Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S.

Embassy
Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02) on v

Name: Jeffrey P. Lodinsky

Date: April 20, 2002 Post: Muscat, Oman

Comments in blue are from the phone interview with Jeff Lodinsky on April 24,2002.

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NIV application and approval process
since September 11, 2001? (Check all that apply)

•*"•";;< ' - , - • - : ' - .'*, Yes No N/A

a. Strengthened anti-fraud programs
- -^ ^ - * &
-' t *
* r ' : X-*^"
X
b. Instituted new or changed; existing standards on how closely ani X
applicant's name and date of birth must match the name and date
of birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers subnufclf-. %^!|
requests for a Security Advisory Opinion) fi
c. Reduced the availability of personal appearance waiver - ' .,; ,4j X
programs ^ - , . » ; ' , " ,-'.«'••-•
d. Increased the percentage of NFV applicants who are ; J X
inteviewed -'• .''*!
e. Other please specify) « ,%
f. Other (please specify) /

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Mr. Lodinksy has been a State employee for many years but Muscat is only his second tour as a
Foreign Service Officer. His first post was Oslo. He arrived in Muscat in August 2001. He did
not receive any training in Arabic or area studies before arriving at post.

Mr. Lodinksy is the only consular officer in Muscat. Two FSNs work with him, and during the
busier summer months, an eligible US family member will usually help out in the consular
section. During our phone conversation, Mr. Lodinksy made the following comments:

la. Oman is a low fraud post; he believes that he rarely sees visa fraud. He processes few visas -
just 6600 NIVs last year and approximately 260 IVs.

Ib. Mr. Lodinksy described Arabic names as the Achilles' heel of the CLASS system since there
are so many ways to spell them. Since 9-11, Mr. Lodinksy said that he has sent in many more
SAOs and he is consulting with the RSO and Omani FSNs more to make sure that his
interpretation of Arabic name matches is correct.
When asked how he defines a "close match," Mr. Lodinsky said that he puts the most emphasis
on seeing a close match on the date of birth. This is because Oman issues reliable birth
certificates that he feels he can rely on. Since there are so many ways to spell Arabic names, he
feels that the DOB is more reliable. He also looks at when the hit was entered. As a general
guideline, Mr. Lodinsky said that he first considers the closeness of the DOB match, then the
name match, and then other factors, such as when the hit was entered into the CLASS system. At
least one of these elements has to be very close in order for him to request an SAO.

Ic. Mr. Lodinksy said that the post does not have a drop box or travel agency referral program
since the visa volume doesn't warrant it. Omanis personally drop off their applications or have
their driver or a company representative drop it off.

Mr. Lodinksy said that he has been asking more Omanis to come in for an interview since 9-11.
Prior to 9-11, he would issue visas to people even if they couldn't really describe why they were
traveling to the U.S. Now he wants Omanis to come in and explain why they are traveling. He
said that the DS-157 is useful to him because it asks for so much more information. Often the
Omanis do not fully understand the DS-157 and therefore do not fill it out completely. Mr.
Lodinksy will ask them to come in to the embassy so that they can review the form and talk more
about their travel plans.

Id. Approximately 50% of NIV applicants in Muscat are TCNs. The practice, even before 9-11,
has been to interview all TCNs. Before 9-11, Mr. Lodinksy said that he interviewed only about 1
percent of Omani applicants. This has increased by about 8-10 percent since September 11. He
primarily interviews Omani men, aged 16-30.
 2) About what percent of NIV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months
prior to September 11, 2001, and (b) since September 11, 2001?

a. 12 months prior to September 11,2001 52

b. Since September 11,2001 60

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Mr. Lodinksy said that the increase from 52 percent to 60 percent is due to the increase in
interviews for Omanis. As mentioned above, post's practice, pre and post 9-11, has been to
interview all TCNs. Since 9-11, about 8 - 10 percent of Omani applicants are interviewed.
3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements
help your post's consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge

a) Security Advisory XX XX
Opinion for selected
individuals from States
Sponsoring International
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees XX
c) CLASS name check s XXX

d) The 20-day waiting XXX XX

period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that XXX
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor XXX
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

3a. Upon discussing the survey, Mr. Lodinsky changed his answer for 3a to read "some extent"
instead of "no extent." He said that requesting an SAO would give him a little more comfort but
that he does not feel an SAO is 100 percent protection against terrorists.

3b. Mr. Lodinksy said that he convenes the Visa Viper committee quarterly but that it is
"useless" since other agencies at the embassy who have information tend to send it back to their
own headquarters using their own methods of communications. Mr. Lodinksy felt that other
agencies were not using the Viper channel to submit information on potential terrorists.

3c. Mr. Lodinksy said that he thinks that CLASS is a good system but that he does not have a
100 percent comfort level with it. When asked how he would improve CLASS, he said that he
wished it had more information in it. He would like to see less-cryptic CLASS entries. He would
like entries to include more information on the background of "00" hits, so that he could see the
actual application of that person and then try to figure out if that person was the same as the
person applying for the visa. He acknowledged that CLASS is an unclassified system but he
thought maybe there could be a classified section of CLASS just for consular officers (i.e. that
FSNs could not access at all). Mr. Lodinksy thinks that CLASS is very "bare bones" in its
current configuration.

3d. As we spoke, Mr. Lodinsky decided to change his initial answer of "some extent" to "no
extent."
Mr. Lodinksy said that the 20-day wait does not help him in any way. He said that perhaps it
helps someone in Washington to make a decision on the applicant but that it does not change his
decision process at post in any way. It only prolongs the visa process, creates more work for him,
and inconveniences legitimate travelers.

Mr. Lodinksy said that the 20-day wait is the "number one" annoyance at post. It hurts legitimate
travelers and does not help the consular officer make decisions on the applicant. Mr. Lodinksy
said that there are many rich, influential businessmen in Oman who travel to the U.S. often and
this 20-day waiting period is very aggravating to them. Mr. Lodinksy has recommended to
C A/EX that there needs to be some sort of "fast track" for certain applicants since he thinks it is
useless to paint all Omani men with the same brush - i.e. to give the same scrutiny to
unemployed 18-year olds as you give to influential businessmen.

Mr. Lodinsky has yet to receive a negative response on any of the 20-day wait applicants.

3e. Mr. Lodinsky likes the DS-157. He feels that consular officer can never have too much
information. He gives the DS-157 to men older than 45 and to many women, too, and he claims
that he has not heard any complaints from applicants. He said that he would re-write/change
some of the questions on the form but that, in general, he is in favor of it.

3f. As with the 20-day wait, Mr. Lodinksy feels that the Visa Condor does not help him detect
potential terrorists in any way. He said that perhaps the Condors are useful to State in order to
screen out terrorists but that it does not help him any way. He said that he sends Condors for
virtually all Omani male applicants in the age group because they all fit the Condor criteria in
some way. This adds considerably to his workload.
4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NTV
application process help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box. in each row.)

Very Some-what Not

helpful helpful helpful Not sure
a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants XXX
(If you check very or somewhat helpful, please
indicate the percentage 96)
b. Interview all applicants XXX
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you XXX
check very or somewhat ftelgfitl, please indicate the
percentage %) ' •
d Fingerprint an applicants XXX
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying XXX
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations^ and cultural sensitivity
g. Make the visa process a law enforcement XXX

comments section on how this should be

accomplished, e.g., should the function remain
within State or be moved to another agency)
h. Other (please specify) , , r v * • . .
- , «• fif , "\" -' •;.• , •""",

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

4a, b. Mr. Lodinksy thought that it would be pointless to interview all Omani applicants. He noted
that even though he had increased the percentage of Omanis he interviewed since 9-11, his
refusal rate had not increased.

4c. Mr. Lodinksy did not think that fingerprinting applicants would, in any way, be useful for him
4d. He said that he could see how fingerprinting might be useful for headquarters but he didn't
think that it would help anyone in the field make decisions about who was a terrorist.

4e. Mr. Lodinksy felt strongly about improving training for consular officers. In his initial
consular training in 1999, there was no mention of terrorists at all. He said that he would like to
see mandatory training for consular officers on how to detect terrorists.

4g. Mr. Lodinksy marked "not sure" for this question since he was not sure if the question implied
that consular officers would have law enforcement duties or if it implied that there would be INS
officers staffed at post alongside the consular officer.

Mr. Lodinksy was skeptical about making the visa system a function of law enforcement. He said
that the visa role should definitely not be turned over to another agency. However, he thought it
might help to have an INS officer at every post that consular officers could talk to if they had
questions about an applicant (the closest regional INS officer that Lodinksy has is in Greece).
4h. Mr. Lodinksy thinks that the visa process "works", even though the 19 hijackers from
September 11 obtained visas. He said that consular officers are not mind readers and that it is not
always possible to detect someone's nefarious intentions. He thinks that anything that asks for
more information of the applicant - such as the DS 157—is good. He thought that it should be
mandatory for consular officers to ask for more documents, such as birth certificates and
employment verification letters, [auditor's note: more docs are great only if they're legitimate].
5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the
NFV process? (Please check one box in each row.)

Vcry; Some- Not , ." , Not

feasible what feasible feasible sure

a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If XX

you check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate
the percentage 96)
b. Interview all applicants XX
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you XX
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %) '••••'
d. Fingerprint all applicants XX
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying 'V XX
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/ ;
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity :
f. Make the visa process a law enforcement function XX
g. Institute a secure travel document that incorporates a XX
biometric such as fingerprints . ; :4%r;
h. Other (please specify) ;;?s
.',' '**!$&

L Other (please specify) , ;£

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Mr. Lodinksy had neglected to answer this question when he sent in the survey, but he gave his
answers as we spoke on the phone.

5a, b. It would be feasible for post to interview more/all applicants as the NIV volume is low.

5c,d. Given the assumption that the consular officer would have to do the fingerprinting, Mr.
Lodinksy did not think that it would be feasible to do this at the post because he would not have
time.

5e. Improved training would not be feasible because it would be difficult to finance it through
the post. Moreover, since Mr. Lodinksy is the only consular officer in Oman, it is difficult for
him to find the time to participate in training programs. If he is away from the consular section,
then other officers at the embassy have to take over his duties.

5f, g. Mr. Lodinksy was "not sure" about the feasibility of turning the visa process over to law
enforcement or of implementing a secure travel document. He felt that it would be feasible if
someone else were paying for it - but that this decision is out of his domain. He said that is more
of a question for the administration officer.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the
proposed changes listed in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great extent Yes, to some extent No Not sure

a Consular staffing shortages XX
b. Lack of space, facilities XX
c. An adverse effect on U.S. interests XX
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d. Host country would require same XX
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

As with question 5, Mr. Lodinksy failed to complete this question before sending in the survey.
We discussed the question on the phone and he gave me his answers.

6a. The proposed changes in questions 4 and 5 would be difficult to implement in Oman because
Mr. Lodinksy is the only consular officer. He would not have the time for many of the proposed
changes.

6b. Space is not an issue in Oman.

6c. Mr. Lodinksy said that it would be a "disaster" to fingerprint all Omani applicants. The 20-
day wait for some applicants was already a major insult to some Omanis. Fingerprinting would
be a public relations disaster.

6d. Since few U.S. citizens travel to Oman, host country reciprocal actions are not too great of a
concern.

Other comments from Mr. Lodinksy:

• Mr. Lodinksy said that, in general, posts need more information. Any additional
training and guidance would be useful.
• Some consular officers are getting cynical. They are wondering if anyone is reading
the cables they send in. Consular officers should not be asked to do more work
unless they know what they're doing is useful and being done for some purpose.
• Mr. Lodinksy wondered if the implementation of new visa regulations since 9-11
was really making a difference. At the moment, the Condors and the 20-day wait
period are just inconvenient for the legitimate traveler and for the consular officer.
He really questioned why they're being required to do these additional steps.