/\IAI

Col. Scott,

Here's some revised key points I think we need in Chapter 4. Do you agree with them and can you think of
things I'm not considering? Chapter 5, remember, is about the future, NORTHCOM, etc.

Please bear in mind: Chapter 3 will have the following sidebars:

WADS and lack of radio/radar coverage on 9/11
SEADS role on 9/11
tanker support on 9/11 (with interviews from Maine guys)
role of other 1AF units on 9/11, to include response at Burlington, Atlantic City and Otis
Maj. Arias and his brother's story

Chapter 4 — Operation Noble Eagle: How does tragedy affect the air sovereignty mission?

On Sept. 12, 2001, we were now in a different world

Within 18 hours of attacks, we maintained 69+ alert sites
Air Force and Air National Guardsmen patrol entire CONUS airspace
Plan was to protect possible targets like nuclear and chemical facilities
Jet airliners were parked at Gander IAP, Newfoundland, and Halifax IAP, Nova Scotia
On Sept. 15, 2001, homeland defense mission is dubbed Operation Noble Eagle
Through it all, never a deployment order - what is significance of this?
How ONE became part of AEF rotation and why
Workload increases at air defense sectors
NATO AWACS crews from 12 nations arrive at Tinker on Oct. 9, flying more than 360 sorties and
logging more than 4,300 flying hours
Surveillance equipment capabilities upgraded in response to attacks and more robust air sovereignty
mission
AOC grows/combat plans/1AF had wanted a recognized AOC for years
QDR now calling homeland defense primary mission
Radar and sensors increase
JBECC (Why important)
All air control squadrons fully employed
Fighter wings are heavily tasked, for example, Jacksonville and Fresno have 8 jets on alert at 2 sites for
6 months
Units fly constant CAPS for seven months - affects readiness and training
Costs of such an operation, financially and personally for people working nonstop without leave
Examples of real-world scrambles and intercepts (have several examples from Col. Cromwell at
WADS)
CONR/1 AF support of Olympics (This is a great example of inter-agency cooperation)
CONR even talks to airliner headquarters
FAA and Customs are more involved in the mission

I think Chapter 4 needs sidebars on the following:

How people are affected personally by tragedy and bigger mission (how call-up is hard on people,
especially single parents, etc.) - Chaplain helps out
Incident on Sept. 12 at NEADS - sector personnel think they're being attacked
Hours on jets - more sorties than ever before wear out the planes

Thanks, Col. Scott, I'll probably think of more things later... thought if you saw this you might think of
things that absolutely need to be in this book.

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Fargo - got battle stations call and then there was a period of time before they actually got the actual
scramble order

By the time they got battle stations call, both towers in ny hit - at least in one of pilot's minds, one of them
saw cnn live

Our ops officer and one of alert pilots that day were going to do a 2v4 with 1FW at Langley

Scheduled for a training mission, 4-ship on 2 fight

Opso already on phone w/1 FW to go over final details w/training sortie

Alert pilot who was going to fly with him by that time cnn on -
After battle stations call, phone had rung in hangar, one of mechanics answered it and got opso on line,

At that pt, question: how many airplanes can you launch?

Already 2 in battle stations - reply came back, how many can you get airborne?

Had 4 planes in det, 2 live, 2 spares

Det commander at x, since retired, was on vacation

3 pilots and four airplanes so they launched all three, first deviations from standard practice, got a scramble
order - all through channels through neads, through established links

all three launch right around 9:25 or so

initial vector to go straight north, but redirected toward Washington

9:38 - hit time at Washington

guy in the pentagon when it got hit

guys were there about 10 minutes later, about 9:48 or 9:49

billy Hutchison made his loop to loop - 2,400 Ibs. When he took off
he took off from 113 under somebody's command, but first flight of two - 10:05 is way too early

fargo did vis i.d. on 113 w, who wasn't armed with anything

who set up cap? Our guys were in constant communication with neads, our guys will tell you NEADS set
up cap

we had direct comm w/neads which had air battle at that pt.

Fargo guys didn't know about 93

That flight was resolved
120 miles out of d.c. when it crashed at shanksville

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Col. Scott, director of staff at 1AF

By early 1994, 1 AF was led by an ANG commander: What was the threat at that point in
time?

Navin - even back then, we kept an eye on soviet long range aviation capability, didn't
vision a wave of bombers cpming over the poles like people thought in 50s and 60s,
how4ever, we still believed the capability was there, maybe not the intent, but capability,
and we needed to have a capability to thwart that,
94, 95, 95, people at laf, we didn't use the word asymmetric, but we talked about things
like the rogue actors — the nation-states that hafd capability and intent to use it

1996 started talking about terorism

col. Scott - most of what people talked about from our perspective back in the timeframe,
wasn't military action, but the threat of embarrasment of the u.s.
we didn't think cuban migs would attack the u.s.
but migs would be an embarrasment in the u.s.
col. Scott - political embarassment was norad's problem like ours

Scott - perception no military threat except for florida straits down in cuba ws nil,
military society at large, wasn't our perception here
Everybody else in ace and air staff wondered why the hell we had anyone on alert to
begin with, period

Navin - the perception of the threat was so low that the air staff developed for the 1997
QDR

What hurdles were you facing from the active duty and others who didn't believe in the
mission?

Start of the transition from the active duty to the Guard, there were people and also
within the guard who did not believe there was any need for the transition simply because
there was no need for the mission, simply did not see a need for that kind of manpowers
in the ang, and that's pretty significant when you think about I,
People thought that was an absolute waste of precious manpower to put that in a mission
area that would totally go away anyway,
Early on, a couple of folks in a briefing over at hurlburt actually briefed the total demise
of 1AF and its sectors,
Infamous slide 31 that was coordinated on, believe it or not, by the guard bureau, I don't
mean the idrector, but the xp of the guard bureau
Plans and programs is xp

NCT0067782
Scott - what it really did was unfund these operations by 2005

Navin - gen killey and I prob spent more time in the pentagon trying to convince general
officers that the mission was not only viable but had to be done than I ever care to think
about
Every single time you'd walk away from there with that horrobiel feeling in that pit of
your stomach, they do't care, they simply don't care

Scott - 1 June 98, the day gen arnold was faxed from gen. hawley, commander of ace, a
signed ace staff summary sheet that asked him to approve the closure of laf and
scattering of his units to other nafs that weren't closing

Scott - about 7 months later, slide 31 happened, 1999

An attempt to close us down, you can imagine how sensitive we were when we got a
briefing about slide 31
That's when the boss said, ok I've had enough
We formed the roles and missions team to determine if the mission was really viable,

Roles and missions team - maj gen. pochmaro

Tag of north dakota, maj. Gen. mike hoggin, bgen jim higgins
Bgen doug moore
Scotty and I were both on the team, mike corbett

Scott - product was a very extensive report

We spent a year, and visited a number of places, bottom line was basically an affirmation
that this mission was not going away
The higher up you get above middle management level of 06s who'd rather be doing
other things, there was never any doubt in comacc orcincnorad, that this was a mission to
execute and support

Navin - gen estes letter - said qdr 1997 sucked - he couldn't do it

Scott - NORAD tenets on website describes homeland defense as #1 priority of u.s.

military and on there before 9/11

Navin - in 1998, many people talking about closing laf and doing away with the sectors,
don't need the mission, that was only 2 years after the shootdown of bttr by the cuban
migs
Things fade into the rceeses of peoples' minds rather rapidly

Scott - about the same x, an emerging debate within military academic circles about the
assyetric threat to ths united states

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A number of papers as we were struggling to stay alive, people id studies, hart rudman
study, we are going to get hit by terrorism in ehnext 5 years

Debate was going on in the mainstream of dod - and we are over here struggling for
survival, what we picked up on from that debate, what are those asymetric threats toward
our mission

We thought the primary threat was some sort of poor-man's cruise missile or unmanned
aerial vehicle from some commercial ship off the coast, maybe some old freighter out
there
Scot t - in one of our briefings, for $83,000 you can buy a uav with gps navigation and
these guys aren't loking for pinpoint accuracy
If you launch it into a metropolitan area, it's good enough
Objective is kill americans, as many as you can, that's what we were targeting that's
where the cruise missile tec d

We never thought that anybody would use fully loaded airliners as suicide weapons

Navin = cruise missile threat, so viable, there are about 80 + thousand of them being
made by 80 different countreis available
If they have the money and the terrorist cells have the money, getting hands on those
types of weapons is an absolute piece of cake

Scott - since 911, as we started talking about osama bin laden, the examples we gave in
our mission brief were wtc, tokyo subway, okc bombing, atalnta olympis
What we did ina poor man's waywas connect those dotes,
Conclusin we drew, there was a viable threat to us from that

We took that mission briefing all over the country

Scott - question we asked when we visited other nafs,
Who should do it?
They all said, we're fully employed, we can't take it on if you close Down

Whole point of closing this down was saving manpower

Col. Scott - 1 June 1998 - at work 30 minutes when he handed me acc/xp proposal to
close 1AF
Nothing official, just a proposal, but went to gen hawley, comacc

Navin - one of gen arnold's favoriste examples of just-how limited the capability we had

Scott - reason no air defense at el paso, there was no military air threat from mexico,
what gen arnold was talkinga bout was an asymetric terrorist threat from emx

We were willing to accept the threat, not a military strike against el paso
Navin - we were only people who thought about things like that

NCT0067784
Relatively closely connected to our expereicne w/in mexico with narcotics trafficking
A gazillion of unmanned little airfields you can get into and out of very easily
Nevery viewed as a military threat

Navin - huge standing armies, very powerful air forces do not necessarily deter people
like osama bin laden from their mission, he does not shake and tremble because we sent
thes forces in afghan, he simply relocates

Scott, he is self-actualized
It's not whether they win or lose, wheter he is involvedin a holy war

When people joined 1AF, some had to sign waivers acknowledging that the organization
could fold: Can you talk about the struggle to keep the mission alive and well?

Ch 2 about struggle for survival

Scott - even on sept 11 still struggling for recognition, staved off being closed down, but
still active elements out there who found us unecessary
It became intuitively obvious

Paul pochmano - great line - this country would never thinka bout opening its land
borders to anyone who wanted to walk in or sea borders, why do people want to open up
air borders to anybody who would want to fly in?

Senior commanders conf- gen eberhart was one of four star speakers two months after
sept. 11, he flatly told the thousands in that audiecne, if we had not thought to keep some
infrastructure in air sovereignty business, he didn't even want to think about what our
reaction to 9/11 would have been

After eberhart made his comments, a two-

Scott - in 1970, when I got my choice out of pilot training, I chose the f!06 in adc,
because I thought highly of the mission, my instructor in 1971 said do not go into adcom,
it is dying on the vine, as far back as 32 years ago, air defnese biz was seen as going on
the wane

Gen Paul Kimmel told me he was at a pentagon mtg. Sept. 8 and the dicussion was
closing 1AF and the sectors, that was on the 8th of Sept.

I'm anoriginal conehead, born in oct. 1979 - might make a good anecdote
Blue box - birth of the coneheads,
Picture of dan aykroyd - origin was when we became part of tac we were treated like the
coneheads in the movie

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NCT0067786
Subj:Scott's answer to Leslie questions
Date:7/14/02 1:22:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: wascott6@comcast.net
To:nobleeaglebook@aol.com
CC:william.scott@tyndall.af.mil
Sent from the Internet (Details)

By early 1994, 1AF was led by an ANG commander: What was the threat at that
point in time?

Threat was perceived as nil.

What hurdles were you facing from the active duty and others who didn't believe in
the mission?

Actually there were many on both sides (AD and ANG) who did not believe in the
mission. Our strategy back then was one of "forward engagement" ... overseas ...
back in the 50s-60s-70s theAF world was split into two commands ... Tactical Air
Command fought wars "over there" (WWII, Korea, SEA ...) the Aerospace Defense
Command fought wars "over here" ... when ADCOM merged with TAG in 1979 ...
the mission submerged into the "over there" crowd ... who had little time and little
patience for homeland defense. The "over here"crowd was swallowed up ... and had
little voice ...

The vast majority of the hurdles were at the mid-management staff level (O-6s and
below) ... the one common thread of responsibility could be found at the General
Officer level ... once given the specific responsibility of air defense/air sovereignty
through their position (CINCNORAD or COMACC) they wouldn't let the mission
die ... but under their watches it continued to be underfunded and derided by the
"over there" crowd.

Can you explain MGen Arnold's El Paso example?

We had fairly large gaps between our seven alert alert sites pre 9-11. The largest was
between Riverside CA and Houston TX. El paso TX was in the middle of those two
alert sites. There was no perceived "military" threat from Mexico. As the threat of
terrorism arose, Gen Arnold began to use the example in his talks to various groups.
The example was that if a terrorist called and said in one hour he would overfly El

NCT0067787
Paso TX and spray deadly gas we would watch it live on CNN becuase we could not jr ^
get aircraft to that location in time to stop the attack. >v

When people joined 1AF, some had to sign waivers acknowledging that the
organization could fold: Can you talk about the struggle to keep the mission alive and
well?

1998: (1 Jun) The ACC/XP staff summary sheet to COMACC; signed by ACC/XP;
with no coordination from 1 AF/CC to close 1AF.

1999: Infamous Slide 31 briefed to the C2 steering group to "unfiind" 1AF and its
sectors beginning FY02 (?)

1999: Result of the previous two was establishment of the "Roles and Mission"
team to study the question of mission viability.

1999-2000: Struggle for Air Operations Center recognition. Finally won in 2001 (9-
11 had a lot to do with it).

Today: Continuing fight with NORAD joint staff over who/where the control of
airpower should be.

What types of terrorist threats did CONR/1AF expect?

Expected "cruise missile" type weapon launched from offshore and using a weapon
of mass destruction (deadly gas, biological, etc)

Osama bin Laden was part of the 1AF briefing: What can you tell me about that?

We were cognizant of several terrorist attacks already conducted within and outside
the US (WTC 94, Khobar Towers, Tokyo Subway, OK City, Atlanta Olympics, etc)
... the DoD was also debating and discussing the emerging terrorist threat... the only
part we didn't see was using airliners as fuel-air bombs in suicide attacks.

Discuss the four-corners idea: where can I learn more about it?

Thefour-comers idea was born in the 1997 QDR report that took "air defense"
squadron from 10 to 4 with the other six squadrons converting from air-air missions
to multi-role missions. The assumption was that the remaining four units would
suopport alert sites. The remaining units (and their alert sites) were Otis ANGB MA,

NCT0067788
^^ Jacksonville FL (at Homestead),Fresno CA (at Riverside) and portland OR. This
became known as the four-corners defense. Gen Estes (CINCNORAD) told the joint
staff in a letter that the minimum alert sites he had to have were seven to provide a
modicum of "air soveregnty." So ... three of the "multirole" units had to continue to
support alert sites (Fargo ND at Langley VA, Duluth MN at Tyndall, and Ellington
ANGB TX.

Here si the text for QDR 97 and QDR 02 ... you will note the passing mention of
defending the homeland in the 97 report and the huge play it gets in the 01 report.

Cheers
Scotty

QDR 97
Section II
Fourth, while we are dramatically safer than during the Cold War, the U.S. homeland
is not free from external threats. In addition to the threat inherent in the strategic
nuclear arsenals of other countries, there is the potential for further spread of
intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, other
.-, unconventional means of attack, such as terrorism, are no longer just threats to our
* diplomats, military forces, and private Americans overseas, but will threaten
Americans at home in the years to come. Information warfare (attacks on our
infrastructure through computer-based information networks) is a growing threat.

Section III
Nevertheless, both U.S. national interests and limited resources argue for the
selective use of U.S. forces. The primary purpose of U.S. forces is to deter and defeat
the threat of organized violence against the United States and its interests. Decisions
about whether and when to use military forces
should be guided, first and foremost, by the U.S. national interests at stake - be they
vital, important, or humanitarian in nature - and by whether the costs and risks of a
particular military involvement are commensurate with those interests. When the
interests at stake are vital - that is, they are of broad, overriding importance to the
survival, security, and vitality of the United States - we should do whatever it takes
to defend them, including, when necessary, the unilateral use of military power. U.S.
vital national interests include, but are not limited to: • protecting the sovereignty,
territory, and population of the United States, and preventing and deterring threats to
^~ our homeland, including NBC attacks and terrorism;

NCT0067789
Section V
AIR FORCE
The total fighter inventory will be restructured and modestly reduced from current
levels. This will be accomplished by retiring older Air National Guard aircraft and
replacing them with approximately 60 fighters from the active component and by
converting six continental air defense squadrons to general purpose, training, or other
missions. These changes will result in a more modern and flexible force of just over
12 active fighter wing equivalents, eight reserve fighter wing equivalents, and four
air defense squadrons (0.8 fighter wing equivalent). The Air Force will consider
further reductions in total fighter wing equivalents as additional older generation
assets are replaced by next generation aircraft. In addition to its fighter force, the Air
Force will maintain a total fleet of 187 bombers, 142 of them assigned to operational
units. The QDR made no changes to the tanker and airlift fleets.
The Air Force is consolidating its fighter, bomber, and theater airlift squadrons,
increasing the number of aircraft in each squadron while decreasing the number of
squadrons. It is also reducing intermediate headquarters to streamline its command
structure. These actions, together with infrastructure efficiencies, will result in the
following personnel reductions:
• Active 26,900 • Reserve 700 • Civilian 18,300

Reserve Component Forces

Air Force. The Air Force has the most integrated Total Force on a day-to-day basis.
This is especially true of its mobility force associate units, where Reserve personnel
often work side-by-side with their active counterparts, even sharing the same aircraft.
A large percentage of Air Force mobility and support missions, in peacetime and in
war, are flown by Reserve personnel. The Reserve fighter force has also been used
extensively in many peacetime missions. However, some efficiencies can be gained.
One initiative will consolidate Reserve aircraft into larger units, allowing savings in
operations and support costs. All Reserve component fighter units will have
15 aircraft assigned. This will be accomplished by transferring a wing of active
aircraft to the Reserve. The Air Force will also convert six air defense squadrons to
general purpose, training, or other missions, leaving four squadrons for air defense.
Also, older aircraft will be retired and
replaced by aircraft transferred from the active force. Including the changes in
missions, the net result is little change in total numbers of Reserve component
fighters, but a significant increase in Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
capability and flexibility.
Didn't CINCNORAD at the time (Gen. Estes?) fight against the QDR that suggested
a four-corners defense?

NCT0067790
QDR2001
U.S. Interests and Objectives
The purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect and advance U.S. national
interests and, if deterrence fails, to decisively defeat threats to those interests. The
United States has interests, responsibilities, and commitments that span the world. As
a global power with an open society, the
United States is affected by trends, events, and influences that originate from beyond
its borders. The development of the defense posture should take into account the
following enduring national interests:

n Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, including:

n U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom
n Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad
n Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure

Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance. As the September 2001

events have horrifically demonstrated, the geographic position of the United States
no longer guarantees immunity from direct attack on its population, territory, and
infrastructure.

Defending the United States and Projecting

U.S. Military Power
Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic
September terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will seek to threaten the
centers of gravity of the United States, its allies, and its friends. As the U.S. military
increased its ability to project power at longrange, adversaries have noted the relative
vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the
development of capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter
U.S. operational advantages with their own strategic effects. Therefore, the defense
strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States and its
land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to safeguard the Nation's way of
life, its political institutions, and the source of its capacity to project decisive military
power overseas. In turn, the
ability to project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United States and,
when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at a distance.

III.
Paradigm Shift in Force

NCT0067791
Planning
The DoD civilian and military leadership approached the force planning task acutely
aware of the need to provide over time a richer set of military options across the
operational spectrum than is available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the
means to adapt in time to surprise. The new
force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:
Defend the United States;
n Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
n Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving
for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts -
including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and n Conduct a limited
number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

In doing so, DoD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and a strategic
reserve to mitigate risks. This new construct - which supports the defense strategy -
has four underlying elements. First, it places new emphasis on the unique operational
demands associated with the defense of the United States and restores the defense of
the United States as the Department's primary mission.

18
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
Defend the United States
The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.
The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic
population, its territory, and its critical defense related infrastructure against attacks
emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law. U.S. forces will
provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold U.S.
commitments under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility,
as specified in U.S. law, to support U.S. civil authorities as directed in managing the
consequences of natural and man-made disasters and CBRNE-related events on U.S.
territory. Finally, the U.S. military will be prepared to respond in a decisive manner
to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an
ally.

Defending the United States, which is the critical base of operations for U.S. defense
activities worldwide, will be a crucial element of DoD's transformation efforts.
Integration of protection mechanisms (e.g., counterintelligence, security,
infrastructure protection, and information
assurance) will be a key component. In particular, the United States must enhance its
capabilities to protect its critical infrastructure, especially infrastructure that supports

NCT0067792
oil and gas transportation and storage, information and communications, banking and
finance, electrical power, transportation, water supply, emergency, and government
services.

Creating the U.S. Military of the 21st Century

Operational Goals
Not all change in military capabilities, however desirable for other reasons, is
transformational. The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve U.S.
military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes
in the strategic environment. Transformation must therefore be focused on emerging
strategic and operational challenges and the opportunities created by these
challenges. Six critical operational goals provide the focus for DoD's transformation
efforts:

n Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and
friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery;

Protecting the American homeland from attack is the foremost responsibility of the
U.S. Armed Forces and a primary mission for the Reserve Components.

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