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U.S. Department of Justice

03 HAR 2 I PH 5: 3l» Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, |J. C. 20535-OQo

March 12, 2003

Senator Charles E. Grassley

United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Grassley:

I am writing in response to your inquiry relating to the recent General Accounting

Office (GAO) report entitled "Border Security."
Starting in January 2002, the Directorate for Visa Services Coordination Division
ofllie U.S. Department of State (DOS) established the Visa Condor clearance program for
certain visa applicants from certain countries. It required that information on these visa
applicants be placed in cables, (denominated by DOS as "Condor cables") and sent by DOS visa
issuing points around the world directly to the FBI for a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO), and
simultaneously to the DOS visa office in Washington, D.C.
Within 30 days, the FBI was expected to search each visa applicant's name and
biographical information in the central index system in order to determine if the visa applicant's
name was referenced in FBI investigative files. If there was no possible match, then the SAO
would indicate that the FBI had "no objection" to issuance of the visa. In all other cases, the
Condor cable information and the possible file references were reviewed to determine whether
the applicant was identical to the file material. This review process could include a review of the
context and basis for the reference within the FBI's investigative division with case management
responsibility for the type of investigative file(s) involved.

If after 30 days, DOS had not received a response from the FBI to a particular
condor request, the original procedure allowed DOS to assume that the FBI had no objection to *
issuance of the visa. Initially, the FBI began to receive these cables at Ihe rale of 2,000 a week. '
i
As the clearing process progressed, it became extremely time and manpower
intensive, resulting in a backlog at the FBI. By April 2002, there was an apparent backlog of
approximately 14,000. visa applicant cables to which the FBI had not yerresponded to DOS,
although the FBI's national name check unit had run all pending visa applicant names through
the central index system. As it turned out, the backlog was only about 10,000 since many of
these Condor cables were duplicates that had not clearly been identified as re-submitted requests.
MAR.-27'U3ITHU) 19:02 SENATE F I N A N C E COMMITTEE TEL:202 228 2131 P. 003

Senator Charles E. Grassley

Although the FBI's national name check unit had searched all these pending names through its
indices, the FBI had not completed administratively processing the names for which no possible
match was found or those which required more detailed, analysis before the SAO could be
completed.
Unfortunately, due to expiration of the 30 day period for action established by the
original Condor procedure, some visas were issued by DOS points to applicants whose cables
were still pending at the FBI. We believe that this is the reason thai visas were issued to 105
applicants whose data reflected possible matches in FBI investigative files.
From April through June 2002, prior to it being consolidated inlo the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division, the Department of Justice Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
(FTTTF) undertook to temporarily assist the FBI in reducing the backlog of responses due to
DOS. FTTTF personnel sorted the cables and keyed pertinent information into a formal that
could be run against the FBI's index system in order to run what amounted to a second name
check. Where no possible match occurred in FBI indices system — which was true in the vast
majority of cases -- DOS was informed that "no objection" existed to issuance of the visa. This
cleared the vast majority of the backlog.
In the remaining cases, applicants that appeared to have possible matching data
were searched by FTTTF staff through FBI automated investigative systems to see if there was
information that either refuted the possible match, confirmed the match or resolved outstanding
substantive questions. About half of the remaining cases were resolved by the FTTTF in this
fashion and DOS was so notified. With respect to the final category of remaining cases that
could not be electronically resolved, DOS was notified to hold in abeyance the final processing
Qf those requests and they were referred byThe^FTTTF back to the FBI soJnat FBI aiialystsc&ujd
retrieve and review the appropriate case filesBvJune,'theITacidog was cleared, and the primary
sponsibility lor the Visa Condor SAO process was returned to the FBI in a revised procedure.
Throughout this difficult period, the FBI, FTTTF and DOS were meeting to
establish more efficient procedures to streamline this process. I am pleased to advise thai by the
end of June 2002, a more effective process was in place. The FBI began electronically
processing these cables and providing reports to DOS within 72 hours on the status of the
applicants where there was no possible match. In all other cases, an application could be held up
for as long as needed to complete the SAO.
With this automated process and in light of concern over the processing of Condor
cables, the DOS recently agreed with the FTTTF to retransmit (o the FBI for updated
reprocessing that portion of the "remaining names" that the FTTTF had sought to resolve on its
own and not referred back to the FBI for an SAO.
In June 2002, the FTTTF conducted an audit of the Condor applications backlog,
that group, the EE£IE determined that 105 persons were issued visas by DOS visa
issuing points before a response was sent to DOS. As your November 26th letter acknowledges,
the initial GAO estimate of roughly 200 prematurely issued visas was also reduced to 105 after
duplicate referrals were taken inio account. The FTTTF review concluded that at leasl 76 of •—
those 105 persons had no information on record that would cause ihe FBI to recommend to DOS D<f
that the visa application be denied. The clearance of those 76 applications means that there are ^L / '7
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Senator Charles E. Grassley

/ less than 30 visa recipients, who have not at this point been the subject of an SAO. If the SAO in
( any of the reprocessed referrals ultimately concludes that a visa should not be issued, the FBI will
vnotify the DOS in accordance with the agreed-upon procedures now in place.

Thank you for your interest in this very important matter and for your patience as
we sought to address these issues. The FBI is committed to assisting GAO in completing its
thorough review of this process.

Sincerely yours,

Eloni P. KaJisch
Acting Assistant Director
Office of Congressional Affairs