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Michael Pedersen Instructor: Malcolm Campbell English 1103 10/1/2013 Fast Draft: Ware Wars Cyber Terrorism's Path from Humble Beginnings to Full Fledged Tools of War As the Internets importance has surged throughout the decades it has increasingly become integrated into every facet of every first world country's infrastructure. Power generation, communication systems, sewage management and national defense sectors are all utilizing highly advanced computer networks to manage the flow or resources and manpower. As with anything which is depended upon as heavily as this there are always be criminals and organizations that will make a point of testing its security and stability. Cyber terrorism, defined by by the Center of Strategic and International Studies as the use of computer network tools to shut down critical infrastructures or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population, by the Center of Strategic and International Studies really sheds light onto the potential impact of these types of weapons but are they really a threat? The age era of cyber terrorism is upon us; threatening critical infrastructure. is upon us but Ggiven how such weapons can only reside in computers, can they really ever be considered a true weapon of war? A very recent example of the extent of cyber terrorisms evolution is the case of Stuxnet. Originally founded by a small anti-virus software vender called VirusBlokAda based in Belarus on June 2010 this virus was touted around the globe as the first real example of how malware, software intended to damage or disable computer systems, could be weaponized on a large scale. ( News | VirusBlokAda ). According to the official Symantec Security Response
Comment [OARJ1]: Maybe better of Comment [OARJ2]: will?

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Report for Stuxnet, the worm's core objective was to infect Windows computers in five Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, the central target being the Natanz facility, and to slow the production of refined uranium by injecting code into the SCADA, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, units. David Kushner from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers reported that these SCADA systems are almost always offline systems, meaning that they are not accessible from outside the facility., so Thus, in order to get Stuxnet in it was put onto flash drives and left around Natanz. Once an unsuspecting technician put it into a laptop used to connect to the SCADA systems then the delivery of Stuxnet was complete. These SCADA systems were responsible for millisecond by millisecond changes of the pressure and speed of the centrifuges used to enrich the nuclear material. Once the code was injected, Stuxnet obtained full control over the centrifuges and allowed it to slowly wear down the central axis by alternating its speed. How could the technicians be so careless in monitoring the crucial centrifuges, though? Ralph Langner, a German control system security consultant, in his TED Talk entitled Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon, reported that Well, the truly brilliant thing about Stuxnet is how it manipulated the monitoring systems in such a way to make it show that everything was fine. reported Ralph Langner, a German control system security consultant, in his TED Talk entitled Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st -century cyber weapon. Technical aspects aside the most interesting part of Stuxnet was the motive behind its development. General Hayden, a former director of the NSA and CIA, mentioned in the article Former CIA chief speaks out on Iran Stuxnet attack, by The National, that he believed that it would require the backing and information gathering resources of one or more nation states to be able to create malware as complex as Stuxnet. Most news sites reported that Stuxnet was codeveloped by Israel and the United States due to how both had the resources, man power, and the
Comment [OARJ5]: Just an idea of introducing the source first. Comment [OARJ6]: Wouldnt it be past tense? was Comment [OARJ3]: Could specify that it was to be put in the computer system. Comment [OARJ4]: How did these get here?

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same desire to delay Iran from obtaining higher grade enriched uranium for nuclear weaponry. In an interview with Edward Snowden, a former CIA and NSA employee, by Spiegel Online, a German newspaper, Snowden was asked Did the NSA help to create Stuxnet? and he confirmed that Stuxnet was co-written by Israel and the NSA. For the United States it is also a very politically stealthy way of dealing with Iran without having to involve Congress or the public. Ben Flanagan in the same article mentioned above estimated the cost of Stuxnet's development to be around one million dollars. The difference in cost between this and an actual physical assault is astonishing, and incredibly useful for countries like the United States which are operating on a tight budget. This low price point might be a factor in the increased production of Stuxnetcomputer-like programs, similar to Stuxnets function, appearing in the wild. Kaspersky Labs have mentioned in a report they filed in September of 2012, that they knew of the existence of three additional Stuxnet related programs. Media headlines reporting the effectiveness of Stuxnet's effectiveness have been quite varied. Numerous media sources have reported that Stuxnet was very successful, often pronouncing that over one thousand centrifuges were destroyed directly because of Stuxnet. Ralph Langer from his TED Talk titled Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon said that it was possible that Stuxnet had set Iran's nuclear program back by two years. According to the Institute for Science and International Security however, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that there was a cyber attack on the Natanz enrichment plant but downplayed the fallout by stating that the attack only succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges. People, like Michael Rundle of the Huffington Post, wrote that Stuxnet actually failed by allowing Iranian uranium refinement output to continue by not hindering the installation of the newer, more efficient refinement centrifuges. Ivanka Barzashka, in her article
Comment [OARJ8]: Maybe mention an estimate cost for a physical assault? Comment [OARJ9]: Seems unnecessary Comment [OARJ7]: Was?

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Are Cyber-Weapons Effective? which appeared in The RUSI Journal, concluded that the number of centrifuges operating at Natanz uranium enrichment facility has actually been steadily growing since August 2010. In this article Barzashka also mentions that between the first and second waves of Stuxnet attacks Iran began enrichment to 20 percent in one IR -1 cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plat at Natanz in February 2010. This means that although Stuxnet might have slowed a portion of the centrifuges at Natanz the Iranians were still able to outpace it as they upgraded to newer centrifuges. In addition, Nate Anderson from Arstechnica wrote in his article, Confirmed: US and Israel created Stuxnet, lost control of it, that due to the IsraelsIsraelis editing Stuxnet's source code before delivery they caused a bug in which Stuxnet was able to live outside of the targeted enrichment centers(s). This just shows how easily these kinds types of weapons can mess upfail and become not only a threat to their targets, but also a threat to everyone on the internetInternet. In Symantec's security report, it is stated that as of September 29, 2010 over 100,000 computers were infected with the Stuxnet worm a piece of malware that was suppose to only be able to infect less than a thousand. Rooted in the argument over Stuxnet's effectiveness lies the debate on whether cyber terrorism is a threat at all like Joshua Green from the Washington Monthly thinks. In his article, The Myth of Cyberterrorism, he points out how cyber weapons have not taken a single life and how cyber terrorism is mostly just a buzz word being used by politicians during political campaigns and speeches to gain support. The Economist in the article, Cyber-warfare: Hype and Fear, made a similar point citing how even with complete access to a computer system, one an individual can't just click a mouse and make the facility blow up. This is all true, at least to some extent, but the primary factor in determining if a cybercyber terrorism can truly be considered a weapon of war is grounded on both its direct and indirect effects. China for instance has recently
Comment [OARJ12]: Where did they cite from? Comment [OARJ10]: Not sure if correct term to refer to the people from Israel Comment [OARJ11]: Define what a bug is. It isnt an insect :P

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been accused of sponsoring many unauthorized intrusions into American industries. In a report by a US security firm by the name of Mandiant, it is found that a section of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), named Unit 61398, is responsible for stealing terabytes of data from over 141 different organizations. In this report there is a horrendous amount of evidence linking this group back to China and given that Mandiant also determined that the size of this group was at least dozens, but potentially hundred of human operators Mandiant concluded that this group would have to be backed by the PLA. In an article published by the Huffington Post entitled, China Military Denis U.S. Accusations Of Sponsoring Cyberattack, its stated multiple times by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman that all of the accusations are all lies and hype. In conclusion, cyber terrorism has not only become a major threat that we must actively defend against, but it has also become a weapon easily readily accessible by to anyone with the intellectual resources to create it, as well. A new age of warfare is dawning based around the destruction of infrastructure, not men, around code, not guns, and around mental might rather than physical brawn. America might may have already taken the first shot, but are we, as a nation, ready to defend against the wave of technological weaponry being built up, refined, and finally eventually aimed at us? Hey Michael, I sincerely enjoyed your paper. It was very informative and the sources were well integrated. The one thing I feel could help would be to make note of the primary question a bit more throughout the paper. By a BIT more I mean at least once more in the middle. Most of the paper in pages 3-5 is research heavy and I lost a bit of what your purpose for the paper was. I understood the reason of why this matters and the complexity, great work. I also, personally, enjoyed the technical aspect of the research you found. Your conclusion leaves room for further investigation and the question is well made as we are still not aware of the effect it will have on the countries that have not been targeted specifically, like the USA. Great work! I think another point could be that you integrate some of your personal thoughts on the subject, too
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Comment [OARJ14]: It is? Comment [OARJ13]: How big is a terabyte?

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Oscar Romero Jorge

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