STATCON 8/8 Read 1 A Study Guide in Statutory Construction: Cases and Materials by Atty. Jose Jesus G.

Laurel (1990 ed.) Read Ch 7 2 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo (2009 ed. ) Unless page numbers are indicated, read the entire section listed. 4.01- verba legis (plain meaning rule) - intent of the legislature is expressed in the language of the statute. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, it muse be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. - inidex animi sermo - language is the insex of intention - verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of the statute there should be no departure 4.02 - dura lex sed lex (the law may be harsh, but it is the law) - if the law is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise, hard or harsh. 4.04 - ratio legis (interpretation according to the spirit of the law) 4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given the interpretation that accomplishes its purpose. 5.17 - noscitur sociis (when a particular word or phrase in itself is ambiguous, its construction may be made clear by the words accompanying it) 5.18 - example: the use of the word suspension can be understood as punitive and not a preventive measure since it is associated to words that are to be understood as punitive. 5.19 - ejusdem generis (general words are given their full, natural, generic sense; UNLESS they are used in association with specific words or phrases) - Requisites: (1) a statute containing an enumeration of particular or specific words, followed by a general word or phrase (2) the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind (3) enumeration is not merely by example (4) no indication of legislative intent to give general words a broader meaning 5.20 - example: where an act makes the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters and the like unlawful... And the like does not mean campaign jingles since what is being made unlawful are in the same class or kind as those specified. 5.21- Limitations of ejusdem generis (1) the enumeration includes: specific and general terms / the specific have no distinguishable common characteristic (2) enumeration of the specific words are exhaustive (3) use of enumeration is to give example (4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature. On consideration of the whole law, it can be seen that the legislature intended for the general word to go beyond the class enumerated. 5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all others) 5.23 - negative-opposite doctrine (argumentum a contrario) what is expressed puts an end to what is implied 5.24 - example: executive powers are vested in the President (only the president has executive power, no other) 5.25 - limitation of 5.22 expressio unius est exclusio alterius (it cannot be used to deter the plainly indicated purpose of the legislator) 5.26 - casus omissus (what is omitted in the enumeration is presumed to be omitted intentionally)

5.27 - doctrine of last antecedent (generally, words only modify those that are immediately associated) 7 Villanueva v. Commission on Elections, 140 SCRA 352 (1991) Facts: - Narciso Mendoza Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon on the last day of filing. On the same day, he withdrew his candidacy through an unsworn letter in his own handwriting - petitioner submitted his own certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Mendoza. - petitioner won by vote, but those votes were not counted since his name was not on the certified list of candidates of COMELEC. - respondent Lirio was announced as the elected vice-mayor - COMELEC dismissed petitioner's petition since Sec. 28 which the petitioner invoked only allows substitution if the withdrawal of the candidate who withdrew was under oath. Since Mendoza's withdrawal was not under oath, it had no legal effect. Issue: whether or not COMELEC erred in its dismissal of the petition Held: - COMELEC denying petitioner's certificate of candidacy based on his name not being in the certified list of candidates should be rejected. There was not enough time to put petitioner's name on the list, but through COMELEC law manager's advice, petitioner circularized to the chairmen of election committees of his candidacy - the fact that Mendoza's withdrawal is not sworn is but a technicality. In Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, it stated that once the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate had not sworn his certificate of candidacy. - COMELEC not allowing due process due to technicality does not follow the spirit of the law, which allows substitute candidates even up to the midday of an election in case of death or withdrawal etc. STATCON Principle: 7.32 - election laws should be liberally construed to achieve its purpose: effectuate and safeguard the will of the people 2 Matabuena v. Cervantes, (1971) Facts: - Felix Matabuena, husband of defendant, owned a parcel of land. - Felix executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant which was done during the time defendant and Felix were not yet married, effective immediately - Felix died. Plaintiff claims the land since she is the nearest collateral relative of the deceased. Her argument is that the deed of donation is null and void since it was done during the common-law relationship Issue: whether the ban on a donation between spouses during marriage applies to common law relationship Held: YES. The ban also applies to a common-law relationship. As applied in the Court of Appeals case: Buenaventura vs. Bautista, it was provided that the interpretation of a similar provision from the old Civil Code is to "prohibit donations in the favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear and undue pressure upon the donor". Therefore, "there is every reason to apply the prohibition to persons who are living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. If any other interpretation is to be applied, it will defeat the purpose of the statute. Apply STATCON Principle. Therefore, ruling of the lower court is reversed. However, the land is still split between appellant and defendant.

STATCON Principle: 4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given the interpretation that accomplishes its purpose. 6 Duncan v. CFI of Rizal (Branch X), (1976) Facts: - The natural mother of the child was a client of Atty. Velasquez, who gave Velasquez the child in order for Velasquez to look for a couple to adopt the child. - the mother after giving the child to Velasquez no longer gave support to the child. - A foreign couple residing in the Philippines decided to adopt the child that was under the care of the principal witness, Atty. Corazon Velasquez. - Velasquez gave the consent for the adoption Issue: whether Velasquez has the authority to give consent for the adoption Held: - YES. Velasquez is authorized. She is recognized as the guardian after the fact that the child is illegitimate and her mother has abandoned her. - the lower court tried to cover their decision under the shield of dura lex sed lex. However, that should not hold be considered. The purpose is to endorse adoption for the benefit of the child. Apply STATCON Principle. STATCON Principle: 4.08 - construction to accomplish purpose. If there is ambiguity, the statute should be given the interpretation that accomplishes its purpose. 8 Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil. 44 (1948) Facts: - the appellant was an opposing candidate to the appellee for the governorship of Leyte. - appellee was one of the three disqualified members of the provincial board of canvassers. They were to be replaced by the division superintendent of schools, the district engineer, and the district health officer as appointed by COMELEC. - during the initial canvassing of votes, the division superintendent of schools and the district engineer were not present. The chief clerk in the office of the superintendent and assistant civil engineer were the ones who took the place of those not present. They proclaimed the appellee as governor-elect - two days later, a canvassing was again done by the board. This time, the superintendent and the district engineer took part. Again, declaring the appellee as the governor-elect. - appellant filed a motion of protest, but the lower courts dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was filed out of time, if the first canvassing of votes is considered. Issue: whether or not the trial court erred in using the first canvassing. Held: - YES. The trial court erred since it was the date of the second canvassing that should be considered, since it was the legitimate canvassing. - the lower court reasoned that the chief clerk and the assistant civil engineer were qualified since it would be absurd if the superintendent and the district engineer could not be represented by their assistants. - The Supreme Court applied the STATCON Principle in finding error to the lower court's reasoning. The revised election code provides those that can replace members of the board if any of the members are found unqualified. The election code did not provide that the replacements can be the assistants of those appointed. Allowing such replacement will take away the power vested in COMELEC to appoint the members of the board. - it was also found the replacements cannot be seen as de facto officers since that would entail a service

in the said office for a length of time that would lead one to presume that the said officer was actually appointed. - in addition, the second canvassing does not validate the mistake made. It was found by the SC that the canvassing was made prematurely since all district election returns have not yet arrived - the court also held that the initial canvass cannot be validated since the two replacements are disqualified, resulting in a lack of quorum. STATCON Principle: 5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all others) 10 City of Manila v. Lyric Music House, Inc. (1935) Facts: - defendant sells music goods. The plaintiff instituted an action to recover from the defendant license fees and penalty of 525php. The lower court held that the defendant should pay the license fees on the grounds that Ordinance 1925 applies to the defendant. Issue: whether or not ordinance 1925 applies to the defendant. Held: - YES. Ordinance 1925 applies since the defendant is considered a general merchandise store. - Ordinance 1925 states that establishments selling items not enumerated in the ordinance (rice, textile, hardwares, etc.) are considered general merchandise stores. - General merchandise stores are to pay license fees as indicated in the amendment in sections of the administrative code: which give the authority to the Municipal Board of Manila to tax and fix the amount of license fees. - the contention of the defendant that the board stretched the definition of "general merchandise" cannot be given consideration following STATCON Principle (1). - in addition, the contention that there were certain businesses expressly mentioned means those not mentioned are to be excluded cannot be applied due to STATCON Principle (2) - the defendant further contends that the tax is excessive, however, taxation is under the discretion of the legislature which the courts do not normally question. STATCON Principle: (1) 5.21- Limitation of ejusdem generis (4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature. On consideration of the whole law, it can be seen that the legislature intended for the general word to go beyond the class enumerated. (2) 5.25 - limitation of 5.22 expressio unius est exclusio alterius (it cannot be used to deter the plainly indicated purpose of the legislator) 16 Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Social Security Comm. (1961) Facts: - petitioner requests that they be exempt from the Social Security Law of 1954 on the grounds that it is a labor law and it does not cover religious or charitable institutions and is limited to businesses organized for profit. The Social Security Commission denied the request. Issue: whether or not the petitioner should be exempt from the Social Security Law Held: - NO. Petitioner is under Social Security Law by definition of employer. - as provided in the Social Security Law, the Commission can compel any employer who has gone beyond 2 years of existence to become a member of the System. The system is then compulsory to the employees 16 to 60 who have have been in service to an employer for at least 6 months. - as defined in the law, employer means any domestic or foreign, natural or juridical person carrying a trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind. The contention of the petitioner that

ejusdem generis should be applied cannot be given consideration due to STATCON Principle (1) - in addition, if the legislature did intend to for the religious to be exempt, they would not have provided the specific exemption to the government. Therefore, STATCON Principle (2) applies. - in addition, the contention of the petitioner that the Social Security Law is a labor law cannot also be given consideration. The law is to provide social security system that is suitable to the needs of the people. It is therefore a social legislation and cannot be limited to labor only - in addition, it is not unconstitutional to give the public funds allocated to the System to priests since the funds are given not because they are priests but because they are employees. STATCON Principle: (1) 5.21- Limitations of ejusdem generis (4) cannot defeat the intent of the legislature. (2) 5.22 - expressio unius est exclusio alterius (express mention implies exclusion of all others) 18 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties (1994) [main opinion only] Facts: - PAGCOR wanted to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro. Due to this, they leased a portion of a building belonging to respondents - the Sangguniang Panglungsod promulgated two ordinances, the first being that all current existing business permits enabling casinos to be cancelled. The second ordinance imposed an administrative fine to those who violate the first ordinance. - the respondents along with PAGCOR questioned the validity of the ordinances, to which the CA decided the ordinances are invalid. Issue: whether or not the ordinances promulgated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid Held: - NO. The ordinances are not valid on the grounds that they limit PAGCOR's power to establish and operate casinos. - in their defense, the SP invoked the local government code saying that it gave them the power to suppress gambling AND other prohibited games of chance. Since the local government code did not distinguish what sort of gambling is to be prevented they invoked STATCON Princinple (1) - the local government code is also a later enactment as compared to PD 1869 which gave power to PAGCOR to establish and operate casinos. Therefore, the petitioners defend that the local government code impliedly repealed PD 1869. Invoking STATCON Principles (2) and (3). In addition, it was mandated that they pass an ordinance preventing gambling both legal and illegal since the word used was "shall" invoking STATCON Principle (5) - However, the SC found that the forms of gambling that the local government code can prevent are those that are illegal applying STATCON Principle (4), which means gambling is associated with other PROHIBITED games of chance. Since gambling in casinos is legal under PD 1869, it cannot be prevented by the LGU. - in addition, the implied repeal cannot be considered since there is no clear intention on the part of the legislature that they wanted to repeal PD 1869. Since there is no clear intention, any conflicting statutes should not be pitted against each other but harmonized. - in addition to being mandated to pass an ordinance the SC invoked the EXCEPT clause of STATCON Principle (5) STATCON Principle: (1) ubi lex non distinguit, nos ditinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish) (2) 7.28 - local government unit codes vs. national statutes should be construed liberally in favor of the LGU and against the national government (3) 7.26 - general welfare statutes (to uphold social justice) are to be construed liberally in favor of those

whom the law seeks to benefit (4) 5.17 - noscitur sociis (when a particular word or phrase in itself is ambiguous, its construction may be made clear by the words accompanying it) 8.06 - use of "shall" or "must" - directory in nature to confer that what is to be done is mandatory - EXCEPT when the legislative intent was to use it as merely directory. In order to ascertain if it is mandatory and not merely directory is when non-compliance means the act is null.