the enterprise which has filed an application before that board, panel or group where he is a member. (r otherwise, he should resign from his public position. &llustration' +en. Bominador !ytono had an interest in the &ligan +teel .ills, which at that time was being subject of an investigation by the +enate Committee of which he was a chairman. He was threatened with prosecution under Republic !ct /o. :@1< so he was compelled to sell all his interest in that steel mill= there is no defense. ?ecause the law says so, even if he voted against it, he commits a violation thereof. These cases are filed with the (mbudsman and not with the regular prosecutorHs office. 0urisdiction is exclusively with the +andiganbayan. The accused public officer must be suspended when the case is already filed with the +andiganbayan. ,nder the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct, the public officer who is accused should not be automatically suspended upon the filing of the information in court. &t is the court which will order the suspension of the public officer and not the superior of that public officer. !s long as the court has not ordered the suspension of the public officer involved, the superior of that public officer is not authori8ed to order the suspension simply because of the violation of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct. The court will not order the suspension of the public officer without first passing upon the validity of the information filed in court. 5ithout a hearing, the suspension would be null and void for being violative of due process. &llustration' ! public officer was assigned to direct traffic in a very busy corner. 5hile there, he caught a thief in the act of lifting the wallet of a pedestrian. !s he could not leave his post, he summoned a civilian to deliver the thief to the precinct. The civilian agreed so he left with the thief. 5hen they were beyond the view of the policeman, the civilian allowed the thief to go home. 5hat would be the liability of the public officerE The liability of the traffic policeman would be merely administrative. The civilian has no liability at all. 7irstly, the offender is not yet a prisoner so there is no accountability yet. The term IprisonerJ refers to one who is already boo9ed and incarcerated no matter how short the time may be. The policeman could not be said as having assisted the escape of the offender because as the problem says, he is assigned to direct traffic in a busy corner street. +o he cannot be considered as falling under the third :rd paragraph of !rticle 1< that would constitute his as an accessory.
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The same is true with the civilian because the crime committed by the offender, which is snatching or a 9ind of robbery or theft as the case may be, is not one of those crimes mentioned under the third paragraph of !rticle 1< of the Revised Penal Code. 5here the public officer is still incumbent, the prosecution shall be with the (mbudsman. 5here the respondent is separated from service and the period has not yet prescribed, the information shall be filed in any prosecutionHs office in the city where the respondent resides. The prosecution shall file the case in the Regional Trial Court unless the violation carries a penalty higher than prision correccional, in which case the +andiganbayan has jurisdiction. The fact that the government benefited out of the prohibited act is no defense at all, the violation being mala prohibita. +ection : #f% of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct 3 where the public officer neglects or refuses to act on a matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining any pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of or discriminating against another interested party. The law itself additionally re>uires that the accusedHs dereliction, besides being without justification, must be for the purpose of obtaining from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or for the purpose of favoring any interested party, or discriminating against another interested party. This element is indispensable. &n other words, the neglect or refusal to act must motivated by gain or benefit, or purposely to favor the other interested party as held in Coronado v. +?, decided on !ugust 16, 1<<:. Re&-"li A ) N%. 71>@ (F%r6ei)-re %6 Ill'*%))en Weal)h) Correlate with R! 1:A< properly under Remedial -aw. This provides the procedure for forfeiture of the ill gotten wealth in violation of the !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct. The proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature. !ny taxpayer having 9nowledge that a public officer has amassed wealth out of proportion to this legitimate income may file a complaint with the prosecutorHs office of the place where the public officer resides or holds office. The prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation just li9e in a criminal case and he will forward his findings to the office of the +olicitor *eneral. The +olicitor *eneral will determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has accumulated an unexplained wealth. &f the +olicitor *eneral finds probable cause, he would file a petition re>uesting the court to issue a writ commanding the respondent to show cause why the ill gotten wealth described in the petition should not be forfeited in favor of the government. This is covered by the Rules on Civil Procedure. The respondent is given 1$ days to answer the petition. Thereafter trial would proceed. 0udgment is rendered and appeal is just li9e in a civil case. Remember that this is not a criminal proceeding. The basic difference is that the preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecutor.
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Chapter Three FRAUDS AND ILLEGAL EXACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS

*R'+CLE 2 1 FR*;D! *7*+-!' '<E P;4L+C 'RE*!;R3 *-D !+M+L*R $FFE-!E! A. !lements of +AAE@C A/A%?CT -E>5%C TA!ACEAJ3 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. t#at #e s#ould #a&e ta<en ad&antage of #is office4 t#at is4 #e inter&ened in t#e transaction in #is official capacity 3. t#at #e entered into an agreement $it# any interested party or speculator or made use of any ot#er sc#eme $it# regard to a. furnis#ing supplies 1. t#e ma<ing of contracts c. t#e ad=ustment or settlements of accounts relating to pu1lic property or funds 4. t#e accused #ad intent to defraud t#e go&ernment. The essence of this crime is ma9ing the government pay for something not received or ma9ing it pay more than what is due. &t is also committed by refunding more than the amount which should properly be refunded. This occurs usually in cases where a public officer whose official duty is to procure supplies for the government or enter into contract for government transactions, connives with the said supplier with the intention to defraud the government. !lso when certain supplies for the government are purchased for the high price but its >uantity or >uality is low. &llustrations' #1% ! public official who is in charge of procuring supplies for the government obtained funds for the first class materials and buys inferior >uality products and poc9ets the excess of the funds. This is usually committed by the officials of the Bepartment of Public 5or9s and Highways. Poorest >uality of in9 paid as if it were of superior >uality. (ne thousand pieces of blan9et for certain unit of the !rmed 7orces of the Philippines were paid for but actually, only 1@@ pieces were bought. The Cue8on City government ordered 1@,@@@ but what was delivered was only 1,@@@ T shirts, the public treasury is defrauded because the government is made to pay that which is not due or for a higher price.
#"% #:% #2%
/ot all frauds will constitute this crime. There must be no fixed allocation or amount on the matter acted upon by the public officer. The allocation or outlay was made the basis of fraudulent >uotations made by the public officer involved. 7or example, there was a need to put some additional lighting along the a street and no one 9nows how much it will cost. !n officer was as9ed to canvass the cost but he
Page 21
connived with the seller of light bulbs, pricing each light bulb at P$$@.@@ instead of the actual price of P$@@.@@. This is a case of fraud against public treasury. &f there is a fixed outlay of P"@,@@@.@@ for the lighting apparatus needed and the public officer connived with the seller so that although allocation was made a lesser number was as9ed to be delivered, or of an inferior >uality, or secondhand. &n this case there is no fraud against the public treasury because there is a fixed allocation. The fraud is in the implementation of procurement. That would constitute the crime of Iother fraudJ in !rticle "12, which is in the nature of swindling or estafa. ?e sure to determine whether fraud is against public treasury or one under !rticle "12. >. !lements of %55!/A5 !IACT%.?C3 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer !?TAECT!@ $it# t#e collection of ta8es4 licenses4 fees4 and ot#er imposts 2. Be is guilty of any of t#e follo$ing acts or omissions3 a. demanding4 directly or indirectly4 t#e payment of sums different from or larger t#an t#ose aut#ori2ed 1y la$ 1. failing &oluntarily to issue a receipt4 as pro&ided 1y la$4 for any sum of money collected 1y #im officially c. Collecting or recei&ing4 directly or indirectly4 1y $ay of payment or ot#er$ise4 t#ings or o1=ects of a nature different form t#at pro&ided 1y la$. T#e pu1lic officer referred to #ere is one $#o is or #as an official duty to collect fees due to t#e go&ernment. %llustration3 %f a treasurer in a municipality fails to issue an official receipt 1ecause t#ey ran out of receipt so #e instead issues a temporary receipt B! %C ?.T 5%A>5! under t#is article -A.(%@!@ #e $ill issue an official receipt later. %f #e recei&es money for ta8 payments and issues anot#er receipt in #is o$n form t#en #e is guilty of illegal e8action. Aeason for issuance of a receipt3 0 t#is is 1ecause t#e collection of pu1lic officers can only 1e accounted for t#ru official receipts t#at t#ey issued. This can only be committed principally by a public officer whose official duty is to collect taxes, license fees, import duties and other dues payable to the government. /ot any public officer can commit this crime. (therwise, it is estafa. 7ixers cannot commit this crime unless he conspires with the public officer authori8ed to ma9e the collection. !lso, public officers with such functions but are in the service of the ?ureau of &nternal Revenue and the ?ureau of Customs are not to be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code but under the Revised !dministrative Code. These officers are authori8ed to
Page 2,
ma9e impositions and to enter into compromises. ?ecause of this discretion, their demanding or collecting different from what is necessary is legal. This provision of the Revised Penal Code was provided before the ?ureau of &nternal Revenue and the Tariff and Customs Code. /ow, we have specific Code which will apply to them. &n the absence of any provision applicable, the Revised !dministrative Code will apply. The essence of the crime is not misappropriation of any of the amounts but the improper ma9ing of the collection which would prejudice the accounting of collected amounts by the government. 6n the first form of illegal e3action &n this form, mere demand will consummate the crime, even if the taxpayer shall refuse to come across with the amount being demanded. That will not affect the consummation of the crime. &n the demand, it is not necessary that the amount being demanded is bigger than what is payable to the government. The amount being demanded maybe less than the amount due the government. /ote that this is often committed with malversation or estafa because when a public officer shall demand an amount different from what the law provides, it can be expected that such public officer will not turn over his collection to the government. &llustrations' #1% ! taxpayer goes to the local municipal treasurer to pay real estate taxes on his land. !ctually, what is due the government is P2@@.@@ only but the municipal treasurer demanded P$@@.@@. ?y that demand alone, the crime of illegal exaction is already committed even though the taxpayer does not pay the P$@@.@@. +uppose the taxpayer came across with P$@@.@@. ?ut the municipal treasurer, thin9ing that he would abstract the P1@@.@@, issued a receipt for only P2@@.@@. The taxpayer would naturally as9 the municipal treasurer why the receipt was only for P2@@.@@. The treasurer answered that the P1@@.@@ is supposed to be for documentary stamps. The taxpayer left. He has a receipt for P2@@.@@. The municipal treasurer turned over to the government coffers P2@@.@@ because that is due the government and poc9eted the P1@@.@@. The mere fact that there was a demand for an amount different from what is due the government, the public officer already committed the crime of illegal exaction. (n the P1@@.@@ which the public officer poc9eted, will it be malversation or estafaE &n the example given, the public officer did not include in the official receipt the P1@@.@@ and, therefore, it did not become part of the public funds. &t remained
#"%
Page 22
to be private. &t is the taxpayer who has been defrauded of his P1@@.@@ because he can never claim a refund from the government for excess payment since the receipt issued to him was only P2@@.@@ which is due the government. !s far as the P1@@.@@ is concerned, the crime committed is estafa. #:% ! taxpayer pays his taxes. 5hat is due the government is P2@@.@@ and the public officer issues a receipt for P$@@.@@ upon payment of the taxpayer of said amount demanded by the public officer involved. ?ut he altered the duplicate to reflect only P2@@.@@ and he extracted the difference of P1@@.@@. &n this case, the entire P$@@.@@ was covered by an official receipt. That act of covering the whole amount received from the taxpayer in an official receipt will have the characteristics of becoming a part of the public funds. The crimes committed, therefore, are the following' #a% #b% &llegal exaction 3 for collecting more than he is authori8ed to collect. The mere act of demanding is enough to constitute this crime. 7alsification 3 because there was an alteration of official document which is the duplicate of the official receipt to show an amount less than the actual amount collected. .alversation 3 because of his act of misappropriating the P1@@.@@ excess which was covered by an official receipt already, even though not payable to the government. The entire P$@@.@@ was covered by the receipt, therefore, the whole amount became public funds. +o when he appropriated the P1@@ for his own benefit, he was not extracting private funds anymore but public funds.
#c%
+hould the falsification be complexed with the malversationE !s far as the crime of illegal exaction is concerned, it will be the subject of separate accusation because there, the mere demand regardless of whether the taxpayer will pay or not, will already consummate the crime of illegal exaction. &t is the breach of trust by a public officer entrusted to ma9e the collection which is penali8ed under such article. The falsification or alteration made on the duplicate can not be said as a means to commit malversation. !t most, the duplicate was altered in order to conceal the malversation. +o it cannot be complexed with the malversation. &t cannot also be said that the falsification is a necessary means to commit the malversation because the public officer can misappropriate the P1@@.@@ without any falsification. !ll that he has to do is to get the excess of P1@@.@@ and misappropriate it. +o the falsification is a separate accusation. However, illegal exaction may be complexed with malversation because illegal exaction is a necessary means to be able to collect the P1@@.@@ excess which was malversed. &n this crime, pay attention to whether the offender is the one charged with the collection of the tax, license or impost subject of the misappropriation. &f he is not the one authori8ed by disposition to do the collection, the crime of illegal exaction is not committed.
Page 25
&f it did not give rise to the crime of illegal exaction, the funds collected may not have become part of the public funds. &f it had not become part of the public funds, or had not become impressed with being part of the public funds, it cannot be the subject of malversation. &t will give rise to estafa or theft as the case may be. #:% The .unicipal Treasurer demanded P$@@.@@ when only P2@@.@@ was due. He issued the receipt at P2@@.@@ and explained to taxpayer that the P1@@ was for documentary stamps. The .unicipal Treasurer placed the entire P$@@.@@ in the vault of the office. 5hen he needed money, he too9 the P1@@.@@ and spent it. The following crimes were committed' #a% #b% #c% &llegal exaction 3 for demanding a different amount= )stafa 3 for deceiving the taxpayer= and .alversation 3 for getting the P1@@.@@ from the vault.
!lthough the excess P1@@.@@ was not covered by the (fficial Receipt, it was commingled with the other public funds in the vault= hence, it became part of public funds and subse>uent extraction thereof constitutes malversation. /ote that numbers 1 and " are complexed as illegal exaction with estafa, while in number :, malversation is a distinct offense. The issuance of the (fficial Receipt is the operative fact to convert the payment into public funds. The payor may demand a refund by virtue of the (fficial Receipt. &n cases where the payor decides to let the official to I9eep the changeJ, if the latter should poc9et the excess, he shall be liable for malversation. The official has no right but the government, under the principle of accretion, as the owner of the bigger amount becomes the owner of the whole. (n the second form of illegal exaction The act of receiving payment due the government without issuing a receipt will give rise to illegal exaction even though a provisional receipt has been issued. 5hat the law re>uires is a receipt in the form prescribed by law, which means official receipt. &llustration' &f a government cashier or officer to whom payment is made issued a receipt in his own private form, which he calls provisional, even though he has no intention of misappropriating the amount received by him, the mere fact that he issued a receipt not in the form prescribed by law, the crime of illegal exaction is committed. There must be voluntary failure to issue the (fficial Receipt.
Page 26
6n the third form of illegal e3action ,nder the rules and regulations of the government, payment of chec9s not belonging to the taxpayer, but that of chec9s of other persons, should not be accepted to settle the obligation of that person. &llustration' ! taxpayer pays his obligation with a chec9 not his own but pertaining to another. ?ecause of that, the chec9 bounced later on. The crime committed is illegal exaction because the payment by chec9 is not allowed if the chec9 does not pertain to the taxpayer himself, unless the chec9 is a managerHs chec9 or a certified chec9, amended already as of 1<<@. #+ee the case of Roman Catholic.% ,nder !rticle "1:, if any of these acts penali8ed as illegal exaction is committed by those employed in the ?ureau of Customs or ?ureau of &nternal Revenue, the law that will apply to them will be the Revised !dministrative Code or the Tariff and Customs Code or /ational Revenue Code. This crime does not re>uire damage to the government. *R'+CLE 2 , $'<ER FR*;D! A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e offender is a pu1lic officer 2. t#at #e ta<es ad&antage of #is official position 3. t#at #e commits any of t#e frauds or deceits enumerated in articles 315031' A pu1lic officer ta<es ad&antage of #is official position in committing3 1. estafa 2. ot#er forms of s$indling 3. s$indling a minor 4. ot#er deceits
*R'+CLE 2 2 PR$<+4+'ED 'R*-!*C'+$-! A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e offender is an appointi&e pu1lic official 2. t#at #e 1ecomes interested4 directly or indirectly4 in any transactions of e8c#ange or speculations 3. t#at t#e transaction ta<es place $it#in t#e territory su1=ect to #is =urisdiction 4. T#at #e 1ecomes interested in t#e transaction during #is incum1ency. ?.TA >!?!3 Applica1le only to appointed pu1lic officers
Page 28
Transactions are limited to e8c#ange or speculations. -urc#asing of stoc<s or s#ares t#erefore is not co&ered #ere4 #ence not punis#a1le.
*R'+CLE 2 5 P$!!E!!+$- $F PR$<+4+'ED +-'ERE!' 43 * P;4L+C $FF+CER A. -ersons 5ia1le for t#e possession of pro#i1ited interest3 1. pu1lic officer $#o directly or indirectly 1ecame interested in any contract or 1usiness in $#ic# it $as #is official duty to inter&ene 2. e8perts4 ar1itrators and pri&ate accountants $#o4 in li<e manner4 too< part in any contract or transactions connected $it# t#e estate or property in t#e appraisal4 distri1ution or ad=udication of $#ic# t#ey #ad acted. 3. /uardians and e8ecutors $it# respect to t#e property 1elonging to t#eir $ards or t#e estate. -u1lic officer #ere is appointed or elected RA 6151 AN ACT DEFINING AND 2ENALIBING THE CRIME OF 2LUNDER K %ll gotten $ealt# amounts to 5*4***4***.** and a1o&e to come under t#is pro&ision. K lia1le3 may 1e a pu1lic officer or any pri&ate person $#o conspires $it# t#e pu1lic officer. ?ote3 H3 %f t#ere is plunder and mal&ersation #o$ many informations s#ould you fileF A3 only 1 1ecause of section 1 (d) Y:any com1ination or series of t#e follo$ing sc#emes3 10 : ( =udge 1elie&es t#at t#e crime of mal&ersation is a1sor1ed in plunder) RA 4C69 AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAAOROF THE STATE ANY 2RO2ERTY FOUND TO HAAE !EEN UNLAWFULLY ACKUIREDQ:UNEX2LAINED WEALTH; Aemem1er t#is is not a criminal prosecution4 t#is is an administrati&e proceeding. T#ere is no penal sanction . t#ere is a penalty 1ut in&ol&ing a past act. AA 13") creates a presumption DEA%C TA?TEM against une8plained $ealt# of pu1lic officers and employees. Cee case in point 1elo$3 Rep*,l#% (s IAC an$ S#mpl#%#& !er$&n G.R. N&. 6<007. Apr#l 468 4959 T#e Court #as carefully gone o&er t#e e&idence presented 1y pri&ate respondents4 and li<e t#e trial court and t#e %ntermediate Appellate Court4 finds t#e ac7uisition of t#e su1=ect properties satisfactorily e8plained. 6#ile respondent spouses #ad ac7uired properties and constructed a #ouse t#e costs of $#ic# $ere disproportionate to t#eir com1ined incomes from t#eir employment in t#e go&ernment4 it #ad 1een pro&ed t#at suc# $ere financed t#roug# a donation and loans. T#e Colicitor /eneral also ma<es muc# of t#e fact t#at t#e statements of assets and lia1ilities filed 1y pri&ate respondent Cimplicio >erdon co&ering t#e years material to t#e
Page 29
case did not accurately reflect t#e donation and t#e loans granted to pri&ate respondent spouses and t#at Cimplicio,s testimony in effect contradicts t#e entries in said statements. %t must 1e emp#asi2ed4 #o$e&er4 t#at in determining $#et#er or not t#ere is une8plained $ealt# $it#in t#e pur&ie$ of A.A. ?o. 13") t#e courts are not 1ound 1y t#e statements of assets and lia1ilities filed 1y t#e respondent.P .n t#e contrary4 t#is statute affords t#e respondent e&ery opportunity to e8plain4 to t#e satisfaction of t#e court4 #o$ #e #ad ac7uired t#e property in 7uestion SCec. 54 A.A. ?o. 13").T %n sum4 t#e presumption under Cec. 2 of A.A. ?o. 13") t#at t#e su1=ect properties $ere unla$fully ac7uired #ad 1een successfully re1utted 1y pri&ate respondents t#roug# competent e&idence. Bence4 t#e %ntermediate Appellate Court did not err in affirming t#e trial court,s decision dismissing t#e Aepu1lic,s petition. T#e pro&isions of t#e la$ creates a presumption against t#e pu1lic officer or employee $#o ac7uires a property grossly disproportionate to #is income4 i.e. t#at t#e property $as unla$fully ac7uired. Bo$e&er4 t#is presumption is =uris tantum. %t may 1e re1utted 1y t#e pu1lic officer or employee 1y s#o$ing to t#e satisfaction of t#e court t#at #is ac7uisition of t#e property $as la$ful.
Chapter F&*r MALAERSATION OF 2U!LIC FUNDS OR 2RO2ERTY

*R'+CLE 2 6 M*L:ER!*'+$- $F P;4L+C F;-D! $R PR$PER'3 A. !5!M!?TC3 1. .ffender3 -u1lic officer (-.) 2. -. #ad t#e custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office
3. +unds or property $ere -E>5%C for !hich he !as accountable 4. T#at t#e -.3 a. appropriated 1. too< or misappropriated c. consented or4 t#roug# a1andonment or negligence4 permitted anot#er person to ta<e t#em >. Acts -unis#ed 1. >y appropriating pu1lic funds or property 2. Ta<ing or misappropriating t#e same 3. Consenting4 or t#roug# a1andonment or negligence 1y permitting any person to suc# pu1lic funds or property. 4. >y ot#er$ise 1eing guilty of misappropriation or mal&ersation of suc# funds or
ta<e property.
Committed 1y Any pu1lic officer $#o4 1y reason of t#e duties of #is office is accounta1le for pu1lic funds or property4 s#all appropriate t#e same4 or s#all ta<e or misappropriate or s#all consent4 or t#roug# a1andonment or negligence4 s#all permit any ot#er person to ta<e suc# pu1lic funds or property4 $#olly or partially or s#all ot#er$ise 1e guilty of misappropriation or mal&ersation of suc# funds or property. Co t#e pu1lic officer is an accounta1le pu1lic officer. H3 $#at are t#e crimes called MA5(!ACAT%.? .+ -E>5%C +E?@C .A -A.-!ATJF
Page 50
A3 t#ey are3 1. mal&ersation 1y appropriating4 misappropriating or permitting any ot#er person to ta<e pu1lic funds or property (art 21") 2. failure of accounta1le officer to render accounts (art 21') 3. failure of a responsi1le pu1lic officer to render accounts 1efore lea&ing t#e country (art 21)) 4. illegal use of pu1lic funds or property (art 22*) 5. failure to ma<e deli&ery of pu1lic funds or property (art 221)
:als& %alle$ as TECHNICAL MALAERSATION;
T$o Modes of Commiting Mal&ersation3 1. t#roug# deli1erate acts 2. t#roug# negligence ?.>. >ut $#et#er deli1erate or t#roug# negligence 00 t#e penalty is t#e same. Mal&ersation is ot#er$ise called as !M>!XX5!M!?T. -rofit or /ain is immaterial in mal&ersation -A!CEMT-%.? .+ MA5(!ACAT%.? 6#en failure of -. (in custody of t#e pu1lic funds or property) fails to produce t#e pu1lic funds or property upon demand4 t#e presumption is t#at t#e -. mal&ersed suc# property or fund. T#e accounta1le -. may 1e con&icted of mal&ersation e&en if t#ere is no direct e&idence in misappropriation and t#e only e&idence is a s#ortage in #is accounts $#ic# #e #as not 1een a1le to e8plain satisfactorily. (-eople & Mingoa4 )2 -#il '5 ) CAC!3 -A!CEM-T%.? .+ /E%5T A!>ETT!@ .?C! CB.AT/A/! %C CAT%C+ACT.A%5J !I-5A%?!@ 2ALMA GIL an$ 2ELAYO (s. 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 6C3<0. Septem,er 48 4959 T#e mayor satisfactorily e8plained t#at t#e donated logs $ere disposed of to construct municipal pro=ects. Bence4 it $as incum1ent upon t#e prosecution to pro&e ot#er$ise T#is4 it failed to do. T#ere is a1solutely no s#o$ing t#at t#e petitioners sold t#e e8cess lum1er or used it for pri&ate purposes or ot#er$ise profited from t#e same. .n t#e contrary4 #e fully accounted for t#e lum1er 1ecause t#e municipal pro=ects $#ere it $as used $ere actually constructed. %t is true t#at all t#at is needed to find a pu1lic officer guilty of mal&ersation is a failure to produce funds or property for $#ic# #e is accounta1le4 on demand. Bo$e&er4 if t#e funds or property $ere &alidly used for pu1lic purposes naturally t#ey can no longer 1e produced. T#ere 1eing a satisfactory e8planation of t#e s#ortage4 t#e presumption of guilt disappears. 6B. MAJ C.MM%T3 )eneral 5ule:
Page 5
Accounta1le -u1lic .fficer Must 1e an accounta1le -.4 ot#er$ise t#e crime is somet#ing else. CAC!3 !A!IDA (s 2EO2LE an$ SANDIGAN!AYAN G.R. N&. 5C9<3. Septem,er 098 4959
T#e undisputed fact is t#at t#e City Auditor #ad found t#e accused s#ort4 as of Ceptem1er 1 4 1)' 4 of t#e sum of - )4"21. 44 a sum t#e latter could not or failed to return upon due demand. T#e latter,s e8cuse4 #o$e&er4 is t#at on t#e same date4 Ceptem1er 1 4 1)' 4 on #er $ay to deposit t#e money $it# t#e @e&elopment >an< of t#e -#ilippines4 t#e same $as purportedly stolen. According to #er4 s#e did not inform t#e City Auditor of it (t#e fact of ro11ery) on t#e spot (s#e su1mitted #er e8planation only on .cto1er 14 1)' )4 1ecause s#e $as supposedly consulting #er la$yer. Also4 so s#e claims4 s#e $as #ospitali2ed on Ceptem1er 1'4 1)' 4 and disc#arged on Ceptem1er 214 1)' . CC con&icted #er of mal&ersation. Exception: a. pri&ate indi&iduals $#o in any capacity $#ate&er4 #a&e c#arge of any national4 pro&incial or municipal funds4 re&enues4 or property; (Art 222) 1. any administrator or depository of funds or property attac#ed4 sei2ed or deposited 1y pu1lic aut#ority4 e&en if suc# property 1elongs to a pri&ate indi&idual; (Art 222) c. pri&ate party is eit#er a principal 1y direct participation or principal 1y indispensa1le cooperation. d. -ri&ate party is in conspiracy $it# t#e -. in committing t#e crime. 0 A pri&ate person %?@EC%?/ a pu1lic officer or 1y necessary act4 A%@C a pu1lic officer in C.?C!?T%?/ .A -!AM%TT%?/ suc# pu1lic funds to fall into t#e #ands of t#e C6%?@5!A 0000 #e must 1e #eld !HEA55J 5%A>5! for MA5(!ACAT%.? as principal 1y induction. -E>5%C +E?@C .A -A.-!ATJ Aeturn of funds or property 1y t#e accused se&eral days after demand does not negate criminal lia1ility 1ut mitigates t#e crime. !8ample Cases3 -olice man arrested a person for illegal possession of firearm. -. did not surrender t#e confiscated firearm 1ut poc<eted t#e same. -. in custody of t#e firearm is4 in effect4 accounta1le to t#e /o&ernment for it is no$ considered pu1lic property. -. can 1e c#arged $it# mal&ersation. Bo$e&er4 in SALAMERA (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN4 a licensed firearm $as deposited for safe+eeping $it# t#e mayor. Caid firearm $as lost. -.4 in t#is case is not guilty of mal&ersation 1ecause t#e licensed gun is not pu1lic property 1ut still remained pri&ate property. SALAMERA (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN G.R. N&. 404199. Fe,r*ar' 468 4999 .ne essential element of t#e crime of mal&ersation is t#at a pu1lic officer must ta<e pu1lic funds4 money or property4 and misappropriate it to #is o$n pri&ate use or 1enefit. T#ere must 1e asportation of pu1lic funds or property4 a<in to t#e ta<ing of anot#er,s property in t#eft. T#e funds4 money or property ta<en must 1e pu1lic funds or pri&ate
Page 52
funds impressed $it# pu1lic attri1utes or c#aracter for $#ic# t#e pu1lic officer is accounta1le. %n t#is case4 Antonio >ena&ide2 &oluntarily turned o&er t#e gun4 a .3' cali1er Cmit# W 6esson re&ol&er4 to petitioner mayor of t#e to$n of Casiguran4 Aurora. Antonio surrendered t#e gun to t#e mayor. T#e gun $as duly licensed. %t $as not sei2ed or confiscated. Antonio o1tained possession of t#e gun from -onciano >ena&ide24 an uncle of #is4 $#o $as t#e o$ner and licensee of t#e gun. -onciano mortgaged it to Antonio. T#e 7uestion may 1e as<ed3 @id Antonio,s surrender of t#e gun to petitioner mayor in&est t#e gun $it# pu1lic c#aracter sufficient to consider t#e gun as pu1lic property for $#ic# t#e mayor is accounta1leF 6e 1elie&e not. T#ere $as no reason to surrender or confiscate t#e gun. %t $as duly licensed to -onciano >ena&ide2. T#e license is not transfera1le. Antonio could not &alidly possess t#e gun. Be s#ould #a&e returned t#e gun to -onciano4 t#e licensed o$ner or surrendered it to t#e local police or to t#e Consta1ulary -ro&incial Commander. >y turning o&er t#e gun to petitioner mayor4 t#e gun did not 1ecome pu1lic property 1ecause it $as not intended for pu1lic use or purpose nor $as it la$fully sei2ed. T#e gun continued to 1e pri&ate property4 t#at is $#y t#e gun o$ner rig#tfully as<ed for its return to #im4 not to 1e turned o&er to t#e pu1lic coffer or treasury. -etitioner,s failure to return t#e gun after demand 1y t#e pri&ate o$ner did not constitute a prima facie e&idence of mal&ersation. T#e property $as pri&ate and t#e one $#o demanded its return $as a pri&ate person4 not a person in aut#ority. T#e presumption of con&ersion $ill not apply. ?ote3 %n ATTACBM!?T CAC!C4 property 1ecomes Custodia 5egis 0 t#erefore it 1ecomes -u1lic -roperty to a certain e8tent. T#erefore4 e&en if suc# propertiesGfunds 1elong to pri&ate indi&iduals 0 as long as suc# property or funds are under CECT.@%A 5!/%C4 t#ere can 1e mal&ersation if suc# propertyGfunds in misappropriated. %M-.ATA?T3 %n MA5(!ACAT%.?4 t#e ?egligence of t#e accounta1le pu1lic official must 1e clearly s#o$n to 1e ine8cusa1le4 appro8imating malice or fraud. H3 %s @emand necessary in mal&ersationF A3 @emand is only for t#e purpose of pro&ing a -rima +acie case of Mal&ersation.
CA!ELLO (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 9C557. Ma' 4<8 4994 Mal&ersation may t#us 1e committed eit#er t#roug# a positi&e act of misappropriation of pu1lic funds or property of passi&ely t#roug# negligence 1y allo$ing anot#er to commit suc# misappropriation. ?onet#eless4 all t#at is necessary to pro&e in 1ot# acts are t#e follo$ing3 (a) t#at t#e defendant recei&ed in #is possession pu1lic funds or property (1) t#at #e could not account for t#em and did not #a&e t#em in #is possession $#en audited; and (c) t#at #e could not gi&e a satisfactory or reasona1le e8cuse for t#e disappearance of said funds or property. An accounta1le officer may t#us 1e con&icted of mal&ersation e&en if t#ere is no direct e&idence of misappropriation and t#e only e&idence is t#at t#ere is a s#ortage in t#e officer,s accounts $#ic# #e #as not 1een a1le to e8plain satisfactorily. 2EO2LE (s AILLACORTA T#e presumption is deemed o&ert#ro$n if t#e accounta1le pu1lic officer satisfactorily pro&es t#at not e&en a single centa&o of t#e missing funds $as used 1y #im for #is personal interest. >ut t#at t#e funds $ere e8tended as a cas# ad&ances to employees in good fait# in t#e
Page 51
1elief t#at t#ey $ere for legitimate purposes4 $it# no intent to gain and of good$ill considering t#at it $as a practice tolerated in t#e office of said pu1lic officer. The r*l#n+ a,&(e has ,een a,an$&ne$V %n MENESES (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE8 G.R. N&. 411307. Ma' 018 499<8 t#e CC #eld3 T#e grant of loans t#roug# t#e Q&aleQ system is a clear case of an accounta1le officer consenting to t#e improper or unaut#ori2ed use of pu1lic funds 1y ot#er persons4 $#ic# is punis#a1le 1y t#e la$. To tolerate a suc# practice is to gi&e a license to e&ery dis1ursing officer to conduct a lending operation $it# t#e use of pu1lic funds. T#ere is no la$ or regulation allo$ing accounta1le officers to e8tend loans to anyone against Q&aleQ or c#its gi&en in e8c#ange 1y t#e 1orro$ers. .n t#e ot#er #and4 in Ca1ello &s. Candigan1ayan4 $e #eld t#at t#e gi&ing of Q&alesQ 1y pu1lic officers out of t#eir accounta1le funds is pro#i1ited 1y -.@. ?o. 11454 ot#er$ise <no$n as t#e /o&ernment Auditing Code of t#e -#ilippines and Memorandum Circular ?o. 5"*4 dated Dune 244 1) ' of t#e /eneral Auditing .ffice. 2EO2LE (s. CONSIGNA8 ET AL. G.R. N&. L@45156. A*+*st C48 4937 ACHE%TTA5 .+ 6%55+E5 ACT .+ MA5(!ACAT%.? %?C5E@!C CAM! .++!?C! C.MM%TT!@ TBA.E/B ?!/5%/!?C!; Epon t#e ot#er #and4 it is also settled t#at under t#e information filed against Consigna4 #e could #a&e 1een con&icted not only of t#e $illful offense e8pressly c#arged t#erein ,*t als& of t#e same offense of mal&ersation t#roug# negligence. %n a similar case4 6e #eld t#at4 $#ile a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a $illful crime 1ut a distinct crime in itself designated as a 7uasi0offense in our -enal Code4 a con&iction for t#e former can 1e #ad under an information e8clusi&ely c#arging t#e commission of a $illful offense4 upon t#e t#eory t#at t#e +reater &""ense #n%l*$es the lesser &ne. T#is is t#e situation o1taining in t#e present case $#ere Consigna $as c#arged $it# $illful mal&ersation of go&ernment property. Ender t#e information filed #e could #a&e 1een con&icted of t#e same offense 1ut committed t#roug# negligence. 2EO2LE (s DE GUBMAN %n mal&ersation4 all t#at is necessary to pro&e is t#at t#e defendant recei&ed in #is position pu1lic funds. A pu1lic officer may1e #eld guilty of mal&ersation 1ased on a preliminary audit report.
DIAB (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN G.R. N&. 40704C. .an*ar' 038 4999 5i7uidation of o1ligations incurred 1y accounta1le pu1lic officials in&ol&es a long process; pertinent go&ernment accounting principles4 re7uire t#e (a) preparation of t#e dis1ursement &ouc#er4 (1) processing of t#e re7uest for allotment supported 1y suc# documents as payrolls4 dis1ursement &ouc#ers4 purc#aseG=o1 orders4 re7uisitions for suppliesGmaterials4 etc.4 and (c) issuance of t#e corresponding c#ec<. !ac# time4 $#en accomplis#ed4 t#e corresponding amount is de1ited or deducted from t#e a&aila1le funds of t#e agency $#ic# $ould t#en consider t#e claim settled and paid alt#oug# t#ere may #a&e yet 1een no actual transfer of cas# in&ol&ed from t#e go&ernment to t#e payee of t#e c#ec<. T#e term Qto li7uidateQ means to settle4 to ad=ust4 to ascertain or to reduce to precision in amount. Q5i7uidationQ does not necessarily signify payment4 and Qto li7uidate an account4Q can mean to ascertain t#e 1alance due4 to $#om it is due4 and to $#om it is paya1le; #ence4 an account t#at #as 1een Qli7uidatedQ can also mean t#at t#e item #as 1een made certain as to $#at4 and #o$ muc#4 is deemed to 1e o$ing. MAGSUCI (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE
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G.R. N&. L@4147<7. .an*ar' C8 4997 T#e actions ta<en 1y Magsuci in&ol&ed t#e &ery functions #e #ad to disc#arge in t#e performance of #is official duties. T#ere #as 1een no intimation at all t#at #e #ad fore<no$ledge of any irregularity committed 1y eit#er or 1ot# !ngr. !nri7ue2 and Ancla. -etitioner mig#t #a&e indeed 1een la8 and administrati&ely remiss in placing too muc# reliance on t#e official reports su1mitted 1y #is su1ordinate (!ngineer !nri7ue2)4 1ut for conspiracy to e8ist4 it is essential t#at t#ere must 1e a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not t#e product of negligence 1ut of intentionality on t#e part of co#orts. %n Ar#as (s. San$#+an,a'an4 /.A. ?o. '15 3. @ecem1er 1)4 1)')4 t#is Court4 a$are of t#e dire conse7uences t#at a different rule could 1ring4 #as aptly concluded3 Q6e $ould 1e setting a 1ad precedent if a #ead of office plagued 1y all too common pro1lems 0 dis#onest or negligent su1ordinates4 o&er$or<4 multiple assignments or positions4 or plain incompetence 0 is suddenly s$ept into a conspiracy con&iction simply 1ecause #e did not personally e8amine e&ery single detail4 painsta<ingly trace e&ery step from inception4 and in&estigate t#e moti&es of e&ery person in&ol&ed in a transaction 1efore affi8ing #is signature as t#e final appro&ing aut#ority. 8 8 8. All #eads of offices #a&e to rely to a reasona1le e8tent on t#eir su1ordinates and on t#e good fait# of t#ose $#o prepare 1ids4 purc#ase supplies4 or enter into negotiations. 8 8 8. 1here has to be some added reason !hy he should examine each (oucher in such detail. Any e8ecuti&e #ead of e&en small go&ernment agencies or commissions can attest to t#e &olume of papers t#at must 1e signed. T#ere are #undreds of documents4 letters4 memoranda4 &ouc#ers4 and supporting papers t#at routinely pass t#roug# #is #ands. T#e num1er in 1igger offices or departments is e&en more appalling.Q
%n s#ort4 a pu1lic officer cannot 1e #eld guilty of mal&ersation if #e relied in good fait# on t#e representation made 1y t#e su1ordinate and pro&ided t#at t#ere $as no conspiracy. This crime is predicated on the relationship of the offender to the property or funds involved. The offender must be accountable for the property misappropriated. &f the fund or property, though public in character is the responsibility of another officer, malversation is not committed unless there is conspiracy. &t is not necessary that the offender profited because somebody else may have misappropriated the funds in >uestion for as long as the accountable officer was remiss in his duty of safe9eeping public funds or property. He is liable for malversation if such funds were lost or otherwise misappropriated by another. There is no malversation through simple negligence or rec9less imprudence, whether deliberately or negligently. This is one crime in the Revised Penal Code where the penalty is the same whether committed with dolo or culpa.
Cuestion D !nswer 5hat crime under the Revised Penal Code carries the same penalty whether committed intentionally or through negligenceE .alversation under !rticle "1A. There is no crime of malversation through negligence. The crime is malversation, plain and simple, whether committed through dolo or culpa. There is no crime of malversation under !rticle :4$ 3 on criminal negligence 3 because in malversation under !rticle "1A, the same penalty is imposed whether the malversation results from negligence or was the product of deliberate act.
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The crime of malversation can be committed only by an officer accountable for the funds or property which is appropriated. This crime, therefore, bears a relation between the offender and the funds or property involved. The offender, to commit malversation, must be accountable for the funds or property misappropriated by him. &f he is not the one accountable but somebody else, the crime committed is theft. &t will be >ualified theft if there is abuse of confidence. !ccountable officer does not refer only to cashier, disbursing officers or property custodian. !ny public officer having custody of public funds or property for which he is accountable can commit the crime of malversation if he would misappropriate such fund or property or allow others to do so.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. !n unlicensed firearm was confiscated by a policeman. &nstead of turning over the firearm to the property custodian for the prosecution of the offender, the policeman sold the firearm. 5hat crime was committedE The crime committed is malversation because that firearm is subject to his accountability. Having ta9en custody of the firearm, he is supposed to account for it as evidence for the prosecution of the offender. ". Can the buyer be liable under the !nti fencing lawE
/o. The crime is neither theft nor robbery, but malversation. :. ! member of the Philippine /ational Police went on absence without leave. He was charged with malversation of the firearm issued to him. !fter two years, he came out of hiding and surrendered the firearm. 5hat crime was committedE The crime committed was malversation. Payment of the amount misappropriated or restitution of property misappropriated does not erase criminal liability but only civil liability. 5hen private property is attached or sei8ed by public authority and the public officer accountable therefor misappropriates the same, malversation is committed also. &llustration' &f a sheriff levied the property of the defendants and absconded with it, he is not liable of >ualified theft but of malversation even though the property belonged to a private person. The sei8ure of the property or fund impressed it with the character of being part of the public funds it being in custodia legis. 7or as long as the public officer is the one accountable for the fund or property that was misappropriated, he can be liable for the crime of malversation. !bsent such relation, the crime could be theft, simple or >ualified.
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Cuestion D !nswer There was a long line of payors on the last day of payment for residence certificates. )mployee ! of the municipality placed all his collections inside his table and re>uested his employee ? to watch over his table while he goes to the restroom. ? too9 advantage of !Hs absence and too9 P$@.@@ out of the collections. ! returned and found his money short. 5hat crimes have been committedE ! is guilty of malversation through negligence because he did not exercise due diligence in the safe9eeping of the funds when he did not loc9 the drawer of his table. &nsofar as ? is concerned, the crime is >ualified theft. ,nder jurisprudence, when the public officer leaves his post without loc9ing his drawer, there is negligence. Thus, he is liable for the loss. &llustration' ! government cashier did not bother to put the public fund in the public safeLvault but just left it in the drawer of his table which has no loc9. The next morning when he came bac9, the money was already gone. He was held liable for malversation through negligence because in effect, he has abandoned the fund or property without any safety. 4 private person may also commit malversation under the following situations< #1% #"% #:% Conspiracy with a public officer in committing malversation= 5hen he has become an accomplice or accessory to a public officer who commits malversation= 5hen the private person is made the custodian in whatever capacity of public funds or property, whether belonging to national or local government, and he misappropriates the same= 5hen he is constituted as the depositary or administrator of funds or property sei8ed or attached by public authority even though said funds or property belong to a private individual.
#2%
&llustration' .unicipal treasurer connives with outsiders to ma9e it appear that the office of the treasurer was robbed. He wor9ed overtime and the co conspirators barged in, hog tied the treasurer and made it appear that there was a robbery. Crime committed is malversation because the municipal treasurer was an accountable officer. /ote that damage on the part of the government is not considered an essential element. &t is enough that the proprietary rights of the government over the funds have been disturbed through breach of trust.
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&t is not necessary that the accountable public officer should actually misappropriate the fund or property involved. &t is enough that he has violated the trust reposed on him in connection with the property. &llustration' #1% &t is a common practice of government cashiers to change the chec9s of their friends with cash in their custody, sometimes at a discount. The public officer 9nows that the chec9 is good because the issuer thereof is a man of name. +o he changed the same with cash. The chec9 turned out to be good. 5ith that act of changing the cash of the government with the chec9 of a private person, even though the chec9 is good, malversation is committed. The reason is that a chec9 is cleared only after three days. Buring that period of three days, the government is being denied the use of the public fund. 5ith more reason if that chec9 bounce because the government suffers. #"% !n accountable public officer, out of la8iness, declares that the payment was made to him after he had cleaned his table and loc9ed his safe for the collection of the day. ! taxpayer came and he insisted that he pay the amount so that he will not return the next day. +o he accepted the payment but is too la8y to open the combination of the public safe. He just poc9eted the money. 5hen he came home, the money was still in his poc9et. The next day, when he went bac9 to the office, he changed clothes and he claims that he forgot to put the money in the new funds that he would collect the next day. *overnment auditors came and subjected him to inspection. He was found short of that amount. He claimed that it is in his house with that alone, he was charged with malversation and was convicted.
!ny overage or excess in the collection of an accountable public officer should not be extracted by him once it is commingled with the public funds. &llustration' 5hen taxpayers pay their accountabilities to the government by way of taxes or licenses li9e registration of motor vehicles, the taxpayer does not bother to collect loose change. +o the government cashier accumulates the loose change until this amounts to a si8able sum. &n order to avoid malversation, the cashier did not separate what is due the government which was left to her by way of loose change. &nstead, he gets all of these and 9eeps it in the public vaultLsafe. !fter the payment of the taxes and licenses is through, he gets all the official receipts and ta9es the sum total of the payment. He then opens the public vault and counts the cash. 5hatever will be the excess or the overage, he gets. &n this case, malversation is committed. /ote that the moment any money is commingled with the public fund even if not due the government, it becomes impressed with the characteristic of being part of public funds. (nce they are commingled, you do not 9now anymore which belong to the government and which belong to the private persons. +o that a public vault or safe should not be used to hold any fund other that what is due to the government. 5hen does presumption of misappropriation ariseE
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5hen a demand is made upon an accountable officer and he cannot produce the fund or property involved, there is a prima facie presumption that he had converted the same to his own use. There must be indubitable proof that thing unaccounted for exists. !udit should be made to determine if there was shortage. !udit must be complete and trustworthy. &f there is doubt, presumption does not arise. Presumption arises only if at the time the demand to produce the public funds was made, the accountability of the accused is already determined and li>uidated. ! demand upon the accused to produce the funds in his possession and a failure on his part to produce the same will not bring about this presumption unless and until the amount of his accountability is already 9nown. &n Bumagat v. +andiganbayan, 14@ +CR! 26:, it was held that the prima facie presumption under the Revised Penal Code arises only if there is no issue as to the accuracy, correctness and regularity of the audit findings and if the fact that public funds are missing is indubitably established. The audit must be thorough and complete down to the last detail, establishing with absolute certainty the fact that the funds are indeed missing. &n Be *u8man v. People, 11< +CR! ::A, it was held that in malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession the public funds and that he could not account for them and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for their disappearance. !n accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is the shortage in the accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. &n Cabello v. +andiganbaya, 1<A +CR! <2, it was held it was held that malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or culpa bringing about the offences is only a modality in the perpetration of the offense. The same offense of malversation is involved, whether the mode charged differs from the mode established in the commission of the crime. !n accused charged with willful malversation may be convicted of .alversation through her negligee. &n Cui8o v. +andiganbayan, the accused incurred shortage #P1.A2% mainly because the auditor disallowed certain cash advances the accused granted to employees. ?ut on the same date that the audit was made, he partly reimbursed the amount and paid it in full three days later. The +upreme Court considered the circumstances as negative of criminal intent. The cash advances were made in good faith and out of good will to co employees which was a practice tolerated in the office. The actual cash shortage was only P1.A2 and together with the disallowed advances were fully reimbursed within a reasonable time. There was no negligence, malice, nor intent to defraud. &n Ciamfranca 0r. v. +andiganbayan, where the accused in malversation could not give reasonable and satisfactory explanation or excuse for the missing funds or property accountable by him, it was held that the return of the funds or property is not a defense and does not extinguish criminal liability.
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&n Parungao v. +andiganbayan, 1<A +CR! 1A:, it was held that a public officer charged with malversation cannot be convicted of technical malversation #illegal use of public funds under !rticle ""@%. To do so would violate accusedHs right to be informed of nature of accusation against him. Technical malversation is not included in the crime of malversation. &n malversation, the offender misappropriates public funds or property for his own personal use, or allows any other person to ta9e such funds or property for the latterHs own personal use. &n technical malversation, the public officer applies the public funds or property under his administration to another public use different from that for which the public fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Recourse' 7ile the proper information.
;)(ates in M*L:ER!*'+$The elements of the offense of mal#ersation of public funds are as follows: ;1< the offender is a public officer= ;2< he has the custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office= ;3< the funds or property in#ol#ed are public funds or property for which he is accountable= and ;7< he has appropriated, ta)en or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the ta)ing by another person of, such funds or property. 37 *oncededly, the first three elements are present in this case. 't is the last element, i.e., whether petitioner misappropriated said public funds, that ser#es as the petitioner0s focus. e claims that he used the missing funds for disbursement of cash ad#ances, and not for his personal use. The Sandiganbayan held that this defense is unacceptable, and indicati#e of petitioner0s guilt. "n this point, we are in agreement. o To begin with, this defense had been ad#anced in se#eral cases before this *ourt, but has been found to be without merit. !s held in 3ueda, Ar. #. Sandiganbayan and other cases: o 9T:he practice of disbursing public funds under the $#ale$ system is not a meritorious defense in mal#ersation cases. The grant of loans through the $#ale$ system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or unauthori+ed use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by law. To tolerate such a practice is to gi#e a license to e#ery disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds. Mal#ersation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property= by ta)ing or misappropriating the same= by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to ta)e such public funds or property= or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or mal#ersation of such funds or property. 1? The essential elements common to all acts of mal#ersation under !rt. 21B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode 2> are: ;a< That the offender be a public officer= ;b< That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office= ;c< That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable= STD4c! ;d< That he appropriated, too), misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to ta)e them. 21 o There can be no mal#ersation of public funds by petitioner "campo in the instant cases since the loan of (11.E million transferred ownership and custody of the funds, which included the sum of money allegedly mal#ersed, to 2T6' for which "campo could no longer be held accountable. Thus, contrary to the allegation of the "ffice of the Special (rosecutor, petitioner "campo cannot be held culpable for mal#ersation committed through negligence in adopting measures to safeguard the money of the (ro#ince of Tarlac, since the same were neither in his custody nor was he accountable therefor after the loan to 2T6'. o Thus, petitioner 6lores, as the e,ecuti#e director of 2T6', cannot also be held liable for mal#ersation of public funds in a contract of loan which transferred ownership of the funds to 2T6' ma)ing them pri#ate in character. 2iwanag #. *ourt of !ppeals 22 held: . . . in a contract of loan once the money is recei#ed by the debtor, ownership o#er the same is transferred. 1eing the owner, the borrower can dispose of it for whate#er purpose he may deem proper. &hat is controlling in the instant cases is that the parties entered into a contract of loan for each release of 5!2/D funds. The second release on "ctober 27, 1?HH included the sub.ect funds in contro#ersy. 1y #irtue of the contract of loan, ownership of the sub.ect funds was transferred to 2T6' ma)ing them pri#ate in character, and therefore not sub.ect of the instant cases of mal#ersation of public funds.
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Mal#ersation is defined and penali+ed under !rticle 21B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The acts punished as mal#ersation are: ;1< appropriating public funds or property, ;2< ta)ing or misappropriating the same, ;3< consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to ta)e such public funds or property, and ;7< being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or mal#ersation of such funds or property. o 4#idently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. !t the time of the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, 1ohol. 1y reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. o The -uestion then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, too) or misappropriated, or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to ta)e such funds.
'n mal#ersation, all that is necessary to pro#e is that the defendant recei#ed in his possession public funds= that he could not account for them and did not ha#e them in his possession= and that he could not gi#e a reasonable e,cuse for its disappearance. !n accountable public officer may be con#icted of mal#ersation e#en if there is no direct e#idence of misappropriation and the only e#idence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to e,plain satisfactorily. Gerily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of mal#ersation e#en if there is no direct e#idence of mal#ersation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which ha#e come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authori+ed to e,amine his accounts is prima facie case of con#ersion. 1ecause of the prima facie presumption in !rticle 21B, the burden of e#idence is shifted to the accused to ade-uately e,plain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. 6ailing to do so, the accused may be con#icted under the said pro#ision. owe#er, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may o#ercome the presumption by proof to the contrary. 'f he adduces e#idence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed.
There can hardly be no dispute about the presence of the first three elements. (etitioner is a public officer occupying the position of a supply officer at the "ffice of the (ro#incial 4ngineer of Marindu-ue. 'n that capacity, he recei#es money or property belonging to the pro#incial go#ernment for which he is bound to account. 't is the last element, i.e., whether or not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself on. 'n the crime of mal#ersation, all that is necessary for con#iction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had recei#ed public funds, that he did not ha#e them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily e,plain his failure to do so. Direct e#idence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary 1@ as long as the accused cannot e,plain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. o 'n con#icting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in !rticle 21B, supra, of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, i.e., the failure of a public officer to ha#e duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authori+ed officer, is prima facie e#idence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. !ccordingly, if the accused is able to present ade-uate e#idence that can nullify any li)elihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effecti#ely negated. This *ourt has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed= in fact, the presumption is ne#er deemed to ha#e e,isted at all. o ere, the return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to #oluntary surrender considering that it too) petitioner almost se#en ;B< years to return the amount. (etitioner has not ad#anced a plausible reason why he could not li-uidate his cash ad#ance which was in his possession for se#eral years. !s a last ditch effort to e,onerate himself, petitioner anchored his defense on Madarang 27 and !gullo, 2E where public employees charged of mal#ersation were cleared of criminal liability. o 'n these two ;2< cases cited by petitioner, we elucidated the legal presumption of assumed criminal liability for accountable funds under the last paragraph of !rticle 21B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 'n Madarang, we e,plained:
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*oncededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. 2ac)ing any e#idence, howe#er, of shortage, or ta)ing, appropriation, or con#ersion by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no mal#ersation ;5arciso #s. Sandiganbayan, 22? S*3! 22? 91??7:<. True, the law creates a presumption that the mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which ha#e come into his hand on demand by an officer duly authori+ed to e,amine his accounts is prima facie e#idence of con#ersion. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. !ccordingly, if petitioner is able to present ade-uate e#idence that can nullify any li)elihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effecti#ely negated. 2@ 'n !gullo, we amplified that: Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this *ourt has consistently and emphatically ruled that the presumption of con#ersion incarnated in !rticle 21B, paragraph ;7< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is 8 by its #ery nature 8 rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not conclusi#e but disputable by satisfactory e#idence to the effect that the accused did not utili+e the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. !ccordingly, if the accused is able to present ade-uate e#idence that can nullify any li)elihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effecti#ely negated. This *ourt has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed= in fact, the presumption is ne#er deemed to ha#e e,isted at all. 2B Dnfortunately, petitioner0s #aunted reliance on Madarang and !gullo does not pro#ide legal relief as the facts in these cases are not on all fours with his case. The accused parties in said cases were able to produce satisfactory e#idence ample enough to pro#e that the missing funds were not con#erted to their personal uses and thus, the legal presumption was effecti#ely negated. 'n Madarang, the accused, based on the *"! audit report, was charged with mal#ersation of (h( 2>,B>>.>> representing ad#ance rental payments for the lease of real property owned by the *ity of *ebu for which he was responsible as a barangay captain. &hen the accused was as)ed to account for such missing funds, he introduced con#incing e#idence that the funds were utili+ed by the barangay for its pro.ects and for the benefit of his constituents, namely: for materials for the water system of the barangay hall, barangay police uniforms, and payment for medicine. Therefore, the legal presumption was successfully o#erturned. 2i)ewise, in !gullo, the accused, who was the disbursing officer of then Ministry of (ublic &or)s and ighways, 3egional "ffice 5o. G''', *andahug, (alo, 2eyte, was charged based on audit, with mal#ersation of (h( 2@,7>7.2@ representing the salaries of the personnel in her office. The accused admitted that the funds were lost= howe#er, she was able to pro#e that she suffered a stro)e while going to her office. This was corroborated by the barangay captain of the place where she suffered a stro)e, as well as medical certificates to pro#e the illness. She was ac-uitted because the loss of funds was not due to mal#ersation. 'n contrast, petitioner anchored his defenses solely on his own bare testimony unsubstantiated by other parol, documentary, or ob.ect e#idence to prop up such self%ser#ing allegations. &ithout doubt, the rulings in Madarang and !gullo cannot be considered precedents to the case at bar because the facts in said cases are not the same or substantially similar to petitioner &a%acon0s situation.
The felony consists not only in misappropriation or con#erting public funds or property to one0s personal use but also by )nowingly allowing others to ma)e use of or misappropriate the same. 3> The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence. 31 !n accountable officer may thus be con#icted of mal#ersation e#en if there is no direct e#idence of misappropriation and the only e#idence is that there is a shortage in the officer0s account which he has not been able to e,plain satisfactorily. !ll that is essential is proof that the accountable officer has recei#ed public funds but that when demand therefor is made, he is unable to satisfactorily account for the same. o The law declares that the failure of the public officer to account for such public funds or property upon demand by any duly%authori+ed officer shall be prima facie e#idence that he has appropriated the same for his personal use. ! public officer may be liable for mal#ersation e#en if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the ta)ing thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such ta)ing. o The prosecution is burdened to pro#e beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial e#idence, that the public officer appropriated, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to ta)e public property or public funds under his custody.
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!bsent such e#idence, the public officer cannot be held criminally liable for mal#ersation. 2B Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of con#ersion= neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn o#er the funds at any gi#en time sufficient to ma)e e#en the prima facie case. 'n fine, con#ersion must be pro#ed. 2H owe#er, an accountable officer may be con#icted of mal#ersation e#en in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is e#idence of shortage in his account which he is unable to e,plain. Demand to produce public funds under a public officer0s custody is not an essential element of the felony. The law creates a prima facie presumption of conni#ance if the public officer fails to produce public funds under his custody upon demand therefor. owe#er, the presumption may be rebutted by e#idence that the public officer had fully accounted for the alleged cash shortage.
M!2G43S!T'"5 "6 (D12'* 6D5DS "3 (3"(43TJ= 424M45TS. 8 The elements of mal#ersation, essential for the con#iction of an accused under the abo#e penal pro#ision are: 1. That the offender is a public officer= 2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office= 3. That the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable= and 7. That he appropriated, too), misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to ta)e them. !a4*S o !**"D5T!124 "66'*43 544D 5"T 14 ! 1"5D4D "66'*'!2. 8 !n accountable public officer, within the pur#iew of !rticle 21B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. To be liable for mal#ersation, an accountable officer need not be a bonded official. The name or relati#e importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. &hat is decisi#e is the nature of the duties that he performs and that as part of, and by reason of said duties, he recei#es public money or property which he is bound to account. o ("2'*4 "66'*43 'S !**"D5T!124 6"3 T 4 6'34!3MS 'SSD4D T" 'M & 45 4 6!'24D T" (3"DD*4 'T D("5 D4M!5D 1J T 4 (3"(43 !DT "3'TJ. 8 'n the case at bar, the deli#ery to petitioner of the firearms belonging to the /o#ernment, by reason of his office as Station *ommander of *alinog, 'loilo, (*%'5(, necessarily entailed the obligation on his part to safely )eep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were entrusted to him, and to return them to the proper authority at the termination of his tenure as commander, or on demand by the owner, the duty to account for said firearms. Thus, in 6elicilda #. /rospe, the *ourt held a police officer accountable for the firearms issued to him and conse-uently con#icted him for mal#ersation of public property when he failed to produce said firearms upon demand by the proper authority. 't must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by #irtue of her official position, or e#en a pri#ate indi#idual, may be liable for mal#ersation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or pri#ate indi#idual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit mal#ersation or illegal use of public funds or property. o The *ourt has also ruled that one who conspires with the pro#incial treasurer in committing si, counts of mal#ersation is also a co%principal in committing those offenses, and that a pri#ate person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing mal#ersation is also guilty of mal#ersation. o &e agree with the petitioner0s contention that under Section 7B7 of the 2ocal /o#ernment *ode, she is not obliged to recei#e public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the same= hence, she is not an accountable officer within the conte,t of !rticle 21B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 'ndeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. 4#en then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can ne#er be con#icted for mal#ersation under the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The name or relati#e importance of the office or employment is not the controlling factor. 27 The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he recei#ed public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not mal#ersation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. ence, a mere cler) in the pro#incial or municipal go#ernment may be held guilty of mal#ersation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
*R'+CLE 2 8 F*+L;RE $F *CC$;-'*4LE $FF+CER '$ RE-DER *CC$;-'! A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer4 $#et#er in t#e ser&ice or separated t#erefrom 2. Be must 1e an accounta1le officer for pu1lic funds or property.
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3. Ae7uired 1y la$ or regulation to render account to t#e central or pro&incial auditor. 1een 4. T#at #e fails to do so for a period of 2 mont#s after suc# accounts s#ould #a&e rendered.
*R'+CLE 2 9 F*+L;RE $F RE!P$-!+4LE P;4L+C $FF+CER '$ RE-DER *CC$;-'! 4EF$RE LE*:+-7 '<E C$;-'R3 A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer. 2. Accounta1le officer for pu1lic funds or property 3. Be must #a&e unla$fully left (or on t#e point of lea&ing) t#e -#ilippines $it#out securing from t#e auditor general a certificate s#o$ing t#at #is accounts #a&e 1een settled. ?ote3 T#is article only applies if t#e pu1lic officer lea&e or attempt to lea&e t#e country E?5A6+E55J. 5hen an accountable officer leaves the country without first settling his accountability or otherwise securing a clearance from the Commission on !udit regarding such accountability, the implication is that he left the country because he has misappropriated the funds under his accountability. 5ho can commit this crimeE ! responsible public officer, not necessarily an accountable one, who leaves the country without first securing clearance from the Commission on !udit. The purpose of the law is to discourage responsible or accountable officers from leaving without first li>uidating their accountability. .ere leaving without securing clearance constitutes violation of the Revised Penal Code. &t is not necessary that they really misappropriated public funds *R'+CLE 220 +LLE7*L ;!E $F P;4L+C F;-D! $R PR$PER'3 Mernel of t#e -ro&ision3 Money for pu1lic purpose is spent for anot#er pu1lic purpose. A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. T#ere is pu1lic funds or property under #is administration. 3. T#at suc# pu1lic funds or property #as 1een appropriated 1y la$ or ordinance. 4. Be applies t#e same to pu1lic use ot#er t#an for $#ic# suc# fund or property #as 1een appropriated 1y la$ or ordinance. H3 A city engineer $as gi&en 2** 1ags of cement for t#e repair of a certain #ig#$ay. Bo$e&er4 t#e engineer used only 1** 1ags for t#e #ig#$ay. T#e remaining 1ags 4 #e used to construct a cemented road in a near1y 1arangay $#ic# according to #im4 needed more attention. %s #e guilty of Tec#nical Mal&ersationF A3 J!C4 t#e 2** 1ags $as for t#e repair of t#e said #ig#$ay. T#e !ngr. cannot su1stitute #is o$n =udgment to t#at of t#e legislati&e 1ody $#ic# appropriated t#e money for t#e pu1lic purpose intended.
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H3 %s damage to /o&ernment necessaryF A3 ?.4 e&en if t#e pu1lic official used t#e fundsGproperty to an e&en greater use0 #e;s still lia1le. %t is not t#e damage t#at determine criminal lia1ility 0 it is t#e fact t#at t#e offender used #is discretion o&er and a1o&e $#at t#e la$Gordinance #ad determined and for $#ic# it is appropriated. $716$% 7$SE: %n an action for Aeple&in4 plaintiff o1tained a fa&ora1le =udgment and accordingly4 t#e local s#eriff $as tas<ed to reco&er t#e sports car $#ic# is t#e su1=ect matter of t#e action. Bo$e&er4 instead of depositing said car4 t#e s#eriff used t#e car and dro&e it to a 1eac# resort. Along t#e $ay4 one of t#e tires #it a nail and got flat. T#e s#eriff too< t#e car to a near1y &ulcani2ing s#op and informed t#e mec#anic t#at t#e car is go&ernment property. Jet4 despite t#e s#eriff;s statement4 t#e mec#anic canni1ali2ed t#e sports car. 6#at crime did t#e s#eriff commitF T#e C#eriff is guilty of MA5(!ACAT%.? 1ecause #e is accounta1le for t#e returnGdeli&ery of t#e sports car. H3 %s;nt t#e s#eriff guilty of t#eftF A3 ?o. T#e s#eriff $ould #a&e 1een guilty of t#eft only if t#e element of Accounta1ility is a1sent. H3 Bo$ a1out t#e mec#anic $#o canni1ali2ed t#e carF 6#at crime did #e commitF A3 T#e mec#anic is also guilty of Mal&ersation 1ecause t#e s#eriff #ad entrusted t#e car to said mec#anic. %M-.ATA?T3 -A.-!ATJ E?@!A CECT.@JK means t#at t#e <eeper of t#e property #as t#e aut#ority to apply or appropriate t#e same. Bis duty is t#e safe<eeping of t#e property. -A.-!ATJ E?@!A A@M%?%CTAAT%.?K means t#at t#e administrator #as to apply t#e property to purposes for $#ic# t#e same #as 1een earmar<ed. Administration connotes application. ?.T!3 %n Mal&ersation4 returning of t#e property $#ic# #as 1een misappropriated #as 1een considered as a mitigating circumstance. Bo$e&er4 if t#e property is returned only after se&eral years #a&e elapsed from t#e time t#e property $as misappropriated4 it cannot anymore 1e considered as mitigating.(Hui2o &s Candigan1ayan) P see AAT 1" last paragrap# 0 -resumption of mal&ersation 0 t#us an accounta1le pu1lic officer may1e con&icted of mal&ersation e&en if t#ere is no @irect !&idence of Misappropriation i.e. t#e only e&idence is t#at t#ere is a s#ortage in #is account $#ic# #as not 1een a1le to e8plain satisfactorily.
2ARUNGAO (s. SANDIGAN!AYAN an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 93107. Ma' 478 4994 @%CT%?/E%CB MA5(!ACAT%.? .+ -E>5%C +E?@C A?@ T!CB?%CA5 MA5(!ACAT%.?; ?.T %?C5E@!@ %? ?.A @.!C %T ?!C!CCAA%5J %?C5E@! TB! CA%M! .+ MA5(!ACAT%.? .+ -E>5%C +E?@C. R A comparison of t#e t$o articles re&eals t#at t#eir elements are entirely distinct and different from t#e ot#er. %n malversati#n of pu1lic funds4 t#e offender misappropriates pu1lic funds for #is o$n personal use or allo$s any ot#er person to ta<e suc# pu1lic funds for t#e latter,s personal use. %n te"/ni"al malversati#n4 t#e pu1lic officer applies pu1lic funds under #is administration not for #is or anot#er,s personal use4 1ut to a pu1lic use ot#er t#an t#at for $#ic# t#e fund $as appropriated 1y la$ or ordinance.
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Tec#nical mal&ersation is4 t#erefore4 not included in nor does it necessarily include t#e crime of mal&ersation of pu1lic funds c#arged in t#e information. Cince t#e acts constituting t#e crime of tec#nical mal&ersation $ere not alleged in t#e information4 and since tec#nical mal&ersation does not include4 or is not included in t#e crime of mal&ersation of pu1lic funds4 #e cannot resultantly 1e con&icted of tec#nical mal&ersation.
&llegal use of public funds or property is also 9nown as technical malversation. The term technical malversation is used because in this crime, the fund or property involved is already appropriated or earmar9ed for a certain public purpose. The offender is entrusted with such fund or property only to administer or apply the same to the public purpose for which it was appropriated by law or ordinance. &nstead of applying it to the public purpose to which the fund or property was already appropriated by law, the public officer applied it to another purpose. +ince damage is not an element of malversation, even though the application made proved to be more beneficial to public interest than the original purpose for which the amount or property was appropriated by law, the public officer involved is still liable for technical malversation. &f public funds were not yet appropriated by law or ordinance, and this was applied to a public purpose by the custodian thereof, the crime is plain and simple malversation, not technical malversation. &f the funds had been appropriated for a particular public purpose, but the same was applied to private purpose, the crime committed is simple malversation only. &llustration' The office lac9ed bond papers. 5hat the government cashier did was to send the janitor, get some money from his collection, told the janitor to buy bond paper so that the office will have something to use. The amount involved maybe immaterial but the cashier commits malversation pure and simple. This crime can also be committed by a private person. &llustration' ! certain road is to be cemented. ?ags of cement were already being unloaded at the side. ?ut then, rain began to fall so the supervisor of the road building went to a certain house with a garage, as9ed the owner if he could possibly deposit the bags of cement in his garage to prevent the same from being wet. The owner of the house, (live, agreed. +o the bags of cement were transferred to the garage of the private person. !fter the public officer had left, and the wor9ers had left because it is not possible to do the cementing, the owner of the garage started using some of the cement in paving his own garage. The crime of technical malversation is also committed. /ote that when a private person is constituted as the custodian in whatever capacity, of public funds or property, and he misappropriates the same, the crime of malversation is also committed. +ee !rticle """. &llustration'
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The payroll money for a government infrastructure project on the way to the site of the project, the officers bringing the money were ambushed. They were all wounded. (ne of them, however, was able to get away from the scene of the ambush until he reached a certain house. He told the occupant of the house to safeguard the amount because it is the payroll money of the government laborers of a particular project. The occupant of the house accepted the money for his own use. The crime is not theft but malversation as long as he 9new that what was entrusted in his custody is public fund or property.
Cuestion D !nswer The sheriff, after having levied on the property subject of a judgment, conducted a public auction sale. He received the proceeds of the public auction. !ctually, the proceeds are to be delivered to the plaintiff. The sheriff, after deducting the sheriffHs fees due to the office, spent part of that amount. He gave the balance to the plaintiff and executed a promissory note to pay the plaintiff the amount spent by him. &s there a crime committedE The +upreme Court ruled that the sheriff committed the crime of malversation because the proceeds of the auction sale was turned over to the plaintiff, such proceeds is impressed with the characteristic of being part of public funds. The sheriff is accountable therefore because he is not supposed to use any part of such proceeds. *R'+CLE 22 F*+L;RE '$ M*EE DEL+:ER3 $F P;4L+C F;-D! $R PR$PER'3 A. Acts -unis#ed 1. >y failing to ma<e payment 1y a pu1lic officer $#o is under t#e o1ligation to ma<e suc# payment from t#e /o&ernment funds in #is possession. 2. >y refusing to ma<e deli&ery 1y a pu1lic officer $#o #as 1een ordered 1y competent aut#ority to deli&ery any property in #is custody or under #is administration. >. !lements 1. T#e pu1lic officer #as /o&ernment funds in #is possession. 2. T#at #e is under o1ligation to ma<e payment from suc# funds 3. +ails to ma<e t#e payment maliciously *R'+CLE 222 $FF+CER! +-CL;DED +- '<E PRECED+-7 PR$:+!+$-! T#e pro&isions of t#is c#apter s#all apply to3 1. -ri&ate indi&iduals $#o in any capacity $#ate&er4 #a&e c#arge of any insular4 pro&incial or municipal funds4 re&enues4 or property and 2. Administrator or depository of funds or property attac#ed4 sei2ed or deposited 1y pu1lic aut#ority4 e&en if suc# property 1elongs to a pri&ate indi&idual. 0 C#eriffs and recei&ers are considered administrators
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0 Dudicial administrator (appointed 1y t#e court to administer t#e estate of t#e deceased) not considered as administrator.
Chapter F#(e INFIDELITY OF 2U!LIC OFFICERS

!e"ti#n $ne% & +n0i(elity in t/e ".st#(y #0 )ris#ners *R'+CLE 221 C$--+:+-7 9+'< $R C$-!E-'+-7 '$ E:*!+$A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Bad in #is custody or c#arge a prisoner4 eit#er detention prisoners &r prisoner 1y final =udgement 3. Cuc# prisoner escaped from #is custody 4. T#at #e $as in conni&ance $it# t#e prisoner in t#e latter;s escape
*R'+CLE 22, E:*!+$- '<R$;7< -E7L+7E-CE A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Be is c#arged $it# t#e custody of a prisoner4 eit#er detention prisoners or prisoner 1y final =udgement 3. T#at suc# prisoner escaped t#roug# #is negligence *R'+CLE 222 E!C*PE $F PR+!$-ER ;-DER '<E C;!'$D3 $F * PER!$- -$' * P;4L+C $FF+CER A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pr#(ate pers&n 2. T#at #e #as in #is %*st&$' of a prisoner or person under arrest #s %&n"#$e$ t& 0 t#us4 Art 225 not applica1le if t#e pri&ate person ma<es t#e arrest 3. T#at t#e prisoner or person under arrest escapes 4. T#e offender consents to t#e escape of t#e prisoner or person under arrest4 or escape ta<es place t#roug# #is negligence The crime is infidelity in the custody of prisoners if the offender involved is the custodian of the prisoner. &f the offender who aided or consented to the prisonerHs escaping from confinement, whether the prisoner is a convict or a detention prisoner, is not the custodian, the crime is delivering prisoners from jail under !rticle1$4.
h#m
t#at t#e
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The crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners can be committed only by the custodian of a prisoner. &f the jail guard who allowed the prisoner to escape is already off duty at that time and he is no longer the custodian of the prisoner, the crime committed by him is delivering prisoners from jail. /ote that you do not apply here the principle of conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all. The party who is not the custodian who conspired with the custodian in allowing the prisoner to escape does not commit infidelity in the custody of the prisoner. He commits the crime of delivering prisoners from jail.
Cuestion D !nswer &f a private person approached the custodian of the prisoner and for a certain consideration, told the custodian to leave the door of the cell unloc9ed for the prisoner to escape. 5hat crime had been committedE &t is not infidelity in the custody of prisoners because as far as the private person is concerned, this crime is delivering prisoners from jail. The infidelity is only committed by the custodian. This crime can be committed also by a private person if the custody of the prisoner has been confided to a private person. &llustration' ! policeman escorted a prisoner to court. !fter the court hearing, this policeman was shot at with a view to liberate the prisoner from his custody. The policeman fought the attac9er but he was fatally wounded. 5hen he could no longer control the prisoner, he went to a nearby house, tal9ed to the head of the family of that house and as9ed him if he could give the custody of the prisoner to him. He said yes. !fter the prisoner was handcuffed in his hands, the policeman expired. Thereafter, the head of the family of that private house as9ed the prisoner if he could afford to give something so that he would allow him to go. The prisoner said, IFes, if you would allow me to leave, you can come with me and & will give the money to you.J This private persons went with the prisoner and when the money was given, he allowed him to go. 5hat crimeLs had been committedE ,nder !rticle ""$, the crime can be committed by a private person to whom the custody of a prisoner has been confided. 5here such private person, while performing a private function by virtue of a provision of law, shall accept any consideration or gift for the non performance of a duty confided to him, ?ribery is also committed. +o the crime committed by him is infidelity in the custody of prisoners and bribery. &f the crime is delivering prisoners from jail, bribery is just a means, under !rticle 1$4, that would call for the imposition of a heavier penalty, but not a separate charge of bribery under !rticle 1$4.
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?ut under !rticle ""$ in infidelity, what is basically punished is the breach of trust because the offender is the custodian. 7or that, the crime is infidelity. &f he violates the trust because of some consideration, bribery is also committed. ! higher degree of vigilance is re>uired. 7ailure to do so will render the custodian liable. The prevailing ruling is against laxity in the handling of prisoners. &llustration' ! prison guard accompanied the prisoner in the toilet. 5hile answering the call of nature, police officer waiting there, until the prisoner escaped. Police officer was accused of infidelity. There is no criminal liability because it does not constitute negligence. /egligence contemplated here refers to deliberate abandonment of duty. /ote, however, that according to a recent +upreme Court ruling, failure to accompany lady prisoner in the comfort room is a case of negligence and therefore the custodian is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner. Prison guard should not go to any other place not officially called for. This is a case of infidelity in the custody of prisoner through negligence under !rticle ""2. !e"ti#n 'w#% & +n0i(elity in t/e ".st#(y #0 (#".ment *R'+CLE 225 REM$:*LA C$-CE*LME-' $R DE!'R;C'+$- $F D$C;ME-'! A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Be a1stracts4 destroys or conceals a document or paper 3. T#at t#e said document or paper s#ould #a&e 1een entrusted to suc# officer 1y reason of #is pu1lic office 4. T#e damage $#et#er serious or not4 to a t#ird party or to t#e pu1lic interest s#ould #a&e 1een caused 0 @amage may mean mere alarm or in t#e alienation of its confidencein t#e go&;t Crimes falling under the section on infidelity in the custody of public documents can only be committed by the public officer who is made the custodian of the document in his official capacity. &f the officer was placed in possession of the document but it is not his duty to be the custodian thereof, this crime is not committed. &llustration' ! letter is entrusted to a postmaster for transmission of a registered letter to another. The postmaster opened the letter and finding the money, extracted the same. The crime committed is infidelity in the custody of the public document because under !rticle ""4, the law refers also to papers entrusted to public officer involved and currency note is considered to be within the term paper although it is not a document.
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5ith respect to official documents, infidelity is committed by destroying the document, or removing the document or concealing the document. Bamage to public interest is necessary. However, material damage is not necessary. &llustration' &f any citi8en goes to a public office, desiring to go over public records and the custodian of the records had concealed the same so that this citi8en is re>uired to go bac9 for the record to be ta9en out, the crime of infidelity is already committed by the custodian who removed the records and 9ept it in a place where it is not supposed to be 9ept. Here, it is again the breach of public trust which is punished. !lthough there is no material damage caused, mere delay in rendering public service is considered damage. Removal of public records by the custodian does not re>uire that the record be brought out of the premises where it is 9ept. &t is enough that the record be removed from the place where it should be and transferred to another place where it is not supposed to be 9ept. &f damage is caused to the public service, the public officer is criminally liable for infidelity in the custody of official documents. Bistinction between infidelity in the custody of public document, estafa and malicious mischief &n infidelity in the custody of public document, the offender is the custodian of the official document removed or concealed. &n estafa, the offender is not the custodian of the document removed or concealed. &n malicious mischief, the offender purposely destroyed and damaged the propertyLdocument.
5here in case for bribery or corruption, the monetary considerations was mar9ed as exhibits, such considerations ac>uires the nature of a document such that if the same would be spent by the custodian the crime is not malversation but &nfidelity in the custody of public records, because the money adduced as exhibits parta9e the nature of a document and not as money. !lthough such monetary consideration ac>uires the nature of a document, the best evidence rule does not apply here. )xample, photocopies may be presented in evidence. *R'+CLE 226 $FF+CER 4RE*E+-7 !E*L A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. C#arged $it# t#e custody of papers or property 3. T#ese papers or property are sealed 1y proper aut#ority 4. Be 1rea<s t#e seal or permits it to 1e 1ro<en
Page 8
&f the official document is sealed or otherwise placed in an official envelope, the element of damage is not re>uired. The mere brea9ing of the seal or the mere opening of the document would already bring about infidelity even though no damage has been suffered by anyone or by the public at large. The offender does not have to misappropriate the same. 0ust trying to discover or loo9 what is inside is infidelity already. The act is punished because if a document is entrusted to the custody of a public officer in a sealed or closed envelope, such public officer is supposed not to 9now what is inside the same. &f he would brea9 the seal or open the closed envelop, indications would be that he tried to find out the contents of the document. 7or that act, he violates the confidence or trust reposed on him. ! crime is already committed regardless of whether the contents of the document are secret or private. &t is enough that it is entrusted to him in a sealed form or in a closed envelope and he bro9e the seal or opened the envelop. Public trust is already violated if he managed to loo9 into the contents of the document. Bistinction between infidelity and theft There is infidelity if the offender opened the letter but did not ta9e the same. There is theft if there is intent to gain when the offender too9 the money.
/ote that he document must be complete in legal sense. &f the writings are mere form, there is no crime. &llustration' !s regard the payroll, which has not been signed by the .ayor, no infidelity is committed because the document is not yet a payroll in the legal sense since the document has not been signed yet. &n Mbrea9ing of sealM, the word Mbrea9ingM should not be given a literal meaning. )ven if actually, the seal was not bro9en, because the custodian managed to open the parcel without brea9ing the seal. *R'+CLE 228 $PE-+-7 CL$!ED D$C;ME-'! A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. T#e closed paper4 document4 or o1=ect are entrusted to #is custody 3. T#at #e opens or permits to 1e opened said closed papers4 documents or o1=ects 4. Be does not #a&e proper aut#ority !e"ti#n '/ree% & Revelati#n #0 se"rets *R'+CLE 229 RE:EL*'+$- $F !ECRE'! 43 *- $FF+CER
Page 82
A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. >y re&ealing any secret (secret must affect pu1lic interest) <no$n to t#e offending pu1lic officer 1y reason of #is official capacity a. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 1. Mno$s a secret 1y reason of #is official capacity c. Ae&eals t#e secret $it#out aut#ority or =ustifia1le reason d. T#e damage4 great or small4 1e caused to t#e pu1lic interest and 2. >y deli&ering $rongfully papers or copies of papers of $#ic# #e may #a&e c#arge $#ic# s#ould not #a&e 1een pu1lis#ed a. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 1. C#arge of papers c. T#at t#ose papers s#ould #a&e not #a&e 1een pu1lis#ed d. Be deli&ers t#ose papers or copies t#ereof to a t#ird person e. @eli&ery is $rongful f. @amage is caused to pu1lic interest
*R'+CLE 210 P;4L+C $FF+CER RE:E*L+-7 !ECRE'! $F PR+:*'E +-D+:+D;*L A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Mno$s a secret of a pri&ate indi&idual 1y reason of #is office 3. Ae&eals t#e secret $it#out aut#ority or =ustifia1le reason
Chapter S#= OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES !Y 2U!LIC OFFICERS

*R'+CLE 21 $PE- D+!$4ED+E-CE A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a =udicial or e8ecuti&e officer 2. T#at t#ere is =udgement4 decision or order of a superior aut#ority 3. T#at suc# =udgement4 decision or order $as made $it#in t#e scope of t#e =urisdiction of t#e superior aut#ority and issued $it# all legal formalities 4. T#at t#e offender $it#out any legal =ustification openly refuses to e8ecute t#e said =udgement4 decision or order4 $#ic# #e is duty 1ound to o1ey *R'+CLE 212 D+!$4ED+E-CE '$ $RDER $F !;PER+$R $FF+CER!A 9<E- !*+D $RDER 9*! !;!PE-DED 4; +-FER+$R $FF+CER A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. An order $as issued 1y #is superior for e8ecution 3. Be #as for any reason suspended t#e e8ecution of t#e order 4. Bis superior disappro&es t#e suspension of t#e e8ecution of t#e order 5. T#e offender diso1eys #is superior despite t#e disappro&al of t#e suspension
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0 T#is article does not apply if t#e order of t#e superior is illegal *R'+CLE 211 REF;!*L '$ *!!+!'*-CE A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. T#at a competent aut#ority demands from t#e offender t#at #e lends #is cooperation to$ards t#e administration of =ustice or ot#er pu1lic ser&ice 3. .ffender fails to comply maliciously !ny public officer who, upon being re>uested to render public assistance within his official duty to render and he refuses to render the same when it is necessary in the administration of justice or for public service, may be prosecuted for refusal of assistance. This is a crime, which a policeman may commit when, being subpoenaed to appear in court in connection with a crime investigated by him but because of some arrangement with the offenders, the policeman does not appear in court anymore to testify against the offenders. He tried to assail the subpoena so that ultimately the case would be dismissed. &t was already held that the policeman could be prosecuted under this crime of refusal of assistance and not that of dereliction of duty. &llustration' ! government physician, who had been subpoenaed to appear in court to testify in connection with physical injury cases or cases involving human lives, does not want to appear in court to testify. He may be charged for refusal of assistance. !s long as they have been properly notified by subpoena and they disobeyed the subpoena, they can be charged always if it can be shown that they are deliberately refusing to appear in court. &t is not always a case or in connection with the appearance in court that this crime may be committed. !ny refusal by the public officer to render assistance when demanded by competent public authority, as long as the assistance re>uested from them is within their duty to render and that assistance is needed for public service, the public officers who are refusing deliberately may be charged with refusal of assistance. /ote that the re>uest must come from one public officer to another. &llustration' ! fireman was as9ed by a private person for services but was refused by the former for lac9 of IconsiderationJ. &t was held that the crime is not refusal of assistance because the re>uest did not come from a public authority. ?ut if the fireman was ordered by the authority to put out the fire and he refused, the crime is refusal of assistance.
Page 8,
&f he receives consideration therefore, bribery is committed. ?ut mere demand will fall under the prohibition under the provision of Republic !ct /o. :@1< #!nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct%. *R'+CLE 21, REF;!*L '$ D+!C<*R7E ELEC'+:E $FF+CE A. !lements 1. .ffender is elected 1y popular election to a pu1lic office 2. Aefuses to 1e s$orn in or to disc#arge t#e duties of said office 3. T#ere is no legal moti&e for suc# refusal to 1e s$orn in or disc#arge t#e duties of said office
*R'+CLE 212 M*L'RE*'ME-' $F PR+!$-ER! A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer or employee 2. Be #as under #is c#arge a prisoner or detention prisoner 3. Be maltreats t#e prisoner in any of t#e follo$ing manner a. >y o&erdoing #imself in t#e correction or #andling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under #is c#arge4 eit#er3 0 imposition of punis#ments not aut#ori2ed 1y t#e regulations 0 inflicting suc# punis#ments (t#ose aut#ori2ed) in a cruel and #umiliating manner 4. maltreating suc# prisoner to e8tort a confession4 or to o1tain some information from t#e prisoner 0 .ffender may also 1e lia1le for p#ysical in=uries or damage caused4 aside from incurring lia1ility from t#is article. This is committed only by such public officer charged with direct custody of the prisoner. /ot all public officer can commit this offense. &f the public officer is not the custodian of the prisoner, and he manhandles the latter, the crime is physical injuries. The maltreatment does not really re>uire physical injuries. !ny 9ind of punishment not authori8ed or though authori8ed if executed in excess of the prescribed degree. &llustration' .a9e him drin9 dirty water, sit on ice, eat on a can, ma9e him strip, hang a sign on his nec9 saying IsnatcherJ. ?ut if as a result of the maltreatment, physical injuries were caused to the prisoner, a separate crime for the physical injuries shall be filed. Fou do not complex the crime of physical injuries with the maltreatment because the way !rticle ":$ is worded, it prohibits the complexing of the crime.
Page 82
&f the maltreatment was done in order to extort confession, therefore, the constitutional right of the prisoner is further violated. The penalty is >ualified to the next higher degree. The offended party here must be a prisoner in the legal sense. The mere fact that a private citi8en had been apprehended or arrested by a law enforcer does not constitute him a prisoner. To be a prisoner, he must have been boo9ed and incarcerated no matter how short it is. &llustration' ! certain snatcher was arrested by a law enforcer, brought to the police precinct, turned over to the custodian of that police precinct. )very time a policeman entered the police precinct, he would as9, I5hat is this fellow doing hereE 5hat crime has he committedEJ. The other policeman would then tell, IThis fellow is a snatcher.J +o every time a policeman would come in, he would inflict injury to him. This is not maltreatment of prisoner because the offender is not the custodian. The crime is only physical injuries. ?ut if the custodian is present there and he allowed it, then he will be liable also for the physical injuries inflicted, but not for maltreatment because it was not the custodian who inflicted the injury. ?ut if it is the custodian who effected the maltreatment, the crime will be maltreatment of prisoners plus a separate charge for physical injuries. &f a prisoner who had already been boo9ed was ma9e to strip his clothes before he was put in the detention cell so that when he was placed inside the detention cell, he was already na9ed and he used both of his hands to cover his private part, the crime of maltreatment of prisoner had already been committed. !fter having been boo9ed, the prisoner was made to show any sign on his arm, hand or his nec9= IBo not follow my footsteps, & am a thief.J That is maltreatment of prisoner if the offended party had already been boo9ed and incarcerated no matter how short, as a prisoner. ?efore this point in time, when he is not yet a prisoner, the act of hanging a sign on his nec9 will only amount to slander because the idea is to cast dishonor. !ny injury inflicted upon him will only give rise to the crime of physical injuries. !e"ti#n 'w#% & *nti"i)ati#nA )r#l#ngati#n an( aban(#nment #0 t/e (.ties an( )#wers #0 ).bli" #00i"e% *R'+CLE 215 *-'+C+P*'+$- $F D;'+E! $F * P;4L+C $FF+CE A. !lements 1. T#e offender is entitled to #old pu1lic office or employment4 eit#er 1y election or appointment 2. T#at t#e la$ re7uires t#at #e s#ould 1e first s$orn in andGor s#ould first gi&e a 1ond 3. T#at #e assumes t#e performance of t#e duties and po$er of suc# office
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4. T#at #e #as not ta<en #is oat# of office andGor gi&es t#e 1ond re7uired *R'+CLE 216 PR$L$-7+-7 PERF$RM*-CE $F D;'+E! *-D P$9ER! A. !lements 1. .ffender is #olding a pu1lic office4 employment or commission 2. T#e period pro&ided 1y la$4 regulation4 or special pro&ision for #olding suc# office #as already e8pired 3. T#at #e continues to e8ercise t#e duties and po$ers of suc# office *R'+CLE 218 *4*-D$-ME-' $F $FF+CE $R P$!+'+$A. !lements 1. .ffender is a pu1lic officer 2. Be formally resigns from #is position 3. Bis resignation #as not yet 1een accepted 4. Be a1andons #is office to t#e detriment of t#e pu1lic ser&ices 0 .ffense is 7ualified if t#e purpose of t#e a1andonment is to e&ade t#e disc#arge of t#e duties of pre&enting4 prosecuting4 or punis#ing any of t#e crimes falling under Crimes against ?ational Cecurity and t#e 5a$ of ?ations .A Ae1ellion4 Cedition and @isloyalty
A,an$&nment *n$er Art. 005 $#st#n+*#she$ "r&m Ne+l#+en%e an$ t&leran%e #n pr&se%*t#&n *n$er Art 015
Art 005 6#o institute &iolations of t#e Bo$ or 1y offenses A1andons #is office to e&ade t#e disc#arge of #is duty A?J pu1lic officer
Art 015 .nly pu1lic officers $#o #a&e t#e duty to prosecution la$ @oes not a1andon #is office 1ut #e fails to prosecute an offense 1y dereliction of duty malicious tolerance of t#e commission of for t#e punis#ment of
!e"ti#n '/ree% & ;s.r)ati#n #0 )#wers an( .nlaw0.l a))#intments *R'+CLE 219 ;!;RP*'+$- $F LE7+!L*'+:E P$9ER! A. !lements 1. T#e offender is an e8ecuti&e or =udicial officer 2. T#at #e3 a. ma<es general rules and regulations 1eyond t#e scope of #is aut#ority 1. attempts to repeal a la$ c. suspends t#e e8ecution t#ereof
Page 86
*R'+CLE 2,0 ;!;RP*'+$- $F E@EC;'+:E F;-C'+$-! A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a =udge 2. T#at #e3 a. assumes a po$er pertaining to t#e e8ecuti&e aut#orities 1. o1structs t#e e8ecuti&e aut#orities in t#e la$ful e8ercise of t#eir po$er 0 5egislati&e officers are not lia1le for usurpation of po$ers *R'+CLE 2, ;!;RP*'+$- $F ?;D+C+*L F;-C'+$-! A. !lements 1. T#e offender is an e8ecuti&e officer 2. T#at #e3 a. assumes =udicial po$ers 1. o1structs t#e e8ecution of any order or decision rendered 1y any =udge $it#in #is =urisdiction *R'+CLE 2,2 D+!$4E3+-7 RE>;E!' F$R D+!>;*L+F+C*'+$A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a pu1lic officer 2. T#at a proceeding is pending 1efore suc# pu1lic officer 3. T#at t#ere is a 7uestion 1roug#t 1efore t#e proper aut#ority regarding #is =urisdiction4 $#ic# is not yet decided 4. T#at #e #as 1een la$fully re7uired to refrain from continuing t#e proceeding 5. T#at #e continues t#e proceeding *R'+CLE 2,1 $RDER! $R RE>;E!'! 43 E@EC;'+:E $FF+CER! '$ *-3 ?;D+C+*L *;'<$R+'3 A. !lements 1. T#e offender is an e8ecuti&e officer 2. T#at #e addresses any order or suggestion to any =udicial aut#ority 3. T#at t#e order or suggestion relates to any case or 1usiness coming $it#in t#e e8clusi&e =urisdiction of t#e courts of =ustice *R'+CLE 2,, ;-L*9F;L *PP$+-ME-'! A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a pu1lic offender
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2. T#at #e nominates or appoints a person to a pu1lic office 3. T#at suc# person lac<s t#e legal 7ualification t#erefore 4. T#at t#e offender <no$s t#at #is nominee or appointee lac<s t#e 7ualifications at t#e time #e made t#e nomination or appointment
9?ominate: is different from 9recommend:4 t#e latter is not punis#a1le. !e"ti#n F#.r% & *b.ses against "/astity *R'+CLE 2,2 *4;!E! *7*+-!' C<*!'+'3 A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a pu1lic officer 2. T#at #e solicits or ma<es immoral or indecent ad&ances to a $oman 3. T#at suc# $oman must 1e3 a. interested in matters pending 1efore t#e offender for decision4 or $it# respect to $#ic# #e is re7uired to su1mit a report to or consult $it# a superior officer 1. under t#e custody of t#e offender $#o is a $arden or ot#er pu1lic officer directly c#arged $it# t#e care and custody of prisoners or persons under arrest c. t#e $ife4 daug#ter4 sister or relati&es $it#in t#e same degree 1y affinity of t#e person in t#e custody of t#e offender 0 t#e mot#er of t#e person in t#e custody of t#e offender is not included 0 crime is consummated e&en 1y mere proposal 0 proof of solicitation is not necessary $#en t#ere is se8ual intercourse The name of the crime is misleading. &t implies that the chastity of the offended party is abused but this is not really the essence of the crime because the essence of the crime is mere ma9ing of immoral or indecent solicitation or advances. &llustration' .ere indecent solicitation or advances of a woman over whom the public officer exercises a certain influence because the woman is involved in a case where the offender is to ma9e a report of result with superiors or otherwise a case which the offender was investigating. This crime is also committed if the woman is a prisoner and the offender is her jail warden or custodian, or even if the prisoner may be a man if the jail warden would ma9e the immoral solicitations upon the wife, sister, daughter, or relative by affinity within the same degree of the prisoner involved. Three instances when this crime may arise' #1% The woman, who is the offended party, is the party in interest in a case where the offended is the investigator or he is re>uired to render a report or he is re>uired to consult with a superior officer. This does not include any casual or incidental interest. This refers to interest in the subject of the case under investigation.
Page 89
&f the public officer charged with the investigation or with the rendering of the report or with the giving of advice by way of consultation with a superior, made some immoral or indecent solicitation upon such woman, he is ta9ing advantage of his position over the case. 7or that immoral or indecent solicitation, a crime is already committed even if the woman did not accede to the solicitation. )ven if the woman may have lied with the hearing officer or to the public officer and acceded to him, that does not change the crime because the crime see9s to penali8e the ta9ing advantage of official duties. &t is immaterial whether the woman did not agree or agreed to the solicitation. &f the woman did not agree and the public officer involved pushed through with the advances, attempted rape may have been committed. #"% The woman who is the offended party in the crime is a prisoner under the custody of a warden or the jailer who is the offender. &f the warden or jailer of the woman should ma9e immoral or indecent advances to such prisoner, this crime is committed. This crime cannot be committed if the warden is a woman and the prisoner is a man. .en have no chastity. &f the warden is also a woman but is a lesbian, it is submitted that this crime could be committed, as the law does not re>uire that the custodian be a man but re>uires that the offended be a woman. &mmoral or indecent advances contemplated here must be persistent. &t must be determined. ! mere jo9e would not suffice. &llustrations' #1% !n investigating prosecutor where the woman is charged with estafa as the respondent, made a remar9 to the woman, thus' IFou 9now, the way of deciding this case depends on me. & can just say this is civil in character. & want to see a movie tonight and & want a companion.J +uch a remar9, which is not discerned if not persistent will not give rise to this crime. However, if the prosecutor 9ept on calling the woman and inviting her, that ma9es the act determined and the crime is committed. ! jailer was prosecuted for abuse against chastity. The jailer said, I&t was mutual on their part. & did not really force my way upon the woman. The woman fell in love with me, & fell in love with the woman.J The woman became pregnant. The woman admitted that she was not forced. 0ust the same, the jailer was convicted of abuse against chastity.
#"%
-egally, a prisoner is an accountability of the government. +o the custodian is not supposed to interfere. )ven if the prisoner may li9e it, he is not supposed to do that. (therwise, abuse against chastity is committed. ?eing responsible for the pregnancy is itself ta9ing advantage the prisoner.
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&f he forced himself against the will of the woman, another crime is committed, that is, rape aside from abuse against chastity. Fou cannot consider the abuse against chastity as absorbed in the rape because the basis of penali8ing the acts is different from each other. #:% The crime is committed upon a female relative of a prisoner under the custody of the offender, where the woman is the daughter, sister or relative by affinity in the same line as of the prisoner under the custody of the offender who made the indecent or immoral solicitation. The mother is not included so that any immoral or indecent solicitation upon the mother of the prisoner does not give rise to this crime, but the offender may be prosecuted under the +ection "6 of Republic !ct /o. :@1< #!nti graft and Corrupt Practices !ct%. 5hy is the mother left outE ?ecause it is the mother who easily succumbs to protect her child. &f the offender were not the custodian, then crime would fall under Republic !ct /o. :@1< #The !nti *raft and Corrupt Practices !ct%. Republic !ct /o. A6AA #!nti +exual Harassment !ct% Committed by any person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a wor9, training or education environment when he or she demands, re>uests, or otherwise re>uires any sexual favor from the other regardless of whether the demand, re>uest or re>uirement for submission is accepted by the object of the said act #for a passing grade, or granting of scholarship or honors, or payment of a stipend, allowances, benefits, considerations= favorable compensation terms, conditions, promotions or when the refusal to do so results in a detrimental conse>uence for the victim%. !lso holds liable any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment, or who cooperates in the commission, the head of the office, educational or training institution solidarily. Complaints to be handled by a committee on decorum, which shall be determined by rules and regulations on such. !dministrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
Page 9
T#tle E#+ht CRIMES AGAINST 2ERSONS

The essence of crime here involves the ta9ing of human life, destruction of the fetus or inflicting injuries. A( )% )he )a5in* %6 h-man li6e9 #%- have$ #1% #"% #:% #2% #$% Parricide= .urder= Homicide= &nfanticide= and *iving assistance to suicide.
/ote that parricide is premised on the relationship between the offender and the offended. The victim is three days old or older. ! stranger who conspires with the parent is guilty of murder. &n infanticide, the victim is younger than three days or A" hours old= can be committed by a stranger. &f a stranger who conspires with parent, both commit the crime of infanticide.
Chapter One DESTRUCTION OF LIFE

!e"ti#n $ne% & Parri"i(eA m.r(erA /#mi"i(e *R'+CLE 2,5 P*RR+C+DE A. !lements 1. T#at a person is <illed 2. T#at t#e deceased is <illed 1y t#e accused 3. T#at t#e deceased is t#e fat#er4 mot#er or c#ild4 $#et#er legitimate or illegitimate4 or a legitimate ot#er ascendant or ot#er descendant4 or t#e legitimate spouse4 of t#e accused. T#e essential element is relations#ipV 9Y or any of #is ascendants4 or descendants4 or #is spouse:0 all of t#em must 1e legitimate. ?ote3 Ender Art. 24 4 t#e c#ild <illed must not 1e less t#an 3 days old 1ecause t#at $ould already fall under t#e crime of %nfanticide. ?ote3 %n -arricide. Aelations#ip must 1e alleged in t#e information 1ecause t#e accused is entitled to <no$ t#e cause of t#e accusation against #im. +ailure to allege relations#ip in t#e information modifies t#e crime to eit#er murder or #omicide. H3 6#en I $as 1orn4 #is fat#er and mot#er #ad already separated. I ne&er <ne$ or e&en sa$ #is fat#er. Cele1rating #is 21st 1irt#day4 I treated #is friends to a drin<ing spree in a near1y clu1. %n t#e course of t#eir drin<ing session4 I and #is friends #ad an altercation $it# a group of men in anot#er ta1le. As a result t#ereof4 a fig#t ensued and I $as a1le to <ill one of t#e men $#o turned out to 1e #is real fat#er J. %s I guilty of parricide e&en if #e didn;t <no$ t#at it $as #is fat#er $#om #e <illedF
Page 92
A3 Jup4 I is still guilty of -arricide under Art 24 . H3 I $anted to <ill #is fat#er >. Be soug#t t#e #elp of J4 a close friend. Toget#er4 I and J succeeded in <illing >. 6#at $as t#e crime committedF A3 I is guilty of parricide $#ile J is guilty of Murder or Bomicide as t#e case may 1e. This is a crime committed between people who are related by blood. ?etween spouses, even though they are not related by blood, it is also parricide. The relationship must be in the direct line and not in the collateral line. The relationship between the offender and the offended party must be legitimate, except when the offender and the offended party are related as parent and child. &f the offender and the offended party, although related by blood and in the direct line, are separated by an intervening illegitimate relationship, parricide can no longer be committed. The illegitimate relationship between the child and the parent renders all relatives after the child in the direct line to be illegitimate too. The only illegitimate relationship that can bring about parricide is that between parents and illegitimate children as the offender and the offended parties. &llustration' ! is the parent of ?, the illegitimate daughter. ? married C and they begot a legitimate child B. &f B, daughter of ? and C, would 9ill !, the grandmother, the crime cannot be parricide anymore because of the intervening illegitimacy. The relationship between ! and B is no longer legitimate. Hence, the crime committed is homicide or murder. +ince parricide is a crime of relationship, if a stranger conspired in the commission of the crime, he cannot be held liable for parricide. His participation would ma9e him liable for murder or for homicide, as the case may be. The rule of conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all does not apply here because of the personal relationship of the offender to the offended party. &llustration' ! spouse of ? conspires with C to 9ill ?. C is the stranger in the relationship. C 9illed ? with treachery. The means employed is made 9nown to ! and ! agreed that the 9illing will be done by poisoning. !s far as ! is concerned, the crime is based on his relationship with ?. &t is therefore parricide. The treachery that was employed in 9illing ?ong will only be generic aggravating circumstance in the crime of parricide because this is not one crime that re>uires a >ualifying circumstance. ?ut that same treachery, insofar as C is concerned, as a stranger who cooperated in the 9illing, ma9es the crime murder= treachery becomes a >ualifying circumstance.
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&n 9illing a spouse, there must be a valid subsisting marriage at the time of the 9illing. !lso, the information should allege the fact of such valid marriage between the accused and the victim. &n a ruling by the +upreme Court, it was held that if the information did not allege that the accused was legally married to the victim, he could not be convicted of parricide even if the marriage was established during the trial. &n such cases, relationship shall be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstance. The +upreme Court has also ruled that .uslim husbands with several wives can be convicted of parricide only in case the first wife is 9illed. There is no parricide if the other wives are 9illed although their marriage is recogni8ed as valid. This is so because a Catholic man can commit the crime only once. &f a .uslim husband could commit this crime more than once, in effect, he is being punished for the marriage which the law itself authori8ed him to contract. That the mother 9illed her child in order to conceal her dishonor is not mitigating. This is immaterial to the crime of parricide, unli9e in the case of infanticide. &f the child is less than three days old when 9illed, the crime is infanticide and intent to conceal her dishonor is considered mitigating. *R'+CLE 2,6 DE*'< $F P<3!+C*L C+RC;M!'*-CE!
+-?;R+E!
+-FL+C'ED
;-DER
E@ECP'+$-*L
A. Ae7uisites for t#e application of Art. 24"3 1. T#at a legally married person or a parent surprises #is spouse or #is daug#ter4 t#e latter under 1' years of age and li&ing $it# #im4 in t#e act of committing se8ual intercourse $it# anot#er person. 2. T#at #e or s#e <ills any or 1ot#4 of t#em or inflicts upon any or 1ot# of t#em any serious p#ysical in=ury in t#e act or immediate t#ereafter. 3. T#at #e #as not promoted or facilitated t#e prostitution of #is $ife or daug#ter4 or t#at #e or s#e #as not consented to t#e infidelity of t#e spouse. P Ta<e note of Art 114 par 1 H3 A suspected #is $ife > of #a&ing an e8tra marital affair $it# t#e neig#1or ne8t door. .ne day4 A told #is $ife t#at #e $ill 1e #ome late 1ecause of a 1usiness meeting. Bo$e&er4 t#ere $as no 1usiness meeting at all 0 A;s intention $as merely to let #er $ife > t#in< t#at #e;s a$ay for $or< so #e can o1ser&e from a safe distance in order to confirm #is suspicious a1out #is $ife. True enoug#4 A $atc#ed as t#e paramour entered #is #ouse. After a fe$ minutes4 A follo$ed and entered t#eir #ouse and caug#t #is $ife and t#e paramour #a&ing carnal <no$ledge. A immediately got #is s#otgun and 1le$ t#e paramour;s #ead off. T#en #e turned to #is $ife and fired t#e remaining 1ullets at t#e latter;s 1ody s#redding t#e s<in and s#attering t#e 1ones of > 0 <illing t#e latter. %s t#is a case of @eat# under e8ceptional circumstances under Art 24"F A3 ?.4 1ecause A did not surprise #is spouse. A actually planned all of it 0 telling > t#at #e $ill 1e #ome late4 etc. T#e crime is murder or #omicide as t#e case may1e. T#us4 in order to 7ualify under t#e article t#e innocent spouse $it# out any ad&anced planning4 must #a&e surprised t#e guilty spouse and t#e paramour.
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?ote3 Art 24" applies if t#e innocent spouse <illed or inflicted upon t#e guilty spouse or t#e paramour Cerious -#ysical %n=uries. >ut if t#ere $as no <illing and t#e in=uries inflicted $ere not serious4 t#e innocent spouse is !I!M-T from any criminal lia1ility. H3 Ender t#e 3rd paragrap# of Article 24"4 must t#e daug#ter 1e legitimate or illegitimateF A3 T#e la$ does not 7ualify so $e s#ould not 7ualify also. 9Curprise: 0 to come upon suddenly and une8pectedly. ?ote3 Art 24" is ?.T A--5%CA>5! $#en t#e accused did not actually see #isG#er spouse #a&ing se8ual intercourse $it# anot#er. >ut t#is is a &ery restricti&e rule. %t is 1elie&ed t#at it is enoug# t#at t#e circumstance s#o$ reasona1ly t#at t#e carnal act is 1eing committed. H3 @oes se8ual intercourse include preparatory actsF A3 %n a case4 CC #eld t#at TB!A! MECT >! ACTEA5 C!IEA5 %?T!AC.EAC! ?ote3 T#e <illingG inflicting of serious p#ysical in=uries must 1e done in t#e act of se8ual intercourse or immediately t#ereafter. H3 Ba&ing surprised #is $ife and t#e paramour4 A <illed #is $ife 1ut t#e paramour =umped off t#e $indo$ and ran. A ga&e c#ase and after a <ilometer of running4 caug#t up $it# t#e paramour and <illed t#e latter. %s t#is deat# under e8ceptional circumstances. A3 Jes4 t#e disco&ery4 t#e escape4 t#e pursuit and t#e <illing must all form part of one Continuous Act. H3 A4 after #a&ing surprised #is $ife in t#e act of committing se8ual intercourse $it# anot#er4 got #is s#otgun and fired at #is $ife. Bo$e&er4 t#e $ife $as not #it 0 instead4 t#eir ne8t door neig#1or $as #it 1y t#e 1ullet and died. %s A criminally lia1le for t#e deat# of t#e neig#1orF A3 ?.4 t#e accused cannot 1e #eld lia1le for in=uries sustained 1y 3 rd persons 1ecause at t#e time of t#e firing4 t#e accused $as doing a la$ful act. wo stages contemplated #efore the article will apply< #1% 5hen the offender surprised the other spouse with a paramour or mistress. The attac9 must ta9e place while the sexual intercourse is going on. &f the surprise was before or after the intercourse, no matter how immediate it may be, !rticle "2A does not apply. The offender in this situation only gets the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, that is, sufficient provocation immediately preceding the act. 5hen the offender 9ills or inflicts serious physical injury upon the other spouse andLor paramour while in the act of intercourse, or immediately thereafter, that is, after surprising.
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Fou have to divide the stages because as far as the first stage is concerned, it does not admit of any situation less than sexual intercourse. +o if the surprising too9 place before any actual sexual intercourse could be done because the parties are only in their preliminaries, the article cannot be invo9ed anymore.
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&f the surprising too9 place after the actual sexual intercourse was finished, even if the act being performed indicates no other conclusion but that sexual intercourse was had, the article does not apply. !s long as the surprising too9 place while the sexual intercourse was going on, the second stage becomes immaterial. &t is either 9illing or inflicting physical injuries while in that act or immediately thereafter. &f the 9illing was done while in that act, no problem. &f the 9illing was done when sexual intercourse is finished, a problem arises. 7irst, were they surprised in actual sexual intercourseE +econd, were they 9illed immediately thereafterE he phrase =immediately thereafter> has #een interpreted to mean that #etween the surprising and the $illing of the inflicting of the physical in?ury" there should #e no #rea$ of time. In other words" it must #e a continuous process. The article presumes that a legally married person who surprises his or her better half in actual sexual intercourse would be overcome by the obfuscation he felt when he saw them in the act that he lost his head. The law, thus, affords protection to a spouse who is considered to have acted in a justified outburst of passion or a state of mental dise>uilibrium. The offended spouse has no time to regain his self control. &f there was already a brea9 of time between the sexual act and the 9illing or inflicting of the injury, the law presupposes that the offender regained his reason and therefore, the article will not apply anymore. !s long as the act is continuous, the article still applies. 5here the accused surprised his wife and his paramour in the act of illicit intercourse, as a result of which he went out to 9ill the paramour in a fit of passionate outburst. !lthough about one hour had passed between the time the accused discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually 9illed, it was held in People v. !barca, 1$: +CR! A:$, that !rticle "2A was applicable, as the shooting was a continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. Here, the accused, after the discovery of the act of infidelity of his wife, loo9ed for a firearm in Tacloban City. !rticle "2A does not provide that the victim is to be 9illed instantly by the accused after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse. 5hat is re>uired is that the 9illing is the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused upon the discovery of the infidelity of his spouse. The 9illing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse. &llustration' ! upon coming home, surprised his wife, ?, together with C. The paramour was fast enough to jump out of the window. ! got the bolo and chased C but he disappeared among the neighborhood. +o ! started loo9ing around for about an hour but he could not find the paramour. ! gave up and was on his way home. ,nfortunately, the paramour, thin9ing that ! was no longer around, came out of hiding and at that moment, ! saw him and hac9ed him to death. There was a brea9 of time and !rticle "2A does not apply anymore because when he gave up the search, it is a circumstance showing that his anger had already died down.
Page 95
!rticle "2A, far from defining a felony merely grants a privilege or benefit, more of an exempting circumstance as the penalty is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. Beath under exceptional character can not be >ualified by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. &n the case of People v. !barca, 1$: +CR! A:$, two persons suffered physical injuries as they were caught in the crossfire when the accused shot the victim. ! complex crime of double frustrated murder was not committed as the accused did not have the intent to 9ill the two victims. Here, the accused did not commit murder when he fired at the paramour of his wife. &nflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. The accused was held liable for negligence under the first part, second paragraph of !rticle :4$, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple negligence. /o aberratio ictus because he was acting lawfully. ! person who acts under !rticle "2A is not committing a crime. +ince this is merely an exempting circumstance, the accused must first be charged with' #1% #"% #:% #2% Parricide 3 if the spouse is 9illed= .urder or homicide 3 depending on how the 9illing was done insofar as the paramour or the mistress is concerned= Homicide 3 through simple negligence, if a third party is 9illed= Physical injuries 3 through rec9less imprudence, if a third party is injured.
&f death results or the physical injuries are serious, there is criminal liability although the penalty is only destierro. The banishment is intended more for the protection of the offender rather than a penalty. &f the crime committed is less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries, there is no criminal liability. The article does not apply where the wife was not surprised in flagrant adultery but was being abused by a man as in this case there will be defense of relation. &f the offender surprised a couple in sexual intercourse, and believing the woman to be his wife, 9illed them, this article may be applied if the mista9e of facts is proved. The benefits of this article do not apply to the person who consented to the infidelity of his spouse or who facilitated the prostitution of his wife. The article is also made available to parents who shall surprise their daughter below 16 years of age in actual sexual intercourse while Iliving with them.J The act should have been committed by the daughter with a seducer. The two stages also apply. The parents cannot invo9e this provision if, in a way, they have encouraged the prostitution of the daughter. he phrase =living with them> is understood to #e in their own dwelling" #ecause of the em#arrassment and humiliation done not only to the parent #ut also to the parental a#ode.
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&f it was done in a motel, the article does not apply. &llustration' ! abandoned his wife ? for two years. To support their children, ! had to accept a relationship with another man. ! learned of this, and surprised them in the act of sexual intercourse and 9illed ?. ! is not entitled to !rticle "26. Having abandoned his family for two years, it was natural for her to feel some affection for others, more so of a man who could help her. Homicide committed under exceptional circumstances, although punished with destierro, is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the .TC because the crime charged is homicide or murder. The exceptional circumstances, not being elements of the crime but a matter of defense, are not pleaded. &t practically grants a privilege amounting to an exemption for ade>uate punishment.
*R'+CLE 2,8 M;RDER A. !lements3 1. T#at a person is <illed 2. T#e accused <illed #im. 3. T#at t#e <illing $as attended 1y any of t#e follo$ing 7ualifying circumstances a. treac#ery4 ta<ing ad&antage of superior strengt#4 $it# t#e aid of armed men4 employing means to $ea<en t#e defense or means to insure impunity. 1. in consideration of pri2e4 re$ard or promise c. 1y means of inundation4 fire4 poison4 s#ip$rec<4 etc. d. on occasion of any calamity e. $it# e&ident premeditation f. $it# cruelty4 1y deli1erately and in#umanely augmenting t#e suffering of t#e &ictim4 or outraging (to commit an e8tremely &icious or deeply insulting act) or scoffing (to =eer and implies a s#aring of irre&erence) at t#e person or corpse of t#e &ictim. 4. T#e <illing is not parricide or infanticide. H3 %f I 1urns t#e #ouse of J and t#e latter dies4 $#at;s t#e crimeF A3 AAC.? is t#e crime. Bo$e&er4 if I 1urned t#e #ouse of J for t#e purpose of <illing J4 t#e crime is MEA@!A. ?ote3 Milling a person $it# treac#ery is murder e&en if t#ere is no intent to <ill. +urt#ermore4 if you <ill a c#ild of tender years4 its murder 1ecause t#e c#ild #as no means of defense. AE5!C +.A TB! A--5%CAT%.? .+ C%ACEMCTA?C!C 6B%CB HEA5%+J TB! M%55%?/ T. MEA@!A3 1. .nly 1 7ualifying circumstance. 6#en more t#an one of t#e circumstances descri1ed are present4 t#e ot#ers must 1e considered as generic aggra&ating. 2. T#at $#en t#e circumstances are a1sor1ed or included in one 7ualifying circumstance4 t#ey cannot 1e considered as generics. 3. Any of t#e 7ualifying circumstances must 1e alleged in t#e information. +ailure to allege reduces t#e crime to Bomicide 1ut t#e prosecution is still allo$ed to present e&idence of aggra&ating circumstances to increase t#e penalty.
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.ETAA/%?/ 0 to commit an e8tremely &icious act e.g. A $as <illed and #is undergarments $ere stuffed inside #is s<ull. > $as <illed and #is se8ual organ $as placed in #is mout#. CC.++%?/ 0 to =eer $it# irre&erence Homicide is >ualified to murder if any of the >ualifying circumstances under !rticle "26 is present. &t is the unlawful 9illing of a person not constituting murder, parricide or infanticide. &n murder, any of the following >ualifying circumstances is present' #1% Treachery, ta9ing advantage of superior strength, aid or armed men, or employing means to wa9en the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity= There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to insure its execution without ris9 to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might ma9e. This circumstance involves means, methods, form in the execution of the 9illing which may actually be an aggravating circumstance also, in which case, the treachery absorbs the same. &llustration' ! person who is determined to 9ill resorted to the cover of dar9ness at nighttime to insure the 9illing. /octurnity becomes a means that constitutes treachery and the 9illing would be murder. ?ut if the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is considered by itself, it is not one of those which >ualify a homicide to murder. (ne might thin9 the 9illing is homicide unless nocturnity is considered as constituting treachery, in which case the crime is murder. he essence of treachery is that the offended party was denied the chance to defend himself #ecause of the means" methods" form in e3ecuting the crime deli#erately adopted #y the offender. It is a matter of whether or not the offended party was denied the chance of defending himself. &f the offended was denied the chance to defend himself, treachery >ualifies the 9illing to murder. &f despite the means resorted to by the offender, the offended was able to put up a defense, although unsuccessful, treachery is not available. &nstead, some other circumstance may be present. Consider now whether such other circumstance >ualifies the 9illing or not. &llustration' &f the offender used superior strength and the victim was denied the chance to defend himself, there is treachery. The treachery must be alleged in the information. ?ut if the victim was able to put up an unsuccessful resistance, there is no more treachery but the use of superior strength can be alleged and it also >ualifies the 9illing to murder.
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(ne attendant >ualifying circumstance is enough. &f there are more than one >ualifying circumstance alleged in the information for murder, only one circumstance will >ualify the 9illing to murder and the other circumstances will be ta9en as generic. To be considered >ualifying, the particular circumstance must be alleged in the information. &f what was alleged was not proven and instead another circumstance, not alleged, was established during the trial, even if the latter constitutes a >ualifying circumstance under !rticle "26, the same can not >ualify the 9illing to murder. The accused can only be convicted of homicide. *enerally, murder cannot be committed if at the beginning, the offended had no intent to 9ill because the >ualifying circumstances must be resorted to with a view of 9illing the offended party. +o if the 9illing were at the Ispur of the momentJ, even though the victim was denied the chance to defend himself because of the suddenness of the attac9, the crime would only be homicide. Treachery contemplates that the means, methods and form in the execution were consciously adopted and deliberately resorted to by the offender, and were not merely incidental to the 9illing. &f the offender may have not intended to 9ill the victim but he only wanted to commit a crime against him in the beginning, he will still be liable for murder if in the manner of committing the felony there was treachery and as a conse>uence thereof the victim died. This is based on the rule that a person committing a felony shall be liable for the conse>uences thereof although different from that which he intended. &llustration' The accused, three young men, resented the fact that the victim continued to visit a girl in their neighborhood despite the warning they gave him. +o one evening, after the victim had visited the girl, they sei8ed and tied him to a tree, with both arms and legs around the tree. They thought they would give him a lesson by whipping him with branches of gumamela until the victim fell unconscious. The accused left not 9nowing that the victim died. The crime committed was murder. The accused deprived the victim of the chance to defend himself when the latter was tied to a tree. Treachery is a circumstance referring to the manner of committing the crime. There was no ris9 to the accused arising from the defense by the victim. !lthough what was initially intended was physical injury, the manner adopted by the accused was treacherous and since the victim died as a conse>uence thereof, the crime is murder although originally, there was no intent to 9ill. 5hen the victim is already dead, intent to 9ill becomes irrelevant. &t is important only if the victim did not die to determine if the felony is physical injury or attempted or frustrated homicide. +o long as the means, methods and form in the execution is deliberately adopted, even if there was no intent to 9ill, there is treachery.
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&n consideration of price, reward or promises= &nundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwrec9, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of a motor vehicle, or with the use of other means involving great waste and ruin= The only problem insofar as the 9illing by fire is concerned is whether it would be arson with homicide, or murder. 5hen a person is 9illed by fire, the primordial criminal intent of the offender is considered. &f the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to 9ill and fire was only used as a means to do so, the crime is only murder. &f the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to destroy property with the use of pyrotechnics and incidentally, somebody within the premises is 9illed, the crime is arson with homicide. ?ut this is not a complex crime under !rticle 26. This is single indivisible crime penali8ed under !rticle :"4, which is death as a conse>uence of arson. That somebody died during such fire would not bring about murder because there is no intent to 9ill in the mind of the offender. He intended only to destroy property. However, a higher penalty will be applied. &n People v. Pugay and +amson, 14A +CR! 2:<, there was a town fiesta and the two accused were at the town pla8a with their companions. !ll were uproariously happy, apparently drenched with drin9. Then, the group saw the victim, a "$ year old retard wal9ing nearby and they made him dance by tic9ling his sides with a piece of wood. The victim and the accused Pugay were friends and, at times, slept in the same place together. Having gotten bored with their form of entertainment, accused Pugay went and got a can of gasoline and poured it all over the retard. Then, the accused +amson lit him up, ma9ing him a fren8ied, shrie9ing human torch. The retard died. &t was held that Pugay was guilty of homicide through rec9less imprudence. +amson only guilty of homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong. There was no animosity between the two accused and the victim such that it cannot be said that they resort to fire to 9ill him. &t was merely a part of their fun ma9ing but because their acts were felonious, they are criminally liable.
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(n occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph c, or an earth>ua9e, eruption of volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public calamity= )vident premeditation= and Cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Cruelty includes the situation where the victim is already dead and yet, acts were committed which would decry or scoff the corpse of the victim. The crime becomes murder. Hence, this is not actually limited to cruelty. &t goes beyond that because even if the victim is already a corpse when the acts deliberately augmenting the
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wrong done to him were committed, the 9illing is still >ualified to murder although the acts done no longer amount to cruelty. ,nder !rticle 12, the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty re>uires that the victim be alive, when the cruel wounds were inflicted and, therefore, must be evidence to that effect. Fet, in murder, aside from cruelty, any act that would amount to scoffing or decrying the corpse of the victim will >ualify the 9illing to murder. &llustration' Two people engaged in a >uarrel and they hac9ed each other, one 9illing the other. ,p to that point, the crime is homicide. However, if the 9iller tried to dismember the different parts of the body of the victim, indicative of an intention to scoff at or decry or humiliate the corpse of the victim, then what would have murder because this circumstance is recogni8ed under !rticle "26, even though it was inflicted or was committed when the victim was already dead. The following are holdings of the +upreme Court with respect to the crime of murder' #1% Pilling of a child of tender age is murder >ualified by treachery because the wea9ness of the child due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the aggressor. )vident premeditation is absorbed in price, reward or promise, if without the premeditation the inductor would not have induced the other to commit the act but not as regards the one induced. !buse of superior strength is inherent in and comprehended by the circumstance of treachery or forms part of treachery. Treachery is inherent in poison. 5here one of the accused, who were charged with murder, was the wife of the deceased but here relationship to the deceased was not alleged in the information, she also should be convicted of murder but the relationship should be appreciated as aggravating. Pilling of the victims hit by hand grenade thrown at them is murder >ualified by explosion not by treachery. 5here the accused housemaid gagged a three year old boy, son of her master, with stoc9ings, placed him in a box with head down and legs upward and covered the box with some sac9s and other boxes, and the child instantly died because of suffocation, and then the accused demanded ransom from the parents, such did not convert the offense into 9idnapping with murder. The accused was well aware that the child could be suffocated to death in a few minutes after she left. Ransom was only a part of the diabolical scheme to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before discovery of the body.
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The essence of 9idnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or deprivation of his liberty. &f there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for some time and there being no appreciable interval between their being ta9en and their being shot, murder and not 9idnapping with murder is committed. *R'+CLE 2,9 <$M+C+DE A. !lements 1. A person is <illed 2. T#e accused <illed t#e person $it#out any =ustifying circumstance 3. T#e accused #ad t#e intention to <ill4 $#ic# is presumed. 4. T#e <illing $as not attended 1y any of t#e 7ualifying circumstances of murder or t#at of parricide or infanticide ?ote3 %n Bomicide4 intent to <ill is conclusi&ely presumed $#en t#ere is deat#. Bo$e&er4 %ntent to <ill is important in attempted or frustrated Bomicide 1ecause if t#e prosecution fails to pro&e suc# intent4 t#e crime may 1e reduced to p#ysical in=uries. H3 I sta11ed J. %nstead of see<ing medical attention4 J $ent #ome and personally treated t#e sta1 $ound. 5ater t#e $ound got infected and J died. %s I lia1leF A3 J!C4 I is lia1le for Bomicide. H3 I intentionally cut t#e arm of J. J didn;t die immediately. Bo$e&er4 1ecause t#e <nife used 1y I $as so rusty4 J suffered from T!TA?EC and conse7uently died. %s I still lia1leF A3 J!C. T#e rule is t#at t#e assailant is lia1le for all t#e ?ATEAA5 C.?C!HE!?C!C of #is o$n &oluntary act. ?ote3 T#e <illing must not 1e =ustified under Art 24). T#ere is no suc# t#ing as frustrated #omicide t#ru imprudence 1ecause $#en you say frustrated0 t#ere must 1e intent to <ill $#ic# is inconsistent $it# imprudence. H3 A and > sta11ed C. T#e $ound inflicted 1y A $as not fatal $#ile t#e $ound inflicted 1y > $as fatal. Are t#ey 1ot# lia1leF A3 J!C. %t is t#e 1urden of t#e defendants to s#o$ Homicide is the unlawful 9illing of a person not constituting murder, parricide or infanticide. ,i()in )i%n "e)ween h%mi i!e an! &h#(i al inB-rie($ &n attempted or frustrated homicide, there is intent to 9ill. &n physical injuries, there is none. However, if as a result of the physical injuries inflicted, the victim died, the crime will be homicide because the law punishes the result, and not the intent of the act. The following are holdings of the +upreme Court with respect to the crime of homicide'
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Physical injuries are included as one of the essential elements of frustrated homicide. &f the deceased received two wounds from two persons acting independently of each other and the wound inflicted by either could have caused death, both of them are liable for the death of the victim and each of them is guilty of homicide. &f the injuries were mortal but were only due to negligence, the crime committed will be serious physical injuries through rec9less imprudence as the element of intent to 9ill in frustrated homicide is incompatible with negligence or imprudence. 5here the intent to 9ill is not manifest, the crime committed has been generally considered as physical injuries and not attempted or frustrated murder or homicide. 5hen several assailants not acting in conspiracy inflicted wounds on a victim but it cannot be determined who inflicted which would which caused the death of the victim, all are liable for the victimHs death.
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/ote that while it is possible to have a crime of homicide through rec9less imprudence, it is not possible to have a crime of frustrated homicide through rec9less imprudence. *R'+CLE 220 PE-*L'3 F$R FR;!'R*'ED P*RR+C+DEA M;RDER $R <$M+C+DE '/e meaning #0 NC$RP;! DEL+C'+O in "rimes against )ers#nsL %t means t#e +ACT of t#e commission of t#e crime. REKUISITES a) -erson is <illed. 1) Accused <illed t#e person.
TAETB of deat# pro&en t#roug# @!ATB C!AT%+%CAT! or T!CT%M.?%!C of
$itnesses $#o sa$ t#e <illing.
CaseB T#e accused $ere seen 1ringing t#e &ictim to a sugar cane plantation. T#ereafter4 guns#ots $ere #eard in t#e area $#ere t#e &ictim $as 1roug#t. After t#e incident4 t#e &ictim $as ne&er seen again. T#us a case $as filed c#arging t#e accused $it# t#e crime of M%@?A--%?/ 6%TB MEA@!A. T#e prosecution merely relied on t#e fact t#at t#e &ictim $as missing after t#at incident. ?o1ody sa$ t#e commission of t#e crime. ?o 1lood stains $ere found in t#e place $#ere t#e &ictim $as last seen. ATC con&icted t#e accused for <idnapping $it# murder. CC reverse( ATC;s decision. -rosecution $as not a1le to pro&e @!ATB. -rosecution cannot rely alone on t#e -A!CEM-T%.? .+ @!ATB. T#e accused is guilty only of M%@?A--%?/.
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*R'+CLE 22 DE*'< C*;!ED +- ';M;L';$;! *FFR*3 A. !lements 1. T#ere are se&eral persons 2. T#ey did not compose groups organi2ed for t#e common purpose of assaulting attac<ing eac# ot#er reciprocally 3. T#at t#ese se&eral persons 7uarreled and assaulted one anot#er in a confused and tumultuous manner 4. Comeone $as <illed in t#e course of t#e affray 5. %t cannot 1e ascertained $#o actually <illed t#e deceased . T#e person $#o inflicted serious p#ysical in=uries or $#o used &iolence can 1e
or
identified
N';M;L';$;!O == t#ere must 1e at least four (4) persons in t#e affray. !8ample3 %n an inter01arangay 1as<et1all game4 t#e supporters of 1ot# teams suddenly 7uarreled and foug#t eac# ot#er using stones4 $ooden c#airs4 etc. in t#e course of t#e incident4 A died. T#us4 Art. 251 applies. %M-.ATA?T3 Art. 251 @.!C ?.T A--5J $#en t#e 2 groups are i(enti0ie( and #rganiIe(% T#e reason 1eing t#at if t#e 2 groups are organi2ed L t#e principle on C.?C-%AACJ $ill apply ACT of one K ACT of all. 2EO2LE (s. FERRER. SISON8 ET AL G.R. N&. 44<9C4@CC. N&(em,er 438 4997 Marcos loyalists $ere staging a rally at t#e 5uneta -ar< $#en a @%!0BAA@ 9Cory0 fan: passed 1y. Epon seeing t#e 9Cory0fan4: t#e Marcos loyalists immediately ganged up on #im and inflicted $ounds $#ic# caused t#e ultimate demise of t#e 9Cory0fan.: 5.6!A C.EAT con&icted t#e Marcos loyalists $it# t#e crime of B.M%C%@!. Marcos loyalists argued $it# t#e Cupreme Court t#at t#e crime is ?.T B.M%C%@! 1ut @!ATB in a TEME5TE.EC A++AAJ. CC #eld t#at Art. 251 @.!C ?.T A--5J 1ecause t#ere $as .?5J one person &s. t#e Marcos loyalists. +urt#er more4 t#e Marcos loyalists $ere identified and organi2edV 8 8 8 +or t#is article to apply4 it must 1e esta1lis#ed t#at3 (1) t#ere 1e se&eral persons; (2) t#at t#ey did not compose groups organi2ed for t#e common purpose of assaulting and attac<ing eac# ot#er reciprocally; (3) t#ese se&eral persons 7uarrelled and assaulted one anot#er in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone $as <illed in t#e course of t#e affray; (5) it cannot 1e ascertained $#o actually <illed t#e deceased; and ( ) t#at t#e person or persons $#o inflicted serious p#ysical in=uries or $#o used &iolence can 1e identified. A tumultuous affray ta<es place $#en a 7uarrel occurs 1et$een se&eral persons and t#ey engage in a confused and tumultuous affray4 in t#e course of $#ic# some person is <illed or $ounded and t#e aut#or t#ereof cannot 1e ascertained.
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T#e 7uarrel in t#e instant case4 if it can 1e called a 7uarrel4 $as 1et$een one distinct group and one indi&idual. Confusion may #a&e occurred 1ecause of t#e police dispersal of t#e rallyists4 1ut t#is confusion su1sided e&entually after t#e loyalists fled to Maria .rosa Ctreet. %t $as only a $#ile later after said dispersal t#at one distinct group identified as loyalists pic<ed on one defenseless indi&idual and attac<ed #im repeatedly4 ta<ing turns in inflicting punc#es4 <ic<s and 1lo$s on #im. T#ere $as no confusion and tumultuous 7uarrel or affray4 nor $as t#ere a reciprocal aggression at t#is stage of t#e incident. As t#e lo$er courts found4 t#e &ictim,s assailants $ere numerous 1y as muc# as fifty in num1er and $ere armed $it# stones $it# $#ic# t#ey #it t#e &ictim. T#ey too< ad&antage of t#eir superior strengt# and e8cessi&e force and frustrated any attempt 1y Calcedo to escape and free #imself. T#ey follo$ed Calcedo from t#e C#inese /arden to t#e Ai2al Monument se&eral meters a$ay and #it #im mercilessly e&en $#en #e $as already fallen on t#e ground. T#ere $as a time Calcedo $as a1le to get up4 prop #imself against t#e pa&ement and $ipe off t#e 1lood from #is face. >ut #is attac<ers continued to pursue #im relentlessly. Calcedo could not defend #imself nor could #e find means to defend #imself. Cumilang tried to sa&e #im from #is assailants 1ut t#ey continued 1eating #im4 #itting Cumilang in t#e process. Calcedo pleaded for mercy 1ut t#ey ignored #is pleas until #e finally lost unconsciousness. T#e deli1erate and prolonged use of superior strengt# on a defenseless &ictim 7ualifies t#e <illing to murder. Tumultuous affray simply means a commotion in a tumultuous and confused manner, to such an extent that it would not be possible to identify who the 9iller is if death results, or who inflicted the serious physical injury, but the person or persons who used violence are 9nown. &t is not a tumultuous affray which brings about the crime= it is the inability to ascertain actual perpetrator. &t is necessary that the very person who caused the death can not be 9nown, not that he can not be identified. ?ecause if he is 9nown but only his identity is not 9nown, then he will be charged for the crime of homicide or murder under a fictitious name and not death in a tumultuous affray. &f there is a conspiracy, this crime is not committed. To be considered death in a tumultuous affray, there must be' #1% #"% a >uarrel, a free for all, which should not involve organi8ed group= and someone who is injured or 9illed because of the fight.
!s long as it cannot be determined who 9illed the victim, all of those persons who inflicted serious physical injuries will be collectively answerable for the death of that fellow. The Revised Penal Code sets priorities as to who may be liable for the death or physical injury in tumultuous affray' #1% #"% #:% The persons who inflicted serious physical injury upon the victim= &f they could not be 9nown, then anyone who may have employed violence on that person will answer for his death. &f nobody could still be traced to have employed violence upon the victim, nobody will answer. The crimes committed might be disturbance of public
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order, or if participants are armed, it could be tumultuous disturbance, or if property was destroyed, it could be malicious mischief. The fight must be tumultuous. The participants must not be members of an organi8ed group. This is different from a rumble which involves organi8ed groups composed of persons who are to attac9 others. &f the fight is between such groups, even if you cannot identify who, in particular, committed the 9illing, the adverse party composing the organi8ed group will be collectively charged for the death of that person. &llustration' &f a fight ensued between "@ +igue +igue *ang men and "@ ?ahala /a *ang men, and in the course thereof, one from each group was 9illed, the crime would be homicide or murder= there will be collective responsibility on both sides. /ote that the person 9illed need not be a participant in the fight. *R'+CLE 222 P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E! +-FL+C'ED +- * ';M;L';$;! *FFR*3 A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere is a tumultuous affray as referred to in t#e preceding Article 2. T#at t#e participant or some participants t#ereof suffer serious p#ysical in=uries or p#ysical in=uries of a less serious nature only 3. T#at t#e person responsi1le t#erefore cannot 1e identified
?.T!3 T#ere is ?. C5%/BT -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C inflicted in a tumultuous affray 1ecause suc# <ind of in=ury is %?B!A!?T in a tumultuous affray. &f in the course of the tumultuous affray, only serious or less serious physical injuries are inflicted upon a participant, those who used violence upon the person of the offended party shall be held liable. &n physical injuries caused in a tumultuous affray, the conditions are also the same. ?ut you do not have a crime of physical injuries resulting from a tumultuous affray if the physical injury is only slight. The physical injury should be serious or less serious and resulting from a tumultuous affray. +o anyone who may have employed violence will answer for such serious or less serious physical injury. &f the physical injury sustained is only slight, this is considered as inherent in a tumultuous affray. The offended party cannot complain if he cannot identify who inflicted the slight physical injuries on him. *R'+CLE 221 7+:+-7 *!!+!'*-CE '$ !;+C+DE A. Acts -unis#ed 1. >y assisting anot#er to commit suicide4 $#et#er t#e suicide is consummated or not 2. >y lending #is assistance to anot#er to t#e e8tent of doing t#e <illing #imself
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HE!AJ3 %s t#e one $#o attempts to commit suicide lia1le under t#is articleF %nterestingly4 ?.. ?.T!3 Mercy <illing or !ut#anasia is %55!/A5 #ere in t#e -#ilippinesVVV *iving assistance to suicide means giving means #arms, poison, etc.% or whatever manner of positive and direct cooperation #intellectual aid, suggestions regarding the mode of committing suicide, etc.%. &n this crime, the intention must be for the person who is as9ing the assistance of another to commit suicide. &f the intention is not to commit suicide, as when he just wanted to have a picture ta9en of him to impress upon the world that he is committing suicide because he is not satisfied with the government, the crime is held to be inciting to sedition. He becomes a co conspirator in the crime of inciting to sedition, but not of giving assistance to suicide because the assistance must be given to one who is really determined to commit suicide. &f the person does the 9illing himself, the penalty is similar to that of homicide, which is reclusion temporal. There can be no >ualifying circumstance because the determination to die must come from the victim. This does not contemplate euthanasia or mercy 9illing where the crime is homicide #if without consent= with consent, covered by !rticle "$:%. The following are holdings of the +upreme Court with respect to this crime' #1% The crime is frustrated if the offender gives the assistance by doing the 9illing himself as firing upon the head of the victim but who did not die due to medical assistance. The person attempting to commit suicide is not liable if he survives. The accused is liable if he 9ills the victim, his sweetheart, because of a suicide pact.
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&n other penal codes, if the person who wanted to die did not die, there is liability on his part because there is public disturbance committed by him. (ur Revised Penal Code is silent but there is no bar against accusing the person of disturbance of public order if indeed serious disturbance of public peace occurred due to his attempt to commit suicide. &f he is not prosecuted, this is out of pity and not because he has not violated the Revised Penal Code. &n mercy 9illing, the victim is not in a position to commit suicide. 5hoever would heed his advice is not really giving assistance to suicide but doing the 9illing himself. &n giving assistance to suicide, the principal actor is the person committing the suicide.
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?oth in euthanasia and suicide, the intention to the end life comes from the victim himself= otherwise the article does not apply. The victim must persistently induce the offender to end his life. &f there is only slight persuasion to end his life, and the offender readily assented thereto. *R'+CLE 22, D+!C<*R7E $F F+RE*RM! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender disc#arges a firearm against at or anot#er person 2. T#at t#e person #ad no intention to <ill t#at person ?.T!3 Ender t#is Article4 t#ere is ?. %?T!?T T. M%55. %M-.ATA?T3 %f you disc#arge your firearm4 $it#out aiming it at anot#er person4 in a (!AJ HE%!T -5AC!4 t#e crime is ?.T @%CCBAA/! .+ +%A!AAM 1ut ALARMPP HE!AJ3 A4 $it#out intent to <ill4 disc#arged #is firearm. T#e 1ullet accidentally #it > in t#e <nee. Crime committedF Comple8 crime of @%CCBAA/! .+ +%A!AAM $it# -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C. HE!AJ3 %n t#e e8ample a1o&e4 $#at if A #ad t#e intent to <ill and t#e $ound sustained 1y > is not fatal4 crime committedF ATT!M-T!@ B.M%C%@! or ATT!M-T!@ MEA@!A as t#e case may 1e. >ET if t#e $ound is serious or fatal. T#e crime is +AECTAAT!@ B.M%C%@! or MEA@!A. %M-.ATA?T3 %f t#e firearm is ?.T disc#arged at t#e person4 t#ere is ?. CA%M! under Art. 254. 3 @isc#arge to$ards t#e #ouse of t#e &ictim is ?.T illegal disc#arge. 3 +iring a gun to$ards a #ouse at AA?@.M4 not <no$ing $#ere t#e people inside $ere4 is A5AAM under Art. 155. This crime cannot be committed through imprudence because it re>uires that the discharge must be directed at another. &f the firearm is directed at a person and the trigger was pressed but did not fire, the crime is frustrated discharge of firearm. &f the discharge is not directed at a person, the crime may constitute alarm and scandal. The following are holdings of the +upreme Court with respect to this crime' #1% &f serious physical injuries resulted from discharge, the crime committed is the complex crime of serious physical injury with illegal discharge of firearm, or if less serious physical injury, the complex crime of less serious physical injury with illegal discharge of firearm will apply. 7iring a gun at a person even if merely to frighten him constitutes illegal discharge of firearm.
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Se%t#&n T-& @@@ In"ant#%#$e an$ a,&rt#&n *R'+CLE 222 +-F*-'+C+DE A. !lements 1. A c#ild $as <illed 2. T#at t#e deceased $as less t#an 3 days of age 3. T#e accused <illed t#e c#ild ?.T!3 %f t#e c#ild is <illed 1y t#e -AT!A?A5 grandparents for t#e purpose of concealing dis#onor 00 ?. M%T%/AT%?/ C%ACEMCTA?C! C&n%eal#n+ $#sh&n&r 00 not an element of infanticide; used for purpose only of a&ailing of mitigating circumstance. ?.T!3 %t is al$ays %?+A?T%C%@!4 regardless of $#et#er t#e <iller is related to t#e &ictim or not L as long as t#e c#ild is 5!CC TBA? 3 @AJC .+ A/!. This is a crime based on the age of the victim. The victim should be less than three days old. The offender may actually be the parent of the child. ?ut you call the crime infanticide, not parricide, if the age of the victim is less than three days old. &f the victim is three days old or above, the crime is parricide. &llustration' !n unmarried woman, !, gave birth to a child, ?. To conceal her dishonor, ! conspired with C to dispose of the child. C agreed and 9illed the child ? by burying the child somewhere. &f the child was 9illed when the age of the child was three days old and above already, the crime of ! is parricide. The fact that the 9illing was done to conceal her dishonor will not mitigate the criminal liability anymore because concealment of dishonor in 9illing the child is not mitigating in parricide. &f the crime committed by ! is parricide because the age of the child is three days old or above, the crime of the co conspirator C is murder. &t is not parricide because he is not related to the victim. &f the child is less than three days old when 9illed, both the mother and the stranger commits infanticide because infanticide is not predicated on the relation of the offender to the offended party but on the age of the child. &n such a case, concealment of dishonor as a motive for the mother to have the child 9illed is mitigating. Concealment of dishonor is not an element of infanticide. &t merely lowers the penalty. &f the child is abandoned without any intent to 9ill and death results as a conse>uence, the crime committed is not infanticide but abandonment under !rticle "A4.
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&f the purpose of the mother is to conceal her dishonor, infanticide through imprudence is not committed because the purpose of concealing the dishonor is incompatible with the absence of malice in culpable felonies. &f the child is born dead, or if the child is already dead, infanticide is not committed. *R'+CLE 225 +-'E-'+$-*L *4$R'+$A. !lements 1. T#ere is a pregnant $oman 2. T#at &iolence is e8erted4 or drugs or 1e&erages administered4 or t#at t#e accused ot#er$ise acts upon t#e pregnant $oman 3. T#at as a result of t#e use of &iolence or drugs or 1e&erages upon #er4 t#e fetus dies in t#e $om1 or after #a&ing e8pelled t#erefrom A,&rt#&n L t#e <illing of t#e foetus in t#e uterus or t#e &iolent e8pulsion of t#e foetus from t#e maternal $om14 $#ic# results in t#e deat# of t#e foetus. ?.T!3 %n a1ortion4 t#e foetus must 1e capa1le of sustaining an independent life. 3 A1ortion is not a crime against t#e pregnant $oman L rat#er it is a crime against a +.!TEC $#ic# may 1e o&er or less t#an mont#s. Disting.is/ *b#rti#n 0r#m +n0anti"i(e% ?.T!3 T#e crime is %?+A?T%C%@! if t#e foetus3 1) Could sustain an independent life4 after its separation from t#e maternal $om14 and 2) %t is <illed. !bortion is the violent expulsion of a fetus from the maternal womb. &f the fetus has been delivered but it could not subsist by itself, it is still a fetus and not a person. Thus, if it is 9illed, the crime committed is abortion not infanticide. Bistinction between infanticide and abortion &t is infanticide if the victim is already a person less that three days old or A" hours and is viable or capable of living separately from the motherHs womb. &t is abortion if the victim is not viable but remains to be a fetus. !bortion is not a crime against the woman but against the fetus. &f mother as a conse>uence of abortion suffers death or physical injuries, you have a complex crime of murder or physical injuries and abortion. &n intentional abortion, the offender must 9now of the pregnancy because the particular criminal intention is to cause an abortion. Therefore, the offender must have 9nown of the pregnancy for otherwise, he would not try an abortion. &f the woman turns out not to be pregnant and someone performs an abortion upon her, he is liable for an impossible crime if the woman suffers no physical injury. &f she does, the crime will be homicide, serious physical injuries, etc.
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,nder the !rticle 2@ of the Civil Code, birth determines personality. ! person is considered born at the time when the umbilical cord is cut. He then ac>uires a personality separate from the mother. ?ut even though the umbilical cord has been cut, !rticle 21 of the Civil Code provides that if the fetus had an intra uterine life of less than seven months, it must survive at least "2 hours after the umbilical cord is cut for it to be considered born. &llustration' ! mother delivered an offspring which had an intra uterine life of seven months. ?efore the umbilical cord is cut, the child was 9illed. &f it could be shown that had the umbilical cord been cut, that child, if not 9illed, would have survived beyond "2 hours, the crime is infanticide because that conceived child is already considered born. &f it could be shown that the child, if not 9illed, would not have survived beyond "2 hours, the crime is abortion because what was 9illed was a fetus only. &n abortion, the concealment of dishonor as a motive of the mother to commit the abortion upon herself is mitigating. &t will also mitigate the liability of the maternal grandparent of the victim 3 the mother of the pregnant woman 3 if the abortion was done with the consent of the pregnant woman. &f the abortion was done by the mother of the pregnant woman without the consent of the woman herself, even if it was done to conceal dishonor, that circumstance will not mitigate her criminal liability. ?ut if those who performed the abortion are the parents of the pregnant woman, or either of them, and the pregnant woman consented for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the penalty is the same as that imposed upon the woman who practiced the abortion upon herself . 7rustrated abortion is committed if the fetus that is expelled is viable and, therefore, not dead as abortion did not result despite the employment of ade>uate and sufficient means to ma9e the pregnant woman abort. &f the means are not sufficient or ade>uate, the crime would be an impossible crime of abortion. &n consummated abortion, the fetus must be dead. (ne who persuades her sister to abort is a co principal, and one who loo9s for a physician to ma9e his sweetheart abort is an accomplice. The physician will be punished under !rticle "$< of the Revised Penal Code. *R'+CLE 226 ;-+-'E-'+$-*L *4$R'+$A. !lements 1. T#ere is a pregnant $oman 2. (iolence is used upon t#e pregnant $oman $it#out intending an a1ortion 34 T#e &iolence is intentionally e8erted
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4. T#e result of t#e &iolence4 t#e fetus dies4 eit#er in t#e $om1 or after #a&ing e8pelled t#erefrom
?.T!3 T#e &iolence must 1e %?T!?T%.?A55J e8erted. !8ample3 %n t#e #eat of a n argument4 B 1o8ed #is pregnant $ife4 6. 6 $as #it in t#e stomac# and conse7uently4 t#e c#ild $as a1orted. B is guilty of E?%?T!?T%.?A5 A>.AT%.?. H3 %s t#e accused lia1le for A>.AT%.? e&en if #e did not <no$ t#at t#e $oman $as pregnantF A3 J!C. ?.T!3 T#ere is a comple8 crime of B.M%C%@! $it# E?%?T!?T%.?A5 A>.AT%.? and -AAA%C%@! $it# A>.AT%.?. Distin"ti#n between intenti#nal ab#rti#n an( .nintenti#nal ab#rti#nB %n INtentional A1ortion4 t#ere is %?T!?T T. A>.AT. %n UNintentional A1ortion4 ?. %?T!?T T. A>.AT 1ut &iolence is inflicted. ,nintentional abortion re>uires physical violence inflicted deliberately and voluntarily by a third person upon the person of the pregnant woman. .ere intimidation is not enough unless the degree of intimidation already approximates violence. &f the pregnant woman aborted because of intimidation, the crime committed is not unintentional abortion because there is no violence= the crime committed is light threats. &f the pregnant woman was 9illed by violence by her husband, the crime committed is the complex crime of parricide with unlawful abortion. ,nintentional abortion may be committed through negligence as it is enough that the use of violence be voluntary. &llustration' ! >uarrel ensued between !, husband, and ?, wife. ! became so angry that he struc9 ?, who was then pregnant, with a soft drin9 bottle on the hip. !bortion resulted and ? died. &n ,+ v. 0effry, 1$ Phil. :<1, the +upreme Court said that 9nowledge of pregnancy of the offended party is not necessary. &n People v. Carnaso, decided on !pril A, 1<42, however, the +upreme Court held that 9nowledge of pregnancy is re>uired in unintentional abortion. Criticism' ,nder !rticle 2, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, any person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the direct, natural, and logical conse>uences of his felonious acts although it may be different from that which is intended. The act of employing violence or physical force upon the woman is already a felony. &t is not material if offender 9new about the woman being pregnant or not.
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&f the act of violence is not felonious, that is, act of self defense, and there is no 9nowledge of the womanHs pregnancy, there is no liability. &f the act of violence is not felonious, but there is 9nowledge of the womanHs pregnancy, the offender is liable for unintentional abortion. &llustration' The act of pushing another causing her to fall is a felonious act and could result in physical injuries. Correspondingly, if not only physical injuries were sustained but abortion also resulted, the felonious act of pushing is the proximate cause of the unintentional abortion.
Cuestions D !nswers 1. ! pregnant woman decided to commit suicide. +he jumped out of a window of a building but she landed on a passerby. +he did not die but an abortion followed. &s she liable for unintentional abortionE /o. 5hat is contemplated in unintentional abortion is that the force or violence must come from another. &f it was the woman doing the violence upon herself, it must be to bring about an abortion, and therefore, the crime will be intentional abortion. &n this case, where the woman tried to commit suicide, the act of trying to commit suicide is not a felony under the Revised Penal Code. The one penali8ed in suicide is the one giving assistance and not the person trying to commit suicide. ". &f the abortive drug used in abortion is a prohibited drug or regulated drug under Presidential Becree /o. 42"$ #The Bangerous Brugs !ct of 1<A"%, as amended, what are the crimes committedE The crimes committed are #1% intentional abortion= and #"% violation of the Bangerous Brugs !ct of 1<A".
*R'+CLE 228 *4$R'+$- PR*C'+CED 43 '<E 9$M*- <ER!ELF $R 43 <ER P*RE-'! A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere is a pregnant $oman $#o #as suffered an a1ortion 2. T#e a1ortion is intended 3. T#at t#e a1ortion is caused 1y3 a. t#e pregnant $oman #erself 1. any ot#er person $it# #er consent c. any of #er parents4 $it# #er consent for t#e purpose of concealing #er dis#onor ?.T!3 A,&rt#&n L maternal grandparents can only claim mitigating circumstance if t#e M.TB!A C.?C!?T!@VV
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*R'+CLE 229 *4$R'+$- PR*C'+CED 43 * P<3!+C+*- $R M+D9+FE *-D D+!PE-!+-7 $F *4$R'+:E! A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere is a pregnant $oman $#o #as suffered an a1ortion 2. T#e a1ortion is intended 3. T#e offender4 $#o must 1e a p#ysician or mid$ife4 causes or assists in t#e causing t#e a1ortion 4. T#e p#ysician or mid$ife ta<es ad&antage of #is or #er scientific <no$ledge or s<ill HE!AJ3 6ill t#e article apply if a ?EAC! assisted t#e doctorF T#e nurse $ill 1e #eld lia1le 1ut t#e penalty $ill not 1e t#e same. Reas#n w/y maxim.m )enalties are im)#se(B T#is is 1ecause of t#e use of scientific <no$ledge for t#e destruction of #uman life. Ta<e note3
RE2U!LIC ACT NO. <609 AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE8 DIS2ENSATION8 ANDJOR DISTRI!UTION OF CONTRACE2TIAE DRUGS AND DEAICES Cec. 1. %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person4 partners#ip4 or corporation4 to sell4 dispense or ot#er$ise distri1ute $#et#er for or $it#out consideration4 any contracepti&e drug or de&ice4 E?5!CC suc# sale4 dispensation or distri1ution is 1y a duly licensed drug store or p#armaceutical company A?@ $it# t#e prescription of a 7ualified medical practitioner.
&f the abortion is produced by a physician to save the life of the mother, there is no liability. This is 9nown as a therapeutic abortion. ?ut abortion without medical necessity to warrant it is punishable even with the consent of the woman or her husband. &llustration' ! woman who is pregnant got sic9. The doctor administered a medicine which resulted in !bortion. The crime committed was unintentional abortion through negligence or imprudence.
Cuestion D !nswer 5hat is the liability of a physician who aborts the fetus to save the life of the motherE /one. This is a case of therapeutic abortion which is done out of a state of necessity. Therefore, the re>uisites under !rticle 11, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code must be present. There must be no other practical or less harmful means of saving the life of the mother to ma9e the 9illing justified.
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Se%t#&n Three. @@ D*el *R'+CLE 250 RE!P$-!+4+L+'3 $F P*R'+C+P*-'! +- * D;EL ?.T!3 -ersons lia1le and t#e acts punis#a1le. J: :ho are liableH 1) T#e person $#o <illed or inflicted p#ysical in=uries upon #is ad&ersary4 or 1ot# com1atants in any ot#er case4 as principals. 2) T#e seconds4 as accomplices. $cts punishable: 1) >y <illing one;s ad&ersary in a duel. 2) >y inflicting upon suc# ad&ersary p#ysical in=uries. 3) >y ma<ing a com1at alt#oug# no p#ysical in=uries #a&e 1een inflicted. *R'+CLE 25 C<*LLE-7+-7 '$ * D;EL A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. C#allenging anot#er to a duel 2. %nciting anot#er to gi&e or accept a c#allenge to a duel 3. >y scoffing at or decrying anot#er pu1licly for #a&ing refused to accept a c#allenge to fig#t a duel -#teB b#t/ *rts% 250 an( 25 are alm#st #bs#letePP There is no such crime nowadays because people hit each other even without entering into any pre conceived agreement. This is an obsolete provision. ! duel may be defined as a formal or regular combat previously consented to by two parties in the presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who ma9e the selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight to settle some antecedent >uarrel. &f these are not the conditions of the fight, it is not a duel in the sense contemplated in the Revised Penal Code. &t will be a >uarrel and anyone who 9illed the other will be liable for homicide or murder, as the case may be. The concept of duel under the Revised Penal Code is a classical one. RE2U!LIC ACT NO. 51<9 AN ACT REGULATING HABING AND OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES IN FRATERNITIES8 SORORITIES8 AND ORGANIBATIONS AND 2ROAIDING 2ENALTIES THEREFOR Distin"ti#nB Bomicide and Ba2ingF HABING >roader 1ecause it co&ers <illing and infliction of p#ysical in=uries. @eat# is not result of intention. T#ere is ?. %?T!?T%.? T. M%554 1ut t#e defendant CA??.T impose t#e defense of no intention to commit so gra&e a $rong as t#at committed.
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HABING @@ initiation rite or practice as a -A!A!HE%C%T! for admission into mem1ers#ip in a fraternity4 sorority or organi2ation (t#us4 it may 1e a 1usiness organi2ation) 1y placing t#e recruit4 neop#yte4 or applicant in some em1arrassing or #umiliating situations suc# as forcing #im to do any M!?%A54 C%55J4 +..5%CB and similar acts or acti&ities or ot#er$ise su1=ecting #im to p#ysical or psyc#ological suffering or in=ury. ROr+an#>at#&nS L A+-4 -?-4 -MA4 .fficer and Cadet Corp of CMTGCAT. ?.T!3 -#ysical4 mentalGpsyc#ological training to determine t#e fitness of prospecti&e mem1er of A+- and -?- as appro&ed 1y t#e Cecretary of ?ational @efense and ?ational -olice Commission duly recommended 1y C#ief of Ctaff4 A+-4 and @irector /eneral of -?- L s#all ?.T 1e considered BAX%?/ under t#e act.
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H3 6#en is #a2ing punis#a1leF A3 .nly $#en t#e &ictim suffers any p#ysical in=ury or dies as a result t#ereof H3 6#o are lia1le as principals3 A3 1. .fficer and mem1ers of t#e fraternity4 sorority or organi2ation $#o actually participated in t#e infliction of p#ysical #arm 2. -arents4 if t#e #a2ing is #eld in t#e #ome of one of t#e officers or mem1ers of t#e fraternity4 group4 or organi2ation4 $#en t#ey #a&e actual <no$ledge of t#e #a2ing conducted t#erein 1ut failed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring. 3. T#e officers4 former officers4 or alumni of t#e organi2ation4 group4 fraternity4 or sorority $#o actually planned t#e #a2ing alt#oug# not present $#en t#e acts constituting t#e #a2ing $ere committed 4. .fficers or mem1ers of an organi2ation4 group4 fraternity4 or sorority $#o <no$ingly cooperated in carrying out t#e #a2ing 1y inducing t#e &ictim to 1e present t#ereat 5. +raternity or sorority,s ad&iser $#o is present $#en t#e acts constituting t#e #a2ing $ere committed and failed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring . Any person present during t#e #a2ing is prime facie e&idence of participation t#erein unless #e pre&ented t#e commission of t#e acts punis#a1le #erein. ". -resident4 manager4 director or ot#er responsi1le officer of a corporation engaged in #a2ing as a re7uirement for employment in t#e manner pro&ided #erein. H3 6#o are lia1le as accomplicesF A3 1. .$ner of t#e place $#ere #a2ing is conducted $#en #e #as actual <no$ledge of t#e #a2ing conducted t#erein 1ut failed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring 2. Cc#ool aut#orities including faculty mem1ers $#o consent to t#e #a2ing or $#o #a&e actual <no$ledge t#ereof 1ut failed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring
H3 %n $#at instances may t#e ma8imum penalty 1e imposedF A3 1. 6#en t#e recruitment is accompanied 1y force4 &iolence4 t#reat4 intimidation or deceit on t#e person of t#e recruit $#o refuses to =oin; 2. 6#en t#e recruit4 neop#yte or applicant initially consents to =oin 1ut upon learning t#at #a2ing $ill 1e committed on #is person4 is pre&ented from 7uitting. 3. 6#en t#e recruit neop#yte or applicant #a&ing undergone #a2ing is pre&ented from reporting t#e unla$ful act to #is parents or guardians4 to t#e proper sc#ool aut#orities4 or to t#e police aut#orities t#roug# force4 &iolence 4 t#reat or intimidation; 4. 6#en t#e #a2ing is committed outside of t#e sc#ool or institution3 or 5. 6#en t#e &ictim is 1elo$ t$el&e (12) years of age at t#e time of t#e #a2ing.
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?.T!3 Cuppose #a2ing is committed in t#e A!C%@!?C! of any of t#e officers or mem1ers of t#e fraternityF 6#at is t#e lia1ility of parentsF 5ia1le as -A%?C%-A5C. A!HE%C%T!C3 1) Ba&e actual <no$ledge of t#e #a2ing conducted in t#e #ouse 2) +ailed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring. ?.T!3 5ia1ility of +ACE5TJ $#o consent to t#e #a2ing $#o3 1) Ba&e actual <no$ledge of t#e #a2ing conducted. 2) +ailed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring. 5ia1le as ACC.M-5%C!C. HE!AJ3 5ia1ility of +.AM!A officers4 alumni $#o actually planned t#e #a2ing alt#oug# ?.T present $#en t#e acts constituting t#e #a2ing $ere committedF 5ia1le as -A%?C%-A5C. HE!AJ3 5ia1ility of fraternity or sorority A@(%C!A $#o $as present $#en t#e #a2ing $as committedF 5ia1le as -A%?C%-A5 $#en #e failed to ta<e any action to pre&ent t#e same from occurring. +MP$R'*-'B :ER3 D*-7ER$;!PPP T#e -A!C!?C! .+ A?J -!AC.? during t#e #a2ing L prima facie e&idence of participation t#erein as -A%?C%-A5 unless #e pre&ented t#e commission of t#e acts punis#a1le t#erein. ?.T!3 NPresen"e #0 any )ers#nO L $it#out 7ualification .-%?%.? on interpretation3 Bere4 2ers&n refers to t#e mem1ers4 officers4 sc#ool aut#orities4 etc. %t does ?.T apply to strangers. ?.T!3 Any person c#arged under t#is pro&ision s#all ?.T 1e entitled to t#e mitigating circumstance t#at t#ere $as no intention to commit so gra&e a $rong. ?.T!3 %n case =uridical persons are in&ol&ed4 e.g. corporations or organi2ations3 -!AC.?C 5%A>5!3 -resident4 manager4 director or ot#er responsi1le officer of a corporation.
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RE2U!LIC ACT NO. 364C C&$e &" C&n$*%t an$ Eth#%al Stan$ar$s "&r 2*,l#% O""#%#als an$ Empl&'ees ?.T!3 T#is is a uni7ue la$. %t is addressed to t#e conscience of pu1lic officers and employees. ?.T!3 T#ere are -!?A5 sanctions ?.T!3 To up#old t#e time0#onored principle of -E>5%C .++%C! %C A -E>5%C TAECT. /ranting incenti&es and re$ards for e8emplary ser&ices. Sal#ent "eat*res &" the la!EC'+$- 2 DECL*R*'+$- $F P$L+C3 ?.T!3 Accounta1ility to t#e people4 responsi1ility4 integrity4 competence and loyalty4 patriotism and =ustice4 lead modest li&es and up#old pu1lic interest o&er personal interest. TWO 2OINTS MA%? point3 Accounta1le to t#e people. Anot#er3 -u1lic interest .(!A pri&ate interest. !M-BAC%C3 Conflict of interest. ?.T!3 Conflict of interest is not emp#asi2ed in ot#er la$s including AA 3*1). !EC'+$- 1 DEF+-+'+$- $F 'ERM! R2U!LIC OFFICIALSS L 364C electi&e4 appointi&e4 permanent4 temporary4 $#et#er in t#e career or non0career ser&ice including military and police personnel4 $#et#er or not t#ey recei&e compensation regardless of amount. 3 t#e pu1lic officer may 1e recei&ing compensation or not recei&ing any at all. C149 t#e pu1lic officer must at least recei&e ?.M%?A5 compensation. RGIFTS L refers to a t#ing or a rig#t disposed of gratuitously or any act of li1erality in fa&or of anot#er $#o accepts it. %t s#all ?.T include unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant &alue not gi&en in anticipation of or in e8c#ange for4 a fa&or from a pu1lic officer or employee. (AA "13) ?.T!3 %n indirect 1ri1ery4 a person gi&es gift to a pu1lic officer4 #e ACC!-TC it 1ecause t#e gi&er is anticipating a fa&or in t#e future. ?.T!3 T#e gift is E?C.5%C%T!@. %t is not e&en necessary for acceptance to e8ist in t#e second sentence of t#e term /%+T. ?.T!3 9Aecei&ing a gift: distinguis# from AA 3*1) RECEIAING ANY GIFT 00 includes t#e act of accepting4 directly or indirectly4 a gift from a person ot#er t#an a mem1er of #is family or relati&e4 e&en on t#e occasion of a family cele1ration or national festi&ity li<e C#ristmas is t#e &alue of t#e gift neit#er nominal nor insignificant4 o r t#e gift is gi&en in t#e anticipation of4 or in e8c#ange for a fa&or. (AA "13)
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3*1)3 find t#e $ord mani0estly ex"essive% "133 &alue of gift is neit#er nominal or insignificant. FAMILY OF 2U!LIC OFFICIALS OR 2U!LIC EM2LOYEES 00 means t#eir spouses and unmarried c#ildren under 1' years of age. CONFLICT INTEREST Simportant definition uni7ue u cannot find t#is any ot#er penal la$T 00 arises $#en a pu1lic official or employee is a mem1er of a 1oard4 an officer4 or a su1stantial stoc<#older of a pri&ate corporation or o$ner or #as a su1stantial interest in a 1usiness and t#e interest of suc# corporation or 1usiness4 or #is rig#ts or duties t#erein 4 may 1e opposed to or affected 1y t#e fait#ful performance of official duty. ?.T!3 -ri&ate interest in conflict $it# your pu1lic position or duty. RELATIAES Speculiar definitionT 00 Aefers to any and all persons related to a pu1lic official or employee $it#in t#e fourt# ci&il degree of consanguinity or affinity4 including bilas4 inso4 and balae. -ilas L in la$ #nso L related t#roug# 1aptism etc. (godparents) -alae L parents of #us1and and $ife !EC'+$- , -$RM! $F C$-D;C' $F P;4L+C $FF+C+*L! *-D EMPL$3EE! ?.T!3 ?.T necessary to concentrate so muc# time on t#is. ?e&er 1een as<ed in t#e >AA 1ut =ust familiari2e4 enumerate. a; 7ommitment to public interest
") )
Professionalism L t#ey s#all endea&or to discourage $rong perceptions of
t#eir roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
8ustness and sincerity L you s#all not discriminate against anyone
especially t#e poor and underpri&ileged. T#ey s#all refrain from doing acts contrary to la$4 good morals4 good customs4 pu1lic policy4 pu1lic order4 pu1lic safety4 pu1lic interest. T#ey s#all not dispense or e8tend undue fa&ors on account of t#eir offices to t#eir relati&es4 $#et#er 1y consanguinity or affinity4 e8cept t#e follo$ing3 appointment of suc# relati&es to positions strictly confidential. mem1ers of t#eir personal staff $#ose terms are coterminous $it# t#eirs d; Political neutrality e; 5esponsi(eness to the public
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6) *) h)
4ationalism and patriotism L loyalty to t#e Aepu1lic and to t#e +ilipino
people4 promote t#e use of locally produced goods4 resources and tec#nology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people.
7ommitment to democracy L commit t#emsel&es to t#e democratic $ay of
life and &alues4 maintain t#e principle of pu1lic accounta1ility4 up#old t#e Constitution and put loyalty to country a1o&e loyalty to person.
Simple li(ing L t#ey s#all not indulge in e8tra&agant or ostentatious
display of $ealt#. !EC'+$- 2 D;'+E! $F P;4L+C $FF+C+*L! *-D EMPL$3EE!% (a) Act promptly on letters and re7uests. ?.T!3 -ar (a) is &ery importantV Ans$er or reply is essential or else you $ill 1e 1roug#t 1efore t#e om1udsman. (1) Cu1mit annual performance reports. Aationale3 T#ere is CJCT!M .+ A!6AA@C t#at is $#y t#ere is rating on pu1lic officers L merit system. (c) -rocess documents and papers e8peditiously. (d) Act immediately on t#e pu1lic;s personal transactions. (e) Ma<e documents more accessi1le to t#e pu1lic. A55 pu1lic documents must 1e made accessi1le to4 and readily a&aila1le for inspection 1y t#e pu1lic $it#in reasona1le $or<ing #ours. ?.T!3 -ursuant to constitutional pro&isions on access to pu1lic records. ?.T!3 A!A@VV !EC'+$- 5 !3!'EM $F +-CE-'+:E! *-D RE9*RD! ?.T!3 .utstanding merits on t#e 1asis of standards set fort# on t#e act. !EC'+$- 6 PR$<+4+'ED *C'! *-D 'R*-!*C'+$-!
%n addition to acts and omissions of pu1lic officials and employees no$ prescri1ed in t#e Constitution and e8isting la$s4 t#e follo$ing s#all constitute pro#i1ited acts and transactions of any pu1lic official and employee and are #ere1y declared to 1e unla$ful3 (a) +inancial and material interest. 0 -u1lic officials and employees s#all not4 directly or indirectly4 #a&e any financial or material interest in any transaction re7uiring t#e appro&al of t#eir office. (1) .utside employment and ot#er acti&ities related t#ereto. 0 -u1lic officials and employees during t#eir incum1ency s#all not3
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(1) .$n4 control4 manage or accept employment as officer4 employee4 consultant4 counsel4 1ro<er4 agent4 trustee or nominee in any pri&ate enterprise regulated4 super&ised or licensed 1y t#eir office unless e8pressly allo$ed 1y la$; (2) !ngage in t#e pri&ate practice of t#eir profession unless aut#ori2ed 1y t#e Constitution or la$4 pro&ided4 t#at suc# practice $ill not conflict or tend to conflict $it# t#eir official functions; or (3) Aecommend any person to any position in a pri&ate enterprise $#ic# #as a regular or pending official transaction $it# t#eir office. T#ese pro#i1itions s#all continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation4 retirement4 or separation from pu1lic office4 e8cept in t#e case of su1paragrap# (1) (2) a1o&e4 1ut t#e professional concerned cannot practice #is profession in connection $it# any matter 1efore t#e office #e used to 1e $it#4 in $#ic# case t#e one0year pro#i1ition s#all li<e$ise apply. (c) @isclosure andGor misuse of confidential information. 0 -u1lic officials and employees s#all not use or di&ulge4 confidential or classified information officially <no$n to t#em 1y reason of t#eir office and not made a&aila1le to t#e pu1lic4 eit#er3 (1) To furt#er t#eir pr#(ate interests4 or gi&e undue ad&antage to anyone; or (2) To pre=udice t#e p*,l#% interest. (d) Colicitation or acceptance of gifts. 0 -u1lic officials and employees s#all not solicit or accept4 directly or indirectly4 any gift4 gratuity4 fa&or4 entertainment4 loan or anyt#ing of monetary &alue from any person in t#e course of t#eir official duties or in connection $it# any operation 1eing regulated 1y4 or any transaction $#ic# may 1e affected 1y t#e functions of t#eir office. As to gifts or grants from foreign go&ernments4 t#e Congress consents to3 (i) T#e acceptance and retention 1y a pu1lic official or employee of a gift of nominal &alue tendered and recei&ed as a sou&enir or mar< of courtesy; (ii) T#e acceptance 1y a pu1lic official or employee of a gift in t#e nature of a sc#olars#ip or fello$s#ip grant or medical treatment; or (iii) T#e acceptance 1y a pu1lic official or employee of tra&el grants or e8penses for tra&el ta<ing place entirely outside t#e -#ilippine (suc# as allo$ances4 transportation4 food4 and lodging) of more t#an nominal &alue if suc# acceptance is appropriate or consistent $it# t#e interests of t#e -#ilippines4 and permitted 1y t#e #ead of office4 1ranc# or agency to $#ic# #e 1elongs. T#e .m1udsman s#all prescri1e suc# regulations as may 1e necessary to carry out t#e purpose of t#is su1section4 including pertinent reporting and disclosure re7uirements. ?ot#ing in t#is Act s#all 1e construed to restrict or pro#i1it any educational4 scientific or cultural e8c#ange programs su1=ect to national security re7uirements.
?.T!3 @. not 1e confused. T#ere are parallel pro&isions in 3*1) as $ell as t#e A-C. IM2ORTANT What are the pr&h#,#te$ a%ts an$ transa%t#&nsM :see pr&(#s#&n; A!A@3 Cec 3(#) of AA 3*1)VV T#is is a parallel pro&isionV 8
(#) @irector or indirectly #a&ing financing or pecuniary interest in any 1usiness4 contract or transaction in connection $it# $#ic# #e inter&enes or ta<es part in #is official capacity4 or in $#ic# #e is pro#i1ited 1y t#e Constitution or 1y any la$ from #a&ing any interest.
HE!AJ3 Teac#ing of la$ $ill it 1e in conflict $it# t#e function of a mem1er of t#e =udiciaryF ?.4 1ecause it is allo$ed 1y la$. Jou #a&e to as< permit from t#e office of t#e court administrator. T#is is pri&ate practice 1ut ?.T in conflict $it# a =udge;s pu1lic duties. ?.T!3 Ender t#e 5ocal /o&ernment Code4 t#ere are some local go&ernment officials $#o cannot practice la$. ?.T!3 -re=udice to pu1lic or pri&ate interest !EC'+$- 8 !'*'EME-'! *-D D+!CL$!;RE!
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?.T!3 .f assets and lia1ilities4 net $ort# and financial and 1usiness interests. SAT ?.T!3 -ro#i1ited acts. S@T
!EC'+$- 9 D+:E!'ME-' %M-.ATA?T3 6#at to do in case Conflict of %nterest arisesF 1) A!C%/? from #is position in any pri&ate 1usiness enterprise $it#in 3o days from #is assumption of office4 or 2) @%(!CT #imself of s#are#oldings or interest $it#in * days from suc# assumption. ?.T!3 Ae7uirement of di&estment. 6#en not appliedF 1) T#ose $#o ser&e t#e go&ernment in an #onorary capacity. 2) To la1orers and casual or temporary $or<ers. !EC'+$PE-*L'+E! ?.T!3 .m1udsman can dismiss employees e&en $it#out criminal proceedings. %s it possi1leF J!C. Ender Cec. 11 (1) of AA "13. HE!AJ3 May pri&ate indi&iduals 1e #eld lia1le for &iolation of AA "13F J!C. -ri&ate indi&iduals $#o participate in conspiracy as co0principals4 accessories or accomplices.
2RESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 4533 Ille+al p&ssess#&n &" "#rearm an$ e=pl&s#(es (As amended 1y AA '2)44 reducing t#e penalty for illegal possession) ?.T!3 %n relation to re1ellion4 insurrection4 murder and #omicide. A%ts p*n#she$ ,' 2D 4533 1) Enla$ful manufacture of firearms or ammunitions 2) Cale of firearms or ammunitions 3) Ac7uisition of firearms or ammunitions 4) @isposition of firearms or ammunitions 5) Enla$ful manufacture4 sale4 ac7uisition4 disposition of e8plosi&es ) Tampering of firearm;s serial num1er ") Aepac<ing or altering composition of la$fully manufactured e8plosi&es ') Enaut#ori2ed issuance of aut#ority to carry firearms andGor ammunitions outosde of residence. ?.T!3 Aelated L >A? on t#e use of firearm during election L /E? >A? 5A6 H3 if you carry firearm outside of your residence during elections4 $#at crime is committedF A3 T6. CA%M!C are committed3 a) -@ 1' and 1) Comelec Aesolution on /un >an
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Unl#%ense$ "#rearm includes3 1. -ossession of firearms $it# e8pired license. 2. Enaut#ori2ed use of l#%ense$ firearm in t#e commission of a crime. 6BJF %s t#ere aut#ori2ed use of licensed in t#e commission of a crimeF ?.?!. Can 1e t#at t#ere is licensed firearm 1ut it is used 1y anot#er for t#e commission of a crime. 2D 4533
Sec =. Enla$ful Manufacture4 Cale4 Ac7uisition4 @isposition or -ossession of +irearms or Ammunition or %nstruments Esed or %ntended to 1e Esed in t#e Manufacture of +irearms or Ammunition T#e penalty of prision correccional in its ma8imum period and a fine of not less t#an +ifteen t#ousand pesos (-154***) s#all 1e imposed upon any person $#o s#all unla$fully manufacture4 deal in4 ac7uire4 dispose4 or possess any l&- p&-ere$ "#rearm4 suc# as rimfire #andgun4 .3'* or .32 and ot#er firearm of similar firepo$er4 part of firearm4 ammunition4 or mac#inery4 tool or instrument used or intended to 1e used in t#e manufacture of any firearm or ammunition3 -ro&ided4 T#at no ot#er crime $as committed. T#e penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of T#irty t#ousand pesos (-3*4***) s#all 1e imposed if t#e firearm is classified as h#+h p&-ere$ "#rearm $#ic# includes t#ose $it# 1ores 1igger in diameter t#an .3' cali1er and ) millimeter suc# as cali1er .4*4 .414 .444 .45 and also lesser cali1ered firearms 1ut considered po$erful suc# as cali1er .35" and cali1er .22 center0fire magnum and ot#er firearms $it# firing capa1ility of full automatic and 1y 1urst of t$o or t#ree3 -ro&ided4 #o$e&er4 T#at no ot#er crime $as committed 1y t#e person arrested. %f #omicide or murder is committed $it# t#e use of an unlicensed firearm4 suc# use of an unlicensed firearm s#all 1e considered as an aggra&ating circumstance. %f t#e &iolation of t#is Cection is in furt#erance of or incident to4 or in connection $it# t#e crime of re1ellion or insurrection4 sedition4 or attempted coup d,etat4 suc# &iolation s#all 1e a1sor1ed as an element of t#e crime of re1ellion4 or insurrection4 sedition4 or attempted coup d,etat. T#e same penalty s#all 1e imposed upon t#e o$ner4 president4 manager4 director or ot#er responsi1le officer of any pu1lic or pri&ate firm4 company4 corporation or entity4 $#o s#all $illfully or <no$ingly allo$ any of t#e firearms o$ned 1y suc# firm4 company4 corporation or entity to 1e used 1y any person or persons found guilty of &iolating t#e pro&isions of t#e preceding paragrap#s or $illfully or <no$ingly allo$ any of t#em to use unlicensed firearms or firearms $it#out any legal aut#ority to 1e carried outside of t#eir residence in t#e course of t#eir employment. T#e penalty of arresto mayor s#all 1e imposed upon any person $#o s#all carry any licensed firearm outside #is residence $it#out legal aut#ority t#erefor. Cec. 2. -resumption of %llegal Manufacture of +irearms or Ammunition. 0 T#e possession of any mac#inery4 tool or instrument used directly in t#e manufacture of firearms or ammunition4 1y any person $#ose 1usiness or employment does not la$fully deal $it# t#e manufacture of firearms or ammunition4 s#all 1e prima facie e&idence t#at suc# article is intended to 1e used in t#e unla$fulGillegal manufacture of firearms or ammunition. Cec 3. Enla$ful Manufacture4 Cale4 Ac7uisition4 @isposition or -ossession of !8plosi&es. R T#e penalty of prision mayor in its ma8imum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less t#an +ifty t#ousand pesos (-5*4***) s#all 1e imposed upon any person $#o s#all unla$fully manufacture4 assem1le4 deal in4 ac7uire4 dispose or possess #and grenade(s)4 rifle grenade(s)4 and ot#er e8plosi&es4 including 1ut not limited to ,pill1o84, ,moloto& coc<tail 1om1s4, ,fire 1om1s4, or ot#er incendiary de&ices capa1le of producing destructi&e effect on contiguous o1=ects or causing in=ury or deat# to any person. 6#en a person commits any of t#e crimes defined in t#e Ae&ised -enal Code or special la$s $it# t#e use of t#e aforementioned e8plosi&es4 detonation agents or incendiary de&ices4 $#ic# results in t#e deat# of any person or persons4 t#e use of suc# e8plosi&es4 detonation agents or incendiary de&ices s#all 1e considered as an aggra&ating circumstance. %f t#e &iolation of t#is Cection is in furt#erance of4 or incident to4 or in connection $it# t#e crime of re1ellion4 insurrection4 sedition or attempted coup d,etat4 suc# &iolation s#all 1e a1sor1ed as an element of t#e crimes of re1ellion4 insurrection4 sedition or attempted coup d,etat. T#e same penalty s#all 1e imposed upon t#e o$ner4 president4 manager4 director or ot#er responsi1le officer of any pu1lic or pri&ate firm4 company4 corporation or entity4 $#o s#all $illfully or <no$ingly allo$ any
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of t#e e8plosi&es o$ned 1y suc# firm4 company4 corporation or entity4 to 1e used 1y any person or persons found guilty of &iolating t#e pro&isions of t#e preceding paragrap#s. Cec. 4. -resumption of Enla$ful Manufacture. 0 T#e possession of any mac#inery4 tool or instrument directly used in t#e manufacture of e8plosi&es4 1y any person $#ose 1usiness or employment does not la$fully deal $it# t#e manufacture of e8plosi&es s#all 1e prima facie e&idence t#at suc# article is intended to 1e used in t#e unla$fulGillegal manufacture of e8plosi&es. Cec 5. Tampering of +irearm,s Cerial ?um1er. R T#e penalty of prision correccional s#all 1e imposed upon any person $#o s#all unla$fully tamper4 c#ange4 deface or erase t#e serial num1er of any firearm. Cec . Aepac<ing or Altering t#e Composition of 5a$fully Manufactured !8plosi&es. R T#e penalty of prision correccional s#all 1e imposed upon any person $#o s#all unla$fully repac<4 alter or modify t#e composition of any la$fully manufactured e8plosi&es. Cec. ". Enaut#ori2ed %ssuance of Aut#ority to Carry +irearm andGor Ammunition .utside of Aesidence. 0 T#e penalty of prision correccional s#all 1e imposed upon any person4 ci&ilian or military4 $#o s#all issue aut#ority to carry firearm andGor ammunition outside of residence4 $it#out aut#ority t#erefor.
+orget t#e cases of -!.-5! &s. TAM0A?4 -!.-5! &s. HE%DA@A and A.A? &s. /.?XA5!C $#ic# $ere a1andoned 1y t#is ne$ la$ -@ 1' .$ners#ip #ere is not a defense. Cases3
2EO2LE (s. AERCHEB8 ET AL G.R. N&. 50609@C0. .*ne 478 499< T#e possession of a firearm 1ecomes unla$ful $#en t#ere is no permit or license for its #olding. T#e la$ does not prescri1e a minimum period of time for t#e #olding of t#e firearm 1efore its possession can 1e illegal. Appellants, allegation t#at t#ey did not #a&e control or management of t#e firearms is $it#out merit. T#e records s#o$ t#at t#ey <ne$ $#ere to find t#e firearms. >ot# (erc#e2 and Alda&e testified t#at t#ey soug#t co&er inside separate 1edrooms $#en t#e la$men fired at t#em. T#ereafter4 t#ey retrie&ed t#e firearms from t#e ca1inet in t#eir respecti&e rooms. T#eir story t#at t#eir finding of firearms in t#e ca1inets $as a #appenstance is simply incredi1le and not deser&ing t#e slig#test consideration of t#is court. 2EO2LE (s. AILLANUEAA G.R. N&. 445165. .*l' 478 4996 %n crimes in&ol&ing illegal possession of firearm4 t#e prosecution #as t#e 1urden of pro&ing t#e elements t#ereof4 &i23 (a) t#e e8istence of t#e su1=ect firearm and (1) t#e fact t#at t#e accused $#o o$ned or possessed it (c) #e does not #a&e t#e corresponding license or permit to possess t#e same. T#e latter is a negati&e fact $#ic# constitutes an essential ingredient of t#e offense of illegal possession4 and it is t#e duty of t#e prosecution not only to allege it 1ut also to pro&e it 1eyond reasona1le dou1t. GONBALES (s. CA an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 9770C. A*+*st 458 4996 As regards t#e penalty imposed 1y t#e trial court and affirmed 1y t#e appellate court4 $e reduce t#e same in &ie$ of t#e passage of A.A. ?o. '2)4 $#erein t#e penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms #as 1een lo$ered.
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Cince it is an elementary rule in criminal =urisprudence t#at penal la$s s#all 1e gi&en retroacti&e effect $#en fa&ora1le to t#e accused4 $e are no$ mandated to apply t#e ne$ la$ in determining t#e proper penalty to 1e imposed on t#e petitioner. 2EO2LE (s. DELA ROSA8 ET AL G.R. N&. 5<576. .an*ar' 438 4995 %t is undisputed t#at accused0appellant Aodolfo dela Aosa and #is companions $ere t#e ones $#o surrendered t#e su1=ect firearm and e8plosi&es to Maga$ad Aigor. Bo$e&er4 Aodolfo dela Aosa denies t#at #e $as in possession of said ammunitions in t#e manner punis#a1le 1y la$. According to #im4 #is real intention $as merely to turn o&er t#e ammunitions4 $#ic# $ere o$ned 1y Mumander Tamang4 to t#e aut#orities. T#e trial court percei&ed ot#er$ise. %t declared t#at since Aodolfo dela Aosa =oined t#e ?e$ -eople,s Army (?-A)4 t#ere is reason to conclude t#at #e pro&ided #imself $it# arms. And since mere possession is sufficient to con&ict a person for crimes $#ic# are malum pro#i1itum li<e illegal possession of firearms4 appellant dela Aosa must 1e con&icted. %t is of no moment t#at #e surrendered t#e ammunitions to t#e aut#orities. 6e fail to see #o$ appellant dela Aosa could 1e con&icted of illegal possession of firearms 1ased on t#e a1o&e reasoning. Cection 1 of -residential @ecree ?o. 1' punis#es any person $#o s#all Q. . . unla$fully manufacture4 deal in4 ac7uire4 dispose or possess any firearms4 part of firearm4 ammunition4 or mac#inery4 tool or instrument used or intended to 1e used in t#e manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.Q >ro<en do$n into its salient elements4 illegal possession of firearms is committed $#en t#e #older t#ereof3 (i) possesses a firearm; and (ii) lac<s t#e aut#ority or license to possess it. %n 2e&ple (. $e Gra%#a4 $e clarified t#e meaning of possession for t#e purpose of con&icting a person under -@ 1' 4 t#us3 Q>ut4 is t#e mere fact of p#ysical or constructi&e possession sufficient to con&ict a person for unla$ful possession of firearms or must t#ere 1e an intent to possess to constitute a &iolation of t#e la$F T#is 7uery assumes significance for illegal possession of firearms is a malum pro#i1itum4 punis#ed 1y a special la$4 in $#ic# case good fait# and a1sence of criminal intent are not &alid defenses. Q6#en a crime is punis#ed 1y a special la$4 as a rule4 intent to commit t#e crime is not necessary4 it is sufficient t#at t#e offender #as t#e intent to perpetrate t#e act pro#i1ited 1y t#e special la$. %ntent to commit t#e crime and intent to perpetrate t#e act must 1e distinguis#ed. A person may not #a&e consciously intended to commit a crime 1ut #e intended to commit an act4 and t#at act is 1y t#e &ery nature of t#ings4 t#e crime itself. %n t#e first (intent to commit t#e crime)4 t#ere must 1e criminal intent4 in t#e second (intent to perpetrate t#e act) it is enoug# t#at t#e pro#i1ited act is done freely and consciously. %n t#e present case4 a distinction s#ould 1e made 1et$een criminal intent and intent to possess. 6#ile mere possession $it#out criminal intent4 is sufficient to con&ict a person for illegal possession of a firearm4 #t m*st st#ll ,e sh&-n that there -as an#m*s p&ss#$en$# &r an #ntent t& p&ssess &n the part &" the a%%*se$ . Cuc# intent to possess is4 #o$e&er4 $it#out regard to any ot#er criminal or felonious intent $#ic# t#e accused may #a&e #ar1ored in possessing t#e firearm. Criminal intent #ere refers to t#e intention of t#e accused to commit an offense $it# t#e use of an unlicensed firearm. T#is is not important in con&icting a person under -residential @ecree ?o. 1' . Bence4 in order t#at one may 1e found guilty of a &iolation of t#e decree4 it is sufficient t#at t#e accused #ad no aut#ority or license to possess a firearm4 and t#at #e intended to possess t#e same4 e&en if suc# possession $as made in good fait# and $it#out criminal intent.Q %n t#e early case of 2e&ple (. Est&#sta4 $e #eld t#at a temp&rar'8 #n%#$ental8 %as*al8 &r harmless p&ssess#&n &" "#rearms #s n&t p*n#sha,le. 6e stated t#erein t#at3 QT#e terms QcontrolQ and QdominionQ t#emsel&es are relati&e terms not suscepti1le of e8act definition4 and opinions on t#e degree and c#aracter of control or dominion sufficient to constitute &iolation &ary. T#e rule laid do$n in t#e Enited Ctates Courts R rule $#ic# $e #ere adopt R is t#at temporary4 incidental4 casual or #armless possession or control of a firearm is not a &iolation of a statute pro#i1iting t#e possessing or carrying of t#is <ind of $eapon. A typical e8ample of suc# possession is $#ere Qa person pic<s up a $eapon or #ands it to anot#er to e8amine or #old for a moment.Q
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Also4 in 2e&ple (. Remereta4 $#ere t#e 7uestion posed $as $#et#er an accused $#o stole a firearm could simultaneously 1e prosecuted for t#eft and illegal possession of firearms4 $e #eld t#at transient possession is not sufficient to con&ict one under t#e latter crime4 t#us3 Q6#ile in stealing a firearm t#e accused must necessarily come into possession t#ereof4 t#e crime of illegal possession of firearms is not committed 1y mere transient possession of t#e $eapon. . . . T#us4 stealing a firearm $it# intent not to use 1ut to render t#e o$ner defenseless4 may suffice for purposes of esta1lis#ing a case of t#eft4 1ut $ould not =ustify a c#arge for illegal possession of firearm4 since intent to #old and e&entually use t#e $eapon $ould 1e lac<ing.Q Bence4 t#e <ind of possession punis#a1le under -@ ?o. 1' is one $#ere t#e accused possessed a firearm eit#er p#ysically or constructi&ely $it# animus possidendi or intention to possess t#e same. %t is not enoug# t#at t#e firearm $as found in t#e person of t#e accused $#o #eld t#e same temporarily and casually or for t#e purpose of surrendering t#e same. Admittedly4 animus possidendi is a state of mind. As suc#4 $#at goes on into t#e mind of an accused4 as #is real intent4 could 1e determined solely 1ased on #is prior and coetaneous acts and t#e surrounding circumstances e8plaining #o$ t#e su1=ect firearm came to #is possession. T#us4 in 2e&ple (. Le& L#an4 $e re=ected t#e argument of t#e accused t#at t#e c#arge against #im s#ould 1e dismissed 1ecause t#ere $as no animus possidendi on #is part. %n said case4 t#e accused contended t#at #e $as on #is $ay to t#e municipal #all to surrender t#e firearm $#en #e met some of #is friends. Be t#en forgot a1out t#e firearm4 until t#e police officer unceremoniously sei2ed t#e same from #im4 affording #im no c#ance to surrender it #imself. %n re=ecting accused0appellant,s claim4 Dustice Aegalado $rote t#at3 Q. . .4 t#e Court finds it #ard to 1elie&e t#at appellant still #ad to #ide t#e firearm in #is $aist 1efore setting out to surrender it to t#e aut#orities $#en #e could #a&e ta<en t#e gun to t#e to$n #all in t#e same 1ag in $#ic# #e found it4 in $#ic# case it $ould #a&e 1een safer and $ould #a&e a&oided detection. %n fine4 t#e indispensa1le elements of possession $it#out t#e necessary aut#ority or license and t#e corresponding attendance of animus possidendi #a&e 1ot# 1een con&incingly esta1lis#ed 1y t#e prosecution to $arrant appellant,s con&iction . . .Q T#at animus possidendi is determina1le from t#e prior and simultaneous acts of t#e accused is furt#er e8emplified 1y 2e&ple (. L*,&. %n t#is case4 $#ile accused0appellant pleaded lac< of animus possidendi4 #is conduct 1elied t#e same. Accused0appellant 5u1o $as found to #a&e secured a Qtemporary licenseQ for t#e su1=ect firearm. Ender suc# circumstance4 $e #eld t#at accused0appellant intended to possess t#e su1=ect firearm 1eyond reasona1le dou1t. Coming no$ to t#e case 1efore us4 it is undisputed t#at t#e police officers ne&er really arrested Aodolfo dela Aosa4 for t#e trut# of t#e matter $as t#at t#ere $as no need for suc# arrest. @ela Aosa and #is companions #ad surrendered t#e ammunitions to Maga$ad Aigor e&en 1efore t#e police arri&ed. %n fact4 t#e police learned of t#e surrender 1ecause Maga$ad Aigor reported it to t#e police station in 5a1rador. T#is is in contrast to -eople &. 5eo 5ian4 $#ere appellant 5ian merely feigned intention to surrender t#e firearm $#ic# t#e police found in #is possession. %n t#e case at 1ar4 appellant dela Aosa,s intention to surrender t#e ammunitions $as &ery clear from t#e 1eginning and #e $as a1le to e8ecute t#e same. Corollarily4 t#e .ffice of t#e Colicitor /eneral,s contention t#at dela Aosa $as in constructi&e possession of t#e ammunitions is irrele&ant for possession R $#et#er p#ysical or constructi&e R $it#out animus possidendi is not punis#a1le. @ela Aosa,s possession $as #armless4 temporary and only incidental for t#e purpose of surrendering t#e ammunitions to t#e aut#orities. Conse7uently4 t#e prosecution failed to esta1lis# t#e first element of animus possidendi.
2EO2LE (s. DE GRACIA8 ET AL G.R. N&s. 410119@41. .*l' 38 499< T#e court defines and clarified t#e meaning of possession in order for t#e purpose of con&icting t#e accused under -@ 1' . Appellant principally contends t#at #e cannot 1e #eld guilty of illegal possession of firearms for t#e reason t#at #e did not #a&e eit#er p#ysical or constructi&e possession t#ereof considering t#at #e #ad no intent to possess t#e same; #e is neit#er t#e o$ner nor a tenant of t#e 1uilding $#ere t#e ammunition and e8plosi&es $ere found; #e $as merely employed 1y Col. Matillano as an errand 1oy; #e $as guarding t#e e8plosi&es for and in 1e#alf of Col. Matillano; and #e did not #a&e actual possession of t#e e8plosi&es. Be
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claims t#at intent to possess4 $#ic# is necessary 1efore one can 1e con&icted under -residential @ecree ?o. 1' 4 $as not present in t#e case at 1ar. 8 8 8 T#e issue to 1e resol&ed is $#et#er or not intent to possess is an essential element of t#e offense punis#a1le under -residential @ecree ?o. 1' and4 if so4 $#et#er appellant @e /racia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition. The r*le #s that &-nersh#p #s n&t an essent#al element &" #lle+al p&ssess#&n &" "#rearms an$ amm*n#t#&n. -hat the la- re)*#res #s merel' p&ssess#&n -h#%h #n%l*$es n&t &nl' a%t*al ph's#%al p&ssess#&n ,*t als& %&nstr*%t#(e p&ssess#&n or t#e su1=ection of t#e t#ing to one,s control and management. T#is #as to 1e so if t#e manifest intent of t#e la$ is to 1e effecti&e. T#e same e&ils4 t#e same perils to pu1lic security4 $#ic# t#e la$ penali2es e8ist $#et#er t#e unlicensed #older of a pro#i1ited $eapon 1e its o$ner or a 1orro$er. To accomplis# t#e o1=ect of t#is la$ t#e proprietary concept of t#e possession can #a&e no 1earing $#atsoe&er. >ut is t#e mere fact of p#ysical or constructi&e possession sufficient to con&ict a person for unla$ful possession of firearms or must t#ere 1e an intent to possess to constitute a &iolation of t#e la$F T#is 7uery assumes significance since t#e offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum pro#i1itum punis#ed 1y a special la$4 ' in $#ic# case good fait# and a1sence of criminal intent are not &alid defenses. When the %r#me #s p*n#she$ ,' a spe%#al la-8 as a r*le8 #ntent t& %&mm#t the %r#me #s n&t ne%essar'. %t is sufficient t#at t#e offender #as t#e intent to perpetrate t#e act pro#i1ited 1y t#e special la$. %ntent to commit t#e crime and intent to perpetrate t#e act pro#i1ited 1y t#e special la$. %ntent to commit t#e crime and intent to perpetrate t#e act must 1e distinguis#ed. A person may not #a&e consciously intended to commit a crime; 1ut #e did intend to commit an act4 and t#at act is4 1y t#e &ery nature of t#ings4 t#e crime itself. %n t#e first (intent to commit t#e crime)4 t#ere must 1e criminal intent; in t#e second (intent to perpetrate t#e act) it is enoug# t#at t#e pro#i1ited act is done freely and consciously. %n t#e present case8 a $#st#n%t#&n sh&*l$ ,e ma$e ,et-een %r#m#nal #ntent an$ #ntent t& p&ssess. 6#ile mere possession4 $it#out criminal intent4 is sufficient to con&ict a person for illegal possession of a firearm4 it must still 1e s#o$n t#at t#ere $as animus possidendi or an intent to possess on t#e part of t#e accused. Cuc# intent to possess is4 #o$e&er4 $it#out regard to any ot#er criminal or felonious intent $#ic# t#e accused may #a&e #ar1ored in possessing t#e firearm. Criminal intent #ere refers to t#e intention of t#e accused to commit an offense $it# t#e use of an unlicensed firearm. T#is is not important in con&icting a person under -residential @ecree ?o. 1' . Bence4 in order t#at one may 1e found guilty of a &iolation of t#e decree4 it is sufficient t#at t#e accused #ad no aut#ority or licensed to possess a firearm4 and t#at #e intended to possess t#e same4 e&en if suc# possession $as in good fait# and $it#out criminal intent. C&n%&m#tantl'8 a temp&rar'8 #n%#$ental8 %as*al8 &r harmless p&ssess#&n &r %&ntr&l &" a "#rearm %ann&t ,e %&ns#$ere$ a (#&lat#&n of a statute pro#i1iting t#e possession of t#is <ind of $eapon4 suc# as -residential @ecree ?o. 1' . T#us4 alt#oug# t#ere is p#ysical or constructi&e possession4 for as long as t#e animus possidendi is a1sent4 t#ere is no offense committed. Coming no$ to t#e case 1efore us4 t#ere is no dou1t in our minds t#at appellant @e /racia is indeed guilty of #a&ing intentionally possessed se&eral firearms4 e8plosi&es and ammunition $it#out t#e re7uisite license or aut#ority t#erefor. Bis pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence. An#m*s p&ss#$en$# is a state of mind $#ic# may 1e determined on a case to case 1asis4 ta<ing into consideration t#e prior and coetaneous acts of t#e accused and t#e surrounding circumstances. 6#at e8ists in t#e realm of t#oug#t is often disclosed in t#e range of action. %t is not contro&erted t#at appellant @e /racia is a former soldier4 #a&ing ser&ed $it# t#e -#ilippine Consta1ulary prior to #is separation from t#e ser&ice for going on a1sence $it#out lea&e (A6.5). 6e do not #esitate4 t#erefore4 to 1elie&e and conclude t#at #e is familiar $it# and <no$ledgea1le a1out t#e dynamites4 Qmoloto&Q 1om1s4 and &arious <inds of ammunition $#ic# $ere confiscated 1y t#e military from #is possession. As a former soldier4 it $ould 1e a1surd for #im not to <no$ anyt#ing a1out t#e dangerous uses and po$er of t#ese $eapons. A fortiori4 #e cannot feign ignorance on t#e import of #a&ing in #is possession suc# a large 7uantity of e8plosi&es and ammunition. +urt#ermore4 t#e place $#ere t#e e8plosi&es $ere found is not a military camp or office4 nor one $#ere suc# items can ordinarily 1ut la$fully 1e stored4 as in a gun store4 a arsenal or armory. !&en an ordinarily prudent man $ould 1e put on guard and 1e suspicious if #e finds articles of t#is nature in a place intended to carry out t#e 1usiness of selling cars and $#ic# #as not#ing to do at all4 directly or indirectly4 $it# t#e trade of firearms and ammunition. .n t#e 1asis of t#e foregoing dis7uisition4 it is apparent4 and $e sold #old4 t#at appellant @e /racia actually intended to possess t#e articles confiscated from #is person.
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*R'+CLE 252 M;'+L*'+$A. !lements 1. T#at t#ere 1e a castration4 t#at is3 mutilation of organs necessary for regeneration4 suc# as t#e penis or o&arium 2. T#at t#e mutilation is caused purposely and deli1erately4 t#at is4 to depri&e t#e offended party of some essential organ for reproduction Mutilation 0 t#e lopping or clipping off of some parts of t#e 1ody ?.TA>!?!3 TB%C CA%M! %C A56AJC %?T!?T%.?A5 %n AA " 1* section 1* t#ereofK if t#e &ictim is 1elo$ 12 years old4 t#e penalty is #ig#er %f t#ere is a duel (tinig1asay) 1et$een t$o men and t#e 9you <no$ $#at: of t#e ot#er $as #it4 t#ere is no mutilation. %t is only serious p#ysical in=uries 1ecause it $as accidental. .utilation is the lopping or clipping off of some part of the body. The intent to deliberately cut off the particular part of the body that was removed from the offended party must be established. &f there is no intent to deprive victim of particular part of body, the crime is only serious physical injury. The common mista9e is to associate this with the reproductive organs only. .utilation includes any part of the human body that is not susceptible to grow again. &f what was cut off was a reproductive organ, the penalty is much higher than that for homicide. This cannot be committed through criminal negligence. *R'+CLE 251 !ER+$;! P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E! H3 #o$ is t#e crime of serious p#ysical in=uries committedF A3 %t is committed 1y3 1. 1y $ounding 2. 1y 1eating 3. 1y assaulting (article 2 3) or 4. 1y administering in=urious su1stance (article 2 4) H3 $#at are serious p#ysical in=uriesF A3 t#ey are3 1. $#en t#e in=ured person 1ecomes insane4 im1ecile4 impotent4 or 1lind in conse7uence of t#e p#ysical in=uries inflicted 2. $#en t#e in=ured person3
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a.
loses t#e use of speec# or t#e po$er to #ear or to smell4 or loses an eye4 a #and4 a foot4 an arm4 or a leg 1. loses t#e use of any suc# mem1er
ha,#t*all' en+a+e$4 in conse7uence of t#e p#ysical in=uries inflicted 3. $#en t#e person in=ured a. 1ecomes deformed 1. loses any mem1er of #is 1ody c. loses t#e use t#ereof
1ecomes #n%apa%#tate$ "&r the -&rF #n -h#%h he -as theret&"&re
!. =.
1ecomes #ll &r #n%apa%#tate$ "&r the per"&rman%e &" the -&rF #n
-h#%h he -as ha,#t*all' en+a+e$ "&r m&re than 91 $a's4 in conse7uence of t#e p#ysical in=uries inflicted
6#en t#e in=ured person 1ecomes #ll &r #n%apa%#tate$ "&r la,&r "&r m&re
than C1 $a's (1ut must not 1e more t#an )* days) as a result of t#e p#ysical in=uries inflicted. ?.TA >!?!3 if t#e in=ury incapacitated t#e person for 15 days 1ut re7uires medical attendance for )* days t#e crime committed is ?.T serious p#ysical in=uries 1ecause no$#ere in t#e paragrap#s under article 2 3 $#ic# re7uires medical attendance. T#e crime committed is 5!CC C!A%.EC -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C 1ecause in t#is case4 t#e re7uirement for medical attendance is present. H3 if t#e p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted during t#e time of #a2ing $#at is t#e crime committedF A3 t#e crime is #a2ing. @eformity K p#ysical ugliness4 permanent and definite a1normality. %t must 1e conspicuous and &isi1le. illustration3 if a person already suffering from p#ysical deformity (#i$i iyang na$ong) #e $as in a fist fig#t. 6#en #e $as #it $it# a punc#4 t#e deformity $as gone and #is face $as normal. %s t#ere deformity $it#in t#e meaning of -#ysical %n=uriesF A3 ?one4 >ecause t#ere $as no p#ysical ugliness. And so if it #eals4 not deformity also. +urt#ermore4 if t#e deformity is not conspicuous li<e it is found in t#e stomac#4 no deformity. HEA5%+%!@ C!A%.EC -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C %f t#e offense is committed3 1. Against any of t#e persons enumerated in t#e article defining t#e crime of parricide (article 24 ) .A 2. 6it# attendance of any of t#e circumstances mentioned in t#e article defining t#e crime of murder (article 24') &n one case, the accused, while conversing with the offended party, drew the latterHs bolo from its scabbard. The offended party caught hold of the edge of the blade of his bolo and wounded himself. &t was held that since the accused did not wound, beat or assault the offended party, he can not be guilty of serious physical injuries.
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The crime of physical injuries is a crime of result because under our laws the crime of physical injuries is based on the gravity of the injury sustained. +o this crime is always consummated, notwithstanding the opinion of +panish commentators li9e Cuello Calon, ;iada, etc., that it can be committed in the attempted or frustrated stage. &f the act does not give rise to injuries, you will not be able to say whether it is attempted slight physical injuries, attempted less serious physical injuries, or attempted serious physical injuries unless the result is there. The reason why there is no attempted or frustrated physical injuries is because the crime of physical injuries is determined on the gravity of the injury. !s long as the injury is not there, there can be no attempted or frustrated stage thereof. Cla((i6i a)i%n %6 &h#(i al inB-rie($ #1% ?etween slight physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, you have a duration of one to nine days if slight physical injuries= or 1@ days to "@ days if less serious physical injuries. Consider the duration of healing and treatment. The significant part here is between slight physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. Fou will consider not only the healing duration of the injury but also the medical attendance re>uired to treat the injury. +o the healing duration may be one to nine days, but if the medical treatment continues beyond nine days, the physical injuries would already >ualify as less serious physical injuries. The medical treatment may have lasted for nine days, but if the offended party is still incapacitated for labor beyond nine days, the physical injuries are already considered less serious physical injuries. #"% ?etween less serious physical injuries and serious physical injuries, you do not consider the period of medical treatment. Fou only consider the period when the offended party is rendered incapacitated for labor. &f the offended party is incapacitated to wor9 for less than :@ days, even though the treatment continued beyond :@ days, the physical injuries are only considered less serious because for purposes of classifying the physical injuries as serious, you do not consider the period of medical treatment. Fou only consider the period of incapacity from wor9. #:% 5hen the injury created a deformity upon the offended party, you disregard the healing duration or the period of medical treatment involved. !t once, it is considered serious physical injuries. +o even though the deformity may not have incapacitated the offended party from wor9, or even though the medical treatment did not go beyond nine days, that deformity will bring about the crime of serious physical injuries. Beformity re>uires the concurrence of the following conditions' #1% #"% #:% The injury must produce ugliness= &t must be visible= The ugliness will not disappear through natural healing process.
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&llustration' -oss of molar tooth 3 This is not deformity as it is not visible. -oss of permanent front tooth 3 This is deformity as it is visible and permanent. -oss of mil9 front tooth 3 This is not deformity as it is visible but will be naturally replaced.
Cuestion D !nswer The offender threw acid on the face of the offended party. 5ere it not for timely medical attention, a deformity would have been produced on the face of the victim. !fter the plastic surgery, the offended party was more handsome than before the injury. 5hat crime was committedE &n what stage was it committedE The crime is serious physical injuries because the problem itself states that the injury would have produced a deformity. The fact that the plastic surgery removed the deformity is immaterial because in law what is considered is not the artificial treatment but the natural healing process. &n a case decided by the +upreme Court, accused was charged with serious physical injuries because the injuries produced a scar. He was convicted under !rticle "4: #2%. He appealed because, in the course of the trial, the scar disappeared. &t was held that accused can not be convicted of serious physical injuries. He is liable only for slight physical injuries because the victim was not incapacitated, and there was no evidence that the medical treatment lasted for more than nine days. +erious physical injuries is punished with higher penalties in the following cases' #1% #"% &f it is committed against any of the persons referred to in the crime of parricide under !rticle "24= &f any of the circumstances >ualifying murder attended its commission.
Thus, a father who inflicts serious physical injuries upon his son will be liable for >ualified serious physical injuries. *R'+CLE 25, *DM+-+!'ER+-7+-?;R+$;! !;4!'*-CE! $R 4E:ER*7E! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender inflicted upon anot#er any serious p#ysical in=ury 2. T#at it $as done 1y Fn&-#n+l' a$m#n#ster#n+ to #im any in=urious su1stances or 1e&erages or 1y ta<ing ad&antage of #is $ea<ness of mind or credulity 3. T#at #e #ad no intent to <ill 0 if t#ere is intent to <ill t#en it is frustrated murderGmurder
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*R'+CLE 252 LE!! !ER+$;! P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E! ?.TA >!?!3 #ere4 t#e element of M!@%CA5 ATT!?@A?C! is present. 1. T#at t#e offended party is incapacitated for la1or for 1* to 3* days .A needs Medical Attendance for t#e same period of time. 2. T#at t#e p#ysical in=uries must not 1e t#ose descri1ed in t#e preceding articles H3 6#en Hualified A3 1. T#e -enalty of arresto mayor4 and a fine not e8ceeding 5** pesos s#all 1e imposed. a. 6#en t#ere is a manifest intent to <ill or offend t#e in=ured person4 1. T#ere are circumstances adding ignominy to t#e offense 2. 6#en t#e &ictim is3 a. t#e offender,s parents4 ascendants4 guardians4 or curators 1. teac#ers4 persons of ran<4 or persons in aut#ority(pro&ided t#e crime is not direct assault) &f the physical injuries do not incapacitate the offended party nor necessitate medical attendance, slight physical injuries is committed. ?ut if the physical injuries heal after :@ days, serious physical injuries is committed under !rticle "4:, paragraph 2. !rticle "4$ is an exception to !rticle 26 in relation to complex crimes as the latter only ta9es place in cases where the Revised Penal Code has no specific provision penali8ing the same with a definite, specific penalty. Hence, there is no complex crime of slander by deed with less serious physical injuries but only less serious physical injuries if the act which was committed produced the less serious physical injuries with the manifest intent to insult or offend the offended party, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense. *R'+CLE 255 !L+7<' P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E! *-D M*L'RE*'ME-' A. T#ree Minds3 1. -#ysical in=uries $#ic# incapacitated t#e offended party for la1or from 1 to ) days4 or s#all re7uire medical attendance during t#e same period. 2. -#ysical in=uries $#ic# do not pre&ent t#e offended party from engaging in #is #a1itual $or< nor re7uire medical assistance. 3. %ll0treatment of anot#er 1y deed $it#out causing any in=ury. ?.TA >!?!3 %ncapacity of in=ured party lasted for ) days or s#all re7uire medical attendance during t#e same period. .r e&en if suc# in=ury does not pre&ent t#e offended party form engaging in #is #a1itual $or< nor re7uire medical attendance. -unis#ed also is t#e act of ill0treating anot#er 1y deed $it#out causing in=ury. This involves even ill treatment where there is no sign of injury re>uiring medical treatment. +lapping the offended party is a form of ill treatment which is a form of slight physical injuries.
Page 21,
?ut if the slapping is done to cast dishonor upon the person slapped, the crime is slander by deed. &f the slapping was done without the intention of casting dishonor, or to humiliate or embarrass the offended party out of a >uarrel or anger, the crime is still ill treatment or slight physical injuries. &llustration' &f Hillary slaps .onica and told her IFou choose your seconds . -et us meet behind the Cuirino *randstand and see who is the better and more beautiful between the two of usJ, the crime is not ill treatment, slight physical injuries or slander by deed= it is a form of challenging to a duel. The criminal intent is to challenge a person to a duel. The crime is slight physical injury if there is no proof as to the period of the offended partyHs incapacity for labor or of the re>uired medical attendance. Republic !ct /o. A41@ #+pecial Protection of Children against Child !buse, )xploitation and Biscrimination !ct%, in relation to murder, mutilation or injuries to a child The last paragraph of !rticle ;& of Republic !ct /o. A41@, provides' I7or purposes of this !ct, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under !rticles "26, "2<, "4" #"% and "4: #1% of !ct /o :61$, as amended of the Revised Penal Code for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve years of age.J The provisions of Republic !ct /o. A14@ modified the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in so far as the victim of the felonies referred to is under 1" years of age. The clear intention is to punish the said crimes with a higher penalty when the victim is a child of tender age. &ncidentally, the reference to !rticle "2< of the Code which defines and penali8es the crime of homicide were the victim is under 1" years old is an error. Pilling a child under 1" is murder, not homicide, because the victim is under no position to defend himself as held in the case of People v. *anohon, 1<4 +CR! 2:1. 7or murder, the penalty provided by the Code, as amended by Republic !ct /o. A4$<, is reclusion perpetua to death 3 higher than what Republic !ct no. A41@ provides. !ccordingly, insofar as the crime is murder, !rticle "26 of the Code, as amended, shall govern even if the victim was under 1" years of age. &t is only in respect of the crimes of intentional mutilation in paragraph " of !rticle "4" and of serious physical injuries in paragraph 1 of !rticle "4: of the Code that the >uoted provision of Republic !ct /o. A14@ may be applied for the higher penalty when the victim is under 1" years old.
?.ris)r.(ential 'ren( in P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E! (2000=2006)

omicidal intent must be e#idenced by the acts that, at the time of their e,ecution, are unmista)ably calculated to produce the death of the #ictim by ade-uate means. &e cannot infer intent to )ill from the appellant0s act of hitting (iamonte in the head with a lead pipe. 'n the first place, wounds were not shown to ha#e been inflicted because of the act. Secondly, absent proof of circumstances to show the intent to )ill beyond reasonable doubt, this *ourt cannot declare that the same was attendant.
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&hen the offender shall ill%treat another by deed without causing any in.ury, and without
causing dishonor, the offense is )altreatment under !rticle 2@@, ?H par. 3 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 't was beyond reasonable doubt that by hitting (iamonte, appellant ill%treated the latter, without causing any in.ury. !s we ha#e earlier stated, no proof of in.ury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense charged in the 'nformation. o &e cannot con#ict appellant of !ttempted or 6rustrated Murder or omicide. The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant0s intent to ta)e the life of the person attac)ed. ?3 Such intent must be pro#ed clearly and con#incingly, so as to e,clude reasonable doubt thereof. ?7 'ntent to )ill may be pro#ed by e#idence of: ;a< moti#e= ;b< the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime= ;c< the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the #ictim= ;d< the manner the crime was committed= and ;e< words uttered by the offender at the time the in.uries are inflicted by him on the #ictim. The only in.ury attributable to 2i is the contusion on the #ictimLs right arm that resulted from 2i stri)ing !rugay with a baseball bat. 'n #iew of the #ictimLs super#ening death from in.uries which cannot be attributed to 2i beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by 2i are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. &hen there is no e#idence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the re-uired medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical in*uries. owe#er, we are not con#inced that appellants should be held liable for frustrated murder. The e#idence presented by the prosecution failed to show conclusi#ely that the wounds inflicted on !nthony were fatal or serious. Dr. Aose !ladin 1ongco, the doctor who had attended to !nthony at the !mang 3odrigue+ Medical *enter, opined that all of the latter0s wounds $can be fatal,$ 32 implying that the former was not sure of their gra#ity. The e,tent of the medical treatment Dr. 1ongco ga#e the #ictim was limited to first aid 8 stopping the flow of blood from the wounds 8 as the latter had refused further medical e,amination and treatment. o 'n the absence of more con#incing e#idence, we hold that the prosecution failed to pro#e that appellants had fatally wounded !nthony Gillanue#a. Thus, they should be held liable only for slight physical in.uries under !rticle 2@@ of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 3E This is because his in.uries lasted less than nine days.
*R'+CLE 255=*
R*PE
RA 5C7C AN ACT EX2ANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RA2E RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST 2ERSONS 1) >y a man $#o s#all #a&e %arnal Fn&-le$+e of a $oman under any of t#e follo$ing circumstances3 a) T#roug# force4 t#reat4 or intimidation; 1) 6#en t#e offended party is depri&ed of reason or ot#er$ise unconscious; c) >y means of fraudulent mac#ination or gra&e a1use of aut#ority; and d) 6#en t#e offended party is under t$el&e (12) years of age or is demented4 e&en t#oug# none of t#e circumstances mentioned a1o&e 1e present. (Stat*t&r' Rape) 2) >y an' pers&n $#o4 under any of t#e circumstances mentioned in paragrap# 1 #ereof4 s#all commit an act of se=*al assa*lt 1y inserting3 a. #is penis (man) into anot#er person,s (man or $oman) mout# or anal orifice4 .A 1. any instrument or o1=ect (1y a man or $oman) 4 into t#e genital or anal orifice of anot#er person(man or $oman) ?.TA >!?!3
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%n t#e crime of rape4 any circumstances $#ic# 7ualifies t#e crime of rape must 1e allege4 ot#er$ise4 court $ill not impose t#e deat# penalty 1ecause t#e crime s#all 1e treated only as simple rape. H3 $#en is rape 7ualified so t#at t#e court s#all impose t#e penalty of reclusion perpetua to deat#F A3 1. $#ene&er it is committed $it# t#e use of a deadly $eapon .A 1y t$o or more persons (#ere t#e $eapon must 1e used to consummate rape) 2. $#en 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e rape4 t#e &ictim #as 1ecome insane (people &s. cesar guy (1)5*;s) KKK #e raped antonietta ca1a#ug4 t#e $oman 1ecame insane) 3. $#en t#e rape is attempted and a #omicide is committed 1y reason of or on t#e occasion t#ereof (US (s Man+*la,nan regarding ro11ery $it# #omicide KKK #omicide on t#e occasion of
ro11ery. T#e ro11er $ent inside t#e #ouse and t#e o$ner of t#e #ouse $ent up to t#e ceiling to #ide. T#e ro11er fired s#ots in t#e air #itting t#e o$ner so <illed. %s t#is ro11ery $it# #omicideF Jes4 1ecause on t#e occasion of ro11ery a person died. Ctill an&ther %ase decided 1y t#e CC4 ro11er $ent inside t#e #ouse and t#e o$ner #ad a #eart attac< and died4 t#is is ro11ery $it# #omicide. Ctill anot#er case4 ro11er $ent inside t#e #ouse4 t#e o$ner $as a1out to s#out for #elp $#en t#e ro11er place a 1read -A?@!CA5 in t#e mout# of t#e o$ner4 $#ic# cause t#e latter to c#o<e to deat#. T#is is ro11ery $it# #omicide. %n #omicide it does not matter if t#e deat# is accidental4 as long as it occurred on t#e occasion of ro11ery. >AA3 ro11ery $as actually committed4 t#en t#ere occurred an e8c#ange of 1ullets. .ne of t#e companions of t#e culprits $as #it and <illed. T#e crime is ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ecause it does not matter $#o $as s#ot or <illed4 e&en if t#e person <illed $as one of t#e ro11ers. %f a person dies in t#e occasion of ro11ery4 t#e crime is ro11ery $it# #omicide. C. A--5J TB! CAM! -A%?C%-5!C %? TB! CA%M! .+ ATT!M-T!@ AA-! A?@ B.M%C%@! KKK e8ample3 t#e $ould01e rapist entered in t#e room of t#e $oman4 attempted to rape #er4 1ut s#e escaped 1y =umping out of t#e $indo$ $#ic# <illed #er. T#e crime is attempted rape $it# #omicide. Anot#er e8ample3 a person attempted to rape t#e $oman4 t#e latter s#outed. Co #e s#ot #er 1ut s#e $asn;t #it4 t#e 1ullet #it someone else. T#e crime is attempted rape $it# #omicide.)
4. $#en 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e rape4 #omicide is committed ?.TA >!?!3 Aelations#ip of t#e &ictim and t#e culprit4 and age of $oman must 1e allege in t#e information4 ot#er$ise4 deat# $ill not 1e imposed. According to t#e CC4 t#e accused is entitled to <no$ t#e cause and accusation against #im. #e pleaded not guilty to t#e allegation $#ic# constitutes simple rape4 not 7ualified rape. Co e&en if pro&en4 if not allege4 t#e crime is simple rape.
(mentioned in cases decided 1y CC year 1)))02***)
Ender t#e ne$ rape la$4 a #us1and can 1e c#arged of rape 1y a $ife. ?.TA >!?!3 %n rape cases t#e &ictim is entitled to moral damages as an additional a$ard to t#e &ictim aside from t#e indemnity as t#e court may deem as =ust $it#out t#e need of pleading (allegation) or proof. %ndeed t#e con&entional re7uirement of allegata et probata in ci&il la$ s#ould 1e dispensed $it# in criminal prosecutions for rape $it# t#e ci&il aspect included t#erein since no appropriate pleadings #a&e 1een filed $#erein suc# allegations can 1e made. C!! AA " 1* if t#e &ictim is a minor
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CAC!C3
2e&ple (s. .&(en $e la C*esta :4999; @efinition of guardian K it is restricti&e since it refers to a legal or =udicial guardian. T#is must 1e construed as suc# in order for t#e deat# penalty to 1e imposed in compliance $it# AA " 5). T#e mere fact t#at t#e mot#er of t#e &ictim as<ed Do&en to loo< after #er c#ild $#ile s#e is a$ay did not constitute t#e relations#ip of guardian0$ard as contemplated 1y t#e la$. Be $as allo$ed to stay in t#e rented room for free of c#arge. At most #e $as a mere custodian or careta<er of t#e c#ild on $#om #e e8ercise limited aut#ority for a temporary period. 2e&ple (s. L&ren>& An$a'a Ese of a deadly $eapon K t#e &ictim #ere is depri&ed of reason4 suffering from mental a1normality. T#e accused #ere offered marriage. T#e offer of marriage is an implied admission of guilt. 2e&ple (s. F"el#=,ert& Fra+a ' Fa#l&n :0111; Ese of a deadly $eapon K it must 1e used to commit rape. An$al (s. 2e&ple :4999; CC re=ected argument a1out @?A test as a means of identification. @?A testing of semen of t#e accused to test $#et#er it matc#ed $it# t#at found in t#e &ictim;s &agina is not necessary. -resence of positi&e identification is t#ere. 2e&ple (ers*s A#%ente Aalle :0111; Aes gestae in rape K accused as<ed for forgi&eness4 an admission of guilt. 2e&ple (s. .*an Man+asen Aape 1y Common la$ K 2e&ple (s. Shar#" Al# :4999; %ranian national $#o 1roug#t a $oman to #is apartment and #e used a $eapon. Be didn;t $ant t#e $oman to lea&e t#e apartment. CC said forci1le a1duction is a1sor1ed in t#e crime of rape if t#e main o1=ecti&e of t#e appellant is to rape t#e &ictim. Appellant used t#e <nife ?.T to consummate t#e crime t#e crime of rape 1ut to t#reaten /ina (&ictim) not to lea&e t#e 1edroom $#ere s#e $as loc<ed up. CC #eld t#at 1e#a&ioral psyc#ology teac#es us t#at people in similar situations react dissimilarly. T#ere is no standard #uman 1e#a&ior $#en confronted $it# s#oc<ing e8periencesG incidents. T#e $or<ings of t#e #uman mind $#en place under emotional stress are unpredicta1le. T#is court indeed #as not laid do$n any rule on #o$ a rape &ictim s#ould 1e#a&e immediately after s#e #as 1een a1used. T#is e8perience is relati&e and may 1e dealt $it# in any $ay 1y t#e &ictim depending on t#e circumstances. T#us4 p#ysical resistance is not t#e sole test to determine $#et#er or not a $oman in&oluntary succum1 to t#e #ands of t#e accused particularly $#en t#e accused employed drugs in order to rape t#e &ictim in an unconscious state. 2EO2LE (s. ESTE!AN AICTOR ' 2ENIS G.R. N&. 40691C. .*l' 98 4995 +urt#ermore4 it is a reputa1le precept t#at testimonies of rape &ictims $#o are young or of tender age are credi1le. T#e re&elation of an innocent c#ild $#ose c#astity $as a1used deser&es full credit. Courts usually lend credence to t#e testimony of a young girl especially $#ere t#e facts point to #er #a&ing 1een a &ictim of se8ual assault. +or sure4 t#e &ictim $ould not ma<e pu1lic t#e offense4 undergo t#e trou1le and #umiliation of a pu1lic trial and endure t#e ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if s#e #ad not in fact 1een raped4 for no decent +ilipina $ould pu1licly admit s#e #ad 1een raped unless it $as t#e trut#. As a rule4 a &ictim of rape $ill not come out in t#e open if #er moti&es $ere not to o1tain =ustice. T#e $illingness of t#e complainant to face police in&estigators and to su1mit to p#ysical e8amination is a mute 1ut elo7uent testimony4 of t#e trut# of #er complaint. 2e&ple (s. Rest#t*t& Man+h*'&+
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!8ecution of an affida&it of desistance filed after t#e institution of a criminal action of crimes against c#astity4 e&en if done in an e8press pardon cannot 1e a ground to dismiss it. 2EO2LE (s. FERMIN IGAT G.R. N&. 400196. .*ne 008 4995 %ntimidation in rape cases is not cali1rated nor go&erned 1y #ard and fast rules. Cince it is addressed to t#e &ictim and is t#erefore su1=ecti&e4 it must 1e &ie$ed in lig#t of t#e &ictim,s perception and =udgment at t#e time of t#e commission of t#e crime. %t is enoug# t#at t#e intimidation produced fear R fear t#at if t#e &ictim did not yield to t#e 1estial demands of t#e accused4 somet#ing far $orse $ould #appen to #er at t#at moment. 6#ere suc# intimidation e8isted and t#e &ictim $as co$ed into su1mission as a result t#ereof4 t#ere1y rendering resistance futile4 it $ould 1e t#e #eig#t of unreasona1leness to e8pect t#e &ictim to resist $it# all #er mig#t and strengt#. %f resistance $ould ne&ert#eless 1e futile 1ecause of intimidation4 t#en offering none at all does not mean consent to t#e assault so as to ma<e t#e &ictim,s su1mission to t#e se8ual act &oluntary. %n any e&ent4 in a rape committed 1y a fat#er against #is o$n daug#ter4 as in t#is case4 t#e former,s moral ascendancy or influence o&er t#e latter su1stitutes for &iolence or intimidation. 2e&ple (s. Sam*el !*rse Aape $it# mutilation K t#e accused struc< t#e &ictim $it# a 1olo t#ree times on t#e face and left #er for dead. T#e &ictim sustained #er $ounds only as a result of a clear attempt of t#e accused to <ill #er and co&er up #is misdeed. T#e in=ury t#us suffered 1y t#e complainant s#ould not 1e ta<en as a circumstance ( t#e mutilation) $#ic# $ould cause to raise t#e penalty to deat# 1ut s#ould rig#tly 1e ta<en up una1sor1ed in t#e crime of frustrated murder. ?o specific description #a&ing 1een gi&en 1y t#e la$ to t#e $ord mutilation. T#erefore it s#ould 1e understood in its ordinary and generic usage. 6e1ster dictionary defines mutilation as Ocutting off or permanently destroying an essential part of t#e 1ody. >lac< defines mutilation in its criminal la$ concept as one t#at $ould depri&e a person of t#e use of any lose of t#ose lim1s $#ic# may 1e useful to #im. 2EO2LE (s. .OSE DELEAERIO G.R. N&s. 4459C6@C5. Apr#l 0<8 4995 T#e mandatory deat# penalty is imposed under t#e first case4 immediately a1o&e4 $#en t#e &ictim is under eig#teen years of age and t#e offender is Qa parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relati(e by consanguinity or affinity !ithin the third ci(il degree, or the common9la! spouse of the parent of t#e &ictim.Q T#e trial court #as t#us #eld incorrectly in considering appellant4 $#o is legally married to Ao8an,s natural grandmot#er4 as among t#ose named in t#e enumeration. Appellant is merely a step@+ran$parent $#o o1&iously is neit#er an QascendantQ nor a Qstep0parentQ of t#e &ictim. T#erefore4 t#e crime of rape is not 7ualified. ALONTE (s. SAAELLANO .R.8 N!I an$ 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 4C4370. Mar%h 98 4995 +irstly4 t#e affida&it of desistance of Du&ie05yn -unong1ayan4 #erein1efore 7uoted4 does not contain any statement t#at disa&o$s t#e &eracity of #er complaint against petitioners 1ut merely see<s to Q1e allo$ed to $it#dra$Q #er complaint and to discontinue $it# t#e case for &aried ot#er reasons. Cecondly4 an affida&it of desistance 1y itself4 e&en $#en construed as a pardon in t#e so0 called Qpri&ate crimes4Q is not a ground for t#e dismissal of t#e criminal case once t#e action #as 1een instituted. T#e affida&it4 ne&ert#eless4 may4 as so earlier intimated4 possi1ly constitute e&idence $#ose $eig#t or pro1ati&e &alue4 li<e any ot#er piece of e&idence4 $ould 1e up to t#e court for proper e&aluation. 2e&ple (s. H&n&ra,le L&ren>& Aenera%#&n Aape $it# #omicide is punis#ed $it# t#e mandatory penalty of deat# 1ut t#e =udge #ere refuse to impose it 1ecause it $as contrary to #is religious 1elief. CC said Jou must impose t#e supreme penalty of deat# regardless of religious 1elief.
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2EO2LE (s. SILAINO SALARBA8 .R. G.R. N&. 446350. A*+*st 458 4996 T#e complainant #ere is a 1ritis# stage and tele&ision actress. C#e too< #er &acation in pala$an. T#e son of t#e o$ner (ric<y) of t#e 1eac# #ouse 1ecame #er 1oyfriend. T#e tourist guide (salarsa) $#o is t#e friend of t#e 1oyfriend0o$ner fell in lo&e. .ne nig#t t#ere $as a 1eac# party4 t#ey dran<. After$ards4 t#e $oman $ent to #er cottage4 too< a s#o$er. T#e accused entered t#e $oman;s room and 1egan to undress t#e $oman4 t#e $oman slig#tly spread #er legs as s#e $as #alf asleep. T#en ser&ino mounted4 t#en #e $#ispered Osaril4 t#is is not ric<y( t#e 1oyfriend); Y 2e&ple (. Almas#n Aape of a mental retardee. CC4 s#e is 7ualified if #e can ma<e <no$n #er perception to ot#ers as long as #e can communicate.
Prior to the amendment of the law on rape, a complaint must be filed by the offended woman. The persons who may file the same in behalf of the offended woman if she is a minor or if she was incapacitated to file, were as follows' a parent= in default of parents, a grandparent= in default or grandparent, the judicial guardian. +ince rape is not a private crime anymore, it can be prosecuted even if the woman does not file a complaint. &f carnal 9nowledge was made possible because of fraudulent machinations and grave abuse of authority, the crime is rape. This absorbs the crime of >ualified and simple seduction when no force or violence was used, but the offender abused his authority to rape the victim. ,nder !rticle "44 C, the offended woman may pardon the offender through a subse>uent valid marriage, the effect of which would be the extinction of the offenderHs liability. +imilarly, the legal husband may be pardoned by forgiveness of the wife provided that the marriage is not void ab initio. (bviously, under the new law, the husband may be liable for rape if his wife does not want to have sex with him. &t is enough that there is indication of any amount of resistance as to ma9e it rape. &ncestuous rape was coined in +upreme Court decisions. &t refers to rape committed by an ascendant of the offended woman. &n such cases, the force and intimidation need not be of such nature as would be re>uired in rape cases had the accused been a stranger. Conversely, the +upreme Court expected that if the offender is not 9nown to woman, it is necessary that there be evidence of affirmative resistance put up by the offended woman. .ere Ino, noJ is not enough if the offender is a stranger, although if the rape is incestuous, this is enough. The new rape law also re>uires that there be a physical overt act manifesting resistance, if the offended party was in a situation where he or she is incapable of giving valid consent, this is admissible in evidence to show that carnal 9nowledge was against his or her will. 5hen the victim is below 1" years old, mere sexual intercourse with her is already rape. )ven if it was she who wanted the sexual intercourse, the crime will be rape. This is referred to as statutory rape.
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&n other cases, there must be force, intimidation, or violence proven to have been exerted to bring about carnal 9nowledge or the woman must have been deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. 5here the victim is over 1" years old, it must be shown that the carnal 9nowledge with her was obtained against her will. &t is necessary that there be evidence of some resistance put up by the offended woman. &t is not, however, necessary that the offended party should exert all her efforts to prevent the carnal intercourse. &t is enough that from her resistance, it would appear that the carnal intercourse is against her will. .ere initial resistance, which does not indicate refusal on the part of the offended party to the sexual intercourse, will not be enough to bring about the crime of rape. /ote that it has been held that in the crime of rape, conviction does not re>uire medico legal finding of any penetration on the part of the woman. ! medico legal certificate is not necessary or indispensable to convict the accused of the crime of rape. &t has also been held that although the offended woman who is the victim of the rape failed to adduce evidence regarding the damages to her by reason of the rape, the court may ta9e judicial notice that there is such damage in crimes against chastity. The standard amount given now is P :@,@@@.@@, with or without evidence of any moral damage. ?ut there are some cases where the court awarded only P "@,@@@.@@. !n accused may be convicted of rape on the sole testimony of the offended woman. &t does not re>uire that testimony be corroborated before a conviction may stand. This is particularly true if the commission of the rape is such that the narration of the offended woman would lead to no other conclusion except that the rape was committed. &llustration' Baughter accuses her own father of having raped her. !llegation of several accused that the woman consented to their sexual intercourse with her is a proposition which is revolting to reason that a woman would allow more than one man to have sexual intercourse with her in the presence of the others. &t has also been ruled that rape can be committed in a standing position because complete penetration is not necessary. The slightest penetration 3 contact with the labia 3 will consummate the rape. (n the other hand, as long as there is an intent to effect sexual cohesion, although unsuccessful, the crime becomes attempted rape. However, if that intention is not proven, the offender can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness. The main distinction between the crime of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the intent to lie with the offended woman. &n a case where the accused jumped upon a woman and threw her to the ground, although the accused raised her s9irts, the accused did not ma9e any effort to remove her underwear. &nstead, he removed his own underwear and placed himself on top of
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the woman and started performing sexual movements. Thereafter, when he was finished, he stood up and left. The crime committed is only acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape. The fact that he did not remove the underwear of the victim indicates that he does not have a real intention to effect a penetration. &t was only to satisfy a lewd design. &s there a complex crime under !rticle 26 of 9idnapping with rapeE Read 9idnapping.
?.ris)r.(ential 'ren( in R*PE (2000=2006)

"n the degree of force as an element of rape, this *ourt finds it $not necessary to show that irresistible force or intimidation accompanied the crime of rape= it suffices to show that force or intimidation was present and did result in the accused copulating with the offended woman against her will.$ o 9T:he #ictim0s character in rape is immaterial. 4#en the fact that the offended party may ha#e been of unchaste character constitutes no defense to the charge of rape, pro#ided that it is pro#ed that the illicit relations described in the complaint was committed with force and #iolence. o The defense goes on to harp on !!!0s delay in reporting the incidents. 71 The oft%repeated obser#ation of this *ourt that it is not unusual for a rape #ictim to conceal the incident at least momentarily should address this. The appellants point to the unusual manner of commission of the crime, in#ol#ing as it did not only the se,ual assault by the man but also the participation of his wife, to discredit the complainant0s testimony. Dnder the 3e#ised (enal *ode, 2? howe#er, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a woman, pro#ided of course a man is charged together with her. Thus, in two cases this *ourt con#icted the woman as a principal by direct participation since it was pro#en that she held down the complainant in order to help her co%accused spouse consummate the offense. o 'n (eople #. Gillamala, 3> the *ourt found the husband and wife guilty for raping their neighbor and $)umare$ in this factual setting, #i+: the wife #isited the #ictim at her home on the prete,t of in-uiring as to the whereabouts of her husband. "nce inside, she whistled for her husband and he immediately appeared at the doorstep. The wife then suddenly pinned her $)umare$ to the floor. The husband forcefully remo#ed the #ictim0s s)irt and panties, remo#ed his shorts, placed himself on top of the #ictim and consummated the rape. 'n the more recent (eople #. Saba, 31 the accused married couple #ictimi+ed a fourteen ;17< year%old epileptic who stayed at their home for treatment by the wife who was a reputed healer. "n the prete,t of conducting a healing session, the wife ordered the #ictim to lie down on the floor then pinned the #ictim0s hands to the floor and co#ered her mouth while her husband remo#ed his pants and briefs and the #ictim0s panties and raped the young girl. These two cases show not only the possibility but the reality of rape committed by a woman together with a man. o The appellants argue that the prosecution failed to present any e#idence of aberrant se,ual beha#ior on their part that would .ustify the trial court0s conclusion that the rape occurred as described by the complainant. This argument must fail since the se,ual habits of the appellant%spouses do not constitute an essential element of the offense of rape. The prosecution only has to pro#e that there was carnal )nowledge of the complainant and that it was done against her will. The trial court0s e#aluation of the e#idence resulted in the appellants0 con#iction and a close scrutiny of its .udgment leads us to affirm it. o 4ach and e#ery charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime= hence, each of the eight other rape charges should be pro#en beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is re-uired to establish, by the necessary -uantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge. 1aby Aane0s testimony on the first rape charge was e,plicit, detailing the participation of each appellant in the offense and clearly illustrating all the elements of the offense of rape. owe#er her simple assertion that the subse-uent rapes occurred in e,actly the same manner as in pre#ious incidents is clearly inade-uate and grossly insufficient to establish to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the eight rape charges are concerned. er testimony was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how each of the subse-uent acts was committed. 4#en her testimony on cross%e,amination did not add anything to support her accusations of subse-uent rape. Thus, only the rape alleged to ha#e been committed on September 1??2 was pro#en beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants may be penali+ed only for this offense. o !rticle 33E of the 3e#ised (enal *ode pro#ides that whene#er the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The use by the appellants of a bladed weapon, alleged in the !mended *omplaint and sufficiently pro#en in this case, -ualifies the rape. 'n
Page 2,2
the absence of any mitigating or aggra#ating circumstance, the penalty that the appellants shall suffer is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. 'n re#iewing rape cases, this *ourt is guided by three principles: ;1< an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to pro#e, it is e#en more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to dispro#e= ;2< considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually in#ol#ed, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutini+ed with great caution= ;3< the e#idence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the wea)ness of the e#idence for the defense. o 'n rape cases, the testimony of the #ictim alone, if credible, is sufficient to con#ict the accused of the crime. The medical certificate is presented merely to corroborate the #ictim0s declaration that she was se,ually molested. 'n fact, what is more telling in the medical findings proffered in e#idence by the prosecution is the presence of hymenal lacerations in different positions in the #ictim0s genitalia which is the best physical e#idence of her forcible defloration. o ! rape #ictim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is )nown to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her assailant, enabling her to ha#e a good loo) at the latter0s physical features. The doctrine consistently upheld by this *ourt is that alibi cannot pre#ail o#er the positi#e identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 't is inherently a wea) defense= and unless supported by clear and con#incing e#idence, it cannot pre#ail o#er the positi#e declaration of the #ictim. o 'n the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in e#idence to pro#e 3achel0s age. The only e#idence of the #ictim0s age is her testimony EB and that of her mother0s ;Sally de /u+man0s< Sinumpaang Salaysay, EH which was adopted as part of the latter0s direct testimony, E? attesting to the fact that her fi#e%year%old daughter was raped. o Sally0s testimony regarding 3achel0s age was insufficient, since 3achel was alleged to be already fi#e years old at the time of the rape, and what is sought to be pro#ed is that she was then less than se#en years old. er testimony will suffice only if it is e,pressly and clearly admitted by the accused. There is no such e,press and clear declaration and admission of the appellant that 3achel was less than se#en years old when he raped her. Moreo#er, the trial court made no finding as to the #ictim0s age. o 't must be stressed that the se#erity of death penalty, especially its irre#ersible and final nature once carried out, ma)es the decision%ma)ing process in capital offenses aptly sub.ect to the most e,acting rules of procedure and e#idence. @> !ccordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of 3achel0s minority, the appellant cannot be con#icted of -ualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. o owe#er, Sally0s testimony that her daughter was fi#e years old at the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding the appellant liable for statutory rape, or the rape of a girl below twel#e years of age. Dnder the second paragraph of !rticle 2@@%1, in relation to !rticle 2@@%!;1< ;d<, carnal )nowledge of a woman under twel#e years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and not the death penalty. The elements of rape under the abo#e pro#isions are: ;1< the offender had carnal )nowledge of a woman= and ;2< such act was accomplished through force or intimidation= or when the #ictim is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious= or when the #ictim is under 12 years of age or is demented. o &e find, howe#er, that the trial court erred in concluding that the crime committed by appellant is statutory rape. &hile the 'nformation alleges that 'mee was 1> years old when the crime was committed on 6ebruary @, 1??7, the prosecution failed to present her *ertificate of 2i#e 1irth or any other e#idence to pro#e her age. o !s regards appellant0s second assigned error, we agree with his contention that the trial court erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death. The trial court considered the use of a piece of wood as a deadly weapon and, therefore, a -ualifying circumstance. Suffice it to state that, as a rule, in order that a -ualifying or aggra#ating circumstance may be appreciated, it must be alleged in the 'nformation and pro#en during trial. 3? ere, no such circumstance has been alleged in the 'nformation which .ustifies the imposition of death. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua as pro#ided in !rt. 33E of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended, -uoted earlier. The gra#amen in the crime of rape is carnal )nowledge. The prosecution must pro#e beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had se,ual contact with the alleged #ictim. This, the prosecution failed to do in this case. &hile the complainant testified that appellant forced her into se,ual intercourse on two occasions, the physical e#idence clouds her testimony. 3ecords show that the complainant was e,amined by se#eral doctors. owe#er, only the reports of the last two doctors who e,amined her were offered as e#idence. The report of Dr. !nnabel Soliman, Medico%2egal "fficer of the 51' shows that there were no signs of in.ury in complainant0s genitalia. 'n a later e,amination, howe#er, conducted by Dr. Manuel !#es of the 1ulacan (ro#incial *rime 2aboratory "ffice, a healed superficial hymenal laceration at 12:>> position was found. Dr. !#es e,plained that the location of the
Page 2,1
laceration e,cludes se,ual intercourse as possible cause thereof. Dr. !#es e,plained that lacerations found on the upper portion of the hymen are normally caused by instrumentation but not by se,ual contact. o &e are not unmindful of the *ourt0s ruling that the absence of laceration in the hymen does not preclude the e,istence of rape and that when a woman states that she has been raped, she states all that is necessary to pro#e the offense. These principles, howe#er, do not in themsel#es support a con#iction. They must be weighed with the presumption of innocence of the accused. To support a finding of guilt, it is necessary that the complainant0s story be belie#able in itself. o 'n rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that con#iction becomes the only logical and ine#itable conclusion. (roof beyond reasonable doubt is re-uired. !lthough the law does not demand absolute certainty of guilt, it nonetheless re-uires moral certainty to support a .udgment of con#iction. &here the inculpatory facts admit of se#eral interpretations, one consistent with accused0s innocence and another with his guilt, the e#idence thus adduced fails to meet the test of moral certainty and it becomes the constitutional duty of the *ourt to ac-uit the accused. !s the trial court ruled, the e#idence for the prosecution has clearly established that Marietta, in all three instances, was forced to submit to appellant0s bestial desires, the latter employing force and intimidation. 'n all the three ;3< rape incidents, the appellant used physical #iolence upon the person of Marietta to consummate his purpose of copulating with the latter. Marietta put up a struggle e#ery time the accused forced himself upon her, but in all instances, she was ine#itably subdued by his strength. !s we held in (eople #s. 1alta+ar, 17 nowhere is it re-uired in law or .urisprudence that a woman must offer tenacious resistance to a se,ual assault. The law does not impose on the rape #ictim the burden of pro#ing resistance. 'n rape, the force and intimidation must be #iewed in the light of the #ictim0s perception and .udgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. 1E 5ot all offended parties in the crime of rape react the same way. There are those who e#en free+e because of fright and shoc), unable to mo#e nor shout. &e cannot fault the latter for not putting up a $tenacious$ resistance. 'n the case at bar, we find that Marietta put up a good fight, but because of her mature age and the disparity between her and appellant0s physical strength, she was easily subdued by her attac)er. o 't is settled that a person accused of rape can be con#icted solely on the testimony of the #ictim if the trial court finds said testimony to be credible, natural, con#incing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. o "n the other hand, e#idence for the defense was anchored solely on the claim of the appellant that he and Merly were sweethearts. e alleged that the se#eral incidents of se,ual intercourse between him and Marietta, twice a wee) on the a#erage, were consensual. &e agree with the finding of the trial court that this $sweetheart defense$ put up by the appellant was preposterous and concocted merely as an afterthought. 5o other e#idence than the self%ser#ing testimony of the appellant was presented to support such a defense, li)e lo#e letters, pictures, mementos, etc. The supposedly corroborati#e testimony of 2eticia dela *ru+ did not say much. !ll she stated was that Marietta always ga#e money to the appellant since 1??H, that Marietta always as)ed her to call the appellant, and that Marietta got angry with the appellant when the latter li#ed in with her friend Dory. 1H 5one of the latter statements could pro#e that Marietta and the appellant were sweethearts. !s the trial court correctly obser#ed, if the appellant were really her boyfriend, then Marietta would not ha#e gone to the e,tent of bringing to court this criminal action which ine#itably e,posed her to the humiliation of recounting in public how she was abused. Dnless truly wronged, she would not ha#e instituted these cases. That she was already fifty%one ;E1< years old rendered her e,posure to a public trial of rape all the more embarrassing and painful. o The prosecution, through Marietta0s testimony, has clearly established that on at least three ;3< occasions 8 !ugust 1@, 1??H, "ctober 3, 1??H, and March 1E, 1??? the appellant 4duardo 6abian y Mari forced himself on Marietta and succeeded in ha#ing carnal )nowledge with her. e employed physical force and intimidation, and e#en threatened her that he would )ill her and her son if she reports to the police. The foregoing satisfy all the elements of rape as defined and penali+ed in Section 2 of 3epublic !ct 5o. H3E3, and warrant the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua upon the accused for each of the three ;3< counts of rape. Time and again, we stress the #erity that in incestuous rape where the fatherMstepfather e,ercises moral dominance o#er his daughterMstepdaughter, the #ictim by the sheer force of this moral influence is reduced to a docile creature, #ulnerable and submissi#e to the se,ual depredations of her tormentor. o 'n a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former0s moral ascendancy and influence o#er the latter substitutes for #iolence and intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the father0s parental authority, which the *onstitution and the laws recogni+e, support and enhance, as well as from the children0s duty to obey and to obser#e re#erence and respect towards their parents. Such re#erence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of 6ilipino children and are
Page 2,,
recogni+ed by law. !buse of both by a father can sub.ugate his daughter0s will, thereby forcing her to do whate#er he wants. !ppellant scrapes the bottom of the barrel in ma)ing much of /emma0s statement that he was on top of her for an hour. 'ndeed, it is too much to e,pect of a minor rape #ictim to gi#e a precise recollection of the rape incident when at the time of the se,ual assault her tender mind was not only bombarded by a mishmash of confusing emotions but, more so, e#ery sinew of her young body was committed to ward off her attac)er in a #ain attempt to defend her purity and honor. Dnderstandably, /emma might ha#e lost all bearings of time for the few harrowing minutes in the hands of her father seemed eternity to her. The rule is that when a rape #ictim0s testimony is straightforward and candid, unsha)en by rigid cross% e,amination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be gi#en full faith and credit. 2> 't is simply too improbable for the minor #ictims, who are guileless and innocent in the ways of the world, to bra+enly impute a crime as serious as rape to the man, they call their father, if it were not true.
'n any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that e#ery essential ingredient of the crime charged must be pro#ed beyond reasonable doubt in order to o#ercome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Aenny0s simple declaration that she was raped is not e#idence but simply a conclusion. The principle that $when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped,$ no longer holds. This means that the prosecution must still pro#e the elements of the crime of rape, and it is not enough for a woman to claim she was raped without showing how the crime was specifically committed. o 'n the earlier case of (eople #. Mendo+a, 21 the accused was ac-uitted by #irtue of the #ictim0s plain statement that she was $raped$ on 11 !ugust 1??E without offering further details on how the alleged incident was carried out. This *ourt declared therein that $;w<hether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine based on the e#idence offered. Testimony to that effect is not e#idence, but simply a conclusion, the proof of which is the #ery purpose of the trial . . . 't is not competent for a witness 9in this case Michelle: to e,press an opinion, conclusion or .udgment thereon.$ o The certificates of li#e birth 22 pro#e that at the time of the rape incidents /emma, Aean and Aenny were minors. &ith the concurrence of their minority and relationship 23 with appellant, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of -ualified rape. &ell%settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an e,amination of her pri#ate parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny #ia an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole moti#ation was not to ha#e the culprit apprehended and punished. ! young girl0s re#elation that she has been raped, coupled with her #oluntary submission to medical e,amination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to gi#e out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. 22 5eedless to say, it is settled .urisprudence that testimonies of child%#ictims are gi#en full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Jouth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. o 'n rape trials, the issue, more often than not, is the credibility of the #ictim. 1ut when a rape #ictim0s testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, then it deser#es full faith and credit. 'f found credible, the declaration of facts gi#en by the offended party alone would be sufficient to sustain a con#iction. o *onspiracy was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the indi#idual acts of the accused when ta)en together as a whole showed that they acted in concert and cooperated to achie#e the same unlawful ob.ecti#e. 2B The e#idence clearly shows that conspiracy e,isted between the three accused shown by their ob#ious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime of rape. 2H 't was established during the trial that while accused%appellant raped the #ictim, his co%accused co#ered the latter0s mouth or restrained her hands. &e ha#e repeatedly held that in cases of multiple rape, each of the defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for those committed by the others. 2? !ccused%appellant, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the two other counts of rape committed by his co%accused. o Similarly, it is highly inconcei#able that complainant would file rape charges against accused%appellant .ust because her father will scold her for failing to go home one night. 5o moti#e was gi#en for her to falsely impute a heinous crime against accused%appellant. !s held in the case of (eople #. Dimailig: 33 $&here there is no e#idence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper moti#e, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith. 't has been repeatedly held that no young and decent 6ilipina would publicly admit that she was ra#ished and her honor tainted unless the same were true, for it would be instincti#e on her part to protect her honor and obtain .ustice for the wic)ed acts committed upon her.$ o &e cannot sustain the accused%appellant0s claim that the absence of lacerations and contusions in the #ictim0s genitalia negate the commission of rape. &e ha#e consistently held that the rupture of the
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hymen or laceration of the #agina is not an essential element of rape, for mere )noc)ing at the door of the pudenda by the accused0s penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape. 3B (enile in#asion, as it has often been held, necessarily entails contact with the labia where e#en the briefest of contact under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, e#en without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our .urisprudence. ence, neither the penetration of the penis beyond the lips of the #agina nor the rupture of the hymen is indispensable to .ustify con#iction. 3H ! medical e,amination is not e#en indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The lone testimony of the #ictim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a con#iction.
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Rep*,l#% A%t 5717 RRape Sh#el$ La-S 2r&(#$#n+ ass#stan%e t& rape (#%t#m an$ esta,l#sh#n+ rape %r#s#s %enter #n e(er' pr&(#n%e. A. Calient features of t#is la$3 %f t#e &ictim of rape is a $oman4 t#e in&estigator s#ould 1e $oman also. %f it reac#es t#e fiscalGprosecutor4 t#e same must also 1e a $oman. %f possi1le4 t#e =udge s#ould also 1e a $oman. H3 6#o are 7ualified to run t#e centerF A3 @%5/4 ?/. and t#ose e8pert in cases in #andling rape cases >. -urpose of t#e center; 1. To pro&ide &ictims $it# psyc#ological counseling; medical ser&ices and medical attention; pro&ided $it# la$yer and ensuring t#e pri&acy of t#e &ictim 2. @uty of t#e police officer to refer t#e rape case to t#e prosecutor 3. %f t#e &ictim is a $oman4 t#e one $#o $ill e8amine #er must also 1e a $oman 4. 6omen des< in e&ery police precinct in t#e country C. -rotecti&e Measure3 1. Complainant;s rig#t to pri&acy 2. %dentity of t#e parties s#all not 1e disclosed Rep*,l#% A%t 6566 SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT H3 6#o are lia1leF A3 employer4 employee4 manager4 super&isor4 agent of t#e employer4 teac#er4 instructor4 professor4 coac#4 trainor4 or any ot#er person3 1. 6#o #a&ing aut#ority4 influence and moral ascendancy 0 it is ta<ing ad&antage of superiority. %t is an a1use of po$er. 2. @emands4 re7uests or ot#er$ise re7uires any se8ual fa&or from t#e ot#er e.g.; Manager and !mployee to #a&e a date 0 it could 1e se8ual intercourse or fondling of 1ody parts 3. Aegardless if t#e demand is accepted Bo$ Committed3 A. W&rF@relate$ or employment en&ironment (1) T#e se8ual fa&or is made as a condition in t#e #iring or in t#e employment4 re0employment or continued employment of said indi&idual4 or in granting said indi&idual fa&ora1le compensation4 terms4 conditions4 promotions4 or pri&ileges; or t#e refusal to grant t#e se8ual fa&or results in limiting4 segregating or classifying t#e employee $#ic# in any $ay $ould discriminate4 depri&e or diminis# employment opportunities or ot#er$ise ad&ersely affect said employee; (2) T#e a1o&e acts $ould impair t#e employee,s rig#ts or pri&ileges under e8isting la1or la$s; or (3) T#e a1o&e acts $ould result in an intimidating4 #ostile4 or offensi&e en&ironment for t#e employee.
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>. E$*%at#&n .A Tra#n#n+ en(#r&nment (1) Against one $#o is under t#e care4 custody or super&ision of t#e offender; (2) Against one $#ose education4 training4 apprentices#ip or tutors#ip is entrusted to t#e offender; (3) 6#en t#e se8ual fa&or is made a condition to t#e gi&ing of a passing grade4 or t#e granting of #onors and sc#olars#ips or t#e payment of a stipend4 allo$ance or ot#er 1enefits4 pri&ileges4 or considerations; or (4) 6#en t#e se8ual ad&ances result in an intimidating4 #ostile or offensi&e en&ironment for t#e student4 trainee or apprentice. A. Ccope of AA "'"" a. $or<4 1. education and c. training related acti&ities >. Ce8ual Barassment can 1e committed 1y a man against a $oman4 $oman against a man 0 %ts all a1out po$erVVV C. %n rape4 a1use of aut#ority must 1e gra&e if ac7uitted #e can still 1e prosecuted under Ce8ual Barassment. @. Aape &. Ce8ual Barassment
7)
2) 3) CB if a
Aape ( c ) t#ere must 1e gra(e abuse of aut#ority4 $#ile in CB only use of aut#ority CB limited to $or<4 educational and training related $#ile in rape it is not. Aape as a general rule must 1e consummated. ?o se8ual intercourse no rape. %n $oman declines t#e demand t#ere is still consummated CB. CB t#ere is demand or re7uest $#ile in rape t#ere is none. (@iretso #ansa< )
=)
!. Cee AA " 1* if t#e &ictim is a minor H3 May an !mployee 1e c#arged $it# Ce8ual Barassment 1y anot#er !mployeeF A3 Jes4 as long as t#ere is moral ascendancy. H3 May a person not #a&ing se8ual intercourse $it# a $oman 1e #eld guilty of Ce8ual BarassmentF A3 Jes4 1ecause in Ce8ual Barassment t#ere is a principal 1y direct participation W principal 1y induction.
9Any person $#o directs or induces anot#er to commit any act of se8ual #arassment as #erein defined4 or $#o cooperates in t#e commission t#ereof 1y anot#er $it#out $#ic# it $ould not #a&e 1een committed4 s#all also 1e #eld lia1le under t#is Act.:
H3 6#at is t#e lia1ility of t#e !mployer or t#e #ead officer in an education and training institutionF A3 %f t#ere is Ce8ual Barassment and no immediate action is ta<en4 #e is C.5%@AA%5J lia1le for damages. T#is refers to ci&il lia1ility.
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'+'LE -+-E CRIMES AGAINST 2ERSONAL LI!ERTY T SECURITY Chapter One CRIMES AGAINST LI!ERTY
!e"ti#n =+llegal Detenti#n *R'+CLE 256 E+D-*PP+-7 *-D !ER+$;! +LLE7*L DE'E-'+$Elemen)($ 1. ". :. 2. (ffender is a private individual= He 9idnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty= The act of detention or 9idnapping must be illegal= &n the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present' a. The 9idnapping lasts for more than : days= b. &t is committed simulating public authority= c. !ny serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person 9idnapped or detained or threats to 9ill him are made= or d. The person 9idnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
&f there is any crime under Title &G which has no corresponding provision with crimes under Title &&, then, the offender may be a public officer or a private person. &f there is a corresponding crime under Title &&, the offender under Title &G for such similar crime is a private person. 5hen a public officer conspires with a private person in the commission of any of the crimes under Title &G, the crime is also one committed under this title and not under Title &&. &llustration' &f a private person commits the crime of 9idnapping or serious illegal detention, even though a public officer conspires therein, the crime cannot be arbitrary detention. !s far as that public officer is concerned, the crime is also illegal detention. &n the actual essence of the crime, when one says 9idnapping, this connotes the idea of transporting the offended party from one place to another. 5hen you thin9 illegal detention, it connotes the idea that one is restrained of his liberty without necessarily transporting him from one place to another. The crime of 9idnapping is committed if the purpose of the offender is to extort ransom either from the victim or from any other person. ?ut if a person is transported not for ransom, the crime can be illegal detention. ,sually, the offended party is brought to a place other than his own, to detain him there. 5hen one thin9s of 9idnapping, it is not only that of transporting one person from one place to another. (ne also has to thin9 of the criminal intent.
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7orcible abduction &f a woman is transported from one place to another by virtue of restraining her of her liberty, and that act is coupled with lewd designs. +erious illegal detention 3 &f a woman is transported just to restrain her of her liberty. There is no lewd design or lewd intent. *rave coercion 3 &f a woman is carried away just to brea9 her will, to compel her to agree to the demand or re>uest by the offender. &n a decided case, a suitor, who cannot get a favorable reply from a woman, invited the woman to ride with him, purportedly to ta9e home the woman from class. ?ut while the woman is in his car, he drove the woman to a far place and told the woman to marry him. (n the way, the offender had repeatedly touched the private parts of the woman. &t was held that the act of the offender of touching the private parts of the woman could not be considered as lewd designs because he was willing to marry the offended party. The +upreme Court ruled that when it is a suitor who could possibly marry the woman, merely 9issing the woman or touching her private parts to IcompelJ her to agree to the marriage, such cannot be characteri8ed as lewd design. &t is considered merely as the Ipassion of a loverJ. ?ut if the man is already married, you cannot consider that as legitimate but immoral and definitely amounts to lewd design. &f a woman is carried against her will but without lewd design on the part of the offender, the crime is grave coercion. &llustration' Tom Cru8 invited /icole Chi8mac9s for a snac9. They drove along Roxas ?oulevard, along the Coastal Road and to Cavite. The woman was already crying and wanted to be brought home. Tom imposed the condition that /icole should first marry him. /icole found this as, simply, a mission impossible. The crime committed in this case is grave coercion. ?ut if after they drove to Cavite, the suitor placed the woman in a house and would not let her out until she agrees to marry him, the crime would be serious illegal detention. &f the victim is a woman or a public officer, the detention is always serious 3 no matter how short the period of detention is. Circumstances which ma9e illegal detention serious #1% #"% #:% #2% #$% 5hen the illegal detention lasted for three days, regardless of who the offended party is= 5hen the offended party is a female, even if the detention lasted only for minutes= &f the offended party is a minor or a public officer, no matter how long or how short the detention is= 5hen threats to 9ill are made or serious physical injuries have been inflicted= and &f it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
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Bistinction between illegal detention and arbitrary detention &llegal detention is committed by a private person who 9idnaps, detains, or otherwise deprives another of his liberty. !rbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who detains a person without legal grounds. The penalty for 9idnapping is higher than for forcible abduction. This is wrong because if the offender 9new about this, he would perform lascivious acts upon the woman and be charged only for forcible abduction instead of 9idnapping or illegal detention. He thereby benefits from this absurdity, which arose when Congress amended !rticle "4A, increasing the penalty thereof, without amending !rticle :2" on forcible abduction. !rticle "4A has been modified by Republic !ct /o. A4$< in the following respects' #1% #"% &llegal detention becomes serious when it shall have lasted for more than three days, instead of five days as originally provided= &n paragraph 2, if the person 9idnapped or detained was a minor and the offender was anyone of the parents, the latter has been expressly excluded from the provision. The liability of the parent is provided for in the last paragraph of !rticle "A1= ! paragraph was added to !rticle "4A, which states' 5hen the victim is 9illed or dies as a conse>uence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture, or dehumani8ing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This amendment brings about a composite crime of 9idnapping with homicide when it is the victim of the 9idnapping who was 9illed, or dies as a conse>uence of the detention and, thus, only one penalty is imposed which is death. !rticle 26, on complex crimes, does not govern in this case. ?ut !rticle 26 will govern if any other person is 9illed aside, because the provision specifically refers to IvictimJ. !ccordingly, the rulings in cases of People v. Parulan, People v. *ing +am, and other similar cases where the accused were convicted for the complex crimes of 9idnapping with murder have become academic. &n the composite crime of 9idnapping with homicide, the term IhomicideJ is used in the generic sense and, thus, covers all forms of 9illing whether in the nature of murder or otherwise. &t does not matter whether the purpose of the 9idnapping was to 9ill the victim or not, as long as the victim was 9illed, or died as a conse>uence of the 9idnapping or detention. There is no more separate crime of 9idnapping and murder if the victim was 9idnapped not for the purpose of 9illing her. &f the victim was raped, this brings about the composite crime of 9idnapping with rape. ?eing a composite crime, not a complex crime, the same is regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact the law punishes such acts with only a single penalty. &n a way, the amendment depreciated the seriousness of the rape because no matter how
#:%
Page 22
many times the victim was raped, there will only be one 9idnapping with rape. This would not be the conse>uence if rape were a separate crime from 9idnapping because each act of rape would be a distinct count. However for the crime to be 9idnapping with rape, the offender should not have ta9en the victim with lewd designs as otherwise the crime would be forcible abduction= and if the victim was raped, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape would be committed. &f the ta9ing was forcible abduction, and the woman was raped several times, there would only be one crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each of the other rapes would constitute distinct counts of rape. This was the ruling in the case of People v. ?acalso. &n People v. -actao, decided on (ctober "<, 1<<:, the +upreme Court stressed that the crime is serious illegal detention if the purpose was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. !nd if in the course of the illegal detention, the offended party was raped, a separate crime of rape would be committed. This is so because there is no complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape since the illegal detention was not a necessary means to the commission of rape. &n People v. ?ernal, 1:1 +CR! 1, the appellants were held guilty of separate crimes of serious illegal detention and of multiple rapes. 5ith the amendment by Republic !ct /o. A4$< ma9ing rape a >ualifying circumstance in the crime of 9idnapping and serious illegal detention, the jurisprudence is superseded to the effect that the rape should be a distinct crime. !rticle 26 on complex crimes may not apply when serious illegal detention and rape are committed by the same offender. The offender will be charged for the composite crime of serious illegal detention with rape as a single indivisible offense, regardless of the number of times that the victim was raped. !lso, when the victim of the 9idnapping and serious illegal detention was subjected to torture and sustained physical injuries, a composite crime of 9idnapping with physical injuries is committed. 6#at is t#e actF - <idnapping or detaining anot#er or in any manner depri&e #im of #is li1erty a. -enalty of Aeclusion -erpetua to deat# in t#e ff. Cases3 1. lasted for more t#an 3 days 2. committed 1y simulating pu1lic aut#ority 3. serious p#ysical in=ury inflicted upon t#e person detained 4. t#reats to <ill #a&e 1een made 5. &ictim is a minor e8cept if t#e accused is t#e parent4 female or pu1lic officer
1. 6#en is deat# mandatoryF 1. <idnap or detention is for t#e purpose of e8torting ransom 0 in <idnapping $it# ransom $e follo$ t#e 5in1erg doctrine in EC. Case3 I4 a girl inside a ta8i $as approac#ed 1y a ro11er. Ao11er as<ed for money or else % $ill <ill you. T#en #e commanded t#e ta8i ta<ing t#e &ictim to a far a$ay place. %s it <idnapping for ransomF A3 ?o4 1ecause in <idnap for ransom4 some1ody must 1e <idnapped and money is
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demanded in e8c#ange for t#e freedom of t#e person detained. 2. $#en t#e &ictim is <illed or dies as a conse7uence. 3. %f raped in t#e course of t#e <idnapping 4. %f su1=ected to torture or de#umani2ing acts
?.ris)r.(ential 'ren( in E+D-*PP+-7

Thus, the applicable rule when the abduction and )illing happened before December 31, 1??3, as in the present case, is: a< &here the accused )idnapped the #ictim for the purpose of )illing him, and he was in fact )illed by his abductor, the crime committed was the comple, crime of )idnapping with murder under !rt. 7H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as )idnapping of the #ictim was a necessary means of committing the murder. b< &here the #ictim was )idnapped not for the purpose of )illing him but was subse-uently slain as an afterthought, two ;2< separate crimes of )idnapping and murder were committed. o The trial court found that $the )idnapping was committed for the purpose of e,torting ransom from the #ictim.$ H Similarly, the *ourt of !ppeals noted that the ob#ious purpose of 2ibertador0s abduction $was to coerce him to pay campaign money$ ? and that $the acts of )illing and burying him were incidental and could ha#e been used only as a means absolutely to compel the payment of the ransom money, and to a#oid the disco#ery of the crime.$ 1> owe#er, both courts found that the crime committed was the comple, crime of )idnapping with murder. o &e do not agree. &e find that two separate crimes of )idnapping for ransom and murder were committed. o The present case falls under paragraph ;b< of the foregoing rule that where the #ictim was )idnapped not for the purpose of )illing him but was subse-uently slain as an afterthought, two ;2< separate crimes of )idnapping and murder were committed. o 'n the instant case, the records clearly show the elements of )idnapping, to wit: "n March 2@, 1??2, appellant together with si, ;@< other armed men abducted 2ibertador for the purpose of e,torting ransom money. They bloc)ed 2ibertador0s con#oy and demanded payment of campaign fee. owe#er, when the payment was not forthcoming right away, they hogtied 2ibertador and brought him to the mountains. "n !pril 7, 1??2, 2ibertador0s relati#es paid the ransom money of (E>,>>>.>> to appellant0s group at 1rgy. Curtingan, Sta. *ru+, "ccidental Mindoro, but the latter reneged on its promise to release 2ibertador and )illed him instead.
o
o
The penalty for 'idnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the #ictim or any other person under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is death. owe#er, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited in #iew of the passage of 3.!. 5o. ?37@, !n !ct (rohibiting the 'mposition of the Death (enalty in the (hilippines. Thus, in lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on appellant, without eligibility for parole. "n the other hand, as the crime was committed prior to the amendment of !rticle 27H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode by 3.!. 5o. B@E?, the appropriate penalty for Murder is reclusion temporal in its ma,imum period, to death. Dnder !rticle @7 ;1< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, in cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single di#isible penalty or composed of three different penalties, and there are neither aggra#ating nor mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period shall be imposed, which in this case is reclusion perpetua. The 'ndeterminate Sentence 2aw is not applicable when the penalty actually imposed is reclusion perpetua.
The elements of the crime defined in !rt. 2@B abo#e are: ;a< the accused is a pri#ate indi#idual= ;b< he )idnaps or detains another, or in any manner depri#es the latter of his liberty= ;c< the act of detention or )idnapping must be illegal= and ;d< in the commission of the offense, any of the four ;7< circumstances mentioned abo#e is present. o There is clear and o#erwhelming e#idence that appellants, who are pri#ate indi#iduals, forcibly dragged Mari.oy and Aac-ueline into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them capti#e against their will. 'n fact, Aac-ueline attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants 8 the first was near the !yala *enter and the second was in Tan%awan, *arcar 8 but both attempts failed. Mari.oy was thrown to a deep ra#ine, resulting to her death. Aac-ueline, on the other hand, has remained missing until now.
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!rticle 2@B states that if the #ictim is )illed or died as a conse-uence of the detention, or is raped or sub.ected to torture or dehumani+ing acts, the ma,imum penalty shall be imposed. 'n (eople #s. 3amos, 131 citing (arulan #s. 3odas, 132 and (eople #s. Mercado, 133 we held that this pro#ision gi#en rise to a special comple, crime, thus: $(rior to 31 December 1??3, the date of effecti#ity of 3! 5o. B@E?, the rule was that where the )idnapped #ictim was subse-uently )illed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a comple, crime of )idnapping with murder under !rt. 7H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, or two ;2< separate crimes of )idnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused )idnapped the #ictim for the purpose of )illing him, and he was in fact )illed by his abductor, the crime committed was the comple, crime of )idnapping with murder under !rt. 7H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as the )idnapping of the #ictim was a necessary means of committing the murder. "n the other hand, where the #ictim was )idnapped not for the purpose of )illing him but was subse-uently slain as an afterthought, two ;2< separate crimes of )idnapping and murder were committed. owe#er, 3! 5o. B@E? amended !rt. 2@B of The 3e#ised (enal *ode by adding thereto a last paragraph which pro#ides 8 +hen the victim is 'illed or dies as a conse,uence of the detention, or is raped or is sub*ected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed% This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 0special comple, crime0 of )idnapping with murder or homicide. 't effecti#ely eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the )illing of the )idnapped #ictim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the )illing of the #ictim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. *onse-uently, the rule now is: +here the person 'idnapped is 'illed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the 'illing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the 'idnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under rt% $-, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of rt% 26., as amended by ! /o% .601.$
The prosecution was able to pro#e that Mari.oy was pushed to a ra#ine and died. 1oth girls were raped by the gang. 'n committing the crimes, appellants sub.ected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumani+ation means depri#ation of human -ualities, such as compassion. 137 6rom our re#iew of the e#idence presented, we found the following dehumani+ing acts committed by appellants: ;1< Mari.oy and Aac-ueline were handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly taped= ;2< they were beaten to se#ere wea)ness during their detention= ;3< Aac-ueline was made to dance amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants= ;7< she was taunted to run and forcibly dragged to the #an= and ;E< until now, Aac-ueline remains missing which aggra#ates the *hiong family0s pain. !ll told, considering that the #ictims were raped, that Mari.oy was )illed and that both #ictims were sub.ected to dehumani+ing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in order.
o
o
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of 'idnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in *riminal *ase 5o. *1D%7E3>3 wherein Mari.oy is the #ictim= and simple 'idnapping and serious illegal detention in *riminal *ase 5o. *1D%7E3>7 wherein Aac-ueline is the #ictim. ! discussion on the nature of special comple, crime is imperati#e. &here the law pro#ides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special comple, crime. Some of the special comple, crimes under the 3e#ised (enal *ode are ;1< robbery with homicide, 13E ;2< robbery with rape, 13@ ;3< )idnapping with serious physical in.uries, 13B ;7< )idnapping with murder or homicide, 13H and ;E< rape with homicide. 13? 'n a special comple, crime, the prosecution must necessarily pro#e each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the sub.ect of separate complaints. !s earlier mentioned, 3.!. 5o. B@E? amended !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode by adding thereto this pro#ision: $&hen the #ictim is )illed or dies as a conse-uence of the detention, or is raped, or is sub.ected to torture or dehumani+ing acts, the ma,imum penalty shall be imposed= and that this pro#ision gi#es rise to a special comple, crime. 'n the cases at bar, particularly *riminal *ase 5o. *1D%7E3>3, the 'nformation specifically alleges that the #ictim Mari.oy was raped $on the occasion and in connection$ with her detention and was )illed $subse-uent thereto and on the occasion thereof.$ *onsidering that the prosecution was able to pro#e each of the component offenses, appellants should be con#icted of the special comple, crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. 't appearing from the o#erwhelming
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e#idence of the prosecution that there is a $direct relation, and intimate connection$ 17> between the )idnapping, )illing and raping of Mari.oy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggra#ating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special comple, crime. 't bears reiterating that in (eople #s. 3amos, 171 and (eople #s. Mercado, 172 interpreting !rticle 2@B, we ruled that $where the person )illed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the )illing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the )idnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be comple,ed under !rticle 7H, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special comple, crime under the last paragraph of !rticle 2@B.$ The same principle applies here. The )idnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be comple,ed under !rticle 7H, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special comple, crime. !t any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no conse-uence in the imposition of the penalty considering that )idnapping and serious illegal detention if comple,ed with either homicide or rape, still, the ma,imum penalty of death shall be imposed. )2!34! 56% 7I3/ 88I/9: 'n murder, the specific intent is to )ill the #ictim. 'n )idnapping, the specific intent is to depri#e the #ictim of hisMher liberty. 'f there is no moti#e for the crime, the accused cannot be con#icted for )idnapping. 'n )idnapping for ransom, the moti#e is ransom. &here accused )ills the #ictim to a#enge the death of a lo#ed one, the moti#e is re#enge. o 'n this case, it is e#ident on the fact of the 'nformation that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to )ill him and that he was sei+ed precisely to )ill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of )illing him. Moreo#er, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to depri#e Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that )illing him was merely incidental to )idnapping. 'rrefragably then, the crime charged in the 'nformation is Murder under !rticle 27H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode and not Cidnapping under !rticle 2@H thereof. The elements of the crime of 'idnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: ;a< the accused is a pri#ate indi#idual= ;b< the accused )idnaps or detains another, or in any manner depri#es the latter of his liberty= ;c< the act of detention or )idnapping is illegal= and ;d< in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned 9in !rt. 2@B, 3e#ised (enal *ode: is present. Moreo#er, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the )idnapping was committed for the purpose of e,torting ransom. 'n the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably pro#en that the )idnapping had been committed for the purpose of e,torting ransom. 'n this case, Aulie, a minor, was not loc)ed up. owe#er, she was sei+ed and ta)en from her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and )ept under the control of accused%appellant and 1ermas. She was pre#ented from going bac) home for a period of about si, days. (atently then, accused%appellant is guilty of )idnapping and illegally detaining Aulie. The crime was aggra#ated by dwelling because Aulie was ta)en from their house by accused%appellant and 1ermas. 7I3/ 88I/9 /3 64!I:26 I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/< 4664/(4 /3 4;4)4/&6 := (!I)4% 8 The essence of the crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penali+ed in !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is the actual depri#ation of the #ictim0s liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. 't is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: ;1< the offender is a pri#ate indi#idual= ;2< he )idnaps or detains another, or in any other manner depri#es the latter of his liberty= ;3< the act of detention or )idnapping must be illegal= and ;7< in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in !rticle 2@B be present. 1ut if the )idnapping was done for the purpose of e,torting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary. o The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the )idnapping was committed $for the purpose of e,torting ransom$ from !le,ander, as to warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. 6or the crime to be committed, at least one o#ert act of demanding ransom must be made. 't is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law re-uires is merely the e,istence of the purpose of demanding ransom. 'n this case, the records are replete with instances when the )idnappers demanded ransom from the #ictim.
&> & &>4 (!I)4 + 6 8:;I&I( ;;? ):&I5 &43 /:& 62@6& /&I &43. 8 !s regards the argument that the crime was politically moti#ated and that conse-uently, the charge should ha#e been rebellion and not )idnapping, we find the same li)ewise to be without merit. !s held in "ffice of the (ro#incial (rosecutor of Famboanga Del 5orte #s. *!, the political moti#ation for the crime must be shown in order to .ustify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that
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appellants were members of the Moro 'slamic 2iberation 6ront or of the Moro 5ational 2iberation 6ront does not necessarily mean that the crime of )idnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. ere, the e#idence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was politically moti#ated. 5either ha#e the appellants sufficiently pro#en their allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has in#ariably #iewed the defense of frame%up with disfa#or. 2i)e the defense of alibi, it can be .ust as easily concocted. 7I3/ 88I/9 /3 64!I:26 I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/< 4;4)4/&6. 8 6or the accused to be con#icted of )idnapping, the prosecution is burdened to pro#e beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: ;a< the offender is a pri#ate indi#idual= ;b< he )idnaps or detains another, or in any manner depri#es the latter of his liberty= ;c< the act of detention or )idnapping must be illegal= and ;d< in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: ;1< the )idnapping or detention lasts for more than three days= ;2< it is committed by simulating public authority= ;3< any serious physical in.uries are inflicted upon the person )idnapped or detained or threats to )ill him are made= or ;7< the person )idnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 'f the #ictim of )idnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 2i)ewise, if the #ictim is )idnapped and it legally detained for the purpose of e,torting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. The essential elements for this crime is the depri#ation of liberty of the #ictim under any of the abo#e%mentioned circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or )nowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the #ictim coupled with intent.
+>4!4 ):&I54 I6 4A&:!&I:/ := ! /6:). 8 To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must pro#e beyond reasonable doubt the following: ;a< intent on the part of the accused to depri#e the #ictim of his liberty= ;b< actual depri#ation of the #ictim of his liberty= ;c< moti#e of the accused, which is e,tortion of ransom from the #ictim or any other person. 'n )idnapping or serious illegal detention for ransom, the purpose of e,torting ransom is a -ualifying circumstance which must be alleged in the 'nformation and pro#ed by the prosecution as the crime itself by words and o#ert acts of the accused before, during and after the )idnapping and detention of the #ictim. 5either actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. !lthough )idnapping for a certain purpose is a -ualifying circumstance, the law does not re-uire that the purpose be accomplished. 3ansom employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense: a sum of money or other thing of #alue, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a )idnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from capti#ity. 't may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the )idnapper or a third person as a condition for the release of the #ictim. S2'/ T '224/!2 D4T45T'"5= 42D*'D!T4D. 8 The appellant is guilty of slight illegal detention under !rticle 2@H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. &hile the epigraph or title of the article mentions only slight illegal detention, )idnapping committed in connection with the lower offense of slight illegal detention is also co#ered by the article. The felony has the following essential elements: 1. That the offender is a pri#ate indi#idual. 2. That he )idnaps or detains another, or in any other manner depri#es him of his liberty. 3. That the act of )idnapping or detention is illegal. 7. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in !rt. 2@B. The crime of slight illegal detention is consummated upon the occurrence of all the elements thereof. $! day,$ in the last paragraph of !rticle 2@H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, should be understood as twenty%four hours, to be counted from the depri#ation of the liberty of the #ictim until the cessation thereof. !s *uello *alon put it: $el pla+o de los tres dias de #einte cuatro horas y desde el momento de la pri#acion de libertad si en -ue esta cesare. The rescue or escape of the #ictim within three days from his )idnapping and detention is not an e,empting circumstance. The #oluntary release by the offender of the #ictim within three days from his detention, without the offender ha#ing attained his purpose and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him for slight illegal detention, is not an e,empting circumstance= it merely ser#es to reduce the penalty to prision mayor in its ma,imum and medium periods and a fine not e,ceeding (B>>. 7I3/ 88I/9 /3 6;I9>& I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/< @:&> (:))I&&43 I/ ( 64 & @ !. 8 !lthough the appellant and his co%conspirators )idnapped /eorge and *hristopher on the same occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two separate crimes: )idnapping under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, and slight illegal detention under !rticle 2@H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The appellant and his co%conspirators were animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal resolutions in )idnapping and illegally detaining the two #ictims. The criminal intent in )idnapping
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*hristopher was separate from and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in )idnapping and detaining /eorge for less than three days. 'n the mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two separate felonies= hence, should be meted two separate penalties for the said crimes: one for )idnapping under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode and another for slight illegal detention under !rticle 2@H of the same code. The felony of slight illegal detention is necessarily included in the crime of )idnapping for ransom= thus, the appellant may be con#icted of the former crime under an 'nformation for )idnapping for ransom. 'f the #ictim of )idnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 2i)ewise, if the #ictim is )idnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of e,torting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. The word $female$ in paragraph 1;7< of !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode refers to the gender of the #ictim and not of the offender. The essence of the crime of )idnapping is the actual depri#ation of the #ictim0s liberty under any of the abo#e%mentioned circumstances, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or )nowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the #ictim because ta)ing coupled with intent completes the offense. Cidnapping which in#ol#es the detention of another is by its nature a continuing crime.
; (7 := (:/64/&, 8!462)43 +>4!4 &>4 5I(&I) I6
=I54B?4 ! :;3 )I/:!. 8 The #ictim0s
lac) of consent is also a fundamental element of )idnapping. The in#oluntariness of the sei+ure and detention is the #ery essence of the crime. The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to pro#e lac) of consent on the part of the #ictim. owe#er, where the #ictim is a minor especially if she is only fi#e years old, lac) of consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to sei+ure and illegal detention. 'n this case, !ngela was merely fi#e years old when she was )idnapped= thus incapable of gi#ing consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better position than if the act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot rely on !ngela0s initial willingness to go along with them to the restaurant.
o o
7I3/ 88I/9 /3 I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/, /:& /49 &43 @? &>4 = (& &> & &>4 5I(&I) + 6 & 74/ ( !43 :=. 8 !lthough !ngela was free to roam around in the $dirty house,$ to draw and to watch tele#ision during the entire period of her detention, and was regularly fed and bathed, the appellants are ne#ertheless guilty of )idnapping and illegally detaining the fi#e%year%old child. !s Audge Mc/ill of the Dnited States *ourt of !ppeals said in Dnited States #. Mc*abe, $to accept a child0s desire for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the conte,t of )idnapping would render the concept meaningless.$ 64!I:26 I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/ I/(;2346 348!I5 &I:/ := ;I@4!&? I/ +> &454! =:!) /3 =:! +> &454! ;4/9&> := &I)4% 8 'n (eople #. 1aldogo, this *ourt held that illegal serious detention under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode as amended, includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the depri#ation of her liberty in whate#er form and for whate#er length of time. 't includes a situation where the #ictim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to mo#e. 'n this case, the door to the office of appellant 1isda was loc)ed while !ngela was detained therein. 4#en if she wanted to escape and go home, !ngela, at her age, could not do so all by herself. During the period of her confinement, !ngela was under the control of the appellants. The helpless child was waiting and hoping that she would be brought home, or that her parents would come and fetch her.
C2 ;I=?I/9 (I!(2)6& /(46< 4A&:!&I/9 ! /6:), 4;2(I3 &43. 8 The purpose of the offender in e,torting ransom is a -ualifying circumstance which may be pro#ed by his words and o#ert acts before, during and after the )idnapping and detention of the #ictim. 5either actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 3ansom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense= meaning, a sum of money or other thing of #alue, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a )idnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from capti#ity. 't may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the )idnapper as a condition for the release of the #ictim.
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5I(&I)D6 ; (7 := (:/64/&< 8!464/& ;&>:29> 5I(&I) I/I&I ;;? (:/64/&43 &: 9: +I&> :==4/34! 8 The #ictim0s lac) of consent is also a fundamental element of )idnapping and serious illegal detention. The in#oluntariness of the sei+ure and detention is the #ery essence of the crime. !lthough the #ictim may ha#e inceptually consented to go with the offender to a place but the #ictim is thereafter pre#ented, with the use of force, from lea#ing the place where he was brought to with his consent and is detained against his will, the offender is still guilty of )idnapping and serious illegal detention. To e,onerate the appellants for the simple reason that the #ictim had initially #oluntarily agreed to go with one of them, is for the *ourt to reward them simply because they were ingenious enough to conceal their true moti#e from the #ictim until he was transported to another place.
7I3/ 88I/9 /3 64!I:26 I;;49 ; 34&4/&I:/ =:! ! /6:)< (:))I&&43 ;&>:29> &>4!4 + 6 = I;2!4 &: !4(4I54 ! /6:) ):/4?% 8 The trial court correctly ruled that the appellants )idnapped and illegally detained the #ictim for the purpose of e,torting ransom. !lthough the appellants failed to recei#e any ransom money for the #ictim0s release, the crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom was nonetheless committed. 'n (eople #s. (agalasan, this *ourt ruled that to warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must pro#e beyond reasonable doubt: ;a< intent on the part of the accused to depri#e the #ictim of his liberty= ;b< actual depri#ation of the #ictim of his liberty= and ;c< moti#e of the accused, which is ransom for the #ictim or other person for the release of the #ictim. The purpose of the offender in e,torting ransom may be pro#ed by his words and o#ert acts before, during and after the )idnapping and detention of the #ictim. 5either actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 3ansom, as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense= meaning, a sum of money or other thing of #alue, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a )idnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from capti#ity. 't may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the )idnapper as a condition for the release of the #ictim.
(&2 ; (:/=I/4)4/& :! !46&! I/& := &>4 5I(&I) :! &>4 348!I5 &I:/ := >I6 ;I@4!&? I6 &>4 8!I) !? 4;4)4/& := (!I)4. 8 The primary element the crime is the actual confinement or restraint of the #ictim or the depri#ation of his liberty. 't is not necessary for the #ictim to be loc)ed up or placed in an enclosure= it is sufficient for him to be detained or depri#ed of his liberty in any manner. o T 4 G'*T'M &!S 4664*T'G42J 34ST3!'54D 'S 2'143TJ= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 'n the present case, the testimony and sworn statement of the #ictim showed that he was effecti#ely restrained of his liberty. e candidly testified that he went with the appellant in the belief that, with his mother0s permission, they were going to get a baggage from the airport and bring it bac) to their house in !ntipolo. &hen they proceeded instead to (asig, the #ictim thought they would .ust be dropping by. &hen the appellant told him to stay in the house in (asig while he and his friend, 'sagani MaNago, instead $got the baggage,$ the #ictim immediately as)ed permission to go home. To ma)e him stay, the appellant assured him twice that they would return to !ntipolo together with the baggage % first, on the night of Aanuary 3>, 1??7 and second, in the morning of Aanuary 31, 1??7. 'n addition to being tric)ed by the appellant to stay in 1ayani0s house in (asig, the #ictim was also so afraid of 1ayani that he could not lea#e the place e#en if he wanted to. 1ayani had a )nife in his waist e#en while sleeping and e#en threatened the #ictim $ang pumapaso) dito ay di na na)alabas ng buhay. $ 1ayani guarded him on the two occasions that appellant left, e#en accompanying the #ictim to urinate outside the house. /i#en all these circumstances, the #ictim was effecti#ely restrained of his liberty 8 the primary element of the offense of )idnapping and serious illegal detention. o 4 G'*T'M G"2D5T!3'2J &45T &'T T 4 !**DS4D "5 6!2S4 '5DD*4M45T= *!S4 !T 1!3 8 The appellant contends that there was no )idnapping because the #ictim #oluntarily went with him. This contention holds no water. 'n the case of (eople #s. Santos, we ruled that the fact that the #ictim #oluntarily went with the accused did not remo#e the element of depri#ation of liberty because the #ictim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the #ictim would not ha#e done so. Such is the situation in the present case 8 the #ictim, a boy 1@ years of age, would not ha#e #oluntarily left with the appellant if not for the false assurance that his mother had supposedly permitted him to accompany the appellant to the airport $to get the baggage$ and bring it bac) to the #ictim0s house. o *!33J'5/ !&!J "6 T 4 G'*T'M *!5 14 M!D4 6"3*'12J "3 63!DDD245T2J. 8 't is important to emphasi+e that, in )idnapping, the #ictim need not be ta)en by the accused forcibly or against his will. &hat is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the #ictim against his or her will after the offender is able to ta)e the #ictim in his custody. 'n short, the carrying away of the #ictim in the crime of )idnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or fraudulently.
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4664/(4 := 7I3/ 88I/9 I6 &>4 (&2 ; 348!I5 &I:/ := 5I(&I)D6 ;I@4!&? (:28;43 +I&> I/32@I& @;4 8!::= := I/&4/& := ((2643 &: 4==4(& 62(> 348!I5 &I:/. 8 96:or )idnapping to ta)e place, it is not necessary that the #ictim be placed in an enclosure= neither is it necessary that the detention be prolonged. owe#er, the essence of )idnapping is the actual depri#ation of the #ictim0s liberty coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such depri#ation. ! re#iew of the narration of e#ents by the prosecution itself shows that it was not able to establish actual confinement, detention or restraint of the child. The testimonies of its witnesses did not ade-uately pro#e that she had been forcefully transported, loc)ed up or restrained. 2i)ewise, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant had intended to depri#e the girl of her liberty. 5either the testimony of her mother nor that of the barangay tanod showed what his intent was. 4#en less helpful was the testimony of the child herself. *ertainly, we ta)e note of her tender age, but this consideration cannot be used to supply her testimony with the details that would ma)e appellant liable for the serious crime he was charged with. !bsent any indubitable proof of his purposeful or )nowing action to restrain her forcibly, there can be no ta)ing coupled with intent to complete the commission of the offense. The primary element of the crime of )idnapping is actual confinement, detention and restraint of the #ictim. H There must be a showing of actual confinement or restriction of the #ictim, and that such depri#ation was the intention of the malefactor. !n accused is liable for )idnapping when the e#idence ade-uately pro#es that he forcefully transported, loc)ed up or restrained the #ictim. ? There must e,ist indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to depri#e the #ictim of his liberty. The restraint of liberty must not arise merely as an incident to the commission of another offense that the offender primarily intended to commit. o 'n this case, actual restraint of the #ictim0s liberty was e#ident from the moment appellant clubbed the #ictim on the nec). !ppellant not only restricted (ati0s freedom of mo#ement, but appellant0s blow also disabled the #ictim from resisting appellant0s criminal design. This facilitated accused0s capacity to carry physically (ati to an un)nown place. "b#iously, this constitutes forcible ta)ing. The circumstances surrounding (ati0s disappearance are indubitable proof of a purposeful or )nowing action by appellant to forcibly ta)e the #ictim. The actual ta)ing indicated an intention to depri#e the #ictim of his liberty. 11 'n this case, appellant and his companions actually too) (ati away. 6or )idnapping to e,ist, it is not necessary to place the #ictim in an enclosed place. 't is sufficient to detain or depri#e him in any manner of his liberty. C'D5!(('5/ 6"3 3!5S"M= !*TD!2 D4M!5D 6"3 (!JM45T "6 3!5S"M, 5"T 34OD'34D= (!JM45T "6 3!5S"M !5D 34*"G43J "6 G'*T'M, 5"T ! D4T43345T 6"3 ! 6'5D'5/ "6 *D2(!1'2'TJ 6"3 T 4 *3'M4= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 &e do not find any -uantum of merit in the contention that )idnapping for ransom is committed only when the #ictim is released as a result of the payment of ransom. 'n (eople #. Salimbago we ruled 8 5o specific form of ransom is re-uired to consummate the felony of )idnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in e,change for the #ictim0s freedom. 'n municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from capti#ity. 5either actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 't is enough if the crime was committed $for the purpose of e,torting ransom.$ *onsidering therefore, that the )idnapping was committed for such purpose, it is not necessary that one or any of the four circumstances be present. So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in !merican .urisprudence from which was deri#ed the crime of )idnapping for ransom, is $not the forcible or secret confinement, imprisonment, in#eiglement, or )idnapping without lawful authority, but . . . the felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a ransom the person so )idnapped, confined, imprisoned, in#eigled, etc.$ 't is ob#ious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, )idnapping for ransom is already committed. !ny other interpretation of the role of ransom, particularly the one ad#anced by accused%appellants, is certainly absurd since it ironically penali+es rescue efforts of )idnap #ictims by law enforcers and in turn rewards )idnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue operations. Moreo#er, our .urisprudence is replete with cases, e.g., (eople #. *hua uy, (eople #. "campo and (eople #. (ingol, wherein botched ransom payments and effecti#e reco#ery of the #ictim did not deter us from finding culpability for )idnapping for ransom. C'D5!(('5/ 6"3 3!5S"M= 4SS45*4 "6 *3'M4: 4SS45T'!2 424M45TS, 4ST!12'S 4D. 8 Cidnapping for ransom, a continuing crime, defined and penali+ed under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3epublic !ct B@E?. The essence of the crime of )idnapping is the actual depri#ation of the #ictim0s liberty coupled with indubitable proof of the accused0s intent to effect the same. !nd if the person detained is a child, the -uestion that needs to be addressed is whether there is e#idence to show that in ta)ing the child, there was depri#ation of the child0s liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to depri#e the mother of the child0s custody. Dndoubtedly, the elements of )idnapping for ransom ha#e been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the circumstances of the case. C'D5!(('5/ 6"3 3!5S"M= *"MM'TT4D 1J D4T!'5'5/ ! (43S"5 T" *"M(42 'M T" (!J 'S D41T. 8 That the detention was, as so alleged by appellants, made to merely compel Sae+ to pay his debt, would not e,onerate
Page 229
them from the crime of )idnapping. 'n (eople #s. !)iran, a similar in#ocation was turned down by the Supreme *ourt= it e,plained: $&e state in passing that e#en if the purpose alleged by the defense be accepted 8 that is, to compel the alleged payment 8 under !rticle 2@B of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3.!. 1>H7 effecti#e Aune 1E, 1?E7, the offense is still )idnapping for ransom. Said amended last paragraph, which increased the penalty for )idnapping and serious illegal detention, pro#ides: 0The penalty shall be death where the )idnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of e,torting ransom from the #ictim or any other person, e#en if none of the circumstances abo#e mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.0 $This pro#ision was deri#ed from statutes of the Dnited States, particularly the 2indbergh 2aw. Thus, !merican Aurisprudence thereon has persuasi#e application. 03ansom0 under !merican rulings, as used in statutes ma)ing )idnapping with intent to hold for ransom a capital offense, has been held to mean in its ordinary sense as 0money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from capti#ity.0 Since the accused in this case demanded and recei#ed money as a re-uisite for releasing a person from capti#ity, whate#er other moti#e may ha#e impelled them to do so, the money is still ransom under the law.$ & 4T 43 "3 5"T T 4 3!5S"M 'S !*TD!22J (!'D T" "3 34*4'G4D 1J T 4 (43(4T3!T"3S 'S "6 5" M"M45T. 8 The corpus delicti in the crime of )idnapping for ransom is the fact that an indi#idual has been in any manner depri#ed of his liberty for the purpose of e,torting ransom from the #ictim or any other person. &hether or not the ransom is actually paid to or recei#ed by the perpetrators is of no moment. 'n (eople #s. Salimbago, the *ourt stressed: $. . . 5o specific form of ransom is re-uired to consummate the felony of )idnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in e,change for the #ictim0s freedom. 'n municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from capti#ity. 5either actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed.$
*R'+CLE 258 !L+7<' +LLE7*L DE'E-'+$A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pr#(ate #n$#(#$*al 2. T#at #e F#$naps or $eta#ns anot#er4 or #n an' manner $epr#(es the (#%t#m &" h#s l#,ert' 3. T#at t#e a%t of <idnapping or detention is #lle+al 4. T#at t#e crime is committed -#th&*t the atten$an%e &" an' &" the %#r%*mstan%es en*merate$ #n Art 036 penalty is lo$er if3 1. offended party is &oluntarily released $it#in 3 days 2. $it#out attaining t#e purpose 3. 1efore t#e institution of criminal action t#is felony is committed in t#e a1sence of circumstances enumerated in Art. 2 "
This felony is committed if any of the five circumstances in the commission of 9idnapping or detention enumerated in !rticle "4A is not present. The penalty is lowered if 3 #1% #"% #:% The offended party is voluntarily released within three days from the start of illegal detention= 5ithout attaining the purpose= ?efore the institution of the criminal action.
(ne should 9now the nature of the illegal detention to 9now whether the voluntary release of the offended party will affect the criminal liability of the offender.
Page 250
5hen the offender voluntarily releases the offended party from detention within three days from the time the restraint of liberty began, as long as the offender has not accomplished his purposes, and the release was made before the criminal prosecution was commenced, this would serve to mitigate the criminal liability of the offender, provided that the 9idnapping or illegal detention is not serious. &f the illegal detention is serious, however, even if the offender voluntarily released the offended party, and such release was within three days from the time the detention began, even if the offender has not accomplished his purpose in detaining the offended party, and even if there is no criminal prosecution yet, such voluntary release will not mitigate the criminal liability of the offender. (ne who furnishes the place where the offended party is being held generally acts as an accomplice. ?ut the criminal liability in connection with the 9idnapping and serious illegal detention, as well as the slight illegal detention, is that of the principal and not of the accomplice. ?efore, in People v. +aliente, if the offended party subjected to serious illegal detention was voluntarily released by the accused in accordance with the provisions of !rticle "46 #:%, the crime, which would have been serious illegal detention, became slight illegal detention only. The prevailing rule now is !sistio v. 0udge, which provides that voluntary release will only mitigate criminal liability if crime was slight illegal detention. &f serious, it has no effect. &n 9idnapping for ransom, voluntary release will not mitigate the crime. This is because, with the reimposition of the death penalty, this crime is penali8ed with the extreme penalty of death. &hat is ransom? It is the money" price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons" a payment that releases a person from captivity. The definition of ransom under the -indberg law of the ,.+. has been adopted in our jurisprudence in People v. !9iran, 16 +CR! ":<, "2", such that when a creditor detains a debtor and releases the latter only upon the payment of the debt, such payment of the debt, which was made a condition for the release is ransom, under this article. &n the case of People v. Roluna, decided .arch "<, 1<<2, witnesses saw a person being ta9en away with hands tied behind his bac9 and was not heard from for six years. +upreme Court reversed the trial court ruling that the men accused were guilty of 9idnapping with murder. The crime is only slight illegal detention under !rticle "46, aggravated by a band, since none of the circumstances in !rticle "4A has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the victim has been missing for six years raises a presumption of death, but from this disputable presumption of death, it should not be further presumed that the persons who were last seen with the absentee is responsible for his disappearance. *R'+CLE 259 ;-L*9F;L *RRE!'
Page 25
A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender arrests or detains anot#er person 2. T#at t#e purpose of t#e offender is to deli&er #im to t#e proper aut#orities 3. T#at t#e arrest or detention is not aut#ori2ed 1y la$ or t#ere is no reasona1le grounds t#erefore t#e felony consists in ma<ing an arrest or detention $it#out legal or reasona1le ground for t#e purpose of deli&ering #im to t#e proper aut#orities no period of detention
%n Enla$ful Arrest4 t#ere is detention or restraint of li1erty 1ut #e arrested t#e person for t#e purpose of deli&ering #im to t#e proper aut#orities. T#e detention is only incidental. This felony consists in ma9ing an arrest or detention without legal or reasonable ground for the purpose of delivering the offended party to the proper authorities. The offended party may also be detained but the crime is not illegal detention because the purpose is to prosecute the person arrested. The detention is only incidental= the primary criminal intention of the offender is to charge the offended party for a crime he did not actually commit. *enerally, this crime is committed by incriminating innocent persons by the offenderHs planting evidence to justify the arrest 3 a complex crime results, that is, unlawful arrest through incriminatory machinations under !rticle :4:. &f the arrest is made without a warrant and under circumstances not allowing a warrantless arrest, the crime would be unlawful arrest. &f the person arrested is not delivered to the authorities, the private individual ma9ing the arrest incurs criminal liability for illegal detention under !rticle "4A or "46. &f the offender is a public officer, the crime is arbitrary detention under !rticle 1"2. &f the detention or arrest is for a legal ground, but the public officer delays delivery of the person arrested to the proper judicial authorities, then !rticle 1"$ will apply. /ote that this felony may also be committed by public officers. !e"ti#n 'w#% & Ei(na))ing #0 min#rs *R'+CLE 260 E+D-*PP+-7 *-D F*+L;RE '$ RE';R- * M+-$R A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is entrusted $it# t#e custody of a minor person ($#et#er o&er or under " years 1ut less t#an 1' years of age4 AA '*)) 2. T#at #e deli1erately fails to restore t#e said minor to t#e latter;s parents or guardians
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According to Dudge -aredes4 it is not <idnapping; crime is only failure to return a minor 2e&ple (. Ast*r+a I4 an ' yr. old girl $as offered a ride #ome 1y t#e accused. >ut4 t#e girl o1ser&ed t#at t#ey $ere going to a different place. T#e girl resented t#is and s#e $as gra11ed 1y t#e accused. A group of men sa$ t#em so t#at t#e girl $as freed. 6#at crime is committedF A. Crime is not <idnapping 1ut coercion. T#ere is no actual confinement or restraint in t#e li1erty of t#e &ictim $#ic# is t#e primary element of <idnapping. T#e accused in forci1ly dragging t#e girl cannot 1e said to 1e in actual confinement. %n <idnapping t#ere is loc<ing upon depri&ation of li1erty for an apprecia1le lengt# of time. 2e&ple (. T' T#e essential element of <idnapping W failure to return a minor is t#at t#e offender is entrusted $it# t#e custody of t#e minor 1ut $#at is punis#ed is not t#e <idnapping 1ut rat#er t#e deli1erate refusal of t#e custodian to gi&e t#em 1ac< to t#eir parents. 2 elements must concur; 1.entrusted $it# a minor 2. deli1erate failure to restore said failure or refusal must also 1e persistent. Co4 to o1lige t#e parents to see< t#e aid of t#e court to o1tain custody 2e&ple (. R&$&na ' men $ere seen tying t#e #ands of t#e &ictim and t#ey 1roug#t #im to a sugarcane plantation. ?o gun firearms #eard 1ut t#e &ictim $as ne&er #eard of for a num1er of years. CC ruled t#ey are lia1le $it# <idnapping only not <idnapping $it# murder 1ecause murder $as ne&er pro&ed. T#ere $as no corpus delicti. T#e presumption of deat# under t#e Ci&il Code is not applica1le to criminal cases. As distinguis#ed in t#e case of -eople &. Casu<a4 people sa$ t#e accused maltreating t#e &ictim in t#e 1anca $#ere #e $as actually <illed. 6#ile in t#e Aodona case4 t#ere $ere no $itnesses. 2e&ple (. A#llan*e(a !ssence of offense of <idnapping is t#e actual depri&ation of li1erty coupled $it# t#e intent of t#e accused to effect it. 2e&ple (. G&mm&n I4 a girl4 $#ile dri&ing #is car4 s#e $as flagged do$n and 1roug#t some$#ere in 5aguna. Be $as s#ot 1ut s#e sur&i&ed. T#e crime committed are <idnapping $it# serious illegal detention4 carnapping and t#eft. T#eft 1ecause $#en t#e accused too< t#e money4 t#ere $as no more &iolence or intimidation applied. %n <idnapping W C%@ of a minor4 t#e lengt# of time is not material. T#e penalty is reclusion perpetua to deat#. 2e&ple (. S#m&n T#e crime committed is not <idnapping 1ut carnapping 1ecause t#e original criminal design $as to get t#e car. T#e depri&ation of li1erty $as only incidental to t#e main purpose of carnapping. H3 6#at is AansomF
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A3 0%n t#e case of 2e&ple (. 2*n& (25* Ccra '5)4 it is t#e money4 price or consideration paid or demanded for t#e redemption of t#e captured person; a payment t#at releases capti&ity. 0not immediate as<ing of money 0it does not matter t#at ransom $as paid 1ecause t#e la$ said for t#e purpose of ransom &f any of the foregoing elements is absent, the 9idnapping of the minor will then fall under !rticle "4A. &f the accused is any of the parents, !rticle "4A does not apply= !rticles "A@ and "A1 apply. &f the ta9ing is with the consent of the parents, the crime in !rticle "A@ is committed. &n People v. *enerosa, it was held that deliberate failure to return a minor under oneHs custody constitutes deprivation of liberty. Pidnapping and failure to return a minor is necessarily included in 9idnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor under !rticle "4A#2%. &n People v. .endo8a, where a minor child was ta9en by the accused without the 9nowledge and consent of his parents, it was held that the crime is 9idnapping and serious illegal detention under !rticle "4A, not 9idnapping and failure to return a minor under !rticle "A@. *R'+CLE 26 +-D;C+-7 * M+-$R '$ *4*-D$- <+! <$ME A. !lements 1. T#at t#e minor (under 1' years old) is li&ing in t#e #ome of #is parents or guardians or t#e person entrusted $it# #is custody 2. T#at t#e offender induces said minor to a1andon suc# #ome 0 %nducement must 1e actual4 committed $it# criminal intent and determination 1y a $ill to cause damage 0 ?ot necessary t#at minor a1andons #is #ome (-eople &. -aalam4 C.A. 54 ../. '2 "0'2 '4 >< %% Aeyes4 p 4'") !e"ti#n '/ree = !lavery an( !ervit.(e *R'+CLE 262 !L*:ER3 A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender purc#ases4 sells4 (<idnaps)4 or detains a #uman 1eing 2. T#at t#e purpose of t#e offender is to ensla&e suc# #uman 1eing 0according to Dudge -aredes4 misleading4 forget t#e $ord <idnap. 01st paragrap# purpose to ensla&e4 2nd paragrap# to assign to immoral traffic. A1sence of t#is element 1ut t#e person is detained4 crime is illegal detention.
Page 25,
This is committed if anyone shall purchase, 9idnap, or detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving him. The penalty is increased if the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to some immoral traffic. This is distinguished from illegal detention by the purpose. &f the purpose of the 9idnapping or detention is to enslave the offended party, slavery is committed. The crime is slavery if the offender is not engaged in the business of prostitution. &f he is, the crime is white slave trade under !rticle :21. *R'+CLE 261 E@PL$+'*'+$- $F C<+LD L*4$R :S*perse$e$ ,' La,&r C&$e an$ RA 6341;
*R'+CLE 26, !ER:+CE! RE-DERED ;-DER C$MP;L!+$- +- P*3ME-' $F DE4' A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender compels a de1tor to $or< for #im4 eit#er as #ouse#old ser&ant or farm la1orer 0 not &iolated if t#e de1tor is compelled to 1e a secretary 2. T#at it is against t#e de1tor;s $ill 3. T#at t#e purpose is to re7uire or enforce t#e payment of a de1t
Chapter T-& CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY

!e"% $ne% & *ban(#nment #0 /el)less )ers#ns an( ex)l#itati#n #0 min#rs% *R'+CLE 262 *4*-D$-ME-' $F PER!$-! +- D*-7ER an( *4*-D$-ME-' $F $-E! :+C'+M A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. >y failing to render assistance to any person $#om t#e offender finds in an unin#a1ited place $ounded or in danger of dying4 $#en #e can render suc# assistance $it#out detriment to #imself4 unless suc# omission s#all constitute a more serious offense a. T#e place is unin#a1ited 1. T#e accused found t#ere a person $ounded .A in danger of dying c. T#e accused can render assistance $it#out detriment to #imself d. t#e accused fails to render assistance 2. >y failing to #elp or to render assistance to anot#er $#om t#e offender #as accidentally $ounded or in=ured 3. >y failing to deli&er a c#ild4 under " years of age $#om t#e offender #as found a1andoned4 to t#e aut#orities or to #is family4 or 1y failing to ta<e #im to a safe place
Page 252
T#is is a crime of omission. 1. !8. %n t#e middle of t#e =ungle4 you did not assist #im4 lia1le in t#is article 2. 5a$ states4 accidental not intentionalY1ut lia1le $it# attempted #omicide or murder ,nder the first act, the offender is liable only when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense. 5here the person is already wounded and already in danger of dying, there is an obligation to render assistance only if he is found in an uninhabited place. &f the mortally wounded, dying person is found in a place not uninhabited in legal contemplation, abandonment will not bring about this crime. !n uninhabited place is determined by possibility of person receiving assistance from another. )ven if there are many houses around, the place may still be uninhabited if possibility of receiving assistance is remote. &f what happened was an accident at first, there would be no liability pursuant to !rticle 1" #2% of the Civil Code 3 damnum abs>ue injuria. ?ut if you abandon your victim, you will be liable under !rticle "A$. Here, the character of the place is immaterial. !s long as the victim was injured because of the accident caused by the offender, the offender would be liable for abandonment if he would not render assistance to the victim. *R'+CLE 265 *4*-D$-+-7 * M+-$R A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender #as t#e custody of t#e c#ild 0 not necessarily t#e legal or =udicial guardian 2. T#at t#e c#ild is under " years old 3. T#at #e a1andons suc# c#ild 4. T#at #e #as no intent to <ill t#e c#ild $#en t#e latter is a1andoned >. Hualifying Circumstances 1. C#ild dies as a result of a1andonment 2. 5ife of minor in danger due to a1andonment *R'+CLE 266 *4*-D$-+-7 $F M+-$R 43 PER!$- E-'R;!'ED 9+'< <+! C;!'$D3F +-D+FFERE-CE $F P*RE-'! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender #as c#arge of t#e rearing and education of a minor 2. T#at #e deli&ers said minor to a pu1lic institution or to ot#er persons 3. T#at t#e one $#o entrusted suc# c#ild to t#e offender #as not consented to suc# if a1sent4 t#e proper aut#orities #a&e not consented to it. >. Acts -unis#ed 1. @eli&ering a minor to a pu1lic institution or to ot#er persons $it#out t#e re7uired consent 2. -arent $#o neglect in not gi&ing t#eir c#ildren proper education $#ic# t#eir station in life
act; or
Page 255
re7uires and financial condition permits 0modified -@ *3 W AA " 1* *R'+CLE 268 E@PL$+'*'+$- $F M+-$R! !cts punished 1. ". Causing any boy or girl under 14 years of age to perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength or contortion, the offender being any person= )mploying children under 14 years of age who are not the children or descendants of the offender in exhibitions of acrobat, gymnast, rope wal9er, diver, or wild animal tamer, the offender being an acrobat, etc., or circus manager or engaged in a similar calling= )mploying any descendant under 1" years of age in dangerous exhibitions enumerated in the next preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any of the said callings= Belivering a child under 14 years of age gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in paragraph ", or to any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being an ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of such child= and &nducing any child under 14 years of age to abandon the home of its ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned in paragraph " or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being any person.
:.
2.
$.
The offender is engaged in a 9ind of business that would place the life or limb of the minor in danger, even though wor9ing for him is not against the will of the minor. -ature of the 1usiness @ his involves circuses which generally attract children so they themselves may en?oy wor$ing there unaware of the danger to their own lives and lim#s. !ge 3 .ust be below 14 years. !t this age, the minor is still growing. &f the employer is an ascendant, the crime is not committed, unless the minor is less than 1" years old. ?ecause if the employer is an ascendant, the law regards that he would loo9 after the welfare and protection of the child= hence, the age is lowered to 1" years. ?elow that age, the crime is committed. ?ut remember Republic !ct /o. A41@ #+pecial Protection of Children against Child !buse, )xploitation and Biscrimination !ct%. &t applies to minors below 16 years old, not 14 years old as in the Revised Penal Code. !s long as the employment is inimical 3 even though there is no physical ris9 3 and detrimental to the childHs interest 3 against moral, intellectual, physical, and mental development of the minor 3 the establishment will be closed.
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!rticle "A6 has no application if minor is 14 years old and above. ?ut the exploitation will be dealt with by Republic !ct /o. A41@. &f the minor so employed would suffer some injuries as a result of a violation of !rticle "A6, !rticle "A< provides that there would be additional criminal liability for the resulting felony. &llustration' The owner of a circus employed a child under 14 years of age to do a balancing act on the tightrope. The crime committed is exploitation of minors #unless the employer is the ascendant of the minor who is not below 1" years of age%. &f the child fell and suffered physical injuries while wor9ing, the employer shall be liable for said physical injuries in addition to his liability for exploitation of minors. 0 modified -@ *3 W AA " 1* -@ *34 Art 5)4 par " 0 0 punis#es t#e parent $#o improperly e8ploits t#e c#ills 1y using #im4 directly or indirectly4 suc# as for purposes of 1egging and ot#er acts $#ic# are inimical to t#e c#ild;s interest and $elfare *R'+CLE 269 *DD+'+$-*L PE-*L'+E! F$R $'<ER $FFE-!E! T#e imposition of t#e penalties prescri1ed in t#e preceding articles4 s#all not pre&ent t#e imposition upon t#e same person of t#e penalty pro&ided for any ot#er felonies defined and punis#ed 1y t#is Code. !e"ti#n 'w#% & 'res)ass t# (welling *R'+CLE 280 >;*L+F+ED 'RE!P*!! '$ D9ELL+-7 A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pri&ate person 0 if -u1lic .fficer or !mployee4 crime is (iolation of @omicile 2. t#at enters t#e d$elling of anot#er 3. T#at suc# entrance is against t#e latter;s $ill @istinctions 1et$een Art 2'* Trespass to d$elling A?@ Art 12' (iolation of @omicile 0 one $ay of committing Art 2'*4 entering t#e d$elling against t#e latter;s $ill. 6#ile (iolation of @omicile4 t#ere are 3 $ays of committing . . . 0 it is Hualified Trespass to @$elling if committed 1y &iolence or intimidation. !8ception to t#e Aule ($#en not lia1le)3 1. %f t#e entrance to anot#er;s d$elling is made for t#e purpose of pre&enting some serious #arm to #imself4 t#e occupants of t#e d$elling or a t#ird person4
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2. %f t#e purpose is to render some ser&ice to #umanity or =ustice4 3. %f t#e place $#ere entrance is made is a cafe4 ta&ern4 inn and ot#er pu1lic #ouses4 $#ile t#e same are open. @$elling defined means a 1uilding or structure de&oted for rest and comfort as distinguis#ed from places de&oted to 1usiness4 office4 etc. 0 !ntry must 1e against t#e $ill of t#e o$ner. %t may 1e presumed or e8press pro#i1ition of occupant. 5ac< of permission does not amount to pro#i1ition. /enerally4 all mem1ers of t#e #ouse#old is presumed to #a&e aut#ority to e8tend an in&itation to t#e #ouse. T#ere must 1e opposition. T#ere is implied pro#i1ition if t#e offender entered in an ingress not intended for entry. 0 -ro#i1ition must 1e prior to or at t#e time of t#e entrance. (iolation or %ntimidation may ta<e place t#e &iolence immediately after t#e entrance. Cuppose t#e offender enters t#e d$elling t#roug# t#e $indo$ W inflicted serious p#ysical in=ury to t#e o$ner. 6#at crime or crimes are committedF A3 TA!C-ACC T. @6!55%?/ A?@ C!A%.EC -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C Trespass may 1e committed 1y t#e o$ner of t#e d$elling..e8. landlord Two forms of trespass 1. Cualified trespass to dwelling 3 This may be committed by any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latterHs will. The house must be inhabited at the time of the trespass although the occupants are out. (r offender brea9s in with force and violence #!rticle "6@%. Trespass to property (ffender enters the closed premises or fenced estate of another= such close premises or fenced estate is uninhabited= there is a manifest prohibition against entering such closed premises or fenced estate= and offender has not secured the permission of the owner or careta9er thereof #!rticle "61%.
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#+ee also Presidential Becree /o. 1""A regarding unlawful entry into any military base in the Philippines.% Bwelling 3 This is the place that a person inhabits. &t includes the dependencies which have interior communication with the house. &t is not necessary that it be the permanent dwelling of the person. +o, a personHs room in a hotel may be considered a dwelling. &t also includes a room where one resides as a boarder. &f the purpose in entering the dwelling is not shown, trespass is committed. &f the purpose is shown, it may be absorbed in the crime as in robbery with force upon things, the trespass yielding to the more serious crime. ?ut if the purpose is not shown and while inside the dwelling he was found by the occupants, one of whom was injured by him, the crime committed will be trespass to dwelling and frustrated homicide, physical injuries, or if there was no injury, unjust vexation.
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&f the entry is made by a way not intended for entry, that is presumed to be against the will of the occupant #example, entry through a window%. &t is not necessary that there be a brea9ing. I!gainst the willJ This means that the entrance is, either expressly or impliedly, prohibited or the prohibition is presumed. 7raudulent entrance may constitute trespass. The prohibition to enter may be made at any time and not necessarily at the time of the entrance. To prove that an entry is against the will of the occupant, it is not necessary that the entry should be preceded by an express prohibition, provided that the opposition of the occupant is clearly established by the circumstances under which the entry is made, such as the existence of enmity or strained relations between the accused and the occupant. 6n violence" Cuello Calon opines that violence may #e committed not only against persons #ut also against things. *o" #rea$ing the door or glass of a window or door constitutes acts of violence. 6ur *upreme Court followed this view in +eople v. ayag. Aiolence or intimidation must" however" #e anterior or coetaneous with the entrance and must not #e posterior. 1ut if the violence is employed immediately after the entrance without the consent of the owner of the house" trespass is committed. If there is also violence or intimidation" proof of prohi#ition to enter is no longer necessary. Bistinction between >ualified trespass to dwelling and violation of domicile ,nli9e >ualified trespass to dwelling, violation of domicile may be committed only by a public officer or employee and the violation may consist of any of the three acts mentioned in !rticle 1"6 3 #1% entering the dwelling against the will of the owner without judicial order= #"% searching papers or other effects found in such dwelling without the previous consent of the owner thereof= and #:% refusing to leave the dwelling when so re>uested by the owner thereof, after having surreptitiously entered such dwelling. Cases when !rticle "6@ does not apply' #1% #"% #:% 5hen the purpose of the entrance is to prevent serious harm to himself, the occupant or third persons= 5hen the purpose of the offender in entering is to render some service to humanity or justice= !nyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses while they are open .
Pursuant to +ection 4, Rule 11: of the Rules of Court, a person who believes that a crime has been committed against him has every right to go after the culprit and arrest him without any warrant even if in the process he enters the house of another against the latterHs will.
*R'+CLE 28
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$'<ER F$RM! $F 'RE!P*!! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender enters t#e closed premises or t#e fenced estate of anot#er 2. T#at t#e entrance is made $#ile eit#er of t#em is unin#a1ited 3. T#at t#e pro#i1ition to enter 1e manifest 4. T#at t#e trespasser #as not secured t#e permission of t#e o$ner or t#e careta<er t#ereof 0 Crime is called Trespass to -roperty !e"ti#n '/ree% & '/reats an( "#er"i#n T#reat &. Coercion 1. T#reat usually effect not immediate W future $#ile Coercion immediate. *R'+CLE 282 7R*:E '<RE*'! A. Acts -unis#a1le 1. >y t#reatening anot#er $it# t#e infliction upon t#e person4 #onor or property of t#e latter or of #is family of any $rong amounting to a crime A?@ demanding money or imposing any ot#er condition4 e&en t#oug# not unla$ful4 and said offender s#all #a&e attained #is purpose. a. .ffender t#reaten anot#er $it# t#e infliction upon t#e person4 #onor or property of t#e latter or of #is family of any $rong 1. Cuc# $rong amounts to a crime c. T#ere is demand for money .A any ot#er condition is imposed4 e&en t#oug# not unla$ful d. .ffender attains #is purpose 2. >y ma<ing suc# t#reat $it#out t#e offender attaining #is purpose 3. >y t#reatening anot#er $it# t#e infliction upon t#e person4 #onor or property of t#e latter or of #is family of any $rong amounting to a crime4 t#e t#reat not su1=ect to a condition. a. .ffender t#reaten anot#er $it# t#e infliction upon t#e person4 #onor or property of t#e latter or of #is family of any $rong 1. Cuc# $rong amounts to a crime c. T#reat is not su1=ect to a condition
0 offense 7ualified if t#reat $as made in $riting or t#roug# a midleman ?.>. 1. 2'1 su1 par 1Ycoercion directed against t#e person of t#e offended party only T#reat is a declaration of an intention or determination to in=ure anot#er 1y t#e commission upon #is person4 #onor4 or property of t#e offended party or to #is family !ssence of crime of t#reat is intimidation and t#e act t#reatened must 1e $rong.
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/ra&e t#reat is committed e&en if t#e offended party is not present during t#e time t#e c#allenge $as made. %t is consummated as soon as it came to t#e <no$ledge of t#e &ictim. %f t#e offender #as ot#er criminal intention and t#e t#reats $ere only incidental..it is a1sor1ed 1y t#e gra&er crime. !8. Ao11ery 1y pointing of gun. T#reat is only a means to t#e main purpose $#ic# is ro11ery. Ao11ery 0 it is t#e immediate gi&ing of money 1ut if it is t#roug# p#oneY/ra&e t#reat is committed. T#at is t#e distinction. Threat is a declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the commission upon his person, honor or property or upon that of his family of some wrong which may or may not amount to a crime' #1% #"% *rave threats 3 when the wrong threatened to be inflicted amounts to a crime. The case falls under !rticle "6". -ight threats 3 if it does not amount to a crime. The case falls under !rticle "6:.
?ut even if the harm intended is in the nature of a crime, if made orally and in the heat of anger and after the oral threat, the issuer of the threat did not pursue the act, the crime is only other light threats under !rticle "6$. To constitute grave threats, the threats must refer to a future wrong and is committed by acts or through words of such efficiency to inspire terror or fear upon another. &t is, therefore, characteri8ed by moral pressure that produces dis>uietude or alarm. The greater perversity of the offender is manifested when the threats are made demanding money or imposing any condition, whether lawful or not, and the offender shall have attained his purpose. +o the law imposes upon him the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the crime threatened to be committed. ?ut if the purpose is not attained, the penalty lower by two degrees is imposed. The maximum period of the penalty is imposed if the threats are made in writing or through a middleman as they manifest evident premeditation. ,istinction #etween threat and coercion< The essence of coercion is violence or intimidation. There is no condition involved= hence, there is no futurity in the harm or wrong done. &n threat, the wrong or harm done is future and conditional. &n coercion, it is direct and personal. ,istinction #etween threat and ro##ery< #1% #"% !s to intimidation 3 &n robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate= in threat, the intimidation is future and conditional. !s to nature of intimidation 3 &n robbery, the intimidation is personal= in threats, it may be through an intermediary.
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#:% #2% #$%
!s to subject matter 3 Robbery refers to personal property= threat may refer to the person, honor or property. !s to intent to gain 3 &n robbery, there is intent to gain= in threats, intent to gain is not an essential element. &n robbery, the robber ma9es the danger involved in his threats directly imminent to the victim and the obtainment of his gain immediate, thereby also ta9ing rights to his person by the opposition or resistance which the victim might offer= in threat, the danger to the victim is not instantly imminent nor the gain of the culprit immediate.
*R'+CLE 281 L+7<' '<RE*'! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender ma<es a t#reat to commit a $rong 2. T#at t#e $rong does not constitute a crime 3. T#at t#ere is a demand for money or t#at ot#er condition is imposed4 e&en t#oug# not unla$ful 4. T#at t#e offender #as attained #is purpose or4 t#at #e #as not attained #is purpose 5ig#t t#reats may amount to >lac<mailing &n order to convict a person of the crime of light threats, the harm threatened must not be in the nature of crime and there is a demand for money or any other condition is imposed, even though lawful.
Cuestion D !nswer 1lac$mailing constitutes what crime? &t is a crime of light threat under !rticle "6: if there is no threat to publish any libelous or slanderous matter against the offended party. &f there is such a threat to ma9e a slanderous or libelous publication against the offended party, the crime will be one of libel, which is penali8ed under !rticle :$4. 7or example, a person threatens to expose the affairs of married man if the latter does not give him money. There is intimidation done under a demand. The law imposes the penalty of bond for good behavior only in case of grave and light threats. &f the offender can not post the bond, he will be banished by way of destierro to prevent him from carrying out his threat. *R'+CLE 28, 4$-D F$R 7$$D 4E<*:+$R 0dead la$ according to Dudge -aredes 0applica1le only to lig#t W gra&e t#reats Art 2'2 W 2'3
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0 if #e fails to gi&e 1ail4 #e s#all 1e sentenced to distierro *R'+CLE 282 $'<ER L+7<' '<RE*'! A. Acts -unis#ed 1. 1y t#reatening anot#er $it# a $eapon or dra$ suc# $eapon in a 7uarrel4 unless la$ful self0defense. 2. >y orally t#reatening anot#er4 in t#e #eat of anger4 $it# some #arm constituting a crime4 $it#out persisting in t#e idea in&ol&ed in #is t#reat 3. >y orally t#reatening to do anot#er any #arm not constituting a felony.
it 1e in
*R'+CLE 285 7R*:E C$ERC+$-
!cts punished 1. ". Preventing another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, from doing something not prohibited by law= Compelling another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
)lements 1. ". :. ! person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will= be it right or wrong= The prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or intimidation= and The person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of law or the right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
*rave coercion arises only if the act which the offender prevented another to do is not prohibited by law or ordinance. &f the act prohibited was illegal, he is not liable for grave coercion. &f a person prohibits another to do an act because the act is a crime, even though some sort of violence or intimidation is employed, it would not give rise to grave coercion. &t may only give rise to threat or physical injuries, if some injuries are inflicted. However, in case of grave coercion where the offended party is being compelled to do something against his will, whether it be wrong or not, the crime of grave coercion is committed if violence or intimidation is employed in order to compel him to do the act. /o person shall ta9e the law into his own hands. &llustration'
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Compelling the debtor to deliver some of his properties to pay a creditor will amount to coercion although the creditor may have a right to collect payment from the debtor, even if the obligation is long over due. The violence employed in grave coercion must be immediate, actual, or imminent. &n the absence of actual or imminent force or violence, coercion is not committed. The essence of coercion is an attac9 on individual liberty. The physical violence is exerted to #1% prevent a person from doing something he wants to do= or #"% compel him to do something he does not want to do. &llustration' &f a man compels another to show the contents of the latterHs poc9ets, and ta9es the wallet, this is robbery and not grave coercion. The intimidation is a means of committing robbery with violence or intimidation of persons. ;iolence is inherent in the crime of robbery with violence or intimidation upon persons and in usurpation of real properties because it is the means of committing the crime. )xception to the rule that physical violence must be exerted' where intimidation is so serious that it is not a threat anymore 3 it approximates violence. &n -ee v. C!, "@1 +C!R 2@$, it was held that neither the crime of threats nor coercion is committed although the accused, a branch manager of a ban9 made the complainant sign a withdrawal slip for the amount needed to pay the spurious dollar chec9 she had encashed, and also made her execute an affidavit regarding the return of the amount against her better sense and judgment. !ccording to the court, the complainant may have acted reluctantly and with hesitation, but still, it was voluntary. &t is different when a complainant refuses absolutely to act such an extent that she becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, not of her own will. &n this situation, the complainant ceases to exits as an independent personality and the person who employs force or intimidation is, in the eyes of the law, the one acting= while the hand of the complainant sign, the will that moves it is the hand of the offender. R&,,er' (. Gra(e C&er%#&n %n ro11ery4 t#ere is intent to gain. %n /ra&e Coercion4 in order to deli&er t#e property $it#out intent to gain. /i&e me your car 1ut it $as #is car. Cuppose t#ere $as a contract4 gipauli t#roug# force...?o intent to gain. . .so t#e crime committed is /C. 6#en is it 7ualifiedF A3 in &iolation of t#e rig#t to suffrage or to compel anot#er to perform a religious act or to pre&ent #im from e8ercising suc# rig#t 0$#at is pre&ented must not 1e pro#i1ited 1y la$ 0/C must 1e made $#en t#e offender must 1e doing or is a1out to do t#e act to 1e pre&ented. %f t#e act is already done $#en t#e &iolence $as e8erted4 t#e crime is un=ust &e8ation. -urpose of /ra&e Coercion3
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?o person may ta<e t#e la$ in #is o$n #ands. The first paragraph deals with light coercions wherein violence is employed by the offender who is a creditor in sei8ing anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt. &n the other light coercions or unjust vexation embraced in the second paragraph, violence is absent. &n unjust vexation, any act committed without violence, but which unjustifiably annoys or vexes an innocent person amounts to light coercion. !s a punishable act, unjust vexation should include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm would, however, unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. &t is distinguished from grave coercion under the first paragraph by the absence of violence. &llustration' Persons stoning someone elseHs house. +o long as stoning is not serious and it is intended to annoy, it is unjust vexation. &t disturbs the peace of mind. The main purpose of the statute penali8ing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may ta9e the law into his hands and that our government is one of laws, not of men. The essence of the crimes is the attac9 on individual liberty. *R'+CLE 286 L+7<' C$ERC+$A. !lements under -ar. 1 1. T#at t#e offender must 1e a creditor 2. T#at #e sei2es anyt#ing 1elonging to #is de1tor 3. T#at t#e sei2ure of t#e t#ing 1e accomplis#ed 1y means of &iolence or display of material force producing intimidation 4. T#at t#e purpose of t#e offender is to apply t#e same to t#e payment of t#e de1t UN.UST AEXATION (Art 2'"4 par 2) 6#at is un=ust &e8ationF %ncludes any #uman conduct $#ic#4 alt#oug# not producti&e of some p#ysical or material #arm $ould4 #o$e&er4 un=ustly annoy or &e8 an innocent person En=ust (e8ation &. Act of 5asci&iousness 0if #e fondles t#e 1reast of t#e girl. %f t#e intention is not 1y lasci&ious conduct4 it is E(. %f t#ere is lasci&iousness4 it is an act of lasci&iousness 1ut if t#e purpose is to #umiliate it is slander 1y deed. *R'+CLE 288
Page 265
$'<ER !+M+L*R C$ERC+$-! (Compulsory purc#ase of merc#andise and payment of $ages 1y means of to<ens) 0modified 1y t#e 5C !cts punished' 1. 7orcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or 9nowingly permitting the forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase merchandise of commodities of any 9ind from him= )lements' 1. ". :. (ffender is any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation= He or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees= He forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or 9nowingly permits to be forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase merchandise or commodities of any 9ind from him or from said firm or corporation.
".
Paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of to9ens or object other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless expressly re>uested by such laborer or employee. )lements' 1. (ffender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him by means of to9ens or object=
1. Those to9ens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines= :. +uch employee or laborer does not expressly re>uest that he be paid by means of to9ens or objects.
*R'+CLE 289 F$RM*'+$-A M*+-'E-*-CE *-D PR$<+4+'+$- $R C$M4+-*'+$$F C*P+'*L $R L*4$R '<R$;7< :+$LE-CE $R '<RE*'! )lements 1. (ffender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or wor9= The purpose is to organi8e, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or labor, stri9e of laborers or loc9out of employers. 0modified 1y 5C
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Chapter Three DISCOAERY AND REAELATION OF SECRETS

*R'+CLE 290 D+!C$:ER+-7 !ECRE'! '<R$;7< !E+Q;RE $R C$RRE!P$-DE-CE A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a pri&ate indi&idual or e&en a pu1lic officer not in t#e e8ercise of #is official function 2. T#at #e sei2es t#e papers or letters of anot#er 3. T#at t#e purpose is to disco&er t#e secrets of suc# anot#er person 4. T#at t#e offender is informed of t#e contents of t#e papers or letters sei2ed 0Jou open a telegram 0not necessary t#at secret is re&ealed. -enalty lo$er if #e $ill not re&eal 0e8ception3 not applica1le to parents4 guardians and spouses This is a crime against the security of oneHs papers and effects. The purpose must be to discover its effects. The act violates the privacy of communication. !ccording to (rtega, it is not necessary that the offender should actually discover the contents of the letter. Reyes, citing People v. +ingh, C!, 2@ (*, +uppl. $, :$, believes otherwise. The last paragraph of !rticle "<@ expressly ma9es the provision of the first and second paragraph thereof inapplicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of minors placed under their care or custody, and to the spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them. The teachers or other persons entrusted with the care and education of minors are included in the exceptions. &n a case decided by the +upreme Court, a spouse who rummaged and found love letters of husband to mistress does not commit this crime, but the letters are inadmissible in evidence because of unreasonable search and sei8ure. The ruling held that the wife should have applied for a search warrant. Bistinction from estafa, damage to property, and unjust vexation' &f the act had been executed with intent of gain, it would be estafa= &f, on the other hand, the purpose was not to defraud, but only to cause damage to anotherHs, it would merit the >ualification of damage to property= &f the intention was merely to cause vexation preventing another to do something which the law does not prohibit or compel him to execute what he does not want, the act should be considered as unjust vexation. Revelation of secrets discovered not an element of the crime but only increases the penalty.
Page 268
*R'+CLE 29 RE:E*L+-7 !ECRE'! 9+'< *4;!E $F $FF+CE A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender is a manager4 employee or ser&ant 2. T#at #e learns t#e secrets of #is principal or master in suc# capacity 3. T#at #e re&eals suc# secret 0committed 1y pri&ate indi&idual !n employee, manager, or servant who came to 9now of the secret of his master or principal in such capacity and reveals the same shall also be liable regardless of whether or not the principal or master suffered damages. The essence of this crime is that the offender learned of the secret in the course of his employment. He is enjoying a confidential relation with the employer or master so he should respect the privacy of matters personal to the latter. &f the matter pertains to the business of the employer or master, damage is necessary and the agent, employee or servant shall always be liable. Reason' no one has a right to the personal privacy of another.
*R'+CLE 292 RE:EL*'+$- $F +-D;!'R+*L !ECRE'! Elemen)( 1. ". :. 2. (ffender is a person in charge, employee or wor9man of a manufacturing or industrial establishment= The manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the industry which the offender has learned= (ffender reveals such secrets= Prejudice is caused to the owner.
! business secret must not be 9nown to other business entities or persons. &t is a matter to be discovered, 9nown and used by and must belong to one person or entity exclusively. (ne who merely copies their machines from those already existing and functioning cannot claim to have a business secret, much less, a discovery within the contemplation of !rticle "<". 0 ta<e note manufacturing or industrial esta1lis#ment
TITLE TEN
CRIMES AGAINST 2RO2ERTY

1. 2. 3. Ao11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons (Art. 2)4); Attempted and frustrated ro11ery committed under certain circumstances (Art. !8ecution of deeds 1y means of &iolence or intimidation (Art. 2)');
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2)");
4. (Art. 2))); 5. . ". '. ). 1*. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 1 . 1". 1'. 1). 2*. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 2 . 2". 2'. 2).
Ao11ery in an in#a1ited #ouse or pu1lic 1uilding or edifice de&oted to $ors#ip Ao11ery in an in#a1ited place or in a pri&ate 1uilding (Art. 3*2); -ossession of pic<loc<s or similar tools (Art. 3*4); >rigandage (Art. 3* ); Aiding and a1etting a 1and of 1rigands (Art. 3*"); T#eft (Art. 3*'); Hualified t#eft (Art. 31*); T#eft of t#e property of t#e ?ational 5i1rary and ?ational Museum (Art. 311); .ccupation of real property or usurpation of real rig#ts in property (Art. 312); Altering 1oundaries or landmar<s (Art. 313); +raudulent insol&ency (Art. 314); C$indling (Art. 315); .t#er forms of s$indling (Art. 31 ); C$indling a minor (Art. 31"); .t#er deceits (Art. 31'); Aemo&al4 sale or pledge of mortgaged property (Art. 31)); @estructi&e arson (Art. 32*); .t#er forms of arson (Art. 321); Arson of property of small &alue (Art. 323); Crimes in&ol&ing destruction (Art. 324); >urning one;s o$n property as means to commit arson (Art. 325); Cetting fire to property e8clusi&ely o$ned 1y t#e offender (Art. 32 ); Malicious misc#ief (Art. 32"); Cpecial case of malicious misc#ief (Art. 32'); @amage and o1struction to means of communication (Art. 33*); @estroying or damaging statues4 pu1lic monuments or paintings (Art. 331).
Chapter One RO!!ERY IN GENERAL

*R'+CLE 291 9<$ *RE 7;+L'3 $F R$44ER3 5obbery 9 1his is the ta+ing or personal property belonging to another, !ith intent to gain, by means of (iolence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. A. !lements 1. -ersonal property (e&en if it $as ta<en from a person $#o is not t#e o$ner of t#e property) 2. >elonging to anot#er 3. Enla$ful ta<ing of t#at property (asportacion) 4. 6it# intent to gain (animus lucrandi) 0 intent to gain is presumed =uris tantum t#e moment t#ere is asportacion. 0 mere intent is sufficient e&en if no actual gain resulted 0 if no intent to gain4 t#e crime may 1e coercion 5. (iolence against or intimidation of any person .A force upon t#ings ?ote3 %n prosecuting t#e crime of ro11ery4 t#e stolen product need not 1e produced.
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D#st#n%t#&ns Gra(e %&er%#&n T#ere is no animus lucrandi or no intent to gain R&,,er' T#ere is animus lucrandi (or intent to gain); (so also $it# usurpation of property4 t#ere is intent to gain)
P %n un=ust &e8ation4 t#ere is no attempted or frustrated un=ust &e8ation. T#is is a &ery minor crime. H3 @efine ro11eryF A3 it is t#e ta<ing of personal property 1elonging to anot#er $it# intent to gain4 1y means of (%.5!?C! A/A%?CT4 %?T%M%@AT%.? of any person; or using +.AC! E-.? A?JTB%?/.
%llustration3 Mr. A confronted and forced Mr. > and said 9gi&e me t#e $rist $atc# 1ecause t#at is mine4 it 1elongs to me: 1ut it turned out later t#at it $asn;t Mr. A;s $rist $atc#4 it truly 1elonged to t#e latter so t#ere is no crime of ro11ery 1ecause t#ere is no intent to gain. Bere4 t#ere is /..@ +A%TB. >ut $#ere t#e claim of o$ners#ip is patently a mere ploy or $as made in 1ad fait#4 animus lucrandi is present.
H3 6#at is t#e meaning of 9to appropriate:F A3 %n Cpanis#4 it means 9appoteramiento:. %t means to depri&e t#e la$ful o$ner of t#e t#ing.
T#e personal property may 1e ta<en from t#e o$ner4 or a mere possessor or e&en a t#ief. T#erefore4 if a ro11er or a t#ief is ro11ed4 t#e crime is ro11ery.
H3 6#en is &iolence employed in ro11eryF A3 it must 1e employed at an' t#me ,e"&re t#e asportation (t#e ta<ing of t#e personal property) is complete. T#e same is true $it# ro11ery $it# t#e use of force upon t#ings.
%llustration3 Cuppose % pic<ed #is poc<et and got #is $allet4 t#e &ictim noticed so #e ga&e c#ased4 % punc#ed #im4 is t#is ro11eryF ?.4 not ro11ery 1ecause &iolence $as inflicted or $as employed after t#e asportation $as completed.
PPP%n article 2)4 (ro11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons)4 &alue of t#e property is immaterial. >ut $it# article 2)) ( ro11ery $it# t#e use of force upon t#ings) t#e &alue of t#e property ta<en is material as it is t#e 1asis for t#e imposition of t#e penalty H3 6#en is 1$"#4) completeF A3 +rom t#e moment t#e offender gains possession of t#e t#ing.
o o
%n Ao11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons4 e&en if t#e culprit does not #a&e t#e opportunity to dispose t#e t#ing4 ta<ing is complete >ET in force upon t#ings4 t#ing must 1e ta<en out of t#e 1uilding to consummate t#e crime.
!e"ti#n $ne% & R#bbery wit/ vi#len"e #r intimi(ati#n #0 )ers#ns%
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*R'+CLE 29, R$44ER3 9+'< :+$LE-CE *7*+-!' $R +-'+M+D*'+$- $F PER!$-!
o
4.
/iolence or intimidation upon persons may result in death or mutilation or rape or serious physical in*uries.
ACTS 2UNISHED
When by reas#n OR #n #""asi#n &" the r&,,er' :taF#n+ &" pers&nal pr&pert' ,el&n+#n+ t& an&ther -#th #ntent t& +a#n;8 the %r#me &" h&m#%#$e #s %&mm#tte$I
o o T#is is punis#a1le $it# A!C5EC%.? -!A-!TEA T. @!ATB. T#e crime is called A.>>!AJ 6%TB B.M%C%@!. %f deat# results or e&en accompanies a ro11ery4 t#e crime $ill 1e ro11ery $it# #omicide -A.(%@!@ t#at t#e ro11ery is consummated. #llustrations3
1. B.M%C%@! 43 RE*!$- $F A.>>!AJ >efore Ta<ing %n order to eliminate opposition t#e ro11ers <illed t#e guard and entered t#e 1uilding 1y smas#ing t#e $indo$. Bere4 in ro11ery $it# #omicide t#e <illing $as done first 1efore t#e ta<ing of t#e property. After Ta<ing T#e ro11ers entered t#e #ouse t#roug# &iolence and intimidation of persons or property4 $#en t#ey $ere a1out to escape t#roug# t#e 1ac< door4 t#ey $ere c#ased 1y t#e o$ner $#om t#ey s#ot and $as <illed4 t#at is ro11ery $it# #omicide0to eliminate opposition. 2. B.M%C%@! $- '<E $CC*!+$- .+ A.>>!AJ A. T#e ro11ers entered t#e #ouse; t#e o$ner $as #iding in t#e attic. T#e ro11ers fired $arning s#ots in t#e ceiling4 $#ic# <illed t#e o$ner #iding t#ereat. T#is is ro11ery $it# #omicide. T#e Cupreme Court #eld t#at it is immaterial t#at deat# $ould super&ene 1y mere accident as long as #omicide $as produced 1y reason or on occasion of t#e ro11ery. :2p A Man+*la,nan8 99 2h#l 990; >. 6#en t#e ro11ers entered t#e #ouse t#e occupant $anted to s#out 1ut t#e ro11er put or stuffed t#e mout# $it# pandesal causing t#e suffocation and deat# of t#e o$ner4 t#e crime is ro11ery $it# #omicide.
4.1$ -E4E: J: #f by reason or on the occasion of robbery, t!o persons died, !hat is the crime committedH A3 t#e crime is r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e4 ?.T ro11ery $it# dou1le #omicide. T#e latter designation is $rong.
2e&ple (s. S&l#s G.R. N&s. 656C0@CC. Fe,r*ar' 4<8 4991 %t is t#e nature of t#e crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide t#at t#e crimes of #omicide4 murder4 or p#ysical in=uries irrespecti&e of t#eir num1ers committed in t#e occasion of or 1y reason of ro11ery are merged in t#e composite crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide. %t is error t#erefore to treat t#e deat# of t#e &ictims as dou1le #omicide. T#e e&idence on record fully sustains t#e trial court,s finding t#at Do&eniano4 Ca1ug and (idal are guilty 1eyond reasona1le dou1t of a special comple8 crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide. %t is t#e nature of t#is crime t#at t#e #omicides or murders and
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p#ysical in=uries4 irrespecti&e of t#eir num1ers4 committed on t#e occasion or 1y reason of t#e ro11ery are merged in t#e composite crime of Qro11ery $it# #omicide.Q (-eople &. -edroso4 et al.4 50 32))"4 Duly 3*4 1)'24 115 CCAA 5))).
J: #f by reason or on the occasion of robbery ten persons died, !hat is the crime committedH A3 r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e4 not ro11ery $it# multiple #omicide. T#e latter is also $rong.
2e&ple (s. K*#n&nes G.R. N&. 511<0. Mar%h 058 4991 T#e Court finds t#at t#e accused $ere incorrectly c#arged $it# ro11ery $it# multiple #omicide and so $ere also incorrectly sentenced 1y t#e trial court. T#e reas&n is t#at t#ere is n& %r#me &" r&,,er' -#th m*lt#ple h&m#%#$e *n$er the Re(#se$ 2enal C&$e. T#e c#arge s#ould #a&e 1een for ro11ery $it# #omicide only regardless of t#e fact t#at t#ree persons $ere <illed in t#e commission of t#e ro11ery. %n t#is special comple8 crime4 t#e num1er of persons <illed is immaterial and does not increase t#e penalty prescri1ed in Article 2)4 of t#e said Code. As $as said 1y t#is Court in -eople &s. Madrid ('' -#il. 1)4 Qt#e general concept of t#is crime does not limit t#e ta<ing of #uman life to one single &ictim ma<ing t#e slaying of #uman 1eing in e8cess of t#at num1er punis#a1le as separate indi&idual offense or offenses. All t#e #omicides or murders are merged in t#e composite4 integrated $#ole t#at is ro11ery $it# #omicide so long as t#e <illings $ere perpetrated 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery.Q
J: Suppose one robber +illed one of the occupants, and raped another occupant, !hat is the crime committedH A3 t#e crime is r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e4 not ro11ery $it# #omicide and rape. T#e latter is $rong. Aeason3 #omicide is t#e greater offense t#an rape. J: #f the robbers +illed one of the occupants, raped another, inflicted serious physical in*uries to another one and less serious physical in*uries to another, !hat is the crime committedH A3 Ao11ery $it# #omicide.
2e&ple (s. Al(are> G.R. N&. 61<<3. .an*ar' C48 4959. -BJC%CA5 %?DEA%!C A?@ M%55%?/ M!A/!@ TB!A!%? AC >.TB 6!A! -!A-!TAAT!@ T. !5%M%?AT! .--.C%T%.? T. TB! A.>>!AJ. R 6#ere all t#e elements of ro11ery4 namely4 intent to gain4 unla$ful ta<ing of personal property 1elonging to anot#er and &iolence against or intimidation of any person (Article 2)34 Ae&ised -enal Code) #a&e 1een duly pro&ed in t#e instant case4 t#e crime committed is ro11ery comple8ed $it# #omicide and serious p#ysical in=uries. Ho!e(er, the physical in*uries inflicted upon E(elyn -acaresas as !ell as the +illing of Se(erino Malapitan, 8r. should be merged in the composite, integrated !hole, that is robbery !ith homicide, it being e(ident that the +illing and the physical in*uries !ere perpetrated !ith the sole end in (ie! of eliminating opposition to the robbery or oppressing the e(idence, or both. %+ C.MM%TT!@ >J A >A?@4 .++!?C! %C @!?.M%?AT!@ AC QA.>>!AJ 6%TB B.M%C%@!Q E?@!A AAT%C5! 2)4 (1) .+ TB! A!(%C!@ -!?A5 C.@!; !5!M!?T .+ >A?@4 A? .A@%?AAJ A//AA(AT%?/ C%ACEMCTA?C!; -!?A5TJ. R Ender t#e pre&ailing =urisprudence4 if ro11ery $it# #omicide is committed 1y a ,an$4 t#e offense is denominated as Qro11ery $it# #omicideQ under Article 2)4 (1) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code $it# t#e element of 1and as an &r$#nar' a++ra(at#n+ %#r%*mstan%e.
9*R-+-7PPP %n t#e past4 t#e Cupreme Court $as consistent $it# its ruling for t#e past t#irty years t#at if t#e ro11ers <illed 3 or 4 or 5 &ictims4 or t#ere $ere multiple rapes t#e multiple <illings $ill 1e considered aggra&ating circumstance so t#at t#e CC s#ould impose t#e deat# penalty4 especially if t#e rape $as committed $#ic# $as considered as ignominy $#ic# is an aggra&ating circumstance.
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>ut in t#e recent case of P) v 7an#4 +e1ruary 2'4 2**14 t#e Cupreme Court #eld t#at the additional rapesKhomicides committed on the occasion of robbery !ould not be considered as an aggra(ating circumstance and therefore !ill not increase the penalty because the enumeration under $rt. =? Aaggra(ating circumstance; is exclusi(e.
2e&ple (s. Castan#t& Gan& GR U 4C<C6C8 Fe,r*ar' 058 0114
Accused /ano <illed 3 persons 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery. T#e 7uestion t#at needs to 1e resol&ed is $#et#er t#e multiplicity of #omicides could 1e appreciated as an aggra&ating circumstance. +or sometime4 t#is tic<lis# issue #as 1een t#e su1=ect of conflicting &ie$s 1y t#is Court $#en it #eld in some cases t#at t#e additional rapesG#omicides committed on t#e occasion of ro11ery $ould not increase t#e penalty4 $#ile in ot#er cases it ruled t#at t#e multiplicity of rapesG #omicides committed could 1e appreciated as an aggra&ating circumstance. >ut in People (. 5egala (/.A. ?o. 13*5*'4 5 April 2***) t#is Court spo<e $it# finality on t#e matter 0 #t should be noted that there is no la! pro(iding that the additional rapeKs or homicideKs should be considered as aggra(ating circumstance. T#e enumeration of aggra&ating circumstances under Article 14 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code is e8clusi&e as opposed to t#e enumeration in Article 13 of t#e same Code regarding mitigating circumstances $#ere t#ere is specific paragrap# (paragrap# 1*) pro&iding for analogous circumstances. %t is true t#at t#e additional rapes (or <illings in t#e case of multiple #omicide on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery) $ould result in an 9anomalous situation: $#ere from t#e standpoint of t#e gra&ity of t#e offense4 ro11ery $it# one rape $ould 1e on t#e same le&el as ro11ery $it# multiple rapes. Bo$e&er4 t#e remedy lies $it# t#e legislature. A penal la$ is li1erally construed in fa&or of t#e offender and no person s#ould 1e 1roug#t $it#in its terms if #e is not clearly made so 1y t#e statute. T#is case is singular in its 1ar1arity and nauseating in t#e manner $it# $#ic# t#e accused4 1olo in #and4 1utc#ered #is preys. ?ot$it#standing t#e &iciousness $it# $#ic# #e perpetrated t#e offense4 $e are constrained to apply t#e principle laid do$n in People (. 5egala4 and accordingly4 the t-& :0; &ther F#ll#n+s contrary to t#e ruling of t#e trial court4 sh&*l$ n&t ,e appre%#ate$ as a++ra(at#n+ %#r%*mstan%es.
-ew r.le in alleging aggravating "ir".mstan"es ).rs.ant t# R 0A RR #n Crim Pr#"e(.re%

%ncidentally4 $e also e8amined t#e possi1ility of appreciating d$elling as a generic aggra&ating circumstance4 1ut t#e attempt $as again t#$arted 1y a recent amendment to Cecs. ' and ) of Aule 11* of t#e Ae&ised Aules on Criminal -rocedure4 $#ic# too< effect 1 @ecem1er 2*** 0 Cec. '. @esignation of t#e offense. 0 T#e complaint or information s#all (1) state t#e designation of t#e offense gi&en 1y t#e statute4 (2) a&er t#e acts or omissions constituting t#e offense4 and (3) specify its 'ualifying $4& aggra(ating circumstances. %f t#ere is no designation of t#e offense4 reference s#all 1e made to t#e section or su1section of t#e statute punis#ing it. -ursuant to t#e afore7uoted amended pro&isions4 the 5ules no! re'uire that the information or complaint allege not only the 'ualifying but the Ageneric; aggra(ating circumstances as !ell4 ot#er$ise4 t#e same cannot 1e properly appreciated. /uided 1y t#e consecrated rule t#at $#en a penal statute4 su1stanti&e and remedial or procedural4 is fa&ora1le to t#e accused4 t#e courts s#all gi&e it a retroacti&e application and so $e must in t#is case as t#e %nformation does not allege d$elling as an aggra&ating circumstance.
R#bbery wit/ <#mi"i(e is ?.T a comple8 crime as understood under Article 4'4 1ut a single indi&isi1le crime. T#is is a special comple8 crime 1ecause t#e specific penalty is pro&ided in t#e la$.
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%n Nap&l#s (. CA8 it $as #eld t#at $#en &iolence or intimidation AND force upon t#ings are 1ot# present in t#e ro11ery4 t#e crime is comple8 under Article 4'. Asee 4o. < for full explanation; T#e term 9h&m#%#$e: is used in t#e generic sense4 and t#e comple8 crime t#erein contemplated compre#ends not only ro11ery $it# #omicide in its restricted sense4 1ut also $it# ro11ery $it# murder. o Co if t#e person <illed is less t#an 3 days old4 it is not ro11ery $it# infanticide. T#e crime is ro11ery $it# #omicide.
o
o
%f treac#ery (or any of t#e 7ualifying circumstances) attended t#e commission of t#e crime4 it is not ro11ery $it# murder >ET ro11ery $it# #omicide. Alt#oug# it is a crime against property and treac#ery is an aggra&ating circumstance t#at applies only to crimes against persons4 if t#e <illing in a ro11ery is committed $it# treac#ery4 t#e treac#ery $ill 1e considered a generic aggra&ating circumstance 1ecause of t#e #omicide. %f t#e person <illed is t#e fat#er or mot#er of t#e <iller4 t#e crime is not ro11ery $it# parricide >ET ro11ery $it# #omicide.
%llustration3 T#e ro11ers enter t#e #ouse. %n entering t#roug# t#e $indo$4 one of t#e ro11ers stepped on a c#ild less t#an t#ree days old. T#e crime is not ro11ery $it# infanticide 1ecause t#ere is no suc# crime. T#e $ord #omicide as used in defining ro11ery $it# #omicide is used in t#e generic sense. %t refers to any <ind of deat#.
+t (#es n#t t/ere0#re matter i0 t/e "rime #0 /#mi"i(e is intenti#nal #r n#t% F#r as l#ng as #n t/e #""asi#n #0 r#bbery a )ers#n (iesA t/ere is r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e%
%llustration3 T#e ro11ers entered t#e #ouse and s#ot one of t#e occupants $#o $as pregnant and died. Also as a result t#e fetus $as a1orted. 6#at crime $as committedF A3 ( Dudge -aredes 1elie&ed) t#ere $ere t$o crimes committed3 1. Ao11ery $it# #omicide 2. A1ortion (a1ortion is not a1sor1ed)
As long as t#ere is only one ro11ery4 regardless of t#e persons <illed4 you only #a&e one crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide. ?ote4 #o$e&er4 t#at 9one ro11ery: does not mean t#ere is only one ta<ing.
%llustration3 Ao11ers decided to commit ro11ery in a #ouse4 $#ic# turned out to 1e a 1oarding #ouse. T#us4 t#ere $ere different 1oarders $#o $ere offended parties in t#e ro11ery. T#ere is only one count of ro11ery. %f t#ere $ere <illings done to different 1oarders during t#e ro11ery 1eing committed in a 1oarder;s 7uarter4 do not consider t#at as separate counts of ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ecause $#en ro11ers decide to commit ro11ery in a certain #ouse4 t#ey are only impelled 1y one criminal intent to ro1 and t#ere $ill only 1e one case of ro11ery. %f t#ere $ere #omicide or deat# committed4 t#at $ould only 1e part of a single ro11ery. %n anot#er case4 a 1and of ro11ers entered a compound4 $#ic# is actually a sugar mill. 6it#in t#e compound4 t#ere $ere 7uarters of t#e la1orers. T#ey ro11ed eac# of t#e 7uarters. T#e Cupreme Court #eld t#at t#ere $as only one count of ro11ery 1ecause $#en t#ey decided and determined to ro1 t#e compound4 t#ey $ere only impelled 1y one criminal intent to ro1.
'/ere is n# s)e"ial "#m)lex "rime #0 r#bbery in ban( an( (#.ble /#mi"i(e an( seri#.sA less seri#.s #r less seri#.s )/ysi"al inR.ries%
2e&ple (s. Mate&
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G.R. N&s. 7C903@09. N&(em,er 4C8 4959 T#e trial court found t#e appellant guilty of t#e crime of 5obbery in -and !ith Homicide. T#is is n&t %&rre%t. %n t#e case of -eople &s. -edroso4 t#e Court said3 Q. . . T#ere is no special comple8 crime of ro11ery in 1and $it# dou1le #omicide and or serious4 less serious or slig#t p#ysical in=uries under t#e present Code4 as amended 1y Aepu1lic Act ?o. 3"3. %f ro11ery $it# #omicide (or $it# t#e ot#er crimes enumerated a1o&e) is committed 1y a 1and4 t#e indicta1le offense $ould still 1e denominated as ,ro11ery $it# #omicide, under Article 2)4(1)4 1ut t#e circumstance t#at it $as committed 1y a 1and is not an element of t#e crime 1ut is merely a generic aggra&ating circumstance $#ic# may 1e offset 1y mitigating circumstances. T#e #omicides or murders and p#ysical in=uries4 irrespecti&e of t#eir num1ers4 committed on t#e occasion or 1y reason of t#e ro11ery are merged in t#e composite crime of ,ro11ery $it# #omicide., . . .Q.
6it# more reason4 t#erefore4 if in a ro11ery4 t#e offender too< a$ay property 1elonging to different o$ners4 as long as t#e ta<ing $as done at one time4 and in one place4 impelled 1y t#e same criminal intent to gain4 t#ere $ould only 1e one count of ro11ery. +n r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e as a single in(ivisible #00enseA it is immaterial w/# gets 8ille( (even i0 t/e )ers#n 8ille( is #ne #0 t/e r#bbers)% Even t/#.g/ t/e 8illing may /ave res.lte( 0r#m negligen"eA y#. will still (esignate t/e "rime as r#bbery wit/ /#mi"i(e%
%llustration3 .n t#e occasion of a ro11ery4 one of t#e offenders placed #is firearm on t#e ta1le. 6#ile t#ey $ere ransac<ing t#e place4 one of t#e ro11ers 1umped t#e ta1le. As a result4 t#e firearm fell on t#e floor and disc#arged. .ne of t#e ro11ers $as t#e one <illed. !&en t#oug# t#e placing of t#e firearm on t#e ta1le $#ere t#ere is no safety precaution ta<en may 1e considered as one of negligence or imprudence4 you do not separate t#e #omicide as one of t#e product of criminal negligence. %t $ill still 1e ro11ery $it# #omicide4 $#et#er t#e person <illed is connected $it# t#e ro11ery or not. Be need not also 1e in t#e place of t#e ro11ery. %n one case4 in t#e course of t#e struggle in a #ouse $#ere t#e ro11ery $as 1eing committed4 t#e o$ner of t#e place tried to $rest t#e arm of t#e ro11er. A person se&eral meters a$ay $as t#e one $#o got <illed. T#e crime $as #eld to 1e ro11ery $it# #omicide.
?ote t#at t#e person <illed need not 1e one $#o is identified $it# t#e o$ner of t#e place $#ere t#e ro11ery is committed or one $#o is a stranger to t#e ro11ers. %t is enoug# t#at t#e #omicide $as committed 1y reason of t#e ro11ery or on t#e occasion t#ereof.
%llustration3 T#ere are t$o ro11ers $#o 1ro<e into a #ouse and carried a$ay some &alua1les. After t#ey left suc# #ouse t#ese t$o ro11ers decided to cut or di&ide t#e loot already so t#at t#ey can go of t#em. Co $#ile t#ey are di&iding t#e loot t#e ot#er ro11er noticed t#at t#e one doing t#e di&ision is trying to c#eat #im and so #e immediately 1o8ed #im. ?o$ t#is ro11er $#o $as 1o8ed t#en pulled out #is gun and fired at t#e ot#er one <illing t#e latter. 6ould t#at 1ring a1out t#e crime of ro11ery $it# #omicideF Jes. !&en if t#e ro11ery $as already consummated4 t#e <illing $as still 1y reason of t#e ro11ery 1ecause t#ey 7uarreled in di&iding t#e loot t#at is t#e su1=ect of t#e ro11ery.
%n 2e&ple (. D&m#n+&8 45< SCRA <198 on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery4 t#e storeo$ner4 a septuagenarian4 suffered a stro<e due to t#e e8treme fear $#ic# directly caused #is deat# $#en t#e ro11ers pointed t#eir guns at #im. %t $as #eld t#at t#e crime committed $as ro11ery $it# #omicide. %t is immaterial t#at deat# super&ened as a mere accident as long as t#e #omicide $as produced 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery4 1ecause it is only t#e result $#ic# matters4 $it#out reference to t#e circumstances or causes or persons inter&ening in t#e commission of t#e crime $#ic# must 1e considered.
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Aemem1er also t#at intent to ro1 must 1e pro&ed. >ut t#ere must 1e an allegation as to t#e ro11ery not only as to t#e intention to ro1. %f t#e moti&e is to <ill and t#e ta<ing is committed t#ereafter4 t#e crimes committed are #omicide and t#eft. %f t#e primordial intent of t#e offender is to <ill and not to ro1 1ut after t#e <illing of t#e &ictims a ro11ery $as committed4 t#en t#ere are $ill 1e t$o separate crimes.
%llustration3 %f a person #ad an enemy and <illed #im and after <illing #im4 sa$ t#at #e #ad a 1eautiful ring and too< t#is4 t#e crime $ould 1e not ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ecause t#e primary criminal intent is to <ill. Co4 t#ere $ill 1e t$o crimes3 one for t#e <illing and one for t#e ta<ing of t#e property after t#e &ictim $as <illed. ?o$ t#is $ould 1ring a1out t#e crime of t#eft and it could not 1e ro11ery anymore 1ecause t#e person is already dead.
+or ro11ery $it# #omicide to e8ist4 #omicide must 1e committed 1y reason or on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery4 t#at is4 t#e #omicide must 1e committed 9in t#e course or 1ecause of t#e ro11ery.: Ao11ery and #omicide are separate offenses $#en t#e #omicide is not committed 9on t#e occasion: or 91y reason: of t#e ro11ery. 6#ere t#e &ictims $ere <illed4 not for t#e purpose of committing ro11ery4 and t#e idea of ta<ing t#e money and ot#er personal property of t#e &ictims $as concei&ed 1y t#e culprits only after t#e <illing4 it $as #eld in 2e&ple (. D&m#n+&8 45< SCRA <198 t#at t#e culprits committed t$o separate crimes of #omicide or murder (7ualified 1y a1use of superior strengt#) AND t#eft. T#e &ictims $ere <illed first t#en t#eir money $as ta<en t#e money from t#eir dead 1odies. T#is is ro11ery $it# #omicide. %t is important #ere t#at t#e #ntent to commit ro11ery m*st pre%e$e the taF#n+ of #uman life in ro11ery $it# #omicide. T#e offender must #a&e t#e intent to ta<e personal property 1efore t#e <illing. %t must 1e conclusi&ely s#o$n t#at t#e #omicide $as committed for t#e purpose of ro11ing t#e &ictim. %n 2e&ple (. Hernan$e>4 appellants #ad not t#oug#t of ro11ery prior to t#e <illing. T#e t#oug#t of ta<ing t#e &ictim;s $rist$atc# $as concei&ed only after t#e <illing and t#ro$ing of t#e &ictim in t#e canal. Appellants $ere con&icted of t$o separate crimes of #omicide and t#eft as t#ere is a1sent direct relation and intimate connection 1et$een t#e ro11ery and t#e <illing. T#e <illing must 1e directly connected $it# t#e ro11ery.
%llustration3 Ao11ers #as already ro11ed t#e #ouse4 t#ey left t#e #ouse already4 1ut after t#ey $ere a fe$ meters a$ay4 t#ey reali2ed t#at t#ey did not loc< t#e door4 so t#ey $ent 1ac<4 t#ey met t#e guard4 s#ot and <illed t#e guard4 t#e crime is ro11ery an$ #omicide4 not ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ecause t#e <illing $as no longer directly connected $it# t#e ro11ery. %llustration3 %f t#e ro11ers detained t#e occupants in t#e #ouse4 and $#en t#e ro11ers left t#ey loc<ed t#e door and secured it4 t#ere is no ro11ery $it# serious illegal detention. %t is simply ro11ery.
Side comment of 8udge Paredes: o %n recent cases in carnapping (2**1)4 it $as usually carnapping $it# #omicide. >ut no$ it is simply carnapping. T#e penalty is mandatory deat# penalty.
%n <idnapping4 if deat# resulted or rape is committed4 t#e crime is <idnapping (C#iong Case).
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T#ere e8ist no offense suc# as ro11ery $it# #omicide and frustrated #omicide. Any ot#er act producing a result s#ort of deat# is #omicide assuming t#at Sanot#erT deat# occurred at t#e same time. T#e crime is simply ro11ery $it# #omicide. +n R#bbery wit/ <#mi"i(eA b#t/ "rimes #r r#bbery an( /#mi"i(e s/#.l( be "#ns.mmate(%
o o
%f r&,,er' #s %&ns*mmate$ 1ut t#e #omicide $as only attempted or frustrated4 t#ere $ill 1e t$o separate crimes. >ut if h&m#%#$e -as %&ns*mmate$ 1ut ro11ery $as attempted or frustrated4 t#ere $ill still 1e a special comple8 crime of K attempted ro11ery $it# #omicide4 or frustrated ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ut it $ill not 1e go&erned 1y article 2)4 1ut 1y article 2)".
2% 9/en t/e r#bbery is a""#m)anie( by ra)e $R intenti#nal m.tilati#n $R ars#nF

On r&,,er' -#th rape T#is is anot#er form of &iolence or intimidation upon person. T#e rape accompanies t#e ro11ery. %n t#is case $#ere rape and not #omicide is committed4 t#ere is only a crime of ro11ery $it# rape if 1ot# t#e ro11ery and t#e rape are consummated. I" during t#e ro11ery4 attempted rape $ere committed4 t#e crimes $ould 1e separate4 t#at is4 one for ro11ery A?@ one for t#e attempted rape. T#e rape committed on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery is not considered a pri&ate crime 1ecause t#e crime is ro11ery4 $#ic# is a crime against property. Co4 e&en t#oug# t#e ro11er may #a&e married t#e $oman raped4 t#e crime remains ro11ery $it# rape. T#e rape is not erased. T#is is 1ecause t#e crime is against property $#ic# is a single indi&isi1le offense. %f t#e $oman4 $#o $as raped on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery4 pardoned t#e rapist $#o is one of t#e ro11ers4 t#at $ould not erase t#e crime of rape. T#e offender $ould still 1e prosecuted for t#e crime of ro11ery $it# rape4 as long as t#e rape is consummated. %f t#e original design is to commit rape4 1ut t#e accused after committing rape also committed ro11ery4 meaning t#ere $as &iolence or intimidation4 t#e criminal acts s#ould 1e &ie$ed $as 2 distinct offenses0rape and ro11ery.
%llustration3 Cuppose t#ere $as ro11ery committed and t#e #ousemaid $as rape. >ut 1ecause t#e ro11er is #andsome4 t#e maid acceded t#at t#e ro11er to marry #er. T#e effect is t#at t#ere $ill 1e no rape 1ecause t#e marriage e8tinguis#es t#e crime of rape. Bo$ a1out t#e crime of ro11ery $it# rape4 as in t#is caseF T#e o$ner of t#e property ta<en pursued t#e criminal case. 6ill it 1e ro11ery only or ro11ery $it# rapeF A3 %t s#ould 1e ro11ery $it# rape 1ecause it is single and indi&isi1le crime. T#e primordial intent must 1e to ro1.
>ut if t#e rape #s attempte$4 since it $ill 1e a separate c#arge and t#e offended $oman pardoned t#e offender00 t#at $ould 1ring a1out a 1ar to t#e prosecution of t#e attempted rape. %f t#e offender married t#e offended $oman4 t#at $ould e8tinguis# t#e criminal lia1ility 1ecause t#e rape is t#e su1=ect of a separate prosecution. T#e intention must 1e to commit ro11ery and e&en if t#e rape is committed 1efore t#e ro11ery4 ro11ery $it# rape is committed. !UT if t#e accused tried to rape t#e offended party and
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1ecause of resistance4 #e failed to consummate t#e act4 and t#en #e snatc#ed t#e &anity case from #er #ands $#en s#e ran a$ay4 t$o crimes are committed3 attempted rape $4& theft. T#ere is no comple8 crime under Article 4' 1ecause a single act is not committed and attempted rape is not a means necessary to commit t#eft and &ice0&ersa. T#e Ae&ised -enal Code does not differentiate $#et#er rape $as committed 1efore4 during or after t#e ro11ery. %t is enoug# t#at t#e ro11ery accompanied t#e rape. Ao11ery must not 1e a mere accident or aftert#oug#t. %n 2e&ple (. Fl&res8 497 SCRA 0978 alt#oug# t#e offenders plan $as to get t#e &ictim;s money4 rape #er and <ill #er4 1ut in t#e actual e8ecution of t#e crime4 t#e t#oug#ts of depri&ing t#e &ictim of #er &alua1les $as relegated to t#e 1ac<ground and t#e offender;s prurient desires surfaced. T#ey persisted in satisfying t#eir lust. T#ey $ould #a&e forgotten a1out t#eir intent to ro1 if not for t#e accidental touc#ing of t#e &ictim;s ring and $rist$atc#. T#e ta<ing of t#e &ictim;s &alua1les turned out to 1e an aftert#oug#t. %t $as #eld t#at t$o distinct crimes $ere committed3 rape !ith homicide and theft. %n 2e&ple (. D#n&la8 45C SCRA <9C8 it $as #eld t#at if t#e original criminal design of t#e accused $as to commit rape and after committing t#e rape4 t#e accused committed ro11ery 1ecause t#e opportunity presented itself4 t$o distinct crimes 0 rape and robbery $ere committed 0 not ro11ery $it# rape. %n t#e latter4 t#e criminal intent to gain must precede t#e intent to rape. On r&,,er' -#th ars&n Anot#er inno&ation of Aepu1lic Act ?o. " 5) is t#e composite crime of ro11ery $it# arson if arson is committed 1y reason of or on occasion of t#e ro11ery. T#e composite crime $ould only 1e committed if t#e primordial intent of t#e offender is to commit ro11er and t#ere is no <illing4 rape4 or intentional mutilation committed 1y t#e offender during t#e ro11ery. .t#er$ise4 t#e crime $ould 1e ro11ery $it# #omicide4 or ro11ery $it# rape4 or ro11ery $it# intentional mutilation4 in t#at order4 and t#e arson $ould only 1e an aggra&ating circumstance. %t is essential t#at ro11ery precedes t#e arson4 as in t#e case of rape and intentional mutilation4 1ecause t#e amendment included arson among t#e rape and intentional mutilation $#ic# #a&e accompanied t#e ro11ery. Moreo&er4 it s#ould 1e noted t#at arson #as 1een made a component only of ro11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons in said Article 2)44 1ut not of ro11ery 1y t#e use of force upon t#ings in Articles 2)) and 3*2. Co4 if t#e ro11ery $as 1y t#e use of force upon t#ings and t#ere$it# arson $as committed4 t$o distinct crimes are committed.
1% 9/en by reas#n #0 #n #""asi#n #0 s."/ r#bberyA any #0 t/e )/ysi"al inR.ries res.lting in insanityA imbe"ilityA im)#ten"y #r blin(ness is in0li"te(F APar =, $rt 2>3; ,% 9/en by reas#n #r #n #""asi#n #0 r#bberyA any #0 t/e )/ysi"al inR.ries res.lting in t/e l#ss #0 t/e .se #0 s)ee"/ #r t/e )#wer t# /ear #r t# smellA #r t/e l#ss #0 an eyeA a /an(A a 0##tA an armA #r a leg #r t/e l#ss #0 t/e .se #0 any s."/ member #r in"a)a"ity 0#r t/e w#r8 in w/i"/ t/e inR.re( )ers#n is t/eret#0#re /abit.ally engage( is in0li"te(F APar 2, $rt 2>3; 2% +0 t/e vi#len"e #r intimi(ati#n em)l#ye( in t/e "#mmissi#n #0 t/e r#bbery is "arrie( t# a (egree .nne"essary 0#r t/e "#mmissi#n #0 t/e "rimeF 5% 9/en in t/e "#.rse #0 its exe".ti#nA t/e #00en(er s/all /ave in0li"te( .)#n any )ers#n n#t res)#nsible 0#r t/e "#mmissi#n #0 t/e r#bbery any #0 t/e )/ysi"al inR.ries in "#nseD.en"e #0 w/i"/ t/e )ers#n inR.re( be"#mes
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(e0#rme( #r l#ses any #t/er member #0 /is b#(y #r l#ses t/e s.e t/ere#0 #r be"#mes ill #r in"a)a"itate( 0#r t/e )er0#rman"e #0 t/e w#r8 in w/i"/ /e is /abit.ally engage( 0#r m#re t/an 90 (ays $R t/e )ers#n inR.re( be"#mes ill #r in"a)a"itate( 0#r lab#r 0#r m#re t/an 10 (aysF APar 3 L ?, $rt 2>3;
T#is is only true if t#ere is no #omicide4 1ecause if in ro11ery t#ere is #omicide and p#ysical in=uries under su1di&ision 14 t#e crime is ro11ery $it# #omicide. T#e only crime t#at can replace ot#er lesser crimes is #omicide. $n r#bbery wit/ )/ysi"al inR.ries To 1e considered as suc#4 t#e p#ysical in=uries m*st al-a's ,e ser#&*s. %f t#e p#ysical in=uries are only less serious or slig#t4 t#ey are a1sor1ed in t#e ro11ery. T#e crime 1ecomes merely ro11ery. !*t if t#e less serious p#ysical in=uries $ere committed a"ter t#e ro11ery $as already consummated4 t#ere $ould 1e a separate c#arge for t#e less serious p#ysical in=uries. %t $ill only 1e a1sor1ed in t#e ro11ery if it $as inflicted in t#e course of t#e e8ecution of t#e ro11ery. T#e same is true in t#e case of slig#t p#ysical in=uries.
%llustration3 After t#e ro11ery #ad 1een committed and t#e ro11ers $ere already fleeing from t#e #ouse $#ere t#e ro11ery $as committed4 t#e o$ner of t#e #ouse c#ased t#em and t#e ro11ers foug#t 1ac<. %f only less serious p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted4 t#ere $ill 1e separate crimes3 one for ro11ery and one for less serious p#ysical in=uries.
>ut if after t#e ro11ery $as committed and t#e ro11ers $ere already fleeing from t#e #ouse $#ere t#e ro11ery $as committed4 t#e o$ner or mem1ers of t#e family of t#e o$ner c#ased t#em4 and t#ey foug#t 1ac< and some1ody $as <illed4 t#e crime $ould still 1e ro11ery $it# #omicide. >ut if serious p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted and t#e serious p#ysical in=uries rendered t#e &ictim impotent or insane or t#e &ictim lost t#e use of any of #is senses or lost a part of #is 1ody4 t#e crime $ould still 1e ro11ery $it# serious p#ysical in=uries. T#e p#ysical in=uries (serious) s#ould not 1e separated regardless of $#et#er t#ey retorted in t#e course of t#e commission of t#e ro11ery or e&en after t#e ro11ery $as consummated. %n Article 2))4 it is only $#en t#e p#ysical in=uries resulted in t#e deformity or incapacitated t#e offended party from la1or for more t#an 3* days t#at t#e la$ re7uires suc# p#ysical in=uries to #a&e 1een inflicted in t#e course of t#e e8ecution of t#e ro11ery4 and only upon persons $#o are n&t resp&ns#,le in t#e commission of t#e ro11ery. !*t if t#e p#ysical in=uries inflicted are t#ose falling under su1di&ision 1 and 2 of Article 2 34 e(en t#oug# t#e p#ysical in=uries $ere #n"l#%te$ *p&n &ne &" the r&,,ers themsel(es4 and e&en t#oug# it #ad 1een inflicted after t#e ro11ery $as already consummated4 t#e crime $ill still 1e ro11ery $it# serious p#ysical in=uries. T#ere $ill only 1e one count of accusation.
%llustration3 After t#e ro11ers fled from t#e place $#ere t#e ro11ery $as committed4 t#ey decided to di&ide t#e spoils and in t#e course of t#e di&ision of t#e spoils or t#e loot4 t#ey 7uarreled. T#ey s#ot it out and one of t#e ro11ers $as <illed. T#e crime is still ro11ery $it# #omicide e&en t#oug# one of t#e ro11ers $as t#e one <illed 1y one of t#em. %f t#ey 7uarreled and serious p#ysical in=uries rendered one of t#e ro11ers impotent4 1lind in 1ot# eyes4 or got insane4 or #e lost t#e use of any of #is senses4 lost t#e use of any part of #is 1ody4 t#e crime $ill still 1e ro11ery $it# serious p#ysical in=uries.
%f t#e ro11ers 7uarreled o&er t#e loot and one of t#e ro11ers #ac<ed t#e ot#er ro11er causing a deformity in #is face4 t#e crime $ill only 1e ro11ery and a separate c#arge for t#e serious p#ysical
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in=uries 1ecause $#en it is a deformity t#at is caused4 t#e la$ re7uires t#at t#e deformity must #a&e 1een inflicted upon one $#o is not a participant in t#e ro11ery. Moreo&er4 t#e p#ysical in=uries $#ic# ga&e rise to t#e deformity or $#ic# incapacitated t#e offended party from la1or for more t#an 3* days4 must #a&e 1een inflicted in t#e course of t#e e8ecution of t#e ro11ery or $#ile t#e ro11ery $as ta<ing place. %f it $as inflicted $#en t#e t#ie&esGro11ers are already di&iding t#e spoils4 it cannot 1e considered as inflicted in t#e course of e8ecution of t#e ro11ery and #ence4 it $ill not gi&e rise to t#e crime of ro11ery $it# serious p#ysical in=uries. Jou only #a&e one count of ro11ery and anot#er count for t#e serious p#ysical in=uries inflicted. %f4 during or on t#e occasion or 1y reason of t#e ro11ery4 a <illing4 rape or serious p#ysical in=uries too< place4 t#ere $ill only 1e one crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide 1ecause all of t#ese 0 <illing4 rape4 serious p#ysical in=uries 00 are contemplated 1y la$ as t#e &iolence or intimidation $#ic# c#aracteri2es t#e ta<ing as on of ro11ery. Jou c#arge t#e offenders of ro11ery $it# #omicide. 5obbery !ith homicide, robbery !ith intentional mutilation and robbery !ith rape are not 'ualified by band or uninhabited place. T#ese aggra&ating circumstances only 7ualify ro11ery $it# p#ysical in=uries under su1di&ision 24 34 and 4 of Article 2)). 6#en it is ro11ery $it# #omicide4 t#e 1and or unin#a1ited place is only a generic aggra&ating circumstance. %t $ill not 7ualify t#e crime to a #ig#er degree of penalty. %n 2e&ple (. Sal(#lla8 it $as #eld t#at if in a ro11ery $it# serious p#ysical in=uries4 t#e offenders #erded t#e $omen and c#ildren into an office and detained t#em to compel t#e offended party to come out $it# t#e money4 t#e crime of serious illegal detention $as a necessary means to facilitate t#e ro11ery; t#us4 t#e comple8 crimes of robbery !ith serious physical in*uries and serious illegal detention. >ut if t#e &ictims $ere detained 1ecause of t#e timely arri&al of t#e police4 suc# t#at t#e offenders #ad no c#oice 1ut to detain t#e &ictims as #ostages in e8c#ange for t#eir safe passage4 t#e detention is a1sor1ed 1y t#e crime of ro11ery and is not a separate crime. T#is $as t#e ruling in 2e&ple (. Ast&r.
6%
+0 t/e vi#len"e em)l#ye( by t/e #00en(er (#es n#t "a.se any #0 t/e seri#.s )/ysi"al inR.ries (e0ine( in *rti"le 251A $R i0 t/e #00en(er em)l#ys intimi(ati#n #nly%
#f robbery !ith (iolence against or intimidation of persons "#n".rs wit/ robbery by the use of force upon things, ho! is the crime characteri,edH Eirst /ie!3 (E.C. &s. Turla4 3' -#il. 34 ; -eople &s. >aluyot4 4* -#il. ').) a,an$&ne$ A3 5obbery !ith (iolence against or intimidation of persons only 1ecause t#is is t#e gra&er offense. Second /ie!3 (.rtega ?otes citing ?apolis &s. CA4 /A.502'' 54 +e1 2'4 1)"2) A3 %f on t#e occasion of t#e ro11ery $it# #omicide4 ro11ery $it# force upon t#ings $as also committed4 you $ill not #a&e only one ro11ery 1ut you $ill #a&e a complex crime of robbery !ith homicide $4& robbery !ith force upon things. '/is is be"a.se r#bbery wit/ vi#len"e #r intimi(ati#n .)#n )ers#ns is a se)arate "rime 0r#m r#bbery wit/ 0#r"e .)#n t/ings%
NA2OLIS (s. CA an$ 2p G.R. N&. L@05537. Fe,r*ar' 058 4960 Epon mature deli1eration4 6e find oursel&es una1le to s#are t#e foregoing &ie$ Afirst (ie!;. %ndeed4 one $#o4 1y 1rea<ing a $all4 enters4 $it# a deadly $eapon4 an in#a1ited #ouse and steals t#erefrom &alua1le effects4 $it#out &iolence against or intimidation upon persons4 is
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punis#a1le under Art. 2)) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code $it# reclusion temporal. -ursuant to t#e a1o&e &ie$4 ad#ered to in pre&ious decisions4 if4 aside from performing said acts4 t#e t#ief lays #and upon any person4 $it#out committing any of t#e crimes or inflicting any of t#e in=uries mentioned in su10paragrap#s (1) to (4) of Art. 2)4 of t#e same Code4 t#e imposa1le penalty R under paragrap# (5) t#ereof R s#all 1e muc# lig#ter. To our mind4 t#is result and t#e process of reasoning t#at #as 1roug#t it a1out4 defy logic and reason. T#e argument to t#e effect t#at t#e &iolence against or intimidation of a person supplies t#e Qcontrolling 7ualification4Q is far from sufficient to =ustify said result. 6e agree $it# t#e proposition t#at ro11ery $it# Q&iolence or intimidation against t#e person is e&idently gra&er t#an ordinary ro11ery committed 1y force upon t#ings4Q 1ut4 precisely4 for t#is reason4 6e cannot accept t#e conclusion deduced t#erefrom in t#e cases a1o&e cited R reduction of t#e penalty for t#e latter offense o$ing to t#e concurrence of &iolence or intimidation $#ic# made it a more serious one. %t is4 to our mind4 more plausi1le to 1elie&e t#at Art. 2)4 applies only $#ere ro11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of person ta<es place $it#out entering an in#a1ited #ouse4 under t#e conditions set fort# in Art. 2)) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. 6e deem it more logical and reasona1le to #old4 as 6e do4 $#en t#e elements of 1ot# pro&isions are present4 t#at t#e crime is a comple8 one4 calling for t#e imposition R as pro&ided in Art. 4' of said Code R of t#e penalty for t#e most serious offense4 in its ma8imum period. . . . %n s#ort4 t#e doctrine adopted in E.C. &. @e los Cantos and applied in E.C. &. Manansala4 E.C. &. Turla4 -eople &. >aluyot4 Mana#an &. -eople4 and -eople &. Ce1astian4 is #ere1y a1andoned.
?;R+!PR;DE-'+*L 'RE-D +- R$44ER3 (2000=2006)

R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 '$ '* $%& 'N$&N$ +4 $%& AC$+R $+ R+B )%'C% */!!,'&* $%& C+NN&C$'+N B&$)&&N $%& %+('C'D& AND $%& R+BB&R- N&C&**AR- $+ C+N*$'$/$& $%& CR'(&. 8 ! con#iction for robbery with homicide re-uires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and ob.ecti#e of the malefactor and the )illing is merely incidental to the robbery. The animo lucrandi must proceed the )illing. 'f the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indi#isible offense. 't is the intent of the actor to rob which supplies the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary to constitute the comple, crime of robbery with homicide.
C+(('$$&D &.&N '4 $%& +R'7'NA, 'N$&N$ )A* N+$ $+ R+B AND ;',, $%& .'C$'(5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 3obbery with homicide is committed e#en if the #ictim of the robbery is different from the #ictim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 't is not e#en necessary that the #ictim of the robbery is the #ery person the malefactor intended to rob. 6or the con#iction of the special comple, crime, the robbery itself must be pro#ed as conclusi#ely as any other element of the crime. 'n this case, the prosecution pro#ed through the testimony of Maria 6e that the appellants threatened to )ill her and her family and robbed her of her money and .ewelry and 3onito and 2eo0s pieces of .ewelry. . . . 't may be true that the original intent of appellant Manuel was to borrow again money from 3onito and Maria 6e but later on conspired with Aose and robbed the couple of their money and pieces of .ewelry, and on the occasion thereof, )illed 3onito. 5onetheless, the appellants are guilty of robbery with homicide. 'n (eople #. Tidong, this *ourt held that the appellant was guilty of robbery with homicide e#en if his original intention was to demand for separation pay from his employer and ended up )illing his employer in the process.
R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 &,/C'DA$&D. 8 The elements of robbery with homicide are the following: ;a< the ta)ing of personal property with #iolence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things= ;b< the property ta)en belongs to another= ;c< the ta)ing be done with animus lucrandi ;intent to gain<= and ;d< on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed.
The offense becomes a special comple, crime of robbery with homicide under !rticle 2?7 ;1< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode if the #ictim is )illed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. !nd when homicide ta)es place by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who too' part in the robbery shall be guilty of the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually
Page 292
participated in the )illing, unless there is proof that they had endea#ored to pre#ent the perpetration of the crime. R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 !R&*&N$ 'N CA*& A$ BAR. 8'n this case, all the essential elements of robbery with homicide were established beyond reasonable doubt. (ersonal items belonging to 4duardo and 4#elyn *e.ar were ta)en at gunpoint by appellants and their companions. The armed group li)ewise forcibly too) the money and firearms they found. 6inally, during the heist, the barangay captain was ruthlessly shot to death.
C+(('$$&D &.&N '4 $%& .'C$'( '* A !&R*+N 'N A/$%+R'$- A* ,+N7 A* R+BB&R- '* $%& (A'N !/R!+*& +4 $%& CR'('NA,* AND $%& ;',,'N7 (&R&,- R&*/,$* B- R&A*+N +R +N $%& +CCA*'+N +4 $%& R+BB&R-5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 There is no comple, crime of $robbery with homicide and assault upon a person in authority.$ The law is clear that, if the #ictim is )illed on the occasion or by reason of a robbery, the offense becomes a special comple, crime of robbery with homicide defined and penali+ed under !rticle 2?7 ;1< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 4#en if the #ictim, as in this case, was a barangay captain and therefore a person in authority under !rticle 1E2 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, the crime committed by appellants would still be robbery with homicide. !s long as robbery is the main purpose and ob*ective of the criminals and the )illing merely results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the indictable offense is robbery with homicide. The e#idence of the prosecution was indubitable that the principal purpose of the appellants and their group was to steal the firearms )ept inside the house of the barangay captain and to di#est the residents thereof of their money and other belongings.
R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D& 8To sustain a con#iction for this special comple, crime, robbery must be pro#ed conclusi#ely as any other essential element of the crime. 't is necessary for the prosecution to clearly establish that a robbery has actually ta)en place, and that, as a conse-uence or on the occasion of such robbery, homicide is committed. &here the e#idence does not conclusi#ely pro#e the robbery, the )illing of the #ictim would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any -ualifying circumstance, and not the comple, offense of robbery with homicide. o *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 There is nothing in the e#idence on record that would show that the #ictim had a wristwatch and that accused%appellant too) said watch on that fateful night, as alleged in the information. 5ot e#en accused%appellant0s e,tra.udicial confession pro#es the robbery. !ccused% appellant merely stated in his confession that he announced a hold%up and thereafter he and the #ictim grappled for the gun. !s they struggled, accused%appellant s-uee+ed the trigger, thus shooting the #ictim. !ccused%appellant then hurriedly got off the ta,icab, lea#ing his gun behind. There was no mention about the ta)ing of the wristwatch. !s the prosecution failed to pro#e the robbery, accused% appellant should only be con#icted for homicide. R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 'n the case at bar, there is no proof that accused%appellant and $Aohnny$ organi+ed themsel#es to commit highway robbery. The prosecution established only a single act of robbery against a particular person. This is not what is contemplated under (.D. E32, the ob.ecti#e of which is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who tra#el from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace and tran-uility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people. *onse-uently, accused%appellant should be held liable for the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide. Dnder !rticle 2?7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstance, accused%appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to !rticle @3 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. ;',,'N7 (/*$ B& D'R&C$,- C+NN&C$&D )'$% R+BB&R-5 $%& $A;'N7 +4 !R+!&R$- *%+/,D N+$ B& (&R&,AN A4$&R$%+/7%$. 8 'n (eople #. !mania, the *ourt had occasion to rule that in robbery with homicide, the )illing must ha#e been directly connected with the robbery. 't is necessary that there must ha#e been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit robbery from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a )illing ta)es place. The original design must ha#e been robbery, and the homicide, e#en if it precedes or is subse-uent to the robbery, must ha#e a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a #iew to consummate the robbery. The ta)ing of the property should not be merely an afterthought which arose subse-uent to the )illing.
N+$ C+(('$$&D )%&R& $A;'N7 +4 !R+!&R$- )A* (&R&,- AN A4$&R$%+/7%$ )%'C% AR+*& */B*&6/&N$ $+ ;',,'N7 +4 .'C$'(*. 8 'n the present case, it does not appear that the primary purpose of accused appellant in accosting the two deceased was to rob the engine of the motori+ed
Page 291
banca. 6rom all indications, accused%appellant, a *!6/D member, was primarily interested in ta)ing the life of the two deceased whom he suspected of e,acting -uota from the 1arangay captain, and the ta)ing of the sub.ect engine was merely an afterthought that arose subse-uent to the )illing of the #ictims. *learly therefore, the criminal acts of accused appellant constitute not a comple, crime of robbery with homicide, but three separate offenses: two crimes for the )illing of the two deceased, and one for the ta)ing of the 1riggs and Straton engine of Aaime 'srael. )%A$ '* &**&N$'A, 'N R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D& '* $%A$ $%&R& B& A D'R&C$ R&,A$'+N AND 'N$'(A$& C+NN&C$'+N B&$)&&N R+BB&R- AND ;',,'N7, )%&$%&R B+$% CR'(&* B& C+(('$$&D A$ $%& *A(& $'(&. 8 3obbery with homicide is a special comple, crime against property. omicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal. The phrase $by reason$ co#ers homicide committed before or after the ta)ing of personal property of another, as long as the moti#e of the offender in )illing a person before the robbery is to depri#e the #ictim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition or in )illing a person after the robbery to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of the stolen property. Thus, it matters not that the #ictim was )illed prior to the ta)ing of the personal properties of the #ictim. &hat is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a direct relation and intimate connection between robbery and )illing, whether both crimes be committed at the same time. R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 $%& $R'A, C+/R$ C+RR&C$,- C+N.'C$&D A!!&,,AN$* +4 $%& CR'(& +4 R+BB&R)'$% %+('C'D& AND N+$ 4+R .'+,A$'+N +4 !R&*'D&N$'A, D&CR&& N+3 <3= >%'7%)A- R+BB&R-? )'$% %+('C'D& A* C%AR7&D 'N $%& 'N4+R(A$'+N. 8 The trial court correctly con#icted accused%appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide and not for #iolation of (residential Decree 5o. E32 ; ighway 3obbery< with homicide as charged in the information. 't is noteworthy that the elements of robbery with homicide are clearly alleged in the information notwithstanding the erroneous caption. 'n (eople #. Gerso+a, the *ourt held that a con#iction for highway robbery re-uires proof that se#eral accused were organi+ed for the purpose of committing highway robbery indiscriminately. *ertainly, there was no such proof in the present case. 5either is there proof that accused%appellants pre#iously attempted to commit similar robberies to show the $indiscriminate$ perpetration thereof. ence, their con#iction for robbery with homicide should be affirmed.
CR'(& +4 A$$&(!$&D %+('C'D& '* AB*+RB&D 'N $%& CR'(& +4 R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&. 8 The ac-uittal of accused%appellants in *riminal *ase 5o. 71H1%G%?7, for attempted homicide is li)ewise in order. The attempt to ta)e the life of S("1 2eandro Santos is absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide which is a special comple, crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or in.uries committed in connection with the robbery.
R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 R+BB&R- (/*$ %A.& A D'R&C$ R&,A$'+N $+ $%& ;',,'N75 CA*& A$ BAR . 8 'n robbery with homicide, it is imperati#e that the prosecution pro#e a direct relation between the robbery and the )illing. 't must con#incingly show that robbery was the original criminal design of the culprit, and that homicide was perpetrated with a #iew to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on occasion thereof. That appellant intended to rob the passengers of the A!* 2iner bus is e#ident. The robbery was foiled, howe#er, when S("1 3i+aldy Merene decided to fight bac). &ere it not for the presence and the bra#ery of this police officer, appellant and his cohorts would ha#e successfully consummated their original plan. 'n the gunfight that ensued between appellant and Merene, bus conductor Aoselito alum was )illed. *learly, his death occurred by reason or as an incident of the robbery. 4#en if it was merely incidental ;he was caught in the crossfire<, still, frustrated robbery with homicide was committed. &ith regard to the charge of frustrated homicide, appellant, in shooting Merene almost pointblan), had performed all the acts necessary to )ill the latter, who sur#i#ed because of timely medical inter#ention. Thus, appellant0s con#iction for frustrated robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide must be sustained. R+BB&R- )'$% RA!&5 RA!& (A- B& C+(('$$&D B&4+R&, D/R'N7 +R A4$&R $%& R+BB&R-5 R+BB&R-5 &,&(&N$*. 8 *oming now to *riminal *ase 5o. 772@2, the information charged appellant and his co%accused with robbery with rape. "n record, the prosecution duly established that appellant committed both robbery and rape. &hen appellant forcibly entered the *antillers0 chic)en coop and too) their chic)ens, while his confederate !mburgo was threatening the *antiller spouses, he committed the crime of robbery. The elements of the offense 8 #i+: (a) personal property belonging to another< (b) unlawful ta'ing< (c) intent to gain< and (d) violence or intimidation 8 were all present. Though robbery appears to ha#e preceded the rape of 4#elyn, it is enough that robbery shall ha#e been accompanied by rape to be punished under the 3e#ised (enal *ode ;as amended< for the *ode does not differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery. )%&R& $%& &.'D&NC& D+&* N+$ C+NC,/*'.&,- !R+.& $%& R+BB&R-, $%& ;',,'N7 +4 $%& .'C$'( )+/,D +N,- B& A *'(!,& %+('C'D& +R (/RD&R . 8 'n (eople #. Su+a, we ruled that $in order to sustain a con#iction for
Page 29,
robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be pro#en conclusi#ely as any other essential element of a crime. 'n order for the crime of robbery with homicide to e,ist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually ta)en place, and that, as a conse-uence of or on the occasion of such robbery, a homicide be committed. &here the e#idence does not conclusi#ely pro#e the robbery, the )illing of the #ictim would, therefore, be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any -ualifying circumstance, and not the comple, offense of robbery with homicide.$ o 5"T 4ST!12'S 4D '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 'n the case at bar, the trial court0s conclusion that the )illing of the deceased was done on occasion or by reason of robbery was based on the following circumstances: 1< that the #ictim0s wallet containing a small amount of money was found beside his dead body and no longer in his poc)et= 2< the presence of money in paper bills of different denominations amounting to a total of (1,>7>.>> scattered on the floor of the front seats, and on the ground beneath the doors of the ta,icab= 3< the statement of accused%appellant immediately after his arrest that he shot the #ictim because the latter refused his demand for money, which statement is allegedly admissible as part of the res gestae. 1ased on applicable .urisprudence, we find that the trial court erred in finding accused% appellant guilty of the comple, crime of robbery with homicide.
4R/*$RA$&D R+BB&R-5 'N$&N$ $+ 7A'N5 N+$ &*$AB,'*%&D 'N CA*& A$ BAR. 8 !bsent accused%appellant0s confession, only two pieces of circumstantial e#idence remain to pro#e the crime of frustrated robbery, to wit: 1< that the #ictim0s wallet containing a small amount of money was found beside his dead body and no longer in his poc)et= and 2< the scattered money in paper bills of different denominations amounting to a total of (1,>7>.>>. ! combination of these circumstances, howe#er, is not sufficient to establish intent to gain or animus lucrandi. That there was a struggle between the accused% appellant and the #ictim is not denied. Thus, the probability that the scattered money bills was caused by the scuffle between the two cannot be discounted. !s to the cause thereof, the prosecution failed to substantiate their claim of an attempt to unlawfully ta)e the deceased0s money. There was no proof that the #ictim0s wallet which was found beside him was ta)en out from his poc)et by accused%appellant. (rosecution witness Aohn 1allo, who saw accused%appellant come out of the #ictim0s ta,icab, ne#er testified that accused%appellant robbed the #ictim. is declaration was that accused%appellant went out of the cab carrying a gun. 5owhere in his testimony did he say that he saw accused%appellant attempting to rob, or wal)ing away with the money of the #ictim.
R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 '$ '* &N+/7% $%A$ D&A$% R&*/,$&D D/R'N7, +R B&CA/*& +4, $%& R+BB&R-5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 'n order to determine the e,istence of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is enough that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes, or persons inter#ening in the commission of the crime, that has to be ta)en into consideration. 'n other words, in the crime of robbery with homicide, it does not matter if the homicide preceded or occurred after the robbery. 6or what is essential is that there is a direct relation or intimate connection between the robbery and the )illing, whether the latter be prior or subse-uent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. The original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a #iew to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, in (eople #. /uiapar, it was held that the death of a guard resulting from the in.ury he sustained during the robbery -ualified the offense to robbery with homicide. !s long as homicide resulted during, or because of, the robbery, e#en if the )illing is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed. 'n the case at bar, !rnold 1ugayon testified that the #ictim 4spina was initially stabbed in the thigh by one of the robbers because it appeared that he would fight to get bac) his money. 'n fact, after he was stabbed, 4spina got off the .eepney to run after the hold%up men to reco#er his money. !t that point, accused%appellant and his co%accused then stabbed 4spina se#eral times and struc) him with a stone. 'n #iew of the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the trial court when it found that the homicide in the case at bar was committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. NA$/R& +4 +44&N*&5 N+$ A,$&R&D B- $%& N/(B&R +4 ;',,'N7* 'N C+NN&C$'+N )'$% $%& R+BB&R-. 8 The crime committed is the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide defined and penali+ed in !rticle 2?7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The trial court correctly considered the crime as robbery with homicide and not $robbery with triple homicide$ as charged in the information. The term $homicide$ in !rticle 2?7;1< is used in its generic sense, embracing not only the act which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. 5either is the nature of the offense altered by the number of )illings in connection with the robbery. The multiplicity of #ictims slain on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as an aggra#ating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gra#ity of the offense, robbery with one )illing would be treated in the same way that robbery with multiple )illings would be.
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R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 $+ */*$A'N C+N.'C$'+N, R+BB&R- '$*&,4 (/*$ B& !R+.&N C+NC,/*'.&,- A* AN- +$%&R &**&N$'A, &,&(&N$ +4 A CR'(&5 !%-*'CA, AC$ +4 A*!+R$A$'+N N+$ !R+.&N 'N CA*& A$ BAR. 8 &ith respect to the charge of robbery, howe#er, we agree with the Solicitor /eneral that the testimony of witness (anerio in the direct e,amination only showed the circumstances surrounding the #ictim0s death but the fact of robbery was neither testified to nor inferable therefrom. &hile the )illing of Teresita was sufficiently established by the e#idence of the prosecution, we find no conclusi#e e#idence pro#ing the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused%appellant. 'n fact, (anerio testified during his cross%e,amination that he did not actually see appellant ta)e the money or .ewelry from the #ictim. e merely stated that since they were the ones who held her up, surely, they too) the money and .ewelry which were in the possession of the #ictim in the morning of March 1?, 1??1. The Solicitor /eneral correctly opined that while DaNucop had money and some pieces of .ewelry in the morning of March 1?, 1??1, the inter#al of time between that period and the commission of the crime was long enough to allow for the possibility that she could ha#e placed the money and said .ewelry elsewhere. &e ruled in (eople #s. (acala, $'t is well settled that in order to sustain a con#iction for robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be pro#en conclusi#ely as any other essential element of a crime. 'n order for the crime of robbery with homicide to e,ist, it is necessary that it be clearly established that a robbery has actually ta)en place, and that, as a conse-uence or on the occasion of such robbery, a homicide be committed. &here the e#idence does not conclusi#ely pro#e the robbery, the )illing of the #ictim would therefore, be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any -ualifying circumstance, and not the comple, offense of robbery with homicide.$ R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 C+N.'C$'+N $%&R&4+R5 R+BB&R- '$*&,4 (/*$ B& !R+.&N A* C+NC,/*'.&,- A* AN- +$%&R &**&N$'A, &,&(&N$ +4 A CR'(&5 !R&*&N$ 'N CA*& A$ BAR . 8 'n a train of decisions, the *ourt categorically enunciated the rule that to sustain a con#iction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperati#e that the robbery itself be pro#en as conclusi#ely as any other essential element of a crime, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is primarily an offense against property. Gerily, the e#idence adduced and presented by the prosecution established all the elements of the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide. 6or in the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery, as what is essential is that there is a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the )illing. This special comple, crime is primarily a crime against property and not against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose and ob.ect of the criminal. 'n the instant case, the records show that the fatal shooting of *arlos De#e+a, while it preceded the robbery, was for the purpose of remo#ing an opposition to the robbery or suppressing e#idence thereof. 'n this specie of offense, the phrase $by reason$ co#ers homicide committed before or after the ta)ing of personal property of another, as long as the moti#e of the offender ;in )illing a person before the robbery< is to depri#e the #ictim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished by eliminating an obstacle or opposition, or to do away with a witness or to defend the possession of stolen property. "b#iously, the )illing of *arlos De#e+a and the shooting of &ilfredo Da+o were perpetrated by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, the physical in.uries sustained by Da+o are deemed absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide. Ta)en in its entirety, the o#ert acts of accused% appellant 2egaspi pro#e that the lone moti#e for the )illing of De#e+a and the shooting of Da+o was for the purpose of consummating and ensuring the success of the robbery. A,, $%+*& )%+ $++; !AR$ A* !R'NC'!A,* 'N $%& R+BB&R- )',, A,*+ B& %&,D 7/',$- A* !R'NC'!A, +4 $%& *!&C'A, C+(!,&: CR'(& +4 R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&. 8 The une,plained possession of stolen articles gi#es rise to a presumption of theft, unless it is pro#ed that the owner of the articles was depri#ed of possession by #iolence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of robbery. The homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery. &hat is essential is that there is an intimate connection between robbery and the )illing whether the latter be prior or subse-uent to the former or whether both crimes be committed as the same time. The rule is well%established that whene#er homicide has been committed as a conse-uence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who too) part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special comple, crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually ta)e part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endea#ored to pre#ent the homicide. 'n this case, appellant tries to e,culpate himself from the homicides by insisting that he did not participate nor could he ha#e pre#ented them. owe#er, considering his established participation in looting the Macalino residence where the )illing of the #ictims too) place during said robbery, his culpability for the comple, crime of robbery with homicide is well grounded and sufficiently pro#ed. R+BB&R- )'$% %+('C'D&5 N+ */C% CR'(& A* R+BB&R- 'N BAND )'$% (/,$'!,& %+('C'D&5 $&R( 2%+('C'D&2 '* /*&D 'N 7&N&R'C *&N*&5 BAND, A (&R& 7&N&R'C A77RA.A$'N7 C'RC/(*$ANC&. 8 The trial court erred in con#icting them of the crime of 3obbery in 1and with Multiple omicide. There is no such crime in the 3e#ised (enal *ode and in the statutes. 3obo con omicido is )illing of a human being for the purpose of robbery. omicide is used in !rticle 2?7 in a generic sense. Dnder the aforecited statutory pro#ision, the term $homicide$ comprehends murder, double homicide and multiple homicide while band is considered as a mere generic
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aggra#ating circumstance. The crime of robbery with homicide remains fundamentally the same regardless of the persons )illed in connection with robbery. 't is primarily a crime against property and the )illing is a mere incident of robbery. R+BB&R- )'$% RA!&5 ,A) D+&* N+$ D'*$'N7/'*% )%&$%&R RA!& )A* C+(('$$&D B&4+R&, D/R'N7 +R A4$&R $%& R+BB&R-. 8 &e do not agree howe#er with the contention of the Solicitor /eneral that accused% appellant should be con#icted of two ;2< separate crimes of rape and robbery. !rticle 2?7, par. ;2<, of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is e,plicit that for robbery with rape to be committed the robbery shall ha#e been accompanied by rape. This means that the offender must ha#e the intent to ta)e the personal property belonging to another with intent to gain, and such intent must precede the rape. The law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during or after the robbery. 't is enough that the robbery was accompanied by rape. Thus, if the original design was to commit robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the robbery and the rape should be #iewed as two ;2< distinct offenses.
*R'+CLE 292 R$44ER3 9+'< P<3!+C*L +-?;R+E!A C$MM+''ED +- *- ;-+-<*4+'ED PL*CE *-D 43 * 4*-DA $R 9+'< '<E ;!E $F F+RE*RM $- * !'REE'A R$*D $R *LLE3 ?.TA >!?!3 T#is is 7ualified ro11ery. H3 $#en is ro11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons 7ualifiedF A3 if any of t#e offenses defined in su1di&isions 34 4 and 5 of article 2)4 (see a1o&e article) is Committed0 1. in an unin#a1ited place 2. 1y a 1and4 or 3. 1y attac<ing a mo&ing train4 street car4 motor &e#icle4 or airs#ip4 or 4. 1y entering t#e passengers; compartments in a train4 or in any manner ta<ing t#e passengers t#ereof 1y surprise in t#e respecti&e con&eyances4 or
2.
on a street4 road4 #ig#$ay4 or alley4 and intimidation is made $it# t#e use of
firearms(firearm #ere may 1e licensed or unlicensed) Ta<e note of t#e 5t# circumstance4 using t#e firearm to intimidate. %f in case #e did not use t#e firearm to intimidate 1ut instead use #is &ery s#arp <nife4 t#e crime is not 7ualified. *R'+CLE 295 DEF+-+'+$- $F * 4*-D *-D PE-*L'3 +-C;RRED 43 '<E MEM4ER! '<ERE$F A. .utline of t#e pro&isions3 1. 6#en at least four (more t#an t#ree) armed malefactors too< part in t#e commission of a ro11ery4 it is deemed committed 1y a 1and. 2. 6#en any of t#e arms used in t#e commission of t#e ro11ery is not licensed t#e penalty upon all t#e malefactors s#all 1e t#e ma8imum of t#e corresponding penalty pro&ided 1y la$4 $it#out pre=udice to t#e criminal lia1ility for illegal possession of suc# unlicensed firearm.( it can 1e inferred #ere t#at if t#e firearm is licensed4 t#e ma8imum penalty may not 1e imposed) 3. Any mem1er of a 1and $#o $as present at t#e commission of t#e ro11ery 1y t#e 1and4 s#all 1e punis#ed as a principal of t#e assaults committed 1y t#e 1and4 unless it 1e s#o$n t#at #e attempted to pre&ent t#e same. 9Armed: K any arms not =ust firearms4 li<e 1olo4 <nife etcY >. Ae7uisites for lia1ility for t#e acts of t#e ot#er mem1ers of t#e 1and (?o. 3)
Page 296
1. Be $as a mem1er of t#e 1and; 2. Be $as present at t#e commission of a ro11ery 1y t#at 1and; 3. T#e ot#er mem1ers of t#e 1and committed an assault; 4. Be did not attempt to pre&ent t#e assault. *R'+CLE 296 *''EMP'ED *-D FR;!'R*'ED R$44ER3 C$MM+''ED ;-DER CER'*+C+RC;M!'*-CE! As in Art. 2)44 t#e 9#omicide: #ere used in a generic sense4 it must #a&e 1een committed 1y reason or on t#e occasion of a frustrated or attempted ro11ery4 and it must #a&e 1een consummated. %f p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted on t#e &ictim4 1ut no intent to <ill $as pro&ed and t#e &ictim did not die4 t#e lia1ility of t#e offender may 1e as follo$s3 a. %f t#e p#ysical in=uries $ere 1y reason of t#e attempted or frustrated ro11ery as t#e means for t#e commission of t#e latter4 t#e in=uries are a1sor1ed 1y t#e latter and t#e crime s#all only 1e attempted or frustrated robbery. 1. %f t#e p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted only on t#e occasion of t#e a1orted ro11ery 1ut not employed as a means of committing t#e latter4 t#ere $ill 1e separate crimes of attempted or frustrated robbery A?@ physical in*uries. %f4 #o$e&er4 a <illing and p#ysical in=uries $ere committed on t#at occasion4 t#e crime $ill 1e penali2ed in accordance $it# t#is article 1ut t#e p#ysical in=uries $ill 1e a1sor1ed. 6#en t#e &ictim #ad no money $#en #e $as treac#erously <illed and t#e crime could not fall under Art. 2)" $#ic# re7uires at least an attempted ro11ery(#ere4 t#ere $as an impossi1le crime of ro11ery)4 1ut since #omicide under t#at article is used in its generic sense4 it $as #eld t#at t#e accused $as guilty of murder. 6#ere t#e accused demanded t#at t#e &ictim;s money 1e 1roug#t out and on 1eing refused4 #e <illed t#e &ictim4 t#e crime $as #eld to 1e attempted ro11ery $it# #omicide since t#ere $as an o&ert act to ro1. *R'+CLE 298 E@EC;'+$- $F DEED! 43 ME*-! $F :+$LE-CE $R +-'+M+D*'+$A. !lements3 1. .ffender #as intent to defraud anot#er; 2. .ffender compels #im to sign4 e8ecute4 or deli&er any pu1lic instrument or document. 3. T#e compulsion is 1y means of &iolence or intimidation ?.TA >!?!3 T#is is a special form or mode of committing ro11ery4 #ence it is categori2ed and punis#ed as suc#. %t is essent#al t#at t#e $&%*ment #s %apa,le &" pr&$*%#n+ le+al e""e%ts A?@ t#at t#e (#%t#m -as *n$er a la-"*l &,l#+at#&n t& e=e%*te an$ $el#(er the same . %f t#e document is &oid4 it cannot 1e said t#at t#e offender #ad intended to defraud t#e &ictim. Bo$e&er4 e&en if t#e foregoing t$o conditions are not o1tained4 t#e offender $ill 1e lia1le for coercion4 for compelling anot#er 1y &iolence or intimidation to perform an act $#et#er rig#t or $rong. !e"ti#n 'w#% & R#bbery by t/e .se #0 0#r"e .)#n t/ings
Page 298
*R'+CLE 299 R$44ER3 +- *- +-<*4+'ED <$;!E $R P;4L+C 4;+LD+-7 $R ED+F+CE DE:$'ED '$ 9$R!<+P %t is t#e c#aracter of t#e #ouse or t#e 1uilding4 etcYt#at is emp#asi2ed #ere. Elements &" r&,,er' ,' the *se &" "&r%e *p&n th#n+s #n s*,$#(#s#&n :a; 1. t#at t#e SarmedT offender !?T!A!@ a. an in#a1ited #ouse 1. pu1lic 1uilding c.
Any s#elter4 s#ip4 or &essel constituting t#e d$elling of one or more persons4 e&en t#oug# t#e in#a1itants t#ereof s#all temporarily 1e a1sent t#erefrom $#en t#e ro11ery is committed. (Art 3*1) %ncludes e&ery 1uilding o$ned 1y t#e go&ernment or 1elonging to a pri&ate person 1ut used or rented 1y t#e go&ernment4 alt#oug# temporarily unoccupied 1y t#e same. (Art 3*1)
edifice de&oted to religious $ors#ip
T#us4 if offender merely inserted #is #and t#roug# an opening in t#e $all or used a pole t#roug# t#e $indo$ to get t#e t#ings inside4 t#e crime is t#eft ?.T ro11ery
2. t#at t#e entrance $as effected t#roug# any of t#e ff. Means3 (t#e four means must 1e resorted to /!T %? not to get out) a. t#roug# t#e opening not intended for entrance or egress
Co4 if t#e culprit entered t#roug# t#e main door and t#e o$ner4 not <no$ing t#e former $as inside4 closed and loc<ed t#e door and left4 and t#e culprit too< property and $ent out t#e $indo$ is guilty of t#eft ?.T ro11ery.
1. 1y 1rea<ing any $all4 roof4 or floor4 or 1rea<ing any door or $indo$

(Ta<e note of t#e $ord ,reaF#n+4 e8ample I4 J4 and X $ent up to t#e roof and Olang<at; t#e roof4 placed a rope around I;s $aist and I entered 1y 1eing pulled or pus#ed 1y t#e use of t#e rope tied on #is $aist. %s t#is ro11eryF T#e crime is t#eft 1ecause #e did not enter t#e #ouse. T#e 6all must 1e an outside $all 1ecause t#e purpose is to enter t#e #ouse .A 1uilding. >ut if t#e room is occupied 1y a person as #is separate d$elling4 t#e 1rea<ing of t#e inside $all may gi&e rise to ro11ery. 6it# regards to t#e 1rea<ing of doors4 t#ere are conflicting decisions3 1. %n one case4 t#e CC said t#at in ro11ery 1y 1rea<ing a door4 t#e door must 1e smas#ed. %f you destroy t#e loc< only4 t#ere is no ro11ery4 only t#eft. 2. Jet in anot#er case t#e CC said3 if t#e loc< is destroyed4 since t#e loc< is part of t#e door4 t#ere is ro11ery not t#eft. )
c.
1y using false <eys4 pic<loc<s or similar tools

+alse <eys must 1e used to enter t#e 1uilding. >ut if it is used to open a $ardro1e or a loc<ed receptacle or inside door4 t#e crime is t#eft unless t#e loc< or sealed furniture is 1ro<en t#en it is ro11ery under Art 22)(1).
d. 1y using any fictitious name or pretending t#e e8ercise of pu1lic aut#ority
(e8ample3 % pretended to 1e from (!C. or a sanitary inspector4 and % need to enter t#e #ouse to see if you #a&e pipes. >ut $#en % $as in t#e #ouse4 % ro11ed. 6sing of fictitious name is used as a means to enter. Ta<e note3 t#ere is no crime of ro11ery 1y using fictitious name in an unin#a1ited place)
3. T#at once inside t#e 1uilding4 t#e offender too< personal property 1elonging to anot#er $it# intent to gain.
Page 299
(Ta<e note t#at under t#is su1di&ision4 t#is is T. !?T!A4 to enter t#e MA%? @..A not t#e door inside t#e #ouse li<e a door to a room.)
Elements &" r&,,er' ,' the *se &" "&r%e *p&n th#n+s #n s*,$#(#s#&n :,; 1. t#at t#e SarmedT offender is inside a d$elling #ouse4 pu1lic 1uilding4 or edifice de&oted to religious $ors#ip4 regardless of t#e circumstances under $#ic# #e entered it
Ta<e note t#at su1section (1) is independent from su1section (a). T#us it is not necessary t#at t#e offender entered t#e 1uilding or #ouse 1y any of t#e means mentioned in su1di&ision (a).
2. t#at t#e offender ta<es personal property 1elonging to anot#er $it# intent to gain4 under any of t#e follo$ing circumstances3
a.
>y t#e 1rea<ing of doors4 $ardro1es4 c#ests4 or any ot#er <ind of loc<ed or sealed
T#e door #ere refers to t#e doors on ca1inets or receptacles4 li<e a lid4 not entrance.
furniture or receptacles
!8ample3 t#e ro11ers entered t#e #ouse 1ecause t#e door is open. Bere t#ere $as no 1rea<ing of door4 t#en t#ey 1ro<e t#e c#est or ca1inet and too< and carried a$ay personal property. T#is is ro11ery.
1. >y ta<ing suc# furniture or o1=ects a$ay to 1e 1ro<en or forced open outside t#e place of t#e ro11ery.
!8ample3 Mr. I entered t#e open door4 sa$ a c#est4 too< it a$ay from t#e #ouse and left4 1ut $#en #e $as outside4 a police officer $as in t#e &icinity4 so t#e ro11er t#ro$ it some$#ere near t#e trees and ran. T#e c#est $as found 1y anot#er man4 Mr. J4 got t#e c#est and opened it and sa$ lots of =e$elry. 6#at crimes did Mr. I and Mr. J commitF A?C6!A3 Mr. I committed ro11ery 1ecause t#e receptacle need not 1e 1ro<en. 6#at is important is it is ,r&*+ht &*ts#$e t# be ,r&Fen &pen outside t#e place of ro11ery. Mr. J committed t#e crime of t#eft only e&en if #e $as t#e one $#o 1ro<e t#e c#est open.
6#en t#e offenders do not carry arms4 and t#e &alue of t#e property ta<en e8ceeds 25* pesos4 t#e penalty ne8t lo$er in degree s#all 1e imposed. T#e same rule s#all 1e applied $#en t#e offenders are armed4 1ut t#e &alue of t#e property ta<en does not e8ceed 25* pesos. 6#en said offenders do not carry arms and t#e &alue of t#e property ta<en does not e8ceed 25* pesos4 t#ey s#all suffer t#e penalty prescri1ed in t#e t$o ne8t preceding paragrap#s4 in t#e minimum period. 6#en t#e ro11ery 1e committed in one of t#e dependencies of an unin#a1ited #ouse4 pu1lic 1uilding or edifice de&oted to religious $ors#ip4 t#e penalties ne8t lo$er in degree t#at t#ose prescri1ed in t#is article s#all 1e imposed. MF%r e -&%n )hin*(M has a technical meaning in law. /ot any 9ind of force upon things will characteri8e the ta9ing as one of robbery. The force upon things contemplated re>uires some element of trespass into the establishment where the robbery was committed. &n other words, the offender must have entered the premises where the robbery was committed. &f no entry was effected, even though force may
Page 100
have been employed actually in the ta9ing of the property from within the premises, the crime will only be theft. wo predicates that will give rise to the crime as ro##ery< 1. ?y mere entering alone, a robbery will be committed if any personal property is ta9en from within= ". The entering will not give rise to robbery even if something is ta9en inside. &t is the brea9ing of the receptacle or closet or cabinet where the personal property is 9ept that will give rise to robbery, or the ta9ing of a sealed, loc9ed receptacle to be bro9en outside the premises. &f by the Imere enteringJ, that would already >ualify the ta9ing of any personal property inside as robbery, it is immaterial whether the offender stays inside the premises. The brea9ing of things inside the premises will only be important to consider if the entering by itself will not characteri8e the crime as robbery with force upon things. .odes of entering that would give rise to the crime of robbery with force upon things if something is ta9en inside the premises' entering into an opening not intended for entrance or egress, under !rticle "<< #a%.
&llustration' The entry was made through a fire escape. The fire escape was intended for egress. The entry will not characteri8e the ta9ing as one of robbery because it is an opening intended for egress, although it may not be intended for entrance. &f the entering were done through the window, even if the window was not bro9en, that would characteri8e the ta9ing of personal property inside as robbery because the window is not an opening intended for entrance. &llustration' (n a sari sari store, a vehicle bumped the wall. The wall collapsed. There was a small opening there. !t night, a man entered through that opening without brea9ing the same. The crime will already be robbery if he ta9es property from within because that is not an opening intended for the purpose.
)ven of there is a brea9ing of wall, roof, floor or window, but the offender did not enter, it would not give rise to robbery with force upon things. ?rea9ing of the door under !rticle"<< #b% (riginally, the interpretation was that in order that there be a brea9ing of the door in contemplation of law, there must be some damage to the door. ?efore, if the door was not damaged but only the loc9 attached to the door was bro9en, the ta9ing from within is only theft. ?ut the ruling is now abandoned because the door is considered useless without the loc9. )ven if it is not the door that was bro9en but only the loc9, the brea9ing of the loc9 renders the door useless and it is therefore tantamount to the brea9ing of the door. Hence, the ta9ing inside is considered robbery with force upon things. &f the entering does not characteri8e the ta9ing inside as one of robbery with force upon things, it is the conduct inside that would give rise to the robbery if there would be a brea9ing of sealed, loc9ed or closed receptacles or cabinet in order to get
Page 10
the personal belongings from within such receptacles, cabinet or place where it is 9ept. &f in the course of committing the robbery within the premises some interior doors are bro9en, the ta9ing from inside the room where the door leads to will only give rise to theft. The brea9ing of doors contemplated in the law refers to the main door of the house and not the interior door. ?ut if it is the door of a cabinet that is bro9en and the valuable inside the cabinet was ta9en, the brea9ing of the cabinet door would characteri8e the ta9ing as robbery. !lthough that particular door is not included as part of the house, the cabinet 9eeps the contents thereof safe. ,se of pic9loc9s or false 9eys refers to the entering into the premises &f the pic9loc9 or false 9ey was used not to enter the premises because the offender had already entered but was used to unloc9 an interior door or even a receptacle where the valuable or personal belonging was ta9en, the use of false 9ey or pic9loc9 will not give rise to the robbery with force upon things because these are considered by law as only a means to gain entrance, and not to extract personal belongings from the place where it is being 9ept. The law classifies robbery with force upon things as those committed in' #1% an inhabited place= #"% public buildings= #:% a place devoted to religious worship. The law also considers robbery committed not in an inhabited house or in a private building. /ote that the manner of committing the robbery with force upon things is not the same. 5hen the robbery is committed in a house which is inhabited, or in a public building or in a place devoted to religious worship, the use of fictitious name or pretension to possess authority in order to gain entrance will characteri8e the ta9ing inside as robbery with force upon things. K*est#&n T Ans-er Certain men pretended to be from the Price Control Commission and went to a warehouse owned by a private person. They told the guard to open the warehouse purportedly to see if the private person is hoarding essential commodities there. The guard obliged. They went inside and bro9e in . They loaded some of the merchandise inside claiming that it is the product of hoarding and then drove away. 5hat crime was committedE &t is only theft because the premises where the simulation of public authority was committed is not an inhabited house, not a public building, and not a place devoted to religious worship. 5here the house is a private building or is uninhabited, even though there is simulation of public authority in committing the ta9ing or even if he used a fictitious name, the crime is only theft.
Page 102
/ote that in the crime of robbery with force upon things, what should be considered is the means of entrance and means of ta9ing the personal property from within. &f those means do not come within the definition under the Revised Penal Code, the ta9ing will only give rise to theft. Those means must be employed in entering. &f the offender had already entered when these means were employed, anything ta9en inside, without brea9ing of any sealed or closed receptacle, will not give rise to robbery.
Illustration< 4 found 1 inside his 94s: house. He as$ed 1 what the latter was doping there. 1 claimed he is an inspector from the local city government to loo$ after the electrical installations. 4t the time 1 was chanced upon #y 4" he has already entered. *o anything he too$ inside without #rea$ing of any sealed or closed receptacle will not give rise to ro##ery #ecause the simulation of pu#lic authority was made not in order to enter #ut when he has already entered.
*R'+CLE 100 R$44ER3 +- *- ;-+-<*4+'ED PL*CE *-D 43 * 4*-D T#is is a 7ualifying aggra&ating circumstance $#ere t#e ma8imum period of t#e penalty pro&ided for under Art 2)) is imposed. T$o re7uisites must concur3 Enin#a1ited -lace AND 1y a >and. @istinction 1et$een Art 3** A?@ Art 2)5 as to Hualifying circumstances. Ender Art 3**4 in order to 1e 7ualified4 Enin#a1ited place A?@ 1y a 1and must concur. Ender Art 2)54 Ao11ery is committed in an Enin#a1ited place .A 1y a 1and. *R'+CLE 10 9<*' +! *- +-<*4+'ED <$;!EA P;4L+C 4;+LD+-7 $R 4;+LD+-7 DED+C*'ED '$ REL+7+$;! 9$R!<+P *-D '<E+R DEPE-DE-C+E! Inha,#te$ h&*se 0 Any s#elter4 s#ip4 or &essel constituting t#e d$elling of one or more persons4 e&en t#oug# t#e in#a1itants t#ereof s#all temporarily 1e a1sent t#erefrom $#en t#e ro11ery is committed. 2*,l#% ,*#l$#n+ 0 %ncludes e&ery 1uilding o$ned 1y t#e go&ernment or 1elonging to a pri&ate person 1ut used or rented 1y t#e go&ernment4 alt#oug# temporarily unoccupied 1y t#e same. Depen$en%#es &" an #nha,#te$ h&*se8 p*,l#% ,*#l$#n+8 &r ,*#l$#n+ $e$#%ate$ t& rel#+#&*s -&rsh#p 0 All interior courts4 corrals4 $are#ouses4 granaries4 1arns4 coac##ouses4 sta1les4 or ot#er departments4 or enclosed interior entrance connected t#ere$it# and $#ic# form part of t#e $#ole. .rc#ards and ot#er lands used for culti&ation or production are not included4 e&en if closed4 contiguous to t#e 1uilding4 and #a&ing direct connection t#ere$it#. T#ree re7uisites (@ependencies)3 1. Must 1e contiguous to t#e 1uilding 2. Must #a&e an interior entrance connected t#ere$it# 3. Must form part of t#e $#ole.
Page 101
*R'+CLE 102 R$44ER3 +- *- ;-+-<*4+'ED PL*CE $R +- * PR+:*'E 4;+LD+-7 Elements 1. T#at t#e offender entered an unin#a1ited place or 1uilding $#ic# $as ?.T a d$elling #ouse4 ?.T a pu1lic 1uilding4 or ?.T an edifice de&oted to religious $ors#ip. 2. T#at any of t#e follo$ing circumstances $as present3 a) T#e entrance $as effected t#roug# an opening not intended for entrance or egress; 1) A $all4 roof4 floor4 or outside door or $indo$ $as 1ro<en; c) T#e entrance $as effected t#roug# t#e use of false <eys4 pic<loc<s or ot#er similar tools; d) A door4 $ardro1e4 c#est4 or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle $as 1ro<en; or e) A closed or sealed receptacle $as remo&ed4 e&en if t#e same 1e 1ro<en open else$#ere. 3. T#at $it# intent to gain4 t#e offender too< t#erefrom4 personal property 1elonging to anot#er. o 6#ile Art. 3*2 pro&ides for ro11ery in an 9unin#a1ited place4: it actually means an unin#a1ited #ouse. T#is o1ser&ation is 1olstered 1y t#e fact t#at in t#e modes of commission set out in t#is article4 -ars. 1 and 3 spea< of 9entrance: $#ic# necessarily connotes a 1uilding.
T#e circumstances affecting t#e ro11er;s lia1ility for ro11ery in an unin#a1ited #ouse are as follo$s3 a) if of mail matter or large cattle4 unless prosecuted under -.@. 533 for t#e latter4 one degree #ig#er (Art. 3*2); and 1) if of seedlings (not cereals)4 one degree lo$er (Art. 3*3). As clarified 1y t#e Cupreme Court4 t#e $ord 9cereals: in Art. 3*3 is not t#e correct translation of t#e Cpanis# te8t. %t s#ould mean seedlings or un#ulled grain in its original state. o +or 1ot# ro11ery and t#eft4 large cattle as referred to in Art. 3*2 s#ould include t#e #orse4 1ull4 mule4 ass4 cara1ao or ot#er domesticated mem1ers of t#e 1o&ine family4 as pro&ided in Cec. 511 of t#e Ae&ised Administrati&e Code. /oats are 9cattle: 1ut not large cattle for purposes of Art. 3*2.
*R'+CLE 101 R$44ER3 $F CERE*L!A FR;+'!A $R F+RE9$$D +- *- ;-+-<*4+'ED PL*CE $R PR+:*'E 4;+LD+-7 Ender t#is Article4 if t#e ro11ery under Article 2)) and 3*2 consists in t#e ta<ing of cereals4 fruits4 or fire$ood4 t#e penalty imposa1le is lo$er. ?>3 Cereals means seedlings or un#ulled rice4 locally <no$n as palay. *R'+CLE 10, P$!!E!!+$- $F P+CEL$CE! $R !+M+L*R '$$L! A. !5!M!?TC .+ %55!/A5 -.CC!CC%.? .+ -%CM5.CMC .A C%M%5AA T..5C 1. T#at t#e offender #as in #is possession pic<loc<s or similar tools. 2. T#at suc# pic<loc<s or similar tools are specially adopted to t#e commission of ro11ery. 3. T#at t#e offender does not #a&e la$ful cause for suc# possession.
Page 10,
?.>.3 -ossession of pic<loc< may 1e legal if you are a loc<smit#. *R'+CLE 102 F*L!E EE3! A. +alse <eys to include t#e follo$ing3 1. Tools mentioned in Article 3*4; 2. /enuine <eys stolen from t#e o$ner; 3. Any <ey ot#er t#an t#ose intended 1y t#e o$ner for use in t#e loc< forci1ly opened 1y t#e offender. ?.>.3 A master <ey is a pic<loc< and its possession is punis#a1le. %n t#e definition of false <eys in Art. 3*54 pic<loc<s are considered as false <eys (-ar. 1)4 1ut only t#e illegal possession of suc# pic<loc<s and similar tools are punis#ed and not t#at of ot#er false <eys $#ic# are not pic<loc<s or similar t#ereto. -ar. 2 also considers as false <eys t#e genuine <eys stolen from t#eir o$ner. !&en if t#e <eys $ere not stolen 1ut $ere lost or misplaced 1y t#e o$ner and t#ey $ere found 1y anot#er $#o did not return t#e same to t#e o$ner alt#oug# #e $as in a position to do so4 t#at constitutes t#eft under Art. 3*'. T#at <ey is4 t#erefore4 stolen #ence a false <ey4 and if used to enter a #ouse from $#ic# articles $ere t#ereafter unla$fully ta<en 1y t#e offender4 t#e crime is ro11ery. Ender -ar. 34 $#ere t#e <ey $as not intended 1y t#e o$ner for use in t#e loc< to t#e #ouse 1ut it $as used 1y t#e offender to manipulate t#e loc< and to enter and steal somet#ing inside t#e #ouse4 it $ould 1e ro11ery. %f on t#e ot#er #and4 t#e #ouse o$ner entrusted t#e <ey to #is confidential secretary for safe<eeping4 1ut t#e latter used it to commit unla$ful acts of entry and a1stractions4 t#e crime is 7ualified t#eft t#roug# gra&e a1use of confidence (Art. 31*).
REP;4L+C *C' 5219 *-'+ C*R-*PP+-7 *C'

@!+%?%T%.?C3
o
o
Carnapping L is t#e ta<ing4 $it# intent to gain4 of a motor &e#icle 1elonging to anot#er $it#out t#e latter;s consent (the"t)4 or 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons4 or 1y using force upon t#ings (r&,,er'). 2enalt' "&r Carnapp#n+ :Se%. 4<; Any person $#o is found guilty of carnapping4 irrespecti&e of t#e &alue of motor &e#icle ta<en4 s#all 1e punis#ed 1y imprisonment $#en t#e carnapping $as committed3 a. 6it#out &iolence or intimidation against persons 0 not less t#an 14 years and ' mont#s A?@ not more t#an 1" years and 4 mont#s4; 1. 6it# &iolence or intimidation against persons .A force upon t#ings 0 not less t#an 1" years and 4 mont#s A?@ not more t#an 3* years4 c. .$ner4 dri&er or occupant is <illed or raped in t#e course of t#e commission .A on t#e occasion of t#e crime 0 life imprisonment to deat#
Page 102
Motor &e#icle L is any &e#icle propelled 1y any po$er ot#er t#an muscular po$er EC%?/ TB! -E>5%C B%/B6AJC4 except3 - road rollers - trollery cars - street0s$eepers - sprin<lers - la$n mo$ers - 1ulldo2ers - graders - for<0lifters - amp#i1ian truc<s - cranes - &e#icles $#ic# only run on rails or trac<s - tractors - trailers
If not used on pu#lic highways.

+o that, if these items ar actually used in the public highways they will be covered under anti carnapping law. )x. &f you steal a bulldo8er and brought to mindanao, the crime is carnapping, not bulldo8enapping.
and traction engines of all <inds used exclusi(ely for agricultural purpose. (so t#at #" n&t e=%l*s#(el' *se$ for agricultural purposes4 and used in t#e
pu1lic #ig#$ay4 and you ta<e it $it#out consent of o$ner or $it# &iolence or intimidation4 it is &iolation of t#e anti0carnapping la$)
Trailers #a&ing any num1er of $#eels4 $#en propelled or intended to 1e propelled 1y attac#ment to a motor &e#icle4 s#all 1e classified as separate motor &e#icle $it# no po$er rating.
TaFe n&te &" e=%ept#&ns a. &e#icles propelled 1y muscular po$er 1. &e#icles not used in pu1lic #ig#$ays c. &e#icles $#ic# only runs on trails and trac<s d. &e#icles use e8clusi&ely for agricultural purposes (traction engines)
@efacing or tampering $it# a serial num1er is erasing4 scraping4 altering4 or c#anging of t#e original factory0inscri1ed serial num1er on a motor &e#icle engine4 engine 1loc<4 or any motor c#assis of any motor &e#icle. 6#ene&er any motor &e#icle is found to #a&e a serial num1er on its motor engine4 engine 1loc< or c#assis $#is# is @%++!A!?T from t#at $#ic# is listed in t#e >ureau of Customs for motor &e#icles imported into t#e -#ilippines4 t#at motor &e#icle s#all 1e considered to #a&e a defaced or tampered $it# serial num1er.
?>3 o o o o T#ere is a ne$ directi&e form t#e office of t#e president. >efore4 Jou cannot transfer or transport your &e#icle from say Ce1u to Mindanao $it#out t#e an0car (anti0carnapping certification). Aig#t no$4 it can 1e done $it#out t#e an0car. %n carnapping4 t#e elements of ro11ery and t#eft are present. Co $it# or $it#out &iolence4 intimidation or force upon t#ings. Trisi<ad4 1icycles4 or scooters not included. /olf course is not a #ig#$ay so not co&ered under anti0carnapping la$.
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>efore4 if deat# results4 or 1y reason or on occasion of carnapping a person is <illed4 t#e crime is carnapping $it# #omicide. >ut no$4 it is plain carnapping punis#ed 1y deat#. %t is no longer carnapping $it# #omicide.
2EO2LE (s. ALAIN TAN G.R. N&. 4C791<. .an*ar' 048 0111 ?o unla$ful ta<ing. %t $as la$ful for Tan to #a&e t#e car for test dri&e. -#illip Cee consented to it. Cuc# consent $as not $it#dra$n. Cee in effect tolerated Tan;s possession of t#e car. ?o lia1ility T#ere is no arguing t#at t#e anti0carnapping la$ is a special la$4 different from t#e crimes of ro11ery and t#eft included in t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %t particularly addresses t#e ta<ing4 $it# intent of gain4 of a motor &e#icle 1elonging to anot#er $it#out t#e latter;s consent4 or 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons4 or 1y using force upon t#ings. >ut a careful comparison of t#is special la$ $it# t#e crimes of ro11ery and t#eft readily re&eals t#eir common features and c#aracteristics4 to $it3 unla$ful ta<ing4 intent to gain4 and t#at personal property 1elonging to anot#er is ta<en $it#out t#e latter;s consent. Bo$e&er4 t#e anti0carnapping la$ particularly deals $it# t#e t#eft and ro11ery of motor &e#icles. Bence4 a motor &e#icle is said to #a&e 1een carnapped $#en it #as 1een ta<en4 $it# intent to gain4 $it#out t#e o$ner;s consent4 $#et#er t#e ta<ing $as done $it# or $it#out &iolence or intimidation of persons or $it# or $it#out t#e use of force upon t#ings. 6it#out t#e anti0 carnapping la$4 suc# unla$ful ta<ing of a motor &e#icle $ould fall $it#in t#e pur&ie$ of eit#er t#eft or ro11ery $#ic# $as certainly t#e case 1efore t#e enactment of said statute. 8 8 8 !&en solely from t#is testimony4 t#is Court finds t#at t#ere $as no unla$ful ta<ing. A felonious ta<ing may 1e defined as t#e act of depri&ing anot#er of t#e possession and dominion of mo&a1le property $it#out #is pri&ity and consent and $it#out animus re(ertendi. T#us4 an unla$ful ta<ing ta<es place $#en t#e o$ner or =uridical possessor does not gi&e #is consent to t#e ta<ing; or4 if t#e consent $as gi&en4 it $as &itiated; or in t#e case of 5oxas, 1rinidad and de /era4 $#ere an act 1y t#e recei&er soon after t#e actual transfer of possession constitutes unla$ful ta<ing. %n t#e last scenario4 t#e recei&er;s act could 1e considered as #a&ing 1een e8ecuted $it#out t#e consent of t#e gi&er. C!!;s testimony clearly e&inced #is assent to TA?;s ta<ing of t#e car not only at t#e time #e yielded t#e p#ysical possession t#ereof for t#e alleged test0dri&ing 1ut e&en t#ereafter4 for #e neit#er $it##eld #is consent nor $it#dre$ t#e same during t#e se&en mont# period t#e car $as $it# TA?. At t#e &ery least4 C!! tolerated TA?,s possession of t#e car. A contrary conclusion inspires only dis1elief. +or if t#e car $as truly carnapped4 $#y did C!! $ait for se&en mont#s 1efore #e reported t#e sameF +urt#er4 TA?;s alleged refusal to meet C!! despite #is repeated attempts to do so s#ould #a&e sufficiently alerted #im of t#e former;s supposed male&olent intent4 yet #e still did not report t#e ta<ing. !&en if #e failed to report t#e ta<ing4 mont#s after t#e alleged test0dri&ing4 #e #ad allegedly seen #is car in t#e initial stages of dismem1erment on 1) May 1))3 yet4 again4 #e did not report t#e carnapping on t#at day nor on t#e ne8t4 1ut muc# later on " Dune 1))3 or almost a mont# t#ereafter. 2EO2LE (s. NOEL SANTOS ' CRIS2INO G.R. N&. 406711. .*ne 58 0111 T#ere $as no proof t#at t#ere $as unla$ful ta<ing. 6#at $as pro&ed $as t#at of t#e deat# of Morales 1ut t#ere $ere no $itnesses t#at indeed it $as Cantos $#o did t#e <illing. T#e accused0 appellant ?oel Cantos is ac7uitted on t#e ground t#at #is guilt is not pro&ed 1eyond reasona1le dou1t. .n t#e last clause of Cec 14 of AA 53)(as amended 1y AA " 5))4 t#ree amendments #a&e 1een made to t#e original Anti0Carnapping Act3 (1) t#e c#ange of t#e penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua4 (2) t#e inclusion of rape4 and (3) t#e c#ange of t#e p#rase Qin t#e commission of t#e carnappingQ to Qin t#e course of t#e commission of t#e carnapping or on t#e occasion t#ereof.Q
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T#is t#ird amendment ma<es clear t#e intention of t#e la$ to ma<e t#e offense a special comple8 crime4 1y $ay of analogy (is9a9(is paragrap#s 1 to 4 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code on ro11ery $it# &iolence against or intimidation of persons. T#us4 under t#e last clause of Cection 14 of t#e Anti0Carnapping Act4 t#e prosecution not only #as to pro&e t#e essential re7uisites of carnapping and of t#e #omicide or murder of Auel Morales 1ut more importantly4 it must s#o$ t#at t#e original criminal design of t#e culprit $as carnapping and t#at t#e <illing $as perpetrated Qin t#e course of t#e commission of t#e carnapping or on t#e occasion t#ereof.Q ?eedless to say4 $#ere t#e elements of carnapping are not pro&ed4 t#e pro&isions of t#e Anti0Carnapping Act $ould cease to 1e applica1le and t#e #omicide or murder (if pro&en) $ould 1e punis#a1le under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %n t#e #erein case4 $e find t#e c#arge of carnapping unsu1stantiated for failure of t#e prosecution to pro&e an unla$ful ta<ing. T#e application of t#e presumption t#at a person found in possession of t#e personal effects 1elonging to a person ro11ed or <illed is considered t#e aut#or of t#e aggression4 t#e deat# of t#e person4 as $ell as t#e ro11ery committed4 #as 1een in&aria1ly limited to cases $#ere suc# possession is eit#er une8plained or t#at t#e proffered e8planation is rendered implausi1le in &ie$ of independent e&idence inconsistent t#ereto. T#e re1uttal of suc# presumption4 in&aria1ly employed in cases of ro11ery and t#eft under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 &alidly applies to a case of carnapping4 for indeed t#e concept of unla$ful ta<ing in t#eft4 ro11ery and carnapping is t#e same4 and #ad it not 1een for t#e enactment of t#e Anti0Carnapping Act4 t#e unla$ful ta<ing of a motor &e#icle $ould certainly fall $it#in t#e pur&ie$ of eit#er t#eft or ro11ery. T#e carnapping not 1eing duly pro&ed4 t#e <illing of Auel Morales may not 1e treated as an incident of carnapping. ?onet#eless4 e&en under t#e pro&isions of #omicide and murder under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 $e find t#at t#e guilt of accused0appellant $as not esta1lis#ed 1eyond reasona1le dou1t.
Chapter T-& !RIGANDAGE

-rigandage 0 T#is is a crime committed 1y more t#an t#ree armed persons $#o form a 1and of ro11ers for t#e purpose of committing ro11ery in t#e #ig#$ay or <idnapping persons for t#e purpose of e8tortion or to o1tain ransom4 or for any ot#er purpose to 1e attained 1y means of force and &iolence. *R'+CLE 105 9<$ *RE 4R+7*-D! A. T#ere is 1rigandage $#en3 1. T#ere 1e at least four armed persons. 2. T#ey formed a 1and of ro11ers. 3. T#e purpose is any of t#e follo$ing3 a) To commit ro11ery in t#e #ig#$ay; or 1) To <idnap persons for t#e purpose of e8tortion or to o1tain ransom; or c) To attain 1y means of force and &iolence any ot#er purpose. o All are presumed #ig#$ay ro11ers or 1rigands if any of t#em carries an unlicensed firearm.
%n t#e recent case of People (s. Puno, et al. (/.A. ?o. )"4"14 +e1. 1"4 1))3)4 t#e accused $as a1le to e8tort -1**4*** in c#ec<s from #is employer 1y refusing to let #er out of #er car $#ic# #e <ept dri&ing around on t#e #ig#$ays of Metro Manila for 7uite some time until s#e ga&e t#e c#ec<s. T#e Cupreme Court #eld t#at t#e crime could not 1e a &iolation of -@ 532 as t#is refers to
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indiscriminate unla$ful acts committed on -#ilippine #ig#$ays 1ut not a particular ro11ery. T#e mere fact t#at t#e car $as 1eing dri&en on a #ig#$ay $#ile t#e accused $as pressuring t#e &ictim to gi&e t#e amount $as purely an incidental fact. Muc# less does it constitute <idnapping for ransom as t#e ta<ing of t#e &ictim $as merely to commit ro11ery and not to transport #er to anot#er place for purposes of detention and ransom. *R'+CLE 106 *+D+-7 *-D *4E''+-7 4*-D $F 4R+7*-D! A. !lements 1. T#ere is a 1and of 1rigands; 2. .ffender <no$s t#e 1and to 1e of 1rigands; 3. .ffender does any of t#e follo$ing acts3 a. Be in any manner aids4 a1ets or protects suc# 1and of 1rigands; 1. Be gi&es t#em information of t#e mo&ements of t#e police or ot#er peace officers of t#e go&ernment; or c. Be ac7uires or recei&es t#e property ta<en 1y suc# 1rigands. Presumption of the la! as to +no!ledge K it s#all 1e presumed t#at t#e person performing any of t#e acts pro&ided in t#is article #as performed t#em Fn&-#n+l'4 unless t#e contrary is pro&en Repeale$ ,' 2D 7C08 Se%. < @ @ @ !e"% ,% *i(ing )irates #r /ig/way r#bbersCbrigan(s #r abetting )ira"y #r /ig/way r#bberyCbrigan(age. 0 Any person $#o <no$ingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or #ig#$ay ro11ersG1rigands4 suc# as gi&ing t#em information a1out t#e mo&ement of police or ot#er peace officers of t#e go&ernment4 or ac7uires or recei&es property ta<en 1y suc# pirates or 1rigands or in any manner deri&es any 1enefit t#erefrom; .A any person $#o directly or indirectly abets t#e commission of piracy or #ig#$ay ro11ery or 1rigandage4 s#all 1e considered as an a%%&mpl#%e of t#e principal offenders and 1e punis#ed in accordance $it# t#e Aules prescri1ed 1y t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %t s#all 1e presumed t#at any person $#o does any of t#e acts pro&ided in t#is Cection #as performed <no$ingly4 unless t#e contrary is pro&en.
2D 7C0 ANTI@2IRACY AND ANTI@HIGHWAY RO!!ERY OF 496<.

Al$ays ta<e note of t#e 9$#ereas Clause: of -@ 532 ot#er$ise <no$n as A?T%0-%AACJ A?@ A?T%0B%/B6AJ A.>>!AJ .+ 1)"4. 9 :hereas4 reports from la$ enforcement agencies re&eal t#at la$less elements are still committing acts of depredation upon t#e persons and properties of innocent and defenseless in#a1itants $#o tra&els from one place to anot#er4 t#ere1y distur1ing t#e peace4 order and tran7uility of t#e nation and stunting t#e economic and social progressed of t#e people; :hereas4 suc# act of depredations constitute eit#er piracy or #ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandage $#ic# are among t#e #ig#est forms of la$lessness condemned 1y t#e penal statues of all countries;: DEFINITIONS3 PH#%#PP#4E H#)H:$I L it s#all refer to any road4 street4 passage4 #ig#$ay or 1ridges or ot#er parts t#ereof4 or rail$ay or railroads $it#in t#e -#ilippines used 1y persons4 or &e#icles4 or
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locomoti&es4 or trains4 for t#e mo&ement or circulation or persons or transportation of goods4 articles or property or 1ot# H#)H:$I 5.--E5I .5 -5#)$4&$)E 0 t#e sei2ure of any person for ransom4 e8tortion4 or ot#er unla$ful purposes4 or t#e ta<ing a$ay of t#e property of anot#er 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon t#ings of ot#er unla$ful means4 committed 1y any )ers#n on any -#ilippine #ig#$ay. Ta<e note of purposes of -@ 5323 1. ransom 2. e8tortion 3. ot#er unla$ful purposes 4. t#e ta<ing a$ay of t#e property of anot#er 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons .A force upon t#ings of ot#er unla$ful means4 Distin"ti#n between brigan(age .n(er t/e Revise( Penal C#(e *-D /ig/way r#bberyCbrigan(age .n(er Presi(ential De"ree -#% 212B #1% Bri*an!a*e as a crime under the Revised Penal Code refers to the formation of a band of robbers by more than three armed persons for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, 9idnapping for purposes of extortion or ransom, or for any other purpose to be attained by force and violence. The mere forming of a band, which re>uires at least four armed persons, if for any of the criminal purposes stated in !rticle :@4, gives rise to brigandage. 3i*hwa# r%""er#Lbrigandage under Presidential Becree /o. $:" is the sei8ure of any person for ransom, extortion or for any other lawful purposes, or the ta9ing away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things or other unlawful means committed by any person on any Philippine highway.
#"%
?rigandage under Presidential Becree /o. $:" refers to the actual commission of the robbery on the highway and can be committed by one person alone. &t is this brigandage which deserves some attention because not any robbery in a highway is brigandage or highway robbery. ! distinction should be made between highway robberyLbrigandage under the decree and ordinary robbery committed on a highway under the Revised Penal Code. &n US v. Feli ian%9 1 +hil. =00, it was pointed out that highway robbery or brigandage is more than ordinary robbery committed on a highway. The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate robbery in highways. &f the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery or robbery in band, if there are at least four armed participants. Presidential Becree /o. $:" introduced amendments to !rticle :@4 and :@A by increasing the penalties. &t does not re>uire at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers. &t does not create a presumption that the offender is a brigand when he an unlicensed firearm is used unli9e the Revised Penal Code. ?ut the essence of brigandage under the Revised Penal Code is the same as that in the Presidential Becree, that is, crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whoever they may potentially be.
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SIMILARITIES .+ >A%/A?@A/! E?@!A A-C AND >A%/A?@A/! E?@!A -@ 532 Ender R2C Ender 2D 7C0 -urposes; t#e purpose is any of t#e follo$ing3 a. to commit ro11ery in t#e #ig#$ay 1. to <idnap persons for t#e purpose of e8tortion or to o1tain ransom c. to attain 1y means of force and &iolence any ot#er purpose purposes of -@ 5323 a. ransom 1. e8tortion c. ot#er unla$ful purposes d. t#e ta<ing a$ay of t#e property of anot#er 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon t#ings of ot#er unla$ful means4 .ne particular ro11ery is not 1rigandage. Big#$ay ro11ery is indiscriminate
.ne particular ro11ery is not 1rigandage. Big#$ay ro11ery is indiscriminate
D#st#n%t#&ns3 !RIGANDAGE To commit ro11ery in t#e #ig#$ay or any of t#e reasons enumerated T#e agreement is to commit ro11ery indiscriminately T#e mere formation of a 1and for any purposes mentioned in t#e la$ is sufficient
RO!!ERY IN !AND To commit ro11ery not necessarily in t#e #ig#$ay To commit a particular ro11ery %t is necessary to pro&e t#at t#e 1and actually committed ro11ery. Mere conspiracy to commit ro11ery is not punis#a1le. !RIGANDAGE UNDER 2D 7C0 :&ther-#se Fn&-n as INDISCRIMINATE HIGHWAY RO!!ERY;
RO!!ERY
!RIGANDAGE UNDER R2C
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.ne particular ro11ery (no #a1ituality4 no #istory) e&en if committed 1y 4 armed persons
Can 1e committed 1y one person (Any armed person) (ictim is predetermined .ne &ictim only ( #o$ can 1 &ictim stunt t#e gro$t# of t#e economyF Al$ays see $#ereas clause of -@ 532) ?ot done #a1itually
+ormation of a 1and of ro11ers e&en if ro11ery #as not yet 1een committed is punis#a1le (note t#at t#is is different from article 2)5 ro11ery 1y a 1and 1ecause in t#is crime4 mere formation or mere conspiracy to commit is not punis#a1le) t#e #eart of t#e offense consist in t#e formation of a 1and for purposes under Art 3* . 0if it is to commit purposes ot#er t#an t#ose enumerated in art 3* 4 t#e crime is ro11ery 1y a 1and %+ C.MM%TT!@ %?@%CCA%M%?AT!5J 0if not done indiscriminately and for any ot#er purpose ot#er t#an art 3* 4 t#is is =ust plain and simple ro11ery Must 1e committed at least 1y four armed persons (ictim is not pre0determined
%ndiscriminate #ig#$ay ro11ery
!&en only 1 person can commit ( any person) (ictim is not pre0determined Target are tra&elers
@one #a1itually
-B%5%--%?! B%/B6AJ is not defined
@one #a1itually. T#ere must 1e e&idence t#at you committed t#e crime 1efore4 not necessary t#at t#ere 1e con&iction4 only #istory t#at t#ey are 1rigands. Al$ays ta<e note of t#e 6B!A!AC clause -B%5%--%?! B%/B6AJ is defined
Clar#"#%at&r' $e%#s#&n &" 2D 7C0

2EO2LE (s. ISA!ELO 2UNO G.R. N&. 96<64. Fe,r*ar' 468 499C S<+7<9*3 R$44ER3S (PD -$% 212)F M$D+F+E! *R'!% 105 *-D 106 $F '<E RE:+!ED PE-*L C$DEF C$-!'R;ED. R -residential @ecree ?o. 532 is not a modification of Article 2 " of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code on <idnapping and serious illegal detention4 >ET of Articles 3* and 3*" on 1rigandage. T#is is e&ident from t#e fact t#at t#e rele&ant portion t#ereof $#ic# treats of Q#ig#$ay ro11eryQ in&aria1ly uses t#is term in t#e alternati&e and synonymously $it# 1rigandage4 t#at is4 as Q#ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandage.Q
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T#is is 1ut in line $it# our pre&ious ruling4 and $#ic# still #olds s$ay in criminal la$4 t#at #ig#$ay ro11ers (ladrones) and 1rigands are synonymous. -residential @ecree ?o 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 3* and 3*" of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code 1y increasing t#e penalties4 al1eit limiting its applica1ility to t#e offenses stated t#erein $#en committed on t#e #ig#$ays and $it#out pre=udice to t#e lia1ility for suc# acts if committed. +urt#ermore4 t#e decree does not re7uire t#at t#ere 1e at least four armed persons forming a 1and of ro11ers; and t#e presumption in t#e Code t#at said accused are 1rigands if t#ey use unlicensed firearms no longer o1tains under t#e decree. >ut4 and t#is $e 1roadly underline4 t#e essence of 1rigandage under t#e Code as a crime of depredation $#erein t#e unla$ful acts are directed not only against specific4 intended or preconcei&ed &ictims4 1ut against any and all prospecti&e &ictims any$#ere on t#e #ig#$ay and $#osoe&er t#ey may potentially 1e4 is t#e same as t#e concept of 1rigandage $#ic# is maintained in -residential @ecree ?o. 5324 in t#e same manner as it $as under its aforementioned precursor in t#e Code and4 for t#at matter4 under t#e old >rigandage 5a$. 4R+7*-D*7E *-D R$44ER3A D+!'+-7;+!<ED. R T#e follo$ing salient distinctions 1et$een 1rigandage and ro11ery are succinctly e8plained in a treatise on t#e su1=ect and are of continuing &alidity3 QT#e main o1=ect of t#e >rigandage 5a$ is to pre&ent t#e formation of 1ands of ro11ers. T#e #eart of t#e offense consists in t#e formation of a 1and 1y more t#an t#ree armed persons for t#e purpose indicated in art 3* . Cuc# formation is sufficient to constitute a &iolation of art. 3* . %t $ould not 1e necessary to s#o$4 in a prosecution under it4 t#at a mem1er or mem1ers of t#e 1and actually committed ro11ery or <idnapping or any ot#er purpose attaina1le 1y &iolent means. T#e crime is pro&en $#en t#e organi2ation and purpose of t#e 1and are s#o$n to 1e suc# as are contemplated 1y art. 3* . .n t#e ot#er #and4 if ro11ery is committed 1y a 1and4 $#ose mem1ers $ere not primarily organi2ed for t#e purpose of committing ro11ery or <idnapping4 etc.4 t#e crime $ould not 1e 1rigandage4 1ut only ro11ery. Cimply 1ecause ro11ery $as committed 1y a 1and of more t#an t#ree armed persons4 it $ould not follo$ t#at it $as committed 1y a 1and of 1rigands. %n fine4 t#e purpose of 1rigandage is4 inter alia4 indiscriminate #ig#$ay ro11ery. %f t#e purpose is only a particular ro11ery4 t#e crime is only ro11ery4 or ro11ery in 1and if t#ere are at least four armed participants. -residential @ecree ?o. 532 punis#es as #ig#$ay ro11ery or 1rigandage only acts of ro11ery perpetrated 1y outla$s indiscriminately against any person or persons on -#ilippine #ig#$ays as defined t#erein4 and not acts of ro11ery committed against only a predetermined or particular &ictim. %ndeed4 it is #ard to concei&e of #o$ a single act of ro11ery against a particular person c#osen 1y t#e accused as t#eir specific &ictim could 1e considered as committed on t#e Qinnocent and defenseless in#a1itants $#o tra&el from one place to anot#er4Q and $#ic# single act of depredation $ould 1e capa1le of Qstunting t#e economic and social progress of t#e peopleQ as to 1e considered Qamong t#e #ig#est forms of la$lessness condemned 1y t#e penal statutes of all countries4Q and $ould accordingly constitute an o1stacle Qto t#e economic4 social4 educational and community progress of t#e people4Q suc# t#at said isolated act $ould constitute t#e #ig#$ay ro11ery or 1rigandage contemplated and punis#ed in said decree. T#is $ould 1e an e8aggeration 1ordering on t#e ridiculous. E+D-*PP+-7F +-'E-' '$ DEPR+:E '<E $FFE-DED P*R'3 $F <ER L+4ER'3F -$' PRE!E-' +- C*!E *' 4*R% R %n t#e case at 1ar4 t#ere is no s#o$ing $#atsoe&er t#at appellants #ad any moti&e4 nurtured prior to or at t#e time t#ey committed t#e $rongful acts against complainant4 ot#er t#an t#e e8tortion of money from #er under t#e compulsion of t#reats or intimidation. 6it# respect to t#e specific intent of appellants &is0a0&is t#e c#arge t#at t#ey #ad <idnapped t#e &ictim4 $e can rely on t#e pro&er1ial rule of ancient respecta1ility t#at for t#is crime to e8ist4 t#ere must 1e indu1ita1le proof t#at t#e actual intent of t#e malefactors $as to depri&e t#e offended party of #er li1erty4 and not $#ere suc# restraint of #er freedom of action $as merely an incident in t#e commission of anot#er offense primarily intended 1y t#e offenders. Bence4 as early as Enited Ctates &s. Anc#eta4 and consistently reiterated t#ereafter4 it #as 1een #eld t#at t#e detention andGor forci1le ta<ing a$ay of t#e &ictims 1y t#e accused4 e&en for an apprecia1le period of time 1ut for t#e primary and ultimate purpose of <illing t#em4 #olds t#e offenders lia1le for ta<ing t#eir li&es or suc# ot#er offenses t#ey committed in relation t#ereto4 1ut t#e incidental depri&ation of t#e &ictims li1erty does not constitute <idnapping or serious illegal detention.
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T#at appellants in t#is case #ad no intention $#atsoe&er to <idnap or depri&e t#e complainant of #er personal li1erty is clearly demonstrated in t#e &erita1ly confessional testimony of appellant -uno. SR*-!$MSF DEF+-EDB *PPL+C*'+$- +- C*!E *' 4*R. R ?eit#er can $e consider t#e amounts gi&en to appellants as e7ui&alent to or in t#e nature of ransom4 considering t#e immediacy of t#eir o1tention t#ereof from t#e complainant personally. Aansom4 in municipal criminal la$4 is t#e money4 price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons4 a payment t#at releases from capti&ity. %t can #ardly 1e assumed t#at $#en complainant readily ga&e t#e cas# and c#ec<s demanded from #er at gunpoint4 $#at s#e ga&e under t#e circumstances of t#is case can 1e e7uated $it# or $as in t#e concept of ransom in t#e la$ of <idnappings. T#ese $ere merely amounts in&oluntarily surrendered 1y t#e &ictim upon t#e occasion of a ro11ery or of $#ic# s#e $as summarily di&ested 1y appellants. Accordingly4 $#ile $e #old t#at t#e crime committed is ro11ery as defined in Article 2)3 of t#e Code4 $e4 #o$e&er4 re=ect t#e t#eory of t#e trial court t#at t#e same constitutes t#e #ig#$ay ro11ery contemplated in and punis#ed 1y -residential @ecree ?o. 532. A%ts &" R&,,er' V&r e(en The"tD $&ne &n a H#+h-a' $&es n&t a*t&mat#%all' "all *n$er 2D 7C0. 2EO2LE (s SANDOAAL G.R. N&s. 97C7C@7<. Mar%h 68 4993 T#e fiscal of Ce1u determined t#at appellant and Cando&al &iolated t$o distinct penal la$s in ro11ing 5aurente and >aguio4 and <illing t#e latter on a city street. %ndeed4 1ecause t#e City +iscal considered t#e t$o accused to #a&e 1een in conspiracy4 #e c#arged t#em 1ot# $it# t#e comple8 crime of ro11ery $it# #omicide as defined and penali2ed under Article 2)4 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code $it# respect to t#e ro11ing and <illing of >aguio A?@4 in a separate information4 also c#arged t#em $it# &iolation of -.@. ?o. 5324 t#e 1)"4 la$ against #ig#$ay ro11ery4 as regards t#e ro11ing of 5aurente. T#e informations filed4 #o$e&er4 indicate t#at t#e filing 1y t#e fiscal of t$o separate c#arges $as impelled 1y t#e fact t#at in t#e same incident4 t#ere $ere t$o &ictims. (t#is $as commiitted in A. 5ope2 st.4 Ce1u City. A. 5ope2 street is definietly a #ig#$ay.) B!5@3 T#is Court finds4 #o$e&er4 t#at only t#e crime of simple ro11ery4 not &iolation of -.@. ?o. 5324 s#ould #a&e 1een c#arged regarding t#e ro11ing of 5aurente. %n -eople &. -uno4 t#e Court e8plicitly #eld t#at -.@. ?o. 532 is a modification of Articles 3* and 3*" on 1rigandageQ $#ic# is committed 1y more t#an t#ree persons. T#e clear implication is t#at t#e number of offenders4 as $ell as t#e fre'uency $it# $#ic# t#ey perpetrate ro11ery4 may determine $#et#er a crime is simple ro11ery or #ig#$ay ro11ery as defined in -.@. ?o. 532. T#us4 in t#e -uno case4 t#e Court e8plained t#at -.@. ?o. 532 treats of Q#ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandageQ or Qindiscriminate #ig#$ay ro11eryQ and4 t#erefore Q(%)f t#e purpose is only a particular ro11ery4 t#e crime is only ro11ery4 or ro11ery in 1and if t#ere are at least four armed participants.Q 8 8 8 +rom t#e information in Criminal Case ?o. C>E0'"324 it is apparent t#at &iolation of -.@. ?o. 532 $as c#arged simply 1ecause t#e crimes transpired $#ile t#e &ictim4 Aomeo 5aurente4 Q$as $al<ing along A. 5ope2 Ct.4 a pu1lic #ig#$ay.Q %n t#is regard4 in t#e same -uno case4 t#e Court said3 QErroneous ad(ertence is ne&ert#eless made 1y t#e court 1elo$ to t#e fact t#at t#e crime of ro11ery committed 1y appellants s#ould 1e co&ered 1y t#e amendatory decree *ust because it !as committed on a high!ay. %f t#e mere fact t#at t#e offense c#arged $as committed on a #ig#$ay $ould 1e t#e determinant for t#e application of -residential @ecree ?o. 5324 it $ould not 1e far0fetc#ed to e8pect misc#ie&ous4 if not a1surd4 effects on t#e corpus of our su1stanti&e criminal la$. 2EO2LE (s LARRY LAURENTE G.R. N&. 4436C<. Mar%h 098 4993
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6e declare at t#e outset t#at e&en granting e8 gratia t#at t#e esta1lis#ed facts pro&e 1eyond reasona1le dou1t t#at 5aurente and #is t$o co0accused indeed committed t#e acts c#arged in t#e information4 5aurente cannot 1e &alidly con&icted for #ig#$ay ro11ery $it# #omicide under -.@. ?o. 532. T#e o1=ect of t#e decree is to deter and punis# la$less elements $#o commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless in#a1itants $#o tra&el from one place to anot#er R $#ic# acts constitute eit#er piracy or #ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandage R t#ere1y distur1ing t#e peace4 order4 and tran7uility of t#e nation and stunting t#e economic and social progress of t#e people. %t is directed against acts of ro11ery perpetrated 1y outla$s indiscriminately against any person on -#ilippine #ig#$ays4 as defined t#erein4 and not t#ose committed against a predetermined or particular &ictim. Accordingly4 a ro11ery committed on a -#ilippine #ig#$ay 1y persons $#o are not mem1ers of t#e prescri1ed la$less elements or directed only against a specific4 intended4 or preconcei&ed &ictim4 is not a &iolation of -.@. ?o. 532. 8 8 8 %f t#e mere fact t#at t#e offense c#arged $as committed on a #ig#$ay $ould 1e t#e determinant for t#e application of -residential @ecree ?o. 5324 it $ould not 1e far0fetc#ed to e8pect misc#ie&ous4 if not a1surd4 effects on t#e corpus of our su1stanti&e criminal la$. +or4 if a motor &e#icle4 eit#er stationary or mo&ing on a #ig#$ay4 is forci1ly ta<en at gunpoint 1y t#e accused $#o #appened to ta<e a fancy t#ereto4 $ould t#e location of t#e &e#icle at t#e time of t#e unla$ful ta<ing necessarily put t#e offense $it#in t#e am1it of -residential @ecree ?o. 5324 t#us rendering nugatory t#e categorical pro&isions of t#e Anti0Carnapping Act of 1)"2F And4 if t#e scenario is one $#ere t#e su1=ect matter of t#e unla$ful asportation is large cattle $#ic# are incidentally 1eing #erded along and tra&ersing t#e same #ig#$ay and are impulsi&ely set upon 1y t#e accused4 s#ould $e apply -residential @ecree ?o. 532 and completely disregard t#e e8plicit prescriptions in t#e Anti0Cattle Austling 5a$ of 1)"4F 6e do not entertain any dou1t4 t#erefore4 t#at t#e coincidental fact t#at t#e ro11ery in t#e present case $as committed inside a car $#ic#4 in t#e natural course of t#ings4 $as casually operating on a #ig#$ay4 is not $it#in t#e situation en&isaged 1y Cection 2(e) of t#e decree in its definition of terms. >esides4 t#at particular pro&ision precisely defineSsT Q#ig#$ay ro11eryG1rigandageQ and4 as $e #a&e amply demonstrated4 t#e single act of ro11ery concei&ed and committed 1y appellants in t#is case does not constitute #ig#$ay ro11ery or 1rigandage. %n t#e instant case4 t#ere is not a s#red of e&idence t#at 5aurente and #is co0accused4 or t#eir acts4 fall $it#in t#e pur&ie$ of -.@. ?o. 5324 as interpreted a1o&e. T#us4 to repeat4 5aurente cannot 1e &alidly con&icted for #ig#$ay ro11ery $it# #omicide under -.@. ?o 532. 2EO2LE (s ARMANDO REANBARES G.R. N&. 4C1373. .*ne 098 0111 T#e accused $as con&icted in t#e A-C of t#e crime of &iolation of -@ 532 #ig#$ay ro11ery $it# #omicide in ATC and #e $as sentenced to deat#. A couple4 /regorio and 5ilia Ta<ta<an4 o$ned a sari0sari store. T#ey closed t#eir sari0sari store and $ere ready to go #ome to t#eir 1arangay to Can Ao7ue4 >atangas. 6#en t#ey rode t#eir passenger =eepney4 t$o men4 one $as Aean2ares4 #eld t#e couple up4 5ilia $as s#ot and died on t#e spot. T$o informations $ere filed. .ne is for &iolation of -@ 532 $it# #omicide and t#e ot#er is for carnapping. Be $as ac7uitted in carnapping for insufficiency of e&idence. B!5@3 %ndeed t#e accused is guilty. >ut t#at t#e accused $as guilty of Big#$ay Ao11ery $it# Bomicide under -@ 532 $as erroneous. As #eld in a num1er of cases4 con&iction for #ig#$ay ro11ery re7uires proof t#at se&eral accused $ere organi2ed for t#e purpose of committing it indiscriminately. T#ere is no proof in t#e instant case t#at t#e accused and #is co#orts organi2ed t#emsel&es to commit #ig#$ay ro11ery. ?eit#er is t#ere proof t#at t#ey attempted to commit similar ro11eries to s#o$ t#e QindiscriminateQ perpetration t#ereof. .n t#e ot#er #and4 $#at t#e prosecution esta1lis#ed $as only a single act of ro11ery against t#e particular persons of t#e Tactacan spouses. Clearly4 t#is single act of depredation is not $#at is contemplated under -@ 532 as its o1=ecti&e is to deter and punis# la$less elements $#o commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless in#a1itants $#o tra&el from one place to
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anot#er t#ere1y distur1ing t#e peace and tran7uility of t#e nation and stunting t#e economic and social progress of t#e people.
2D 4340 ANTI@FENCING LAW OF 4969

%n t#e special la$ of A?T%0+!?C%?/ 5A64 t#e one $#o 1uys4 recei&es4 <eep etc4 may 1e lia1le as an accessory to t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft4 .A as a principal in t#is special la$. T#e prosecutor #as a c#oice. 9+encing: is t#e act of any person $#o4 !ith intent to gain for himself or for another4 s#all - 1uy - recei&e - possess - <eep - ac7uire - conceal - sell - dispose of - s#all 1uy and sell - or in any ot#er manner deal in any article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue $#ic# #e <no$s4 or s#ould 1e <no$n to #im4 to #a&e 1een deri&ed from t#e proceeds of ro11ery or t#eft. Q+enceQ includes any person4 firm4 association corporation or partners#ip or ot#er organi2ation $#oG$#ic# commits t#e act of fencing. ?>3 9intent to gain: may not 1e an element. TB!A! %C ?. +!?C%?/ 6%TB.ET A.>>!AJ .A TB!+T T#e fence is not in conspiracy of t#e ro11er or t#ief ot#er$ise #e is lia1le for ro11ery or t#eft. Ender A-C4 a fence may 1e an accessory to t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft. Ender t#is special la$4 suc# person4 t#e fence is a principal in t#e crime of fencing. >asis of penalty K &alue of t#ing >efore t#e enactment of -@ 1 12 in 1)") t#e fence could only 1e prosecuted as an accessory after t#e fact of ro11ery and t#eft as t#e term is defined in article 1) 1ut t#e penalty is lig#t as it is 2 degrees lo$er. -@ 1 12 $as enacted to impose #ea&y penalties on t#ose persons $#o profits to t#e crime of ro11ery andGor t#eft. +encing is a distinct crime from t#eft and ro11ery. %f t#e participant $#o profited is 1eing prosecuted $it# person $#o ro11ed4 t#e person is prosecuted as an accessory. %f #e is 1eing prosecuted separately4 t#e person $#o partoo< of t#e proceeds is lia1le for fencing. 2res*mpt#&n &" "en%#n+3 :Se%. 7; Mere possession of any good4 article4 item4 or o1=ect4 or anyt#ing of &alue $#ic# #as 1een sub*ect of robbery or thie(ery s#all 1e prima facie e&idence of fencing.
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ERNESTO DUMLAO (s. CA AUGUST 008 4993 @umlao $as c#arged $it# anti0fencing 1ecause #e #as in #is possession pipes4 $#ic# actually 1elong to t#e complainant. Be displayed it t#ere in #is store. Be said t#at t#ere $as someone $#o $ent in #is compound and dumped t#e pipes in #is compound. Be too< it and displayed it. Be said t#ere $as no proof t#at t#ere $as intent to gain and t#at t#ere $as no proof of purc#ase. B!5@3 T#e la$ does not re7uire proof of purc#aser4 1ecause mere possession is prima facie e&idence.
Cince Cection 5 of -residential @ecree ?o. 1 12 e8pressly pro&ides t#at mere possession of anyt#ing of &alue $#ic# #as 1een su1=ect of t#eft or ro11ery s#all 1e prima facie e&idence of fencing4 it follo$s t#at a possessor of stolen goods is presumed to #a&e <no$ledge t#at t#e goods found in #is possession after t#e fact of t#eft or ro11ery #as 1een esta1lis#ed. T#e presumption does not offend t#e presumption of innocence in t#e fundamental la$. T#is $as t#e ruling in 2am#nt*an (. 2e&ple8 $e%#$e$ &n .*l' 448 499<. >urden of proof is upon fence to o&ercome presumption; if e8planation insufficient or unsatisfactory4 court $ill con&ict. T#is is a malum pro#i1itum so intent is not material. >ut if prosecution is under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 as an accessory4 t#e criminal intent is controlling.
2AMINTUAN (s 2EO2LE G.R. N&. 444<03. .*l' 448 499< Ctolen =e$elries4 displayed inside a s#o$case in a stall4 $ere reco&ered from #erein petitioner. Conse7uently4 t#e latter $as c#arged for &iolation of -@1 12. As a defense4 petitioner argued t#at s#e did not <no$ t#at t#e =e$elries $ere stolen. B!5@3 .n t#e element of <no$ledge t#at t#e items are deri&ed from t#e proceeds of t#e crime of ro11ery and of intent to gain for #erself or for anot#er4 t#e Anti0+encing 5a$ pro&ides3 ,Cec. 5. -resumption of +encing. R Mere possession of any good4 article4 item4 o1=ect4 or anyt#ing of &alue $#ic# #as 1een t#e su1=ect of ro11ery of t#ie&ery s#all 1e prima facie e&idence of fencing., Mno$ledge and intent to gain are pro&en 1y t#e fact t#at t#ese =e$elries $ere found in possession of appellant and t#ey $ere displayed for sale in a s#o$case 1eing tended 1y #er in a stall along +lorentino Ctreet4 Cta. Cru24 Manila.Q 1HE E%EME41S .E 1HE 75#ME .E EE47#4) $5E: 1. A crime of ro11ery of t#eft #as 1een committed; 2. T#e accused4 $#o is not a principal or accomplice in t#e commission of t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft4 1uys4 recei&es4 possesses4 <eeps4 ac7uires4 conceals4 sells or disposes4 or 1uys and sells4 or in any manner deals in any article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue4 $#ic# #as 1een deri&ed from t#e proceeds of t#e said crime; 3. T#e accused <no$s or s#ould #a&e <no$n t#at t#e said article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue #as 1een deri&ed from t#e proceeds of t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft; and 4. T#ere is4 on t#e part of t#e accused4 intent to gain for #imself or for anot#er. %n t#e instant case4 t#ere is no dou1t t#at t#e first4 second4 and fourt# elements $ere duly esta1lis#ed. T#e more crucial issue to 1e resol&ed is $#et#er t#e prosecution pro&ed t#e e8istence of t#e t#ird element3 that the accused +no! or should ha(e +no!n that the items reco(ered from here !ere the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft. 88 8 Mno$ledge refers to a mental state of a$areness a1out a fact. Cince t#e court cannot penetrate t#e mind of an accused and state $it# certainty $#at is contained t#erein4 it must
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determine suc# <no$ledge $it# care from t#e o&ert acts of t#at person. And gi&en t$o e7ually plausi1le states of cognition or mental a$areness4 t#e court s#ould c#oose t#e one $#ic# sustains t#e constitutional presumption of innocence. Cince Cection 5 of -.@. ?o. 1 12 e8pressly pro&ides t#at QCmDere possession of any good, article, item, ob*ect, or anything of (alue !hich has been the sub*ect of robbery or thie(ery shall be prima facie e(idence of fencing4Q it follo$s t#at t#e petitioner is presumed to #a&e <no$ledge of t#e fact t#at t#e items found in #er possession $ere t#e proceeds of ro11ery or t#eft. T#e presumption is reasona1le for no ot#er natural or logical inference can arise from t#e esta1lis#ed fact of #er possession of t#e proceeds of t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft. T#is presumption does not offend t#e presumption of innocence ens#rined in t#e fundamental la$. 88 8 T#e petitioner $as una1le to re1ut t#e presumption under -.@. ?o. 1 12. C#e relied solely on t#e testimony of #er 1rot#er $#ic# $as insufficient to o&ercome t#e presumption4 and4 on t#e contrary4 e&en disclosed t#at t#e petitioner $as engaged in t#e purc#ase and sale of =e$elry and t#at s#e used to 1uy from a certain +redo. +redo $as not presented as a $itness and it $as not esta1lis#ed t#at #e $as a licensed dealer or supplier of =e$elry. Cection of -.@. ?o. 1 12 pro&ides t#at Qall stores4 esta1lis#ments or entities dealing in t#e 1uy and sell of any good4 article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue o1tained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier t#ereof4 s#all 1efore offering t#e same for sale to t#e pu1lic4 secure t#e necessary clearance or permit from t#e station commander of t#e %ntegrated ?ational -olice in t#e to$n or city $#ere suc# store4 esta1lis#ment or entity is located.Q Ender t#e Aules and Aegulations promulgated to carry out t#e pro&isions of Cection 4 an unlicensed dealerGsupplier refers to any person4 partners#ip4 firm4 corporation4 association or any ot#er entity or esta1lis#ment not licensed 1y t#e go&ernment to engage in t#e 1usiness of dealing in or supplying Qused second#and articles4Q $#ic# refers to any good4 article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue o1tained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier4 regardless of $#et#er t#e same #as actually or in fact 1een used.
Is the %r#me &" E"en%#n+E a %&nt#n*#n+ &""ense that %&*l$ all&- the "#l#n+ &" an #n"&rmat#&n there"&r #n the pla%e -here the r&,,er' &r the"t #s %&mm#tte$ an$ n&t ne%essar#l' -here the pr&pert' *nla-"*ll' taFen #s "&*n$ t& ha(e later ,een a%)*#re$M %n 2e&ple (. .*$+e $e G*>man 8 #n"ra8 it $as #eld t#at fencing is not a continuing offense. Durisdiction is $it# t#e court of t#e place $#ere t#e personal property su1=ect of t#e ro11ery or t#eft $as possessed4 1oug#t4 <ept4 or dealt $it#. T#e place $#ere t#e t#eft or ro11ery $as committed $as inconse7uential.
2EO2LE (s HON. DE GUBMAN G.R. N&. 66C35. O%t&,er 78 499C Ao11ery $as committed in Hue2on City in t#e #ouse of .1illos $#ere &arious pieces of precious =e$elry alleged to 1e $ort# millions of pesos $ere ta<en. An information $as instituted against t#e perpetrators in t#e ATC of Hue2on City. T#e =e$els $ere reco&ered in Antipolo4 Ai2al4 from Cps. Alcantara. >ut t#e information against t#e latter $as also filed in Hue2on City for &iolation of -@ 1 12. Accused Cps Alcantara mo&ed to 7uas# t#e information alleging t#at t#e ATC of Hue2on City #as no =urisdiction o&er t#e crime c#arged 1ecause t#e =e$els $ere reco&ered in Antipolo4 Ai2al ?.T Hue2on City. T#e Colicitor /eneral argued t#at an essential element of t#e crime of fencing is t#e commission of ro11ery4 in t#is case committed in Hue2on City. Be t#eori2es t#at fencing is a Qcontinuing offense.Q Bo$e&er4 t#e Cupreme Court ruled t#at fencing is ?.T a continuing offense.
Page 1 8
%n -eople &s. 5edesma4 $e said3 Q. . . a ,%&nt#n*&*s %r#me, is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not suscepti1le of di&ision. +or it to e8ist t#ere s#ould 1e (1) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (2) unity of penal pro&ision infringed upon or &iolated; (3) unity of criminal intent or purpose4 $#ic# means t#at t$o or more &iolations of t#e same penal pro&ision are united in one and t#e same intent leading to t#e perpetration of t#e same criminal purpose or aim. 75#M#4$% %$:M 5.--E5IM &#S1#4)6#SHE& E5.M EE47#4) Ao11ery is t#e ta<ing of personal property 1elonging to anot#er4 $it# intent to gain4 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of any person4 or using force upon anyt#ing. Q+encing4Q upon t#e ot#er #and4 is t#e act of any person $#o4 $it# intent to gain for #imself or for anot#er4 s#all 1uy4 recei&e4 possess4 <eep4 ac7uire4 conceal4 sell or dispose of4 or s#all 1uy and sell4 or in any ot#er manner deal in any article4 item4 o1=ect or anyt#ing of &alue $#ic# #e <no$s4 or s#all 1e <no$n to #im4 to #a&e 1een deri&ed from t#e proceeds of t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft. T#e crimes of ro11ery and fencing are clearly t#en t$o distinct offenses. T#e la$ on fencing does not re7uire t#e accused to #a&e participated in t#e criminal design to commit4 or to #a&e 1een in any $ise in&ol&ed in t#e commission of4 t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft. ?eit#er is t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft made to depend on an act of fencing in order t#at it can 1e consummated. True4 t#e o1=ect property in fencing must #a&e 1een pre&iously ta<en 1y means of eit#er ro11ery of t#eft 1ut t#e place $#ere t#e ro11ery or t#eft occurs is inconse7uential.
The pr&se%*t#&n m*st pr&(e the +*#lt &" the a%%*se$ ,' esta,l#sh#n+ the e=#sten%e &" all the elements &" the %r#me %har+e$. Other-#se8 a%)*#ttal #s pr&per.
RAMON TAN (s 2p G.R. N&. 4C<095. A*+*st 038 4999 Complainant Aosita 5im testified t#at s#e lost certain items and Manuelito Mende2 confessed t#at #e stole t#ose items and sold t#em to t#e accused. Bo$e&er4 Aosita 5im ne&er reported t#e t#eft or e&en loss to t#e police. C#e admitted t#at after Manuelito Mende24 #er former employee4 confessed to t#e unla$ful ta<ing of t#e items4 s#e forga&e #im4 and did not prosecute #im. T#eft is a pu1lic crime. %t can 1e prosecuted de oficio4 or e&en $it#out a pri&ate complainant4 1ut it cannot 1e $it#out a &ictim. As complainant Aosita 5im reported no loss4 $e cannot #old for certain t#at t#ere $as committed a crime of t#eft. T#us4 t#e "#rst element of t#e crime of fencing is a,sent4 t#at is4 a crime of ro11ery or t#eft #as 1een committed. 88 8 T#ere must 1e corro1oration 1y e&idence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. 7orpus delicti means t#e Q1ody or su1stance of t#e crime4 and4 in its primary sense4 refers to t#e fact t#at t#e crime #as 1een actually committed.Q %n t#is case4 t#e t#eft $as not pro&ed 1ecause complainant Aosita 5im did not complain to t#e pu1lic aut#orities of t#e felonious ta<ing of #er property. C#e soug#t out #er former employee Manuelito Mende24 $#o confessed t#at #e stole certain articles from t#e $are#ouse of t#e complainant and sold t#em to petitioner. Cuc# confession is insufficient to con&ict4 $it#out e&idence of corpus delicti. 6#at is more4 t#ere $as no s#o$ing at all t#at t#e accused <ne$ or s#ould #a&e <no$n t#at t#e &ery stolen articles $ere t#e ones sold to #im. 6it#out petitioner <no$ing t#at #e ac7uired stolen articles4 #e can not 1e guilty of QfencingQ. Conse7uently4 t#e prosecution #as failed to esta1lis# t#e essential elements of fencing4 and t#us petitioner is entitled to an ac7uittal.
Page 1 9
6#en t#ere is notice to person 1uying4 t#ere may 1e fencing suc# as $#en t#e price is $ay 1elo$ ordinary prices; t#is may ser&e as notice. Be may 1e lia1le for fencing e&en if #e paid t#e price 1ecause of t#e presumption. 9Jou oug#t to <no$: t#at t#e articles sold to you are stolen. Jou s#ould 1e $ary. !8ample3 T( set is sold to you and you <no$ for a fact t#at it costs 5*4*** 1ut a man sold it to you for 145**. T#erefore4 you oug#t to <no$. T#e la$ of fencing does not re7uire t#e accused to #a&e participated in t#e criminal design to commit or to #a&e 1een ot#er$ise in&ol&ed in t#e crime of ro11ery or t#eft.
Chapter Three THEFT

1HEE1 0 committed 1y any person $#o4 $it# intent to gain 1ut $it#out &iolence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon t#ings4 s#all ta<e personal property of anot#er $it#out t#e latter;s consent. *R'+CLE 108 9<$ *RE L+*4LE F$R '<EF' A. 6#o are lia1leF 1. t#ose $#o3 (a) $it# intent to gain4 SpresumedT (1) 1ut $it#out &iolence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon t#ings4 (c) ta<e (d) personal property (e) of anot#er (f) $it#out t#e latter;s consent 2. t#ose $#o3 (a) #a&ing found lost property (1) fail to deli&er t#e same to t#e local aut#orities or to its o$ner
+inder of lost property ?.T limited to ACTEA5 finder >ET finder %? 5A6. T#us4 A found a purse 1elonging to C. A ga&e it to >4 a policeman. %nstead of gi&ing it to C4 > appropriated it. B!5@3 > is lia1le for t#eft
3. t#ose $#o3 (a) after #a&ing maliciously damaged t#e property of anot#er4
(1)
remo&e or ma<e use of t#e fruits or o1=ect of t#e damage caused 1y t#em.
!8ample3 I and J #ad a 7uarrel. I <illed t#e pet of J4 $#ic# is a pig; #e su1se7uently too< it and coo<ed it. T#e crime is t#eft. >ut if I =ust <illed piggy 1ut did not coo< it4 t#e crime is malicious misc#ief L damaging t#e property of anot#er for t#e sa<e of damaging it as a result of #atred or re&enge. (al$ays ta<e note or consider t#e intent of t#e offender. %f to gain from it all4 it is t#eft. %f not4 li<e if #e =ust $ant to destroy t#e piggy4 t#en it is malicious misc#ief)
4. t#ose $#o3 (a) enter an enclosed estate or a field $#ere (1) trespass is for1idden or $#ic# 1elongs to anot#er and 4 $it#out consent of its o$ner (c) #unt or fis# upon t#e same or gat#er fruits4 cereals or ot#er forest or farm products.
Page 120
Ta<e note t#at any person $#o s#all enter an enclosed estate $#ere trespass is for1idden in order to #unt or to fis# t#e crime is t#eft and not t#e crime of .t#er +orm .f Trespass under article 2'1 of A-C. T#e trespass #ere in t#eft is a means to commit t#e crime of t#eft4 so t#at trespass is a1sor1ed in t#e crime of t#eft. T#e distinction is again %?T!?T T. /A%?.
H3 #o$ $ill you distinguis# simple theft by ta+ing fish A?@ 'ualified theft by ta+ing fishF A3 in simple t#eft4 t#ere is no fis#pond4 t#e estate #as only a Osapa;4 1ut if you ta<e it from a fis#pond or fis#ery4 it 1ecomes 7ualified t#eft. Aeason3 $e #a&e to protect our fis#pond industry. ?.>. %n t#eft K property is ta<en; *R'+CLE 109 PE-*L'+E! >asis of penalties of t#eft3 %n estafa K t#e property is deli&ered
7.
t#e (al*e &" the th#n+ st&len4 and in some cases
2. t#e &alue and also t#e nature of t#e property ta<en4 or 3. T#e circumstances and causes t#at impelled t#e culprit to commit t#e crime. H3 suppose t#ere is a c#ec< &alued at 1*4*** and stolen. Bo$ $ill you determine t#e penalty if property stolen is a c#ec<F A3 it is t#e face &alue of t#e c#ec<. H3 suppose t#e c#ec< is &alueless4 1ecause it may 1e a stale c#ec<. 6#at is t#e penaltyF A3 t#e penalty is &alue of t#e property less t#an 5.** (in 2EO2LE (s. REYES4 CC said t#at if t#ere is no a&aila1le e&idence to pro&e it or t#at t#e prosecution fails to pro&e it4 t#e court s#ould impose t#e minimum penalty corresponding to t#eft in&ol&ing t#e &alue of 5.**)
2EO2LE (s. SERANILLA8 SANCHEB an$ DE .OYA G.R. N&. L@7<191. Ma' 98 4955 Accused @e Doya and Canc#e2 allege t#at t#ere $as no crime committed considering t#e finding t#at t#e c#ec<s $ere of no commercial &alue. CC #eld3 %t is of no moment t#at t#ere $as real or actual gain. T#e important consideration is t#at t#ere $as an #ntent to gain. %t is one of t#e essential elements of t#eft. (-eople &. Mercado4 5 -#il. 5).
?>3 %n t#eft4 it does not matter from $#om t#e property is ta<en; it may 1e from t#e o$ner4 careta<er4 and 1aileeY T#eft may e&en 1e committed 1y ta<ing property of anot#er t#ie&e. *R'+CLE 1 0 >;*L+F+ED '<EF' T#eft is 7ualified3
Page 12
7. 0.
if t#e t#eft is committed 1y a domestic ser(ant (al$ays 7ualified) if t#e t#eft is committed $it# +ra(e a1use of confidence (o$ner;s trust
T#eft 1y a #ousemate not al$ays 7ualified 1ecause t#e fact of t#em li&ing toget#er under t#e same roof produces some confidence4 it is not necessarily gra&e.
&iolated)
3. %f t#e property stolen is a
a. .
Motor &e#icle (in anti0carnapping la$4 t#ere is a definition of $#at
is a motor &e#icle. %n A-C no definition) 1. mail matter large cattle (in anti0cattle rustling la$4 large cattle is defined 1ut in
A-C no definition) 4. if t#e property stolen consists of coconuts ta<en from t#e premises of t#e plantation (if t#e coconuts $ere stolen from your 1ac<yard4 not 7ualified t#eft 1ecause a 1ac<yard is not a plantation) 5. if t#e property stolen is fis# ta<en from t#e fis#pond or fis#ery . if property is ta<en on t#e occasion of fire4 eart#7ua<e4 typ#oon4 &olcanic eruption4 or any ot#er calamity4 &e#icular accident or ci&il distur1ance (if t#is #appens4 t#ere $ill 1e no aggra&ating circumstance anymore 1ecause t#e crime is already 7ualified)
?.ris)r.(ential tren( in '<EF' (2006)

!rticle 3>H pro#ides for a general definition of theft, and three alternati#e and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. "n the face of the definition, there is only one operati#e act of e,ecution by the actor in#ol#ed in theft 8 the ta1in# of personal property of another. 't is also clear from the pro#ision that in order that such ta)ing may be -ualified as theft, there must further be present the descripti#e circumstances that the ta)ing was with intent to gain= without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons< and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.
o o
'ndeed, we ha#e long recogni+ed the following elements of theft as pro#ided for in !rticle 3>H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, namely: (") that there be ta'ing of personal property< (2) that said property belongs to another< (#) that the ta'ing be done with intent to gain< ($) that the ta'ing be done without the consent of the owner< and (0) that the ta'ing be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things% 'n Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or $unlawful ta)ing,$ to characteri+e theft. Austice 3egalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a contro#ersial interpretation and application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical ta)ing was constituti#e of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with $the intent to appropriate the ob.ect in order to constitute apoderamiento= and to appropriate means to depri#e the lawful owner of the thing.$ owe#er, a conflicting line of cases decided by the *ourt of !ppeals ruled, alternati#ely, that there must be permanency in the ta)ing or an intent to permanently depri#e the owner of the stolen property= or that there was no need for permanency in the ta)ing or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. Dltimately, as Austice 3egalado notes, the *ourt adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful ta1in#.
Page 122
o o
So long as the $descripti#e$ circumstances that -ualify the ta)ing are present, including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the ta1in# of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the trans#ression went beyond the attempted sta#e. !s applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such sei+ure moti#ated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict #iolence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales *lub, petitioner forfeited the e,tenuating benefit a con#iction for only attempted theft would ha#e afforded him. "n the critical -uestion of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to
apply !rticle @ of the 3e#ised (enal *ode to ascertain the answer. 6ollowing that pro#ision, the theft would ha#e been frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a conse-uence, Edo not produce Fsuch theftG by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator%E There are clearly two determinati#e factors to consider: that the felony is not Eproduced,E and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the e#idence at hand in each particular case. The first, howe#er, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the indi#idual felonies in the 3e#ised (enal *ode as to when a particular felony is $not produced,$ despite the commission of all the acts of e,ecution. $%& D+C$R'N&@ (Theft cannot have a frustrated stage % Theft can only be attempted or
consummated)
o o o o
Synthesis of the DiNo and 6lores rulings is in order. $he determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor 2to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary32 Such circumstance was not present in either DiNo or 6lores, as the stolen items in both cases were retrie#ed from the actor before they could be physically e,tracted from the guarded compounds from which the items were filched. owe#er, as implied in 6lores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could ha#e been $free disposition,$ as in the case where the chattel in#ol#ed was of $much less bul) and more common . . ., 9such: as money . . . .$ &ith that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the DiNoM6lores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constituti#e element of the crime of theft. 't finds no support or e,tension in !rticle 3>H, whether as a descripti#e or operati#e element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To restate what this *ourt has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as pro#ided for in !rticle 3>H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode are: (") that there be ta'ing of personal property< (2) that said property belongs to another< (#) that the ta'ing be done with intent to gain< ($) that the ta'ing be done without the consent of the owner< and (0) that the ta'ing be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things% Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the ta1in#, with intent to #ain, of personal property of another without the latter's consent . &hile the DiNoM6lores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspecti#e of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the depri#ation of property on the part of the #ictim. =or the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the ,uestion is again, when is the crime of theft producedH There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is depri#ation of personal property due to its ta)ing by one with intent to gain. .iewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once havin# committed all the acts of eAecution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
Page 121
ensued from such acts of eAecution. This conclusion is reflected in *hief Austice !-uino0s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "!i"n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same# although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated."
't might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen del#es into the concept of $ta)ing$ itself, in that there could be no true ta)ing until the actor obtains such degree of control o#er the stolen item. 1ut e#en if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of e,ecution ha#e not been completed, the $ta)ing not ha#ing been accomplished.$ (erhaps this point could ser#e as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration pro#es ultimately immaterial to that -uestion. Moreo#er, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. +e are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the ta'ing by the petitioner was completed in this case% +ith intent to gain, he ac,uired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the par'ing lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab%
o o o o
o
'ndeed, we ha#e, after all, held that unlawful ta)ing, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, e#en if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. ?2 !nd long ago, we asserted in (eople #. !#ila: . . % F&Ghe most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the ta'ing of the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which idea is ,ualified by other conditions, such as that the ta'ing must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner< and it will be here noted that the definition does not re,uire that the ta'ing should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction of no slight importance% 'nsofar as we consider the present -uestion, 2unlawful ta1in#$ is most material in this respect. Dnlawful ta)ing, which is the depri#ation of one0s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. !t the same time, without unlawful ta)ing as an act of e,ecution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. &ith these considerations, we can only conclude that under !rticle 3>H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, theft cannot have a frustrated sta#e. $heft can only be attempted or consummated. 5either DiNo nor 6lores can con#ince us otherwise. 1oth fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession o#er the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been depri#ation of property. &he presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the ta'ing. Moreo#er, as is e#ident in this case, the adoption of the rule 8 that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft 8 would introduce a con#enient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated intent, ?E since the *ourt would ha#e car#ed a #iable means for offenders to see) a mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. 't is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. &ould this depend on the psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in DiNoK "r, more li)ely, the appreciation of se#eral classes of factual circumstances such as the si+e and weight of the property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of people whom the offender is e,pected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen property, the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored= and -uite fran)ly, a whole lot more. 4#en the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, rele#ant as that would be on whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, e#en after the ta)ing has been consummated. !ll these complications will ma)e us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed depri#ed of property by one who intended to produce such depri#ation for reasons of gain.
Page 12,
6or such will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recogni+ed, for therein, all of the acts of e,ecution, including the ta)ing, ha#e been completed. 'f the facts establish the non%completion of the ta)ing due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of e,ecution ha#e been performed. 1ut once all these acts ha#e been e,ecuted, the ta)ing has been completed, causing the unlawful depri#ation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
o o
Maybe the DiNoM6lores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Jet they do not align with the legislated framewor) of the crime of theft. The 3e#ised (enal *ode pro#isions on theft ha#e not been designed in such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. A#ain, there is no lan#ua#e in Article 3BC that eApressly or impliedly allows that the 2free disposition of the items stolen2 is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced . DiNo itself did not rely on (hilippine laws or .urisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later 6lores was ultimately content in relying on DiNo alone for legal support. These cases do not en.oy the weight of stare decisis, and e#en if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft lea#e them susceptible to re#ersal. &e thus conclude that under the 3e#ised (enal *ode, there is no crime of frustrated theft3 !s petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the DiNo and 6lores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our .urisdiction. That it has ta)en all these years for us to recogni+e that there can be no frustrated theft under the 3e#ised (enal *ode does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. 't will ta)e considerable amendments to our 3e#ised (enal *ode in order that frustrated theft may be recogni+ed. "ur deference to Giada yields to the higher re#erence for legislati#e intent ;$%&'()*'&% $+. ,'-,&'# .*(' 1# //0.
!lthough there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. !s early as *.+. v. de $era, the *ourt has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. *hief Austice 3amon *. !-uino, in his commentary on the 3e#ised (enal *ode, succinctly opined:
o o o o
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is ta)en while in estafa the accused recei#es the property and con#erts it to his own use or benefit. owe#er, there may be theft e#en if the accused has possession of the property. 'f he was entrusted only with the material or physical ;natural< or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the .uridical possession of the thing, his con#ersion of the same constitutes embe++lement or estafa. 'n de Gera, the accused, 5ie#es de Gera, recei#ed from (epe, an 'gorot, a bar of gold weighing EE?.B grams for the purpose of ha#ing a sil#ersmith e,amine the same, and ban) notes amounting to (2>>.>> to ha#e them e,changed for sil#er coins. !ccused appropriated the bar of gold and ban) notes. The *ourt ruled that the crime committed was theft and not estafa since the deli#ery of the personal property did not ha#e the effect of transferring the .uridical possession, thus such possession remained in the owner= and the act of disposal with gainful intent and lac) of owner0s consent constituted the crime of theft. 'n ,eople v. Trinidad, defendant recei#ed a finger ring from the offended party for the purpose of pledging it as security for a loan of (E.>> for the benefit of said offended party. 'nstead of pledging the ring, the defendant immediately carried it to one of her neighbors to whom she sold it for (3>.>> and appropriated the money to her own use. The *ourt, citing de Gera, similarly con#icted defendant of theft. 'n ,eople v. &ocson, this *ourt considered deposits recei#ed by a teller in behalf of a ban) as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with e-ual force to money recei#ed by a ban) teller at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of ser#icing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Auridical possession remains with the ban). 'n line with the reasoning of
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the *ourt in the abo#e%cited cases, beginning with (eople #. de Gera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. 6urther, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the ban) places money in the teller0s possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of 8ualified theft would be committed.
'n ,eople v. 1saac, this *ourt con#icted a .eepney dri#er of theft and not estafa when he did not return the .eepney to its owner since the motor #ehicle was in the .uridical possession of its owner, although physically held by the dri#er. The *ourt reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the .eepney because the (ublic Ser#ice 2aw and its regulations prohibit a motor #ehicle operator from entering into any )ind of contract with any person if by the terms thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his e-uipment under a fi,ed rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the $boundary system,$ legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the owner. Thus, the accused0s possession of the #ehicle was only an e,tension of the owner0s.
!3T. 31>. 6ualified theft. P The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties ne,t higher by two degrees than those respecti#ely specified in the ne,t preceding article, if committed . . . with gra#e abuse of confidence . . . . o The elements of theft as well as the circumstances that made the same as -ualified theft were sufficiently established by the prosecution. o 't appears that petitioner was personally and fa#orably recommended by Melanie to pri#ate complainant. Since Melanie is a trusted and long%time employeeMassistant of the pri#ate complainant, the latter accepted petitioner to wor) at the T1"S. During the initial period of her wor) as a saleslady in the T1"S, petitioner had performed her .ob well. 'mpressed, the pri#ate complainant reposed her full trust and confidence on the petitioner by promoting the latter to the sensiti#e position of a cashier. !s such, petitioner had an easy access to the lists of sales report and the proceedsMcash of the daily sales. Cnowing that she already en.oyed the full trust and confidence of pri#ate complainant and of her co% employees, petitioner had $systematically and repeatedly$ E1 understated the amounts in the lists which contains the daily sales of the T1"S, and poc)eted the money or the proceeds thereof for her personal benefit. o The lists as attached to the records clearly show that the petitioner understated the amountMfigures thereof by (1>> to (B>> for 13 times on separate dates ;Aanuary 1??7 up to 6ebruary 1??7<. E2 4#idently, such consistent understatements of small amounts were, as aptly stated by the trial court, meant to forestall detection or obser#ation. E3 &hen pri#ate complainant, howe#er, noticed the discrepancies on the lists, she confronted the petitioner. The petitioner told the pri#ate complainant that she would pay the missing amount or the corresponding shortages in the lists. 5onetheless, petitioner failed to reimburse or return the missing amount to the pri#ate complainant.
2D 4CC 2RESCRI!ING A HEAAY 2ENALTY FOR THE THEFT OF ANY MATERIAL8S2ARE 2ART8 2RODUCT OR ARTICLE !Y EM2LOYEES AND LA!ORERS
Any employee or la1orer $#o s#all steal any materials4 product or article t#at #e is $or<ing on4 using4 or producing s#all upon con&iction 1e punis#ed. !8ample3 furniture ma<er $#o s#all steal #is materials is lia1le. -urpose3 to protect o$ners from t#ie&ery of t#eir employers. ?>3 Can also 1e 7ualified t#eft 1ecause t#ere is gra&e a1use of confidence.
2D 7CC Militis Lex Fraternity 09 (by EDLER)

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ANTI@CATTLE RUSTLING LAW

Cattle Austling and Hualified T#eft of 5arge Cattle 0 T#e crime of cattle0rustling is defined and punis#ed under 2res#$ent#al De%ree N&. 7CC4 t#e Anti0Cattle Austling la$ of 1)"44 as t#e ta<ing 1y any means4 met#od or sc#eme4 of any lar+e %attle4 !ith or !ithout intent to gain and $#et#er committed $it# or $it#out &iolence against or intimidation of person or force upon t#ings4 so long as t#e ta<ing is $it#out t#e consent of t#e o$nerG1reed t#ereof. T#e crime includes t#e <illing or ta<ing t#e meat or #ide of large cattle $it#out t#e consent of t#e o$ner. Cince t#e intent to gain is not essential4 t#e <illing or destruction of large cattle4 e&en $it#out ta<ing any part t#ereof4 is ?.T a crime of malicious misc#ief >ET cattle0rustling. T#e -residential @ecree4 #o$e&er4 does not supersede t#e crime of 7ualified t#eft of large cattle under Article 31* of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 1ut merely modified t#e penalties pro&ided for t#eft of large cattle and4 to t#at e8tent4 amended Articles 3*) and 31*. ?ote t#at t#e o&ert act t#at gi&es rise to t#e crime of cattle0rustling is t#e ta<ing or <illing of large cattle. 6#ere t#e large cattle $as not ta<en4 1ut recei&ed 1y t#e offender from t#e o$nerGo&erseer t#ereof4 t#e crime is not cattle0rustling; it is 7ualified t#eft of large cattle. 6#ere t#e large cattle $as recei&ed 1y t#e offender $#o t#ereafter misappropriated it4 t#e crime is 7ualified t#eft under Article 31* if only p#ysical or material possession t#ereof $as yielded to #im. %f 1ot# material and =uridical possession t#ereof $as yielded to #im $#o misappropriated t#e large cattle4 t#e crime $ould 1e estafa under Article 315 (11). -residential @ecree ?o. 533 is not a special la$ in t#e conte8t of Article 1* of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. %t merely modified t#e penalties pro&ided for t#eft of large cattle under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code and amended Article 3*) and 31*. T#is is e8plicit from Cection 1* of t#e -residential @ecree. Conse7uently4 t#e trial court s#ould not #a&e con&icted t#e accused of frustrated murder separately from cattle0rustling4 since t#e former s#ould #a&e 1een a1sor1ed 1y cattle0rustling as <illing $as a result of or on t#e occasion of cattle0rustling. %t s#ould only 1e an aggra&ating circumstance. >ut 1ecause t#e information did not allege t#e in=ury4 t#e same can no longer 1e appreciated; t#e crime s#ould4 t#erefore 1e only4 simple cattle0rustling. :2e&ple (. Mart#na$a8 Fe,r*ar' 4C8 4994; -resumption of cattle rustling (Cec. ") !&ery person #a&ing in #is possession4 control or custody of large cattle s#all4 upon demand 1y competent aut#orities4 e8#i1it t#e documents prescri1ed in t#e preceding sections. +ailure to e8#i1it t#e re7uired documents s#all 1e prima facie e&idence t#at t#e large cattle in #is possession4 control4 or custody are t#e fruits of t#e crime of cattle rustling -enalties (Cec. ') %rrespecti&e of t#e &alue of t#e large cattle in&ol&ed3 1. 6it#out &iolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon t#ings 0 prision mayor in its ma8imum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period 2. 6it# &iolence against or intimidation of person or force upon t#ings 0 t#e penalty of reclusion temporal in its ma8imum period to reclusion perpetua s#all 1e imposed. 3. %f a person is seriously in=ured or <illed as a result or on t#e occasion of t#e commission of cattle rustling 0 reclusion perpetua to deat# %f t#e property ta<en is a large cattle t#e crime falls under -@ 533. %f t#e property ta<en is not a large cattle (1ut small cattle) t#en it is simple t#eft.
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5arge Cattle K does not include goats (2p (s. NABARENO8 #n"ra) and pigs.
2EO2LE (s. HON. RAMON NABARENO G.R. N&. L@<11C6. Apr#l C18 4963 The le+al #ss*e #n th#s %ase #s -hether the the"t &" t-& +&ats (al*e$ at &ne h*n$re$ "#"t' pes&s #s )*al#"#e$ the"t. -ri&ate respondents $ere c#arged $it# 7ualified t#eft in Ce1u for #a&ing allegedly stolen t$o female goats &alued at -15*4 penali2ed under t#e A-C. T#e Cupreme Court ruled t#at goats cannot 1e categori2ed as large and t#erefore larceny of t$o goats &alued at -15*.** constitute only simple t#eft punis#a1le under Article 3*)(4) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 6e #old t#at t#e C+% and t#e Col. /en. are in error 1ecause t#e t#eft of t$o goats is not 7ualified t#eft. %t is simple t#eft. /oats do not 1elong to t#e category of Qlarge cattleQ as contemplated in article 31* of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. T#e term QcattleQ refers to domesticated 7uadrupeds suc# as s#eep4 #orses and s$ine4 or to 1o&ine animals suc# as co$s4 1ulls and steers. T#e term Qlarge cattleQ in article 31* refers to ganado mayor suc# as mules4 as distinguis#ed from ganado menor li<e s#eep. Cmall cattle are <no$n as ganado lanar y ca1rio. T#e terms lanar and ca1rio refer to s#eep and goats4 respecti&ely. Act ?o. 2*3*4 $#ic# amended articles 5*34 5*'4 512 and 52* of t#e old -enal Code regarding t#eft of large cattle4 pro&ides t#at for purposes of t#at la$ t#e term Qlarge cattleQ includes Qcara1aos4 #orses4 mules4 asses4 and all mem1ers of t#e 1o&ine familyQ (Art. 3 " of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code repealed Act ?o. 2*3*). According to t#e dictionary4 t#e $ord Q,&(#neQ refers to animals related to or resem1ling o8en or co$s. T#ey 1elong to t#e genus >os (>o&idae). 6#ile goats may 1e included in t#e term QcattleQ4 or 1elong to t#e 1o&ine family (genus Capra)4 t#ey cannot 1e included in t#e term Qlarge cattleQ. To include goats in t#e term Qlarge cattleQ $ould render meaningless t#e ad=ecti&e QlargeQ. T#e la$ e&idently #as made a distinction 1et$een large cattle and small cattle. As goats cannot 1e categori2ed as large cattle4 t#e larceny of t$o goats &alued at -15* is simple t#eft punis#a1le under article 3*)(4) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code 1y imprisonment for t$o mont#s and one day of arresto mayor medium to t$o years and four mont#s of prision correccional minimum.
*R'+CLE 1 '<EF' $F '<E PR$PER'3 $F '<E -*'+$-*L L+4R*R3 *-D -*'+$-*L M;!E;M H3 Mr. I too< property from t#e national museum4 $#at is t#e crime committedF A3 t#e crime is t#eft of property of t#e national li1rary or national museum4 not t#eft only. Aeason3 t#is is no ordinary t#eft4 t#e penalty is #ig#er.
Chapter F&*r USUR2ATION

*R'+CLE 1 2 $CC;P*'+$- $F RE*L PR$PER'3 $R ;!;RP*'+$- $F RE*L R+7<'! +PR$PER'3 A. Acts punis#ed3 1. 1y ta<ing possession of any real property 1elonging to anot#er 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons
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2. 1y usurping any real rig#ts in property 1elonging to anot#er 1y means of &iolence against or intimidation of persons >. !lements3 a. t#at t#e offender ta<es possession of any real property or usurps any real rig#ts in property 1. t#at t#e real property or real rig#ts 1elong to anot#er c. t#at &iolence against or intimidation of persons is used 1y t#e offender in occupying real property or usurping real rig#ts in property d. t#at t#ere is intent to gain.
Alt#oug# not in t#e definition4 t#ere must 1e %?T!?T T. /A%?. %f t#ere is no intent to gain4 1ut t#ere is &iolence4 t#e crime is coercion. %f t#ere is no intent to gain4 and no &iolence or intimidation of persons4 t#ere is no criminal lia1ility4 1ut only ci&il action for reco&ery .+ A!A5 property or real rig#ts.
Ese t#e degree of intimidation to determine t#e degree of t#e penalty to 1e applied for t#e usurpation. Esurpation under Article 312 is committed in t#e same $ay as ro11ery $it# &iolence or intimidation of persons. T#e main difference is t#at in ro11ery4 personal property is in&ol&ed; $#ile in usurpation of real rig#ts4 it is real property. :2e&ple (. .*$+e Al"e%he8 .*l' 0C8 4990; H3 Cuppose in t#e ta<ing of real property4 serious or less serious p#ysical in=uries $ere inflicted on t#e offended party. May t#e offender 1e also c#arged $it# serious or less serious p#ysical in=uriesF A3 Jes4 1ecause under article 312 t#ere is a p#rase 9 in addition to t#e penalty incurred for t#e acts of &iolence e8ecuted 1y #imY: Esurpation cannot 1e comple8ed $it# in=uries inflicted 1y &iolence used on t#at occasion. T#e penalty of t#e former s#all 1e in addition of t#e penalties of t#e in=uries. Esurpation of real rig#ts and property s#ould not 1e comple8ed using Article 4' $#en &iolence or intimidation is committed. T#ere is only a single crime4 1ut a t$o0tiered penalty is prescri1ed to 1e determined on $#et#er t#e acts of &iolence used is a<in to t#at in ro11ery in Article 2)44 gra&e t#reats or gra&e coercion and an incremental penalty of fine 1ased on t#e &alue of t#e gain o1tained 1y t#e offender. T#erefore4 it is not correct to state t#at t#e t#reat employed in usurping real property is a1sor1ed in t#e crime; ot#er$ise4 t#e additional penalty $ould 1e meaningless. T#e complainant must 1e t#e person upon $#om &iolence $as employed. %f a tenant $as occupying t#e property and #e $as t#reatened 1y t#e offender4 1ut it $as t#e o$ner $#o $as not in possession of t#e property $#o $as named as t#e offended party4 t#e same may 1e 7uas#ed as it does not c#arge an offense. T#e o$ner $ould4 at most4 1e entitled to ci&il recourse only. On %arnapp#n+ an$ the"t &" m&t&r (eh#%le T#e ta<ing $it# intent to gain of a motor &e#icle 1elonging to anot#er4 $it#out t#e latter;s consent4 or 1y means of &iolence or intimidation of persons4 or 1y using force upon t#ings is penali2ed as carnapping under Rep*,l#% A%t N&. 37C9 :An A%t 2re(ent#n+ an$ 2enal#>#n+ Carnapp#n+;4 as amended. T#e o&ert act $#ic# is 1eing punis#ed under t#is la$ as carnapping is also t#e ta<ing of a motor &e#icle under circumstances of t#eft or ro11ery. %f t#e motor &e#icle $as not ta<en 1y t#e offender 1ut $as deli&ered 1y t#e o$ner or t#e possessor to t#e offender4 $#o t#ereafter misappropriated t#e same4 t#e crime is eit#er 7ualified
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t#eft under Article 31* of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code .A estafa under Article 315 (1) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Hualified t#eft of a motor &e#icle is t#e crime if only t#e material or p#ysical possession $as yielded to t#e offender; ot#er$ise4 if =uridical possession $as also yielded4 t#e crime is estafa. On s)*att#n+ According to t#e Ur,an De(el&pment an$ H&*s#n+ A%t4 t#e follo$ing are s7uatters3 1. T#ose $#o #a&e t#e capacity or means to pay rent or for legitimate #ousing 1ut are s7uatting any$ay; 2. Also t#e persons $#o $ere a$arded lots 1ut sold or lease t#em out; 3. %ntruders of lands reser&ed for sociali2ed #ousing4 pre0empting possession 1y occupying t#e same. *R'+CLE 1 1 *L'ER+-7 4$;-D*R+E! $R L*-DM*RE! A. !lements3 1. t#ere are 1oundary mar<s or monuments of to$ns4 pro&inces4 or estates4 or any ot#er mar<s intended to designate t#e 1oundaries of t#e same 2. t#at t#e offender alters said 1oundary mar<s ?>3 >oundaries and landmar<s #ere refer to pri&ate and pu1lic lands. Bere4 t#e element of intent to gain is a1sent. 5eading cases3 2EO2LE (s. ECHAAES 2D 660 has alrea$' ,een repeale$P ?o more s7uatting on pri&ate lands >ut t#ere is still s7uatting of pu1lic agricultural lands under AA )4" Rep*,l#% A%t N&. 9<6 C!CT%.? 1. %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person4 corporation or association to enter or occupy4 t#roug# force4 intimidation4 t#reat4 strategy or stealt#4 any pu1lic agricultural land including suc# pu1lic lands as are granted to pri&ate indi&iduals under t#e pro&isions of t#e -u1lic 5and Act or any ot#er la$s pro&iding for t#e disposal of pu1lic agricultural lands in t#e -#ilippines4 and are duly co&ered 1y t#e corresponding applications re7uired for t#e purpose not$it#standing t#e fact t#at title t#ereto still remains in t#e /o&ernment; or for any person4 natural or =uridical4 to instigate4 induce or force anot#er to commit suc# acts.
Chapter F#(e CUL2A!LE INSOLAENCY

*R'+CLE 1 , FR*;D;LE-' +-!$L:E-C3 A. !lements3
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1. t#at t#e offender is a de1tor; t#at ism #e #as an o1ligation due and paya1le 2. #e a1sconds $it# #is property (property #ere is not defined4 so it may 1e personal or real) 3. t#at t#ere 1e pre=udice to #is creditors
%llustration3 Jou are inde1ted and you are sued for collection and you a1scond and 1roug#t $it# you your properties4 you are lia1le under t#is article. >ut if you a1scond 1ut you still #a&e property $ort# 14***4***. %s t#ere fraudulent insol&encyF ?o 1ecause t#e creditor $ill not 1e pre=udiced. Jou are sued for collection of sum of money and you e8ecuted fraudulent sales of your property to anot#er. +raudulent insol&ency 1ecause it is a1sconding your property actually.
?>3 Actual pre=udice or damage must #a&e 1een caused 1y t#e a1sconder to #is creditors. T#is is re7uired T#e culpa1le insol&ency referred to in t#is article is a criminal act and is different from t#at in&ol&ed in t#e proceedings under t#e %nsol&ency 5a$ (Act ?o. 1)5 ) $#ic# refers to a1sconding after t#e institution of t#e aforesaid proceedings. T#e crime in t#is article may 1e committed e&en $it#out any insol&ency proceedings #a&ing 1een instituted.
Chapter S#= SWINDLING AND OTHER DECEITS

*R'+CLE 1 2 !9+-DL+-7 (E!'*F*) ESTAFA .*r#$#%al p&ssess#&n of t#e o1=ect is transferred to t#e accused $#o later con&erts t#e same to #is o$n use or purpose. T#ere is transfer or =uridical possession $#en t#e transfer of property is made 1y &irtue of an o1ligation created 1y contract or 1y la$ $#ic# grants to t#e transferee $it# a rig#t to possession $#ic# #e may e&en setGsee< out against. Elements #n +eneral 1. Accused defrauded anot#er 1y (1) a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e .A (2) 1y means of $e%e#t; and T#is co&ers t#e t#ree different $ays of committing estafa under Article 315; t#us4 estafa is committed 0 a. 6it# *n"a#th"*lness OR a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e; 1. >y means of "alse pretenses OR "ra*$*lents a%ts; or c. T#roug# "ra*$*lent means. THEFT 2h's#%al &r mater#al p&ssess#&n of t#e o1=ect is transferred and it is ta<en4 it is t#eft
Page 11
(T#e first form under su1di&ision 1 is <no$n as estafa $it# a1use of confidence; and t#e second and t#ird forms under su1di&isions 2 and 3 co&er co&er estafa 1y means of deceit.)
2. @amage or pre=udice capa1le of pecuniary estimation is caused to t#e offended party or t#ird person.
T#is is t#e 1asis of t#e penalty4 so t#erefore4 damage must 1e capa1le of pecuniary estimaion
.ne element of estafa is @AMA/!. .ne damage #ere may 1e temporary distur1ance of property rig#ts. 1emporary depri(ation is sufficient damage. %n estafa t#e profit or gain o1tained 1y t#e accused personally and #is mere negligence in permitting4 anot#er to 1enefit from t#e transaction is not estafa. 2p (s NE21MUCENO
!stafa or C$indling is committed 1y any person $#o s#all defraud anot#er 1y any of t#e means mentioned #ere 1elo$Y3
Elements &" esta"a -#th *n"a#th"*lness &" a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e *n$er Art#%le C47 :4; @eceit is not an essential element in t#is su1di&ision. (EC &s -ascual4 1* -#il 321) T#is is so 1ecause a1use of confidence: and 9deceit: are t$o different means in committing estafa. %n t#e crime of estafa $it# a1use of confidence4 t#e &ery t#ing recei&ed must 1e t#e same t#ing entrusted. %f t#e offender is gi&en a c#oice to return a su1stitute and #e appropriated t#e t#ing entrusted4 t#e crime of estafa $ill not arise 1ecause t#e relation of entrustor0entrustee no longer e8ists. T#ere must 1e an o1ligation to deli&er or return t#e same t#ing4 goods4 money4 or personal property t#at t#e accused recei&ed. T#e moment t#at t#ere is t#at aut#ority to gi&e a su1stitute or replacement t#e crime of estafa $ill not arise. T#e offender is entrusted 1y t#e offended party and t#e offender &iolated t#at trust. %n t#e first place4 t#e offended party must #a&e entrusted somet#ing to t#e offender. %f $#at is transfered is t#e mere p#ysical possession 1ut no =uridical possession4 t#e crime is t#eft. >ut if $#at is transfered is =uridical possession4 t#en t#e crime is s$indling. T#erefore4 fiduciary relations#ip (a relations#ip of trust and confidence) 1et$een t#e complainant and t#e accused is an essential element of t#is <ind of estafa. -#ysical possession is only material possession is transferred. %n =uridical possession4 not only material possession is transferred 1ut also possession of rig#ts in t#e concept of an o$ner. 6#en o$ners#ip is transferred4 t#ere is no more fiduciary relations#ip4 and failure of t#e person $#o #as recei&ed it $ill only gi&e rise to ci&il lia1ility and not estafa. Ender paragrap# (a) 1. .ffender BAC an onerous o1ligation to deli&er somet#ing of &alue4 e&ent#oug# suc# o1ligation 1e 1ased on an immoral or illegal consideration; 2. Be alters its su1stance4 7uantity4 or 7uality; 3. @amage or pre=udice is caused to anot#er.
T#us4 if donation is transferred 1y a +rat*#t&*s title and t#ere is alteration4 t#ere is no estafa. T#ere must 1e an agreement as to t#e 7uality of t#e t#ing to 1e deli&ered4 ot#er$ise4 no estafa
Ender paragrap# (1) 1. Money4 goods4 or ot#er personal property is recei&ed 1y t#e offender in trust4 .A on commission4 .A for administration4 .A under any ot#er o1ligation in&ol&ing t#e duty to ma<e deli&ery of4 or to return4 t#e same;
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2. T#ere is m#sappr&pr#at#&n .A %&n(ers#&n of suc# money or property 1y t#e offender4 .A $en#al on #is part of suc# receipt; 3. Cuc# misappropriation or con&ersion .A denial is to t#e pre=udice of anot#er; and 4. T#ere is a demand made 1y t#e offended party to t#e offender.
(T#e fourt# element is not necessary $#en t#ere is e&idence of misappropriation of t#e goods 1y t#e defendant. VT*,, (. 2e&ple8 et al.8 414 2h#l. 44<D ).
%n /#m (. 2e&ple8 49C SCRA C<<8 it $as #eld t#at if an employee recei&es cas# ad&ance from #is employer to defray #is tra&el e8penses4 #is failure to return unspent amount is not estafa t#roug# misappropriation or con&ersion 1ecause o$ners#ip of t#e money $as transferred to employee and no fiduciary relation $as created in respect to suc# ad&ance. T#e money is a loan. T#e employee #as no legal o1ligation to return t#e same money4 t#at is4 t#e same 1ills and coins recei&ed. %n Sa$$*l .r. (. CA8 490 SCRA 0668 it $as #eld t#at t#e act of using or disposing of anot#er;s property as if it $ere one;s o$n4 or of de&oting it to a purpose or use different from t#at agreed upon4 is a misappropriation and con&ersion to t#e pre=udice of t#e o$ner. Con&ersion is unaut#ori2ed assumption an e8ercise of t#e rig#t of o$ners#ip o&er goods and c#attels 1elonging to anot#er4 resulting in t#e alteration of t#eir condition or e8clusion of t#e o$ner;s rig#ts. %n All#e$ !anF C&rp&rat#&n (. Se%retar' Or$&ne>8 490 SCRA 0<38 #t -as hel$ that under Cection 13 of -residential @ecree ?o. 1154 t#e failure of an entrustee to turn o&er t#e proceeds of sale of t#e goods co&ered 1y t#e Trust Aeceipt4 or to return said goods if t#ey are not sold4 is punis#a1le as estafa Article 315 (1) (1). %llustration3
/oods are assigned to anot#er to 1e sold 1y t#e latter $it#in a period of * days. %f goods are sold4 proceeds are remitted and commission is recei&ed. %f t#e goods are unsold4 you return items. After t#e lapse of * days4 t#e proceeds are not remitted4 if sold4 or returned if unsold4 t#ere is estafa. (Cee TAECT A!C!%-TC 5A6 -@ 115)
Ender 2res#$ent#al De%ree N&. 4474 t#e failure of t#e entrustee to turn o&er t#e proceeds of t#e sale of t#e goods4 documents4 or instruments co&ered 1y a trust receipt4 to t#e e8tent of t#e amount o$ing to t#e entruster4 or as appearing in t#e trust receipt; or t#e failure to return said goods4 documents4 or instruments if t#ey $ere not sold or disposed of in accordance $it# t#e terms of t#e trust receipt constitute estafa. C!CT%.? 4 .+ -@ 115 defines a Qtrust receiptQ and a Qtrust receipt transactionQ for purposes of t#e decree in t#e follo$ing terms3 Cec. 4. 6#at constitutes a trust receipt transaction. R A tr*st re%e#pt transa%t#&n4 $it#in t#e meaning of t#is @ecree4 is any transaction 1y and 1et$een a person referred to in t#is @ecree as t#e entruster4 and anot#er person referred to in t#is @ecree as t#e entrustee4 $#ere1y t#e entruster4 $#o o$ns or #olds a1solute title or security interests o&er certain specified goods documents or instruments4 releases t#e same to t#e possession of t#e entrustee upon t#e latter,s e8ecution and deli&ery to t#e entruster of a signed document called a ,tr*st re%e#pt, $#erein t#e entrustee 1inds #imself to #old t#e designated goods4 documents or instruments in trust for t#e entruster and to sell or ot#er$ise dispose of t#e goods4 documents or instruments $it# t#e o1ligation to turn o&er to t#e entruster t#e proceeds t#ereof to t#e e8tent of t#e amount o$ing to t#e entruster or as appears in t#e trust receipt or t#e goods4 documents or instruments t#emsel&es if t#ey are unsold or not ot#er$ise disposed of 4 in accordance $it# t#e terms and conditions specified in t#e trust receipt4 . . .Q
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Ender paragrap# (c) 1. T#e paper $it# t#e signature of t#e offended party is in 1lan<; 2. .ffended party deli&ered it to t#e offender; 3. A1o&e t#e signature of t#e offended party4 a document is $ritten 1y t#e offender $it#out aut#ority to do so (taF#n+ *n$*e a$(anta+e); 4. T#e document so $ritten creates a lia1ility of4 or causes damage to4 t#e offended party .A any t#ird person. Elements &" esta"a ,' means &" "alse pretenses &r "ra*$*lent ACTS EXECUTED 2RIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD *n$er Art#%le C47 :0; Acts punis#ed under paragrap# (a) 1. Esing fictitious name; 2. +alsely pretending to possess po$er4 influence4 7ualifications4 property4 credit4 agency4 1usiness or imaginary transactions; or 3. >y means of ot#er similar deceits. Ender paragrap# (1) Altering t#e 7uality4 fineness4 or $eig#t of anyt#ing pertaining to #is art or 1usiness. Ender paragrap# (c) -retending to #a&e 1ri1ed any go&ernment employee4 $it#out pre=udice to t#e action for calumny $#ic# t#e offended party may deem proper to 1ring against t#e offender. Ender paragrap# (d) 1. .ffender postdated a c#ec<4 or issued a c#ec< in payment of an o1ligation; 2. Cuc# postdating or issuing a c#ec< $as done $#en t#e offender #ad no funds in t#e 1an<4 or #is funds deposited t#erein $ere not sufficient to co&er t#e amount of t#e c#ec<. ?ote t#at t#is only applies if 0 (1) T#e o1ligation is n&t pre@e=#st#n+; (2) T#e c#ec< is $ra-n t& enter #nt& an &,l#+at#&n;
(Aemem1er t#at it is t#e c#ec< t#at is supposed to 1e t#e sole consideration for t#e ot#er party to #a&e entered into t#e o1ligation. +or e8ample4 Aose $ants to purc#ase a 1racelet and dra$s a c#ec< $it#out insufficient funds. T#e =e$eler sells #er t#e 1racelet solely 1ecause of t#e consideration in t#e c#ec<.)
(3) %t does n&t %&(er c#ec<s $#ere t#e purpose of dra$ing t#e c#ec< is t& +*arantee a l&an as t#is is not an o1ligation contemplated in t#is paragrap# T#e c#ec< must 1e genuine. %f t#e c#ec< is falsified and is cas#ed $it# t#e 1an< or e8c#anged for cas#4 t#e crime is estafa t#ru falsification of a commercial document. T#e general rule is t#at t#e accused must 1e a1le to o1tain somet#ing from t#e offended party 1y means of t#e c#ec< #e issued and deli&ered. !8ception3 $#en t#e c#ec< is issued not in payment of an o1ligation. %t must not 1e promissory notes4 or guaranties.
Page 11,
/ood fait# is a defense. %f t#e c#ec<s $ere issued 1y t#e defendant and #e recei&ed money for t#em4 t#en stopped payment and did not return t#e money4 and #e #ad an intention to stop payment $#en #e issued t#e c#ec<4 t#ere is estafa. @eceit is presumed if t#e dra$er fails to deposit t#e amount necessary to co&er t#e c#ec< $it#in t#ree days from receipt of notice of dis#onor or insufficiency of funds in t#e 1an<.
;)(ates in E!'*F* (2002=2008)

The elements of estafa under !rt. 31E, par. 1 ;b< of the 3(* 1> are as follows: ;1< that money, goods or other personal property is recei#ed by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation in#ol#ing the duty to ma)e deli#ery of or to return the same= ;2< that there be misappropriation or con#ersion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt= and ;3< that such misappropriation or con#ersion or denial is to the pre.udice of another. o !lthough the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to pri#ate complainant Dy, it cannot be denied that there e,ists a factual basis for holding that petitioner0s refusal to account for or return the pieces of .ewelry had pre.udiced the rights and interests of Dy. *ertainly, disturbance of property rights is e-ui#alent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute in.ury within the meaning of !rt. 31E, par. 1 ;b< of the 3(*. 12 'n this case, Dy, who is a businessman, not only failed to reco#er his in#estment but also lost the opportunity to reali+e profits therefrom. !n,iety also set in as he ran the ris) of being sued by the person who li)ewise entrusted him the same pieces of .ewelry. To assert his legal recourse, Dy further incurred e,penses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under this pro#ision are as follows: 1. That money, goods, or other personal property be recei#ed by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation in#ol#ing the duty to ma)e deli#ery of, or to return, the same= 2. That there be misappropriation or con#ersion of such money or property by the offender= or denial on his part of such receipt= 3. That such misappropriation or con#ersion or denial is to the pre.udice of another= and 7. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. o (etitioner had the obligation to return the amount of (1E>,>>> which he failed to pay to the 1"* as agreed upon. The obligation or duty to ma)e deli#ery or to return personal property is broad enough to include a ci#il obligation arising by agreement of pri#ate complainant and petitioner. &hile not denying receipt of the chec) of the said amount, petitioner unreasonably maintains that no written agreement e,pressly en.oined him to remit the money to the 1"* or to return it to pri#ate complainant if no payment was made. is reasoning is distorted, to say the least.
o
o
The distinction between the con#ersion of a chec) and the con#ersion of cash in relation to the formal allegation in the information of con#ersion of a specific sum of money is not material in estafa. 1@ $9T:he deli#ery by the 9pri#ate complainant: of the chec) and its acceptance by 9petitioner: signified not merely the transfer to 9petitioner: of the money belonging to 9pri#ate complainant, it: also mar)ed the creation of a fiduciary relation between the parties.$ 1B More important, howe#er, is the fact that the law pro#ides only the degree of proof necessary to engender moral certainty and does not re-uire any specific form 8 whether oral or documentary 8 to produce con#iction beyond reasonable doubt. 1H The essential facts establishing the elements of the crime may be pro#en by pure testimony. The records clearly establish that the arrangement either for the remittance to the 1"* or the return of the money to pri#ate complainant in fact e,isted. (etitioner e#en wants us to belie#e that the money was an $additional cost$ of the car without any proof sa#e his self%ser#ing statement to this effect. Jet, contrary to this stance, he also posits that he was not able to raise his share of the ta, burden, hence, he could not remit the full amount to the 1"* to settle the ta, deficiency. 2i)ewise, contradictory to his initial stance, petitioner e#en offered, albeit belatedly, to return the (1E>,>>>. 6or sure, the money was deli#ered to petitioner for a particular purpose, the non%fulfillment of which mandated its return.
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o o o o
stated:
The words 2convert$ and $misappropriate$ connote an act of using or disposing of another0s property as if it were one0s own or de#oting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. 2> To misappropriate for one0s own use includes not only con#ersion to one0s personal ad#antage but also e#ery attempt to dispose of the property of another without any right. "n the element of con#ersion or misappropriation, the court a -uo, as upheld by the *!,
'n the instant case, 9petitioner: admittedly con#erted or di#erted the chec) he recei#ed by encashing it from the drawee ban), and yet, did not pay the deficiency custom duties and ta,es as agreed upon. . . . 22 !s to what circumstances .ustify a party so recei#ing money to withhold the application of the same to the agreed purpose, there is no fi,ed rule. 23 4ach case should be decided based on its own particular facts. 3eference must be made primarily to the good or bad faith e,hibited by the accused in withholding the money from the use for which it was intended to be applied. 27 'n this case, petitioner ne#er ga#e a good reason for not remitting the money to the 1"* or for not returning it to pri#ate complainant. (etitioner only made self%ser#ing statements to .ustify withholding the (1E>,>>>. The ruling in the ci#il case declaring that the importer, neither petitioner nor pri#ate complainant, was re-uired by law to pay the deficiency ta,es did not #indicate petitioner. The ruling of the court did not .ustify his withholding the amount which was entrusted to him as pri#ate complainant0s share in the ta, burden= it only identified the proper ta,payer of the sub.ect ta,. (etitioner only offered to return the money after the filing of the ci#il case against him and after being charged before the city prosecutor for estafa. 2E 'ndeed, the misappropriation or con#ersion by petitioner caused pre.udice to pri#ate complainant and his wife. Damage as an element of estafa may consist in ;1< the offended party being depri#ed of his money or property as a result of the defraudation= ;2< disturbance in property right= or ;3< temporary pre.udice. 2@
o o o
o
3egistration of the car in the name of pri#ate complainant0s wife still had not been accomplished as of the time this petition was filed since the ta,es due remained unpaid. /ranting that both petitioner and pri#ate complainant were not liable therefor, the money supposedly meant for the 1"* fell into the wrong hands. 6inally, e#en if demand is not re-uired by law, it is necessary to pro#e misappropriation. 6ailure to account, upon demand, is circumstantial e#idence of misappropriation. The consummation of the crime of 9estafa:. . . does not depend on the fact that a re-uest for the return of the money is first made and refused in order that the author of the crime should comply with the obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or con#ersion of money recei#ed to the pre.udice of the owner thereof 9is: the sole essential 9fact: which constitute the crime of 9estafa:, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed by the 93(*:.
Deceit and damage are the essential elements of estafa. Deceit to constitute estafa under abo#e%-uoted !rticle 31E 2 ;d< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. There must be concomitance: the issuance of the chec) should be the means to obtain money or property from the payer. !ll these elements are present in the case at bar. (etitioner admitted ha#ing recei#ed in trust the amount of (h(1>>,>>> from *astro= the amount was misappropriated or con#erted= such misappropriation or con#ersion was to the pre.udice of *astro= and *astro demanded payment from petitioner.
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(etitioner asserts that upon receipt of the amount, it was transferred to her and she was not prohibited to use or spend the same. 1@ The #ery same money cannot be returned but only the same amount. This ma)es the transaction a loan and not a trust agreement= thus, her liability is merely ci#il and not criminal. (etitioner0s arguments are not meritorious. !rt. 31E 1 ;b< e,plicitly includes money in its scope. The nature of money, that is, the e,act bills and coins recei#ed in trust cannot be returned, was already considered by the law. !s long as the money was recei#ed in trust, on commission, for administration, or under an obligation to return, failure to account for it upon demand is punishable under !rt. 31E 1 ;b<. &ith regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the *! that demand under this )ind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court obser#ed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under !rt. 31E 1 ;b<, thus:
o o o o
o
&hen the law does not -ualify, &e should not -ualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would ha#e stated so. "therwise, the word $demand$ should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as e#idence is not fatal. 1? 'n Tubb #. (eople, where the complainant merely #erbally in-uired about the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the -uery was tantamount to a demand, thus: 9T:he law does not re-uire a demand as a condition precedent to the e,istence of the crime of embe++lement. 't so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial e#idence of misappropriation. The same way, howe#er, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. Similarly in this case, there was a demand for petitioner to pay pri#ate complainant. This was admitted by petitioner and the pri#ate complainant in their testimonies. *astro stated that she went to the house of petitioner in (angasinan to demand the return of the money, while petitioner stated that *astro demanded the return of the $down payment$ because allegedly, the sale did not materiali+e. 'n both #ersions, the fact remains that demand was made upon petitioner.
The essence of estafa under this paragraph is the appropriation or con#ersion of money or property recei#ed, to the pre.udice of the owner thereof. 't ta)es place when a person actually appropriates the property of another for his own benefit, use and en.oyment. 'n a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is e#idence of misappropriation or con#ersion= and failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial e#idence of misappropriation.
o
o o
Manantan misappropriated *arilla0s properties, which she held in trust, by failing to remit the sale price of the .ewelries or return the same to *arilla upon the e,piration of the stipulated period, despite repeated demands by the latter. Manantan issued chec)s to *arilla as supposed payment of the sales proceeds of the .ewelries but these chec)s were dishonored. *arilla hired a lawyer and sent a demand%letter to Manantan but the latter still failed to turn o#er the .ewelries or the sale prices thereof. !s already heretofore pointed out, failure to account upon demand for the return of the thing deli#ered in trust raises a presumption of misappropriation. Manantan0s bare denials are not sufficient to o#ercome such presumption. 4stafa may also be committed by denying untruthfully that the thing was recei#ed. 3@ Manantan denied ha#ing recei#ed .ewelries from *arilla. owe#er, as we ha#e already determined, such denial is unsubstantiated and therefore cannot pre#ail o#er the categorical declarations of *arilla that the .ewelries were turned o#er in trust to Manantan. ence, Manantan0s denial of the receipt of .ewelries also constitutes estafa.
The words $con#ert$ and $misappropriate$ as used in the afore-uoted law connote an act of using or disposing of another0s property as if it were one0s own or of de#oting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To $misappropriate$ a thing of #alue for one0s own use or benefit, not only the con#ersion to one0s personal ad#antage
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but also e#ery attempt to dispose of the property of another without a right. Misappropriation or con#ersion may be pro#ed by the prosecution by direct e#idence or by circumstantial e#idence. o Demand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent to the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. 'ndeed, the accused may be con#icted of the felony under !rticle 31E, paragraph 1;b< of the 3e#ised (enal *ode if the prosecution pro#ed misappropriation or con#ersion by the accused of the money or property sub.ect of the 'nformation. 17 'n a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is e#idence of misappropriation or con#ersion. 1E owe#er, failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial e#idence of misappropriation.
o
o
Demand need not be formal. 't may be #erbal. 'n 1arrameda #. *ourt of !ppeals, 1B the *ourt ruled that e#en a -uery as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to a demand: 't must be noted that the specific word $demand$ need not be used to show that demand had, indeed, been made upon the person charged of the offense. ! -uery as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one pro#en in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand.
!atas 2am,ansa !l+. 00 !OUNCING CHEC/S LAW

Bo$ &iolated A. 1. A person ma<es or dra$s and issues any c#ec<; 2. T#e c#ec< is made or dra$n and issued to apply on account or for &alue; T#us4 it can apply to pre0e8isting o1ligations4 too. 3. T#e person $#o ma<es or dra$s and issued t#e c#ec< <no$s at t#e time of issue t#at #e $&es n&t ha(e s*""#%#ent "*n$s in or credit $it# t#e dra$ee 1an< for t#e payment of suc# c#ec< in full upon its presentment; 4. T#e c#ec< is su1se7uently dis#onored 1y t#e dra$ee 1an< for insufficiency of funds or credit4 or $ould #a&e 1een dis#onored for t#e same reason #ad not t#e dra$er4 $it#out any &alid reason4 ordered t#e 1an< to stop payment. 1. A person has s*""#%#ent "*n$s in or credit $it# t#e dra$ee 1an< $#en #e ma<es or dra$s and issues a c#ec<; 2. Be fails to <eep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to co&er t#e full amount of t#e c#ec< if presented $it#in )* days from t#e date appearing; 3. T#e c#ec< is dis#onored 1y t#e dra$ee 1an<.
>.
@istinction 1et$een !stafa under Article 315 (2) (d) AND &iolation of >-223 (1) Ender 1ot# Article 315 (2) (d) and >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 t#ere is criminal lia1ility if t#e c#ec< is dra$n for non0pre0e8isting o1ligation. %f t#e c#ec< is dra$n for a pre0e8isting o1ligation4 t#ere is criminal lia1ility only under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22. (2) !stafa under Article 315 (2) (d) is a crime against property $#ile >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 is a crime against pu1lic interest. T#e gra&amen for t#e former is t#e deceit employed4 $#ile in t#e latter4 it is t#e issuance of t#e c#ec<. Bence4 t#ere is no dou1le =eopardy.
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(3) %n t#e estafa under Article 315 (2) (d)4 deceit and damage are material4 $#ile in >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 t#ey are immaterial. (4) %n estafa under Article 315 (2) (d)4 <no$ledge 1y t#e dra$er of insufficient funds is not re7uired4 $#ile in >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 <no$ledge 1y t#e dra$er of insufficient funds is re7uired. Aen*e3 since t#is is a continuing crime4 t#e case may 1e filed in t#e place $#ere t#e c#ec< $as issued .A in t#e place $#ere t#e c#ec< is made for payment or in cas#. :hen is there prima facie e(idence of +no!ledge of insufficient fundsH T#ere is a prima facie e&idence of <no$ledge of insufficient funds $#en t#e c#ec< $as presented $it#in )* days from t#e date appearing on t#e c#ec< and $as dis#onored. !8ceptions 1. 6#en t#e c#ec< $as presented after )* days from date; 2. 6#en t#e ma<er or dra$er 00 a. -ays t#e #older of t#e c#ec< t#e amount due $it#in fi&e 1an<ing days after recei&ing notice t#at suc# c#ec< #as not 1een paid 1y t#e dra$ee; 1. Ma<es arrangements for payment in full 1y t#e dra$ee of suc# c#ec< $it#in fi&e 1an<ing days after notice of non0payment T#e dra$ee must cause to 1e $ritten or stamped in plain language t#e reason for t#e dis#onor. %f t#e dra$ee 1an< recei&ed an order of stop0payment from t#e dra$er $it# no reason4 it must 1e stated t#at t#e funds are insufficient to 1e prosecuted #ere. T#e unpaid or dis#onored c#ec< $it# t#e stamped information re3 refusal to pay is prima facie e&idence of (1) t#e ma<ing or issuance of t#e c#ec<; (2) t#e due presentment to t#e dra$ee for payment W t#e dis#onor t#ereof; and (3) t#e fact t#at t#e c#ec< $as properly dis#onored for t#e reason stamped on t#e c#ec<.
:MORE DISCUSSIONS ON !200 !ELOW;
Acts punis#ed under paragrap# (e) 1. a. .1taining food4 refres#ment4 or accommodation at a #otel4 inn4 restaurant4 1oarding #ouse4 lodging #ouse4 or apartment #ouse; 1. 6it#out paying t#erefor; c. 6it# intent to defraud t#e proprietor or manager. 2. a. .1taining credit at any of t#e esta1lis#ments a1o&ementioned; 1. Esing false pretense; 3. a. A1andoning .A surreptitiously remo&ing any part of #is 1aggage in t#e esta1lis#ment; 1. After o1taining credit4 food4 refres#ment4 accommodation; c. 6it#out paying. Esta"a thr&*+h an' &" the "&ll&-#n+ "ra*$*lent means *n$er Art#%le C47 :C;
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Ender paragrap# (a) 1. .ffender induced t#e offended party to sign a document; 2. @eceit $as employed to ma<e #im sign t#e document; 3. .ffended party personally signed t#e document; 4. -re=udice $as caused. Ender paragrap# (1) Aesorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gam1ling game; Ender paragrap# (c) 1. .ffender remo&ed4 concealed or destroyed; 2. Any court record4 office files4 documents or any ot#er papers; 3. 6it# intent to defraud anot#er. Criminal lia1ility for estafa not affected 1y ?o&ation of contract. %n order to relie&e t#e accused from criminal lia1ility4 t#e no&ation must ta<e place 1efore t#e criminal lia1ility is incurred; t#ose already committed is not affected 1y compromise or no&ation of contract4 for it is a pu1lic offense $#ic# must 1e prosecuted and punis#ed 1y t#e Ctate 1y its o$n &olition. F#l#n+ &" a %#(#l %ase "&r n*ll#t' &" Vtr*st re%e#ptsD $&%*ments NOT a preG*$#%#al )*est#&n
ALFREDO CHING (s CA G.R. N&. 4415<<. Apr#l 068 0111 C#ing signed a trust receipt. Be failed to comply $it# #is o1ligation so #e $as c#arged under -@ 115. Be filed a ci&il a ci&il case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. Be soug#t t#e suspension of t#e criminal case on t#e ground t#at t#e decision of t#e ci&il action is pending meaning it is a pre=udicial 7uestion. ATC denied t#e motion to suspend $#ic# $as affirmed 1y t#e CA. B!5@3 e8ist. More simply4 for t#e court to appreciate t#e pendency of a pre=udicial 7uestion4 t#e la$4 in no uncertain terms4 re7uires t#e concurrence of t$o essential re7uisites4 to $it3 a) T#e ci&il action in&ol&es an issue similar or intimately related to t#e issue raised in t#e criminal action; and 1) T#e resolution of suc# issue determines $#et#er or not t#e criminal action may proceed. (erily4 under t#e pre&ailing circumstances4 t#e alleged pre=udicial 7uestion in t#e ci&il case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages4 does not *uris et de *ure determine t#e guilt or innocence of t#e accused in t#e criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo t#at t#e court #earing t#e ci&il aspect of t#e case ad=udicates t#at t#e transaction entered into 1et$een t#e parties $as not a trust receipt agreement4 nonet#eless t#e guilt of t#e accused could still 1e esta1lis#ed and #is culpa1ility under penal la$s determined 1y ot#er e&idence. To put it differently4 e&en on t#e assumption t#at t#e documents are declared null4 it does not ipso facto follo$ t#at suc# declaration of nullity s#all e8onerate t#e accused from criminal prosecution and lia1ility. Accordingly4 t#e prosecution may adduce e&idence to pro&e t#e criminal lia1ility of t#e accused for estafa. CC agrees $it# t#e findings of t#e ATC as affirmed 1y t#e CA t#at no pre=udicial 7uestion
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6e must stress t#oug#4 t#at an act &iolati&e of a trust receipt agreement is only one mode of committing estafa under t#e a1o&ementioned pro&ision of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. Ctated differently4 a &iolation of a trust receipt arrangement is not t#e sole 1asis for incurring lia1ility under Article 315 1(1) of t#e Code.
2EO2LE (s. 2ENDON CA8 7C O.G. 46< T#ere must 1e a formal demand from t#e offender on t#e offender to comply $it# #is o1ligation 1efore #e can 1e c#arged $it# estafa. T#ere are t$o e8ceptions3 1. $#en t#e o1ligation to comply is su1=ect to a period 2. 6#en t#e accused cannot 1e located despite due e&idence.
Huery3 you #ire a passenger =eep. Duridical possession is transferred. %f you failed to return t#e =eep4 $#at is t#e crime committedF A3 !stafa. H3 >ut if you #ire it for personal use4 and you failed to return it4 t#e crime is not estafa 1ut 7ualified t#eft 1ecause t#ere is a pro#i1ition of #iring passenger =eepneys for personal use 1ecause t#ey are for pu1lic use. 2ers&n #s %har+e$ -#th #lle+al re%r*#tment he -#ll als& %har+e$ -#th esta"a.
2EO2LE AS. TAN TIONG MENG G.R. N&s. 4015C7@<1. Apr#l 418 4996 %n -eople &. Calon2o4 t#e Court reiterated t#e rule t#at a person con&icted for illegal recruitment under t#e 5a1or Code can 1e con&icted for &iolation of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code pro&isions on estafa pro&ided t#e elements of t#e crime are present. %n -eople &. Aomero t#e elements of t#e crime $ere stated t#us3 a) t#at t#e accused defrauded anot#er 1y a1use of confidence .A 1y means of deceit4 and 1) t#at damage or pre=udice capa1le of pecuniary estimation is caused to t#e offended party or t#ird person. >ot# elements #a&e 1een pro&en in t#is case.
Esta"a %an ,e %&mm#tte$ -#th the atten$an%e &" ,&th m&$es &" %&mm#ss#&n8 that #s8 a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e AND $e%e#t empl&'e$ a+a#nst the same (#%t#m an$ %a*s#n+ $ama+e t& the latterI M*lt#ple %&*nts &" esta"a ma' res*lt -hen m#srepresentat#&n &r $e%e#t -as $&ne &n $#""erent $ates an$ #n separate pla%es. GERONCIO ILAGAN (s CA G.R. N&. 441346. De%em,er 098 499< T#e accused $as c#arged $it# t$o <inds of estafa. Be $as an employee of a corporation; #e $as entrusted 1y t#e manager of t#e corporation $#ic# sells su1di&ision lots. Be collected a1out ) su1di&isions. 5ater t#e corporation <ne$ t#at #e misappropriated t#e amounts #e collected for #is o$n use. T#e first c#arge $as estafa $it# unfait#fulness A?@ t#e second estafa 1y falsely pretending to possess po$er (po$er to collect). B!5@3
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1. T#e crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation4 on t#e one #and4 and t#ose committed against t#e lot 1uyers4 on t#e ot#er4 are definitely separate felonies. T#ey $ere dictated 1y different criminal intents4 committed under different modes of commission pro&ided 1y t#e la$ on estafa4 perpetrated 1y different acts4 consummated on different occasions4 and caused in=ury to different parties. T#e crime of estafa against respondent corporation $as committed t#roug# *n"a#th"*lness &r a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e4 specifically as pro&ided in 2ara+raph 4:,; &" Art#%le C474 Ae&ised -enal Code. T#e operati&e act in t#e perpetration t#ereof $as t#e failure to turn o&er or deli&er to respondent corporation t#e amounts collected 1y t#e accused4 despite t#eir duty to do so. T#e felony $as consummated on t#e dates $#en and at t#e places $#ere suc# amounts $ere to 1e deli&ered to respondent corporation under t#e agency agreement t#erefor or $it#in a reasona1le time from receipt of t#e payments made 1y t#e lot 1uyers. T#e aggrie&ed party $as respondent corporation $#ic# suffered damages 1asically to t#e e8tent of t#e sums collected in its 1e#alf 1ut not deli&ered or accounted for 1y t#e accused. 6it# respect to t#e lot 1uyers4 t#e offense of s$indling $as committed 1y $e%e#t &r "alse pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously $it# t#e commission of t#e fraud4 more specifically as pro&ided in 2ara+raph 0:a; &" Art C47 of t#e Code4 t#at is4 1y t#e accused falsely pretending to possess t#e po$er to collect t#e payments due from said 1uyers4 despite t#e peculiar 1ut specific pro#i1ition imposed 1y t#eir said principal. T#e felony $as perpetrated t#roug# t#e aforesaid t#e deceitful misrepresentations $#ic# made possi1le t#e unaut#ori2ed collections. T#e offense $as consummated upon receipt 1y t#e accused of t#e amounts in t#e different occasions and places $#ere t#e payments $ere made 1y t#e lot 1uyers. T#e aggrie&ed parties $ere t#e lot 1uyers $#o indi&idually and separately suffered damages 1y 1eing depri&ed not only of t#eir money 1ut primarily of t#eir property rig#ts to and in t#e lots t#ey respecti&ely purc#ased. %n eit#er instance4 t#e re7uisite ingredients of estafa as separate offenses are present4 t#at is4 for respondent corporation t#e elements of a1use of confidence and damage4 and for t#e lot 1uyers t#e elements of deceit and damage. %t #as 1een #eld t#at estafa can 1e committed $it# t#e attendance of 1ot# modes of commission4 t#at is4 a1use of confidence and deceit employed against t#e same &ictim and causing damage to #im. T#us4 $#ere an agent deli1erately misrepresented to t#e lando$ner t#e real position of t#e prospecti&e 1uyer of t#e land in order to induce said o$ner to agree to a lo$er price and4 t#ereafter4 t#e agent sold t#e land for t#e #ig#er amount $#ic# $as actually agreed upon 1y #im and t#e 1uyer4 and #e t#en clandestinely misappropriated t#e e8cess4 t#e crime of estafa $as committed under 1ot# modes and #e could 1e c#arged under eit#er. 6it#al4 it #as also 1een #eld t#at suc# estafa is more properly categori2ed as one committed t#roug# a1use of confidence. 6it# muc# more reason4 t#erefore4 s#ould t#e offense of estafa against respondent corporation 1e considered discretely and separately from t#ose committed against t#e lot 1uyers since4 inter alia4 different modes of commission and different parties are concerned. +urt#ermore4 to underscore t#e distinction 1et$een t#e estafa committed against respondent corporation A?@ t#e lot 1uyers4 #n esta"a thr&*+h a,*se &" %&n"#$en%e prior demand should be made 1y t#e offended party on t#e accused to comply $it# t#e o1ligation 1efore t#e latter may 1e c#arged criminally4 >ET t#ere is no suc# re7uirement $#ere t#e esta"a $as committed thr&*+h $e%e#t. As earlier stated4 t#e $ama+e sustained 1y t#e lot 1uyers is distinct from t#at suffered 1y respondent corporation since4 primarily4 t#e in=ury to t#e lot 1uyers $as t#e depri&ation of t#eir rig#ts or t#e e8ercise t#ereof o&er t#e properties t#ey respecti&ely purc#ased. %t #as long 1een t#e rule t#at actual damage is not necessary in estafa4 as long as it is capa1le of pecuniary estimation4 #ence mere temp&rar' $#st*r,an%e &" pr&pert' r#+hts #s e)*#(alent t& $ama+e. !&en if t#e pre=udice is temporary4 t#at $ould suffice for t#e element of damage in estafa. Bere4 t#e lot 1uyers in&ol&ed in t#e criminal cases su1=ect of t#e present recourse #a&e4 as a direct conse7uence of t#e acts of petitioners4 1een depri&ed of t#e e8ercise of t#eir rig#ts of actual or potential o$ners#ip o&er t#eir properties since 1))1 up to t#e present. 2. Conse7uent to t#e t#eory of identity of t#e offense committed against respondent corporation &is0a0&is t#ose against t#e lot 1uyers4 $e re=ect petitioners, plea for t#e dismissal of Criminal Cases ?os. C04*4'3 to C04*4') $#ic# $ere filed eac# $it# one lot 1uyer as t#e offended party t#erein. 6#ile t#e felonious acts perpetrated against said lot 1uyers do not constitute a delito continuado4 t#ere must 1e an e8plicitation as to $#et#er4 under t#e ta8onomy in t#e Cpanis#
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concept of concurso de delitos4 t#e se&en acts of defraudation under said informations constitute material or real plurality4 #ence t#ere are se&en crimes of estafa4 or s#ould 1e considered as in t#e nature of formal or ideal plurality4 #ence t#ere is only one crime of estafa. 6e rule t#at said se&en cases fall under t#e category of concurso real4 #ence t#ere are se&en =uridically independent crimes in&ol&ing said lot 1uyers. T#e series of acts committed against t#e se&en lot 1uyers $as not t#e product of a single criminal intent. T#e misrepresentation or deceit $as employed against eac# lot 1uyer on different dates and in separate places4 #ence t#ey originated from separate criminal intents and conse7uently resulted in separate felonies. +urt#ermore4 e&en assuming arguendo t#at t#e defraudations $ere pursuant to an identical design4 t#ey $ere committed o&er a period of a1out one and a #alf years and at su1stantial inter&als 1ot# in time and in distance of situs. More conclusi&e is t#e fact t#at4 after t#e commission of one estafa4 t#e accused could not #a&e #ad t#e fore<no$ledge as to $#en or $#et#er t#ey could replicate t#e same felony against anot#er &ictim still necessarily un<no$n. T#is lac< of pre&ision on t#eir part definitely pro&es t#at t#e criminal intent entailed in a preceding s$indle could not operate as t#e same criminal intent in futuro as regards anot#er su1se7uent estafa. T#e inescapa1le conclusion is t#at4 all told4 a total of eig#t crimes of estafa $ere actually committed 1y t#e accused against different &ictims.
!2 00 !OUNCING CHEC/S LAW

T#e issuance of c#ec< $it# insufficient funds may 1e #eld lia1le for estafa and >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22. >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 e8pressly pro&ides t#at prosecution under said la$ is $it#out pre=udice to any lia1ility for &iolation of any pro&ision in t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. D&*,le .e&par$' ma' n&t ,e #n(&Fe$ 1ecause a &iolation of >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 is a malum pro#i1itum and is 1eing punis#ed as a crime against t#e pu1lic interest for undermining t#e 1an<ing system of t#e country4 $#ile under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 t#e crime is malum in se $#ic# re7uires criminal intent and damage to t#e payee and is a crime against property. %n estafa4 t#e c#ec< must #a&e 1een issued as a reciprocal consideration for parting of goods. T#ere must 1e concomitance. T#e deceit must 1e prior to or simultaneous $it# damage done4 t#at is4 seller relied on c#ec< to part $it# goods. %f it is issued after parting $it# goods as in credit accommodation only4 t#ere is no estafa. %f t#e c#ec< is issued for a pre0e8isting o1ligation4 t#ere is no estafa as damage #ad already 1een done. T#e dra$er is lia1le under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22.
%llustration3 %f I 1uys appliances4 and paid c#ec<s. >ecause of t#e assurance of t#e 1uyer t#at t#e c#ec<s are duly funded. Bere t#ere is simultaneously e8c#ange of goods and t#e c#ec<. Bere4 if t#e c#ec< 1ounced4 t#ere is &iolation of >- 22 .A !stafa4 depending on t#e circumstances. 9@A%+:or @ra$n Against %nsufficient +unds is stamped on t#e c#ec< %llustration3 %f I 1uys appliances 1ut pays t#e $ee< after and t#e c#ec< 1ounced4 t#e crime is not under article 315 (2)(d) >ET under >- 22. Aeason3 t#ere $as no simultaneous e8c#ange of c#ec<s and goods. T#e c#ec<s $ere in payment of a pre0e8isting o1ligation.
+or criminal lia1ility to attac# under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 it is enoug# t#at t#e c#ec< $as issued to Qapply on account or for &alueQ and upon its presentment it $as dis#onored 1y t#e dra$ee 1an< for insufficiency of funds4 pro&ided t#at t#e dra$er #ad 1een notified of t#e dis#onor and inspite of suc# notice fails to pay t#e #older of t#e c#ec< t#e full amount due t#ereon $it#in fi&e days from notice. Ender >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 a dra$er must 1e gi&en notice of dis#onor and gi&en fi&e 1an<ing days from notice $it#in $#ic# to deposit or pay t#e amount stated in t#e c#ec< to negate t#e
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presumtion t#at dra$er <ne$ of t#e insufficiency. After t#is period4 it is conclusi&e t#at dra$er <ne$ of t#e insufficiency4 t#us t#ere is no more defense to t#e prosecution under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22. T#e mere issuance of any <ind of c#ec< regardless of t#e intent of t#e parties4 $#et#er t#e c#ec< is intended to ser&e merely as a guarantee or as a deposit4 ma<es t#e dra$er lia1le under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 if t#e c#ec< 1ounces. As a matter of pu1lic policy4 t#e issuance of a $ort#less c#ec< is a pu1lic nuisance and must 1e a1ated. %n De A#lla (. CA8 $e%#$e$ Apr#l 458 49948 it $as #eld t#at under >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 t#ere is no distinction as to t#e <ind of c#ec< issued. As long as it is deli&ered $it#in -#ilippine territory4 t#e -#ilippine courts #a&e =urisdiction. !&en if t#e c#ec< is only presented to and dis#onored in a -#ilippine 1an<4 >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 applies. T#is is true in t#e case of dollar or foreign currency c#ec<s. 6#ere t#e la$ ma<es no distinction4 none s#ould 1e made. %n 2e&ple (. N#ta"an8 it $as #eld t#at as long as instrument is a c#ec< under t#e negotia1le instrument la$4 it is co&ered 1y >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22. A memorandum c#ec< is not a promissory note4 it is a c#ec< $#ic# #a&e t#e $ord 9memo4: 9mem:4 9memorandum: $ritten across t#e face of t#e c#ec< $#ic# signifies t#at if t#e #older upon maturity of t#e c#ec< presents t#e same to t#e dra$er4 it $ill 1e paid a1solutely. >ut t#ere is no pro#i1ition against dra$er from depositing memorandum c#ec< in a 1an<. 6#ate&er 1e t#e agreement of t#e parties in respect of t#e issuance of a c#ec< is inconse7uential to a &iolation to >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 $#ere t#e c#ec< 1ounces. >ut o&erdraft or credit arrangement may 1e allo$ed 1y 1an<s as to t#eir preferred clients and >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 does not apply. %f c#ec< 1ounces4 it is 1ecause 1an< #as 1een remiss in #onoring agreement. T#e c#ec< must 1e presented for payment $it#in a )*0day period. %f presented for payment 1eyond t#e )* day period and t#e dra$er;s funds are insufficient to co&er it4 t#ere is no >atas -am1ansa >lg. 22 &iolation. 6#ere c#ec< $as issued prior to August '4 1)'44 $#en Circular ?o. 12 of t#e @epartment of t#e Dustice too< effect4 and t#e dra$er relied on t#e t#en pre&ailing Circular ?o. 4 of t#e Ministry of Dustice to t#e effect t#at c#ec<s issued as part of an arrangementGagreement of t#e parties to guarantee or secure fulfillment of an o1ligation are not co&ered 1y >atas -am1ansa >lg. 224 no criminal lia1ility s#ould 1e incurred 1y t#e dra$er. Circular s#ould not 1e gi&en retroacti&e effect. (La>ar& (. CA8 N&(em,er 448 499C8 %#t#n+ 2e&ple (. Al,ert&8 O%t&,er 058 499C) H3 $#at are t#e common crimes against c#ec<s3 A3 t#ey are t#e follo$ing3 1. %ssuance of 1ouncing c#ec<s in &iolation of >- 22 2. !stafa under article 315 paragrap# 2 (d) 3. +orgery or alteration of c#ec<s under Title %( 4. Miting as a form of estafa under 315 (11) Merriam06e1ster defines a Q<iteQ as Qa c#ec< dra$n against uncollected funds in a 1an< accountQ or Qa c#ec< t#at #as 1een fraudulently raised 1efore cas#ingQ Ill*strat#&n &" /#t#n+3
2EREB (s 2EO2LE G.R. N&. L@<C7<5. .*ne 098 4954

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E/ITING O2ERATIONSE %? CAC! AT >AA. R T#is is 7uite uni7ue 1ecause it is an episode in t#e <iting game. %t $as implicit in t#e agreement or contract 1et$een -etra and 5eonila to e8c#ange good c#ec<s and t#us attain t#eir respecti&e mercenary o1=ecti&es4 -etra issued to 5eonila in @ecem1er4 1) 3 t$enty0eig#t c#ec<s of t#e -?C >an< $it# a total face &alue of -4414*5).** $#ic# $ere all cas#ed 1y 5eonila. %n turn4 5eonila issued to -etra c#ec<s of t#e Aepu1lic >an< $it# a total &alue of -'434)*".** $#ic# $ere #onored 1y t#e 1an<. 5eonila issued to -etra c#ec<s for t#e same amount. +rom +e1ruary 5 to 1*4 1) 44 -etra issued to 5eonila ten c#ec<s $it# a total &alue of -2544 **.** and as per agreement4 5eonila issued to -etra c#ec<s for t#at same amount. Co far4 so good. T#en4 during t#e fi&e0day period from +e1ruary 1* to 144 1) 44 -etra issued to 5eonila t#irteen -?C >an< c#ec<s $it# a total &alue of -3""4)3*.** $#ic# $ere cas#ed 1y 5eonila. @uring t#at same fi&e0day period. 5eonila issued to -etra t#irteen Aepu1lic >an< c#ec<s also for t#e total amount of -3""4)3*.** 1ut (sad to state) 5eonila,s c#ec<s $ere dis#onored for #a&ing 1een dra$n against uncollected deposits (@AE@C) or 1ecause t#ere $as a notice of QCtop -aymentQ. %t appears t#at -etra #ad issued to 5eonila ele&en c#ec<s dated +e1ruary 1*4 114 124 134 224 2' and 2)4 1) 4 for t#e total sum of -2)24"2*.** $#ic# $ere dis#onored. +.AM .+ !CTA+A CBAA/!@ %? CAC! AT >AA. R 5eonila,s t#irteen QMacArt#urQ c#ec< or c#ec<s dis#onored for #a&ing 1een @AE@C or 1ecause t#ere $as a notice of QCtop -aymentQ4 are t#e 1ases of t#e estafa case against #er. 5eonila $as not c#arged $it# estafa for #a&ing issued 1ouncing c#ec<s4 a form of estafa t#roug# false pretenses under paragrap# 2(d)4 article 315 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code 1ut $as c#arged and con&icted of t#e ot#er <ind of estafa; estafa t#roug# misappropriation committed $it# unfait#fulness or a1use of confidence under paragrap# 1(1) of article 315. %nstead of 1eing c#arged $it# t#irteen offenses4 5eonila $as c#arged $it# only one offense. Apparently4 t#e alleged estafa $as treated as a continuing offense. +AAE@E5!?T >A?M%?/ -AACT%C!C; M%T%?/ .-!AAT%.?C; @!+%?!@. R Miting operation or t#e <iting game is a $#s%&*nt#n+ $e(#%e "&r the man#p*lat#&n &" ,anF %re$#t 1y means of c#ec<s usually underta<en $it# t#e conni&ance of &enal 1an< officials. Miting is commonly employed to denote a species of fraud or fraudulent practice consisting in t#e e8c#ange of drafts or c#ec<s of appro8imately t#e same dates and amounts. Ender t#e agreement to play t#e <iting game4 t#ere $ould 1e an e8c#ange of good c#ec<s4 so t#at if one c#ec< is cas#ed4 t#e cas# $ould 1e returned to t#e issuer of t#e c#ec< 1y means of t#e c#ec< issued 1y t#e ot#er player $#o #ad cas#ed t#e first player,s c#ec<. QM%T!Q @!+%?!@. R A Q<iteQ is a c#ec< dra$n against uncollected funds in a 1an< account. To Q<iteQ means to secure t#e temporary use of money 1y issuing a negotiating $ort#less paper and t#en redeeming suc# paper $it# t#e proceeds of similar paper4 ad infinitum. QCB!CM M%T%?/Q @!+%?!@. R QC#ec< <itingQ is a procedure $#ere1y c#ec<s $ritten on accounts in separate 1an<s are used to generate s#ort0term purc#asing po$er t#roug# t#e use of t#e 1an<,s credit. A depositor $it# accounts in t$o 1an<s may 1uild up #is 1alance in >an< A 1y depositing a c#ec< dra$n on >an< > alt#oug# #is 1alance in >an< > (per#aps an out0of0to$n 1an<) is not sufficient to co&er t#e c#ec<. Be ma<es t#e c#ec< good 1efore it is presented for collection 1ut in t#e meantime #as made use of t#e 1an<,s credit. >!TAAJA5 .+ C.?+%@!?C! %? A QM%T%?/ /AM!Q ?. CA%M%?A5 ACT%.? 6.E5@ 5%!; A!M!@J %C A C%(%5 ACT%.?; CAC! AT >AA R C#ould t#ere 1e a 1etrayal of confidence or &iolation of t#e agreement in a Q<iting gameQ t#e lia1ility of t#e infractor $ould 1e ci&il assuming t#at suc# agreement to manipulate 1an< credit could gi&e rise to a legitimate ci&il action. May1e t#e 1asis of suc# a ci&il action $ould 1e t#e pre&ention of un=ust enric#ment of one at t#e e8pense of t#e ot#er. Ender t#e singular facts of t#is case4 5eonila -ere2 is not criminally lia1le for #er failure to return to -etra +arin in t#e amount co&ered 1y -etra,s t#irteen c#ec<s 1ecause t#e latter,s remedy is t#e ci&il action for t#e reco&ery of t#e amount of t#e encas#ed c#ec<s s#e filed in t#e Court of +irst %nstance of Ai2al in ?o&em1er4 1) 44 Ci&il Case ?o. H0'44 $#ic# up to t#is time4 #as not 1een tried. 5eonila committed simply a 1reac# of contract $#ic# resulted in #er 1eing inde1ted to -etra and since -etra allegedly issued also 1ouncing c#ec<s4 5eonila could also file a counterclaim 1ased on t#e same t#eory. 5eonila and -etra <ne$ t#e ris<s of t#e <iting game. T#ey <ne$ t#at eit#er one could easily dou1le0cross t#e ot#er. Cuc# a dou1le0cross is a &iolation of t#eir contract to play fairly t#e <iting game. T#e 1reac# of contract gi&es rise to a ci&il action4 not to a criminal action.
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Lan$marF Case &n !2 003

LOBANO (s MARTINEB G.R. N&s. L@335C9@<0. De%em,er 458 4953 >.-. 22 (>.E?C%?/ CB!CM 5A6); C.(!AC A55 M%?@C .+ CB!CMC. R T#e language of >- 22 is 1road enoug# to co&er all <inds of c#ec<s4 $#et#er present dated or postdated4 or $#et#er issued in payment of pre0e8isting o1ligations or gi&en in mutual or simultaneous e8c#ange for somet#ing of &alue. !CC!?T%A5 !5!M!?T .+ M?.65!@/!; -A%MA +AC%! -A!CEM!@ >J A!+ECA5 .+ @AA6!! T. -AJ E-.? -A!C!?TM!?T. R An essential element of t#e offense is Q<no$ledgeQ on t#e part of t#e ma<er or dra$er of t#e c#ec< of t#e insufficiency of #is funds in or credit $it# t#e 1an< to co&er t#e c#ec< upon its presentment. Cince t#is in&ol&es a state of mind difficult to esta1lis#4 t#e statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of suc# <no$ledge $#ere payment of t#e c#ec< Qis refused 1y t#e dra$ee 1ecause of insufficient funds in or credit $it# suc# 1an< $#en presented $it#in ninety ()*) days from t#e date of t#e c#ec<. CBA55 ?.T AA%C! 6B!? -AJM!?T %C MA@! 6%TB%? +%(! (5) @AJC +A.M A!C!%-T .+ @%CB.?.A. R To mitigate t#e #ars#ness of t#e la$ in its application4 t#e statute pro&ides t#at suc# presumption s#all not arise if $it#in fi&e (5) 1an<ing days from receipt of t#e notice of dis#onor4 t#e ma<er or dra$er ma<es arrangements for payment of t#e c#ec< 1y t#e 1an< or pays t#e #older t#e amount of t#e c#ec<. @%CB.?.A .+ CB!CM >J @AA6!! >A?M; -A%MA +AC%! -A..+ .+ MAM%?/ .A %CCEA?C! .+ CB!CM A?@ @E! -A!C!?TM!?T TB!A!.+. R Anot#er pro&ision of t#e statute4 also in t#e nature of a rule of e&idence4 pro&ides t#at t#e introduction in e&idence of t#e unpaid and dis#onored c#ec< $it# t#e dra$ee 1an<,s refusal to pay Qstamped or $ritten t#ereon or attac#ed t#ereto4 gi&ing t#e reason t#erefore4 s#all constitute prima facie proof of Qt#e ma<ing or issuance of said c#ec<4 and t#e due presentment to t#e dra$ee for payment and t#e dis#onor t#ereof . . . for t#e reason $ritten4 stamped or attac#ed 1y t#e dra$er on suc# dis#onored c#ec<.Q T#e presumptions 1eing merely prima facie4 it is open to t#e accused of course to present proof to t#e contrary to o&ercome t#e said presumptions. D+!'+-7;+!<ED FR$M *R'+CLE 1 2A RE:+!ED PE-*L C$DE. R Article 315 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code defining t#e crime of estafa reads as follo$s3 QArticle 315. C$indling (estafa). 0 Any person $#o s#all defraud anot#er 1y any of t#e means mentioned #erein 1elo$ s#all 1e punis#ed 1y . . . . (2) >y means of any of t#e follo$ing false pretenses or fraudulent acts e8ecuted prior to or simultaneously $it# t#e commission of t#e fraud3 ... (d) >y postdating a c#ec<4 or issuing a c#ec< in payment of an o1ligation t#e offender <no$ing t#at at t#e time #e #ad no funds in t#e 1an<4 or t#e funds deposited 1y #im $ere not sufficient to co&er t#e amount of t#e c#ec< $it#out informing t#e payee of suc# circumstances.Q T#e scope of paragrap# 2 (d)4 #o$e&er4 $as deemed to e8clude c#ec<s issued in payment of pre0e8isting o1ligations. T#e rationale of t#is interpretation is t#at in estafa4 t#e deceit causing t#e defraudation must 1e prior to or simultaneous $it# t#e commission of t#e fraud. %n issuing a c#ec< as payment for a pre0e8isting de1t4 t#e dra$er does not deri&e any material 1enefit in return or as consideration for its issuance. .n t#e part of t#e pa'ee4 #e #ad already parted $it# #is money or property ,e"&re t#e c#ec< is issued to #im4 #ence4 #e is not defrauded 1y means of any QpriorQ or QsimultaneousQ deceit perpetrated on #im4 1y t#e dra$er of t#e c#ec<. AAT%C5! 3154 A!(%C!@ -!?A5 C.@! AC AM!?@!@ >J A.A. 4''5; -AJM!?T .+ -A!0!I%CT%?/ .>5%/AT%.?C ?.T C.(!A!@. R Art#%le C474 as amended 1y Aepu1lic Act 4''54 $&es n&t %&(er c#ec<s issued in payment of pre@e=#st#n+ &,l#+at#&ns4 again relying on t#e concept underlying t#e crime of estafa t#roug# false pretense or deceit 0 $#ic# is4 t#at t#e $e%e#t &r "alse pretense must be prior to or simultaneous !ith the commission of the fraud.
Page 1,5
>ATACA?/ -AM>A?CA 22 (>.E?C%?/ CB!CM 5A6;) TBAECT .+ 5A6; -E?%CB!C ACT .+ MAM%?/ .A %CCE%?/ 6.ATB5!CC CB!CM AC A? .++!?C! A/A%?CT -E>5%C .A@!A. R T#e gra&amen of t#e offense punis#ed 1y >.-. 22 is t#e act of ma<ing and issuing a $ort#less c#ec< or a c#ec< t#at is dis#onored upon its presentation for payment. #t is not the non9 payment of an obligation !hich the la! punishes. T#e la$ is not intended or designed to coerce a de1tor to pay #is de1t. 1he thrust of the la! is to prohibit4 under pain of sanctions4 the ma+ing of !orthless chec+s and putting them is circulation. >ecause of its deleterious effects on t#e p*,l#% #nterest4 t#e practice is proscri1ed 1y t#e la$. T#e la$ punis#es t#e act not as an offense a+a#nst property4 1ut an offense against p*,l#% &r$er. (A5%@ !I!AC%C! TB!A!.+; ?.T A!-E/?A?T T. C.?CT%TET%.?A5 %?B%>%T%.? A/A%?CT %M-A%C.?M!?T +.A @!>T. R T#e enactment of >.-. 22 is a declaration 1y t#e legislature t#at4 as a matter of pu1lic policy4 t#e ma<ing and issuance of a $ort#less c#ec< is deemed a pu1lic nuisance to 1e a1ated 1y t#e imposition of penal sanctions. T#e effect of t#e issuance of a $ort#less c#ec<s transcends t#e pri&ate interests of t#e parties directly in&ol&ed in t#e transaction and touc#es t#e interests of t#e community at large. T#e misc#ief it creates is not only a $rong to t#e payee or #older4 1ut also an in=ury to t#e pu1lic. %n sum4 $e find t#e enactment of >.-. 22 a &alid e8ercise of t#e police po$er and is not repugnant to t#e constitutional in#i1ition against imprisonment for de1t. +A!!@.M .+ C.?TAACT ?.T %M-A%A!@ CB!CMC ?.T CAT!/.A%X!@ AC C.?TAACTC. R 6e find not &alid ground to sustain t#e contention t#at >.-. 22 impairs freedom of contract. T#e freedom of contract $#ic# is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into Qla$fulQ contracts. Contracts $#ic# contra&ene pu1lic policy are not la$ful. 6e must 1ear in mind t#at c#ec<s can not 1e categori2ed as mere contracts. %t is a commercial instrument $#ic#4 in t#is modern day and age4 #as 1ecome a con&enient su1stitute for money; it form part of t#e 1an<ing system and t#erefore not entirely free from t#e regulatory po$er of t#e state.
Ne- 2&l#%' &" C&*rts -#th re+ar$ the #mp&s#t#&n &" penalt#es "&r (#&lat#&n &" !2 00 ADMINISTRATIAE CIRCULAR NO. 40@0111 RE 2ENALTY FOR AIOLATION OF !.2. !LG. 00 Se%t#&n 4 &" !.2. !l+. 00 (An Act -enali2ing te Ma<ing or @ra$ing and %ssuance of a C#ec< 6it#out Cufficient +unds for Credit and for .t#er -urposes) imposes t#e penalty of #mpr#s&nment of not less t#an t#irty (3*) days 1ut not more t#an one (1) year .A a "#ne of not less t#an 1ut not more tan dou1le t#e amount of t#e c#ec<4 $#ic# fine s#all in no case e8ceed -2**4***4 .A ,&th suc# fine and imprisonment at t#e discretion of t#e court. %n its decision in E$*ar$& Aa%a8 (. C&*rt &" Appeals (/.A. ?o. 131"144 1 ?o&em1er 1))'; 2)' CCAA 5 4 4) t#e Cupreme Court (Cecond @i&ision) per Mr. Dustice (. Mendo2a4 modified t#e sentence imposed for &iolation of >.-. >lg. 22 1y $elet#n+ the penalt' &" #mpr#s&nment AND #mp&s#n+ &nl' the penalt' &" "#ne in an amount dou1le t#e amount of t#e c#ec<. %n =ustification t#ereof4 t#e Court said3
-etitioner are first0time offenders. T#ey are +ilipino entrepreneurs $#o presuma1ly contri1ute to t#e national economy. Apparently4 t#ey 1roug#t t#is appeal4 1elie&ing in all good fait#4 alt#oug# mista<enly t#at t#ey #ad not committed a &iolation of >.-. >lg. 22. .t#er$ise t#ey could simply #a&e accepted t#e =udgment of t#e trial court and applied for pro1ation to e&ade a prison term. %t $ould 1est ser&e t#e ends of criminal =ustice if in fi8ing t#e penalty $it#in t#e range of discretion allo$ed 1y [14 par. 14 t#e same p#ilosop#y underlying t#e %ndeterminate Centence 5a$ is o1ser&e4 namely4 t#at of redeeming &alua1le #uman material and pre&enting unnecessary depri&ation f personal li1erty and economic usefulness $it# due regard to t#e protection f t#e social order. %n t#is case $e 1elie&e t#at a fine in an amount e7ual to dou1le t#e amount of t#e c#ec< in&ol&ed is an appropriate penalty to impose on eac# of t#e petitioners
%n t#e recent case of R&sa L#m (. 2e&ple &" the 2h#l#pp#nes (/. A. ?o. 13**3'4 1'
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Ceptem1er 2***)4 t#e Cupreme Court en 1anc4 applying (aca also deleted t#e penalty of imprisonment and sentenced t#e dra$er of t#e 1ounced c#ec< to t#e ma8imum of t#e fine allo$ed 1y >.-. >lg. 224 i.e.4 -2**4***4 and concluded t#at 9suc# $ould 1est ser&e t#e ends of criminal =ustice.: All courts and =udges concerned s#ould #encefort# ta<e note pf t#e foregoing policy of t#e Cupreme Court on t#e matter of t#e imposition of penalties for &iolations of >.-. >lg. 22. T#e Court Administrator s#all cause t#e immediate dissemination of t#is Administrati&e Circular to all courts and =udges concerned. T#is Administrati&e Circular4 referred to and appro&ed 1y t#e Cupreme Court en 1anc4 s#all ta<e effect upon its issuance. %ssued t#is 21st day of ?o&em1er 2***.
Clar#"'#n+ A$m#n#strat#(e %#r%*lar 40@0111 ADMINISTRATIAE CIRCULAR 4C@0114 %t is understood t#at administrati&e circular 1202*** does not remo&e as an alternati&e penalty. T#e =udges, concerned may in t#e e8ercise of a sound discretion and ta<ing into consideration t#e peculiar circumstances of eac# case4 determine $#et#er t#e imposition of a fine $ould ser&e t#e ends of =ustice or $#et#er fore1earing to impose imprisonment $ould depreciate t#e seriousness of t#e offense and $or< &iolence on t#e social order or ot#er$ise 1e contrary to t#e imperati&e of =ustice.
Co t#is is in t#e alternati&e4 eit#er imprisonment or fine4 depending on t#e discretion of t#e court.
!OUNCING CHEC/S UNDER ARTICLE C47 :0;:!; @eceit and damage are essential Cuc# circumstance mitigates criminal lia1ility Cpecific and definite penalties are fi8ed in 1ot# offenses. Mala in se !stafa is a crime against property
!OUNCING CHEC/S UNDER !2 00 T#is is mala pro#i1ita so no need to esta1lis# or pro&e deceit or damage A dra$er of a c#ec< may 1e con&icted of >- 22 e&en if #e issued t#e same for a pre0e8isting o1ligation Cpecific and definite penalties are fi8ed in 1ot# offenses. Mala pro#i1ita Crime against pu1lic interest (not pu1lic order)
N& De%e#t -hen part#es a+ree$ at the t#me &" #ss*an%e that the %he%Fs -#ll n&t ,e %ashe$ &r presente$ ,' the ,anFs
2ACHECO (s. CA G.R. N&. 403361. De%em,er 08 4999 -ac#eco 1orro$ed money from (icencio. (icencio said 9.<4 1ut do not sign any promissory note or any document4 =ust issue a c#ec< to us:. -ac#eco said t#ey do not #a&e any funds in t#e 1an<. As time $ent 1y4 t#e -ac#ecos; 1orro$ed and 1orro$ed money and issued se&eral c#ec<s upon t#e insistence of t#e (icencio;s. 5ater on4 t#e (icencios; send letters of demand for t#em to pay. T#ey $ere not a1le to pay so c#arges of estafa for many counts $ere filed and con&icted.
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B!5@3 !lements to sustain a con&iction under article 315 (2)(d); 1. t#e offender postdated or issued a c#ec< in payment of an o1ligation contracted at t#e time t#e c#ec< $as issued 2. t#at t#e issuance of t#e c#ec< $as done 1y t#e offender $#o #as no funds in t#e 1an< or funds are not sufficient 3. deceit on t#e accused T#e first and t#e t#ird element are not present. T#e c#ec< #as t#e c#aracter of negotia1ility and at t#e same time it constitute an e&idence of inde1tedness. >y mutual agreement of t#e parties t#e negotia1le c#aracter of t#e c#ec< may 1e $ai&ed and t#e instrument may 1e treated simply as proof of an o1ligation ($#ic# is t#e case at 1ar). T#ere cannot 1e deceit on t#e part of t#e o1ligors 1ecause t#ey agreed $it# t#e o1ligee at t#e time of t#e issuance and postdating of t#e c#ec<s t#at t#e same $ill not 1e cas#ed or presented 1y t#e 1an<s as per assurance of t#e o1ligee t#at t#e c#ec<s $ere mere e&idence of loan or security t#ereof in lieu of or for t#e same purpose as a promissory note. The %he%Fs8 there"&re8 are mere e(#$en%e &" #n$e,te$ness. N& $e%e#t ,e%a*se the' -ere #n"&rme$ ,' 2a%he%& that the' n& l&n+er hea(e "*n$s.
Element &" /n&-le$+e m*st ,e pr&(e$ ,' the pr&se%*t#&n

IDOS ( CA an$ 2p G.R. N&. 441650. Septem,er 078 4995 %dos issued a c#ec< to #er 1usiness partners $#ic# 1ounced. Con&icted 1y t#e lo$er court. C#e argued t#at s#e ga&e t#e c#ec< only as an assurance of #er s#are in t#e partners#ip. T#eir goods $ere not yet sold. B!5@3 C#e could not 1e #eld lia1le under >- 22. T#e element of <no$ledge of insufficiency of funds #as to 1e pro&en 1y t#e prosecution. .t#er$ise4 no con&iction. %n >- 224 t#e relations#ip of creditor0de1tor e8ists4 in t#e case at 1ar4 no suc# relations#ip 1ecause t#ey are still partners. %n t#e case at 1ar4 as earlier discussed4 petitioner issued t#e c#ec< merely to e&idence t#e proportionate s#are of complainant in t#e partners#ip assets upon its dissolution. -ayment of t#at s#are in t#e partners#ip $as conditioned on t#e su1se7uent reali2ation of profits from t#e unsold goods and collection of t#e recei&a1les of t#e firm. T#is condition must 1e satisfied or complied $it# 1efore t#e complainant can actually Qencas#Q t#e c#ec<. T#e reason for t#e condition is t#at petitioner #as no independent means to satisfy or disc#arge t#e complainant,s s#are4 ot#er t#an 1y t#e future sale and collection of t#e partners#ip assets. T#us4 prior to t#e selling of t#e goods and collecting of t#e recei&a1les4 t#e complainant could not4 as of yet4 demand #is proportionate s#are in t#e 1usiness. T#is situation $ould #old true until after t#e $inding up4 and su1se7uent termination of t#e partners#ip. +or only t#en4 $#en t#e goods $ere already sold and recei&a1les paid t#at cas# money could 1e a&ailed of 1y t#e erst$#ile partners. Complainant did not present any e&idence t#at petitioner signed and issued four c#ec<s actually <no$ing t#at funds t#erefor $ould 1e insufficient at t#e time complainant $ould present t#em to t#e dra$ee 1an<. +or it $as uncertain at t#e time of issuance of t#e c#ec<s $#et#er t#e unsold goods $ould #a&e 1een sold4 or $#et#er t#e recei&a1les $ould #a&e 1een collected 1y t#e time t#e c#ec<s $ould 1e encas#ed. As it turned out4 t#ree $ere fully funded $#en presented to t#e 1an<; t#e remaining one $as settled only later on. To recapitulate4 $e find t#e petition impressed $it# merit. -etitioner may not 1e #eld lia1le for &iolation of >.-. 22 for t#e follo$ing reasons3 (1) t#e su1=ect c#ec< $as not made4 dra$n and issued 1y petitioner in e8c#ange for &alue recei&ed as to 7ualify it as a c#ec< on account or for &alue; (2) t#ere is no sufficient 1asis to conclude t#at petitioner4 at t#e time of issue of t#e c#ec<4 #ad actual <no$ledge of t#e insufficiency of funds; and (3) t#ere $as no notice of dis#onor of said c#ec< actually ser&ed on petitioner4 t#ere1y depri&ing #er of t#e opportunity to pay or ma<e arrangements for t#e payment of t#e c#ec<4 to a&oid criminal prosecution.
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!2 00 an$ 2D 9768 Se%. 0C re%&n%#le$

FRANCISCO SYCI2 (s. CA G.R. N&. 407179. Mar%h 468 0111 CC said >- 22 creates a refuta1le presumption of <no$ledge on t#e part of t#e issuer on t#e time of t#e c#ec<;s issuance t#at #e did not #a&e funds or credit in t#e 1an< for payment t#ereof upon presentment. >- 22 and -@ )5" must 1e reconciled. 6#ile >- 22 enacted to safeguard t#e interest of t#e 1an<ing system4 it is difficult to see #o$ con&iction of t#e accused could protect t#e sanctity of t#e financial system. -@ )5" is enacted to protect t#e interest of to$n#ouse 1uyers. A statute must 1e construed $it# ot#er la$s so as to carry out t#eir legitimate aims and purposes. 6#ere ends are inconsistent $it# t#e general purpose of t#e acts4 more so $#en it is in contra&ention of anot#er &alid statute4 1ot# la$s must 1e reconciled. -etitioner argues t#at t#e court a 'uo erred $#en it affirmed #is con&iction for &iolation of >.-. >lg. 224 considering t#at #e #ad cause to stop payment of t#e c#ec<s issued to respondent. -etitioner insists t#at under -.@. ?o. )5"4 t#e 1uyer of a to$n#ouse unit #as t#e rig#t to suspend #is amorti2ation payments4 s#ould t#e su1di&ision or condominium de&eloper fail to de&elop or complete t#e pro=ect in accordance $it# duly0appro&ed plans and specifications. /i&en t#e findings of t#e B5EA> t#at certain aspects of pri&ate complainant,s to$n#ouse pro=ect $ere incomplete and unde&eloped4 t#e e8ercise of #is rig#t to suspend payments s#ould not render #im lia1le under >.-. >lg. 22. T#e Colicitor /eneral argues t#at since $#at petitioner $as c#arged $it# $ere &iolations of >.-. >lg. 224 t#e intent and circumstances surrounding t#e issuance of a $ort#less c#ec< are immaterial. T#e gra&amen of t#e offense c#arged is t#e act itself of ma<ing and issuing a $ort#less c#ec< or one t#at is dis#onored upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a 1ad c#ec< is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to pu1lic $elfare. %n #is &ie$4 -.@. ?o. )5" does not pro&ide petitioner a sufficient defense against t#e c#arges against #im. Admittedly4 $#at are in&ol&ed #ere are postdated c#ec<s. -ostdating simply means t#at on t#e date indicated on its face4 t#e c#ec< $ould 1e properly funded4 not t#at t#e c#ec<s s#ould 1e deemed as issued only t#en. T#e c#ec<s in t#is case $ere issued at t#e time of t#e signing of t#e Contract to Cell in August 1)'). >ut $e find from t#e records no s#o$ing t#at t#e time said c#ec<s $ere issued4 petitioner #ad <no$ledge t#at #is deposit or credit in t#e 1an< $ould 1e insufficient to co&er t#em $#en presented for encas#ment. .n t#e contrary4 t#ere is testimony 1y petitioner t#at at t#e time of presentation of t#e c#ec<s4 #e #ad -15*4***.** cas# or credit $it# Citi1an<. As t#e e&idence for t#e defense s#o$ed4 t#e closure of petitioner,s Account ?o. '45515 $it# Citi1an< $as not for insufficiency of funds. %t $as made upon t#e ad&ice of t#e dra$ee 1an<4 to a&oid payment of #efty 1an< c#arges eac# time petitioner issued a Qstop paymentQ order to pre&ent encas#ment of postdated c#ec<s in pri&ate respondent,s possession. Caid e&idence contradicts t#e prima facie presumption of <no$ledge of insufficiency of funds. >ut it esta1lis#es petitioner,s state of mind at t#e time said c#ec<s $ere issued on August 244 1)'). -etitioner definitely #ad no <no$ledge t#at #is funds or credit $ould 1e insufficient $#en t#e c#ec<s $ould 1e presented for encas#ment. Be could not #a&e foreseen t#at #e $ould 1e ad&ised 1y #is o$n 1an< in t#e future4 to close #is account to a&oid paying t#e #efty 1an<s c#arges t#at came $it# eac# Qstop paymentQ order issued to pre&ent pri&ate respondent from encas#ing t#e 3* or so c#ec<s in its possession. 6#at t#e prosecution #as esta1lis#ed is t#e closure of petitioner,s c#ec<ing account. >ut t#is does not suffice to pro&e t#e second element of t#e offense under >.-. >lg. 224 $#ic# e8plicitly re7uires Qe&idence of <no$ledge of insufficient fundsQ 1y t#e accused at t#e time t#e c#ec< or c#ec<s are presented for encas#ment. To rely on t#e presumption created 1y >.-. ?o. 22 as t#e prosecution did in t#is case4 $ould 1e to misconstrue t#e import of re7uirements for con&iction under t#e la$. 6#ile >.-. >lg. 22 $as enacted to safeguard t#e interest of t#e 1an<ing system4 it is difficult to see #o$ con&iction of t#e accused in t#is case $ill protect t#e sanctity of t#e financial system. Moreo&er4 protection must also 1e afforded t#e interest of to$n#ouse 1uyers under -.@. ?o. )5".
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QC!C. 23. 4on9Eorfeiture of Payments. L ?o installment payment made 1y a 1uyer in a su1di&ision or condominium pro=ect for t#e lot or unit #e contracted to 1uy s#all 1e forfeited in fa&or of t#e o$ner or de&eloper $#en t#e 1uyer4 after due notice to t#e o$ner or de&eloper4 desists from furt#er payment due to t#e failure of t#e o$ner or de&eloper to de&elop t#e su1di&ision or condominium pro=ect according to t#e appro&ed plans and $it#in t#e time limit for completing t#e same. Cuc# 1uyer may4 at #is option4 1e reim1ursed t#e total amount paid including amorti2ation interests 1ut e8cluding delin7uency interests $it# interest t#ereon at t#e legal rate.Q ?ote t#at $e #a&e up#eld a 1uyer,s reliance on Se%t#&n 0C &" 2.D. 976 to suspend payments until suc# time as t#e o$ner or de&eloper #ad fulfilled its o1ligations to t#e 1uyer. T#is e8ercise of a statutory rig#t to suspend installment payments4 is to our mind4 a (al#$ $e"ense a+a#nst the p*rp&rte$ (#&lat#&ns &" !.2. !l+. 00 t#at petitioner is c#arged $it#. /i&en t#e findings of t#e B5EA> as to incomplete features in t#e construction of petitioner,s and ot#er units of t#e su1=ect condominium 1oug#t on installment from +AC4 $e are of t#e &ie$ t#at petitioner #ad a &alid cause to order #is 1an< to stop payment. To say t#e least4 t#e t#ird element of Qsu1se7uent dis#onor of t#e c#ec<... !ithout (alid causeQ appears to us not esta1lis#ed 1y t#e prosecution. As already stated4 t#e prosecution tried to esta1lis# t#e crime on a prima facie presumption in >.-. >lg. 22. Bere t#at presumption is una&ailing4 in t#e presence of a &alid cause to stop payment4 t#ere1y negating t#e t#ird element of t#e crime. .ffenses punis#ed 1y a special la$4 li<e t#e >ouncing C#ec<s 5a$4 are not su1=ect to t#e A-C4 1ut t#e Code is supplementary to suc# a la$. 6e find not#ing in t#e te8t of >.-. >lg. 224 $#ic# $ould pre&ent t#e Ae&ised -enal Code from supplementing it. +ollo$ing Article 11 (5) of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 petitioner,s e8ercise of a rig#t of t#e 1uyer under Article 23 of -.@. ?o. )5" is a &alid defense to t#e c#arges against #im.
2ERSON 2RE.UDICED NEED NOT !E THE OWNER OF GOODS EM!EBBLED HERNANDEB (s CA G.R. N&. 41<56<. De%em,er 4<8 499C As to t#e o$ners#ip of t#e =e$elry4 $e #eld in -eople &. @y4 1*) CCAA 4** (1)'1) t#at3 Q.$ners#ip is not a necessary element of t#e crime of estafa. . . . %n estafa4 t#e person pre=udiced or t#e immediate &ictim of t#e fraud need not 1e t#e o$ner of t#e goods. T#us4 Article 315 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code pro&ides t#at ,Any person $#o s#all defraud anot#er (it does not say ,o$ner,) 1y any means mentioned #erein 1elo$ s#all 1e punis#ed . . ., All t#at is necessary is t#at t#e loss s#ould #a&e fallen on someone ot#er t#an t#e perpetrators of t#e crime . . .Q T#e trial court 1ased t#e ci&il indemnity on t#e actual price of t#e =e$elry as agreed upon 1y petitioner and de 5eon at t#e time of t#e transactions and t#is is reflected 1y t#e face &alue of t#e c#ec<s. ?>3 -re0e8isting de1t constitutes &alue. @eli1erations during t#e >atasang -am1ansa indicate t#at an ACC.E?T refers to a pre0e8isting o1ligation t#at is $#y in >- 22 e&en if t#e c#ec< is a issued in t#e payment of a pre e8isting o1ligation t#ere is a &iolation of t#e said la$. 6#ile +.A (A5E! means an o1ligation incurred simultaneously $it# t#e issuance of a c#ec< in e8c#ange of t#e c#ec< for goods.
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2RESIDENTIAL DECREE 0145 MA/ING ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT A CRIME OF ECONOMIC SA!OTAGE AND 2UNISHA!LE WITH LIFE IM2RISONMENT ?>3 %n connection $it# t#e crime of estafa4 $e s#ould also study illegal recruitment Co t#at persons c#arged $it# illegal recruitment is also c#arged $it# estafa; no dou1le =eopardy. :2p (s CALONBO4 /A11515*0554 Cept. 2"4 1)) ) 2.D. 0145 has amen$e$ Art#%les C5 an$ C9 &" the La,&r C&$e ,' pr&(#$#n+ #nter al#a as "&ll&-s ART. C5. Ille+al Re%r*#tment. O . . .
(a) Any recruitment acti&ities4 including t#e pro#i1ited practices enumerated under Article 34 of t#is Code4 to 1e underta<en 1y n&n@l#%ensees or n&n@h&l$ers &" a*th&r#t' s#all 1e deemed illegal and punis#a1le under Article 3) of t#is Code. T#e Ministry of 5a1or and !mployment (no$ @.5!) or any la$ enforcement officers may initiate complaints under t#is Article. (1) %llegal recruitment $#en committed 1y a s'n$#%ate .A in lar+e s%ale s#all 1e considered an offense in&ol&ing economic sa1otage and s#all 1e penali2ed in accordance $it# Article 3) #ereof. %llegal recruitment is deemed committed 1y a s'n$#%ate if carried out 1y a group of t#ree (3) or more persons conspiring andGor confederating $it# one anot#er in carrying out any unla$ful or illegal transaction4 enterprise or sc#eme defined under t#is first paragrap# #ereof. %llegal recruitment is deemed committed in lar+e s%ale if committed against t#ree (3) or more persons indi&idually or as a group. (c) 8 8 8 (T#is paragrap# #as 1een declared unconstitutional 1ecause only a =udge may issue $arrants of searc# and arrest. ( SALABAR (s ACHACOSO an$ MARKUEB4 /A'151*4 Marc# 144 1))*)) ART. C9. 2enalt#es.
(a) T#e penalty of t#e imprisonment and a fine of -1**4***.** s#all 1e imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sa1otage as defined #erein; 888 888 888 (c) Any person $#o is neit#er a licensee nor a #older of aut#ority under t#is Title found &iolating any pro&ision t#ereof or its implementing rules and regulations s#all4 upon con&iction t#ereof4 suffer t#e penalty of imprisonment of not less t#an four years nor more t#an eig#t years or a fine of not less t#an -2*4*** nor more t#an -1**4*** or 1ot# suc# imprisonment and fine4 at t#e discretion of t#e Court.
(-.@. 2*1' cannot apply to t#e appellants retroacti&ely as it $ould 1e an e8 post facto la$ to t#em. A la$ is e8 post facto if it refers to a criminal act4 punis#es an act $#ic# $as innocent $#en done4 and retroacts to t#e disad&antage of t#e accused. -rior to t#e said date4 recruiting on a large scale $as not yet punis#ed $it# t#e penalty imposed in t#e said decree.)
Art. 4C:,;4 &" 2D <<0 defines recruitment as Qany act of can&assing4 enlisting4 contracting4 transporting4 utili2ing4 #iring or procuring $or<ers4 and includes referrals4 contract ser&ices4 promising or ad&ertising for employment4 locally or a1road4 $#et#er for profit or not;
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pro&ided4 t#at any person or entity $#ic#4 in any manner4 offers or promises for a fee employment to t$o or more persons s#all 1e deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.Q >ut see Cec. 4 of RA 51<0 M#+rant W&rFers an$ O(erseas F#l#p#n&s A%t &" 4997 %%. %55!/A5 A!CAE%TM!?T
Se%. 3. De"#n#t#&n. 0 Eor purposes of this $ct4 illegal recruitment s#all mean any act of can&assing4 enlisting4 contracting4 transporting4 utili2ing4 #iring4 or procuring $or<ers and includes referring4 contract ser&ices4 promising or ad&ertising for employment a1road4 $#et#er for profit or not4 $#en underta<en 1y a non0licensee or non0#older of aut#ority contemplated under Article 13(f) of -@4423 -ro&ided4 T#at any suc# non0licensee or non0#older $#o4 in any manner4 offers or promises for a fee employment a1road to t$o or more persons s#all 1e deemed so engaged. %t s#all li<e$ise include t#e follo$ing acts4 $#et#er committed 1y any person4 $#et#er a non0licensee4 non0#older4 licensee or #older of aut#ority3 8 8 8 %llegal recruitment is deemed committed 1y a syndicate if carried out 1y a group of t#ree (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating $it# one anot#er. %t is deemed committed in large scale if committed against t#ree (3) or more persons indi&idually or as a group. T#e persons criminally lia1le for t#e a1o&e offenses are t#e principals4 accomplices and accessories. %n case of =uridical persons4 t#e officers #a&ing control4 management or direction of t#eir 1usiness s#all 1e lia1le. T#e rule is settled t#at t#e recruitment of persons for o&erseas employment $it#out t#e necessary recruiting permit or aut#ority from t#e -.!A constitutes illegal recruitment
*R'+CLE 1 5 $'<ER F$RM! $F !9+-DL+-7 6nder paragraph = 0 >y con&eying4 selling4 encum1ering4 or mortgaging any real property4 pretending to 1e t#e o$ner of t#e same !lements 1. T#ere is an immo&a1le4 suc# as a parcel of land or a 1uilding; 2. .ffender $#o is not t#e o$ner represents #imself as t#e o$ner t#ereof; 3. .ffender e8ecutes an act of o$ners#ip suc# as selling4 leasing4 encum1ering or mortgaging t#e real property; 4. T#e act is made to t#e pre=udice to t#e o$ner or a t#ird person. 6nder paragraph 2 0 1y disposing of real property as free from encum1rance4 alt#oug# suc# encum1rance 1e not recorded !lements 1. T#e t#ing disposed is a real property3 2. .ffender <ne$ t#at t#e real property $as encum1ered4 $#et#er t#e encum1rance is recorded or not; 3. T#ere must 1e e8press representation 1y offender t#at t#e real property is free from encum1rance; 4. T#e act of disposing of t#e real property is made to t#e damage of anot#er.
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6nder paragraph 3 0 1y $rongfully ta<ing 1y t#e o$ner of #is personal property from its la$ful possessor !lements 1. .ffender is t#e o$ner of personal property; 2. Caid personal property is in t#e la$ful possession of anot#er; 3. .ffender $rongfully ta<es it from its la$ful possessor; 4. -re=udice is t#ere1y caused to t#e possessor or t#ird person. 6nder paragraph ? 0 1y e8ecuting any fictitious contract to t#e pre=udice of anot#er 6nder paragraph performed 0 1y accepting any compensation for ser&ices not rendered or for la1or not
6nder paragraph > 0 1y selling4 mortgaging or encum1ering real property or properties $it# $#ic# t#e offender guaranteed t#e fulfillment of #is o1ligation as surety !lements 1. .ffender is a surety in a 1ond gi&en in a criminal or ci&il action; 2. Be guaranteed t#e fulfillment of suc# o1ligation $it# #is real property or properties; 3. Be sells4 mortgages4 or in any manner encum1ers said real property; 4. Cuc# sale4 mortgage or encum1rance is $it#out e8press aut#ority from t#e court4 or made 1efore t#e cancellation of #is 1ond4 or 1efore 1eing relie&ed from t#e o1ligation contracted 1y #im.
*R'+CLE 1 6 !9+-DL+-7 * M+-$R A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e offender ta<es ad&antage of t#e ine8perience or emotions or feelings of a minor 2. t#at #e induces suc# minor a. to assume an o1ligation or 1. to gi&e release or c. to e8ecute a transfer of any property rig#t 3. t#e consideration is a. some loan of money 1. credit or c. ot#er personal property 4. t#at t#e transaction is to t#e detriment of suc# minor ?>3 Aeal property not included since a minor cannot con&ey real property. AA '*)3 t#e age of ma=ority no$ is 1' years of age and a1o&e. *R'+CLE 1 8 $'<ER DECE+'! A. Acts punis#ed
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1. @efrauding or damaging anot#er 1y any ot#er deceit not mentioned in t#e preceding articles; 2. %nterpreting dreams4 1y ma<ing forecasts4 1y telling fortunes4 or 1y ta<ing ad&antage or t#e credulity of t#e pu1lic in any ot#er similar manner4 for profit or gain.
Chapter Se(en CHATTEL MORTGAGE

*R'+CLE 1 9 REM$:*LA !*LEA $R PLED7E $F M$R'7*7ED PR$PER'3 Acts punis#ed 1. Mno$ingly remo&ing any personal property mortgaged under t#e C#attel Mortgage la$ to any pro&ince or city ot#er t#an t#e one in $#ic# it $as located at t#e time of e8ecution of t#e mortgage4 $it#out t#e $ritten consent of t#e mortgagee or #is e8ecutors4 administrators or assigns; !lements3 1. -ersonal property is mortgaged under t#e C#attel Mortgage 5a$; 2. .ffender <no$s t#at suc# property is so mortgaged; 3. .ffender remo&es suc# mortgaged personal property to any pro&ince or city ot#er t#an t#e one in $#ic# it $as located at t#e time of t#e e8ecution of t#e mortgage; 4. T#e remo&al is permanent; 5. T#ere is no $ritten consent of t#e mortgagee or #is e8ecutors4 administrators or assigns to suc# remo&al. 2. Celling or pledging personal property already pledged4 or any part t#ereof4 under t#e terms of t#e C#attel Mortgage 5a$4 $it#out t#e consent of t#e mortgagee $ritten on t#e 1ac< of t#e mortgage and noted on t#e record t#ereof in t#e office of t#e register of deeds of t#e pro&ince $#ere suc# property is located. !lements3 1. -ersonal property is already pledged under t#e terms of t#e C#attel Mortgage 5a$; 2. .ffender4 $#o is t#e mortgagor of suc# property4 sells or pledges t#e same or any part t#ereof; 3. T#ere is no consent of t#e mortgagee $ritten on t#e 1ac< of t#e mortgage and noted on t#e record t#ereof in t#e office of t#e register of deeds. %n 1ot# -ar. 1 and par. 24 to a&oid penal lia1ility4 t#e $ritten consent of t#e mortgagee must 1e o1tained; and in sale or pledge under par. 24 t#e mortgagee;s consent must furt#er 1e $ritten at t#e 1ac< of t#e instrument $#ic# s#ould t#en 1e duly registered. !&en if t#e sale of t#e property $as $it# t#e consent of t#e mortgagee4 1ut t#e mortgagor sold t#e same as unencum1ered4 #e commits estafa. %f t#ere $as no $ritten consent of t#e
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mortgagee4 and t#e mortgagor sold t#e property as unencum1ered4 #e commits t$o separate crimes against different offended parties4 t#at is4 estafa against t#e 1uyer4 and &iolation of t#is article against t#e mortgagee.
Chapter E#+ht ARSON AND OTHER CRIMES INAOLAING DESTRUCTION

(Articles 32* to 32 0> #as 1een e8pressly repealed 1y -@ 1 13. Article 32* $as t#en re&i&ed 1y -@ 1"44. T#e latest amendment is 1y section 1* of AA " 5) on destructi&e arson) *R'+CLE 120 DE!'R;C'+:E *R!$Minds of arson 1. Arson4 under Cection 1 of 2res#$ent#al De%ree N&. 434C; 2. @estructi&e arson4 under Art#%le C01 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code4 as amended 1y Aepu1lic Act ?o. " 5); 3. .t#er cases of arson4 under Se%t#&n C &" 2res#$ent#al De%ree N&. 434C. Compare Art 32* par. 54 to t#e pro&isions on estafa particularly t#e 1urning of records to conceal fraud. H3 6#en is arson punis#ed $it# reclusion perpetua to deat#F A3 $#en t#e arson is committed or perpetrated 1y t$o or more persons regardless of $#et#er t#e purpose is merely to 1urn or destroy t#e 1uilding or t#e 1urning merely constitutes an o&ert act in t#e commission of anot#er &iolation of la$. H3 6#en is arson punis#ed $it# mandatory deat#F A3 if as a conse7uence of t#e acts punis#ed in t#is article deat# results4 t#e mandatory penalty of deat# s#all 1e imposed.
%llustration3 %f I 1urns t#e #ouse of J and J died4 t#e crime is arson. >ut if I 1urns t#e #ouse of J in order in order to <ill t#e latter t#e crime is murder. Co #ere4 under t#is article t#ere must 1e no intention to <ill.
?;R+!PR;DE-'+*L 'RE-D +- *R!$$%&R& '* N+ C+(!,&: CR'(& +4 AR*+N )'$% >(/,$'!,&? %+('C'D&3 !&% #20%3estructive rson% I % % % If as a conse,uence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this rticle, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed% F4mphasis supplied%G 8residential 3ecree /o% "6"#J 64(% 0% +here 3eath !esults from rson% I If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed% F4mphasis supplied%G o !rt. 32> of the 3(*, as amended, with respect to destructi#e arson, and the pro#isions of (D 5o. 1@13 respecting other cases of arson pro#ide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether
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considered destructi#e or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d0Qtre is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the conse-uence. &hether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will ha#e to be a separate crime altogether, the .oint discussion of the late Mr. *hief Austice 3amon *. !-uino and Mme. Austice *arolina *. /riNo%!-uino, on the sub.ect of the crimes of arson and murderMhomicide, is highly instructi#e: /roi+ard says that when fire is used with the intent to )ill a particular person who may be in a house and that ob.ecti#e is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. &hen the (enal *ode declares that )illing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to ta)e life. 'n other words, if the main ob0ect of the offender is to 1ill by means of fire, the offense is murder3 But if the main ob0ective is the burnin# of the buildin#, the resultin# homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson. 'f the house was set on fire after the #ictims therein were )illed, fire would not be a -ualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson. !ccordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crimeMcrimes wasMwere perpetrated 8 whether arson, murder or arson and homicideMmurder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main ob.ecti#e of the malefactor: (a) if the main ob*ective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed< (b) if, on the other hand, the main ob*ective is to 'ill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only< lastly, (c) if the ob*ective is, li'ewise, to 'ill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the 'illing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed I homicideKmurder and arson%
'n the crime of arson, the identities of the #ictims are immaterial in that intent to )ill them
particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. !s we ha#e clarified earlier, the )illing of a person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructi#e. The prosecution need only pro#e, that the burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. !gain, in the case of ,eople v. +oriano, we e,plained that: !lthough intent may be an ingredient of the crime of !rson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural conse-uences of his act= and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further e#idence of his wrongful intent. &he ultimate ,uery now is which 'ind of arson is accusedBappellant guilty ofH
o o
!s pre#iously discussed, there are two ;2< categories of the crime of arson: 1< destructive arson, under !rt. 32> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3epublic !ct 5o. B@E?= and 2< simple arson, under (residential Decree 5o. 1@13. Said classification is based on the 'ind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the #alue of the damage caused, 7H to wit: %rticle 2 / of The 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3! B@E?, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.97? : The classification of this type of crime is )nown as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self%e#ident: to effecti#ely discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to pre#ent the destruction of properties and protect the li#es of innocent people. 4,posure to a brewing conflagration lea#es only destruction and despair in its wa)e= hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The e,ceptionally se#ere punishment imposed for this crime ta)es into consideration the e,treme danger to human li#es e,posed by the malicious burning of these structures= the danger to property resulting from the conflagration= the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators= and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. 94mphasis supplied.:
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'f as a conse-uence of the commission of any of the acts penali+ed under !rt. 32>, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. "n the other hand, !D 1 13 which repealed !rts. 321 to 32@%1 of The 3e#ised (enal *ode remains the go#erning law for *imple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in rt% #20 , as amended by 3! B@E?, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, go#ernment buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, whar#es and other industrial establishments.9E> : !lthough the purpose of the law on Simple !rson is to pre#ent the high incidence of fires and other crimes in#ol#ing destruction, protect the national economy and preser#e the social, economic and political stability of the nation, (D 1@13 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple !rson recogni+es the need to lessen the se#erity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 94mphasis supplied.: To emphasi+e: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from *imple Arson by the degree of per#ersity or #iciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under !rt. 32> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode ;as amended< constituting Destructi#e !rson are characteri+ed as heinous crimes for being grie#ous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wic)edness, #iciousness, atrocity and per#ersity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a .ust, ci#ili+ed and ordered society. E1 "n the other hand, acts committed under (D 1@13 constituting Simple !rson are crimes with a lesser degree of per#ersity and #iciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. 'n other words, Simple !rson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructi#e !rson. owe#er, acts falling under Simple !rson may ne#ertheless be con#erted into Destructi#e !rson depending on the -ualifying circumstances present. 94mphasis supplied.:
o
o
(rescinding from the abo#e clarification #is%R%#is the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the 'nformation, it is -uite e#ident that accused%appellant was charged with the crime of Simple !rson 8 for ha#ing $deliberately set fire upon the twoBstorey residential house of !:@4!&: 648 ! and family % % % 'nowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thic'ly populated place and as a conse,uence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (.) ad*oining residential houses, were razed by fire.$ 94mphasis supplied.: The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of (eople #. Soriano. E3 The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Dnfortunately, the bla+e spread and gutted down fi#e ;E< neighboring houses. The 3T* therein found the accused guilty of destructi#e arson under paragraph 1 E7 of !rt. 32> of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3epublic !ct 5o. B@E?. This *ourt, through Mr. Austice 1ellosillo, howe#er, declared that: . . . 9T:he applicable pro#ision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of (D 1@13, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused% appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second !mended 'nformation particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, (ar. 2, of (D 1@13, and not !rt. 32>, par. 1 of the (enal *ode. 'n case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well%settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the go#ernment, and liberally in fa#or of the accused. The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of (D 1@13 are: ;a< there is intentional burning= and ;b< what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. 'ncidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar. !s stated in the body of the 'nformation, accused%appellant was charged with ha#ing intentionally burned the two%storey residential house of 3obert Separa. Said conflagration li)ewise spread and destroyed se#en ;B< ad.oining houses. *onse-uently, if pro#ed, as it was pro#ed, at the trial, she may be con#icted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case $notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the information remains effecti#e insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.$ E@ $&hat is controlling is not the title of the
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complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly #iolate, . . ., but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.$ There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the 3T* as Sec. E of (D 5o. 1@13 categorically pro#ides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is: S4*. E. &here Death 3esults from !rson. 8 'f by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. 94mphasis supplied.:
AR*+N5 D&4'N&D5 C,A**'4'CA$'+N. 8 !rson is the malicious burning of property. Dnder !rt. 32> of The 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended, and (D 1@13, !rson is classified into two )inds: ;1< Destructi#e !rson ;!rt. 32>< and ;2< other cases of arson ;(D 1@13<. This classification is based on the )ind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the #alue of the damage caused.
D&*$R/C$'.& AR*+N5 &,AB+RA$&D. 8 !rticle 32> of The 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3! B@E?, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and pri#ate, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, #essels, aircraft, factories and other military, go#ernment or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is )nown as Destructi#e !rson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self%e#ident: to effecti#ely discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to pre#ent the destruction of properties and protect the li#es of innocent people. 4,posure to a brewing conflagration lea#es only destruction and despair in its wa)e= hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The e,ceptionally se#ere punishment imposed for this crime ta)es into consideration the e,treme danger to human li#es e,posed by the malicious burning of these structures= the danger to property resulting from the conflagration= the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators= and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation. 'f as a conse-uence of the commission of any of the acts penali+ed under !rt. 32>, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
D'*$'N7/'*%&D 4R+( +$%&R CA*&* +4 AR*+N5 '(!+*AB,& !&NA,$-5 CA*& A$ BAR . 8 The legal basis of the trial court for con#icting accused%appellant is !rt. 32>, par. 1, of The 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended by 3! B@E?, Sec. 1>, par. 1. Dnder this pro#ision, a person found guilty of Destructi#e !rson is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death where the burning affects one ;1< or more buildings or edifices, conse-uent to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on se#eral or different occasions. owe#er, we belie#e that the applicable pro#ision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of (D 1@13, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused%appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second !mended 'nformation particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of (D 1@13, and not !rt. 32>, par. 1 of the (enal *ode. 'n case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well% settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the go#ernment, and literally in fa#or of the accused.
*'(!,& AR*+N5 &,AB+RA$&D. 8 "n the other hand, (D 1@13 which repealed !rts. 321 to 32@%1 of The 3e#ised (enal *ode remains the go#erning law for Simple !rson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of public and pri#ate structures, regardless of si+e, not included in !rt. 32>, as amended by 3! B@E?, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, go#ernment buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, whar#es and other industrial establishments. !lthough the purpose of the law on Simple !rson is to pre#ent the high incidence of fires and other crimes in#ol#ing destruction, protect the national economy and preser#e the social, economic and political stability of the nation, (D 1@13 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple !rson recogni+es the need to lessen the se#erity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
D'*$'N7/'*%&D 4R+( D&*$R/C$'.& AR*+N. 8 The nature of Destructi#e !rson is distinguished from Simple !rson by the degree of per#ersity or #iciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under !rt. 32> of The 3e#ised (enal *ode constituting Destructi#e !rson are characteri+ed as heinous crimes $for being grie#ous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wic)edness, #iciousness, atrocity and per#ersity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
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standards and norms of decency and morality in a .ust, ci#ili+ed and ordered society.$ "n the other hand, acts committed under (D 1@13 constituting Simple !rson are crimes with a lesser degree of per#ersity and #iciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. 'n other words, Simple !rson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructi#e !rson. owe#er, acts falling under Simple !rson may ne#ertheless be con#erted into Destructi#e !rson depending on the -ualifying circumstances present. !3D3 N+3 1 135 AR*+N5 &,&(&N$* $%&R&+45 AC$/A, ;N+),&D7& $%A$ $%& %+/*& )A* 'N%AB'$&D '* N+$ N&C&**AR-5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 &hen 6erigel burned !#elino0s house, the law applicable was (.D. 5o. 1@13. Dnder Section 3 ;2< of the law, the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is $any inhabited house or dwelling.$ Dnder the amendment, it is the fact that the house burned is inhabited that -ualifies the crime. There is no need to pro#e that the accused had actual )nowledge that the house was inhabited. Dnder Section 3 ;2< of (residential Decree 5o. 1@13, the elements of arson are: ;1< that there is intentional burning= and ;2< that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The records show that when 6erigel willfully set fire to the roof of !#elino0s house, !#elino0s wife and children were asleep therein. C+R!/* D&,'C$' +4 AR*+N5 CA*& A$ BAR. 8 (roof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses. *orpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime. 't refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. *orpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be pro#ed by the testimonies of witnesses. 'n murder, the fact of death is the corpus delicti. 'n arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its ha#ing been intentionally caused. The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to pro#e the corpus delicti and to warrant con#iction. ere, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly pro#en beyond reasonable doubt.
Chapter N#ne MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

*R'+CLE 126 M*L+C+$;! M+!C<+EF A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e offender deli1erately caused damage to t#e property of anot#er 2. t#at suc# act does not constitute arson or ot#er crimes in&ol&ing destruction 3. t#at #e act of damaging anot#er;s property 1e committed merely for t#e sa<e of damaging it. T#ere is destruction of t#e property of anot#er 1ut t#ere is no misappropriation. .t#er$ise4 it $ould 1e t#eft if #e gat#ers t#e effects of destruction.
%llustration3 %f I and J are enemies and t#ey #ad =ust a fig#t4 I <ills t#e pig of J. T#e crime committed may eit#er 1e malicious misc#ief or t#eft.
Malicious misc#ief is destruction out of #ate4 re&enge or ot#er e&il moti&e4 for t#e specific purpose of destroying property. Bence4 it cannot 1e committed t#ru rec<less imprudence or t#ru &iolence in t#e course of a fig#t. Also4 t#e damages must not #a&e 1een caused 1y arson or ot#er destructi&e means as pro&ided in t#e preceding C#apter !ig#t. %f property $as maliciously damaged t#en appropriated 1y t#e offender4 t#e crime $ould 1e t#eft under Art. 3*' (2)4 t#e malicious act 1eing a1sor1ed t#erein. 6#ere t#e pigs of t#e anot#er $ere <illed 1y t#e accused to a&oid damage to #is crops4 #e incurs only ci&il lia1ility. >ut $#ere t#e cattle of t#e offended party $ere <illed 1y t#e accused out of #ate or for re&enge4 it $ould 1e malicious misc#ief.
Page 150
*R'+CLE 128 !PEC+*L C*!E! $F M*L+C+$;! M+!C<+EF A. Acts punis#ed 1. Causing damage to o1struct t#e performance of pu1lic functions; 2. Esing any poisonous or corrosi&e su1stance; 3. Cpreading any infection or contagion among cattle; 4. Causing damage to t#e property of t#e ?ational Museum or ?ational 5i1rary4 or to any arc#i&e or registry4 $ater$or<s4 road4 promenade4 or any ot#er t#ing used is common 1y t#e pu1ic. ?>3 H3 %n t#e crime of sedition4 t#ere is also a pro&ision t#ere on destruction of pu1lic functions4 $#at is t#e distinctionF A3 t#e only difference is in sedition t#ere is a tumultuous pu1lic uprising. T#e act of causing damage to o1struct t#e performance of pu1lic functions s#ould not 1e confused $it# sedition $#ic# re7uires a pu1lic uprising and t#e o1struction t#erein need not entail damage to property.
*R'+CLE 129 $'<ER M+!C<+EF! All ot#er misc#iefs not included in t#e ne8t preceding article *R'+CLE 110 D*M*7E *-D $4!'R;C'+$- '$ ME*-! $F C$MM;-+C*'+$Aesult in derailment of cars4 collisions or ot#er accident. %f t#e property damaged is appropriated4 t#e crime is t#eft 1ecause t#ere is intent to gain. T#e destruction is no longer considered. @istinction 1et$een coup d; etat and article 33* C&*p $? etat -urpose is to diminis# state po$er -olitical crime art#%le CC1 t#e purpose is to destroy Crime against property
T#is is committed 1y damaging any rail$ay4 telegrap# or telep#one lines.

*R'+CLE 11 DE!'R$3+-7 $R D*M*7+-7 !'*';E!A P;4L+C M$-;ME-'! $R P*+-'+-7!
Page 15
Chapter Ten EXEM2TION FROM CRIMINAL LIA!ILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST 2RO2ERTY

*R'+CLE 112 PER!$-! E@EMP' FR$M CR+M+-*L L+*4+L+'3 A. Crimes in&ol&ed in t#e e8emption 1. T#eft; 2. !stafa; and 3. Malicious misc#ief. >. -ersons e8empted from criminal lia1ility 1. Cpouse4 ascendants and descendants4 or relati&es 1y affinity in t#e same line; 2. 6ido$ed spouse $it# respect to t#e property $#ic# 1elonged to t#e deceased spouse 1efore t#e same passed into t#e possession of anot#er 3. >rot#ers and sisters and 1rot#ers0in0la$ and sisters0in0la$4 if li&ing toget#er. .nly t#e relati&es enumerated incur no lia1ility if t#e crime relates to t#eft (not ro11ery)4 s$indling4 and malicious misc#ief. T#ird parties $#o participate are not e8empt. T#e relations#ip 1et$een t#e spouses is not limited to legally married couples; t#e pro&ision applies to li&e0in partners. !stafa s#ould not 1e comple8ed $it# any ot#er crime in order for e8emption to operate. T#e relations#ip 1et$een t#e offender and t#e offended party operates as an a1solutory cause in t#e crimes of t#eft4 estafa and malicious misc#ief. Bence4 t#e e8emption does not apply to ro11ery or $#ere one of t#e crimes mentioned #ere is comple8ed $it# anot#er4 suc# as t#eft t#ru falsification or estafa t#ru falsification. Aegarding t#e relati&es mentioned in -ar. 14 it #as 1een #eld t#at included in t#e e8emptions are parents0in0la$4 step0parents and adopted c#ildren. T#e e8emption furt#er applies to illegitimate c#ildren pro&ided t#ey are recogni2ed or t#eir filiation is duly pro&ed. %t does not apply4 #o$e&er4 to an 9illegitimate grandfat#er:. Aegarding t#e $ido$ed spouse4 s#e is also e8empt if t#e property 1elonging to t#e estate of t#e deceased #as not 9passed into t#e possession of anot#er4: #ence if t#e estate is already under =udicial settlement4 t#e e8emption cannot 1e in&o<ed as t#e property is deemed to 1e in t#e possession of t#e administrator or in custodia legis if t#e in&entory t#ereof #as 1een appro&ed 1y t#e pro1ate court. >rot#ers and sisters or 1rot#ers0in0la$ and sisters0in0la$ $ill also en=oy t#e e8emption if t#ey are actually li&ing toget#er4 1ut not to $#ere one is only gi&en temporary s#elter 1y t#e ot#er4 for t#en t#e closeness of t#e ties of consanguinity or affinity $ould 1e supplanted 1y considerations of con&enience $#ic# may 1e ta<en ad&antage of.
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TITLE ELEAEN
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. . ". '. ). 1*. Adultery (Art. 333); Concu1inage (Art. 334); Acts of lasci&iousness (Art. 33 ); Hualified seduction (Art. 33"); Cimple seduction (Art. 33'); Acts of lasci&iousness $it# t#e consent of t#e offended party (Art. 33)); Corruption of minors (Art. 34*); 6#ite sla&e trade (Art. 34); +orci1le a1duction (Art. 342); Consented a1duction (Art. 343).
T#e crimes of A$*lter'4 C&n%*,#na+e4 Se$*%t#&n4 A,$*%t#&n and A%ts &" las%#(#&*sness are t#e so0called pr#(ate %r#mes. T#ey cannot 1e prosecuted e8cept upon t#e complaint initiated 1y t#e offended party. T#e la$ regards t#e pri&acy of t#e offended party #ere as more important t#an t#e distur1ance to t#e order of society. +or t#e la$ gi&es t#e offended party t#e preference $#et#er to sue or not to sue. >ut t#e moment t#e offended party #as initiated t#e criminal complaint4 t#e pu1lic prosecutor $ill ta<e o&er and continue $it# prosecution of t#e offender. T#at is $#y under Article 3444 if t#e offended party pardons t#e offender4 t#at pardon $ill only 1e &alid if it comes 1efore t#e prosecution starts. T#e moment t#e prosecution starts4 t#e crime #as already 1ecome pu1lic and it is 1eyond t#e offended party to pardon t#e offender.
Chapter One ADULTERY AND CONCU!INAGE

*R'+CLE 111 9<$ *RE 7;+L'3 $F *D;L'ER3 A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e $oman is married 2. t#at s#e #as se8ual intercourse $it# a man not #er #us1and 3. t#at as regards t#e man $it# $#om s#e #as se8ual intercourse4 #e must <no$ #er to 1e married. Special mitigating circumstance: %f t#e person guilty of adultery committed t#is offense $#ile 1eing a1andoned $it#out =ustification 1y t#e offended spouse4 penalty is lo$ered 1y 1 degree. Crimes against c#astity are also referred to as pri&ate crimes4 or crimes $#ic# cannot 1e prosecuted de oficio, 1ecause of t#e re7uirement t#at t#e prosecution t#ereof 1e upon a s$orn $ritten complaint of t#e offended party or certain persons aut#ori2ed 1y la$. T#e crimes against c#astity $#ic# cannot 1e prosecuted de oficio are3 a) adultery Art. 333 1) concu1inage Art. 334 c) acts of lasci&iousness $it# or $it#out consent Art. 33 4 33) d) seduction $#et#er 7ualified or simple Art. 33"4 33' e) a1duction $#ic# may 1e forci1le or consented Art. 3424 343. T#e crimes against c#astity $#ic# can 1e prosecuted de oficio are3
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a) corruption of minors Art. 34*. 1) $#ite sla&e trade Art. 341. T#ere $ill 1e separate crimes of adultery and 1igamy e&en if t#e adultery resulted from or $as 1y reason of t#e 1igamous marriage. Adultery is a crime not only of t#e married $oman 1ut also of t#e man $#o #ad intercourse $it# a married $oman <no$ing #er to 1e married. !&en if t#e man pro&es later on t#at #e does not <no$ t#e $oman to 1e married4 at t#e 1eginning4 #e must still 1e included in t#e complaint or information. T#is is so 1ecause $#et#er #e <no$s t#e $oman to 1e married or not is a matter of defense and its up to #im to &entilate t#at in formal in&estigations or a formal trial. %f after preliminary in&estigation4 t#e pu1lic prosecutor is con&inced t#at t#e man did not <no$ t#at t#e $oman is married4 t#en #e could simply file t#e case against t#e $oman. T#e ac7uittal of t#e $oman does not necessarily result in t#e ac7uittal of #er co0accused. %n order to constitute adultery4 t#ere must 1e a =oint p#ysical act. Doint criminal intent is not necessary. Alt#oug# t#e criminal intent may e8ist in t#e mind of one of t#e parties to t#e p#ysical act4 t#ere may 1e no suc# intent in t#e mind of t#e ot#er party. .ne may 1e guilty of t#e criminal intent4 t#e ot#er innocent4 and yet t#e =oint p#ysical act necessary to constitute t#e adultery may 1e complete. Co4 if t#e man #ad no <no$ledge t#at t#e $oman $as married4 #e $ould 1e innocent insofar as t#e crime of adultery is concerned 1ut t#e $oman $ould still 1e guilty; t#e former $ould #a&e to 1e ac7uitted and t#e latter found guilty4 alt#oug# t#ey $ere tried toget#er. A #us1and committing concu1inage may 1e re7uired to support #is $ife committing adultery under t#e rule in pari delicto. T#ere is no frustrated adultery 1ecause of t#e nature of t#e offense. +or adultery to e8ist4 t#ere must 1e a marriage alt#oug# it 1e su1se7uently annulled. T#ere is no adultery4 if t#e marriage is &oid from t#e 1eginning. Adultery is an instantaneous crime $#ic# is consummated and completed at t#e moment of t#e carnal union. !ac# se8ual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. Adultery is not a continuing crime unli<e concu1inage.
%llustration3 Madamme I is a married $oman residing in -asay City. Be met a man4 J4 at Ao8as >oule&ard. C#e agreed to go $it# to >aguio City4 supposedly to come 1ac< t#e ne8t day. 6#en t#ey $ere in >ulacan4 t#ey stayed in a motel4 #a&ing se8ual intercourse t#ere. After t#at4 t#ey proceeded again and stopped at @agupan City4 $#ere t#ey $ent to a motel and #ad se8ual intercourse.
T#ere are t$o counts of adultery committed in t#is instance3 one adultery in >ulacan4 and anot#er adultery in @agupan City. !&en if it in&ol&es t#e same man4 eac# intercourse is a separate crime of adultery.
*R'+CLE 11, C$-C;4+-*7E A. Acts punis#ed 1. Meeping a mistress in t#e con=ugal d$elling; 2. Ba&ing se8ual intercourse4 under scandalous circumstances;
Page 15,
3. Co#a1iting $it# #er in any ot#er place. >. !lements 1. T#e man is married; 2. Be is eit#er 0 a. Meeping a mistress in t#e con=ugal d$elling; 1. Ba&ing se8ual intercourse under scandalous circumstances $it# a $oman $#o is not #is $ife; or c. Co#a1iting $it# a $oman $#o is not #is $ife in any ot#er place; 3. As regards t#e $oman4 s#e <no$s t#at t#e man is married. consent K refers to future acts pardon K refers to past acts ?>3 T#ere can 1e no accomplice 1ot# in adultery and concu1inage Concu1inage is committed in t#ree $ays. T#e element of #a1ituality in t#e commission of t#e crime is re7uired in t#e first and t#ird modes. %n t#e t#ird mode4 co#a1iting in any ot#er place re7uires t#at 1ot# t#e accused actually li&e toget#er as #us1and and $ife. .ccasional &isits or mere transient inter&ie$s 1et$een t#e accused does not constitute co#a1itation $#ic# is e8pressly re7uired 1y t#e Code. 6it# respect to concu1inage t#e same principle applies3 only t#e offended spouse can 1ring t#e prosecution. T#is is a crime committed 1y t#e married man4 t#e #us1and. Cimilarly4 it includes t#e $oman $#o #ad a relations#ip $it# t#e married man. %t #as 1een as<ed $#y t#e penalty for adultery is #ig#er t#an concu1inage $#en 1ot# crimes are infidelities to t#e marital &o$s. T#e reason gi&en for t#is is t#at $#en t#e $ife commits adultery4 t#ere is a pro1a1ility t#at s#e $ill 1ring a stranger into t#e family. %f t#e #us1and commits concu1inage4 t#is pro1a1ility does not arise 1ecause t#e mot#er of t#e c#ild $ill al$ays carry t#e c#ild $it# #er. Co e&en if t#e #us1and 1rings $it# #im t#e c#ild4 it is clearly <no$n t#at t#e c#ild is a stranger. ?ot in t#e case of a married $oman $#o may 1ring a c#ild to t#e family under t#e guise of a legitimate c#ild. T#is is t#e reason $#y in t#e former crime t#e penalty is #ig#er t#an t#e latter. Enli<e adultery4 concu1inage is a continuing crime. Inn&%ent Sp&*se n& l&n+er has the r#+ht t& #nst#t*te A$*lter' &r C&n%*,#na+e a"ter a D#(&r%e has ,een De%ree$
IMELDA 2ILA2IL (s. HON I!AY@SOMERA an$ GEILING G.R. N&. 51443. .*ne C18 4959 An ill0starred marriage of a +ilipina and a foreigner $#ic# ended in a foreign a1solute di&orce4 only to 1e follo$ed 1y a criminal infidelity suit of t#e latter against t#e former4 pro&ides Es t#e opportunity to lay do$n a decisional rule on $#at #it#erto appears to 1e an unresol&ed =urisdictional 7uestion. .n Ceptem1er "4 1)")4 petitioner %melda -ilapil4 a +ilipino citi2en4 and pri&ate respondent /eiling4 a /erman national4 $ere married 1efore t#e Aegistrar of >irt#s4 Marriages and @eat#s at +riedens$eiler in t#e +ederal Aepu1lic of /ermany. T#e marriage started auspiciously enoug#4 and t#e couple li&ed toget#er for some time in Malate4 Manila $#ere t#eir only c#ild4 %sa1ella -ilapil /eiling4 $as 1orn on April 2*4 1)'*.
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T#ereafter4 marital discord set in4 $it# mutual recriminations 1et$een t#e spouses4 follo$ed 1y a separation de facto 1et$een t#em. A@E5T!AJ A?@ C.?CE>%?A/!; A+T!A A @%(.AC! BAC >!!? @!CA!!@4 TB! %??.C!?T C-.EC! ?. 5.?/!A BAC TB! A%/BT T. %?CT%TET! -A.C!!@%?/C A/A%?CT TB! .++!?@!AC. R American =urisprudence4 on cases in&ol&ing statutes in t#at =urisdiction $#ic# are in pari materia $it# ours4 yields t#e rule t#at after a di&orce #as 1een decreed4 t#e innocent spouse no longer #as t#e rig#t to institute proceedings against t#e offenders $#ere t#e statute pro&ides t#at t#e innocent spouse s#all #a&e t#e e8clusi&e rig#t to institute a prosecution for adultery. 6#ere4 #o$e&er4 proceedings #a&e 1een properly commenced4 a di&orce su1se7uently granted can #a&e no legal effect on t#e prosecution of t#e criminal proceedings to a conclusion. MAAA%A/! %? TB! +!@!AA5 A!-E>5%C .+ /!AMA?J >!T6!!? A +%5%-%?A A?@ A /!AMA?4 A!C./?%X!@ %? TB! -B%5%--%?!C. R %n t#e present case4 t#e fact t#at pri&ate respondent o1tained a &alid di&orce in #is country4 t#e +ederal Aepu1lic of /ermany4 is admitted. Caid di&orce and its legal effects may 1e recogni2ed in t#e -#ilippines insofar as pri&ate respondent is concerned in &ie$ of t#e nationality principle in our ci&il la$ on t#e matter of status of persons. C!(!AA?C! .+ MAT!A%A5 >.?@ BA@ TB! !++!CT .+ @%CC.C%AT%?/ TB! +.AM!A C-.EC!C +A.M !ACB .TB!A. R T#e allegation of pri&ate respondent t#at #e could not #a&e 1roug#t t#is case 1efore t#e decree of di&orce for lac< of <no$ledge4 e&en if true4 is of no legal significance or conse7uence in t#is case. 6#en said respondent initiated t#e di&orce proceeding4 #e o1&iously <ne$ t#at t#ere $ould no longer 1e a family nor marriage &o$s to protect once a dissolution of t#e marriage is decreed. ?eit#er $ould t#ere 1e a danger of introducing spurious #eirs into t#e family4 $#ic# is said to 1e one of t#e reasons for t#e particular formulation of our la$ on adultery4 since t#ere $ould t#encefort# 1e no spousal relations#ip to spea< of. T#e se&erance of t#e marital 1ond #ad t#e effect of dissociating t#e former spouses from eac# ot#er4 #ence t#e actuations of one $ould not affect or cast o1lo7uy on t#e ot#er.
Chapter T-& RA2E AND ACTS OF LASCIAIOUSNESS

*R'+CLE 112 '/e (e0initi#n #0 t/e "rime #0 ra)e was ex)an(e( an( t/e same was re"lassi0ie( as a "rime against )ers#ns an( in"#r)#rate( int# 'itle Eig/t .n(er C/a)er '/ree as *rti"les 255=*A 255=4A 255=C an( 255=D%) *R'+CLE 115 *C'! $F L*!C+:+$;!-E!! A. !lements 1. .ffender commits any act of lasci&iousness or le$dness; 2. %t is done under any of t#e follo$ing circumstances3 a. >y using force or intimidation; 1. 6#en t#e offended party is depri&ed or reason of ot#er$ise unconscious; or c. 6#en t#e offended party is anot#er person of eit#er se8. Any person can 1e a &ictim; man or $oman ?o attempted or frustrated stage in t#is crime 1ecause t#is is a crime of result. ?ote t#at t#ere are t$o <inds of acts of lasci&iousness under t#e Ae&ised -enal Code3 (1) under Article 33 4 and (2) under Article 33).
Page 155
=. $rticle 33>. $cts of %asci(iousness Ender t#is article4 t#e offended party may 1e a man or a $oman. T#e crime committed4 $#en t#e act performed $it# le$d design $as perpetrated under circumstances $#ic# $ould #a&e 1roug#t a1out t#e crime of rape if se8ual intercourse $as effected4 is acts of lasci&iousness under t#is article. T#is means t#at t#e offended party is eit#er 0 (1) (2) under 12 years of age; or 1eing o&er 12 years of age4 t#e lasci&ious acts $ere committed on #im or #er t#roug# &iolence or intimidation4 or $#ile t#e offender party $as depri&ed of reason4 or ot#er$ise unconscious.
2. $rticle 33@. $cts of %asci(iousness !ith the 7onsent of the .ffended Party: Ender t#is article4 t#e &ictim is limited only to a $oman. T#e circumstances under $#ic# t#e lasci&ious acts $ere committed must 1e t#at of 7ualified seduction or simple seduction4 t#at is4 t#e offender too< ad&antage of #is position of ascendancy o&er t#e offender $oman eit#er 1ecause #e is a person in aut#ority4 a domestic4 a #ouse#elp4 a priest4 a teac#er or a guardian4 or t#ere $as a deceitful promise of marriage $#ic# ne&er $ould really 1e fulfilled. (Cee Article 33)) Al$ays remem1er t#at t#ere can 1e no frustration of acts of lasci&iousness4 rape or adultery 1ecause no matter #o$ far t#e offender may #a&e gone to$ards t#e reali2ation of #is purpose4 if #is participation amounts to performing all t#e acts of e8ecution4 t#e felony is necessarily produced as a conse7uence t#ereof. %ntent to rape is not a necessary element of t#e crime of acts of lasci&iousness. .t#er$ise4 t#ere $ould 1e no crime of attempted rape.
;)(ates in *C'! $F L*!C+:+$;!-E!!

'n 5a#arrete, the *ourt punished the accused under Section E ;b< for touching the complainant0s #agina and po)ing her #agina with a cotton bud. 'n (eople #. *anda+a, 7? the *ourt punished the accused under Section E ;b< for )issing the lips, lic)ing the #agina, and mashing the breasts of the complainant. 'n !mployo, E> the *ourt punished the accused under Section E ;b< for touching the breasts of the complainant. 'n )eeping with .urisprudence, Montinola is liable under Section E ;b< for caressing the thigh and touching the #agina of !!!. o 'n *riminal *ase 5o. >2%B2E, the alternati#e circumstance of relationship under !rticle 1E of the 3e#ised (enal *ode E1 should be considered against Montinola. 'n (eople #. 6etalino, E2 the *ourt held that, $in crimes against chastity, li)e acts of lasci#iousness, relationship is considered aggra#ating.$ 'n that case, the *ourt considered relationship as an aggra#ating circumstance since the informations mentioned, and the accused admitted, that the complainant was his daughter. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS. 8 The elements of the crime of acts of lasci#iousness are: ;1< that the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;2< that it is done: ;a< by using force and intimidation or ;b< when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ;c< when the offended party is under 12 years of age= and ;3< that the offended party is another person of either se,. o 34(D12'* !*T 5". B@1> ;T 4 * '2D !1DS4 2!&<= 2!S*'G'"DS *"5DD*T, D46'54D. 8 Section 32, !rticle S''', of the 'mplementing 3ules and 3egulations of 3! B@1> or the *hild !buse 2aw defines lasci#ious conduct, as follows: $9T:he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttoc)s, or the introduction of any ob.ect into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite se,, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
Page 156
degrade, or arouse or gratify the se,ual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lasci#ious e,hibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.$ 'n the case at bar, all the elements of the offense were established, ma)ing accused%appellant liable for the crime of acts of lasci#iousness, as defined and penali+ed under !rticle 3@@ of the 3e#ised (enal *ode in relation to 3.!. 5o. B@1> or the *hild !buse 2aw. 2E !s e#idenced by her birth certificate, 2@ the #ictim was @ years of age at the time of the commission of the offense on !ugust 1?, 1??B, ha#ing been born on 5o#ember 3, 1??1. !ccused%appellant0s acts of remo#ing the #ictim0s underwear, inserting his finger into and lic)ing her #agina, and lying on top of her, constitute lasci#ious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his se,ual desire. 'ndeed, the #ictim0s testimony that accused%appellant performed the said lecherous acts should be gi#en full faith and credence. 'n cases of acts of lasci#iousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Such is the testimony of #ictims who are young, immature, and ha#e no moti#e to falsely testify against the accused, as in the instant case.
!*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= *"MM'TT4D & 434 !**DS4D 6"3*'12J (2!*4D 'S !5D 14T&445 T 4 24/S "6 ! /'32 "G43 12 J4!3S "2D "3 &'T "DT 6"3*4 '6 S 4 &434 D5D43 T !T !/4. 8 't has been ruled that the act of an accused in forcibly placing his hand between the legs of a girl o#er 12 years old, or without force if she were under that age, constitutes the crime of acts of lasci#iousness. owe#er, in the present case, e#en the lesser crime of acts of lasci#iousness has not been pro#en by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. o !TT4M(T4D 3!(4= !**DS4D *!5 5"T 14 42D /D'2TJ T 434"6 & 434 'T &!S S "&5 T !T 4 M4342J (2!*4D 'S 6'5/43 '5 T 4 G'*T'M0S G!/'5!. 8 1ased on the testimony of Ma. *ristina, the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty of rape as the child understood $ari,$ penis or $titi$ as the finger of her father. 5owhere could we find from said testimony any indication that appellant successfully placed, or tried to insert, his penis and penetrated at least the labia of the #ictim. The #ictim only said in her testimony that Mauro placed his finger in her #agina while bathing her and while she was asleep. Dnder such situation, neither could appellant be held guilty of attempted rape. &ithout the penetration, the crime committed is either attempted rape or acts of lasci#iousness. 17 !ttempted rape, howe#er, re-uires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by o#ert acts but does not perform all the acts of e,ecution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 1E 'n the present case, nothing pre#ented appellant from consummating the act and it would seem that he was already contented with rubbing his penis against the complainant without actually inserting it into her pri#ate part. Thus, appellant cannot be con#icted of attempted rape but only of acts of lasci#iousness for the Aune 1??? incident. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS. 8 The elements of the crime of acts of lasci#iousness are as follows: 1. The offender commits an act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= 2. The act is done ;a< by using force or intimidation, ;b< when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ;c< when the offended party is under 12 years of age= and 3. The offended party is another person of either se,. o "3D43'5/ ! /'32 T" 34M"G4 43 D5D43&4!3 6"3 T 4 (D3("S4 "6 S44'5/ 43 (3'G!T4 "3/!5 *"5ST'TDT4S !5 !*T "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS. 8 6rom the en#ironmental circumstance under which the acts was done, lewd design can be imputed to Aimmy. e claimed that his purpose was to see her pri#ate organ because of the alleged rumors that it ;!nalyn0s genitalia< was $beautiful and big.$ Such act was not out of sheer curiosity but rather out of lasci#ious curiosity. 5otably, on cross%e,amination, he testified that he ne#er tried $to peep to see the pri#ate organs$ of his sisters to confirm whether they were big and beautiful. e also ac)nowledged that it is $#ery immoral for a man to loo) and stare at the pri#ate organ of a lady.$ The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Mole0s guilt for rape notwithstanding, this *ourt finds him liable for the lesser crime of acts of lasci#iousness. The records clearly show that appellant lay on top of the #ictim, mashed her breasts and )issed her lips, acts from which appellant0s lewd design was e#ident. !lthough the information filed was for the crime of rape, appellant can be con#icted of acts of lasci#iousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape. 71 !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= *!5 14 *"MM'TT4D !5J& 434. 8 The fact that the petitioner molested Aocelyn in a place fre-uented by other co%wor)ers, some of whom use it as a short%cut and a passageway, is not improbable. 'n a catena of cases, we ha#e ruled that lust is no respecter of time and place. 'f rape can be committed in places where people congregate, e#en in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping, there is less
Page 158
reason to belie#e that other people sleeping in the same room can ser#e as a deterrent for the commission of lasci#ious acts. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS. 8 Thus, as earlier stated, notwithstanding the prosecution0s failure to pro#e accused%appellant0s guilt for rape, the *ourt holds that there is sufficient e#idence to con#ict him for acts of lasci#iousness under !rticle 33@ of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The elements of the crime are: ;1< that the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;2< that it is done ;a< by using force and intimidation or ;b< when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ;c< when the offended party is under 12 years of age= and ;3< that the offended party is another person of either se,. !lthough the information was for -ualified rape, accused%appellant can be con#icted of acts of lasci#iousness because the crime of acts of lasci#iousness is included in rape. 3owena clearly testified that, wearing only his briefs, accused%appellant approached her while she was half%asleep and )issed her. &ith lewd design, accused%appellant grabbed 3owena and then undressed her. e also threatened to )ill her. !ll the elements of the crime of acts of lasci#iousness are therefore present and ha#e been sufficiently established. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS. 8 'n *riminal *ase 5o. 1?12>, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty of acts of lasci#iousness. The elements of this crime are that: ;a< the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;b< by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious, or the offended party is under 12 years of age. 'n acts of lasci#iousness, the acts complained of are prompted by lust or lewd design where the #ictim has not encouraged such acts. 'n cases of acts of lasci#iousness, the offender is deemed to ha#e accomplished all the elements necessary for the e,istence of the felony once he has been able, by his o#ert acts, to actually achie#e or attain his purpose. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS= (34S45T '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 !lthough it was not established that accused% appellant had carnal )nowledge of pri#ate complainant, the e#idence showed that he touched pri#ate complainant0s pri#ate parts while the latter was deep in sleep. Such act constitutes acts of lasci#iousness penali+ed under !rticle 3@@ of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. The elements of the crime of acts of lasci#iousness are: ;1< that the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;2< that it is done ;a< by using force or intimidation or ;b< when the offended party is under 12 years of age= and ;3< that the offended party is another person of either se,. !ll the elements of the offense are present in this case. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS= (34S45T '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 (etitioner0s acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and )issing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her se,ual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant0s se,ual organ 3ather, these acts constitute acts of lasci#iousness. The elements of said crime are. ;1< that the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;2< that is done ;a< by using force and intimidation or ;b< when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious, or ;c< when the offended, party is under 12 years of age= and ;3< that the offended party is another person of either se,. !ll these elements are present and ha#e been sufficiently established in this case. (etitioner clearly committed lewd acts against the complainant. Moreo#er, petitioner employed force when he committed these acts on the complainant. !*TS "6 2!S*'G'"DS54SS= 424M45TS T 434"6= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 The elements of acts of lasci#iousness are: ;1< the offender commits any act of lasci#iousness or lewdness= ;2< the act is done under any of the following circumstances 8 ;a< when force or intimidation is used, or ;b< when the offended party is depri#ed of reason or is otherwise unconscious, or ;c< when the offended party is under 12 years of age, or ;3< when the offended party is another person of either se,. Dndeniably, the e#idence shows that appellant committed lewd acts against the #ictim with the use of force and intimidation when he mashed her body while pointing a bolo at her. !lthough the 'nformation filed was for the crime of rape, he may be con#icted of acts of lasci#iousness only. To repeat, the latter is necessarily included in a charge of rape through force. 'n other words, $touching$ of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. !nything short of that will only result in either attempted rape or acts of lasci#iousness. Significantly, (eople #. *ampuhan did not set a demarcation line separating attempted rape from acts of lasci#iousness. The difference lies in the intent of the perpetrator deducible from his e,ternal acts. Thus when the $touching$ of the #agina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed. "therwise, it is merely acts of lasci#iousness. 'nasmuch as the touching of the #ictim0s organ by the penis of accused%appellant on E Aune 1??3 was but a mere incident of the $rubbing against or between the #ictim0s thighs$ which in no way manifests an act preliminary to se,ual intercourse, accused%appellant should only be con#icted of acts of lasci#iousness instead of consummated rape.
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Chapter Three SEDUCTION8 CORRU2TION OF MINORS8 AND WHITE SLAAE TRADE

C!@ECT%.? 0 enticing a $oman to unla$ful se8ual intercourse 1y promise of marriage or ot#er means of persuasion $it#out use of force. *R'+CLE 116 >;*L+F+ED !ED;C'+$A. T$o Minds of Ceductions3 1. 7ualified seduction (Art 33") 2. simple seduction (Art 33') >. Acts punis#ed 1. Ceduction of a &irgin o&er 12 years and under 1' years of age 1y certain persons4 suc# as a person in aut#ority4 priest4 teac#er; and Elements 1. .ffended party is a &irgin4 $#ic# is presumed if s#e is unmarried and of good reputation; 2. C#e is o&er 12 and under 1' years of age; 3. .ffender #as se8ual intercourse $it# #er; 4. T#ere is a1use of aut#ority4 confidence or relations#ip on t#e part of t#e offender.
2. Ceduction of a sister 1y #er 1rot#er4 or descendant 1y #er ascendant4 regardless of #er age or reputation. C. -erson lia1le 1. T#ose $#o a1used t#eir aut#ority 0 a. -erson in pu1lic aut#ority; 1. /uardian; c. Teac#er; d. -erson $#o4 in any capacity4 is entrusted $it# t#e education or custody of t#e $oman seduced; 2. T#ose $#o a1used confidence reposed in t#em 0 a. -riest; 1. Bouse ser&ant; c. @omestic; 3. T#ose $#o a1used t#eir relations#ip 0 a. >rot#er $#o seduced #is sister; 1. Ascendant $#o seduced #is descendant. @istinguis# 7ualified seduction from se8ual #arassment3 K*al#"#e$ se$*%t#&n Se=*al harassment T#ere must 1e se8ual intercourse ?o se8ual intercourse re7uired
Page 160
.&er 12 1ut under 1' years of age (ictim is a $oman (&irgin) A1use of aut#ority
Age does not matter Man or $oman may 1e &ictims Ese of aut#ority4 influence or moral ascendancy
T#e gist of 7ualified seduction is t#e a1use of aut#ority4 confidence4 or relations#ip as t#e means of committing t#e crime4 in simple seduction4 it is t#e use of deceit. Bence4 as long as t#ere is suc# a1use 1y t#e offender4 t#e seduction is 7ualified e&en if t#ere $as also deceit4 suc# as a contri&ed promise of marriage4 as t#is latter circumstance $ill merely 1e considered a superfluity. @eceit is not re7uired in 7ualified seduction. Hualified seduction does not re7uire p#ysical &irginity. T#e legal &ie$ is t#at 7ualified seduction only re7uires &irginity in la$4 t#at is4 t#at t#e &ictim #as #ad no ot#er &oluntary carnal relations $it# anot#er man. Cince &irginity is re7uired 1y la$4 it is suggested t#at t#ere can 1e no 7ualified seduction of a $ido$4 unless it can 1e pro&ed t#at s#e ne&er #ad se8ual relations $it# t#e deceased #us1and4 e&en if s#e is 12 years or o&er and under 1' and t#ere $as a1use of aut#ority4 confidence or if t#e offender is a 1rot#er or ascendant. %n any e&ent4 t#e &ictim;s &irginity or age is immaterial4 and t#e crime is categori2ed as 7ualified seduction as an e8pression of t#e la$;s re&ulsion against incest. Ceduction is a continuing offense and continuous co#a1itation during a particular period4 or se&eral acts of intercourse under t#e same promise of marriage4 is only one offense. T#is crime also in&ol&es se8ual intercourse. T#e offended $oman must 1e o&er 12 1ut 1elo$ 1' years. T#e $#st#n%t#&n 1et$een 7ualified seduction A?@ simple seduction lies in t#e fact4 among ot#ers4 t#at t#e -&man #s a (#r+#n in 7ualified seduction4 $#ile in simple seduction4 it is not necessary t#at t#e $oman 1e a &irgin. %t is enoug# t#at s#e is of good repute. Alt#oug# in 7ualified seduction4 t#e age of t#e offended $oman is considered4 if t#e offended party is a descendant or a sister of t#e offender 0 no matter #o$ old s#e is or $#et#er s#e is a prostitute 0 t#e crime of 7ualified seduction is committed.
%llustration3 %f a person goes to a sauna parlor and finds t#ere a descendant and despite t#at4 #ad se8ual intercourse $it# #er4 regardless of #er reputation or age4 t#e crime of 7ualified seduction is committed.
%n t#e case of a teac#er4 it is not necessary t#at t#e offended $oman 1e #is student. %t is enoug# t#at s#e is enrolled in t#e same sc#ool. @eceit is not necessary in 7ualified seduction. Hualified seduction is committed e&en t#oug# no deceit inter&ened or e&en $#en suc# carnal <no$ledge $as &oluntary on t#e part of t#e &irgin. T#is is 1ecause in suc# a case4 t#e la$ ta<es for granted t#e e8istence of t#e deceit as an integral element of t#e crime and punis#es it $it# greater se&erity t#an it does t#e simple seduction4 ta<ing into account t#e a1use of confidence on t#e part of t#e agent. A1use of confidence #ere implies fraud. *R'+CLE 118 !+MPLE !ED;C'+$A. !lements
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1. .ffender party is o&er 12 and under 1' years of age; 2. C#e is of good reputation4 single or $ido$; 3. .ffender #as se8ual intercourse $it# #er; 4. %t is committed 1y means of deceit. T#is crime is committed if t#e offended $oman is single or a $ido$ of good reputation4 o&er 12 and under 1' years of age4 t#e offender #as carnal <no$ledge of #er4 and t#e offender resorted to deceit to 1e a1le to consummate t#e se8ual intercourse $it# #er. @omestic K not t#e same as #ouse ser&ant. A domestic is any person $#o may 1e li&ing in t#e same #ouse $it# t#e &ictim as a lodger4 1oarder4 transient4 #ouse guest or as a mem1er of t#e same #ouse#old. Ceduction is a continuing offense. +or simple seduction4 aside from t#e age re7uirement4 it is only re7uired t#at t#e &ictim is single or a $ido$ of good reputation. %t is not re7uired in simple seduction t#at t#e &ictim 1e a &irgin. Enli<e in 7ualified seduction4 &irginity is not essential in t#is crime. 6#at is re7uired is t#at t#e $oman 1e unmarried and of good reputation. Cimple seduction is not synonymous $it# loss of &irginity. %f t#e $oman is married4 t#e crime $ill 1e adultery. A promise of marriage is usually t#e principal inducement4 #ence it must precede t#e seduction4 e&en if made 11 mont#s 1efore t#e act. T#e failure to comply $it# t#e promise of marriage constitutes t#e deceit mentioned in t#e la$. /enerally4 a 1reac# of a promise of marriage constitutes t#e deceitful conduct 1ut t#ere #a&e 1een ot#er deceitful means resorted to4 as $#ere t#e offender con&inced t#e $oman t#at se8ual congress $as part of #er medication or $#ere a fictitious marriage ceremony $as performed to con&ince t#e &ictim. D&%tr#ne &" m*t*al $es#re3 t#e $oman0&ictim yielded not 1ecause of deceit 1ut 1ecause #er o$n desire4 applica1le only to simple seduction 1ut not to 7ualified seduction $#erein t#e essence of t#e crime is a1use of aut#ority4 confidence4 or relations#ip. T#e offended $oman must 1e under 1' 1ut not less t#an 12 years old; ot#er$ise4 t#e crime is statutory rape. *R'+CLE 119 *C'! $F L*!C+:+$;!-E!! 9+'< C$-!E-' $F '<E $FFE-DED P*R'3 A. !lements3 1. t#at t#e offender commits acts of lasci&iousness or le$dness 2. t#at t#e acts are committed upon a $oman $#o is a &irgin or single or $ido$ of good reputation4 under 1' years of age 1ut o&er 12 years4 or a sister or descendant regardless of #er reputation or age 3. t#at t#e offender accomplis#es t#e acts 1y a1use of aut#ority4 confidence4 relations#ip or deceit *R'+CLE 1,0 C$RR;P'+$- $F M+-$R!
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-romote or facilitate t#e prostitution or corruption of person under age to satisfy t#e lust of anot#er. T#us $#ere t#e girl $as forci1ly ta<en $it#out le$d designs on t#e part of t#e accused 1ut to satisfy t#e lust of anot#er4 t#e crime is corruption of t#at minor and not a1duction. Corruption of minors is punis#a1le $it#out need for #a1ituality4 a1use of aut#ority or a1use of confidence on t#e part of t#e offender. Corruption of minors and $#ite sla&e trade are distinguis#ed as follo$s3 C#rr.)ti#n #0 min#rs %t is essential t#at minors are used May #a&e &ictims of eit#er se8 May not necessarily 1e for profit Committed 1y a single act 9/ite slave tra(e Minority need not 1e in&ol&ed 5imited to females /enerally for profit Committed #a1itually
T#is punis#es any person $#o s#all promote or facilitate t#e prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy t#e lust of anot#er. %t is not re7uired t#at t#e offender 1e t#e guardian or custodian of t#e minor. %t is not necessary t#at t#e minor 1e prostituted or corrupted as t#e la$ merely punis#es t#e act of promoting or facilitating t#e prostitution or corruption of said minor and t#at #e acted in order to satisfy t#e lust of anot#er. *R'+CLE 1, 9<+'E !L*:E 'R*DE A. ACTC -!?A5%X!@3 1. engaging in t#e 1usiness of prostitution 2. profiting 1y prostitution 3. enlisting t#e ser&ices of $omen for t#e purpose of prostitution T#e first t$o modes of re7uire t#e element of profit and #a1ituality. %n t#e t#ird mode4 t#e profit moti&e is not re7uired4 nor is #a1ituality an element t#ereof. 6#ite sla&e trade may 1e $it# or $it#out t#e consent of t#e $oman4 $#ile sla&ery for t#e purpose of assigning in t#e $oman to immoral traffic (Art. 2"2) is committed against #er $ill.
Chapter F&*r A!DUCTION

*R'+CLE 1,2 F$RC+4LE *4D;C'+$A. !lements 1. T#e person a1ducted is any $oman4 regardless or #er age4 ci&il status4 or reputation; 2. T#e a1duction is against #er $ill;
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3. T#e a1duction is $it# le$d designs. ?o need of se8ual intercourse %n 1ot# forms of a1duction (Art. 342 and 343)4 t#ere must 1e le$d designs and t#ere must 1e t#e ta<ing of t#e $oman4 not necessarily $it# some degree of permanence 1ut for some apprecia1le period of time. %n forci1le a1duction4 force sufficient to o&ercome t#e &ictim;s resistance is re7uired4 unless t#e &ictim is under 12 years of age. %f t#e &ictim;s consent $as o1tained t#roug# deceit and t#erefore t#ere $as no &alid consent4 t#e crime is forci1le a1duction4 t#e deceit to 1e considered as constructi&e force. Actual intercourse $it# t#e &ictim is not re7uired in a1duction4 as le$d designs in t#e ta<ing is sufficient. H3 A $oman named Ana1elle Buggins $as a1ducted and raped t#ree times. Bo$ many crimes $ere committedF A3 T#ree crimes3 forci1le a1duction $it# rape and t$o separate crimes of rape 1ecause t#ey s#all 1e considered as separate crimes.
2EO2LE (s. .AIME .OSE G.R. N&. L@050C0. Fe,r*ar' 38 4964 Daime Dose and ot#ers raped Maggie de la Ai&a (a mo&ie star) 6e are con&inced t#at t#e #erein four appellants #a&e conspired toget#er to commit t#e crimes imputed to t#em in t#e amended information 7uoted at t#e 1eginning of t#is decision. T#ere is no dou1t at all t#at t#e forci1le a1duction of t#e complainant from in front of #er #ouse in Hue2on City4 $as a necessary if not indispensa1le means $#ic# ena1led t#em to commit t#e &arious and successi&e acts of rape upon #er person. %t 1ears noting4 #o$e&er4 t#at e&en $#ile t#e first act of rape $as 1eing performed4 t#e crime of forci1le a1duction #ad already 1een consummated4 so t#at eac# of t#e t#ree succeeding crimes of t#e same nature can not legally 1e considered as still connected $it# t#e a1duction R in ot#er $ords4 t#ey s#ould 1e detac#ed from4 and considered independently of4 t#at of forci1le a1duction and4 t#erefore4 t#e former can no longer 1e comple8ed $it# t#e latter. 6B!A!+.A!4 t#e =udgment under re&ie$ is #ere1y modified as follo$s3 appellants Dose4 -ineda4 Dr.4 and A7uino are pronounced guilty of t#e comple8 crime of forci1le a1duction $it# rape4 and eac# and e&ery one of t#em is li<e$ise con&icted of t#ree (3) ot#er crimes of rape.
A $oman is carried against #er $ill or 1roug#t from one place to anot#er against #er $ill $it# le$d design. %f t#e element of le$d design is present4 t#e carrying of t#e $oman $ould 7ualify as a1duction; ot#er$ise4 it $ould amount to <idnapping. %f t#e $oman $as only 1roug#t to a certain place in order to 1rea< #er $ill and ma<e #er agree to marry t#e offender4 t#e crime is only gra&e coercion 1ecause t#e criminal intent of t#e offender is to force #is $ill upon t#e $oman and not really to restrain t#e $oman of #er li1erty. %f t#e offended $oman is under 12 years old4 e&en if s#e consented to t#e a1duction4 t#e crime is forci1le a1duction and not consented a1duction. 6#ere t#e offended $oman is 1elo$ t#e age of consent4 e&en t#oug# s#e #ad gone $it# t#e offender t#roug# some deceitful promises re&ealed upon #er to go $it# #im and t#ey li&e toget#er
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as #us1and and $ife $it#out t#e 1enefit of marriage4 t#e ruling is t#at forci1le a1duction is committed 1y t#e mere carrying of t#e $oman as long as t#at intent is already s#o$n. %n ot#er $ords4 $#ere t#e man cannot possi1ly gi&e t#e $oman t#e 1enefit of an #onora1le life4 all t#at man promised are =ust mac#inations of a le$d design and4 t#erefore4 t#e carrying of t#e $oman is c#aracteri2ed $it# le$d design and $ould 1ring a1out t#e crime of a1duction and not <idnapping. T#is is also true if t#e $oman is depri&ed of reason and if t#e $oman is mentally retardate. +orci1le a1duction is committed and not consented a1duction. 5e$d designs may 1e demonstrated 1y t#e lasci&ious acts performed 1y t#e offender on #er. Cince t#is crime does not in&ol&e se8ual intercourse4 if t#e &ictim is su1=ected to t#is4 t#en a crime of rape is furt#er committed and a comple8 crime of forci1le a1duction $it# rape is committed. T#e ta<ing a$ay of t#e $oman may 1e accomplis#ed 1y means of deceit at t#e 1eginning and t#en 1y means of &iolence and intimidation later. T#e &irginity of t#e complaining $itness is not a determining factor in forci1le a1duction. %n order to demonstrate t#e presence of t#e le$d design4 illicit criminal relations $it# t#e person a1ducted need not 1e s#o$n. T#e intent to seduce a girl is sufficient. %f t#ere is a separation in fact4 t#e ta<ing 1y t#e #us1and of #is $ife against #er $ill constitutes gra&e coercion. @istinction 1et$een forci1le a1duction and illegal detention3 6#en a $oman is <idnapped $it# le$d or unc#aste designs4 t#e crime committed is forci1le a1duction. 6#en t#e <idnapping is $it#out le$d designs4 t#e crime committed is illegal detention. >ut $#ere t#e offended party $as forci1ly ta<en to t#e #ouse of t#e defendant to coerce #er to marry #im4 it $as #eld t#at only gra&e coercion $as committed and not illegal detention.
?.ris)r.(ential tren( in F$RC+4LE *4D;C'+$6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5= 424M45TS= (34S45T '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 This comple, crime occurs when there is carnal )nowledge of the abducted woman under any of the circumstances mentioned earlier when force or intimidation is used= when the woman is depri#ed of reason or is otherwise unconscious= and when the woman is under twel#e years of age or is demented. The prosecution sufficiently pro#ed the elements of forcible abduction 8 the ta)ing of the #ictims against their will with lewd design. !s to the first element, although they #oluntarily went with appellant, it was indubitably shown that they did so upon being decei#ed. !ccording to their testimonies, he told them that his leader wanted to tal) to them, and that no harm would be done to them. Dpon this representation, they went with him. . . . The second element, lewd design, was established by the actual rapes.
o
o
T 4 4M(2"JM45T "6 D4*4(T'"5 SD66'*4S T" *"5ST'TDT4 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5. 8 The employment of deception suffices to constitute forcible abduction. This *ourt has pre#iously ruled that if the #ictim0s consent was obtained through deceit and there was therefore no #alid consent, the crime is forcible abduction, as the deceit may be considered as constructi#e force. T 434 'S "52J "54 *"M(24S *3'M4 "6 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &'T 3!(4 *"MM'TT4D !/!'5ST 4!* G'*T'M= (45!2TJ= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 There can be only one comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape committed against each #ictim. The crime of forcible abduction was necessary only for the first rape. !fter the comple, crime had already been consummated, the subse-uent rape can no longer be considered as a separate instance thereof That is, it should be detached from, and considered independently of, the forcible abduction. ence, any subse-uent rape of the same #ictim is simply rape
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and can no longer be considered as a separate comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape. . . . 6or the comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty for the rape 8 which is the more serious crime 8 shall be imposed in its ma,imum period. !t the time of the commission of the crime, the applicable penalty for rape committed by two or more persons was reclusion perpetua to death. Since the rape was committed by two or more persons 8 a fact duly alleged in the 'nformation and pro#en in court it should ha#e warranted the imposition of the death penalty. owe#er, appellant committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on 5o#ember 1>, 1??> 8 before the passage of 3epublic !ct B@E? or the Death (enalty 2aw, which too) effect on December 31, 1??3. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the penalty that could be imposed was reclusion perpetua. 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &'T 3!(4= 424M45TS. 8 The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in !rticle 372 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, are: ;1< the ta)ing of a woman against her will and ;2< with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a comple, crime that occurs when there is carnal )nowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: ;1< by using force or intimidation= ;2< when the woman is depri#ed of reason or otherwise unconscious= and ;3< when the woman is under twel#e years of age or is demented.
SD66'*'45T2J !224/4D !5D 4ST!12'S 4D '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 'n the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the ta)ing of complainant against her will and with lewd design. 't was li)ewise alleged that accused%appellant and his three co% accused conspired, confederated and mutually aided one another in ha#ing carnal )nowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation and against her will. !side from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution con#incingly established that the carnal )nowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreo#er, the prosecution sufficiently pro#ed beyond reasonable doubt that accused%appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. ence, accused%appellant is guilty of the comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape. 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &!S "52J 54*4SS!3J 6"3 T 4 6'3ST 3!(4= "52J "54 *"M(24S *3'M4 &!S *"MM'TT4D. 8 9!:s correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subse-uent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate comple, crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused%appellant should be con#icted of one comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.
6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &'T 3!(4= 424M45TS. 8 ! .udgment of con#iction is proper only where the prosecution was able to pro#e the elements of the comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape. !rticle 372 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode defines and penali+es the crime of forcible abduction. The elements of forcible abduction are ;a< that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, ci#il status, or reputation= ;b< that the abduction is against her will= and, ;c< that the abduction is with lewd designs. "n the other hand, !rt. 33E of the same *ode defines the crime of rape and pro#ides for its penalty. The elements of rape pertinent to this case are: ;a< that the offender had carnal )nowledge of a woman= and, ;b< that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. o 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5= 424M45TS= 4ST!12'S 4D '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 !ll the elements of forcible abduction were pro#ed in this case. The #ictim, who is a young girl, was ta)en against her will as shown by the fact that at )nife%point she was dragged and ta)en by accused%appellant to a place far from her abode. !t her tender age, 2enie could not be e,pected to physically resist considering the fact that e#en her companion, Aessica Silona, had to run home to escape accused%appellant0s wrath as he brandished a hunting )nife. 6ear gripped and paraly+ed 2enie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accused% appellant who was armed and twenty%four ;27< years her senior. The e#idence li)ewise shows that the ta)ing of the young #ictim against her will was done con miras deshonestas or in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lasci#ious, lecherous. 't signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity= or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts which accused% appellant displayed towards the #ictim after she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from the fact that while 2enie was then a nai#e twel#e ;12<%year old, accused%appellant was thirty%si, ;3@< years old and although unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she. !1S"31S 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5. 8 The trial court found that the forcible abduction with rape alleged in *riminal *ase 5o. 772@7 was absorbed by the rape charged in *riminal *ase 5o. 772@3. The e#idence for the prosecution
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shows that 4smaylita was brought by !mburgo and appellant to a banana plantation some 1%1M2 )ilometers away from her house for the purpose of raping her. 1oth men then successi#ely had carnal )nowledge of her at said place. &here complainant was forcibly ta)en away for the purpose of se,ually assaulting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the forcible abduction. The trial court, thus, correctly held that the rape charged and pro#ed in *riminal *ase 5o. 772@3 already absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in *riminal *ase 5o. 772@7. 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5= 424M45TS. 8 6orcible abduction is defined under !rticle 372 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode as the abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd designs. The elements of this crime are: ;1< the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, ci#il status, or reputation= ;2< the abduction is against her will= and ;3< the abduction is with lewd designs. o 6!'2D34 "6 G'*T'M T" '5T'M!T4 T" T 4 "&543S "6 "DS4 T !T S 4 &!S 13"D/ T T 434 !/!'5ST 43 &'22, 5"T *"5S'ST45T &'T *2!'M "6 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5. 8 &hen complainant and the three accused reached the house in *alauan, 2aguna where she was supposedly ta)en and )ept against her will, complainant did not as much as intimate to the owners of the house that she was being forcibly brought there against her will, notwithstanding that she had e#ery opportunity to do so. *omplainant was ta)en to the house of accused !gno0s cousin where among those present were !gno0s cousin, his wife and their son. The beha#ior of the complainant was not consistent with her claim that she was an unwilling #ictim. 'n one case, the *ourt held that the failure of the offended party to mention or to insinuate to the persons she tal)ed to after the moment the alleged abductor brought her to a house and when she was brought home that she was raped renders the prosecution0s case doubtful. *omplainant admitted ha#ing #oluntarily gone up the second floor of the house after dinner. !s accused%appellant ne#er threatened or forced her, she could ha#e chosen to remain downstairs where the owners of the house were staying if it is true as she alleges that she was fearful of the three accused0s $e#il designs.$ 34M"G!2 "6 D5D43&4!3, ! 34DD45'5/ JM45, !5 !* '5/ (3'G!T4 (!3T !5D 12""D "6 T 4 D5D43&4!3 D" 5"T (3"G4 *!35!2 C5"&24D/4. 8 3emo#al of underwear, a reddening hymen, an aching pri#ate part and blood on the underwear do not pro#e carnal )nowledge. The remo#al of the #ictim0s underwear is at most a preparation to engage in se,ual intercourse. The reddening hymen could ha#e been caused by a male se, organ but that is .ust a possibility. 'n the case at bar, considering the age of the #ictim and the condition of her hymen, there should be laceration if there was penetration by an adult male se, organ. The aching pri#ate part could well be part of the o#erall effect of her beating. The blood on the panty disco#ered by 2a+el after she wo)e up could ha#e come from the wound inflicted on her leg. 't is easy to speculate that 2a+el was raped. 1ut in criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot ta)e the place of proof re-uired to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter how strong, must not sway .udgment. o 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5= 24&D= D46'54D= (3"G45 '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 !ccused%appellant is not, howe#er, off the hoo). The prosecution pro#ed the crime of forcible abduction. 't is established that accused% appellant too) 2a+el against her will and with lewd designs. The word $lewd$ is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lasci#ious, lecherous. 't signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity= or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. The medico%legal finding and 2a+el0s testimony, although insufficient to pro#e rape, buttress the conclusion that accused%appellant had lewd designs when he abducted 2a+el. 5" 24/!2 1!S'S T" *"5G'*T !((422!5T "6 T 4 *"M(24S *3'M4 "6 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &'T 3!(4= & '24 T 4 '56"3M!T'"5 SD66'*'45T2J !224/4S T 4 6"3*'124 T!C'5/ "6 *"M(2!'5!5T 63"M *41D T" M!S1!T4, T 4 S!M4 6!'2S T" !224/4 $24&D D4S'/5S.$ 8 &as appellant0s con#iction by the trial court for the comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape correctK The elements of forcible abduction are: ;1< that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of age, ci#il status, or reputation= ;2< that the abduction is against her will= and ;3< that the abduction is with lewd designs. The prosecution0s e#idence clearly shows that the #ictim was forcibly ta)en at )nifepoint from 1orbon, *ebu by appellant and through threats and intimidation brought to #arious towns in Masbate, where he passed her off as his $wife.$ That appellant was mo#ed by lewd designs was shown in regard to rape by his ha#ing carnal )nowledge of pri#ate complainant, against her will, on Auly 7, 1??7 at *agba, Tugbo, Masbate. &hile it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penali+ed by !rticle 372 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode was also committed, we are not totally disposed to con#ict appellant for the comple, crime of forcible abduction with rape. &e note that while the information sufficiently alleges the forcible ta)ing of complainant from *ebu to Masbate, the same fails to allege $lewd designs.$ &hen a comple, crime under !rticle 7H of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is a,iomatic that the prosecution must allege and pro#e the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape. &hen appellant, using a blade, forcibly too) away complainant for the purpose of se,ually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. ence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.
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6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5 &'T 3!(4= 4ST!12'S 4D '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 !rticle 372 of the re#ised (enal *ode defines and penali+es the crime of forcible abduction. The elements are: ;1< that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, ci#il status or reputation= ;2< that she is ta)en against her will= and ;3< that the abduction is with lewd designs. 3ape, on the other hand, is committed when an offender had carnal )nowledge with a woman ;1< by force or intimidation, or ;2< when the woman is depri#ed of reason or is unconscious, or ;3< when the woman is under 12 years of age. The carnal )nowledge in the instant case was committed through force and intimidation. The prosecution pro#ed beyond reasonable doubt that 3olando de 2ara succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. o 6"3*'124 !1DD*T'"5= 24&D '5T45T MDST 14 C5"&5 T" !22 !**DS4D & " *""(43!T4 '5 T 4 *"MM'SS'"5 "6 T 4 642"5J= 5"T 4ST!12'S 4D '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 &e find merit in the contention of these three that the element of lewd design was not pro#en as to them. 5or was there conspiracy in this case. ence, they cannot be con#icted of the crime of forcible abduction. !s held in (eople #. *risostomo, to constitute abduction, the ta)ing away of a woman against her will must be pro#en to ha#e been effected with unchaste designs. !ccordingly, in the case at bar, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to pro#e that the three accused were actuated by lewd design. The prosecution failed to do so, e,cept with respect to 3olando de 2ara. 5or can we find any basis for the allegation of conspiracy to commit the crime of forcible abduction, much less forcible abduction with rape, e#en if it was pro#en that one of the accused harbored lewd designs. &hile it is enough that at least one of the accused entertained lewd design in order to con#ict all of them of forcible abduction, such lewd intent, howe#er, must be )nown to all accused who cooperated in the commission of the felony. 'n the case at bar, it was not pro#en that *arlito Gillas, 4duardo Gillas and Magno Tamares had )nowledge of lewd designs entertained by 3olando de 2ara.
*R'+CLE 1,1 C$-!E-'ED *4D;C'+$(!lopement) A. !lements 1. .ffended party is a &irgin; 2. C#e is o&er 12 and under 1' years of age; 3. .ffender ta<es #er a$ay $it# #er consent4 after solicitation or ca=olery; 4. T#e ta<ing a$ay is $it# le$d designs. %t is not t#e in=ury to t#e $oman 1ut t#e outrage and t#e alarm to t#e family $#ic# is important #ere. +or consented a1duction4 t#ere is no need for deceit4 1ut #e &ictim;s consent must 1e intelligently and freely gi&en4 considering t#at s#e is already a person of sufficient discretion. 6#ere se&eral persons participated in t#e forci1le a1duction and t#ese persons also raped t#e offended $oman4 t#e original ruling in t#e case of 2e&ple (. .&se8 s*pra is t#at t#ere $ould 1e one count of forci1le a1duction $it# rape and t#en eac# of t#em $ill ans$er for #is o$n rape and t#e rape of t#e ot#ers minus t#e first rape $#ic# $as comple8ed $it# t#e forci1le a1duction. T#is ruling is no longer t#e pre&ailing rule. T#e &ie$ adopted in cases of similar nature is to t#e effect t#at $#ere more t#an one person #as effected t#e forci1le a1duction $it# rape4 all t#e rapes are =ust t#e consummation of t#e le$d design $#ic# c#aracteri2es t#e forci1le a1duction and4 t#erefore4 t#ere s#ould only 1e one forci1le a1duction $it# rape.
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%n t#e crimes in&ol&ing rape4 a1duction4 seduction4 and acts of lasci&iousness4 t#e marriage 1y t#e offender $it# t#e offended $oman generally e8tinguis#es criminal lia1ility4 not only of t#e principal 1ut also of t#e accomplice and accessory. Bo$e&er4 t#e mere fact of marriage is not enoug# 1ecause it is already decided t#at if t#e offender marries t#e offended $oman $it#out any intention to perform t#e duties of a #us1and as s#o$n 1y t#e fact t#at after t#e marriage4 #e already left #er4 t#e marriage $ould appear as #a&ing 1een contracted only to a&oid t#e punis#ment. !&en $it# t#at marriage4 t#e offended $oman could still prosecute t#e offender and t#at marriage $ill not #a&e t#e effect of e8tinguis#ing t#e criminal lia1ility. -ardon 1y t#e offended $oman of t#e offender is not a manner of e8tinguis#ing criminal lia1ility 1ut only a 1ar to t#e prosecution of t#e offender. T#erefore4 t#at pardon must come 1efore t#e prosecution is commenced. 6#ile t#e prosecution is already commenced or initiated4 pardon 1y t#e offended $oman $ill no longer 1e effecti&e 1ecause pardon may preclude prosecution 1ut not pre&ent t#e same. All t#ese pri&ate crimes 0 e8cept rape 0 cannot 1e prosecuted de officio. %f any slander or $ritten defamation is made out of any of t#ese crimes4 t#e complaint of t#e offended party is till necessary 1efore suc# case for li1el or oral defamation may proceed. %t $ill not prosper 1ecause t#e court cannot ac7uire =urisdiction o&er t#ese crimes unless t#ere is a complaint from t#e offended party. T#e paramount decision of $#et#er #e or s#e $anted t#e crime committed on #im or #er to 1e made pu1lic is #is or #ers alone4 1ecause t#e indignity or dis#onor 1roug#t a1out 1y t#ese crimes affects more t#e offended party t#an social order. T#e offended party may prefer to suffer t#e outrage in silence rat#er t#an to &indicate #is #onor in pu1lic. %n t#e crimes of rape4 a1duction and seduction4 if t#e offended $oman #ad gi&en 1irt# to t#e c#ild4 among t#e lia1ilities of t#e offender is to support t#e c#ild. T#is o1ligation to support t#e c#ild may 1e true e&en if t#ere are se&eral offenders. As to $#et#er all of t#em $ill ac<no$ledge t#e c#ild4 t#at is a different 7uestion 1ecause t#e o1ligation to support #ere is not founded on ci&il la$ 1ut is t#e result of a criminal act or a form of punis#ment. %t #as 1een #eld t#at $#ere t#e $oman $as t#e &ictim of t#e said crime could not possi1ly concei&e anymore4 t#e trial court s#ould not pro&ide in its sentence t#at t#e accused4 in case a c#ild is 1orn4 s#ould support t#e c#ild. T#is s#ould only 1e proper $#en t#ere is a pro1a1ility t#at t#e offended $oman could gi&e 1irt# to an offspring.
Chapter F#(e 2ROAISIONS RELATIAE TO THE 2RECEDING CHA2TERS OF TITLE ELEAEN

*R'+CLE 1,, PR$!EC;'+$- $F '<E CR+ME! $F *D;L'ER3A C$-C;4+-*7EA !ED;C'+$-A *4D;C'+$-A *-D *C'! $F L*!C+:+$;!-E!! 1. Adultery and concu1inage must 1e prosecuted upon complaint signed 1y t#e offended spouse 2. Ceduction4 a1duction4 and acts of lasci&iousness must 1e prosecuted upon complaint signed 1y a. offended party 1. #er parents c. grandparents4 or d. guardians in t#e order in $#ic# t#ey are named a1o&e
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(rape not anymore included as amended 1y AA '353 and incorporated as article 2 crimes against persons) H3 $#o can prosecute t#e crimes of adultery and concu1inageF A3 upon complaint of t#e offended party ?>3
as part of t#e
T#e offended party cannot prosecute (upon complaint) t#e crimes of adultery or concu1inage $it#out including 1ot# t#e offended parties. *R'+CLE 1,2 C+:+L L+*4+L+'3 $F PER!$-! 7;+L'3 $F CR+ME! *7*+-!' C<*!'+'3
7. 0. 1.
To indemnify t#e offended $oman To ac<no$ledge t#e offspring unless t#e la$ s#ould pre&ent #im from doing so %n e&ery case to support t#e offspring
if a married man rapes a single $oman4 and s#e got pregnant4 t#e man cannot 1e forced to ac<no$ledge t#e c#ild4 1ut #e is o1liged to support t#e offspring. *R'+CLE 1,5 L+*4+L+'3 $F *!CE-D*-'!A 7;*RD+*-!A 'E*C<ER!A $R $'<ER PER!$-! E-'R;!'ED 9+'< '<E C;!'$D3 $F '<E $FFE-DED P*R'3 -ersons $#o cooperate as accomplices 1ut are punis#ed as principals in rape4 acts of lasci&iousness4 seduction4 corruption of minors4 $#ite sla&e trade4 and a1duction4 t#ey are3 1. ascendants 2. guardians 3. curators 4. teac#ers 5. any ot#er person $#o cooperates as accomplice $it# a1use of aut#ority or confidential relations#ip
TITLE TWELAE CRIMES AGAINST THE CIAIL STATUS OF 2ERSONS Chapter One SIMULATION OF !IRTHS AND USUR2ATION OF CIAIL STATUS
*R'+CLE 1,6 !+M;L*'+$- $F 4+R'<!A !;4!'+';'+- $F $-E C<+LD F$R *-$'<ERA *-D C$-CE*LME-' $R *4*-D$-ME-' $F * LE7+'+M*'E C<+LD
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A. Acts punis#ed 1. Cimulation of 1irt#s; 2. Cu1stitution of one c#ild for anot#er; 3. Concealing or a1andoning any legitimate c#ild $it# intent to cause suc# c#ild to lose its ci&il status.
%f t#e simulation of 1irt# is for t#e purpose of traffic<ing4 t#en it falls under AA " 1*. %f t#e simulation of 1irt# is for t#e purpose of causing t#e loss of ci&il status of t#e c#ild4 t#en it falls under t#is article. +or simulation of 1irt#s and su1stitution of c#ildren4 t#e la$ does not re7uire t#at t#e c#ild 1e legitimate4 1ut for concealment and a1andonment4 t#e c#ild must 1e legitimate. Cale of c#ild is not punis#ed under t#is article 1ut under -@ *3 c#ild and yout# $elfare code and AA " 1*. Simulation of birth 0 ta<es place $#en t#e $oman pretends to 1e pregnant $#en in fact s#e is not4 and on t#e day of t#e supposed deli&ery ta<es t#e c#ild of anot#er as #er o$n Substitution of one child for another 0 T#is is committed $#en for instance4 I is 1orn of A and >; J is 1orn of C and @; and t#e offender4 $it# intent to cause t#e loss of any trace of t#eir filiations4 e8c#ange I and J $it#out t#e <no$ledge of t#eir respecti&e parents. 7oncealing or abandoning any legitimate child !lements 1. T#e c#ild must 1e legitimate 2. T#e offender conceals or a1andons t#e c#ild 3. T#e offender #as t#e intent to cause suc# c#ild to lose its ci&il status
%f t#e c#ild is 1eing <idnapped and t#ey <ne$ t#at t#e <idnappers are not t#e real parents of t#eir c#ild4 t#en simulation of 1irt# is committed. %f t#e parents are parties to t#e simulation 1y ma<ing it appear in t#e 1irt# certificate t#at t#e parents $#o 1oug#t t#e c#ild are t#e real parents4 t#e crime is not falsification on t#e part of t#e parents and t#e real parents 1ut simulation of 1irt#. K*est#&ns T Ans-ers 1. A $oman $#o #as gi&en 1irt# to a c#ild a1andons t#e c#ild in a certain place to free #erself of t#e o1ligation and duty of rearing and caring for t#e c#ild. 6#at crime is committed 1y t#e $omanF T#e crime committed is a1andoning a minor under Article 2" . 2. Cuppose t#at t#e purpose of t#e $oman is a1andoning t#e c#ild is to preser&e t#e in#eritance of #er c#ild 1y a former marriage4 $#at t#en is t#e crime committedF T#e crime $ould fall under t#e second paragrap# of Article 34". T#e purpose of t#e $oman is to cause t#e c#ild to lose its ci&il status so t#at it may not 1e a1le to s#are in t#e in#eritance.
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3. Cuppose a c#ild4 one day after #is 1irt#4 $as ta<en to and left in t#e midst of a lonely forest4 and #e $as found 1y a #unter $#o too< #im #ome. 6#at crime $as committed 1y t#e person $#o left it in t#e forestF %t is attempted infanticide4 as t#e act of t#e offender is an attempt against t#e life of t#e c#ild. Cee US (. Cap#ll&8 et al.8 C1 2h#l. C<9. *R'+CLE 1,8 ;!;RP*'+$- $F C+:+L !'*';! A. Bo$ committed3 1. 1y assuming filiation or 2. 1y assuming parental rig#ts 3. 1y assuming con=ugal rig#ts of anot#er -urpose3 to defraud t#e offended party of #is #eirs %f t#e purpose is to merely en=oy or use t#e usurp rig#ts as 1y using anot#er;s license4 or to get anot#er passport etc.. #e $ill not 1e lia1le under t#is article 1ut #e may 1e lia1le for using fictitious name4 or estafa if t#ere is intent to defraud4 or forgery or falsification. T#is crime is committed $#en a person represents #imself to 1e anot#er and assumes t#e filiation or t#e parental or con=ugal rig#ts of suc# anot#er person. T#us4 $#ere a person impersonates anot#er and assumes t#e latter,s rig#t as t#e son of $ealt#y parents4 t#e former commits a &iolation of t#is article. T#e term Qci&il statusQ includes one,s pu1lic station4 or t#e rig#ts4 duties4 capacities and incapacities $#ic# determine a person to a gi&en class. %t seems t#at t#e term Qci&il statusQ includes one,s profession. *R'+CLE 1,9 4+7*M3 A. !lements 1. .ffender #as 1een legally married; 2. T#e marriage #as not 1een legally dissol&ed or4 in case #is or #er spouse is a1sent4 t#e a1sent spouse could not yet 1e presumed dead according to t#e Ci&il Code; 3. Be contracts a second or su1se7uent marriage; 4. T#e second or su1se7uent marriage #as all t#e essential re7uisites for &alidity. >igamy4 1eing a crime against status4 can 1e committed independently from adultery or concu1inage. T#e crime of 1igamy does not fall $it#in t#e category of pri&ate crimes t#at can 1e prosecuted only at t#e instance of t#e offended party. T#e offense is committed not only against t#e first and second $ife 1ut also against t#e state. /ood fait# is a defense in 1igamy.
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+ailure to e8ercise due diligence to ascertain t#e $#erea1outs of t#e first $ife is 1igamy t#roug# rec<less imprudence. T#e second marriage must #a&e all t#e essential re7uisites for &alidity $ere it not for t#e e8istence of t#e first marriage. A =udicial declaration of t#e nullity of a marriage4 t#at is4 t#at t#e marriage $as &oid a1 initio4 is no$ re7uired. .ne con&icted of 1igamy may also 1e prosecuted for concu1inage as 1ot# are distinct offenses. T#e first is an offense against ci&il status4 $#ic# may 1e prosecuted at t#e instance of t#e state; t#e second is an offense against c#astity4 and may 1e prosecuted only at t#e instance of t#e offended party. T#e test is not $#et#er t#e defendant #as already 1een tried for t#e same act4 1ut $#et#er #e #as 1een put in =eopardy for t#e same offense. .ne $#o4 alt#oug# not yet married 1efore4 <no$ingly consents to 1e married to one $#o is already married is guilty of 1igamy <no$ing t#at t#e latter;s marriage is still &alid and su1sisting. D#st#n%t#&n ,et-een ,#+am' an$ #lle+al marr#a+e >igamy is a form of illegal marriage. T#e offender must #a&e a &alid and su1sisting marriage. @espite t#e fact t#at t#e marriage is still su1sisting4 #e contracts a su1se7uent marriage. %llegal marriage includes also suc# ot#er marriages $#ic# are performed $it#out complying $it# t#e re7uirements of la$4 or suc# premature marriages4 or suc# marriage $#ic# $as solemni2ed 1y one $#o is not aut#ori2ed to solemni2e t#e same. +or 1igamy to 1e committed4 t#e second marriage must #a&e all t#e attri1utes of a &alid marriage. 2res%r#pt#(e per#&$ "&r !#+am' %&*nte$ "r&m the $#s%&(er' &" the "el&n#&*s a%t8 n&t "r&m the t#me the entr' &" marr#a+e -as entere$ #nt& the l&%al C#(#l Re+#str' :C&nstr*%t#(e N&t#%e; SERMONIA (s. CA8 ET AL. G.R. N&. 419<7< .*ne 4<8 499<
>%/AMJ; @!+%?!@. R >igamy is an illegal marriage committed 1y contracting a second or su1se7uent marriage 1efore t#e first marriage #as 1een legally dissol&ed4 or 1efore t#e a1sent spouse #as 1een declared presumpti&ely dead 1y means of a =udgment rendered in t#e proper proceedings. >eing punis#a1le 1y an afflicti&e penalty4 t#is crime prescri1es in fifteen (15) years. T#e fifteen0year prescripti&e period commences to run from t#e day on $#ic# t#e crime is disco&ered 1y t#e offended party4 t#e aut#orities4 or t#eir agents. . . .Q AE5! .? C.?CTAECT%(! ?.T%C!; ?.T A--5%CA>5! TB!A!T.. R 6#ile $e concede t#e point t#at t#e rule on constructi&e notice in ci&il cases may 1e applied in criminal actions if t#e factual and legal circumstances so $arrant4 $e agree $it# t#e &ie$ e8pounded 1y t#e Court of Appeals t#at it cannot apply in t#e crime of 1igamy not$it#standing t#e possi1ility of its 1eing more fa&ora1le to t#e accused. T#e appellate court succinctly e8plains R Argued 1y t#e petitioner is t#at t#e principle of constructi&e notice s#ould 1e applied in t#e case at 1ar. T#is Court is of t#e &ie$ t#at t#e principle of constructi&e notice s#ould not 1e applied in regard to t#e crime of 1igamy as =udicial notice may 1e ta<en of t#e fact t#at a 1igamous marriage is +enerall' entere$ into 1y t#e offender #n se%re%' from t#e spouse of t#e pre&ious su1sisting marriage. Also4 a 1igamous marriage is +enerall' entere$ #nt& #n a pla%e -here the &""en$er #s n&t Fn&-n t& ,e st#ll a marr#e$ pers&n4 in order to conceal #is legal impediment to contract anot#er marriage.
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%n t#e case of real property4 t#e registration of any transaction in&ol&ing any rig#t or interest t#erein is made in t#e Aegister of @eeds of t#e place $#ere t#e said property is located. (erification in t#e office of t#e Aegister of @eeds concerned of t#e transactions in&ol&ing t#e said property can easily 1e made 1y any interested party. %n t#e case of a 1igamous marriage4 &erification 1y t#e offended person or t#e aut#orities of t#e same $ould indeed 1e 7uite difficult as suc# a marriage may 1e entered into in a place $#ere t#e offender is not <no$n to 1e still a married person. >e it noted t#at in t#e criminal cases cited 1y t#e petitioner $#erein constructi&e notice $as applied4 in&ol&ed t#erein $ere land or property disputes and certainly4 marriage is not property. T#e non0application to t#e crime of 1igamy of t#e principle of constructi&e notice is not contrary to t#e $ell entrenc#ed policy t#at penal la$s s#ould 1e construed li1erally in fa&or of t#e accused. To compute t#e prescripti&e period for t#e offense of 1igamy from registration t#ereof $ould amount to almost a1sol&ing t#e offenders t#ereof for lia1ility t#erefor. 6#ile t#e cele1ration of t#e 1igamous marriage may 1e said to 1e open and made of pu1lic record 1y its registration4 t#e offender #o$e&er is not trut#ful as #e conceals from t#e officiating aut#ority and t#ose concerned t#e e8istence of #is pre&ious su1sisting marriage. Be does not re&eal to t#em t#at #e is still a married person. Be li<e$ise conceals from #is legitimate spouse #is 1igamous marriage. And for t#ese4 #e contracts t#e 1igamous marriage in a place $#ere #e is not <no$n to 1e still a married person. And suc# a place may 1e any$#ere4 under $#ic# circumstance4 t#e disco&ery of t#e 1igamous marriage is rendered 7uite difficult and $ould ta<e time. %t is t#erefore reasona1le t#at t#e pres%r#pt#(e per#&$ for t#e crime of 1igamy s#ould 1e %&*nte$ &nl' "r&m the $a' &n -h#%h the sa#$ %r#me -as $#s%&(ere$ ,' the &""en$e$ part'8 the a*th&r#t#es &r the#r a+en%' (sic). Considering suc# concealment of t#e 1igamous marriage 1y t#e offender4 if t#e prescripti&e period for t#e offense of 1igamy $ere to 1e counted from t#e date of registration t#ereof4 t#e prosecution of t#e &iolators of t#e said offense $ould almost 1e impossi1le. T#e interpretation urged 1y t#e petitioner $ould encourage fearless &iolations of a social institution c#eris#ed and protected 1y la$.
*R'+CLE 120 M*RR+*7E C$-'R*C'ED *7*+-!' PR$:+!+$-! $F L*9! A. !lements 1. .ffender contracted marriage; 2. Be <ne$ at t#e time t#at 0 a. T#e re7uirements of t#e la$ $ere not complied $it#; or 1. T#e marriage $as in disregard of a legal impediment. >. Marriages contracted against t#e pro&isions of la$s 1. T#e marriage does not constitute 1igamy. 2. T#e marriage is contracted <no$ing t#at t#e re7uirements of t#e la$ #a&e not 1een complied $it# or in disregard of legal impediments. 3. .ne $#ere t#e consent of t#e ot#er $as o1tained 1y means of &iolence4 intimidation or fraud. 4. %f t#e second marriage is &oid 1ecause t#e accused <no$ingly contracted it $it#out complying $it# legal re7uirements as t#e marriage license4 alt#oug# #e $as pre&iously married. 5. Marriage solemni2ed 1y a minister or priest $#o does not #a&e t#e re7uired aut#ority to solemni2e marriages. *R'+CLE 12 PREM*';RE M*RR+*7E!
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A. -ersons lia1le3 1. A $ido$ $#o married $it#in 3*1 days from t#e date of t#e deat# of #er #us1and4 or 1efore #a&ing deli&ered if s#e is pregnant at t#e time of #is deat# 2. A $oman $#o4 #er marriage #a&ing 1een annulled or dissol&ed4 married 1efore #er deli&ery or 1efore e8piration of t#e period of 3*1 days after t#e date of t#e legal separation. -urpose of t#e la$3 T. A(.%@ CAC!C .+ @.E>T+E5 -AT!A?%TJ H3 is a man lia1leF A3 no. only a $oman is lia1le under t#is article T#e Cupreme Court #as already ta<en into account t#e reason $#y suc# marriage $it#in 3*1 days is made criminal4 t#at is4 1ecause of t#e pro1a1ility t#at t#ere mig#t 1e a confusion regarding t#e paternity of t#e c#ild $#o $ould 1e 1orn. %f t#is reason does not e8ist 1ecause t#e former #us1and is impotent4 or $as s#o$n to 1e sterile suc# t#at t#e $oman #as #ad no c#ild $it# #im4 t#at 1elief of t#e $oman t#at after all t#ere could 1e no confusion e&en if s#e $ould marry $it#in 3*1 days may 1e ta<en as e&idence of good fait# and t#at $ould negate criminal intent. *R'+CLE 122 PERF$RM*-CE $F +LLE7*L M*RR+*7E CEREM$-3 A. 6#o are lia1le3 1. -riests 2. Ministers 3. Ci&il aut#orities
TITLE THIRTEEN
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Chapter One LI!EL
!e"ti#n $ne = De0initi#nA 0#rmsA an( ).nis/ment #0 t/is "rime *R'+CLE 121 DEF+-+'+$- $F L+4EL A li1el is a pu1lic and malicious imputation of a crime4 or of a &ice or defect4 real or imaginary4 or any act4 omission4 condition4 status4 or circumstances tending to cause t#e dis#onor4 discredit4 or contempt of a natural or =uridical person4 or to 1lac<en t#e memory of one $#o is dead. A. !lements3 1. T#ere must 1e an imputation of a crime4 or of a &ice or defect4 real or imaginary4 or any act4 omission4 condition4 status4 or circumstance; 2. T#e imputation must 1e made pu1licly; 3. %t must 1e malicious;
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4. T#e imputation must 1e directed at a natural or =uridical person4 or one $#o is dead; 5. T#e imputation must tend to cause t#e dis#onor4 discredit or contempt of t#e person defamed. @!+AMAT%.? %C TB! -A.-!A T!AM +.A 5%>!A E?@!A AAT%C5! 353 %f t#e @!+AMAT%.? is directed to or in connection $it# t#e -A%(AT! 6%+! .+ TB! (%CT%M4 t#ere is MA5%C! %? 5A6. @istinction 1et$een malice in fact A?@ malice in la$ Mal#%e #n "a%t is t#e malice $#ic# t#e la$ presumes from e&ery statement $#ose tenor is defamatory. %t does not need proof. T#e mere fact t#at t#e utterance or statement is defamatory negates a legal presumption of malice. %n t#e crime of li1el4 $#ic# includes oral defamation4 t#ere is no need for t#e prosecution to present e&idence of malice. %t is enoug# t#at t#e alleged defamatory or li1elous statement 1e presented to t#e court &er1atim. %t is t#e court $#ic# $ill pro&e $#et#er it is defamatory or not. %f t#e tenor of t#e utterance or statement is defamatory4 t#e legal presumption of malice arises e&en $it#out proof. Mal#%e #n "a%t 1ecomes necessary only if t#e malice in la$ #as 1een re1utted. .t#er$ise4 t#ere is no need to adduce e&idence of malice in fact. Co4 $#ile mal#%e #n la- does not re7uire e&idence4 malice in fact re7uires e&idence. Mal#%e #n la- can 1e negated 1y e&idence t#at4 in fact4 t#e alleged li1elous or defamatory utterance $as made $it# good moti&es and =ustifia1le ends or 1y t#e fact t#at t#e utterance $as pri&ileged in c#aracter. %n la$4 #o$e&er4 t#e pri&ileged c#aracter of a defamatory statement may 1e a1solute or 7ualified. 6#en t#e pri&ileged c#aracter is said to 1e a1solute4 t#e statement $ill not 1e actiona1le $#et#er criminal or ci&il 1ecause t#at means t#e la$ does not allo$ prosecution on an action 1ased t#ereon.
%llustration3 As regards t#e statements made 1y Congressmen $#ile t#ey are deli1erating or discussing in Congress4 $#en t#e pri&ileged c#aracter is 7ualified4 proof of malice in fact $ill 1e admitted to ta<e t#e place of malice in la$. 6#en t#e defamatory statement or utterance is 7ualifiedly pri&ileged4 t#e malice in la$ is negated. T#e utterance or statement $ould not 1e actiona1le 1ecause malice in la$ does not e8ist. T#erefore4 for t#e complainant to prosecute t#e accused for li1el4 oral defamation or slander4 #e #as to pro&e t#at t#e accused $as actuated $it# malice (malice in fact) in ma<ing t#e statement.
6#en a li1el is addressed to se&eral persons4 unless t#ey are identified in t#e same li1el4 e&en if t#ere are se&eral persons offended 1y t#e li1elous utterance or statement4 t#ere $ill only 1e one count of li1el. %f t#e offended parties in t#e li1el $ere distinctly identified4 e&en t#oug# t#e li1el $as committed at one and t#e same time4 t#ere $ill 1e as many li1els as t#ere are persons dis#onored.
%llustration3 %f a person uttered t#at 9All t#e Marcoses are t#ie&es4Q t#ere $ill only 1e one li1el 1ecause t#ese particular Marcoses regarded as t#ie&es are not specifically identified.
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%f t#e offender said4 9All t#e Marcoses 0 t#e fat#er4 mot#er and daug#ter are t#ie&es.: T#ere $ill 1e t#ree counts of li1el 1ecause eac# person li1eled is distinctly dis#onored.
%f you do not <no$ t#e particular persons li1eled4 you cannot consider one li1el as gi&ing rise to se&eral counts of li1el. %n order t#at one defamatory utterance or imputation may 1e considered as #a&ing dis#onored more t#an one person4 t#ose persons dis#onored must 1e identified. .t#er$ise4 t#ere $ill only 1e one count of li1el. ?ote t#at in li1el4 t#e person defamed need not 1e e8pressly identified. %t is enoug# t#at #e could possi1ly 1e identified 1ecause 9innuendos may also 1e a 1asis for prosecution for li1el. As a matter of fact4 e&en a compliment $#ic# is undeser&ed4 #as 1een #eld to 1e li1elous. T#e crime is li1el is t#e defamation is in $riting or printed media. T#e crime is slander or oral defamation if it is not printed. !&en if $#at $as imputed is true4 t#e crime of li1el is committed unless one acted $it# good moti&es or =ustifia1le end. -oof of trut# of a defamatory imputation is not e&en admissi1le in e&idence4 unless $#at $as imputed pertains to an act $#ic# constitutes a crime and $#en t#e person to $#om t#e imputation $as made is a pu1lic officer and t#e imputation pertains to t#e performance of official duty. .t#er t#an t#ese4 t#e imputation is not admissi1le. 6#en proof of trut# is admissi1le 1. 6#en t#e act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of $#et#er t#e offended party is a pri&ate indi&idual or a pu1lic officer; 2. 6#en t#e offended party is a go&ernment employee4 e&en if t#e act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime4 pro&ided if its related to t#e disc#arged of #is official duties. Ae7uisites of defense in defamation 1. %f it appears t#at t#e matter c#arged as li1elous is true; 2. %t $as pu1lis#ed $it# good moti&es; 3. %t $as for =ustifia1le ends. %f a crime is a pri&ate crime4 it cannot 1e prosecuted de officio. A complaint from t#e offended party is necessary.
*R'+CLE 12, RE>;+REME-' $F P;4L+C+'3 /eneral Aule3 Malice is -A!CEM!@ from e&ery defamatory imputation !8ception3 ($#en malice not presumed) 1. A pri&ate communication made 1y any person to anot#er in t#e performance of any legal4 moral or social duty Elements: a. T#at t#e person $#o made t#e communication #ad a legal4 moral4 social duty to ma<e t#e communication4 or at least #e #ad t#e interest to 1e up#eld
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1. T#at t#e communication is addressed to an officer or a 1oard4 or superior4 #a&ing some interest or duty in t#e matter c. T#at t#e statements in t#e communication are made in good fait# $it#out malice 2. A fair and true report4 made in good fait#4 $it#out any comments or remar<s4 of any =udicial4 legislati&e or ot#er official proceedings $#ic# are not of confidential nature4 or of any statement4 report or speec# deli&ered in said proceedings4 or of any ot#er act performed 1y pu1lic officers in t#e e8ercise of t#eir functions.
*R'+CLE 122 L+4EL 43 ME*-! $F 9R+'+-7 $R !+M+L*R ME*-! 5i1el may 1e committed 1y means of3 1. 6riting 2. -rinting 3. 5it#ograp#y 4. !ngra&ing 5. Aadio . -#onograp# ". -ainting '. T#eatrical !8#i1ition ). Cinematograp#ic 1*. or any similar means
?.ris)r.(ential tren( in L+4EL (9*R-+-7B L$-7 D+!C;!!+$- $- L+4EL)

4#ery defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. 2E 3ima and !legre failed to show ade-uately their good intention and .ustifiable moti#e in airing the supposed gripes of the students. !s hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, 3ima and !legre should ha#e presented the public issues $free from inaccurate and misleading information.$ 2@ earing the students0 alleged complaints a month before the e,posT, 2B they had sufficient time to #erify their sources and information. owe#er, 3ima and !legre hardly made a thorough in#estigation of the students0 alleged gripes. 5either did they in-uire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in !M4* from the Department of 4ducation, *ulture and Sports. !legre testified that he merely went to !M4* to #erify his report from an alleged !M4* official who refused to disclose any information. !legre simply relied on the words of the students $because they were many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true.$ 2H This plainly shows 3ima and !legre0s rec)less disregard of whether their report was true or not.
*ontrary to 615'0s claim, the broadcasts were not $the result of straight reporting.$ Significantly, some courts in the Dnited States apply the pri#ilege of $neutral reportage$ in libel cases in#ol#ing matters of public interest or public figures. Dnder this pri#ilege, a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless of the republisher0s sub.ecti#e awareness of the truth or falsity of the accusation. 2? 3ima and !legre cannot in#o)e the pri#ilege of neutral reportage because unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreo#er, there is no e,isting contro#ersy in#ol#ing !M4* when the broadcasts were made. The pri#ilege of neutral reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is in#ol#ed in an e,isting contro#ersy, and a party to that contro#ersy ma)es the defamatory statement.
2ibel is defined as $a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a #ice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or .uridical person, or to blac)en the memory of one who is dead.$ 2B !ny of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in !rticle 3E7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, e#ery defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. 2H The presumption of malice, howe#er, does not e,ist in the following instances: 1. ! pri#ate communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty= and 2. ! fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remar)s, of any .udicial, legislati#e, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
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speech deli#ered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the e,ercise of their functions. The law recogni+es two )inds of pri#ileged matters. 6irst are those which are classified as absolutely pri#ileged which en.oy immunity from libel suits regardless of the e,istence of malice in fact. 'ncluded herein are statements made in official proceedings of the legislature by the members thereof. 3> 2i)ewise, statements made in the course of .udicial proceedings are absolutely pri#ileged but only if pertinent or rele#ant to the case in#ol#ed. 31 The other )ind of pri#ileged matters are the -ualifiedly or conditionally pri#ileged communications which, unli)e the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel pro#ided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The e,ceptions pro#ided for in !rticle 3E7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode fall into this category. o 'n the case, howe#er, of 1or.al #. *ourt of !ppeals, 32 this *ourt recogni+ed that the enumeration stated in !rticle 3E7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode is not e,clusi#e but is rendered more e,pansi#e by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, thus: o . . . To be sure, the enumeration under !rt. 3E7 is not an e,clusi#e list of -ualifiedly pri#ileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are li)ewise pri#ileged. The rule on pri#ileged communications had its genesis not in the nation0s penal code but in the 1ill of 3ights of the *onstitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. !s early as 1?1H, in Dnited States #. *aNete 93H (hil. 2E3:, this *ourt ruled that publications which are pri#ileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to gi#e it e,press recognition in the statute punishing libels.
*learly, when confronted with libel cases in#ol#ing publications which deal with public officials and the discharge of their official functions, this *ourt is not confined within the wordings of the libel statute= rather, the case should li)ewise be e,amined under the constitutional precept of freedom of the press. !s enunciated in the seminal case of Dnited States #. 1ustos 37 8 The interest of society and the maintenance of good go#ernment demand a full discussion of public affairs. *omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relie#es the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an un.ust accusation= the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. ! public officer must not be too thin%s)inned with reference to comment upon his official acts. "nly thus can the intelligence and dignity of the indi#idual be e,alted. "f course, criticism does not authori+e defamation. 5e#ertheless, as the indi#idual is less than the State, so must e,pected criticism be born for the common good. 3ising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the *hief 4,ecuti#e, to the 2egislature, to the Audiciary 8 to any or all the agencies of /o#ernment 8 public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. 3E "f course, this does not mean that a public official is barred from reco#ering damages in cases in#ol#ing defamations. is entitlement, howe#er, is limited to instances when the defamatory statement was made with actual malice 8 that is, with )nowledge that it was false or with rec)less disregard of whether it was false or not. 3@ This is the test laid down in the leading case of 5ew Jor) Times *o. #. Sulli#an 'n the case at bar, the "ffice of the Solicitor /eneral ;"S/< argues that the purported libelous news item was $designed to malign the integrity and reputation of the 9pri#ate complainant:$ for it ascribed to the latter corruption and dishonesty in go#ernment ser#ice. 3H Moreo#er, the "S/ maintains that the -uestioned news article does not en.oy the mantle of protection afforded a pri#ileged matter as the petitioner and 3amos published the news item based on mere speculation and con.ecture. 3? Their decision to publish the un#erified information furnished them by the unnamed source, who was ne#er presented before the trial court, and their failure to #erify the truth of statements which appeared under the banner headline of the 1H%27 !ugust 1?H@ issue of the 1icol 6orum indicates that the news item was published $intemperately and maliciously.$ 7> The "S/ is therefore of the opinion that the sub.ect news item satisfied the test pronounced in the 5ew Jor) Times case. &e do not agree. !s the DS Supreme *ourt itself declared, $rec1less disre#ard . . . cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. 'ne#itably its outer limits will be mar)ed out through case%by%case ad.udication.$ 71 The case of /arrison #. State of 2ouisiana 72 stressed that $only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by 5ew Jor) Times may be the sub.ect of either ci#il or criminal sanctions$ 73 and concluded by restating the $rec)less disregard standard$ in the following manner:
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. . . The test which we laid down in 5ew Jor) Times is not )eyed to ordinary care= defeasance of the pri#ilege is conditioned, not on mere negligence, but on rec)less disregard for the truth. Subse-uently, in St. !mant #. Thompson 7E it was stated that 8 . . . These cases are clear that rec)less conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would ha#e published, or would ha#e in#estigated before publishing. There must be sufficient e#idence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. (ublishing with such doubts shows rec)less disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. !pplied to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution failed to meet the criterion of $rec)less disregard.$ !s the records re#eal, the issue of cash ad#ances against the coffers of the pro#incial go#ernment of *amarines Sur was a ma.or political topic in said locality at that time. 4#en the pri#ate respondent himself admitted during his direct testimony that he went on radio in order to address the matter. 't was clearly a legitimate topic to be discussed not only by the members of the media but by the public as what was in#ol#ed was the dispensation of ta,payers0 money. ! rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct andMor good moti#es and .ustifiable ends for ma)ing such allegations would not only be contrary to !rt. 3@1 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. 't would, abo#e all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of e,pression. Such a rule would deter citi+ens from performing their duties as members of a self% go#erning community. &ithout free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. !s Austice 1randeis has said, $public discussion is a political duty$ and $the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.$ E1 'ndeed, the difficulty of producing e#idence, both documentary and testimonial, on behalf of the petitioner was readily apparent when, during his cross%e,amination, 3amos testified that he was not allowed by the custodians of the material pro#incial financial records to photocopy the latter particularly because said documents dealt with the matter of cash ad#ances.
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6inally, the pri#ate respondent claims that the banner headline ridiculed him before the public does not merit consideration as the rule in this .urisdiction is that $9t:he headline of a newspaper story or publication claimed to be libelous must be read and construed in connection with the language that follows.$E3 ! perusal of the entire news story accompanying the headline in this case readily establishes the fact that the -uestioned article dealt with refutations by the pri#ate respondent0s critics of his e,planation o#er the radio with regard to the issues mentioned therein. The wording of the headline may ha#e contained an e,aggeration but the same ne#ertheless represents a fair inde, of the contents of the news story accompanying it.
Criminal ,ibel visDEDvis the 7uarantee of 4ree *peech Dnder our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a #ice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or .uridical person, or to blac)en the memory of one who is dead. 2E Thus, the elements of libel are: ;a< imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another= ;b< publication of the imputation= ;c< identity of the person defamed= and, ;d< e,istence of malice. 2@ o "riginally, the truth of a defamatory imputation was not considered a defense in the prosecution for libel. 'n the landmar) opinion of 4ngland0s Star *hamber in the 2ibelis 6amosis case in 1@>3, two ma.or propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remar)s were established: first, that libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second, that it is immaterial that the libel be true. 2B These propositions were due to the fact that the law of defamatory libel was de#eloped under the common law to help go#ernment protect itself from criticism and to pro#ide an outlet for indi#iduals to defend their honor and reputation so they would not resort to ta)ing the law into their own hands. 2H o "ur understanding of criminal libel changed in 1B3E with the trial and ac-uittal of Aohn (eter Fenger for seditious libel in the then 4nglish colony of 5ew Jor). Fenger, the publisher of the 5ew%Jor) &ee)ly Aournal, had been charged with seditious libel, for his paper0s consistent attac)s against *olonel &illiam *osby, the 3oyal /o#ernor of 5ew Jor). 'n his defense, Fenger0s counsel, !ndrew amilton, argued that the criticisms against /o#ernor *osby were $the right of e#ery free%born sub.ect to ma)e when the matters so published can be supported with truth.$ 2? The .ury, by ac-uitting Fenger, ac)nowledged
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albeit unofficially the defense of truth in a libel action. The Fenger case also laid to rest the idea that public officials were immune from criticism. 3> The Fenger case is crucial, not only to the e#olution of the doctrine of criminal libel, but also to the emergence of the !merican democratic ideal. 't has been characteri+ed as the first landmar) in the tradition of a free press, then a somewhat radical notion that e#entually e#ol#ed into the 6irst !mendment 31 in the !merican 1ill of 3ights and also pro#ed an essential weapon in the war of words that led into the !merican &ar for 'ndependence. 32 Jet e#en in the young !merican state, the go#ernment paid less than ideal fealty to the proposition that *ongress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of speech. The notorious !lien and Sedition !cts of 1B?H 33 made it a crime for any person who, by writing, spea)ing or printing, should threaten an officer of the go#ernment with damage to his character, person, or estate. The law was passed at the insistence of (resident Aohn !dams, whose 6ederalist (arty had held a ma.ority in *ongress, and who had faced persistent criticism from political opponents belonging to the Aeffersonian 3epublican (arty. !s a result, at least twenty%fi#e people, mostly Aeffersonian 3epublican editors, were arrested under the law. The !cts were ne#er challenged before the D.S. Supreme *ourt, but they were not subse-uently renewed upon their e,piration. 37 The massi#e unpopularity of the !lien and Sedition !cts contributed to the electoral defeat of (resident !dams in 1H>>. 'n his stead was elected Thomas Aefferson, a man who once famously opined, $&ere it left to me to decide whether we should ha#e a go#ernment without newspapers, or newspapers without a go#ernment, ' should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.$ 3E There is an important obser#ation to be made about the -uality of the !merican press during the time of Aefferson, one that is crucial to the contemporaneous understanding of the $freedom of e,pression$ clause at the time of its inception. The tenor of the public debate during that era was hardly polite. !bout the impending election of Aefferson, the 5ew 4ngland *ourant predicted that $murder, robbery, rape and adultery and incest will be openly taught and practiced, the air will be rent with cries of distress, the soil soa)ed with blood and the nation blac) with crimes.$ 3@ !fter Aefferson was elected, rumors spread about his dalliances with his sla#e, Sally emmings, adding more fodder to his critics. The thirteen%year old &illiam *ullen 1ryant, who would grow up to become a prominent poet and abolitionist, published the following doggerel: $Thy country0s ruin and thy country0s shameUM /o wretchU 3esign the (residential chairMDisclose thy secret measures foul and fair. . .M /o scan, philosophist, thy 9Sally0s: charmsM!nd sin) supinely in her sable arms.$ 3B !ny comprehensi#e history of the !merican media during the first few decades of the e,istence of the Dnited States would re#eal a similar preference in the media for such $mad%dog rhetoric.$ 3H These obser#ations are important in light of the misconception that freedom of e,pression e,tends only to polite, temperate, or reasoned e,pression. The assailed decision of the 3T* betrays such a perception, when it opined that the sub.ect ad#ertisement was libelous $because by the language used, it had passed from the bounds of playful gist, and intensi#e criticism into the region of scurrilous calumniation and intemperate personalities.$ 3? 4#idently, the 6irst !mendment was designed to protect e,pression e#en at its most rambunctious and #itriolic form as it had pre#alently ta)en during the time the clause was enacted. 5onetheless, .uristic enforcement of the guarantee of freedom of e,pression was not demonstrably prominent in the Dnited States during most of the 1H>>s. 5otably, the pre#alent philosophy then was that the 1ill of 3ights did not apply to the different federal states. 7> &hen the DS Supreme *ourt was confronted with substantial 6irst !mendment issues in the late 1H>>s and early 1?>>s, it responded by repeatedly declining to protect free speech. 71 The subse-uent enactment of the due process clause in the 6ourteenth !mendment e#entually allowed the D.S. Supreme *ourt to accept, in /itlow #. 5ew Jor) 72 that the 6irst !mendment was protected from impairment by the States, thus allowing for a more #igorous enforcement of the freedom of e,pression clause in the twentieth century. 73 The most important !merican ruling on libel, arguably from which modern libel law emerged 77 was 5ew Jor) Times #. Sulli#an, 7E penned by the liberal lion Austice &illiam 1rennan, Ar. 'n ascertaining whether the 5ew Jor) Times was liable for damages in a libel action, the D.S. Supreme *ourt had ac)nowledged that the writing in -uestion, an ad#ertisement published in the paper 7@ e,tolling the #irtues of the ci#il rights mo#ement, had contained se#eral factual inaccuracies in describing actions ta)en by Montgomery, !labama officials on ci#il rights protesters. 7B The *ourt e#en concluded that at most, there was a finding against the 5ew Jor) Times of negligence in failing to disco#er the misstatements against the news stories in the newspaper0s own files. 7H 5onetheless, the D.S. Supreme *ourt s-uarely assessed the import of the 6irst !mendment freedoms in the prosecution of criminal libel. 6amously, the precedent was established that a public official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can pro#e actual malice, which was defined as $with )nowledge that the statement was false or with rec)less disregard as to whether or not it was true.$ 7? 1y this standard, it was concluded that factual errors aside, actual malice was not pro#en to sustain the
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con#ictions for libel. Moreo#er, leeway was allowed e#en if the challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made. E> Shortly after 5ew Jor) Times was promulgated, its principles were e,tended by the D.S. Supreme *ourt to criminal libel actions in /arrison #. 2ouisiana. E1 The decision, also penned by Austice 1rennan, commented on the mar)ed decline in the common resort to criminal libel actions: &here criticism of public officials is concerned, we see no merit in the argument that criminal libel statutes ser#e interests distinct from those secured by ci#il libel laws, and therefore should not be sub.ect to the same limitations. !t common law, truth was no defense to criminal libel. !lthough the #ictim of a true but defamatory publication might not ha#e been un.ustly damaged in reputation by the libel, the spea)er was still punishable since the remedy was designed to a#ert the possibility that the utterance would pro#o)e an enraged #ictim to a breach of peace . . . 9 owe#er:, preference for the ci#il remedy, which enabled the frustrated #ictim to trade chi#alrous satisfaction for damages, has substantially eroded the breach of peace .ustification for criminal libel laws. 'n fact, in earlier, more #iolent times, the ci#il remedy had #irtually pre%empted the field of defamation= e,cept as a weapon against seditious libel, the criminal prosecution fell into #irtual desuetude. E2 Then, the *ourt proceeded to consider whether the historical limitation of the defense of truth in criminal libel to utterances published $with good moti#es and for .ustifiable ends:$ E3 . . . The $good moti#es$ restriction incorporated in many state constitutions and statutes to reflect !le,ander amilton0s unsuccessfully urged formula in (eople #. *roswell, liberali+ed the common%law rule denying any defense for truth. . . . 'n any e#ent, where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in pri#ate reputation is o#erborne by the larger public interest, secured by the *onstitution, in the dissemination of truth. . . . Moreo#er, e#en where the utterance is false, the great principles of the *onstitution which secure freedom of e,pression in this area preclude attaching ad#erse conse-uences to any e,cept the )nowing or rec)less falsehood. Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the spea)er must run the ris) that it will be pro#ed in court that he spo)e out of hatred= e#en if he did spea) out of hatred, utterances honestly belie#ed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. . . . E7 2est the impression be laid that criminal libel law was rendered e,tinct in regards to public officials, the *ourt made this important -ualification in /arrison: The use of calculated falsehood, howe#er, would put a different cast on the constitutional -uestion. !lthough honest utterance, e#en if inaccurate, may further the fruitful e,ercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, )nowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should en.oy a li)e immunity. !t the time the 6irst !mendment was adopted, as today, there were those unscrupulous enough and s)illful enough to use the deliberate or rec)less falsehood as an effecti#e political tool to unseat the public ser#ant or e#en topple an administration. That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it under the protecti#e mantle of the *onstitution. 6or the use of the )nown lie as a tool is at once with odds with the premises of democratic go#ernment and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. EE !nother ruling crucial to the e#olution of our understanding was *urtis (ublishing *o. #. 1utts, E@ which e,panded the actual malice test to co#er not .ust public officials, but also public figures. The D.S. Supreme *ourt, spea)ing through *hief Austice &arren, stated that: 9D:ifferentiation between 0public figures0 and 0public officials0 and adoption of separate standards of proof for each ha#e no basis in law, logic, or 6irst !mendment policy. 'ncreasingly in this country, the distinctions between go#ernmental and pri#ate sectors are blurred. . . . 9':t is plain that although they are not sub.ect to the restraints of the political process, 0public figures0, li)e 0public officials0, often play an influential role in ordering society. !nd surely as a class these 0public figures0 ha#e as ready access as 0public officials0 to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their #iews and acti#ities. "ur citi+enry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their in#ol#ement in public issues and e#ents is as crucial as it is in the case of $public officials.$ The fact that they are not amenable to the restraints of the political process only underscores the legitimate and substantial nature of the interest, since it means that public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can attempt to influence their conduct. EB The public figure concept was later -ualified in the case of /ert+ #. &elch, 'nc., EH which held that a pri#ate person should be able to reco#er damages without meeting the 5ew Jor) Times standard. E? 'n doing so, the D.S. Supreme *ourt recogni+ed the legitimate state interest in compensating pri#ate indi#iduals for wrongful in.ury to reputation. @> The prominent !merican legal commentator, *ass Sunstein, has summari+ed the current !merican trend in libel law as follows:
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9*:onsider the law of libel. ere we ha#e an e,plicit system of free speech tiers. To simplify a comple, body of law: 'n the highest, most%speech protecti#e tier is libelous speech directed against a $public figure$. /o#ernment can allow libel plaintiffs to reco#er damages as a result of such speech if and only if the spea)er had $actual malice$ 8 that is, the spea)er must ha#e )nown that the speech was false, or he must ha#e been rec)lessly indifferent to its truth or falsity. This standard means that the spea)er is protected against libel suits unless he )new that he was lying or he was truly foolish to thin) that he was telling the truth. ! person counts as a public figure ;1< if he is a $public official$ in the sense that he wor)s for the go#ernment, ;2< if, while not employed by go#ernment, he otherwise has per#asi#e fame or notoriety in the community, or ;3< if he has thrust himself into some particular contro#ersy in order to influence its resolution. Thus, for e,ample, Aerry 6alwell is a public figure and, as a famous case holds, he is barred from reco#ering against a maga+ine that portrays him as ha#ing had se, with his mother. Mo#ie stars and famous athletes also -ualify as public figures. 6alse speech directed against public figures is thus protected from libel actions e,cept in -uite e,treme circumstances. @1 't may also be noted that this heightened degree of protection afforded to free e,pression to comment on public figures or matters against criminal prosecution for libel has also gained a foothold in 4urope. !rticle 1> of the 4uropean *on#ention on uman 3ights and 6undamental 6reedoms pro#ides that $9e:#eryone has the right to freedom of e,pression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to recei#e and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.$ @2 The 4uropean *ourt of uman 3ights applied this pro#ision in 2ingens #. !ustria, @3 in ruling that the 3epublic of !ustria was liable to pay monetary damages $as .ust satisfaction$ to a .ournalist who was found guilty for defamation under the !ustrian *riminal *ode. @7 The 4uropean *ourt noted: 9!rticle 1>: is applicable not only to 0information0 or 0ideas0 that are fa#ourably recei#ed or regarded as inoffensi#e or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shoc) or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 0democratic society0. . . . These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. &hilst the press must not o#erstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the 0protection of the reputation of others0, it is ne#ertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political issues .ust as on those in other areas of public interest. 5ot only does the press ha#e the tas) of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has the right to recei#e them. . . . @E The international trend in diminishing the scope, if not the #iability, of criminal libel prosecutions is clear. Most pertinently, it is also e#ident in our own acceptance in this .urisdiction of the principles applied by the D.S. Supreme *ourt in cases such as 5ew Jor) Times and /arrison. (articularly, this *ourt has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard go#erns the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. 'n !diong #. *"M424*, @@ the *ourt cited 5ew Jor) Times in noting that $9w:e ha#e adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include #ehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attac)s on go#ernment and public officials.$ @B The *ourt was e#en more e,plicit in its affirmation of 5ew Jor) Times in Gas-ue+ #. *ourt of !ppeals. @H Spea)ing through Austice Mendo+a: 6or that matter, e#en if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned pro#es that the statement was made with actual malice 8 that is, with )nowledge that it was false or with rec)less disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmar) case of 5ew Jor) Times #. Sulli#an, which this *ourt has cited with appro#al in se#eral of its own decisions. @? This is the rule of $actual malice.$ 'n this case, the prosecution failed to pro#e not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with )nowledge of their falsity or with rec)less disregard of whether they were false or not. B> The *ourt has li)ewise e,tended the $actual malice$ rule to apply not only to public officials, but also to public figures. 'n !yer (roductions (ty. 2td. #. *apulong, B1 the *ourt cited with appro#al the following definition of a public figure propounded by an !merican te,tboo) on torts: ! public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of li#ing, or by adopting aprofession or calling which gi#es the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 0public personage.0 e is, in other words, a celebrity. "b#iously to be included in this category are those who ha#e achie#ed some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, howe#er, broader than this. 't includes public officers, famous in#entors and e,plorers, war heroes and e#en ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the /rand 4,alted 3uler of a lodge. 't includes, in short, anyone who has arri#ed at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. B2
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!yer did not in#ol#e a prosecution for libel, but a complaint for in.unction on the filming of a dramati+ed account of the 1?H@ 4DS! 3e#olution. 5onetheless, its definition of a public figure is important to this case, as it clearly establishes that e#en non%go#ernmental officials are considered public figures. 'n fact, the definition propounded in !yer was e,pressly applied by the *ourt in 1or.al #. *ourt of !ppeals B3 in ascertaining whether the complainant therein was a public figure, thus warranting the application of the actual malice test. B7 &e considered the following proposition as settled in this .urisdiction: that in order to .ustify a con#iction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning )nowledge that the statement was false or with rec)less disregard as to whether or not it was true. !s applied to the present petition, there are two main determinants: whether complainant is a public figure, and assuming that he is, whether the publication of the sub.ect ad#ertisement was made with actual malice. Sadly, the 3T* and the *! failed to duly consider both propositions.
Complainant 's a !ublic 4i#ure There should be little contro#ersy in holding that complainant is a public figure. e is a broadcast .ournalist hosting two radio programs aired o#er a large portion of the Gisayas and Mindanao. Measured against the definition pro#ided in !yer, complainant would definitely -ualify as a public figure. *omplainant e#en asserted before the trial court that his broadcast was listened to widely, hence, his notoriety is un-uestionable. o *omplainant0s standing as a public figure is further militated by the conte,tual circumstances of the case. The newspaper in -uestion, the Sunday (ost, is particularly in circulation in the areas where complainant0s broadcasts were aired. *ertainly, it cannot be denied that the target audience of the newspaper were the same persons who may ha#e listened regularly to the complainant0s broadcast. 4#en if the sphere of complainant0s renown is limited in geography, it is in the same plane as the circulation of the offending newspaper. The e,tent of complainant0s ability to influence hearts and minds through his broadcasts need not be established, only that he has such capacity and willingness to e,ert an influence. *omplainant0s #olition to practice the radio broadcasting profession necessarily thrusts him in the public sphere. Actual (alice Not !roven !s it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to pro#e actual malice on the part of 2im and petitioner when the latter published the article sub.ect matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must ha#e established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants )new the statements in the ad#ertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with rec)less disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true. 't should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no con#iction for libel can be had. !ny statement that does not contain a pro#ably false factual connotation will recei#e full constitutional protection. BE !n e,amination of the records of this case showed that the prTcis of information contained in the -uestioned publication were actually true. o 'n con#icting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to !rticle 3E7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, which pro#ides that $e#ery defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, e#en if it be true, if no good intention and .ustifiable moti#e for ma)ing it is shown . . .$. &e hold that this pro#ision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free e,pression, and this *ourt0s precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The pro#ision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense $good intention and .ustifiable moti#e.$ The e,ercise of free e,pression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly -ualify as $.ustifiable moti#e,$ if not $good intention.$ o 't cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the 1ill of 3ights is accompanied by e,cessi#e color or innuendo. *ertainly, persons in possession of truthful facts are not obliged to present the same in bland fashion. These true facts may be utili+ed to con#ince the listenerMreader against a particular position, or to e#en dissuade one against accepting the credibility of a public figure. Dry facts, by themsel#es, are hardly stirring. 't is the commentary thereupon that usually animates the discourse which is encouraged by the *onstitution as integral to the democratic way of life. This is replete in many components of our daily life, such as political addresses, tele#ised debates, and e#en commercial ad#ertisements. o !s ad#erted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but e#en e,pression in its most unsophisticated form. *riminal libel stands as a necessary -ualification to any absolutist interpretation of the free speech clause, if only because it pre#ents the proliferation of untruths which if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public discourse. 1ut in order to safeguard against fears that the public debate might be muted due to the rec)less enforcement of libel
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laws, truth has been sanctioned as a defense, much more in the case when the statements in -uestion address public issues or in#ol#e public figures. 'n ascertaining the degree of falsity that would constitute actual malice, the *ourt, citing 5ew Jor) Times, has e#en gone so far as ac)nowledging: 4#en assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or e#en falsity alone does not pro#e actual malice. 4rrors or misstatements are ine#itable in any scheme of truly free e,pression and debate. *onsistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mista)es or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for mis.udgment. "nly by gi#ing them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effecti#ely function as critical agencies in our democracy. 'n 1ulletin (ublishing *orp. #. 5oel we held 8 ! newspaper especially one national in reach and co#erage, should be free to report on e#ents and de#elopments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or ci#il charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and )eeps within the standards of morality and ci#ility pre#ailing within the general community. To a#oid the self%censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules go#erning liability for in.ury to reputation are re-uired to allow an ade-uate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. 't is for the same reason that the 5ew Jor) Times doctrine re-uires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of $actual malice$ on the part of the person ma)ing the libelous statement. B? To this end, the publication of the sub.ect ad#ertisement by petitioner and 2im cannot be deemed by this *ourt to ha#e been done with actual malice. !side from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public )now the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed under the mantle of ha#ing been done with good moti#es and for .ustifiable ends. The ad#ertisement in -uestion falls s-uarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected e,pression under Section 7, !rticle ''', and thus, ac-uittal is mandated. ;/D'5//D'5/ GS. *!, S4(T. 3>, 2>>E<
2'142= & 45 D46!M!T"3J &"3DS !34 2'142"DS (43 S4= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 5ecessarily, !rticle 3E3 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode comes into play. !n allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a #ice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blac)en the memory of one who is dead. !s a general rule, words, written or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to e,pose a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, a#ersion, or disgrace, induce an e#il opinion of him in the minds of right thin)ing persons, and depri#e him of their friendly intercourse in society, regardless of whether they actually produce such results. 'n the present case, it is e#ident that the sub.ect article attributes a discreditable or dishonorable act or condition to all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious beliefs of the Muslims and of the ob.ecti#es of respondent *ouncil to herald the truth about 'slam, in particular. The portion of the assailed article which declares that the Muslims worship the pigs as /od is obno,iously contrary to the basic belief of the Muslims. Thus, the article is not only an imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. 't has been held that scandalous matter is not necessary to ma)e a libel= it is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be held of the plaintiff, or to ma)e him contemptible or ridiculous= or that the imputation tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the offended party. o 2'!1'2'TJ 6"3 2'142 D"4S 5"T D4(45D "5 T 4 '5T45T "6 T 4 D46!M43 1DT "5 T 4 6!*T "6 D46!M!T'"5. 8 Significantly, liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of the defamation. 'n matters of libel, the -uestion is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the words he has used. The meaning of the writer is -uite immaterial. The -uestion is, not what the writer meant, but what he con#eyed to those who heard or read. o D46!M!T'"5= M!2'*4 'S (34SDM4D '6 T 4 'M(DT!T'"5 'S D46!M!T"3J= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 'f the imputation is defamatory, the *ourt has held that malice is presumed and the burden of o#ercoming the presumption of malice by mere preponderance of e#idence rested on the petitioners. ! careful e,amination of the records of the case does not re#eal any cogent reason that would set aside the presumption of malice. 'n fact, there is con#incing e#idence that the publication of the assailed article was malicious, as more e,tensi#ely discussed in the latter portion of herein opinion. 6urthermore, there is no showing that the instant case falls under any of the e,ceptions pro#ided for in !rticle 3E7 of the 3e#ised (enal *ode. *onse-uently, there is no compelling reason to disregard the findings of the *ourt of !ppeals that no e#idence was presented to o#ercome said presumption of malice. o "1A4*T "6 2'142"DS (D12'*!T'"5 MDST 14 SD66'*'45T2J 'D45T'6'4D= "1G'"DS G'*T'MS !34 T 4 MDS2'MS '5 *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 Specific identity of the person defamed means that the third person who
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read or learned about the libelous article must )now that if referred to the plaintiff. 'n order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the #ictim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named= it is li)ewise not sufficient that the offended party recogni+ed himself as the person attac)ed or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the ob.ect of the libelous publication. 't cannot be refuted that the ob#ious #ictims in the article in -uestion are specifically identified 8 the Muslims. The principle laid down in 5ewswee) 'nc. #s. 'ntermediate !ppellate *ourt, that $where the defamation is alleged to ha#e been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all%embracing as to apply to e#ery indi#idual in that class or group, or sufficiently specific so that each indi#idual in that class or group can pro#e that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be,$ ob#iously applies to the present case. *ertainly, the defamatory imputation contained in the sub.ect article is a sweeping statement affecting a common or general interest of all Muslims, that is, their religious belief in !llah as the one and only /od. The publication was directed against all Muslims without e,ception and it is not necessary to name each one of them as they could only ha#e one cause of action which is the damage suffered by them caused by the insult inflicted on their basic religious tenets.
*R'+CLE 125 '<RE*'E-+-7 '$ P;4L+!< *- $FFER '$ PRE:E-' !;C< P;4L+C*'+$- F$R * C$MPE-!*'+$T#is is AC@DC KKK Attac< and Collect L Defend and Collect A. Acts -unis#ed3 1. >y t#reatening anot#er to pu1lis# a li1el concerning #im or t#e parents4 spouse4 c#ild4 or ot#er mem1ers of #is family 2. >y offering to pre&ent t#e pu1lication of suc# li1el for a compensation or money consideration. !la%Fma#l 0 %n its metap#orical sense4 1lac<mail may 1e defined as any unla$ful e8tortion of money 1y t#reats of accusation or e8posure. T$o $ords are e8pressi&e of t#e crime 0 #us# money. (US (. E+*#a8 et al.8 C5 2h#l. 576) >lac<mail is possi1le in (1) lig#t t#reats under Article 2'3; and (2) t#reatening to pu1lis#4 or offering to pre&ent t#e pu1lication of4 a li1el for compensation4 under Article 35 .
*R'+CLE 126 PR$<+4+'ED P;4L+C*'+$- $F *C'! REFERRED '$ +- '<E C$;R!E $F $FF+C+*L PR$CEED+-7! A. !lements 1. T#e offender is a reporter4 editor4 or manager of a ne$spaper daily or maga2ine 2. T#at #e pu1lis#es facts connected $it# t#e pri&ate life of anot#er 3. T#at suc# facts are offensi&e to t#e #onor4 &irtue and reputation of said person T#e pro&isions of Article 35" constitute t#e so0called Q/ag 5a$.Q *R'+CLE 128 !L*-DER S.ral defamationT A. T#ere are t$o <inds of oral defamation3
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1. Cimple slander; and 2. /ra&e slander4 $#en it is of a serious and insulting nature. >. +actors t#at determine t#e gra&ity of oral defamation 1. personal e8pressions used 2. personal relations of t#e accused and t#e offended party 3. circumstances surrounding t#e case
*R'+CLE 129 !L*-DER 43 DEED A. Bo$ committed3 o 1y performing any act $#ic# casts dis#onor discredit4 or contempt upon anot#er person. >. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender performs any act not included in any ot#er crime against #onor 2. T#at suc# act is performed in t#e presence of anot#er person or persons 3. T#at suc# acts casts dis#onor4 discredit or contempt upon t#e offended party C. T$o <inds of slander 1y deed 1. Cimple slander 1y deed; and 2. /ra&e slander 1y deed4 t#at is4 $#ic# is of a serious nature. ?.>. Clander 1y deed refers to performance of an act4 not use of $ords. 6#et#er a certain slanderous act constitutes slander 1y deed of a serious nature or not4 depends on t#e social standing of t#e offended party4 t#e circumstances under $#ic# t#e act $as committed4 t#e occasion4 etc. !e"ti#n 'w# = 7eneral Pr#visi#ns *R'+CLE 150 PER!$-! RE!P$-!+4LE F$R L+4EL A. -erson 5ia1le 1. -erson $#o s#all pu1lis#es4 e8#i1its4 or causes t#e pu1lication or e8#i1ition of any defamation in $riting or 1y similar means 2. T#e aut#or or editor of a 1oo< or pamp#let4 3. T#e editor or 1usiness manager of a daily ne$spaper4 maga2ine or serial pu1lication4 4. T#e o$ner of t#e printing plant $#ic# pu1lis#es a li1elous article $it# its consent and all ot#er person $#o in any $ay participate in or #a&e connection $it# t#e pu1lication >. (!?E! in criminal prosecution for li1el3 1. %f t#e offended party is a pu1lic officer or employee 2. %f t#e offended person is a pri&ate person DEA%C@%CT%.? %C 6%TB ATCVVVV
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?.T!3
%? CAC! .+ C.?+5%CT >!T6!!? TB! A-C A?@ AA " )1 on Durisdiction andGor &enue4 A-C pre&ails ($it# reference to a Cupreme Court case discussed) *R'+CLE 15 PR$$F $F 'R;'< A. -roof of trut# is admissi1le in any of t#e follo$ing3 1. 6#en t#e act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of $#et#er t#e offender party is a pri&ate indi&idual or pu1lic officer 2. 6#en t#e offended party is a /o&ernment employee4 e&en if t#e act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime4 pro&ided it is related to t#e disc#arge of #is official duties *R'+CLE 152 L+4EL$;! REM*RE! 5i1elous remar<s or comments on matters pri&ileged4 if made $it# malice in fact4 do not e8empt t#e aut#or and t#e editor.
Chapter T-& INCRIMINATORY MACHINATION

*R'+CLE 151 +-CR+M+-*'+-7 +--$CE-' PER!$-! A. !lements 1. T#at t#e offender performs an act 2. T#at 1y suc# act #e directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person t#e commission of a crime 3. T#at suc# act does not constitute per=ury '/is is limite( t# )lanting evi(en"e% %f t#e e&idence planted is a lesser drug4 and t#e offender is a pu1lic officer or employee4 t#e penalty is &ery #ig#. T#is crime cannot 1e committed t#roug# &er1al incriminatory statements. %t is defined as an act and4 t#erefore4 to commit t#is crime4 more t#an a mere utterance is re7uired. %f t#e incriminating mac#ination is made orally4 t#e crime may 1e slander or oral defamation. %f t#e incriminatory mac#ination $as made in $riting and under oat#4 t#e crime may 1e per=ury if t#ere is a $illful falsity of t#e statements made. %f t#e statement in $riting is not under oat#4 t#e crime may 1e falsification if t#e crime is a material matter made in a $ritten statement $#ic# is re7uired 1y la$ to #a&e 1een rendered. As far as t#is crime is concerned4 t#is #as 1een interpreted to 1e possi1le only in t#e so0called planting of e&idence.
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*R'+CLE 15, +-'R+7;+-7 *7*+-!' <$-$R S/ossipT Rep*,l#% A%t <011 An A%t t& pr&h#,#t an$ penal#>e -#re tapp#n+ an$ &ther relate$ (#&lat#&ns &" pr#(ate %&mm*n#%at#&n8 an$ &ther p*rp&ses (also <no$n as t#e TA?A@A 5A6) Cection 1. %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person4 not 1eing aut#ori2ed 1y all t#e parties to any pri&ate communication or spo<en $ord4 to tap any $ire or ca1le or 1y using any ot#er de&ice or arrangement4 to secretly o&er#ear4 intercept4 or record suc# communication or spo<en $ord 1y using a de&ice commonly <no$n as a dictap#one or dictagrap# or detectap#one or $al<ie0tal<ie or taperecorder4 or #o$e&er ot#er$ise descri1ed; %t s#all 1e unla$ful for any person4 1e #e a participant or not in t#e act or acts penali2ed in t#e ne8t preceeding sentence4 to <no$ingly possess any tape record4 $ire record4 disc record4 or any ot#er suc# record4 or copies t#ereof4 of any communication or spo<en $ord secured eit#er 1efore or after t#e effecti&e date of t#is Act in t#e manner pro#i1ited 1y t#is la$; or to replay t#e same for any ot#er person or persons; or to communicate t#e contents t#ereof4 eit#er &er1ally or in $riting4 or to furnis# transcriptions t#ereof4 $#et#er complete or partial4 to any ot#er person3 -ro&ided4 t#at t#e use of suc# record or any copies t#ereof as e&idence in any ci&il4 criminal in&estigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Cection 3 #ereof4 s#all not 1e co&ered 1y t#is pro#i1ition.Q 8 8 8
%llustration3 A la$yer listening to t#e con&ersation of #is client $it# t#e opponent. Beld3 not lia1le under AA 42**. Be did not tap any $ire or ca1le4 #e did not use any de&ice or arrangement to secretly o&er#ear ot intercept.
RAMIREB ( CA an$ GARCIA G.R. N&. 9C5CC. Septem,er 058 4997 T#e aforestated pro&ision clearly and une7ui&ocally ma<es it illegal for any person4 not aut#ori2ed 1y all t#e parties to any pri&ate communication to secretly record suc# communication 1y means of a tape recorder. T#e la$ ma<es no distinction as to $#et#er t#e party soug#t to 1e penali2ed 1y t#e statute oug#t to 1e a party ot#er t#an or different from t#ose in&ol&ed in t#e pri&ate communication. T#e statute,s intent to penali2e all persons unaut#ori2ed to ma<e suc# recording is underscored 1y t#e use of t#e 7ualifier QanyQ. Conse7uently4 as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded4 Qe&en a (person) pri&y to a communication $#o records #is pri&ate con&ersation $it# anot#er $it#out t#e <no$ledge of t#e latter ($ill) 7ualify as a &iolatorQ under t#is pro&ision of A.A. 42**. +inally petitioner,s contention t#at t#e p#rase Qpri&ate communicationQ in Cection 1 of A.A 42** does not include Qpri&ate con&ersationsQ narro$s t#e ordinary meaning of t#e $ord QcommunicationQ to a point of a1surdity. T#e $ord communicate comes from t#e latin $ord communicare4 meaning Qto s#are or to impart.Q %n its ordinary signification4 communication connotes t#e act of s#aring or imparting4 as in a con&ersation4 or signifies t#e Qprocess 1y $#ic# meanings or t#oug#ts are s#ared 1et$een indi&iduals t#roug# a common system of sym1ols (as language signs or gestures)Q T#ese definitions are 1road enoug# to include &er1al or non0&er1al4 $ritten or e8pressi&e communications of Qmeanings or t#oug#tsQ $#ic# are li<ely to include t#e emotionally R c#arged e8c#ange4 on +e1ruary 224 1)''4 1et$een petitioner and pri&ate respondent4
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in t#e pri&acy of t#e latter,s office. Any dou1ts a1out t#e legislati&e 1ody,s meaning of t#e p#rase Qpri&ate communicationQ are4 furt#ermore4 put to rest 1y t#e fact t#at t#e terms Qcon&ersationQ and QcommunicationQ $ere interc#angea1ly used 1y Cenator Tanada in #is !8planatory ?ote to t#e 1ill4 7uoted 1elo$3 Q%t #as 1een said t#at innocent people #a&e not#ing to fear from t#eir con&ersations 1eing o&er#ead. >ut t#is statement ignores t#e usual nature of con&ersations as $ell as t#e undenia1le fact t#at most4 if not all4 ci&ili2ed people #a&e some aspects of t#eir li&es t#ey do not $is# to e8pose. +ree con&ersations are often c#aracteri2ed 1y e8aggerations4 o1scenity4 agreea1le false#oods4 and t#e e8pression of anti0social desires of &ie$s not intended to 1e ta<en seriously. T#e rig#t to t#e pri&acy of communication4 among ot#ers4 #as e8pressly 1een assured 1y our Constitution. ?eedless to state #ere4 t#e framers of our Constitution must #a&e recogni2ed t#e nature of con&ersations 1et$een indi&iduals and t#e significance of man,s spiritual nature4 of #is feelings and of #is intellect. T#ey must #a&e <no$n t#at part of t#e pleasures and satisfactions of life are to 1e found in t#e unaudited4 and free e8c#ange of communication 1et$een indi&iduals R free from e&ery un=ustifia1le intrusion 1y $#ate&er means.Q
T#is crime is committed 1y any person $#o s#all ma<e any intrigue $#ic# #as for its principal purpose to 1lemis# t#e #onor or reputation of anot#er person. %ntriguing against #onor is referred to as gossiping. T#e offender4 $it#out ascertaining t#e trut# of a defamatory utterance4 repeats t#e same and pass it on to anot#er4 to t#e damage of t#e offended party. 6#o started t#e defamatory ne$s is un<no$n. D#st#n%t#&n ,et-een #ntr#+*#n+ a+a#nst h&n&r an$ slan$er 6#en t#e source of t#e defamatory utterance is un<no$n and t#e offender simply repeats or passes t#e same4 t#e crime is intriguing against #onor. %f t#e offender made t#e utterance4 $#ere t#e source of t#e defamatory nature of t#e utterance is <no$n4 and offender ma<es a repu1lication t#ereof4 e&en t#oug# #e repeats t#e li1elous statement as coming from anot#er4 as long as t#e source is identified4 t#e crime committed 1y t#at offender is slander. D#st#n%t#&n ,et-een #ntr#+*#n+ a+a#nst h&n&r an$ #n%r#m#nat#n+ an #nn&%ent pers&n %n intriguing against #onor4 t#e offender resorts to an intrigue for t#e purpose of 1lemis#ing t#e #onor or reputation of anot#er person. %n incriminating an innocent person4 t#e offender performs an act 1y $#ic# #e directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person t#e commission of a crime.
*R'+CLE 152 +MPR;DE-CE *-D -E7L+7E-CE Huasi0offenses under t#is article are committed in 4 $ays3 1. >y committing t#roug# rec<less imprudence any act4 $#ic# #ad it 1een intentional4 $ould constitute a gra&e or less gra&e felony or lig#t felony 2. >y committing t#roug# simple imprudence or negligence an act $#ic# $ould ot#er$ise constitute a gra&e or a less serious in=ury 3. >y causing damage to t#e property of anot#er t#roug# rec<less imprudence or s imple imprudence or negligence
Page ,00
4. >y causing t#roug# simple imprudence or negligence some $rong $#ic#4 if done maliciously $ould #a&e constituted a lig#t felony Elements A. Re%Fless #mpr*$en%e 1. T#at t#e offender does or fails to do an act 2. T#at t#e doing of or failure to do t#at act is &oluntary 3. T#at it 1e $it#out malice 4. T#at material damage is caused 5. T#at t#ere is ine8cusa1le lac< of precaution on t#e part of t#e offender4 ta<ing into consideration3 a. #is employment or occupation4 1. degree of intelligence4 c. p#ysical condition and d. ot#er circumstances regarding persons4 time and place. !. S#mple #mpr*$en%e 1. T#at t#ere is lac< of precaution on t#e part of t#e offender 2. T#at t#e damage impending to 1e caused is not immediate nor t#e danger clearly manifested C. Cr#m#nal Ne+l#+en%e 1. T#at t#ere 1e a real pre=udice or in=ury caused 2. T#at suc# in=ury or pre=udice 1e not intentionally done 1ut simply 1e t#e result or incident of anot#er act performed 1y t#e doer 3. T#at in performing t#e act $#ic# $as t#e origin or cause of t#e in=ury due care and diligence $ere not needed 4. T#at t#e act $#ic# resulted in t#e in=ury or pre=udice 1e la$ful per se4 or at least not considered as a felony e&en t#oug# it may sometimes 1e for1idden 1y rules and regulation
T#ere is a separate su1=ect3 T.ATC A?@ @AMA/!C %n one case4 t#e Cupreme Court said 9An offended party in a criminal negligence case cannot reco&er t$ice. Cince #e did not dismiss t#e 7uasi0delict case against t#e o$ner of t#e &e#icle so s#ould #e proceed $it# t#e ci&il case4 #e cannot claim t#e su1sidiary lia1ility in t#e criminal case. >ut t#is case is -A. BAC (%C! 9for t#is case only:4 in cannot 1e a precedent in any ot#er case.: %n order to #old t#e o$ner su1sidiary lia1le4 t#e follo$ing re7uisites must 1e present3 1. determine if t#ere is employer0employee relations#ip 2. esta1lis# if t#e employer is engaged in some <ind of industry 3. t#ere is due diligence or not Cu1sidiary lia1ility t#erefore is not automatic; t#ere must 1e a separate proceedings to determine it. E=e%*t#&n a+a#nst Empl&'er "&r h#s s*,s#$#ar' l#a,#l#t' m*st n&t #ss*e as matter &" %&*rse !UT st#ll re)*#res hear#n+
YONAHA (s. CA an$ HEIRS OF CAWETE G.R. N&. 440C<3. Mar%h 098 4993
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T#e statutory 1asis for an employer,s su1sidiary lia1ility is found in Article 1*3 of t#e Ae&ised -enal Code. T#is Court #as since sanctioned t#e enforcement of t#is su1sidiary lia1ility in t#e same criminal proceedings in $#ic# t#e employee is ad=udged guilty4 on t#e t#esis t#at it really is a part of4 and merely an incident in4 t#e e8ecution process of t#e =udgment. >ut4 e8ecution against t#e employer must not issue as =ust a matter of course4 and it 1e#oo&es t#e court4 as a measure of due process to t#e employer4 to determine and resol&e a priori4 in a hear#n+ set for t#e purpose4 t#e legal applica1ility and propriety of t#e employer,s lia1ility. T#e re7uirement is mandatory e&en $#en it appears prima facie t#at e8ecution against t#e con&icted employee cannot 1e satisfied. T#e court must first determine if t#e follo$ing elements are present3 (a) t#e e8istence of an employer0employee relations#ip; (1) t#at t#e employer is engaged in some <ind of industry; (c) t#at t#e employee is ad=udged guilty of t#e $rongful act and found to #a&e committed t#e offense in t#e disc#arge of #is duties (not necessarily any offense #e commits Q$#ileQ in t#e disc#arge of suc# duties); and (d) t#at said employee is insol&ent. T#e =udgment of con&iction of t#e employee4 of course4 concludes t#e employer and t#e su1sidiary lia1ility may 1e enforced in t#e same criminal case4 1ut to afford t#e employer due process4 t#e court s#ould #ear and decide t#at lia1ility on t#e 1asis of t#e conditions re7uired t#erefor 1y la$.
>.asi=#00enses ).nis/e( 1. Committing t#roug# rec<less imprudence any act $#ic#4 #ad it 1een intentional4 $ould constitute a gra&e or less gra&e felony or lig#t felony; 2. Committing t#roug# simple imprudence or negligence an act $#ic# $ould ot#er$ise constitute a gra&e or a less serious felony; 3. Causing damage to t#e property of anot#er t#roug# rec<less imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence; 4. Causing t#roug# simple imprudence or negligence some $rong $#ic#4 if done maliciously4 $ould #a&e constituted a lig#t felony. D#st#n%t#&n ,et-een re%Fless #mpr*$en%e an$ ne+l#+en%e T#e t$o are distinguis#ed only as to $#et#er t#e danger t#at $ould 1e impending is easily percei&a1le or not. %f t#e danger t#at may result from t#e criminal negligence is clearly percei&a1le4 t#e imprudence is rec<less. %f it could #ardly 1e percei&ed4 t#e criminal negligence $ould only 1e simple. T#ere is no more issue on $#et#er culpa is a crime in itself or only a mode of incurring criminal lia1ility. %t is practically settled t#at criminal negligence is only a modality in incurring criminal lia1ility. T#is is so 1ecause under Article 34 a felony may result from dolo or culpa. Cince t#is is t#e mode of incurring criminal lia1ility4 if t#ere is only one carelessness4 e&en if t#ere are se&eral results4 t#e accused may only 1e prosecuted under one count for t#e criminal negligence. Co t#ere $ould only 1e one information to 1e filed4 e&en if t#e negligence may 1ring a1out resulting in=uries $#ic# are slig#t. @o not separate t#e accusation from t#e slig#t p#ysical in=uries from t#e ot#er material result of t#e negligence. %f t#e criminal negligence resulted4 for e8ample4 in #omicide4 serious p#ysical in=uries and slig#t p#ysical in=uries4 do not =oin only t#e #omicide and serious p#ysical in=uries in one information for
Page ,02
t#e slig#t p#ysical in=uries. Jou are not comple8ing slig#t $#en you =oin it in t#e same information. %t is =ust t#at you are not splitting t#e criminal negligence 1ecause t#e real 1asis of t#e criminal lia1ility is t#e negligence. %f you split t#e criminal negligence4 t#at is $#ere dou1le =eopardy $ould arise.
;)(ates in +MPR;DE-CE *-D -E7L+7E-CE

!rt. 3@E of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, as amended, states that rec)less imprudence consists in #oluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of ine,cusable lac) of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. *ompared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what ta)es the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or e#il is the failure of the offender to ta)e precautions due to lac) of s)ill ta)ing into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. o The elements of rec)less imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused%appellants which, because of their lac) of medical s)ill in treating the #ictim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latter0s death. !s already stated, accused%appellants, none of whom is a medical practitioners, belong to a religious group, )nown as the Missionaries of "ur 2ady of 6atima, which is engaged in faith healing. o 'n Dnited States #. Di#ino, 3> the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the #ictim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soa)ed in petroleum around the #ictim0s feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing in.uries to the #ictim. The *ourt held the accused liable for rec)less imprudence resulting in physical in.uries. 't was noted that the accused had no intention to cause an e#il but rather to remedy the #ictim0s ailment. o 'n another case, (eople #. Gda. de /ole+, 31 the *ourt ruled that the proper charge to file against a non%medical practitioner, who had treated the #ictim despite the fact that she did not possess the necessary technical )nowledge or s)ill to do so and caused the latter0s death, was homicide through rec)less imprudence. o The trial court0s reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary. 32 The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to )ill on the part of the accused%appellants. 'ndeed, the trial court0s findings can be sustained only if the circumstances of the case are ignored and the *ourt limits itself to the time when accused% appellants undertoo) their unauthori+ed $treatment$ of the #ictim. "b#iously, such an e#aluation of the case cannot be allowed. Dnder !rticle 3@E of the 3e#ised (enal *ode, criminal negligence $is treated as a mere -uasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. 't is not a -uestion of classification or terminology. 'n intentional crimes, the act itself is punished= in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penali+ed is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous rec)lessness, lac) of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descripti#e phrase as 0homicide through rec)less imprudence0, and the li)e= when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, 0rec)less imprudence resulting in homicide0= or 0simple imprudence causing damages to property0.$ *3'M'5!2 54/2'/45*4= !SS'ST!5*4 34OD'34D 1J !3T. 3@E "6 34G'S4D (45!2 *"D4= *!S4 !T 1!3. 8 &e hold that the attendant circumstance of failure to lend assistance defined in the last paragraph of !rticle 3@E, 3e#ised (enal *ode, was not ade-uately pro#ed by the e#idence for the prosecution. The trial court did not err in disregarding said circumstance in the sentencing of the accused. . . The assistance re-uired by !rticle 3@E, 3e#ised (enal *ode, is one which $may be in the hands of the offender to gi#e.$ &e must therefore ta)e into consideration the type and degree of assistance that the offender, at the time and place of the incident is capable of gi#ing. Dnder the circumstances of this case, we find that petitioner is not a hit%and%run dri#er. e e,erted efforts to see to it that the #ictim had been amended to. There were se#eral people assisting the #ictim, including his co%employees wor)ing for the bus company. The in.ured party was carried from the terminal, to a #ehicle, then to the hospital. 1efore petitioner was gi#en clearance by the dispatcher to lea#e, an hour later, he was assured that the #ictim was brought already to the hospital. &e note that petitioner had a bus full of passengers re-uiring also his attention. e could only do so much, so that the burden of helping the in.ured party was shared by the bus company personnel and other good Samaritans.
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'llustrations of rec)less imprudence resulting in homicide are: ;1< e,hibiting a loaded re#ol#er to a friend, who was )illed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling= 1? or ;2< discharging a firearm from the window of one0s house and )illing a neighbor who .ust at the moment leaned o#er the balcony front= 2> or ;3< where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .7E caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. "n petitioners0 claim that the charge for #iolation of !rticle 3@E of the 3(* $absorbs$ the charges for #iolation of (D 1>@B, (D ?H7, and 3! B?72, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony ;such as 3ec)less 'mprudence 3esulting in Damage to (roperty< cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes ;such as those #iolating (D 1>@B, (D ?H7, and 3! B?72<. &hat ma)es the former a felony is criminal intent ;dolo< or negligence ;culpa<= what ma)es the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
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