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AIRPORT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 2006

Copyright TRL (Transport Research Laboratory), August 2006. All rights reserved.
The information contained herein is the property of the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL). Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the matter presented in this report is relevant, accurate and up-to-date at the time of publication, TRL cannot accept any liability for any error or omission. TRL (Transport Research Laboratory) Registered in England, Number 3142272 Registered Offices: Crowthorne House, Nine Mile Ride, Wokingham, Berkshire, RG40 3GA. For further information on this publication please contact: Peter Mackenzie-Williams Head of Aviation Transport Research Laboratory Crowthorne House Nine Mile Ride Wokingham Berkshire, UK RG40 3GA Tel: (+44) (0)1344 770424 Fax: (+44) (0)1344 770618 Email: aviation@trl.co.uk Website: www.trl.co.uk

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TRANSPORT RESEARCH LABORATORY


About TRL TRL is an independent, internationally recognised centre of excellence for research and consultancy in transport issues. It has worked closely with clients in the public, private and independent sectors in the UK and worldwide for more than 60 years. The organisation provides research based technical help which enables clients to obtain improved value for money, generate competitive advantage and achieve a better understanding of transport problems. TRL employs around 500 staff with a wide range of professional disciplines, including economists, mathematicians, physicists, psychologists, engineers and statisticians. Facilities include a conference centre, extensive library and a 2.2 km test track. TRL and aviation TRLs activities in the aviation sector and include the following: Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q air transport demand forecasting and market analysis; comparative studies of airport and airline efficiency and levels of airport charges; assessments of personal risk and risk contour modelling related to airport developments; advice on airfield pavement construction and maintenance; provision of software to control traffic flows within airport road systems; research into causes of vehicle accidents in airport operational areas, and the provision of training programmes designed to reduce accident rates; use of GIS systems to assist in increasing the use of public transport for access to airports; risk and liability assessments arising from vehicle accidents at airports .

Other annual aviation publications: Q Airline Performance Indicators 2006 TRLs Airline Performance Indicators is an analysis of an extensive range of 38 airline performance measures. The document analyses operational and fictional outputs and results of a total of 50 airlines, to assist airline managers, financial analysts and regulators around the world assess the performance of airlines in which they have a particular interest. Review of Airport Charges 2006 TRLs Review of Airport Charges allows airline and airport managers, financial analysts and regulators around the world to compare the relative costs, using a sample of 50 of the worlds leading airports.

For further details of these and other TRL activities, please contact: Peter Mackenzie-Williams Head of Aviation Transport Research Laboratory Crowthorne House Nine Mile Ride, Wokingham Berkshire, RG40 3GA, UK Tel: (+44) (0)1344 770424 Fax: (+44) (0)1344 770618 Email: aviation@trl.co.uk Website: www.trl.co.uk

AIRPORT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 2006


CONTENTS
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Introduction Defining Core Airport Activities to Achieve Better Comparability of Data The Performance Indicators Description of the Airports and their Relative Performance Measuring Total Performance Performance Indicators Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5: Table 6: Table 7: Table 8: Table 9: Table 10: Table 11: Table 12: Table 13: Table 14: Table 15: Table 16: Table 17: Table 18: Table 19: Table 20: Table 21: Table 22: Table 23: Table 24: Table 25: Table 26: Table 27: Table 28: Table 29: Table 30: Table 31: Table 32: Table 33: Table 34: Table 35: Total Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per Passenger Total Revenue per Employee Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Aeronautical Revenue as a Percentage of Total Costs Aeronautical Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenue per Passenger Commercial Revenue per Passenger Commercial Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue Total Costs per ATM Total Costs per Passenger Total Costs per 1,000 ATUs Operating Costs per Passenger Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating And Staff Costs Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs per Passenger Staff Costs as a Percentage Of Turnover Operating Profit Operating Profit per Passenger Return on Capital Employed Return on Shareholders Funds Passengers per Employee Passengers per ATM ATUs per Employee Total Assets per Passenger Equity Ratio Liquidity Ratio Assets per Employee Capital Expenditure per Passenger Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of Turnover Taxation Effect Net Cash Generation per Passenger EBITDA as a Percentage of Turnover 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 1 5 10 49 152

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) is pleased to present the seven th in its annual series of publications on Airport Performance Indicators. This work is now well established as a reference source worldwide, and it is used by airport operators, airlines, government regulators and financial analysts for a wide variety of purposes. Underlying this wide-ranging interest is the desire to understand how the performance of individual airports can be assessed against world best practice. Interest also comes from the media, demonstrating how the quantitative comparison of businesses is a normal tool for the business press. Additionally, much of this interest stems from the continuing trend towards airport privatisation, which continues to attract considerable interest from investors and which returned to the financial market agenda relatively quickly after the events of September 11 2001. More recently, it has continued despite the short term traffic downturns associated with the SARS epidemic. At the time of preparing this years publication the takeover of BAA by Ferrovial has generated enormous interest in the airports industry, demonstrating that it continues to be regarded as an attractive area by both strategic investors and financial markets. This means that the need for information on performance will continue to grow, with analytical techniques growing in tandem with this demand. However, privatisation is not the only source of pressure for increased efficiency and knowledge about performance benchmarks. In the US, where meaningful airport privatisation is as far away as ever, the quest for information on relative levels of efficiency is as great as anywhere in the world. The sample of airports included in this years publication remains at 50. We were unable to obtain data from Brussels and Osaka Kansai airports, but we were able to add Beijing and Dallas Fort Worth to the sample. The composition of the sample is not fixed and, as shown this year, depends to an extent on data availability. On the whole this has improved over the years as airports have adopted both a more commercial approach to their customers and a more transparent stance to shareholders and stakeholders. Thus, for example, we are able to include an analysis of both Johannesburg and Cape Town airports, using data provided by Airports Company South Africa which is not published in its normal Annual Report. On th e other hand the South African data is the only information available from an African airport group and as far as we are aware there are no published financial reports for any South American airports. Of the 50 airports or airport groups covered, 19 are wholly or partly privatised and six others are either at early stages of government divestment, or have at some time been the subject of government announcements of an intention to privatise. However, at least one of these has seen a series of changes of intention brought about by changes in administrations. Not surprisingly, airport privatisation remains at times a sensitive political issue. The 19 private sector airports can be expected to compare strongly with their public sector counterparts, particularly in measures relating to commercial revenues, although this is by no means an invariable rule. Work cultures do not change overnight simply as a result of privatisation, and the lead times for the construction or re-modelling of additional terminal space for retail use inevitably mean that big improvements in financial results from this source can take several years to materialise. There are also a number of public sector airports which are already very efficient in both financial and operational terms. The number of performance measures which we produce remains at 35. These cover a broad range of aspects of the operational outputs, revenues and costs of the airports. Various financial measures include both standard accounting ratios and others which measure factors such as the increasingly important role of commercial revenues, which account for over half of total revenues at a growing number of airports. During 1999/2000 we carried out research to identify a more complete measure of overall airport output than the Work Load Unit (WLU) which has been in common use for a number of years. Subsequently we introduced results based on the Airport Throughput Unit (ATU) in the 2001 edition of this publication. The ATU is defined in Section 3. We have made some changes over time to the way in which this measure is calculated and we would welcome any comments relating to the concept of the ATU in general.

The contents of the publication are as follows. In Section 2, we describe how we make adjustments to airports raw data so as to be able to make comparisons between a reasonably homogeneous set of figures. In Section 3 we present the series of 35 performance indicators with definitions and comments on the input variables, and brief accompanying comments or explanations. In Section 4, we provide brief comments on the airports and groups covered, including details of corporate status, progress towards privatisation if appropriate, and details of major infrastructure projects in progress or planned. This year we have also introduced an analysis of the extent to which each airports performance differs from the average for the sample. In Section 5, we present the latest results of our continuing work with Durham University Business School which examines each airports overall performance as a single measure. The airports covered in this publication are listed opposite, together with the level of passenger throughput achieved in the review period and the relevant financial reporting period. There is a range of financial reporting periods of both financial and calendar years.

Airport/Group
ACSA (South African airports) ADM (Aeroporti di Milano) Aroports de Montral ADP (Aroports de Paris) ADR (Aeroporti di Roma) AENA (Spanish airports) Amsterdam Group ANA (Portuguese airports) AoT (Airports of Thailand) Athens Atlanta Auckland BAA Beijing Berlin Airport Group Birmingham Brisbane Calgary Cape Town Chicago OHare Copenhagen Dallas Fort Worth Finnish Airports Group Fraport AG Geneva Hong Kong Johannesburg London Gatwick London Heathrow Los Angeles Malaysian Airports Manchester Airport Group Melbourne Miami Munich Ontario (California) Oslo Perth San Francisco Singapore Stockholm Arlanda Swedish Airports Group Sydney Tokyo Narita Toronto Vancouver Vienna Washington Dulles Washington National Zurich

Reporting period (year ending)


March 2005 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 September 2004 December 2004 December 2004 June 2005 March 2005 December 2004 December 2004 March 2005 June 2005 December 2004 March 2005 December 2004 December 2004 September 2005 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 March 2005 March 2005 March 2005 March 2005 June 2005 December 2004 March 2005 June 2005 September 2004 December 2004 June 2005 December 2004 June 2005 June 2005 March 2005 December 2004 December 2004 June 2005 March 2005 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004 December 2004

Passenger throughput (millions)


25.8 30.7 10.3 75.3 30.7 164.1 44.3 19.4 45.1 13.7 83.2 11.3 141.7 34.9 14.9 8.8 15.9 9.2 6.2 75.5 19.0 59.1 14.6 77.1 8.6 38.3 14.7 32.0 67.7 61.2 39.4 26.7 20.8 30.2 26.8 7.0 14.9 6.7 33.2 30.4 16.3 28.0 28.3 31.8 28.6 15.7 14.8 22.6 15.9 17.3

% change on previous year


8.5 16.3 15.3 6.5 9.2 8.0 8.1 7.4 24.4 11.5 5.6 8.3 6.3 43.2 11.8 -4.4 11.0 7.0 13.6 8.7 7.5 0.9 39.3 9.2 6.2 38.4 10.9 6.5 5.3 5.6 17.8 5.4 8.4 2.5 10.8 3.0 8.9 10.2 2.9 23.1 7.5 5.5 7.0 18.2 15.1 9.8 15.7 35.4 12.5 1.3

While none of the analysis contained in this publication would have been possible without the provision of the Annual Reports which were used as a source of raw data, a number of airport operators gave additional assistance by providing further information or explanations of details provided in their Reports. In this regard, we would like to record our thanks to the officials who provided assistance at ACSA, Aroports de Paris, AENA, Airports of Thailand, Copenhagen, the Civil Aviation Administration of Sweden, and Washington, all of whom played a part in ensuring that our analyses were carried out as accurately as possible.

2.

DEFINING CORE AIRPORT ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE BETTER COMPARABILITY OF DATA

Introduction A common problem in making any form of performance comparison between different centres of output within the same industry is that of ensuring that the organisations in question are sufficiently similar in structure and function as to make comparisons valid. The airport industry is a case in point. Within the sample of airports covered in Airport Performance Indicators there are several which are involved in various activities which we regard as being outside of those that would normally be regarded as core airport activities. We regard the core activities as being: the provision of runways, taxiways and aprons for the use of airlines and their agents; the provision and operation of terminals in which passengers pre- and post-flight formalities are completed, including the processing of baggage, and the provision of space within terminals in which concessionaires in a variety of retail businesses may provide shopping, catering and amusement facilities for passengers use.

Major non-core activities, particularly in revenue terms, include the provision of ground handling and car parking services. Another non-core activity which is more significant in cost terms is the operation of air traffic control services. This becomes an issue when airports are operated as part of a national civil aviation organisation, with financial reporting covering all of the organisations activities. Within the sample of airports covered in Airport Performance Indicators, air traffic control services are provided by the administrations in Finland, Portugal, Spain, Norway, Singapore and Sweden. Additionally, catering services, hotel ownership and operation, and revenues derived from passthrough charges added to utility costs may be part of an airports operating portfolio. The generally accepted approach to this problem is to make adjustments to the raw operating and financial data so as to remove all measurable effects of the non-core activities. Thus revenues are deducted from the gross aeronautical, commercial or other revenues as appropriate. Costs of noncore activities are generally largely confined to operating or staff-related costs (though some associated depreciation costs can be identified), and these are deducted from gross reported figures along with the associated number of staff. Where capital expenditure can be identified which has been incurred in connection with a non-core activity, this is also deducted. Further adjustments are needed on the revenue side. It is clear that if an airport did not itself perform functions such as the operation of car parks or ground handling services, then it would be necessary for a third party to operate these services instead. Inevitably, that third party would pay a concession fee to the airport, or a percentage of its profits, and so a hypothetical concession fee is calculated in proportion to th e revenues deducted for the non-core activities, and added back to commercial revenues. In addition, the figures related to corporation tax are reduced to take account of the estimated overall reduction in profitability which would result from the airport not being directly involved in the noncore activity. Similarly, interest charges and various balance sheet measures are adjusted to take account of adjusted levels of activity which are lower than those which actually take place. A final adjustment relates to the common practice within airport groups for a Head Office to exist. Staff employed in Head Offices are clearly engaged in activities which would normally be carried out by managerial or administrative staff in an airport, unless they are engaged in work related to non-core activities. In these cases an appropriate number of Head Office staff, and their associated cost, is allocated to the individual airports on the basis of airport turnover. Head Office staff which can be identified as working on non-core activities are deducted from Group staff numbers in the same way as for individual airports. Against this background, we provide details in Annex 1 of the non-core activities which we have identified at each airport or airport group, with confirmation of the steps taken to reduce the data to a common set. Adjustments of the type described above were made at all but eleven of the airports or groups covered in this publication.

Other comparability issues The dissimilarities between airports are not confined to the extent to which non-core services are performed. A number of other factors may explain differences in performance indicators, as discussed below. Ownership The issue of whether an airport is in the public or private sector, or a combination of the two, is clearly going to influence a number of operating strategies. While most airports these days have a strong focus on increasing commercial revenues this is particularly the case for private sector airports, generally because in most cases a regulatory framework places a strict limit on the extent to which aeronautical charges can be increased. A number of factors relating specifically to public sector airports affect their performance. The most extreme case is in the US, where in many cases airports scope to achieve profitability is severely limited, either due to Federally-imposed restrictions on the way in which aeronautical charges can be set or due to the terms of Lease and Use Agreements entered into with airline users. The common US practice of leasing terminals at major hub airports to airlines, or for airlines to build their own terminals, also restricts the extent to which airports can maximise the return on their assets. In a number of cases elsewhere in the world, governments have insisted that aeronautical charges at all major airports should be set at common rates, regardless of the relationship of those charges to the costs of running each airport. Asset ratios are also affected by the practice in the case of some public sector airports of the retention by government of the land on which the airport is built, so that the assets recorded for the airport do not reflect the full value of the airport. Similarly, the fixed assets at many state-owned airports are often not revalued with any regularity, or at all. In the case of the main Australian airports, the assets were not revalued for many years during the years of public ownership as a matter of policy. At the same time aeronautical charges were kept at low levels so as to encourage growth in tourism and business development. By refraining from revaluing the airport assets, however, the government was able to point to reasonable returns on assets despite low levels of airport income. It is also the case that government-run airports often receive help from a central or local government department, in terms of administrative or other functions being performed by government rather than airport employees, such that the true costs of operating the airport are not reflected in its Accounts. Foe example, a number of basic financial administration functions are performed by the City of Los Angeles on the airports behalf rather than by the airport itself. Accounting Practices Different accounting practices frequently complicate comparisons between different organisations, regardless of their ownership structure. This chiefly affects depreciation. Depreciation periods on fixed assets varies considerably: for instance, in the UK, BAA depreciates its runways, taxiways and aprons over periods of up to 100 years, whereas much shorter periods are more normally used. Airports may choose whether to classify expenditure on equipment as either an operating cost or as capital expenditure, which has a clear impact on operating profit. Interest costs on capital expenditure are capitalised and amortised at Calgary, but this is an exception to the practice adopted by most other airports covered in this publication. Sources of Finance, Including Subsidies For airports in the private sector, the normal source of finance for capital expenditure will either be cash generated by the business or commercial loans. Credit ratings for airports generally reflect a view on the part of the finance market that airports are reliable cash generators, but even so normal market interest rates apply. In the case of public sector airports the situation is different in that they are often debarred from taking out commercial loans, but instead have access to national or local government funds. When such funds are made available, there are varying conditions under which they may be repaid, from the payment of interest based on a fixed rate of return to repayment of the loan but no payment of interest. In some cases public sector funds a re made available as a grant. These arrangements inevitably place the public sector airport at an advantage over its private sector counterpart, and this is reflected in lower interest charges. The main disadvantage of the system is that often the funds required are not available from government sources, or come later than required. It is a lack of
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available funds for airport expansion which has led a number of countries to turn to privatisation as a means of enabling future airport expansion. In the US, the restrictive approach to aeronautical charge pricing is balanced by a system which allows airports to raise capital through the issuance of fixed interest bonds, coupled with no liability to the payment of federal taxes. US airports also have access to Federal funds in the form of the Airport Improvement Program from the Aviation Trust Fund, which is fed by the payment of an International Passenger Tax on airline tickets. The availability of these funds has become somewhat limited in recent years as the Fund has been built up so as to mitigate the need to raise Federal taxes. Less obvious subsidies from governments to public sector airports include the provision of services such as air traffic control and security for less than a normal commercial rate. Arrangements such as this will tend to reduce operating costs and staff costs below the levels which a private sector airport might expect to have to pay. Passenger Service Standards The passenger service standards provided by airports vary considerably, depending on the extent to which the airport is concerned, for example, to optimise waiting times for baggage collection or check-in or the extent to which it feels that it stands to gain business from competing airports by improving service standards. The ability of an airport to improve standards may in itself be limited by funding restrictions which will apply regardless of the ambitions of the airport management. Optimising service standards carries a cost, both in terms of infrastructure and staff levels. An airport which seeks to provide high standards may therefore appear to have relatively high costs. However, in many cases the effect of improving service standards, which will often include increasing retail floorspace, is to increase revenues. For this reason a more profitable airport, or one with a relatively high level of income per passenger, will often have relatively high unit costs. Traffic Mix The characteristics of an airports passengers will have an impact on both its revenues and costs. A high proportion of domestic traffic will tend to reduce both: domestic passengers are less likely to check-in hold baggage than international passengers so they generate less need for baggage handling equipment, and less floorspace in check-in areas. While international passengers generate a greater need for space and infrastructure, they will have access to tax- and duty-free retail outlets, which will increase airport revenues. This is particularly the case where an airport has a high level of international transfer passengers, who may have two hours or more between flights without having to devote any time to formalities such as check-in or immigration clearance. Local Air Traffic Control At an increasing number of airports, the air traffic control service related to aircraft in flight on approach to or departure from an airport, or aircraft moving on the ground, is charged direct to the airlines rather than being charged to the airport. The separation of these charges, known as terminal navigation charges, results in a greater level of transparency in the costs levied on airlines than the old system under which airports were charged for the service and then passed the cost on to airlines as a component of landing charges. For the airport, the result of moving from the old system to the new is to reduce both aeronautical charges and operating costs. Summary It is clear that, in addition to the differences in operating activities already described, many factors can impact on an airports ability to optimise its performance, and on its relative level of performance when compared to its peers. While it would theoretically be possible to make adjustments to the data so as to take account of these factors, it would be very difficult if not impossible to gather all of the information which would be needed to do so, and inevitably it would be necessary to make a great number of assumptions. We would in any case question the value of such an exercise, given that in many cases the adjusted set of data would bear little resemblance to reality. As we have already remarked, the benchmarking of performance indicators in any industry is bound to be subject to the kinds of influencing factors discussed above. This has not prevented the acceptance of benchmarking of airline performance for many years, despite the fact that, for example, different route networks and passenger mixes impact on relative performance levels. The existence of these influencing factors has also failed to prevent a growth in interest in benchmarking generally, and this has certainly been the case in the airport industry in recent years.
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Recently, there has been a growing level of interest in bottom-up benchmarking, sometimes referred to as process benchmarking. This seeks to break down operating functions into individual parts and to seek to understand ways in which airports carry out these functions more or less efficiently. This is a useful development, but it must be recognised that the data needed to carry out this form of benchmarking is rarely if ever available in the public forum. While we will continue to consider ways in which the evaluation of airport performance can be refined, the level of interest which is shown in our work is a good indication that the concept of measuring airport performance is useful to airport managers, shareholders, airline users and analysts. Airports Annual Reports are also increasingly using performance indicators to demonstrate improving trends, either internally or in relation to competitors. In using performance indicators as a strategic planning tool it is necessary only to bear in mind that the measures produced should not be regarded as guidelines rather than absolutes. They can, however, be taken to give reliable indications of relative performance between broad groupings of airports, as discussed in Section 5.

3.

THE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Introduction In this section we present the main body of results from the analysis undertaken to produce this publication, in the form of a series of thirty-five tables of performance indicators. The results for each airport are shown in absolute terms and ranked, and we also relate the airports performance in relation to the average in each case, expressed as an indexed value. Since the raw data on which the financial indicators are based are provided in units of local currency, it is necessary to convert the data into a common measure of currency so as to allow comparisons to be made. Our preferred conversion unit is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) which is a unit based on the trade-weighted values of a group of major currencies from the G8 nations. This unit allows comparisons to be made over extended periods of time which smooth out some of the larger fluctuations in currency value which can occur in relation to a single currency such as the US dollar. The SDR rates used to convert each local currency are shown in Annex 2. The raw data, shown in units of local currency, are shown in Annex 3. These data have been gathered from the airports annual Report and Accounts in each case, and in some cases they have been supplemented by additional information provided by the airport. They reflect any adjustments which may have been made as described in Section 2, so in these cases the data shown in the Annex will not correspond with what is shown in the Annual Report. Annex 4 contains a glossary of terms which covers a number of the units or ratios which appear in the measures, which may either be unfamiliar to the reader or which may require clarification. The Work Load Unit, and the Airport Throughput Unit We have sought for some time to identify a means of measuring total airport throughput in a way which has not hitherto been in widespread usage. For the sake of completeness we include here a full description of the way in which our thinking has evolved on this issue. Among the terms covered in Annex 4 is the Work Load Unit (WLU), which is a measure which combines the passenger and cargo elements of an airports throughput. A WLU equates to one passenger or 100 kgs of cargo or mail. The measure has been in use in the aviation industry for some years. While it is clearly applicable in the case of airlines it is not always accepted that the same can be said of its use in relation to airports. This is because the cargo element of an airports production is often of minor importance in terms of the additional work required by the airport. The passage of passengers through terminals coupled with the facilitation of aircraft movements is, it is argued, far more central to an airports primary role. During 1997/98, we were associated with a research project carried out within the Transport Studies Group at the University of Westminster which set out to try to establish whether a credible alternative to the WLU could be devised. The scope of the project was limited in terms of time resources, and because the sample of airports was necessarily limited it was concluded that the results of the analysis were not as statistically significant as would be needed to propose an alternative to the WLU with confidence. During 1999 and 2001, research was carried out at TRL, in association with the French Ecole National des Travaux Publics de lEtat, to continue the search for an algorithm which combined passenger numbers and aircraft movements. This work also started from the position that, while the maximisation of an airports cargo throughput is often not a significant priority, it should not be ignored completely in proposing an alternative definition of throughput. The work was also intended to reflect the view that the maximisation of ATMs is not in itself a primary productivity goal, since this could imply the intensive use of a runway by small aircraft carrying small numbers of passengers. It was felt that this situation would clearly not represent an efficient use of the runway. Similarly, it was felt that maximising the size of aircraft using the airport is not in i tself an objective if those aircraft are being operated with low passenger occupancy levels. In this case the use of a large aircraft when a smaller one could have carried the same passenger load would imply inefficient use of the terminal apron space, and could in extremis prevent another aircraft from parking. Ideally, therefore, it was felt that a replacement for the WLU might be a unit of measure which combines: the number of passengers per ATM;
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the number of ATMs; and the weight of aircraft,

with t he optimum being achieved when the first two elements are maximised and the last is minimised. The fundamental problem with this ideal was the fact that few airports outside of the US and Australia publish details of the landed weight of aircraft. It was still possible, however, to incorporate the relative efficiency of the aircraft movement in a measure by taking the number of passengers per ATM into account. Thus we arrived at the algorithm of: Passengers x Passengers per ATM which became Passengers ATMs. From this, it was possible to extend the measure to encompass the carriage of freight, which was done simply by using the traditional WLU measure: WLUs ATMs. The results from this extension, when applied to a range of performance measures, were very little different from those which were produced by the passengers-only based measure. In our view, this reflects the fact that a shortcoming of the WLU is that it raises false expectations of producing significantly different results to passenger-denominated measures, whereas the addition of the cargo element often makes little material difference. The new measure, which we refer to as the Airport Throughput Unit (ATU), appeared to avoid this pitfall. Over the past four years we have presented a number of tables which express various inputs in terms of both passengers and ATUs in this publication. During 2004 05 we discussed with a client airport a number of points which it had raised about the derivation of the ATU measure. The thrust of these comments was that the use of Passengers or WLUs per ATM as a component in the measure meant that a productivity measure was being constructed which included a component which itself is productivity related. It was also noted that the construction of the formula meant that: Double the passenger numbers results in 4 times the ATU measure Double the ATMs results in half the ATU measure.

The second of these effects was an intended feature of the measure, given that our focus was to include a productivity element in the measure, but we recognise that the effect could be regarded as being somewhat counter-intuitive for a measure of throughput. It was suggested that an alternative approach would be to construct a measure which was based on the following equation: ATUs = passengers + (a x freight) + (b x ATMs). It was accepted that the value of a should be 10, corresponding with the industry standard method of calculating WLUs. The airports suggestion was that the value of b should be the average passenger load. We have given this issue further thought. At this stage we accept that the formula used up to 2004 involved a degree of duality as a result of the inclusion of a productivity element in the measure. We broadly agree that the formula above fulfils the original purpose of combining all elements of airport throughput. However, there are difficulties in arriving at a value for b. There is an inherent attractiveness in placing a value of 10 on a. Apart from being one which can be expected to receive widespread acceptance, it is also attractive because it is a figure which does not need to vary over time, and it is a figure which can be applied universally to all airports. These qualities make for a measure which is both easy to understand and easy to calculate. In contrast, there appear to be a number of difficulties associated with the use of an individual airports average passenger load, principally: The figure cannot be applied universally to all airports;
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The use of this figure means that, leaving aside the freight element, the ATU effectively becomes a measure expressing twice the actual number of passengers, plus cargo; The figure needs to change over time to reflect shifts in average passenger loads.

A means of overcoming the first and last of these problems would exist if a non-varying figure could be identified. We regard the logic of at least basing the figure on a measure of average passenger load as sound. The use of a standardised figure related to the average for a sample of airports has some attractions, and in principle we would support the use of a generic figure to be applied to each of a small number of airport groups, for example major international or regional airports. An alternative might be to identify a figure related to overall passenger throughput, which would tend to correspond to a simple qualitative categorisation. For the purposes of this work we considered the use of a fixed figure, which we arrived at for the 2005 publication and which for the moment remains unchanged. The sample of airports which we used to derive this figure was the 41 airports which had all been included in the past three years publications. A line of best fit, constrained to go through the origin, was plotted to determine the relationship between WLUs and ATMs for these airports. For all three years, the line of best fit suggests that 1 ATM is equivalent to just over 100 WLUs. This suggests that, for the 'average' airport, handling one ATM requires approximately the same effort in some sense as handling one hundred WLUs. Since the 10 is an approximate figure, it is sensible to use the approximated figure of 100 for the second factor. Hence, we have now adopted the following equation to define the ATU: ATUs = Passengers + (10 * freight tonnes) + (100 * ATMs) It will be necessary to check the data reasonably regularly to ensure that the 100 factor does not differ significantly over time, or as a result of the addition or removal of one or two airports. This is akin to ensuring that the weight of the average passenger does not change significantly from 0.1 of a tonne over time, but the ATM factor is likely to be much more sensitive. We present a number of tables in the remainder of this section which express various inputs in terms of both passengers and ATUs. A comparison of the relative results in these cases indicates that per ATU measures produce distinctly different results from per passenger measures. However, the thrust of these differences is that airports with high levels of passengers per ATM achieve lower rankings in costs per ATU measures than airports with low levels of passengers per ATM. Given this result, (which some might regard as counter-intuitive) we would be interested to receive any comments from users of this publication as to the effectiveness and usefulness of this measure. The Unit of Airport Activity (UAA) During 2006 we have been in correspondence with the Spanish airports operator AENA, which has devised its own measure of total airport output, which it calls the UAA - Unit of Airport Activity/Unidad de Actividad Aeroportuaria. This is intended to capture the output of airports which is not covered by passengers, cargo and ATMs, consisting principally of general aviation aircraft movements. To cover this additional activity the formula for ATUs has been adapted as follows: UAA = Commercial Passengers + (10 * Freight tonnes) + (100 * Commercial Air Transport Movements) + (5 * Other Types of Transport) . The purpose of this measure for AENA is to enable the company to compare the performance of all of its airports, even though some of them handle little or no commercial passenger traffic. AENA is giving further consideration to the multiplier used to convert Other Types of Transport to UAAs, and reported that a multiplier of 10 may be more appropriate than 5. On this basis the perceived value of one general aviation movement would be one-tenth of the value of a commercial ATM. AENAs analysis of this issue is continuing. In the case of the airports in our sample in this publication, the majority handle relatively little general aviation traffic and in the case of the more congested airports, such as London Heathrow, use of the runway by general aviation operators tends to be discouraged. Given the small number of movements falling into this category, and assuming a relatively small multiplier, it seems unlikely that the addition of this further traffic group would make very much difference to the ATU-denominated results. Data availability could also be a problem in some cases. However, we can fully agree that this measure appears potentially useful in comparing the performance of small airports with little or no commercial traffic with their larger peers, and it may be that other airport groups which include small airfields, such as ACSA and the Swedish Airports Group, would find it particularly helpful.
10

Table 1: Total Revenue per ATM


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow Hong Kong Singapore Aeroports De Paris London-Gatwick San Francisco Baa Group Amsterdam Group Athens Zurich Manchester Birmingham Frankfurt Oslo Munich Aeroporti Di Milano Vienna Aeroporti Di Roma Copenhagen Miami Toronto Perth Sydney Ana Ontario Airports Of Thailand Johannesburg Stockholm Finnish Airports Group Melbourne Los Angeles Berlin Group Auckland Geneva Acsa Brisbane Beijing Aena Cape Town Washington Dulles Vancouver Washington National Calgary Aeroports De Montreal Swedish Airports Group Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'hare Atlanta Malaysian Airports 1,064.4 Total Revenue/ATM 5,928.0 2,741.1 2,278.3 1,997.4 1,815.4 1,764.9 1,653.0 1,617.1 1,565.8 1,398.1 1,320.1 1,217.9 1,175.0 1,140.5 1,096.7 1,078.3 1,065.2 1,053.9 1,053.4 944.7 940.7 940.2 936.4 935.0 873.2 797.5 793.9 777.6 761.3 753.9 729.7 705.8 681.3 668.8 664.7 604.0 598.3 595.2 584.8 579.9 521.2 520.7 512.7 474.8 466.4 459.2 440.2 341.9 341.2 314.0
11

100 Ranking Index 556.9 257.5 214.1 187.7 170.6 165.8 155.3 151.9 147.1 131.3 124.0 114.4 110.4 107.2 103.0 101.3 100.1 99.0 99.0 88.8 88.4 88.3 88.0 87.8 82.0 74.9 74.6 73.1 71.5 70.8 68.6 66.3 64.0 62.8 62.4 56.8 56.2 55.9 54.9 54.5 49.0 48.9 48.2 44.6 43.8 43.1 41.4 32.1 32.1 29.5

Table 2: Total Revenue per 1000 ATUs


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow Aroports de Paris Athens London-Gatwick BAA Group Zurich Amsterdam Group Birmingham San Francisco Oslo Munich Manchester Vienna Hong Kong Singapore Aeroporti di Roma Aeroporti di Milano Toronto Copenhagen Frankfurt Finnish Airports Group Stockholm ANA Sydney Geneva Miami Perth Berlin Group Johannesburg Auckland Washington Dulles Melbourne Washington National ACSA Vancouver Swedish Airports Group Aroports de Montreal Ontario AENA Brisbane Los Angeles Cape Town Airports of Thailand Calgary Beijing Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Atlanta Malaysian Airports 4,859.3 Total Revenue/ 1000 ATUs 20,979.7 10,067.7 7,908.8 7,865.7 7,357.8 6,999.4 6,897.8 6,643.8 6,430.8 6,298.0 6,103.4 6,071.7 6,051.6 5,999.7 5,896.9 5,534.8 5,509.8 5,284.8 5,272.9 5,189.5 4,926.4 4,679.5 4,468.1 4,456.2 4,287.5 4,283.6 4,106.4 4,067.5 4,033.3 3,689.2 3,605.0 3,237.0 3,219.7 3,205.8 3,163.0 3,121.5 3,100.6 3,016.0 2,990.1 2,957.5 2,925.9 2,916.6 2,877.0 2,741.9 2,688.8 2,518.0 2,293.2 1,770.4 1,748.5 1,507.3
12

100 Ranking Index 431.7 207.2 162.8 161.9 151.4 144.0 142.0 136.7 132.3 129.6 125.6 124.9 124.5 123.5 121.4 113.9 113.4 108.8 108.5 106.8 101.4 96.3 91.9 91.7 88.2 88.2 84.5 83.7 83.0 75.9 74.2 66.6 66.3 66.0 65.1 64.2 63.8 62.1 61.5 60.9 60.2 60.0 59.2 56.4 55.3 51.8 47.2 36.4 36.0 31.0

Table 3: Total Revenue per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Athens London-Heathrow Aeroports de Paris Zurich Vienna Amsterdam Group Munich Oslo Hong Kong Birmingham Manchester BAA Group Copenhagen London-Gatwick Finnish Airports Group Toronto Geneva Aeroporti di Milano Singapore Aeroporti di Roma San Francisco Miami Stockholm Frankfurt Aeroports de Montreal Swedish Airports Group Berlin Group ANA Sydney Auckland Washington Dulles Vancouver Ontario Johannesburg Washington National Perth ACSA Calgary Los Angeles Melbourne AENA Cape Town Brisbane Dallas Fort Worth Beijing Airports of Thailand Chicago O'Hare Atlanta Malaysian Airports 11.23 Total Revenue/Passenger 34.82 19.55 19.02 17.72 17.68 16.02 15.24 14.89 14.48 14.40 14.38 14.08 13.92 13.55 13.52 13.45 13.27 12.89 12.22 12.13 12.13 11.98 11.97 11.49 11.17 10.61 10.30 10.21 9.75 9.47 9.41 9.05 8.95 8.74 8.58 8.57 7.82 7.48 7.04 6.70 6.34 6.24 6.08 6.02 5.46 5.20 5.20 4.49 3.96 3.62
13

100 Ranking Index 310.2 174.2 169.5 157.9 157.5 142.7 135.8 132.7 129.0 128.2 128.1 125.4 124.0 120.7 120.4 119.8 118.2 114.8 108.9 108.1 108.1 106.7 106.6 102.4 99.5 94.6 91.7 91.0 86.9 84.4 83.9 80.6 79.8 77.9 76.4 76.3 69.6 66.7 62.7 59.7 56.5 55.6 54.1 53.7 48.6 46.3 46.3 40.0 35.3 32.3

Table 4: Total Revenue per Employee


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Hong Kong Calgary Toronto Perth Vancouver Auckland Atlanta Oslo Athens London-Heathrow Amsterdam Group Singapore Washington Dulles Stockholm San Francisco Zurich Vienna Washington National Dallas Fort Worth London-Gatwick Aeroports de Paris Miami Manchester BAA Group Chicago O'Hare Aeroports de Montreal Aeroporti di Roma Geneva Swedish Airports Group Aeroporti di Milano AENA Birmingham Copenhagen Johannesburg ANA Finnish Airports Group Munich Ontario Cape Town Los Angeles ACSA Berlin Group Airports of Thailand Frankfurt Malaysian Airports Beijing 293,566 Total Revenue/Employee 1,241,701 1,062,977 765,791 673,892 564,915 471,210 439,367 429,940 421,537 413,937 393,834 390,068 382,662 343,047 331,821 328,846 288,357 280,478 274,097 269,255 251,513 244,607 232,651 230,466 228,629 224,253 223,549 206,747 203,802 202,039 200,076 199,199 193,209 191,605 189,098 183,486 173,362 163,294 135,781 135,420 130,761 125,734 121,171 120,765 115,511 101,449 69,599 51,232 31,099 30,475
14

100 Ranking Index 423.0 362.1 260.9 229.6 192.4 160.5 149.7 146.5 143.6 141.0 134.2 132.9 130.3 116.9 113.0 112.0 98.2 95.5 93.4 91.7 85.7 83.3 79.3 78.5 77.9 76.4 76.1 70.4 69.4 68.8 68.2 67.9 65.8 65.3 64.4 62.5 59.1 55.6 46.3 46.1 44.5 42.8 41.3 41.1 39.3 34.6 23.7 17.5 10.6 10.4

Table 5: Aeronautical Revenue per ATM


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow Hong Kong Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Singapore San Francisco Athens BAA Group Toronto London-Gatwick Manchester Birmingham Zurich Vienna Frankfurt Oslo ANA Copenhagen Stockholm Munich Finnish Airports Group Sydney Airports of Thailand Beijing Johannesburg Miami Aeroporti di Milano Aeroporti di Roma Berlin Group Perth AENA ACSA Geneva Cape Town Calgary Auckland Los Angeles Melbourne Vancouver Swedish Airports Group Aeroports de Montreal Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Brisbane Ontario Washington Dulles Malaysian Airports Atlanta Washington National 596.22 Aeronautical Revenue/ATM 4,115.25 1,278.85 1,084.97 972.83 962.83 884.76 857.99 849.84 822.75 787.07 734.53 725.77 717.32 687.85 686.61 646.59 572.43 564.68 539.67 538.88 501.73 495.80 492.07 490.27 480.77 471.86 471.55 471.50 467.60 441.76 425.05 378.27 368.28 361.32 360.70 358.77 354.31 348.32 332.11 329.56 321.36 312.95 259.91 253.83 253.24 232.85 203.32 199.48 183.29 157.78
15

100 Ranking Index 690.2 214.5 182.0 163.2 161.5 148.4 143.9 142.5 138.0 132.0 123.2 121.7 120.3 115.4 115.2 108.4 96.0 94.7 90.5 90.4 84.2 83.2 82.5 82.2 80.6 79.1 79.1 79.1 78.4 74.1 71.3 63.4 61.8 60.6 60.5 60.2 59.4 58.4 55.7 55.3 53.9 52.5 43.6 42.6 42.5 39.1 34.1 33.5 30.7 26.5

Table 6: Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Costs


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Atlanta Auckland Johannesburg Airports of Thailand Sydney ACSA Beijing Melbourne Calgary Cape Town Toronto Stockholm Vienna Athens Copenhagen Birmingham Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Brisbane Tokyo Narita Amsterdam Group AENA Finnish Airports Group BAA Group Singapore Perth Malaysian Airports Vancouver ANA Manchester Aeroports de Montreal London-Heathrow Oslo Swedish Airports Group Hong Kong Aeroports de Paris Los Angeles Zurich Geneva San Francisco Aeroporti di Roma Frankfurt London-Gatwick Miami Aeroporti di Milano Berlin Group Washington Dulles Munich Washington National Ontario 83.0% Aero. Revenues/Total Costs (%) 169.3% 156.3% 152.7% 141.2% 118.0% 112.0% 107.0% 101.4% 100.7% 100.2% 99.3% 96.6% 96.4% 95.2% 95.1% 86.2% 85.6% 85.1% 83.6% 82.0% 79.7% 79.5% 79.1% 78.7% 78.4% 78.0% 77.5% 76.1% 75.8% 75.3% 74.5% 74.3% 73.8% 72.6% 69.7% 64.0% 63.3% 62.6% 62.0% 61.5% 61.2% 59.2% 59.1% 58.9% 56.1% 55.4% 50.0% 48.4% 47.7% 31.4%
16

100 Ranking Index 204.1 188.4 184.1 170.2 142.3 135.0 129.0 122.2 121.4 120.8 119.7 116.4 116.2 114.8 114.7 104.0 103.2 102.6 100.7 98.9 96.0 95.9 95.3 94.8 94.5 94.0 93.4 91.7 91.4 90.7 89.8 89.6 89.0 87.6 84.0 77.2 76.3 75.5 74.8 74.2 73.8 71.4 71.2 71.0 67.6 66.8 60.2 58.3 57.5 37.9

Table 7: Aeronautical Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue


Average Ranking Airport 1 Toronto 2 Beijing 3 Calgary 4 Chicago O'Hare 5 Stockholm 6 Swedish Airports Group 7 Tokyo Narita 8 Aeroports de Montreal 9 Finnish Airports Group 10 Vienna 11 Berlin Group 12 AENA 13 ANA 14 Malaysian Airports 15 Vancouver 16 Cape Town 17 Amsterdam Group 18 Airports of Thailand 19 Birmingham 20 ACSA 21 Athens 22 Johannesburg 23 Manchester 24 Dallas Fort Worth 25 Copenhagen 26 Frankfurt 27 Geneva 28 Atlanta 29 Aeroports de Paris 30 Auckland 31 Sydney 32 Oslo 33 Zurich 34 San Francisco 35 BAA Group 36 Miami 37 Los Angeles 38 Hong Kong 39 London-Heathrow 40 Munich 41 Melbourne 42 Perth 43 Aeroporti di Roma 44 Singapore 45 Aeroporti di Milano 46 Brisbane 47 London-Gatwick 48 Washington Dulles 49 Washington National 50 Ontario 56.5% Aero. Revenue/Total Revenue (%) 83.7% 80.8% 75.6% 74.2% 70.8% 70.0% 69.4% 67.1% 65.8% 65.1% 64.8% 64.7% 64.7% 63.5% 63.3% 62.2% 62.1% 61.8% 61.0% 61.0% 60.8% 60.7% 59.6% 59.0% 57.1% 56.7% 54.4% 53.7% 53.0% 53.0% 52.6% 52.2% 52.1% 51.9% 50.9% 50.1% 49.3% 47.6% 46.7% 46.5% 45.5% 45.4% 44.4% 44.3% 44.3% 42.3% 41.6% 39.0% 30.8% 29.2%
17

100 Ranking Index 148.1 142.9 133.7 131.3 125.2 123.8 122.8 118.7 116.3 115.3 114.7 114.4 114.4 112.4 112.0 110.0 109.9 109.2 108.0 107.9 107.5 107.3 105.4 104.4 101.1 100.3 96.2 95.0 93.8 93.7 93.1 92.3 92.2 91.8 90.0 88.7 87.3 84.2 82.5 82.3 80.5 80.3 78.5 78.4 78.3 74.9 73.6 69.0 54.4 51.7

Table 8: Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Athens London-Heathrow Toronto Aroports de Paris Amsterdam Group Birmingham Vienna Manchester Zurich BAA Group San Francisco Oslo Stockholm Finnish Airports Group London-Gatwick Copenhagen ANA Munich Hong Kong Frankfurt Berlin Group Singapore Aeroporti di Roma Aeroporti di Milano Geneva Sydney Johannesburg Swedish Airports Group Miami Beijing Calgary Aroports de Montreal Vancouver ACSA AENA Auckland Perth Cape Town Airports of Thailand Melbourne Los Angeles Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Washington Dulles Brisbane Washington National Malaysian Airports Atlanta Ontario
18

2,745.7 Aeronautical Revenue/1000 ATUs 14,564.3 4,781.3 4,697.0 4,414.3 4,194.5 4,127.7 3,926.0 3,908.8 3,606.2 3,594.0 3,561.2 3,269.1 3,185.6 3,162.6 3,077.3 3,062.3 2,964.6 2,881.9 2,825.2 2,808.2 2,792.9 2,615.4 2,451.7 2,445.8 2,339.2 2,328.6 2,256.4 2,238.7 2,169.9 2,058.4 2,033.8 2,031.7 2,023.6 1,975.7 1,928.4 1,912.9 1,909.9 1,846.3 1,789.6 1,693.3 1,465.3 1,439.3 1,353.9 1,314.3 1,262.6 1,238.4 986.6 957.5 939.2 873.0

100 Ranking Index 530.4 174.1 171.1 160.8 152.8 150.3 143.0 142.4 131.3 130.9 129.7 119.1 116.0 115.2 112.1 111.5 108.0 105.0 102.9 102.3 101.7 95.3 89.3 89.1 85.2 84.8 82.2 81.5 79.0 75.0 74.1 74.0 73.7 72.0 70.2 69.7 69.6 67.2 65.2 61.7 53.4 52.4 49.3 47.9 46.0 45.1 35.9 34.9 34.2 31.8

Table 9: Aeronautical Revenue per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Athens Toronto Vienna Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Zurich London-Heathrow Finnish Airports Group Birmingham Manchester Stockholm Copenhagen Oslo Swedish Airports Group Aeroports de Montreal BAA Group Geneva Munich Hong Kong Berlin Group Fraport ANA San Francisco Miami Vancouver London-Gatwick Aeroporti di Milano Aeroporti di Roma Singapore Calgary Johannesburg Auckland Sydney ACSA Beijing AENA Cape Town Perth Washington Dulles Chicago O'Hare Los Angeles Dallas Fort Worth Airports of Thailand Melbourne Washington National Ontario Brisbane Malaysian Airports Atlanta 6.35 Aero. Revenue/Passenger 24.17 11.88 11.11 10.44 9.47 9.40 9.21 8.88 8.84 8.78 8.39 8.13 7.74 7.56 7.21 7.12 7.08 7.01 6.93 6.86 6.62 6.33 6.31 6.22 6.00 5.67 5.62 5.41 5.39 5.37 5.32 5.21 4.99 4.98 4.56 4.20 4.04 3.78 3.55 3.53 3.33 3.31 3.22 3.21 2.88 2.64 2.55 2.55 2.30 2.13
19

100 Ranking Index 380.8 187.2 174.9 164.4 149.1 148.1 145.1 139.8 139.3 138.2 132.2 128.1 121.9 119.1 113.5 112.2 111.5 110.4 109.2 108.0 104.3 99.7 99.3 97.9 94.5 89.3 88.6 85.2 84.8 84.7 83.8 82.0 78.6 78.5 71.9 66.2 63.6 59.5 55.9 55.6 52.5 52.1 50.8 50.6 45.4 41.5 40.2 40.2 36.3 33.5

Table 10: Commercial Revenue per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow London-Gatwick Hong Kong Zurich Munich Oslo Athens BAA Group Singapore Ontario Aeroporti di Roma Miami Washington National Birmingham Geneva Washington Dulles Aeroports de Paris Auckland Vienna Manchester Amsterdam Group Aeroporti di Milano Sydney Perth Finnish Airports Group Copenhagen Berlin Group Los Angeles Johannesburg ANA Brisbane Melbourne Stockholm San Francisco ACSA Aeroports de Montreal Swedish Airports Group AENA Cape Town Toronto Vancouver Airports of Thailand Calgary Atlanta Malaysian Airports Dallas Fort Worth Beijing Chicago O'Hare Frankfurt 4.17 Commercial Revenue/Passenger 10.31 8.98 7.49 7.43 7.38 7.16 6.90 6.88 6.45 6.36 6.11 6.06 5.91 5.82 5.60 5.55 5.39 4.96 4.43 4.42 4.38 4.30 4.28 4.23 4.20 4.16 3.42 3.39 3.30 3.17 3.10 2.94 2.76 2.75 2.69 2.67 2.63 2.57 2.18 2.15 1.99 1.88 1.66 1.56 1.36 1.32 1.29 0.96 0.96 0.77
20

100 Ranking Index 247.2 215.3 179.5 178.0 176.8 171.5 165.4 164.8 154.6 152.5 146.4 145.2 141.7 139.6 134.2 133.1 129.3 118.8 106.1 105.9 104.9 103.1 102.6 101.3 100.6 99.7 82.0 81.2 79.1 75.9 74.3 70.5 66.2 66.0 64.5 64.1 63.1 61.6 52.3 51.4 47.7 45.1 39.9 37.3 32.5 31.7 30.9 23.1 23.1 18.5

Table 11: Commercial Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Ontario Washington National Washington Dulles London-Gatwick Perth Singapore Hong Kong Aeroporti di Roma Miami Los Angeles Brisbane Munich Oslo London-Heathrow Auckland BAA Group Sydney Melbourne Geneva Zurich Birmingham Johannesburg Malaysian Airports ACSA Cape Town Athens Aeroporti di Milano AENA Atlanta Berlin Group Airports of Thailand ANA Manchester Finnish Airports Group Tokyo Narita Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Vienna Copenhagen Swedish Airports Group Aeroports de Montreal Stockholm Dallas Fort Worth San Francisco Calgary Chicago O'Hare Vancouver Beijing Toronto Frankfurt 37.3% Commercial Revenue/Total Revenue (%) 69.9% 68.0% 59.6% 55.4% 53.7% 52.4% 51.6% 49.9% 49.4% 49.2% 48.8% 48.0% 47.6% 47.2% 47.0% 46.4% 44.6% 43.6% 43.1% 41.7% 39.0% 36.9% 36.5% 35.7% 35.3% 35.2% 35.0% 34.9% 34.2% 33.2% 32.0% 31.8% 31.1% 30.9% 29.6% 28.2% 28.0% 27.6% 25.3% 25.0% 24.8% 24.0% 23.6% 22.5% 22.1% 21.5% 21.0% 18.5% 15.0% 6.9%
21

100 Ranking Index 187.6 182.5 159.9 148.7 144.1 140.8 138.5 134.0 132.7 132.2 131.0 129.0 127.9 126.8 126.2 124.5 119.9 117.0 115.7 112.0 104.6 99.0 97.9 95.9 94.8 94.4 94.0 93.7 91.9 89.0 85.9 85.3 83.4 83.0 79.5 75.8 75.1 74.0 67.8 67.0 66.6 64.3 63.5 60.3 59.4 57.6 56.5 49.8 40.3 18.6

Table 12: Total Costs per ATM


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow Hong Kong Aeroports de Paris San Francisco London-Gatwick Amsterdam Group Singapore Zurich Frankfurt BAA Group Munich Manchester Athens Aeroporti di Milano Birmingham Miami Berlin Group Toronto Oslo Aeroporti di Roma ANA Ontario Vienna Finnish Airports Group Geneva Copenhagen Stockholm Los Angeles Perth AENA Beijing Swedish Airports Group Vancouver Aeroports de Montreal Sydney Washington Dulles Cape Town Calgary Airports of Thailand Washington National ACSA Melbourne Johannesburg Dallas Fort Worth Brisbane Chicago O'Hare Malaysian Airports Auckland Atlanta 780.9 Total Costs/ATM 5,015.8 1,720.5 1,557.5 1,503.6 1,394.6 1,243.4 1,221.2 1,128.6 1,098.0 1,091.9 1,045.6 1,036.9 964.4 892.4 841.2 831.7 800.7 797.0 792.5 775.2 764.0 744.7 741.2 712.3 627.0 582.5 567.2 558.0 550.2 545.0 475.6 449.2 442.4 433.3 420.0 416.9 406.8 360.0 356.1 347.2 330.5 328.9 327.5 309.0 303.5 303.1 298.2 257.4 226.7 108.2
22

100 Ranking Index 642.3 220.3 199.4 192.5 178.6 159.2 156.4 144.5 140.6 139.8 133.9 132.8 123.5 114.3 107.7 106.5 102.5 102.1 101.5 99.3 97.8 95.4 94.9 91.2 80.3 74.6 72.6 71.5 70.5 69.8 60.9 57.5 56.7 55.5 53.8 53.4 52.1 46.1 45.6 44.5 42.3 42.1 41.9 39.6 38.9 38.8 38.2 33.0 29.0 13.9

Table 13: Total Costs per Passenger


Average Ranking Airport 1 Tokyo Narita 2 Zurich 3 Aeroports de Paris 4 Munich 5 Athens 6 Berlin Group 7 London-Heathrow 8 Amsterdam Group 9 Geneva 10 Finnish Airports Group 11 Toronto 12 Manchester 13 Vienna 14 Frankfurt 15 Oslo 16 Miami 17 Birmingham 18 San Francisco 19 Swedish Airports Group 20 Hong Kong 21 Aeroporti di Milano 22 Aeroports de Montreal 23 London-Gatwick 24 BAA Group 25 Aeroporti di Roma 26 Stockholm 27 ANA 28 Copenhagen 29 Ontario 30 Vancouver 31 Washington Dulles 32 Singapore 33 Washington National 34 Calgary 35 Los Angeles 36 AENA 37 Perth 38 Sydney 39 ACSA 40 Beijing 41 Chicago O'Hare 42 Cape Town 43 Dallas Fort Worth 44 Johannesburg 45 Auckland 46 Brisbane 47 Malaysian Airports 48 Melbourne 49 Airports of Thailand 50 Atlanta 8.35 Total Costs/Passenger 29.46 14.71 14.68 14.32 12.48 11.95 11.94 11.89 11.29 11.18 11.18 11.15 10.83 10.69 10.24 10.19 10.18 10.10 9.92 9.84 9.65 9.56 9.52 9.00 8.80 8.42 8.32 8.14 8.12 7.45 7.06 6.86 5.52 5.28 5.23 5.08 4.55 4.22 4.07 3.92 3.92 3.77 3.76 3.41 3.19 3.05 2.97 2.84 2.27 1.26
23

100 Ranking Index 352.9 176.2 175.8 171.5 149.5 143.1 143.0 142.4 135.3 133.9 133.9 133.5 129.7 128.1 122.6 122.0 121.9 121.0 118.8 117.9 115.6 114.5 114.0 107.8 105.4 100.9 99.6 97.4 97.3 89.2 84.6 82.1 66.2 63.2 62.6 60.8 54.5 50.6 48.8 47.0 46.9 45.2 45.1 40.8 38.2 36.6 35.6 34.1 27.2 15.0

Table 14: Total Costs per 1000 ATUs


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Aroports de Paris London-Heathrow Munich Zurich San Francisco London-Gatwick Amsterdam Group Athens Manchester Berlin Group Frankfurt Birmingham BAA Group Toronto Oslo Aeroporti di Milano Vienna Hong Kong Aeroporti di Roma Finnish Airports Group ANA Geneva Miami Stockholm Singapore Copenhagen Swedish Airports Group Ontario Aroports de Montreal Vancouver Washington Dulles AENA Perth Los Angeles Washington National Calgary Sydney Beijing Cape Town ACSA Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Brisbane Johannesburg Melbourne Malaysian Airports Auckland Airports of Thailand Atlanta 3,589.2 Total Costs/ 1000 ATUs 17,751.4 6,550.4 6,319.2 5,838.8 5,737.3 5,313.4 5,183.7 5,181.6 5,020.8 4,791.9 4,718.5 4,716.5 4,552.0 4,525.9 4,444.7 4,314.2 4,173.3 4,055.2 4,031.2 3,996.1 3,891.8 3,800.5 3,753.9 3,495.1 3,274.7 3,127.5 3,115.8 2,987.3 2,779.1 2,716.1 2,597.8 2,526.2 2,405.1 2,367.5 2,273.4 2,066.8 2,016.7 1,911.5 1,900.0 1,786.3 1,722.3 1,580.9 1,544.0 1,482.2 1,466.1 1,444.9 1,235.7 1,222.1 1,199.3 554.7
24

100 Ranking Index 494.6 182.5 176.1 162.7 159.8 148.0 144.4 144.4 139.9 133.5 131.5 131.4 126.8 126.1 123.8 120.2 116.3 113.0 112.3 111.3 108.4 105.9 104.6 97.4 91.2 87.1 86.8 83.2 77.4 75.7 72.4 70.4 67.0 66.0 63.3 57.6 56.2 53.3 52.9 49.8 48.0 44.0 43.0 41.3 40.8 40.3 34.4 34.0 33.4 15.5

Table 15: Operating Costs per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Munich Amsterdam Group Toronto Aeroports de Paris London-Heathrow Berlin Group Zurich Oslo Finnish Airports Group Hong Kong Vancouver Aeroports de Montreal Manchester London-Gatwick Athens Miami Birmingham Geneva BAA Group Aeroporti di Milano San Francisco Stockholm Swedish Airports Group Ontario Aeroporti di Roma Singapore Calgary ANA Perth Washington Dulles Washington National Vienna Los Angeles Beijing AENA Malaysian Airports Johannesburg Cape Town ACSA Copenhagen Frankfurt Chicago O'Hare Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Auckland Dallas Fort Worth Airports of Thailand Atlanta 3.61 Operating Costs/Passenger 12.83 7.18 6.48 6.24 6.24 5.74 5.49 5.34 5.29 5.24 4.86 4.83 4.77 4.76 4.68 4.50 4.45 4.33 4.19 4.02 3.83 3.82 3.79 3.79 3.78 3.76 3.27 3.13 3.06 2.58 2.55 2.36 2.35 2.35 2.13 2.07 1.92 1.82 1.81 1.79 1.76 1.73 1.55 1.53 1.40 1.34 1.22 1.20 0.98 0.32
25

100 Ranking Index 355.4 199.0 179.7 173.0 172.9 159.0 152.0 147.8 146.6 145.3 134.8 133.8 132.1 132.0 129.7 124.8 123.3 120.1 116.1 111.5 106.1 105.9 105.0 104.9 104.8 104.3 90.5 86.6 84.8 71.4 70.7 65.3 65.1 65.0 59.2 57.3 53.2 50.4 50.0 49.5 48.6 47.9 43.0 42.4 38.7 37.1 33.9 33.4 27.0 9.0

Table 16: Staff Costs as a percentage of Operating and Staff Costs


Average Ranking Airport 1 Frankfurt 2 Vienna 3 Copenhagen 4 Atlanta 5 Geneva 6 ANA 7 Los Angeles 8 Dallas Fort Worth 9 BAA Group 10 Birmingham 11 Airports of Thailand 12 Berlin Group 13 Ontario 14 Aeroports de Paris 15 Miami 16 Washington National 17 San Francisco 18 ACSA 19 Chicago O'Hare 20 Swedish Airports Group 21 AENA 22 Finnish Airports Group 23 Johannesburg 24 Aeroporti di Milano 25 Manchester 26 Washington Dulles 27 Zurich 28 London-Gatwick 29 Cape Town 30 Auckland 31 Aeroporti di Roma 32 Stockholm 33 Munich 34 London-Heathrow 35 Athens 36 Amsterdam Group 37 Aeroports de Montreal 38 Tokyo Narita 39 Malaysian Airports 40 Sydney 41 Beijing 42 Oslo 43 Perth 44 Singapore 45 Brisbane 46 Toronto 47 Hong Kong 48 Melbourne 49 Vancouver 50 Calgary 38.3% Staff Costs/Operating and Staff Costs (%) 78.8% 72.1% 67.1% 55.7% 51.5% 49.7% 48.5% 48.2% 45.5% 45.3% 44.8% 44.6% 44.2% 43.6% 43.3% 43.1% 43.1% 42.5% 42.1% 42.0% 41.9% 41.4% 40.7% 40.3% 40.3% 40.2% 40.1% 39.5% 39.1% 37.8% 37.2% 36.6% 36.5% 35.6% 30.0% 28.2% 27.3% 27.0% 26.2% 25.5% 24.9% 24.2% 23.0% 22.3% 21.3% 20.4% 19.5% 19.4% 18.8% 15.0%
26

100 Ranking Index 205.7 188.2 175.2 145.4 134.3 129.7 126.7 125.7 118.7 118.3 116.9 116.3 115.5 113.7 113.0 112.5 112.4 111.0 109.8 109.6 109.4 107.9 106.2 105.3 105.1 104.8 104.7 103.0 101.9 98.6 97.0 95.6 95.4 92.8 78.4 73.6 71.2 70.5 68.5 66.6 64.9 63.0 60.0 58.2 55.6 53.2 50.9 50.6 49.2 39.2

Table 17: Staff Costs per 1000 ATUs


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Frankfurt Vienna Aroports de Paris Berlin Group BAA Group Munich London-Heathrow London-Gatwick Birmingham San Francisco Geneva Zurich ANA Manchester Copenhagen Finnish Airports Group Miami Aeroporti di Milano Amsterdam Group Ontario Aeroporti di Roma Los Angeles Stockholm Swedish Airports Group Athens Oslo AENA Washington National Toronto Washington Dulles ACSA Cape Town Johannesburg Aroports de Montreal Hong Kong Dallas Fort Worth Chicago O'Hare Singapore Airports of Thailand Perth Vancouver Beijing Auckland Malaysian Airports Sydney Calgary Melbourne Atlanta Brisbane 985.24 Staff Costs/1000 ATUs 2,862.69 2,839.41 2,275.09 2,148.82 1,742.88 1,689.68 1,685.91 1,675.37 1,662.67 1,607.21 1,522.16 1,477.58 1,395.63 1,382.15 1,379.85 1,373.70 1,286.84 1,165.70 1,119.58 1,111.22 1,026.84 1,010.78 963.51 851.40 826.20 778.27 710.02 707.21 668.40 634.85 612.89 559.68 548.04 536.61 508.46 483.30 469.99 443.81 427.65 417.66 400.29 390.86 342.48 284.25 283.99 216.56 211.04 186.80 180.22 175.77
27

100 Ranking Index 290.6 288.2 230.9 218.1 176.9 171.5 171.1 170.0 168.8 163.1 154.5 150.0 141.7 140.3 140.1 139.4 130.6 118.3 113.6 112.8 104.2 102.6 97.8 86.4 83.9 79.0 72.1 71.8 67.8 64.4 62.2 56.8 55.6 54.5 51.6 49.1 47.7 45.0 43.4 42.4 40.6 39.7 34.8 28.9 28.8 22.0 21.4 19.0 18.3 17.8

Table 18: Staff Costs per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Frankfurt Vienna Aeroports de Paris Tokyo Narita Geneva Berlin Group Munich Finnish Airports Group Birmingham Copenhagen Zurich Miami BAA Group Manchester London-Heathrow London-Gatwick ANA Ontario San Francisco Swedish Airports Group Aeroporti di Milano Amsterdam Group Aeroporti di Roma Los Angeles Stockholm Athens Aeroports de Montreal Washington National Washington Dulles Oslo Toronto AENA ACSA Johannesburg Hong Kong Cape Town Chicago O'Hare Vancouver Dallas Fort Worth Singapore Airports of Thailand Perth Auckland Beijing Malaysian Airports Calgary Sydney Atlanta Melbourne Brisbane 2.32 Staff Costs/Passenger 6.44 6.08 4.82 4.75 4.45 4.41 4.14 3.70 3.59 3.59 3.58 3.40 3.36 3.21 3.17 3.05 3.02 3.00 2.89 2.74 2.59 2.55 2.23 2.21 2.19 1.93 1.79 1.79 1.71 1.69 1.60 1.49 1.32 1.25 1.18 1.16 1.13 1.12 1.12 0.94 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.68 0.55 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.36
28

100 Ranking Index 276.9 261.4 207.2 204.4 191.3 189.8 177.9 159.1 154.6 154.3 153.9 146.2 144.5 138.1 136.2 131.4 130.1 129.1 124.5 118.1 111.4 109.7 95.7 95.3 94.2 83.2 77.0 76.8 73.7 72.5 68.7 64.2 57.0 53.7 50.8 49.8 48.4 48.2 48.1 40.3 34.1 33.1 31.9 30.4 29.4 23.8 20.6 17.5 15.8 15.6

Table 19: Staff Costs as a Percentage of Turnover


Average Ranking Airport 1 Frankfurt 2 Berlin Group 3 Vienna 4 Geneva 5 Ontario 6 Los Angeles 7 ANA 8 Miami 9 Munich 10 Finnish Airports Group 11 Aeroports de Paris 12 Swedish Airports Group 13 Copenhagen 14 Chicago O'Hare 15 Birmingham 16 San Francisco 17 BAA Group 18 AENA 19 Manchester 20 London-Gatwick 21 Aeroporti di Milano 22 Washington National 23 Dallas Fort Worth 24 Zurich 25 Stockholm 26 Cape Town 27 Washington Dulles 28 Malaysian Airports 29 Aeroporti di Roma 30 ACSA 31 Aeroports de Montreal 32 Amsterdam Group 33 London-Heathrow 34 Airports of Thailand 35 Johannesburg 36 Tokyo Narita 37 Beijing 38 Vancouver 39 Toronto 40 Oslo 41 Atlanta 42 Athens 43 Perth 44 Hong Kong 45 Auckland 46 Calgary 47 Singapore 48 Brisbane 49 Melbourne 50 Sydney 20.4% Staff Costs/Turnover (%) 57.6% 43.2% 37.9% 34.5% 34.3% 33.0% 31.0% 28.4% 27.8% 27.5% 27.2% 26.6% 26.5% 25.1% 25.0% 24.2% 24.1% 23.9% 22.8% 22.6% 21.2% 20.9% 20.5% 20.2% 19.1% 19.0% 18.9% 18.8% 18.3% 17.7% 16.9% 16.7% 16.6% 15.2% 14.5% 13.6% 13.6% 12.5% 12.0% 11.6% 10.3% 9.9% 9.8% 8.2% 7.9% 7.8% 7.7% 6.0% 5.8% 5.1%
29

100 Ranking Index 282.5 211.8 185.9 169.1 168.3 161.9 152.0 139.2 136.1 134.8 133.2 130.6 129.8 122.9 122.5 118.5 118.3 117.2 111.8 110.8 103.9 102.2 100.5 99.2 93.4 93.4 92.8 92.4 89.9 86.7 82.6 82.0 81.6 74.7 71.3 66.9 66.7 61.4 59.0 57.0 50.5 48.5 48.2 40.2 38.7 38.5 37.9 29.4 28.4 24.8

Table 20: Operating Profit


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Atlanta Auckland Johannesburg Airports of Thailand Sydney Melbourne Brisbane ACSA Singapore Perth Copenhagen Cape Town London-Heathrow Athens Washington National BAA Group Vienna Hong Kong Dallas Fort Worth London-Gatwick Oslo Birmingham Aeroporti di Roma Stockholm Calgary Beijing Los Angeles Amsterdam Group Washington Dulles Aeroporti di Milano Manchester AENA Malaysian Airports Aroports de Paris Finnish Airports Group Zurich Vancouver Toronto San Francisco Tokyo Narita Miami ANA Chicago O'Hare Geneva Aroports de Montreal Ontario Frankfurt Munich Swedish Airports Group Berlin Group 28% Operating Profit (%) 68% 66% 60% 56% 55% 55% 49% 46% 43% 42% 40% 38% 37% 36% 36% 35% 32% 32% 31% 30% 29% 29% 27% 27% 25% 25% 22% 22% 22% 21% 21% 19% 18% 17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 15% 13% 12% 10% 7% 4% 4% 4% -17%
30

100 Ranking Index 248.1 240.2 219.0 204.4 201.4 200.3 179.3 165.5 158.0 151.9 145.2 137.8 135.3 131.4 129.1 128.4 117.8 115.0 112.9 107.4 106.5 106.2 99.8 97.0 90.8 89.2 80.1 80.0 79.8 76.4 75.6 67.9 65.5 62.4 61.2 61.1 61.0 57.1 56.8 55.9 54.1 53.5 46.5 44.9 36.1 25.6 15.5 13.9 13.3 -61.7

Table 21: Operating Profit per Passenger


Average Ranking Airport 1 London-Heathrow 2 Athens 3 Auckland 4 Copenhagen 5 Tokyo Narita 6 Singapore 7 Sydney 8 Vienna 9 Johannesburg 10 BAA Group 11 Hong Kong 12 Oslo 13 Birmingham 14 London-Gatwick 15 Melbourne 16 ACSA 17 Amsterdam Group 18 Aeroporti di Roma 19 Perth 20 Stockholm 21 Washington National 22 Aeroports de Paris 23 Zurich 24 Brisbane 25 Manchester 26 Airports of Thailand 27 Atlanta 28 Aeroporti di Milano 29 Cape Town 30 Finnish Airports Group 31 Toronto 32 Washington Dulles 33 San Francisco 34 Miami 35 Calgary 36 Dallas Fort Worth 37 Geneva 38 Vancouver 39 Los Angeles 40 ANA 41 Beijing 42 AENA 43 Aeroports de Montreal 44 Malaysian Airports 45 Ontario 46 Chicago O'Hare 47 Munich 48 Frankfurt 49 Swedish Airports Group 50 Berlin Group 2.88 Operating Profit/Passenger 7.08 7.07 6.22 5.41 5.36 5.28 5.25 5.19 5.17 4.92 4.55 4.25 4.20 3.99 3.49 3.41 3.35 3.33 3.27 3.07 3.04 3.04 2.98 2.97 2.93 2.92 2.70 2.57 2.30 2.26 2.08 1.99 1.87 1.78 1.76 1.70 1.59 1.50 1.48 1.44 1.28 1.17 1.06 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.48 0.38 -1.73
31

100 Ranking Index 246.2 245.8 216.3 188.2 186.3 183.5 182.4 180.5 179.8 171.0 158.3 147.6 146.0 138.8 121.5 118.5 116.6 115.9 113.6 106.7 105.8 105.8 103.4 103.3 101.9 101.7 93.9 89.4 80.1 78.7 72.4 69.1 65.1 61.9 61.2 59.0 55.4 52.2 51.4 49.9 44.4 40.5 36.7 22.7 21.4 20.0 19.9 16.5 13.1 -60.3

Table 22: Return on Capital Employed


Average Ranking Airport 1 Johannesburg 2 ACSA 3 Auckland 4 Cape Town 5 Vienna 6 Aeroporti di Milano 7 Airports of Thailand 8 London-Heathrow 9 Copenhagen 10 BAA Group 11 Melbourne 12 Stockholm 13 Birmingham 14 Geneva 15 Washington National 16 London-Gatwick 17 Beijing 18 Aeroports de Paris 19 ANA 20 Singapore 21 Oslo 22 Athens 23 Atlanta 24 Finnish Airports Group 25 Amsterdam Group 26 Los Angeles 27 Perth 28 Sydney 29 Calgary 30 Aeroporti di Roma 31 Brisbane 32 Vancouver 33 Manchester 34 Hong Kong 35 Malaysian Airports 36 Zurich 37 Tokyo Narita 38 AENA 39 Dallas Fort Worth 40 Washington Dulles 41 San Francisco 42 Aeroports de Montreal 43 Miami 44 Toronto 45 Frankfurt 46 Swedish Airports Group 47 Ontario 48 Chicago O'Hare 49 Munich 50 Berlin Group 7.0% Return on Capital Employed (%) 27.4% 21.7% 19.3% 18.3% 14.4% 14.3% 12.9% 12.8% 12.1% 11.4% 11.3% 9.8% 9.1% 8.7% 7.7% 7.5% 7.5% 7.4% 7.1% 6.8% 6.6% 6.4% 6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 5.5% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 4.0% 3.8% 3.2% 3.0% 2.7% 2.5% 2.1% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.1% -7.2%
32

100 Ranking Index 392.5 309.9 275.9 261.3 205.8 204.4 184.6 182.6 173.2 162.7 161.0 140.4 129.9 123.9 110.9 107.0 106.7 105.3 101.8 97.2 93.8 90.9 85.9 84.1 83.0 81.0 78.3 74.3 72.3 70.2 69.9 68.1 66.8 63.5 56.9 54.4 45.3 43.3 38.1 36.0 30.1 27.3 26.9 26.3 24.1 21.4 19.7 19.2 15.0 -103.3

Table 23: Return on Shareholders Funds


Average (Of those >0) Ranking Airport 1 Sydney 2 Melbourne 3 Johannesburg 4 Auckland 5 Washington National 6 Geneva 7 Copenhagen 8 Oslo 9 ACSA 10 Cape Town 11 Aeroporti di Milano 12 Stockholm 13 Vienna 14 Airports of Thailand 15 London-Heathrow 16 Atlanta 17 Birmingham 18 Los Angeles 19 London-Gatwick 20 Finnish Airports Group 21 Athens 22 BAA Group 23 ANA 24 Calgary 25 Dallas Fort Worth 26 Beijing 27 Singapore 28 Tokyo Narita 29 Hong Kong 30 Vancouver 31 Amsterdam Group 32 AENA 33 Malaysian Airports 34 Aeroports de Paris 35 Ontario 36 Aeroporti di Roma 37 Manchester 38 Washington Dulles 39 Frankfurt 40 Miami 41 Zurich 42 Chicago O'Hare 43 Perth 44 Brisbane 45 Swedish Airports Group 46 Aeroports de Montreal 47 Munich 48 Toronto 49 San Francisco 50 Berlin Group 4.1% Return on Shareholders Funds 96.3% 31.0% 20.2% 19.4% 18.1% 16.9% 16.8% 16.3% 15.0% 13.9% 12.3% 12.1% 10.3% 9.9% 9.1% 8.9% 7.9% 7.3% 6.9% 6.8% 6.5% 6.4% 5.7% 5.6% 5.5% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 4.2% 3.0% 2.6% 2.6% 2.1% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.4% -0.3% -1.5% -6.2% -7.4% -7.5% -8.5% -11.2% -19.4% -24.2% -27.7% -110.0%
33

100.0 Ranking Index 2376.5 765.9 498.8 477.4 446.2 417.3 413.8 401.7 370.7 343.7 303.8 298.1 254.5 243.4 223.6 219.2 194.3 179.7 169.9 168.5 159.2 157.9 141.0 138.1 134.7 125.7 119.8 109.0 107.7 106.0 104.7 74.9 64.7 63.4 51.3 34.6 29.7 25.6 9.1 -6.6 -36.9 -153.1 -181.5 -186.0 -209.1 -276.5 -479.7 -597.6 -683.0 -2714.1

Table 24: Passengers per Employee


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Melbourne Sydney Brisbane Atlanta Calgary Perth Vancouver Chicago O'Hare Auckland Dallas Fort Worth Hong Kong Tokyo Narita Toronto Washington Dulles AENA Washington National Singapore Oslo Stockholm San Francisco Amsterdam Group Cape Town Athens Aeroports de Montreal Johannesburg Swedish Airports Group Miami London-Heathrow Los Angeles London-Gatwick Aeroporti di Roma Manchester Vienna Aeroporti di Milano Geneva ACSA Zurich BAA Group Ontario ANA Airports of Thailand Aeroports de Paris Copenhagen Birmingham Finnish Airports Group Berlin Group Munich Malaysian Airports Beijing Frankfurt 29,762 Passengers/Employee 120,814 112,255 111,864 99,508 66,955 55,000 47,083 45,366 43,969 42,606 39,242 35,661 33,120 31,854 30,284 28,552 27,101 26,930 24,405 22,886 21,774 19,943 19,574 19,035 19,028 18,761 18,739 18,032 18,013 17,052 16,492 15,876 15,696 15,677 15,456 15,438 15,228 14,856 14,386 13,923 13,387 12,901 12,795 12,764 10,071 9,934 8,780 8,583 5,860 4,587
34

100 Ranking Index 405.9 377.2 375.9 334.3 225.0 184.8 158.2 152.4 147.7 143.2 131.9 119.8 111.3 107.0 101.8 95.9 91.1 90.5 82.0 76.9 73.2 67.0 65.8 64.0 63.9 63.0 63.0 60.6 60.5 57.3 55.4 53.3 52.7 52.7 51.9 51.9 51.2 49.9 48.3 46.8 45.0 43.3 43.0 42.9 33.8 33.4 29.5 28.8 19.7 15.4

Table 25: Passengers per ATM


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita Singapore Hong Kong Airports of Thailand London-Heathrow San Francisco London-Gatwick Perth BAA Group Melbourne Beijing Los Angeles Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Frankfurt Brisbane Sydney Cape Town AENA Ontario Johannesburg ANA Aeroporti di Milano Aeroporti di Roma Malaysian Airports Manchester Atlanta Birmingham ACSA Dallas Fort Worth Miami Chicago O'Hare Oslo Zurich Munich Athens Auckland Toronto Copenhagen Calgary Berlin Group Stockholm Vienna Washington National Vancouver Washington Dulles Finnish Airports Group Geneva Swedish Airports Group Aeroports de Montreal 91.4 Passengers/ATM 170.2 164.6 158.3 152.7 144.1 138.0 130.6 119.8 116.2 115.1 114.5 105.3 102.7 102.4 102.1 99.3 98.7 95.4 93.7 91.2 90.6 89.5 87.2 86.8 86.7 86.5 86.2 81.7 80.7 80.6 78.6 76.1 75.7 74.7 72.4 71.5 71.0 70.9 69.7 67.5 66.7 66.2 65.8 59.8 58.2 57.6 56.1 51.6 44.6 43.9
35

100 Ranking Index 186.3 180.1 173.1 167.1 157.6 151.0 142.9 131.1 127.1 126.0 125.2 115.2 112.4 112.1 111.7 108.7 108.0 104.4 102.5 99.8 99.1 98.0 95.3 95.0 94.8 94.6 94.3 89.4 88.3 88.2 86.0 83.3 82.8 81.7 79.2 78.2 77.7 77.5 76.3 73.8 73.0 72.5 72.0 65.5 63.6 63.0 61.3 56.4 48.8 48.1

Table 26: ATUs per Employee


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Sydney Melbourne Brisbane Atlanta Calgary Vancouver Chicago O'Hare Auckland Perth Dallas Fort Worth Hong Kong Washington Dulles Toronto Washington National Aroports de Montreal AENA Oslo Stockholm Swedish Airports Group Singapore Tokyo Narita Amsterdam Group Athens Geneva Johannesburg San Francisco Miami Cape Town Ontario Vienna Los Angeles Zurich Manchester ACSA Aeroporti di Roma Aeroporti di Milano London-Heathrow Copenhagen London-Gatwick ANA BAA Group Finnish Airports Group Aroports de Paris Birmingham Airports of Thailand Berlin Group Munich Malaysian Airports Beijing Frankfurt 69,203 ATUs/Employee 247,923 237,846 230,321 225,235 175,251 135,044 115,117 114,823 105,702 101,453 95,799 89,081 83,326 76,302 66,989 63,938 63,910 62,774 62,313 59,414 59,186 49,945 48,649 46,503 44,262 43,521 42,578 42,117 42,051 41,921 41,406 39,035 36,941 36,520 36,313 36,256 34,074 33,406 31,322 30,470 29,538 28,939 28,908 28,532 25,384 25,153 21,536 20,632 12,103 10,399
36

100 Ranking Index 358.3 343.7 332.8 325.5 253.2 195.1 166.3 165.9 152.7 146.6 138.4 128.7 120.4 110.3 96.8 92.4 92.4 90.7 90.0 85.9 85.5 72.2 70.3 67.2 64.0 62.9 61.5 60.9 60.8 60.6 59.8 56.4 53.4 52.8 52.5 52.4 49.2 48.3 45.3 44.0 42.7 41.8 41.8 41.2 36.7 36.3 31.1 29.8 17.5 15.0

Table 27: Total Assets per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Tokyo Narita London-Heathrow Athens Toronto Hong Kong Sydney Miami Zurich San Francisco Washington Dulles Singapore Finnish Airports Group Aeroporti di Roma BAA Group Oslo Manchester Dallas Fort Worth Amsterdam Group Brisbane Perth London-Gatwick Aeroports de Montreal Munich Aeroports de Paris Birmingham Vienna ANA Ontario Auckland Berlin Group AENA Chicago O'Hare Copenhagen Swedish Airports Group Washington National Aeroporti di Milano Calgary Stockholm Fraport Melbourne Vancouver Los Angeles Airports of Thailand Geneva Beijing Johannesburg ACSA Malaysian Airports Cape Town Atlanta 60.05 Total Assets/Passenger 191.75 130.08 121.34 113.69 111.22 104.04 103.26 95.00 93.03 84.66 84.10 77.28 74.33 72.18 69.91 69.73 67.29 66.61 62.85 61.90 60.14 59.13 58.79 55.50 54.64 51.16 50.45 48.56 48.52 48.46 48.06 46.20 45.53 39.83 39.23 38.63 37.61 36.18 33.41 32.83 32.79 29.22 24.37 22.54 21.73 20.49 18.83 18.70 14.17 12.78
37

100 Ranking Index 319.3 216.6 202.1 189.3 185.2 173.2 171.9 158.2 154.9 141.0 140.0 128.7 123.8 120.2 116.4 116.1 112.1 110.9 104.7 103.1 100.1 98.5 97.9 92.4 91.0 85.2 84.0 80.9 80.8 80.7 80.0 76.9 75.8 66.3 65.3 64.3 62.6 60.2 55.6 54.7 54.6 48.6 40.6 37.5 36.2 34.1 31.3 31.1 23.6 21.3

Table 28: Equity Ratio


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Atlanta Johannesburg Airports of Thailand Singapore Beijing Los Angeles ACSA Cape Town Ontario Vienna London-Gatwick Hong Kong Fraport Malaysian Airports Manchester BAA Group Amsterdam Group Vancouver Birmingham Copenhagen Finnish Airports Group AENA Geneva Auckland Calgary Athens London-Heathrow Washington National Stockholm Aeroporti di Milano Aeroports de Paris Aeroporti di Roma Dallas Fort Worth Zurich Brisbane Swedish Airports Group Perth ANA Miami Tokyo Narita Munich Washington Dulles Chicago O'Hare Aeroports de Montreal Toronto Melbourne San Francisco Oslo Berlin Group Sydney 42.6% Equity Ratio (%) 168.0% 89.3% 88.9% 88.8% 77.7% 77.0% 76.8% 76.0% 70.0% 68.3% 68.0% 65.8% 63.7% 61.6% 60.3% 59.9% 59.9% 55.4% 52.1% 41.6% 40.5% 37.0% 34.8% 34.6% 34.2% 32.7% 32.5% 32.3% 32.0% 29.0% 28.9% 27.5% 26.3% 23.6% 23.4% 21.5% 20.9% 19.9% 19.5% 18.3% 15.8% 15.8% 14.5% 13.8% 11.3% 8.3% 7.9% 5.2% 5.1% -4.4%
38

100 Ranking Index 394.0 209.5 208.4 208.2 182.2 180.7 180.1 178.3 164.3 160.2 159.6 154.4 149.5 144.4 141.3 140.5 140.5 130.0 122.1 97.6 94.9 86.8 81.7 81.2 80.1 76.6 76.3 75.9 75.2 68.1 67.8 64.4 61.7 55.3 54.9 50.3 49.1 46.6 45.6 43.0 37.1 37.0 34.0 32.4 26.4 19.5 18.5 12.1 12.0 -10.2

Table 29: Liquidity Ratio


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Finnish Airports Group Atlanta Singapore Aeroports de Paris Frankfurt Chicago O'Hare Berlin Group Airports of Thailand Oslo Dallas Fort Worth AENA Washington Dulles Washington National Aeroporti di Roma Los Angeles Vancouver Birmingham Athens Malaysian Airports BAA Group San Francisco Sydney Ontario Calgary Brisbane Miami Manchester Aeroporti di Milano Stockholm Geneva Amsterdam Group Perth Beijing Vienna London-Gatwick Swedish Airports Group ANA Tokyo Narita Aeroports de Montreal ACSA Munich Hong Kong Zurich Johannesburg Melbourne Cape Town London-Heathrow Toronto Copenhagen Auckland 3.14 Liquidity Ratio (%) 43.33 17.77 12.86 6.51 6.02 5.59 5.11 4.69 3.81 3.64 3.44 2.90 2.83 2.72 2.59 2.43 2.20 2.17 2.06 1.90 1.84 1.84 1.61 1.57 1.45 1.32 1.18 1.13 1.05 1.01 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.63 0.62 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.00
39

100 Ranking Index 1378.0 565.2 408.9 206.9 191.6 177.9 162.5 149.2 121.3 115.7 109.4 92.1 90.0 86.5 82.4 77.4 70.1 68.9 65.4 60.5 58.5 58.5 51.2 49.9 46.1 42.0 37.6 35.9 33.3 32.3 30.7 29.5 27.6 26.0 24.6 20.0 19.8 15.9 15.5 14.9 8.4 8.3 8.1 7.3 6.8 5.4 4.9 1.2 0.0 0.0

Table 30: Assets per Employee


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Sydney Brisbane Tokyo Narita Hong Kong Melbourne Toronto Perth Dallas Fort Worth Washington Dulles Calgary Athens London-Heathrow Singapore Auckland San Francisco Chicago O'Hare Miami Oslo Vancouver AENA Amsterdam Group Zurich Atlanta Aeroporti di Roma Aeroports de Montreal Washington National Manchester BAA Group London-Gatwick Stockholm Vienna Finnish Airports Group Swedish Airports Group Aeroports de Paris ANA Ontario Birmingham Aeroporti di Milano Copenhagen Los Angeles Munich Berlin Group Johannesburg Geneva Airports of Thailand ACSA Cape Town Malaysian Airports Frankfurt Beijing 1,819,360 Assets/Employee 11,679,439 7,031,087 6,838,105 4,364,542 3,965,979 3,765,541 3,404,244 2,867,089 2,696,634 2,517,858 2,375,096 2,345,528 2,279,153 2,133,573 2,129,116 2,095,707 1,934,880 1,882,799 1,543,768 1,455,834 1,450,342 1,446,549 1,271,672 1,225,893 1,125,540 1,120,156 1,107,122 1,072,257 1,025,494 882,990 802,977 778,356 747,305 716,001 702,384 698,565 697,406 605,608 582,581 526,269 516,181 481,467 389,926 348,439 326,180 290,636 282,600 160,539 153,269 127,309
40

100 Ranking Index 642.0 386.5 375.9 239.9 218.0 207.0 187.1 157.6 148.2 138.4 130.5 128.9 125.3 117.3 117.0 115.2 106.3 103.5 84.9 80.0 79.7 79.5 69.9 67.4 61.9 61.6 60.9 58.9 56.4 48.5 44.1 42.8 41.1 39.4 38.6 38.4 38.3 33.3 32.0 28.9 28.4 26.5 21.4 19.2 17.9 16.0 15.5 8.8 8.4 7.0

Table 31: Capital Expenditure per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport London-Heathrow Aeroports de Montreal BAA Group Miami Washington Dulles Tokyo Narita AENA ANA Aeroports de Paris Zurich Amsterdam Group Dallas Fort Worth London-Gatwick Berlin Group Auckland Singapore Calgary Vienna Vancouver Perth Aeroporti di Milano Birmingham Atlanta Hong Kong Finnish Airports Group Copenhagen Fraport Melbourne Stockholm Geneva Swedish Airports Group Chicago O'Hare Sydney Johannesburg ACSA Cape Town Manchester Brisbane San Francisco Los Angeles Athens Washington National Ontario Aeroporti di Roma Beijing Oslo Munich Malaysian Airports Airports of Thailand Toronto
41

4.12 Capex/Passenger 20.72 15.75 12.25 10.38 9.31 9.24 7.09 6.59 6.04 5.95 5.50 5.19 5.06 4.98 4.91 4.73 4.35 4.12 3.99 3.28 3.25 3.00 2.97 2.92 2.73 2.64 2.50 2.48 2.39 2.25 2.25 2.22 2.16 2.07 2.07 2.01 1.94 1.77 1.75 1.75 1.73 1.72 1.49 1.39 1.23 1.00 0.55 0.40 0.11 0.06

100 Ranking Index 502.4 381.9 297.0 251.7 225.7 224.1 171.8 159.7 146.3 144.3 133.3 125.9 122.8 120.8 119.2 114.6 105.5 99.8 96.8 79.6 78.9 72.6 72.0 70.8 66.3 64.0 60.5 60.1 58.0 54.5 54.4 53.8 52.3 50.3 50.2 48.8 47.0 42.9 42.5 42.3 41.9 41.8 36.0 33.8 29.7 24.2 13.3 9.8 2.7 1.4

Table 32: Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of Turnover


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Aeroports de Montreal AENA London-Heathrow Washington Dulles Dallas Fort Worth BAA Group Miami Atlanta ANA Calgary Auckland Chicago O'Hare Berlin Group Vancouver Perth Melbourne Singapore London-Gatwick Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Zurich Cape Town Brisbane ACSA Aeroporti di Milano Tokyo Narita Los Angeles Vienna Johannesburg Beijing Sydney Frankfurt Swedish Airports Group Birmingham Stockholm Finnish Airports Group Hong Kong Washington National Copenhagen Geneva Ontario San Francisco Manchester Aeroporti di Roma Malaysian Airports Athens Oslo Munich Airports of Thailand Toronto 38.9% Capex/Turnover (%) 148.4% 113.5% 108.9% 102.8% 95.1% 88.0% 86.7% 75.0% 67.5% 61.8% 52.2% 49.4% 48.8% 44.6% 42.0% 39.1% 39.0% 37.5% 36.1% 34.1% 33.7% 33.1% 29.4% 27.7% 26.6% 26.5% 26.0% 25.7% 24.2% 23.6% 22.8% 22.3% 21.8% 20.8% 20.8% 20.3% 20.3% 20.1% 19.5% 17.4% 17.0% 14.6% 13.8% 11.5% 11.1% 8.8% 6.9% 3.7% 2.1% 0.4%
42

100 Ranking Index 381.8 292.1 280.3 264.6 244.7 226.5 223.2 193.0 173.8 159.1 134.3 127.0 125.5 114.7 108.0 100.7 100.3 96.4 92.8 87.6 86.6 85.2 75.5 71.2 68.5 68.3 67.0 66.1 62.2 60.7 58.6 57.5 56.1 53.6 53.6 52.3 52.2 51.7 50.1 44.9 43.7 37.6 35.4 29.6 28.6 22.7 17.7 9.5 5.5 1.1

Table 33: Taxation Effect


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Aeroports de Paris Fraport Manchester Aeroporti di Roma Malaysian Airports Tokyo Narita Melbourne Aeroporti di Milano Amsterdam Group ANA Birmingham BAA Group Auckland ACSA Vienna London-Heathrow Airports of Thailand Beijing Copenhagen Cape Town Oslo London-Gatwick Singapore Johannesburg Calgary Hong Kong Stockholm Athens Vancouver AENA Los Angeles Washington Dulles Chicago O'Hare Atlanta Aeroports de Montreal Swedish Airports Group Geneva San Francisco Dallas Fort Worth Perth Finnish Airports Group Sydney Washington National Miami Berlin Group Toronto Zurich Ontario Brisbane Munich 1.414 Taxation Effect 4.876 3.983 3.193 2.946 2.059 2.007 1.982 1.728 1.663 1.610 1.568 1.554 1.487 1.481 1.471 1.443 1.429 1.429 1.415 1.412 1.399 1.399 1.392 1.346 1.342 1.226 1.119 1.011 1.011 1.010 1.005 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.862 0.781 0.533 0.325 0.216
43

100 Ranking Index 344.9 281.7 225.9 208.4 145.6 142.0 140.2 122.2 117.7 113.9 110.9 109.9 105.2 104.7 104.1 102.1 101.1 101.1 100.1 99.9 99.0 99.0 98.5 95.2 94.9 86.7 79.1 71.5 71.5 71.4 71.1 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 70.7 69.0 61.0 55.2 37.7 23.0 15.3

Table 34: Net Cash Generation per Passenger


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Athens Tokyo Narita Oslo Copenhagen Sydney Hong Kong Toronto Aeroporti di Roma Manchester San Francisco Vienna Birmingham Johannesburg Airports of Thailand Singapore Stockholm Munich Zurich Washington National Brisbane Aeroporti di Milano Auckland ACSA Geneva Melbourne Finnish Airports Group Swedish Airports Group Perth Beijing Cape Town London-Gatwick Amsterdam Group Aeroports de Paris Malaysian Airports Frankfurt Ontario Los Angeles Atlanta Chicago O'Hare Vancouver Calgary Dallas Fort Worth ANA AENA Washington Dulles Berlin Group BAA Group Miami London-Heathrow Aeroports de Montreal 1.17 Net Cash Generation/Passenger 11.38 8.00 6.51 5.57 5.44 5.43 5.37 4.75 4.17 3.51 3.48 3.45 3.44 3.32 3.20 3.12 3.03 2.82 2.70 2.56 2.55 2.54 2.30 2.00 1.96 1.77 1.52 1.19 1.13 1.10 0.72 0.71 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.47 0.40 0.26 -0.40 -0.99 -0.99 -2.05 -2.92 -4.40 -4.52 -4.67 -5.72 -6.26 -10.60 -11.69
44

100 Ranking Index 974.6 685.0 557.5 476.7 465.5 465.2 459.7 406.4 356.7 300.2 298.0 295.6 294.5 284.3 274.2 267.1 259.1 241.2 231.3 218.9 218.2 217.0 196.9 171.6 167.9 151.5 130.3 101.8 96.9 94.4 61.2 60.8 54.1 53.0 43.5 40.3 33.9 22.0 -34.5 -84.5 -85.1 -175.9 -249.7 -377.0 -387.2 -399.7 -489.2 -535.8 -907.6 -1001.0

Table 35: EBITDA as a percentage of turnover


Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Airport Atlanta Sydney Auckland Brisbane Melbourne Athens Airports of Thailand Singapore Johannesburg Copenhagen ACSA Hong Kong Dallas Fort Worth Perth London-Heathrow Washington Dulles Oslo Washington National Cape Town Aeroporti di Roma Zurich Tokyo Narita Stockholm Calgary Aeroporti di Milano Vienna BAA Group Beijing Birmingham San Francisco Manchester AENA London-Gatwick Toronto Amsterdam Group Chicago O'Hare Aeroports de Montreal Aeroports de Paris ANA Swedish Airports Group Miami Vancouver Finnish Airports Group Geneva Los Angeles Malaysian Airports Frankfurt Munich Ontario Berlin Group 47.8% EBITDA 81.5% 80.2% 79.1% 71.8% 70.1% 67.1% 66.0% 65.4% 64.3% 60.6% 58.4% 58.0% 57.4% 57.2% 53.2% 52.9% 51.9% 51.6% 51.2% 50.6% 49.6% 49.5% 48.0% 47.7% 47.5% 47.4% 47.0% 45.4% 44.9% 43.9% 43.4% 43.0% 42.8% 40.9% 40.7% 40.4% 38.2% 37.6% 37.6% 36.6% 34.4% 33.6% 33.5% 33.0% 32.0% 28.2% 26.9% 24.0% 22.4% 3.1%
45

100 Ranking Index 170.4 167.7 165.4 150.1 146.5 140.2 138.0 136.7 134.4 126.6 122.1 121.3 120.1 119.6 111.2 110.5 108.4 108.0 107.1 105.9 103.7 103.5 100.3 99.8 99.3 99.1 98.2 94.8 93.8 91.8 90.7 89.9 89.4 85.5 85.2 84.5 79.9 78.7 78.7 76.5 72.0 70.2 70.0 69.0 66.8 59.0 56.2 50.2 46.8 6.4

4.

DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRPORTS AND THEIR RELATIVE PERFORMANCE

Introduction The organisations covered in this publication, which we describe in this section, are mainly individual airports, although we also include analyses of airport groups in some cases. The style and level of detail of the Annual Reports produced by the groups varies, but in some cases we are able to analyse one or more of the main airports in a group separately from the group entity. This is not possible in the cases of Aroports de Montreal, ADM, ADP, ADR, AENA, ANA, AoT, the Berlin Group, the Finnish Group, Fraport, the Manchester Airport Group and Malaysian Airports because the level of detail provided in their Reports is insufficient to allow a full set of data relating to the principal airport to be extracted. The references to financial results and capital expenditures in this section are made in both local currency and US dollars. The conversion has been made at mid-2004 rates, so as to relate directly to the financial periods under review. Performance profiles This year we have introduced a new feature in the form of performance profiles for each airport. These indicate how the airport has performed in each of the performance measures in relation to the average performance for the measure. The performance is calculated in terms of its z -value, the derivation of which may be explained as follows. The statistical process of deriving z-values is intended to improve upon a simple relationship to an average value by taking into account the overall degree of variation from the average so as to determine how significant is the variation. To illustrate this: If the industry average is 4.2, performance is 3.8 and the overall variation around the average is +/-4.0, then the variation of -0.4 is not very significant, but: If the industry average is 4.2, performance is 3.8 and the overall variation around the average is +/-0.5, then the variation of -0.4 is much closer to the extreme and may be considered significant. So, in deciding whether a measure of performance is unusual or not it is necessary to pay attention to the spread of the data. Standard deviation is a measure of spread and so for any value x using: z = (x mean) / standard deviation measures how many standard deviations from the mean x is. z is a pure ratio and is therefore independent of units of measurement. This means that it provides a common definition of unusual for any and all data sets. If the data are (roughly) Normally distributed then: if the absolute value of z >1 33% of data are this extreme if the absolute value of z >2 only 5% of data are this extreme if the absolute value of z >3 only 0.2% of data are this extreme.

46

ACSA - Airports Company of South Africa, Capetown and Johannesburg


ACSA Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Cape Town Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Johannesburg Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Number 25,826,978 436.126 251,820 Number 6,242,000 92,548 n.a. Number 14,728,000 187,436 262,532 Change in % +10.9% +5.2% -2.6% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Change in % +8.5% +2.6% +3.9% Change in % +13.6% +0.0% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s R 591,622 R 1,963,106 R 485,852 Value in 000s R 189,114 R 375,945 R 113,942 Value in 000s R 765,584 R 1,242,172 R 277,267 Change in % +29.8% +5.2% +3.1% Change in % +76.8% +9.1% +24.0% Change in % +4.0% +5.7% -1.1%

The Airports Company of South Africa operates the main airports of South Africa (Cape Town, Durban International Airport and Johannesburg) as well as six smaller domestic airports (Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein, George, Kimberley and Pilanesberg international Airport). Total traffic amounts to 218,603 air transport movements (ATM) and 28.8 million passengers. This corresponds to an increase in passengers from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005 of 12%. The major role of Johannesburg (56% of passengers) and Cape Town (23% of passengers) continues. Growth over the past five years has been very strong, fuelled by the growth of low cost scheduled domestic services, and this trend is expected to continue. The profitability of the group continues to grow, extending a period of above-average profitability with a rise in profit of +25.8%. The most important contributor is the division of commercial services, contributing 45.5% of the group revenues and 76.6% of net operating profit. The average growth rate of this sector in the last eight years is three times higher than that of the aviation sector. In September 2005 the 20% shareholding of Aeroporti di Roma was sold to the South African Public Investment Corporation (PIC), a state-owned pensions fund, so unusually the company has reverted from being partially privatised to being almost entirely State-owned. Around 5% of total shares are split between an incentive scheme for the staff of ACSA (1.19%) and various empowerment investors. Investment in the groups facilities focuses on the two main airports and aims at preparing the group for further growth in demand, especially with the forthcoming football world cup 2010 in mind. The main drivers for the growth of both traffic and profit, the latter mainly through commercial revenues, remain the biggest airports of Johannesburg and Cape Town which in turn consume most of the investment made by ACSA, in line with their traffic volumes. A system of price regulation is in force with aeronautical charges being set for five year periods, but reviewed three years after being set. A pricing formula will be set during 2006 for the period commencing April 2007. A new terminal for JNB is expected to be operating by 2009, for CIA by 2008. JNB will be an early operator of the new Airbus A380 and is estimated to operate 24 million passengers by 2010. It should be noted that these two airports` profits account for more than the profit of the group, indicating that they cross-subsidize smaller airports. Uncertainty remains as to the timing and funding sources for a new airport at Durban, and indeed it is not clear whether the proposed King Shaka airport will be either owned or operated by ACSA. A provisional date for start of operations is 2015.

47

Performance profile s The profile for ACSA shows variations from the mean values in various categories. The better than average EBITDA is reflected in the performance indicators for costs and revenues. Cost indicators are lower than the average, especially total cost per passengers (z-value is -0.92) and revenue indicators are stronger than the average (see aeronautical revenue as percentage of cost). For revenues, aeronautical revenues are stronger than commercial revenues. This in turn relates to the importance of domestic traffic for ACSA and the fact that commercial revenues are primarily generated by international passengers. In the light of the planned expansions in the period up to 2010 and the recent capacity constraints at the two major airports of Cape Town and Johannesburg, the strong position of the performance indicators may be challenged the need for infrastructure investments in the future. The strong return on capital employed is in line with this as much of the infrastructure used is comparably old. A major impact can be expected from the preparations for the FIFA World Cup to be held in 2010 in South Africa and the resulting changes in capital assets. Variations in the employee measures can be explained by relatively low labour costs (see staff costs per passenger) although passenger per employee performance is below average.
ACSA
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,70 0,28 0,08 -0,35 -0,52 -0,75 -0,42 1,11 -1,19 -0,54 -0,36 -0,53 0,30 0,48 2,47 1,07 -0,26 -0,66 -0,66 0,32 -0,87 -0,78 -0,92 -0,64 -0,11 -0,66 -0,51 -0,45 0,38 1,05 -0,41 -0,77 -0,71 -0,62 -0,53

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

48

For Cape Town the strongest deviation is a z-value of +1.9 for return on capital employed. This needs to be seen as an indication of the continued use of relatively old infrastructure which produces this high ratio. In line with this, the total assets per passenger are lower than average (-1.33) although Cape Town does not handle particularly large numbers of passengers. In this context also the underlying reason for variations to the left for assets per employee (-0.75) need to be understood. A second factor to contribute to the high profitability ratios is the low cost structure compared to the average. All cost indicators deviate to the left. The average ratios involving profitability measures (EBITDA rate +0.23) also result from elow average returns (total revenue per passenger -0.98). Overall the ratios indicate that the airport operates with better than average costs with old infrastructure and below average revenues.

Cape Town
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0.42 -0.74 -0.98 -0.74 -0.56 -0.90 -0.73 -0.55 0.48 0.63 -0.77 -0.70 0.07 -0.86 -0.77 -0.99 -0.59 -0.14 0.62 -0.13 -1.33 -0.43 0.15 -0.36 -0.30 0.43 1.90 -0.54 -0.75 -0.46 1.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.18 0.23

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Johannesburgs profile shows deviations for asset and capex related ratios (total assets per passenger 1.14) which, as with Cape Town, can be explained by the use of relatively old infrastructure which will soon be subject to change. Equity and profitability ratios are above average, particularly in the case of return on capital employed (+3.45) as they benefit from a highly competitive cost structure. Both staff cost and operating cost ratios are well below average (e.g. staff costs per passenger -0.71), while staff costs are slightly more significant at Johannesburg compared with the sample (staff costs as percentage of staff and operational cost +0.19). Revenue ratios are mainly a little below average (e.g. aeronautical revenue per passenger -0.32). However, aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total cost are well above average (+2.51). Total revenue ratios are correspondingly below average (total revenue per passenger -0.50). The overall profile shows an airport that has, compared to the average, a competitive cost structure which generates high profit ratios, while assets are currently relatively low. This might change once the preparations for the World Cup 2010 in South Africa begin to affect ACSA and its airport network.

49

Johannesburg
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,08 0,55 -0,08 -0,46 -0,52 -0,70 -0,45 1,51 -1,14 -0,44 -0,02 -0,40 1,25 0,70 1,93 -0,56 -0,71 -0,66 0,19 -0,85 -0,86 -1,07 -0,67 -0,02 -0,44 -0,32 -0,24 0,35 2,51 -0,22 -0,56 -0,50 -0,39 -0,33

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

50

Aeroporti di Milano (ADM)


Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 30,679,174 352,010 493,257 Change in % +16.3% +14.5% +9.4% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 134,374 462,118 120,518 Change in % +1.3% +6.6% +33.9%

ADM operates the airports of Linate, Malpensa and Orio al Serio. Malpensa and Orio al Serio are relatively new airports, while Linate, previously the main airport, is declining in relative importance. The decision was taken some years ago to develop Malpensa as the main airport as Linate is close to the central of Milan, with little land available for expansion and with a high noise impact. Overall traffic growth is therefore mostly accommodated at Malpensa, which now accounts for about 60% of overall passengers and 68% of overall cargo. Ownership of the company is still in public hands, with shareholdings by the municipality of Milan (84.56%) and the province of Milan (14.56%), with around 1% held by diverse minority shareholders. Plans for privatization were suspended after the events of September 11 2001 and have not been revived yet. Competition in the ground handling activities was introduced in 2002 for EU competition law reasons. Initial airline resistance to transferring traffic from Linate to Malpensa has been overcome, and Malpensa is now undoubtedly the centre of the ADM network. This shows also in the slight decline of share in overall passenger traffic for Linate and the strong growth of Orio al Serio, with growth rates of Orio being well above the overall average and growth rates of Linate being well below average. The markets served by ADM are mostly within the EU, with 36.4% of all passengers being domestic and 37.4% being intra-EU passengers. Aeronautical revenues account for 58.9% of all revenues indicating a significant potential for further commercial development.

51

Performance profile
Aeroporti di Milano
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,01 0,34 0,39 -0,38 -0,22 -0,59 -0,31 -0,44 -0,62 -0,55 -0,14 -0,52 -0,15 0,36 1,23 -0,37 0,08 0,18 0,19 0,16 0,10 0,22 0,28 0,09 -0,16 0,05 -0,27 -0,22 -1,06 -0,96 -0,22 -0,44 0,19 0,13 0,00

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Aeroporti di Milano shows few significant variations from the mean. It achieved amongst others an EBITDA and staff costs that were virtually identical to the average. The largest deviations were in return on capital employed (z value +1.23) and the share of aeronautical revenue of total revenue (z-value 1.06). All indicators for asset ratios and most indicators for revenue ratios are slightly below average while all cost indicators are slightly above average. Profit growth of 1.3% was weak in relation to an increase in overall revenue of 6.6% an increase in passengers of 5.5%. The lower performance for asset ratios results from the absence of major extensions as two of the current three airports (Orio al Serio and Malpensa) are relatively new, and the systems capacity is sufficient for the current traffic volumes and expected growth.

52

Aeroporti di Roma (ADR)


Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 30,700,000 352,291 153,746 Change in % +9.2% +4.5% +4.2% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 12,244 492,397 51,643 Change in % +1145.4% +4.9% +4.9%

Aeroporti di Roma was founded in 1974 to manage and operate Rome's two airports, Fiumicino (Leonardo da Vinci) and Ciampino. During 2000 the former owner of ADR, the state holding company Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), transferred 51.166% of its share capital to Leonardo S.p.A., a consortium comprising Fiat's Gemina holding company and Falck, Italpetroli, and Impregilo. During 2001 ADR was merged with Leonardo, becoming Aeroporti di Roma S.p.A.. Traffic in the year under review amounted to 28.2 million passengers at Fiumincino compared to 2.5 million passengers at Ciampino, although the growth rates differed strongly with good growth at Fiumicino (+7%) and very strong growth at Ciampino (+43.1%). This is mostly related to a strong growth in Low Cost Carrier (LCC) traffic at Ciampino. Plans are in place to expand the capacity of Fiumicino in the coming years to 45 million passengers to meet expected traffic growth. The most important market region for AdR is Europe, both due to the expansion of the European Union and the rise of LCCs. Market shares reflect this with domestic traffic accounting for 44.9% of total group traffic and intra-EU-traffic accounting for 33.5%. Aviation revenues accounted for 56.2% of company revenues while in comparison to the previous year commercial revenues (+5%) did not grow as strongly as traffic revenues (+9.2%). This is partly explained by a reduction in the number of passengers flying to EU Accession States able to purchase duty-free goods, and to the shift towards LCC traffic. AdRs 20% share in Airports Company South Africa was sold in September 2005. It retains a 15% share in the airport of Genoa. The increase in profits results mainly from the increased revenues while costs have not increased significantly.

53

Performance profile
Aeroporti di Roma
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,19 0,86 1,89 -0,85 -0,70 -0,29 -0,07 -0,49 0,41 -0,52 -0,15 -0,49 0,26 -0,11 -0,34 0,01 -0,20 -0,06 -0,05 -0,08 0,07 0,07 0,09 -0,02 0,96 0,84 -0,27 -0,23 -1,05 -0,78 -0,23 -0,40 0,17 0,11 -0,01

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Aeroporti di Roma represents the second Italian organization within the sample and has stronger variations from the mean than Aeroporti di Milano. Above average are net cash generation per passenger, taxation effect and the indicators for commercial revenues. Below average are indicators for capital expenditure, equity ratios and employee productivity. A large negative variation was achieved for aeronautical revenues as percentage of total revenues. The largest variations originate from the same source. The above-average value of commercial revenues as a share of total revenue results from a below-average value for aeronautical revenues as a share of total revenue. For Aeroporti di Roma, absolute commercial revenues exceeded absolute aeronautical revenues, which reflects increased commercial activities and unchanged airport fees due to constant regulation since 2001. The low values for assets per employee and the high ratios for assets per passenger point to a belowaverage performance on the airside activities of the group which may be related to existing excess capacities. A future capacity of 45 million passengers is planned, so this might well be the case.

54

AENA
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 164,076,521 2,056,959 653,999.8 Change in % +8.0% +4.5% +1.4% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 27,718 250,719 1,403,659 Change in % -67.7% +19.8% -3.8%

AENA (Aeropuertos Espaoles y Navegacin Area) is the operator of 43 Spanish and various international airports, together with the five Spanish Air Traffic Control Centres. As well as being the biggest global network of airports operated by one organization, it is one of the 50 biggest companies of Spain. International operations exist through a share in TBI in the UK, Sweden, the US, Bolivia and Costa Rica and through minority shares in airport operating companies in Mexico and Columbia. The most important airports are Madrid-Barajas with 38.7 million passengers or 23.3% of the total, Barcelona with 24.6 million (14.8%) and Palma de Mallorca with 20.4 million (12.3%). 57.5% of all passengers are on international services, and Madrid airport in particular is the main European hub for connecting services to and from South America. Almost three quarters of revenue comes from air-side activities (airport revenues 38.4% and air traffic control revenues 37.5%), showing the importance of air navigation services to AENAs business. Press reports in June 2006 indicated that consideration may be given to the privatisation of Madrid and Barcelona airports. The announcement stated that this was through necessity rather than desire, citing the very high costs of the further development which is expected to be needed at both airports. The first private airport in Spain, operated by consortium Ciudad Real Aeropuerto S.L. (CRA) is in the final stages of construction and will open during 2006. The terminal building will incorporate a new railway station allowing direct access to Central Madrid with a journey time of approximately 45 minutes. The profitability of AENA is substantially generated through its six largest airports, as they generate 112.9 million passengers or 67.9% of all traffic. Revenues are mostly dependant on air-side activities. The objectives of diversifying activities through international activities and increasing commercial revenues through investments into equity abroad, infrastructure at airports and commercial activities reflect this heavy dependence on aeronautical revenues.

Performance profile
The Spanish airport operator, the biggest company in this sector worldwide, achieved mostly weaker results than the average of the sample. This shows in the dependency on aeronautical revenues and the weak operating profit per passenger. This is related to the extensive network of the company with heterogeneous levels of profitability. Also, the operator is not entirely profit-orientated as it is highly influenced by the Spanish authorities. Therefore, regional economic development is a company target alongside economic performance. Performance is also affected by the current extensive phase of capital investment compared with the rest of the sample. Once capital investments are fully implemented and assuming that traffic grows as expected, results may move towards a more profitable outcome, in absolute and relative/standardized values. It should be noted that although both income and cost indicators are below the samples average that the company has been operating in profit in recent years. The variation merely shows that compared to other operators, AENAs profit are not as high the mean.

55

AENA
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,16 -1,33 -0,50 2,50 0,76 -0,13 0,41 -0,18 -0,35 0,04 0,09 0,09 -0,92 -0,04 -0,67 -0,46 0,33 -0,61 -0,54 0,38 -0,84 -0,60 -0,78 -0,47 -0,45 -1,03 -0,66 -0,49 1,02 0,08 -0,39 -0,44 -1,02 -0,77 -0,59

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

56

Aroports de Montral
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 10,300,000 235,209 251,820 (cargo only) Change in % +15.3% +2.2% +4.0% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s CAD -10,299 CAD 239,579 CAD 320,500 Change in % -30.9% +15.0% +43.9%

Like the other Canadian airports covered in this publication, Aroports de Montral is a public not-forprofit corporation without share capital, charged with operating the two Montral airports of Dorval (which changed its name to Montral Trudeau in 2004) and Mirabel, under the terms of a 60 year lease entered into with the Transport Canada ministry in 1992. While Trudeau is mostly dedicated to passenger traffic, Mirabel has been a cargo-only airport since 2004. The reason behind the use of a two-airport system to handle this relatively modest number of passengers lies in the original intention for Mirabel, opened in 1975, to replace Dorval, an older airport dating back to the 1940s. However, airlines and passengers were reluctant to transfer to the new airport, which is situated further from the city centre (39 miles as against 13 miles) than Dorval. The problem of distance was exacerbated by a lack of surface access infrastructure provision at the time of the airports opening. The strong growth in traffic should be considered in the context of the renovation and better connection of Montral Trudeau through more flights to international hubs (CDG, LHR, FRA), where a investment program worth CAD 634 million is in progress, of which CAD 320.5 million was invested in 2004. This investment also allowed Mirabel to be converted into a cargo-only airport, leading to growth in cargo volumes in each of the past four years. In the light of this development, commercial revenues rose in line with traffic to 39% of overall revenue, with expanded shop facilities and extended parking facilities at Trudeau. Profitability is, despite the current loss, improving. The need to finance all investment either by own means or through the capital market imposes stronger constraints on the airport operator than e.g. a fully stateowned operator would experience. 16% of overall costs are interest payments, and overall debt equates to around 85% of all assets. Future developments for Trudeau include the adaptation of the airport to the needs of the new Airbus A 380 and the planning of a connection to the rail system. An upgrade of the road connection to Trudeau has already been agreed upon for 2006. Mirabel changed its former passenger facilities into industrial areas and it will be the future centre of production for the Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bombardier. It remains to be seen if this approach will allow AdM to regain the role as a major international hub which it lost to Toronto airport following the opening of Mirabel.

57

Performance profile

Aeroports de Montreal
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,61 -0,51

2,97 -0,34 -0,41 -0,93 -0,03 -0,04 -1,62 -0,40 -0,97 -0,65 -0,85 -1,01 -0,34 -0,35 -0,72 -0,81 0,54 -0,37 0,26 -0,51 -0,93 -0,68 0,22 -0,39 0,90 -0,30 -0,50 -0,39 -0,12 -0,65 -0,69

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Aroports de Montreal (AdM) shows strong variations in its ratios. Net cash generation per passengers is at a z-value of -3.07 and capital expenditure as a percentage of turnover with a z-value of +3.38. AdM is a special case within the sample due to the history of its two airports Mirabel and Dorval. The resulting economically challenging situation for AdM, with low traffic volumes caused by the traffic losses to Toronto and high costs due to overcapacity, explains the variations displayed above. The move back to Dorval made significant investments for new facilities or the redesign of facilities necessary, pushing the capex ratios to very high levels compared with the mean of the sample. The challenges from the past push equity-, asset and liquidity ratios below average levels, as well as all revenue indicator ratios. The only revenue ratio which was better than the average was aeronautical revenue per passengers but it should be noted that the ratio for passengers per ATM is well below average (-1.62), providing another source of difficulty in revenue generation. Overall, the variations show the challenges for AdM from the reshaping the organisation of its airports and the impact of past deficiencies in profitability.

58

Aroports de Paris
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 75,313,343 735,223 1,993,009 Change in % +6.6% +3.3% +8.9% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 125,871 1,820.9 548,700 Change in % -2.4% +6.4% -3.8%

AdP operates the two main airports of France, Charles de Gaulle (CDG), and Orly in Paris. Passenger throughput at CDG amounted to 51.3 million passengers in the year under review, making it the second busiest airport in Europe after London Heathrow, narrowly exceeding traffic levels of 51.0 million passengers at Frankfurt. Aeronautical revenues account for almost half of the business revenues (46.9%), while commercial revenues consist of a wide range of activities, including real estate development, provision of business areas within terminals, and consulting on airport operations. The importance of commercial revenues for AdP is underlined by the numerous minority interests held in airports throughout the world, e.g. in Beijing and Mexico. Due to a structural failure in the roof of terminal 2E of Charles de Gaulle in March 2004, profit declined by 2.4% compared with the prior reporting period. This disguises the fact that revenues grew more strongly (+6.4%) than cost (+6%). The accident contributed to the decision to postpone plans to partially privatize CDG, though these have now been implemented (see below). The decision not to build more runways at CDG taken in 2003 still stands at present. Traffic volumes are generated mostly on routes to French destinations (including overseas territories of France) and Europe, with the latter growing mostly due to the integration of countries in East Europe into the European Union. The two regions account for 67.4% of all traffic of AdP. The next most important destinations are Africa (9.9%), North Atlantic (9.7%) and the Far East (6.2%). If there were significant substitution effects between means of other transport services (principally rail) interconnected at CDG, they are outweighed by the growth of traffic to and from other destinations, especially in the East of Europe. Staff costs account for about a third of total cost and, notable for a traditionally conflict-prone labour relationship, working days lost due to strike activity decreased by 10% compared to the prior reporting period. Investment at the airports reflects the expectation of AdP that traffic volumes will continue to grow at 3.3% annually, the intention to enhance the productivity of AdPs airports (also by renovating terminals at CDG) and the need to rebuild terminal 2Es roof completely. However, a shortfall in investment has been recognised for some time, and an IPO aimed at selling 30 -40% of the group was launched in May 2006. The issue raised 1.4 billion, and the French State holding has now reduced to 67.5%. Performance profile The ratios show a very strong taxation effect (+4.28), the strongest within the sample due to the tax environment in France. Also above average are cost and ratios, whilst profit ratios are fairly close to the samples mean. On the cost side, staff costs deviate most strongly, indicating the strong positions of trade unions in France, while revenue ratios are all above average apart from total revenue per employee (-0.28).

59

Aeroports de Paris
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,65 -0,12 -0,15 0,49 -0,54 0,51 -0,44 -0,13 -0,70 0,39 -0,62 0,10 -0,06 0,07 -0,59 0,66 1,66 1,88 0,40 1,23 1,31 1,36 1,02 -0,69 0,35 0,87 0,85 -0,31 -0,68 0,65 -0,28 1,24 1,16 0,88

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

60

Airports of Thailand
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 45,114,098 295,444 1,088,497 Change in % +24.4% +20.6% +9.2% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s BAHT 4,770,335 BAHT 13,973,928 BAHT 2,752,218 Change in % +25.3% +16.5% -79.2%

Airports of Thailand (AoT) operate the countrys five main international airports at Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Hat Yai, Phuket and Chiang Rai. Of these Bangkok is by far the most important, handling 36.4 million passengers, or 80.6% of total passengers in the year under review, which is a slight decrease compared to the year before. Financial performance in the year under review amounted to a net profit of Baht 4.77 billion on a turnover of Baht 13.97 billion. In the past, this very strong result appeared to be largely attributable to very low costs (see Table 13), rather than particularly high revenues. The main source of revenue remains aeronautical services accounting for around 62% of all operating revenues, with the main cost component being staff cost with 35% of overall costs. Bangkok generates 89% of all revenues and 84% of all costs. The increase in traffic volume and hence profitability can be accounted for with the rise of low cost carriers (21,750 flights and 2.65 million passengers), increasing tourism traffic and the recovery from the effects of SARS. All smaller airports showed a stronger relative growth than Bangkok Airport, which is reflected in a slight decrease of Bangkok share in overall traffic. Until September 2002, AoT was th e Airports Authority of Thailand (AAT), a State Enterprise under the control of the Ministry of Transport. A high degree of State control in AAT in 2001 was apparent in that over half of the Board of directors held military or police rank. Corporatisation, together with the name change, took place in September 2002 as a first step towards privatisation. An IPO triggered by the start of building a new Bangkok airport at Suvarnabhumi took place in March 2004, selling 428.6 million new shares to a broad range of mainly domestic investors. The main owner remains the Ministry of Finance with 70% of all shares. The remaining shareholders have up to 2.4% shares in the company, so the state continues to dominate the company. The completion of the new airport was supposed to be in late 2005 but at the time of preparing this publication it was expected that the first scheduled services will be operated in September 2006. Performance profile The chart for Airports of Thailand shows a number of strong variations. One group is that of asset- and capex-related ratios (Capex as a percentage of turnover, Capex per passenger, assets per employee, and total assets per employee) which are all lower than the samples average. All cost-related ratios are also below average, except for the share of labour cost in total costs (+0.49), which indicates, in comparison to the mean for the sample, cheap labour, even cheaper operational costs and an overall low cost level. On the revenue side, aeronautical revenues are more important for AoT than for the average of the sample of airports (aeronautical revenue as share of total revenue, +0.44) and aeronautical revenues account for a much higher share of total costs than the average (aeronautical revenue as a percentage of total costs +2.10). Overall, revenues are in comparison to the sampls mean lower (Total Revenue per passenger -2.10). The most significant variations from the mean are the relative importance of aeronautical revenue (+2.10) and the ratio of passengers per ATM (+2.11).

61

Airports of Thailand
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,19 0,52 0,02 -1,14 -1,02 -0,73 0,23 1,50 -1,03 -0,76 2,11 -0,60 0,04 0,25 1,00 1,69 -0,50 -1,02 -0,82 0,49 -1,25 -0,95 -1,31 -0,61 -0,39 -1,11 -0,89 -0,50 0,44 2,10 -0,19 -0,97 -1,15 -0,68 -0,31

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

62

Amsterdam Group
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 44,331,000 431,546 1,421,066 Change in % +8.1% +3.4% +8.7% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 158,257 887,369 294,120 Change in % -17.3% +16.5% -16.7%

Schiphol Group operates the airports of Schiphol, Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Lelystad. Additional activities are the diversification of activities in other regions, such as the USA (JFK airport) and Australia (Brisbane) where it holds minority shares. The ownership structure of the group remains unchanged with the state of the Netherlands (75.8%) controlling the group and the cities of Amsterdam (21.8%) and Rotterdam (2.4%) as minority share holders. Total traffic for the Group in the year under review was 44.3 million passengers, an increase of 8.1% compared to the year before, with Amsterdam accounting for almost all of the traffic. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol still ranks fourth in Europe in terms of both passenger numbers and cargo throughput, after London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle and Frankfurt and it is the second largest airport for international traffic after Heathrow within Europe. In 2004, significant events included a downward revision in the noise abatement limit values following the correction of a data mistake in the original decision, the permission to build a new terminal at Eindhoven as well as several investments into technological aspects of Schiphol operations, e.g. areawide WiFi-network or initial use of RFID (Radio Frequency Identification Device) within baggage handling. The government also announced an intention to sell a minority share in the airport at a suitable juncture, although similar announcements have been made in the past and subsequently reversed. The profitability declined overall, mainly due to a decline in unrealised capital gains and losses from 83 million to 5 million. This was partially offset by higher profitability in other business segments as the overall decline in profit was only 34 million. The composition of revenue shifted slightly towards aeronautical revenues (57% of overall returns, up from 54% in 2003) based on strong growth in cargo traffic with more connections and more fully loaded aircraft as well as stable demand on the passenger side. Additionally, airport charges rose. Commercial revenue suffered from a decline in business with international departing passengers which was not fully offset by better performances in parking and real estate activities. Schiphols punctuality deteriorated, mostly due to very poor weather conditions at the beginning of the reporting period. The group extended its overseas operations with a new strategic partnersip agreement with Aruba Airport, adding to existing operations abroad at New York JFK and Brisbane.

63

Performance profile
Amsterdam Group
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,45 -0,11 0,31 -0,09 0,35 -0,18 -0,34 0,56 0,19 -0,39 0,40 -0,29 0,27 0,01 -0,19 -0,31 -0,35 0,15 0,30 -0,74 1,35 0,78 0,76 0,62 -0,67 0,06 0,89 0,87 0,48 -0,11 0,67 0,16 0,77 0,77 0,59

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Within the chart, there are three major variations. All cost indicators are above average, indicating higher than average operating and staff costs. Secondly, aeronautical revenues developed more strongly than the samples average, resulting in the third group of deviations, stronger overall revenues. Minor deviations are the equity ratio (+0.56) and EBITDA (+0.46). These variations show that Amsterdam airport group in comparison with the sample uses relatively expensive inputs with an above-average number of staff. Despite the strong revenues, profitability remains comparable to the rest of the sample.

64

ANA
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 19,422,320 216,929 25,490 Change in % +7.4% +6.7% +2.7% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 11,773 220,525 154,394 Change in % -12.2% +12.1% +239.4%

ANA is responsible for the operation of the three principal mainland Portuguese airports at Lisbon, Porto and Faro, together with a total o f six airports in the Madeira and Azores islands. At the beginning of 1999, the public enterprise ANA EP was split into two new operations, namely a joint stock company, ANA SA, responsible for airport operations and NAV EP, responsible for air traffic control. However, there is no indication that privatisation is currently being considered. The year under review was mostly influenced by the Euro 2004 European football championship held in Portugal. Due to strongly increased traffic volumes, costly external services for security operations had to be procured to process all traffic related to this event, resulting in a financial loss of approx. 4 million as a direct result. Also, improving but still loss-making subsidiaries consumed two thirds of the parent companys profits. The expected overall economic revival for the reporting period did not occur, leaving ANA heavily relying on their aeronautical revenues (67% of overall revenue) as in previous periods. However, retail results developed strongly showing that, without the extraordinary events of 2004, profits might have looked better. The most important destination markets remain Europe and South-America, both of which achieved double digit growth rates. With respect to past profitability problems, several reorganizations occurred, amongst them the change of the pension-scheme from a guaranteed benefit to guaranteed contribution scheme. A new airport for Lisbon has been under consideration for many years, and a site at Ota, 50 kilometres to th e north of the city, was selected around 15 years ago. The government announced a timetable for construction early in 2006, with planning to start in 2007 and construction starting by the beginning of 2009, with a start of operations by 2017. The project is expected to cost 3.5 billion. The government has confirmed that it will provide up to 10% of the funding, with the remainder coming from private investors and the European Union. Performance profile The Portuguese airport operator shows several variations, all at a significant level, but none with a zvalue of more than one (hence all deviations are within range of the standard deviation) except for one value of +1.03 (staff cost as percentage of total revenue). The deviations can be grouped roughly as follows. Equity and asset ratios are below average, as well as output related ratios (e.g. passengers per employee -0.58). Profitability measures are below average (EBITDA -0.65 and net cash generation per passenger -0.97) although capital expenditure ratios were higher than the samples average (Capex as percentage of turn-over +0.88). One reason for the below average profitability indicators are the high ratios for staff costs (e.g. Staff costs as percentage of turnover +1.03) which was barely offset by low operating costs (operating costs per passenger -0.27 and total costs per passenger -0.01). The revenues are dependant on airside activities (aeronautical revenue as a percentage of total revenues +0.70, commercial revenue per passenger -0.47). This may be related to the public ownership structure of ANA . It should be noted that despite these issues of average overall cost performance, high staff costs and below average profitability, the company is profitable in absolute terms.

65

ANA
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,65 -0,97 0,24 0,88 0,63 -0,54 -0,39 -0,74 -0,28 -0,63 -0,05 -0,58 -0,77 0,08 0,03 -0,74 1,03 0,47 0,50 0,86 -0,27 0,01 -0,01 -0,05 -0,41 -0,47 -0,01 0,00 0,70 -0,25 -0,06 -0,68 -0,28 -0,22 -0,22

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

66

Athens
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 13,700,000 191,000 119,000 Change in % +11.5% +12.3% +8.4% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 47,100 329,800 28,497 Change in % +40.2% +13.4% +16.2%

The new Eleftherios Venizelos airport at Spata, serving Athens, opened for operations on 28 March 2001. The Greek government took the decision to develop a new airport for the greater Athens area in 1975, and after an extensive selection process the Spata site was decided upon in 1978. Planning and land expropriation processes then occupied the period up to 1991, when a tendering process to find a private investor on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer basis began, and a consortium headed by Hochtief was declared winner of the tender in 1993. However, the tender procedure was suspended later that year following a change of government, and negotiations with Hochtief continued on the basis that the Government was seeking a private sector partner for the project. These negotiations were completed and ratified in law in 1995, and work began in September 1996. The ownership structure is a public-private partnership of which 55% is owned by the Greek State and 45% by the Hochtief consortium. The reporting period needs to be seen in the light of the 2004 Olympic Games held in Greece which created extraordinary business and infrastructure (e.g. a metro connection) for Athens International Airport (AIA). Increased profits resulted, both from rising aeronautical as well as commercial revenues, albeit commercial grew more strongly than traffic and aeronautical revenues grew in line with traffic. Shareholders benefited from this situation with a 78.5% increase in dividend payment for the reporting period. As well as the Olympic Games, 2004 was also considered to be a year of full recovery for traffic, but not for the airports economic situation due to t he impact of the rise of low cost carriers and the increased fuel prices. The former are very resistant to Athens level of airport fees, the latter one challenges the profitability of airline business in general and therefore both willingness and ability to pay fees. The majority of traffic is international (62.8% of overall traffic), most of which is within the EU. The increase in destinations and airlines (5 out of 7 new airlines are Low Cost Carriers) coincided with an increase in the importance of non-aeronautical revenues. The long-term strategy is to continue to develop the non-aeronautical business as the main income source of the future. As a result of the one-off effects of the Olympic Games, the airport expected traffic to decrease slightly in 2005, and stated that airport charges would not be increased during the year.

67

Performance profile
Athens
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,26 2,45 -0,50 -0,93 -0,61 0,27 -0,16 -0,32 1,77 -0,32 -0,67 -0,38 2,27 0,11 -0,10 0,52 -1,01 -0,26 -0,36 -0,61 0,41 0,48 0,89 0,16 -0,15 1,20 1,57 0,95 0,36 0,45 0,45 0,38 1,59 0,90 0,39

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

The international airport of Athens was subject to several extraordinary influences in the period under review that originated from the effects of the Olympic Games in Athens. Primarily, all revenue and profitability ratios are above average, especially aeronautical revenue per passenger (+1.57) and total revenue per passenger (+1.59). Within these, aeronautical revenues are more important than commercial (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue -0.15, aeronautical revenue as percentage of total revenue +0.36) but also commercial revenues compared with the sample were stronger (commercial revenue per passenger +1.20). Overall, revenues are stronger than the average and aeronautical revenues are the most important element of this. . Despite lower staff costs (e.g. staff costs per 1,000 ATUs -0.36) overall cost ratios are above average as operating costs were above average (total costs per 1,000 ATUs +0.48 and operating cost per passenger +0.41). Another factor increasing the profitability of the airport is that it is relatively new and therefore needs little infrastructure enhancement (Capex per passenger -0.61). For the reasons given above, the ratios indicating profitability are all well above average, e.g. net cash generation per passenger +2.45 or operating profit per passenger +2.27.

68

Atlanta
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 83,188,586 964,858 862,230 Change in % +5.6% +5.8% +7.5% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s US$ 211,688 US$ 487,448 US$ 362,704 Change in % -1.5% +1.2% - 10.6%

Atlanta Airport, renamed in honour of two mayors of the city of Atlanta to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport in October 2003, remains the biggest airport for passengers worldwide. With a share of 92% domestic traffic, it strongly relies on the American market and its function as a major hub for Delta Airlines. The airport layout consists of a main terminal building with adjacent surface access infrastructure for road and rapid transit systems, plus a total of five remote concourses/satellites connected by an underground transit system. There are five runways of which the fifth is expected to be operating by the summer of 2006. This is part of a $5.4 billion 10 year development plan to 2010 for investment in airport infrastructure. These extensive investments are intended to enable the airport to handle an expected traffic volume of 121 million passengers in 2015, representing around 40% overall growth from current levels. Atlanta remains a highly profitable airport with an operating margin of 43.4% of revenues . This should be viewed in the context of the airports predominantly domestic traffic and its relatively small number of airlines. Additionally, the airlines operate domestic terminals themselves which reduces the cost base for the airport. Discussions on the possible privatisation of the airport, and other large US airports, have been resisted by the main US airlines, which insist that airport profits must be re-invested in the airport where they are generated. No change to this situation seemed likely at the time this review was written. Performance profile The airport is almost completely operated through contracted work of various kinds, and most of the passenger terminals are operated by the airlines. It is therefore to be expected that the z-values of Atlanta will show strong variations from the mean. There are two groups of variations that can be identified. Firstly, revenue ratios (total revenue per 1,000 ATU -1.10) are below average but the amount of traffic offsets this and creates an average profit result (operating profit per passenger -0.08). Secondly, all cost ratios are skewed to the left, e.g. total cost per passengers -1.53. The strong deviations in the upper part of the graph result from the sheer size of the airport. Overall, these results should be used cautiously as Atlanta is a special case, both in terms of its dimensions and in the way it is organized.

69

Atlanta
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
2.20 -0.21 -0.51 1.11 -0.30 -0.27 2.22 -1.37 2.69 -0.17 2.56 -0.08 0.21 -0.16 2.39 -0.97 -1.27 -1.21 1.30 -1.56 -1.24 -1.53 -0.95 -0.22 -1.25 -1.20 -0.96 -0.25 -0.74 0.43 -1.39 -1.10 -0.84

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

70

Auckland
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 11,256,077 158,452 229,348 Change in % +8.3% +2.4% +5.9% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s NZ $ 105,641 NZ$ 282,581 NZ$ 28,497 Change in % +12.0% +7.6% +16.2%

Auckland is New Zealands principal airport and remains highly profitable with its net result breaking the 100 million NZ$ for the first time ever. It is a privatised airport with public authorities holding minor shares (around 22%) and over 50,000 different shareholders. Non-aeronautical revenue is important (54.1%), and 30% of total revenues originated from retail activities, although average retail expenditure per passenger declined. The majority of passenger traffic is international (57.2%) but accounts only for a quarter of the ATMs indicating a low average passenger number on domestic flights. Additionally, international traffic grew more strongly (+5.2%) than domestic (+3.9%). The cargo business did not develop significantly. The airport expects to handle 30 million passengers by 2050 and this is reflected in the plan to build a second runway, for which building operations are expected to start in 2007, with operations with two runways in 2010. Extensive investment in international facilities includes the creation of an A380 compatible section of the international terminal. Recently occurring bottlenecks which have occurred recently in peak times are being tackled by additional capacity for passport control. A rehabilitation programme of the existing runway was expected to be completed by the end of 2005. Price regulation is not in force at present, but consultations on aeronautical charges started in August 2004 and are due to be completed in September 2007, with an initial view being presented in the middle of 2006. Performance profile Auckland is one of the most profitable airports in the sample, which shows amongst others in the values for EBITDA (+2.04) and operating profit per passengers (+1.81). The cost base of the airport is very low, as shown by all of the cost measures. Commercial revenue is more important for Aucklands overall revenues than for the average of the sample (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue +0.74), but aeronautical revenue accounts for a bigger share of total costs than the average (aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total cost +2.64). Despite slightly lower revenue ratios, e.g. total revenue per passenger -0.35, the strong cost situation compared with the rest of the sample creates the strong profitability ratios.

71

Auckland
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
2.04 0.33 0.09 0.41 0.20 0.15 -0.49 -0.26 -0.33 0.74 -0.69 0.52 1.81 0.66 2.07 2.27 -1.21 -1.05 -1.05 -0.03 -1.13 -0.97 -1.11 -0.78 0.74 0.12 -0.39 -0.44 -0.31 2.64 -0.43 0.52 -0.35 -0.44 -0.46

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

72

BAA, London Heathrow and London Gatwick


BAA Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Heathrow Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Gatwick Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail Number 141,728,100 1,219,703 1,809,137 Number 67,654,600 469,560 1,323,530 Number 32.007.200 245,104 216,151 Change in % +6.3% +3.5% +6.7% Change in % +5.3% +1.9% +7.8% Change in % +6.5% +4.6% -3.3% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 546,000 2,115,000 1,429,000 Value in 000s 200,900 1,109,000 1,133,000 Value in 000s -14,700 349,600 131,000 Change in % +44.4% +7.4% +12.9% Change in % -2.7% +9.4% +2.9% Change in % prior profit 59,300 +7.4% + 7.3%

BAA operates a total of seven UK airports, including the three principal London airports at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted and it is involved to varying degrees in the operation of eleven airports in Australia, the US, Italy and until 2004 in Oman. In the year under review traffic at Stansted continued to grow very rapidly, reflecting the continued expansion of the low cost carriers based there, although this growth slowed significantly in 2005/06. Growth at the larger airports of London-Gatwick (LGW) and London-Heathrow (LHR) was much slower, reflecting capacity constraints at both. In 2003, the UK government invited BAA to bring forward proposals for the construction of a new runway at Stansted. At the time it was hoped that this could be opened by 2011/12, but already the earliest opening date appears to be 2015/16. The continued congestion in the London area led to several developments. 93.8% of all capital expenditure of BAA is for the regulated London airports of which LHR alone accounts for over 80%. New infrastructure includes the new Terminal 5 (completed 60%, on budget, ahead of schedule) at LHR and the planned renovation of several terminals. With the new terminal LHR is expected to have additional capacity of 30 million passengers per year by 2012 and due to other investment to be one of the first airports operating the new Airbus A380 when it is introduced. By 2012, LHR is scheduled to be an airport with a completely changed infrastructure and likely to remain the worlds busiest international airport. Early in 2006, BAA announced proposals for another new terminal at LHR, replacing the existing Terminal 2 and the adjacent Queens Building. It indicated that this would match T5 in terms of scale. LGW remains the busiest single-runway airport in the world and is a major hub for both the low cost carrier easyJet and for British Airways. It is expected that the capacity limit of 41 million passengers and 280,000 aircraft movements will be met by 2015. A longstanding legal agreement precludes work on a second runway until 2019 at the earliest. The strong growth in Group profit originates from strong growth in general and from extraordinary profits of 111 million arising from the disposal of investment properties. International activities did not increase in the period under review. The other activities of BAA, e.g. with other national or international airports, are profitable but remain comparably small compared to the operations at the London airports of LHR, LGW and Stansted. The future prospects of BAA depend on the general development of traffic and the ability to diversify business both horizontally and vertically, as even with further expansions on the London airports, their capacity is inevitably limited at some point of time, even with the current capacity enhancements. During the first half of 2006, the most significant event in the airport industry was a battle to acquire BAA, which began with a hostile bid by the Spanish construction and airports group Ferrovial. At the
73

time of finalising this publication the bid had been accepted by BAA, and completion of the deal process was expected by September 2006. Performance profile The graph shows no major deviations apart from a weaker than average net generation of cash per passenger (-1.64), high capex ratios (+1.51 and +2.07) and a strong operating profit per passenger (+1.11). Also strongly shifted to the right is commercial revenue per passenger (+1.01). The capex ratios are related to the extensive work being undertaken at Heathrow (Terminal 5) and Gatwick which account for the majority of the Groups overall capital expenditure. Also, much of the cashflow of BAA is used for capital investment, negatively affecting the net cash generated. The significant aspect of the deviations is that they are almost all to the right, indicating higher values than the average of the sample both for revenues and for costs. Overall cost per ATM deviates by +0.37 but total revenue per ATM (+0.65) deviates rath er more. The strongest variation in cost relates from staff (staff costs per 1,000 ATUs +1.01). This demonstrates that a big company can operate profitably with raised levels of cost whilst undertaking large investments, as long as revenue levels are also raised.

74

BAA Group
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,04 -1,64 0,17 1,51 2,07 -0,36 -0,20 0,56 0,35 -0,66 0,86 -0,55 1,11 0,11 0,74 0,47 0,37 0,69 1,01 0,54 0,19 0,34 0,14 0,37 0,69 1,01 0,21 0,40 -0,49 -0,15 0,40 -0,37 0,52 0,69 0,65

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Gatwicks profile shows a general alignment to the right. Profitability measures are at or close to average levels, with the exception of operating profit per passenger (+0.61) which is above average. The equity ratio also deviates significantly (+0.82). An indication for the pressure on runway capacity at Gatwick is the value of passengers per ATM (+1.35). Cost ratios are all aligned to the right, staff cost ratios more so than operating cost ratios. Aeronautical revenues are at average levels, with the exception of aeronautical revenue as percentage of total revenue (-1.29). This reflects commercial revenue ratios which perform strongly (commercial revenue per passenger +1.47) and account for the variations of total revenue ratios (e.g. total revenue per 1,000 ATUs +0.75). In summary, the deviations of the cost and revenue ratios seem to offset each other, creating average profitability ratios.

75

London Gatwick
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,32 -0,10 -0,02 -0,05 0,24 -0,39 -0,37 0,82 0,00 -0,62 1,35 -0,47 0,61 0,13 0,09 0,13 0,22 0,49 0,91 0,10 0,50 0,55 0,25 0,65 1,37 1,47 -0,21 0,10 -1,29 -0,85 0,25 -0,27 0,44 0,75 0,82

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Heathrows profile shows a stronger general deviation to the right with one major exception (net cash generation per passenger -2.81) which is caused by the ongoing extensive investments at Terminal 5. High capex ratios confirm this. The current capacity constraints are highlighted by the very high ratio of passengers per ATM compared to the sample (+2.16). Cost and revenue indicators are aligned to the right, but revenue ratios more so than cost ratios. Within the revenues, commercial revenues are more important for Heathrow than for the sample average (commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue +1.37). Total revenue ratios show much stronger return ratios than the average. This is also reflected in a high variation for the operating profit ratio. Overall, the profile shows a very busy airport with a higher than average cost structure, a significantly high revenue structure and extensive investment in progress, affecting capex ratios and cash flow ratios.

76

London Heathrow
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over -2,81 Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,36 0,04 2,16

0,26 -0,46 -0,33 2,02 -0,61 1,82 -0,43 2,28 0,22 0,98 0,58 -0,36 0,56 1,10 -0,20 1,00 1,17 0,77 1,33 0,75 2,14 0,72 1,09 -0,86 -0,30 1,22 0,21 1,49 1,88 1,96

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

77

Beijing
Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 34,883,190 307,778 668,690 Change in % +43.2% +29.2% +1.0% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s RMB 749,354 RMB 3,133,630 RMB 520,802 Change in % +87.3% +38.2% +9.7%

The airport of Beijing is operated through the Beijing Capital International Airport Company Limited, which was partially privatised through an IPO in 2000 of a minimum of one third of all shares. The revenues from the IPO were used to finance capacity extensions. Originally built in 1958 and located about 25 km north-east of Beijing, the airport has evolved significantly into a major airport in China. Terminal expansions were carried out in the 1980s and from 1995 to 1999. A new expansion plan to an expected capacity of 60 million passengers p.a., 500,000 aircraft movements and 1.8 million tonnes of cargo over three years was approved in 2004. This is both to prepare for the needs of expected growth in demand and the impact of the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. The operations of the company include virtually all parts of the airport, including retail, ground handling, restaurants, car parking and in-flight catering. Despite the challenges the global aviation market faced in 2004, Beijing airport more than recovered from the effects of the SARS crisis with a record level of passenger traffic in the period under review. Its revenues increased by 38.2% while costs grew considerably more slowly at +25.8%. This is both due to the strong development in traffic and the reconstruction of debt from long-term to short-term liabilities. The repayment of the companys entire long-term debt during the year under review allowed for a decline of finance costs of 63.7%. The composition of the traffic evolves towards the use of increasingly large aircraft. For destinations, Beijing is mostly connected to other Asian international airports and operates more than three quarters of its traffic nationally. Two airlines account for more than half of all traffic (Air China and China Southern Airlines). Capacity constraints were partially relieved by the reopening of a terminal in 2004, but to cater for the continued growth the planned expansion to a capacity of 60 million passengers per year is necessary. Future growth is expected to be strong, generated by the Olympic Games in 2008 and the continuing rapid growth in the Chinese economy, creating demand for both more business and leisure travel. Performance profile Most of the variations are at a significant level, with most of them skewed to the left. The only significant deviations into positive z -values are equity ratio (+1.13), passengers per ATM (+0.80), aeronautical revenues as percentage of total revenues (+2.08) and aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total cost (+0.87). Average or close to average results are achieved for profitability ratios (EBITDA -0.15, return on shareholders fund 0.05, operating profit -0.16 and return on capital employed +0.08). Total cost ratios are lower than the average with all cost categories contributing to this situation. Revenue indicators show a strong dependency on aeronautical revenues (aeronautical revenues as percentage of total revenues +2.08) compared to the rest of the sample, while total revenue ratios are below the samples average value (e.g. total revenue per employee -1.13). It should be remembered that these ratios merely indicate that the ratios differ from those of the average of the sample. The airport itself operates profitably but within the comparison of standardized data it is shown that it operates less profitably than the other airports. For the future, impacts from the upcoming Olympic games at Beijing can be expected as well as from very strong traffic growth in the region.

78

Beijing
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,15 0,00 0,02 -0,48 -0,74 -0,82 -0,35 1,13 -1,11 -0,96 0,80 -0,88 -0,85 0,05 0,08 -0,16 -0,65 -1,07 -0,95 -0,99 -0,70 -0,68 -0,95 -0,47 -1,40 -1,42 -0,61 -0,36 2,08 0,87 -0,21 -1,13 -1,15 -0,80 -0,54

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

79

Berlin Airports Group


Number Passengers ATMs Cargo+Mail 14,871,700 222,926 48,932 Change in % +11.8 +3.8% -4.9% Profit Total Revenue CAPEX Value in 000s 13,590 183,231 89,434 Change in % Loss in previous year +2.7% +12.6%

Berlin Brandenburg Flughafen Holding GmbH (BBF) runs three airports, at Tegel, Tempelhof and Schnefeld. Tegel remains the most important airport, accounting for three quarters of overall traffic including direct flights to the US. Schnefeld doubled its traffic in the year under review from 1.7 million passengers to 3.4 million, mostly due to a boom in low-cost-carrier traffic. Tempelhof continues to operate at a loss and lost traffic compared to the previous year. The three airports differ significantly as Tegel operates close to its capacity limit, while the two other airports have extensive spare capacity and incur operating losses. The strong growth in traffic (+11.8%) did not translate into either a strong growth in aeronautical (+4.1%) or non-aeronautical revenues. This is closely related to the strong growth in low-cost-carrier traffic which now accounts for about a quarter of overall revenue. The most important development is the Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI) project, a planned new airport with capacity for 35 million passengers per year (initially 20 million) at the Schnefeld site. As soon as BBI is operating, the closure of the loss-producing Tempelhof airport will take place. Recent attempts to close Tempelhof were shelved in the face of protests from airlines currently based there, but as noted above there are no signs that its financial results will improve. In March 2006, a court ruled in favour of allowing the building of BBI. This was the highest court for this matter, so no further legal conflicts over the question of BBI being built are expected. However, the terms of the ruling stated that there should be no flights between midnight and 05.00h and increased the levels of compensation payable to neighbouring communities, as well as stipulating more noise protection measurement. Despite the operating profit for the period in review, the general problem of three airports operating at their combined overall traffic volume remains unsolved. Until BBI is operating, the structure of the airports will remain defined by the historical background of a divided city. Future prospects mostly relate to th e impact of growth in low-cost carrier-traffic. Schnefeld is expected to handle 4.5 million passengers within the next few years compared to a current level of 3.4 million, and the new BBI airport which will allow for a new strategic approach. Performance profile The Berlin airport group differs from other operators because of the special history of its location as former capital of the GDR and the new capital of the unified Germany. One of the three airports it operates generates the profits to subsidize the other two airports. Additionally, the ongoing planning to build a new airport to replace the existing airports challenges the Groups profitability. All profitability measures are significantly below average, with return on shareholders` funds at a value of -4.87. Some cost ratios deviate strongly (staff cost as percentage of turn-over +2.21) but total cost ratios are closer to average. The same pattern applies to revenue ratios but with a generally stronger deviation to the left. Overall, the ratios show that the Berlin airport group operated unprofitably in the period under review as its cost structure is above average, and its revenue structure below average, within the sample.

80

Berlin Group
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-2,89 -1,39 -0,54 0,30 0,22 -0,65 0,29 -1,22 -0,33 -0,71 -0,84 -0,73 -2,48

Performance Indicator

-2,39 -2,59 2,21 1,39 0,96 0,48 0,88 0,32 0,77 0,02 -0,30 -0,35 0,08 -0,16 0,71 -0,98 -0,27 -0,83 -0,19 -0,38 -0,44

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

81

Birmingham
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 8,820,000 108,000 10,538 Change in % -4.4% -7.6% -12.4% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s 18,764 110,195 22,369 Change in % -5.7% +0.6% + 73.7%

After strong growth in the period before this review, traffic volumes and profit declined due to the loss of several airlines which relocated their services elsewhere following disputes over the level of aeronautical charges. The decline in aeronautical revenue was partially offset by an increase in commercial revenues. With overall costs increasing, profit declined overall. Birmingham is a privatised airport with several major shareholders. Despite its decreased profitability, dividends were paid at the same level as in the previous year. Operational reorganisations during the year under review included the outsourcing of cleaning services and a reorganization of administrative functions. Since 2003 the airport has been connected to the adjacent rail and bus interchange by a people mover system which replaced a pioneering but disused Maglev system. In addition, the road network to and from the airport has been improved. Despite the challenges of the period under review, the airport continues to assume that traffic will grow substantially, aiming to double todays traffic by 2015, with a further doubling to 33 million passengers by 2030. The potential need for a new runway by 2015 remains under consideration with a planning application likely in the medium term given existing levels of congestion at peak times. Perform ance profile Birmingham is an airport with few significant variations from the mean of the sample. The overall cost situation is a little above average, driven by above average staff cost ratios. Revenues deviate to a similar extent from their average of the sample, so that overall both revenue and cost ratios are shifted to the right. Output-related ratios such as ATMs per employee and capital expenditure ratios are skewed to the left.

82

Birmingham
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,18 0,55 0,19 -0,56 -0,29 -0,55 -0,15 0,31 -0,16 -0,65 -0,32 -0,63 0,72 0,17 0,36 0,11 0,45 0,85 0,75 0,53 0,33 0,25 0,39 0,07 0,13 0,64 0,69 0,47 0,38 0,12 0,22 -0,47 0,60 0,37 0,13

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

83

Brisbane
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 15,884,687 159,932 82,769 Change in % +11.0% +10.5% +14.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s A$27,944 A$ 228,925 A$ 59,000 Change in % Loss in previous year +18.6% +78.8%

Brisbane is Australias third largest and fastest growing airport. By 2023, traffic is expected to triple to 36 million passengers, and it aspires to grow to a level at which its traffic would exceed that at Sydney. The airport was one of those privatised as part of the first tranche of operating lease sales in Australia, and the period under review is its seventh year of private sector operation. It is operated by Brisbane Airport Corporation Ltd (BAC), an 80% Australian owned, non-listed company. It has four principle shareholders (Port of Brisbane, National Asset Management Limited, Schiphol Australia Pty Ltd and Commonwealth Custodial Services Ltd), of which the Port of Brisbane Corporation, a wholly owned State enterprise, is the largest with 37.9% of the shares. Schiphol Australia, a subsidiary of Schiphol Airport Amsterdam, holds 15.8% and the airports CEO is a Schiphol nominee, having previously been a senior manager with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. The airports results continue to be overshadowed by interest costs associated with the purchase of the operating lease with around 65% of EBIT consumed by interest payments. The airport benefits from its location on a 2,700 hectare site, and it is pursuing a strategy of attracting aviation-related businesses to relocate north to its 202-hectare Aerotech Park . The development of this area is pushed by a development program worth A$ 1.5 billion which is to be spent on airport infrastructure. This infrastructure is needed to accommodate new large aircraft, particularly the Airbus A380, a new runway (expected to be needed and operating by 2012) next to other infrastructure enhancements needed for an expected traffic volume of 36 million passengers. Performance profile Brisbane has a number of significant variations from average values. Most notable is that all the cost indicators are skewed to the left, most notably staff cost as percentage of turn-over (-1.39). Revenue indicators are also skewed to the left apart from total revenue per employee (+1.64). Compared to the sample, Brisbane relies more on commercial than on aeronautical revenues. All very big variations (bigger than 2), are associated with the traditionally low staff count at Australian airports (Assets/ATUs/passengers/total revenue per employee). Despite the cost advantages, operating profit per passenger is very close to the samples average (+0.06). This is due more to its competitive cost structure than to its income strength.

84

Brisbane
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,57 0,34 -1,34 -0,30 -0,60 2,54 -0,27 -0,62 0,08 2,86 0,28

Performance Indicator

0,06 -0,49 -0,35 1,29 -1,39 -1,30 -1,23 -1,26 -1,08 -0,89 -1,14 -0,67 0,87 -0,54 -1,08 -0,82 -1,23 0,03 -0,61 1,64 -0,99 -0,73 -0,54

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

85

Calgary
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 9,172,847 218,347 124,000 Change in % +7.0% +0.2% +8.0% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s C$ 19,889 C$ 139,300 C$ 78,606 Change in % +293.8% +12.1% - 15.8%

Calgary is Canadas fourth largest airport after Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal. overtook Calgary in 2003. Traffic is dominated by domestic flights.

Montreal only

Calgary is operated by the Calgary Airport Authority, a non-government public corporation created in 1992 to oversee the operation and expansion of the airport on a not-for-profit basis. It is leased from Transport Canada, the national transport administration. Profits and revenues grew in the year under review because of a modest increase in lease fees and interest charges and a decline in depreciation while revenues grew significantly, especially aeronautical revenues which account for almost 70% of all revenues of the airport. As with the other Canadian airports, the lease payment to the Canadian state is a significant burden to the airport. From 2006 on, lease payments will be well in excess of C$50 million per year, twice as high as in the year under review. Without a significant increase in revenues, the airport is likely to run at a loss. A review of the lease fees is in progress, but no conclusion had been made at the time of this review. In the year under review lease payments accounted for around a third of overall revenue. The capacity of Calgary airport is being continuously enhanced, with the long-term target for capacity of 35 million passengers p.a. Most important is the new parallel runway that will require a redesign of the road network adjacent to the airport. For the period between 2002 and 2006, an overall volume of C$400 million is being invested in airport facilities. Like Brisbane, the airport benefits from being located on a very large site, giving considerable scope for commercial property development. Performance profile The profile for Calgary shows variations for the cost structure (staff cost as a percentage of turnover 1.37, staff cost per passenger -1.26, staff costs per 1,000 ATUs -1.23 and staff cost as percentage of total cost -1.96) that indicate below average staff costs compared to the sample. This is also reflected in strong variations for ratios based on head count (ATU per employee +1.82, passengers per employee +1.36, total revenue per employee +0.77). Overall costs are also below average (total cost per 1,000 ATUs -0.67, total cost per passenger -0.66 and total cost per ATM -0.60). The revenues in turn are dominated by airside revenues (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue 1.13, aeronautical revenues as percentage of total revenues +1.64). However, the variation of total revenue ratios (e.g. total revenue per passenger -0.80) to the left offsets these cost advantages and leads to average profit ratios compared with the sample (EBITDA rate -0.01). The background to this is the generally below average labour costs in airports from North America and Australia/New Zealand, and the legal environment of the Canadian airports which are obliged to make long-term lease payments to the government. The lease fees represent an extra cost compared to those incurred by other airports in the sample which offset the labour cost advantages : the variation for operating costs per passenger is only -0.18.

86

Calgary
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,01 -0,51 -0,09 0,71 0,06 0,34 -0,25 -0,27 -0,65 1,82 -0,81 1,36 -0,59 0,07 -0,32 -0,13 -1,37 -1,26 -1,23 -1,96 -0,18 -0,67 -0,66 -0,60 -1,13 -1,16 -0,29 -0,40 1,64 0,65 -0,42 0,77 -0,80 -0,78 -0,68

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

87

Chicago OHare
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 75,534,692 992,427 1,689,304 Change in % +8.7% +6.9% +5.5% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s US$ -12,922 US$ 442,569 US$ 246,074 Change in % +23.6% - 8.2% +21.5%

Chicago OHare remains the worlds second largest airport and managed to reduce its operating loss despite declining total revenues. Aeronautical revenues, including passenger facility charge fees, account for 63% of revenues . Chicago Midway airport is operated through the same organization but not subject to this review. Midway operates mostly low cost carrier South West and focuses on pointto-point connections. OHare grew more strongly than Midway and by US standards has a significant level of international traffic, accounting for 14.4% of total passengers. Delays, which average 20 minutes, are an issue and are being tackled with various infrastructure measures including the construction of a new runway, the reconfiguration of the existing runway system, the lengthening of two existing runways and the building of a new terminal, with a total project value of US$6.6 billion. As with a number of US airports, profitability is not a primary objective of the management at OHare. However, if the PFC was taken into account as operational revenue, there would be a substantial profit. International traffic increased its importance for the airport in the year under review and cargo traffic keeps growing strongly. The substantial infrastructure investments referred to above are intended to prepare for further substantial traffic growth until 2030. Performance profile The profile for Chicago shows major variations below the average (27 out of 35 indicators). The biggest variation is that of aeronautical revenue as a percentage of total revenue (+1.52). This reflects the residual cost system under which OHare operates, which dictates that aeronautical revenues should do no more than make up the difference between commercial revenue and total operating cost, with the airport overall not aiming to generate profits. The analysis demonstrates that, without a direct incentive to maximise overall revenues including commercial revenues, the result is that aeronautical revenues account for a disproportionately high percentage of total revenues, while being below average in relation to the output measures: the other aeronautical revenue ratios are skewed to the left. As a result, total revenue ratios are also significantly below average, as are cost ratios. The ratios show that both labour and operating costs are well below the average. Although the ratio of staff costs to the sum of operating and staff cost is above the average, this is due to the extent to which operating costs are removed from the system by virtue of the operation of most of the terminals by the airlines: staff productivity measures are above average. The overall result is that the profitability ratios are skewed to the left, with the strongest variation for these ratios being operating profit per passenger at -1.23. Asset and capex-ratios vary only slightly around the mean. In sum, the profile shows an airport with competitive costs, but which does not generate the same amount of revenues from the inputs as the sample average due to the regulatory environment in which it operates.

88

Chicago
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1.29 -1.06 -0.84 -0.61 -0.39 -1.23 -0.43 -0.95 -0.85 0.46 -0.80 -0.80 0.29 -0.98 -0.83 -0.96 -0.68 -1.18 -1.42 -0.86 -0.74 1.52 0.08 -0.91 -0.40 0.72 -0.51 0.57 -0.49 0.13 0.37 -0.47 -0.37 -0.51 0.32

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

89

Copenhagen
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 19,000,000 272,518 335,649 Change in % +7.5% +5.2% 0.0% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s DKK 592,800 DKK 2,485,300 DKK 450,000 Change in % +37.2% +12.3% +213.3%

Copenhagen (CPH) is SAS's principal airport and thus one of the hubs of the Star Alliance. In addition, the airport is the North European hub for the airfreight company DHL and is therefore known as the cargo hub for the Baltic S ea and Scandinavia. The airport is owned and operated by Kbenhavns Lufthaven A/S, a company listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, with 66% of shares in free float, 11.3% held by Macquarie Airports and 22.7% by the Kingdom of Denmark. Traffic volumes at Copenhagen airport are at an all-time high and continue the history of an airport with above-average growth. The increase in traffic is the result of an increased catchment area following the construction of the resund Bridge connecting Sjaeland and Sweden, and a recovery from the negative impacts of the SARS crisis and the Iraq war. There was an increase in locally departing passengers and a decrease in transfer passengers within the strong overall traffic growth. A further driver of traffic is the continued growth of low cost carrier traffic, which now accounts for 9.4% of overall traffic volume. Despite its important role as a cargo hub, the cargo throughput remained virtually unchanged. Revenues are split fairly evenly between aeronautical and commercial sources. The increase in revenues originates mostly from the increase in traffic coupled with aeronautical charges which were allowed to rise by 2.75% under the terms of a voluntary agreement with airline users. On the commercial side there is an important contribution from the running of an airport hotel at Copenhagen, while airport operations in other countries are also important. During the year under review the airport was active in China, Spain, the UK and Mexico. While it increased its share in the Mexican organisation ASUR from 6.4% to 8.0%, it disposed of a 36.7% interest in a commercial operation at a Norwegian military airfield due to difficulties in agreeing the terms for commercial operations with the Norwegian government. A bid for Brussels airport when this was privatised was not successful. The significantly increased capital expenditure was needed to finance various projects to extend the operational efficiency of CPH and reflects the relatively low level in the previous year. For the future, the airport expects continued traffic growth, but at a slower rate, in both its domestic and international markets. Performance profile Copenhagen shows a profile with three groups of variations. First, with Copenhagen not being challenged by capacity constraints, there is no need for extensive investment which translates into equity-, asset- and capex-ratios being skewed to the left. Second, the strongest deviation in the profile is for staff costs as a percentage of operating and staff costs with a value of +2.15. Costs vary strongly above average for the other staff cost ratios and below average for operating costs, resulting in total cost ratios slightly below the average for the sample. Aeronautical revenue ratios are close to the average but remain more important for Copenhagen airport than commercial revenues (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue -0.90). Total revenue ratios deviate both above and below the average, but not significantly. The cost advantages from the operating cost ratios help to explain the above average profit ratios, such as EBITDA rate +0.84, net cash generation per passenger +1.06 and operating profit per passenger +1.38. In sum, the profile shows an airport with a slightly below average cost structure despite relative disadvantages in labour cost ratios, overall average revenue ratios and strongly positive profit ratios.

90

Copenhagen
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,84 1,06 0,00 -0,60 -0,38 -0,60 -0,49 -0,03 -0,42 -0,60 -0,73 -0,62 1,38 0,55 0,87 0,74 0,59 0,84 0,56 2,15 -0,88 -0,21 -0,05 -0,30 -0,90 -0,33 0,40 0,10 0,05 0,44 -0,10 -0,52 0,45 0,09 -0,14

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

91

Dallas Fort Worth


Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 59,095,000 733,000 832,000 Change in % +0.9% -8.9% +4% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s USD 666,604 USD 388,955 USD 450,665 Change in % +11.1% +22.9% -29.6%

The airport of Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) was built in 1968 as a joint venture of the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, both in Texas. It is a not-for-profit-organisation that is intended to provide an essential tool for the economic development of the region. From DFW, about 95% of the US population can be reached within 4 hours. The airport is a strong intermodal hub between air, road and rail. The main operator, especially after the major decline of Delta Airlines, is American Airlines which accounts for 81.3% of all passengers. Regionally, the only real competition from other airports comes from Love Field, Texas, where South West Airlines operates. For the period under review, three aspects are important. First and most important, DFW mostly has traditional carriers which experienced continued economic challenges both through strong competition from low cost carriers and from increasing costs in a market with declining yields. As a consequence of this continuing situation, two of the five major carriers at DFW w ere under bankruptcy protection in the review period. Additionally, the previously second most important customer, Delta Airlines, almost completely stopped operations from DFW with only 18 daily flights compared with 254 previously, operating from 4 instead of 28 gates previously and generating 6.2% instead of 16% of total passenger traffic previously. The adverse effects of this were only offset by underlying growth in domestic traffic and by American Airlines taking over most of the former Delta Airlines facilities. Also, 2005 was the completion year for an extensive investment program worth a total of USD 2.73 billion for a new terminal, a hotel, and additional parking facilities . The financing is set up through market-interest based bonds, which are to be paid off by future passenger facility charges. Grants are given to the airport but not in significant amounts and mostly dedicated to security aspects. The cost increases experienced were mostly caused by increases in write-offs and finance costs. The increased finance costs and amortization/depreciation are challenging the profitability of the airport but are more than equalized by increased revenues. Additional competitive pressure may result from further changes to the Wright Amendment which limits the use of the South West Airlines-dominated airfield in Love Field, Texas. Although surveys differ in their opinion, a repeal of the amendment allowing for unconstrained use of Love Field is expected to result in US$ 83 to US$ 137 million of lost revenue for DFW, depending on the extent to which Love Field is allowed to develop.

92

Performance profile
Dallas Fort Worth
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,64 -0,77 -0,51 1,73 0,27 0,51 0,07 -0,53 0,21 0,55 -0,36 0,47 -0,63 0,07 -0,72 0,22 0,01 -0,80 -0,79 0,74 -1,14 -0,83 -0,99 -0,67 -1,02 -1,28 -0,89 -0,74 0,21 0,10 -0,60 -0,26 -1,10 -0,90 -0,72

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

The Dallas-Fort Worth profile shows variations mainly to the left. Profitability-, asset- and equity ratios deviate to the left and right with values of up to -0.77 (net cash generation per passenger) to the left and +0.55 (ATUs per employee). The strongest variation overall is +1.73 for capex as a percentage of turnover. However capex per passenger is close to the average of the sample, reflecting the very high level of passenger throughput. The cost ratios all deviate to the left, e.g. operating cost per passenger -1.14 or total cost per 1,000 ATUs -0.83. While the cost ratios are below average, the revenue ratios are as well (e.g. commercial revenue per passenger -1.28, aeronautical revenue per 1,000 ATUs -0.74, total revenue per ATM 0.72). The variations point to an airport with a competitive cost structure but also with below average revenues and mixed profitability ratios. This situation is driven by the same regulatory system as applies at Chicago OHare.

93

Finnish Airports Group


PAX ATM Cargo+Mail Number 14,618,690 260,628 131,404 Change in % +39.3% +45.2% +7.6% Value in 000s Profit Total Rev. CAPEX 15,027 233,847 48,234 Change in % -9.3% +6.8% +12.0%

Helsinki airport and 24 other airports are operated by the Finnish Civil Aviation Administration. The Administration produces an overall Annual Report which does not show separate financial results for Helsinki or any of the other airports. Traffic at the latter is almost entirely domestic, travelling to and from Helsinki. The only additional international connections are those of low cost carriers operating point to point connections from Europe. As such the airport system is regarded as a single entity. Profit declined in the year under review despite the increase in revenues due to a stronger increase in costs, albeit not by as much as expected. The increase in revenue resulted from an increase in traffic outweighing declining air fares. Most of the overall traffic (73.2%) is operated through Helsinki airport. Domestic traffic remains comparably weak at 90% of the level achieved in 2000, while strong growth in international traffic (+14%) moved traffic development back to a long-term growth trend of 4% p.a. The Finnish airports are regarded by the authorities more as a tool for economic development than a profit-orientated enterprise, which is why small local airports are cross-subsidized. For the year under review, these airports collectively lost 5 million. For 2006, an administrative review was planned, which was carried out by the time this review was written but which so far seems to be more of a renaming than a redistribution of tasks. The changes in traffic volume have created the need to expand the central airport at Helsinki from a capacity of 12 million to a capacity of 16 million passengers as efficiency reserves are deemed to be exhausted. A financial goal of a profit of 19 million was set for the financial year 2005. Performance profile The Finnish airport group profile shows only one significant variation, which is the liquidity ratio of +6.121 resulting from unusually high amounts of current assets held by the organization. None of the other variations exceed a value of 1. Profitability, asset and equity ratios are close to the average but show a slight deviation to the left. All cost ratios are skewed to the right, where staff cost ratios deviate more strongly than the operating cost ratios. The variations of the partial cost indicators are stronger than those of the total cost ratios. Revenue ratios deviate both to left and right, indicating close to average overall revenues (total revenue per passenger +0.43 and total revenue per employee -0.68). The profitability measures show below average performance with an EBITDA of -0.92. Overall, the social and economic development focus of the organisation is reflected in the ratios.

94

Finnish Airports Group


EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,92 0,15 -0,51 -0,58 -0,35 -0,51 -0,07 0,50 -0,76 -0,24 -0,72 -0,32 0,12 -0,18 -0,61 0,69 0,92 0,85 0,24 0,76 0,45 0,61 0,23 -0,47 0,00 0,71 0,51 0,79 -0,13 0,26 -0,68 0,43 0,27 0,08

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

95

Fraport AG
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 77,050,185 754,522 2,217,547 Change in % +9.2% +4.6% +11.7% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s 136,400 2,043,700 279,400 Change in % +18.4% +8.3% +8.8%

Fraport AG was created in 2001 and is the owner and operator of Frankfurt Airport. It also has various levels of international shareholdings in other airports or airport terminals, as follows: 50% of the international terminal at Antalya in Turkey; 73.07% in Hahn airport, a former military base near Frankfurt which is being developed as a base for freight and low-cost scheduled airline operations; 30% in Hanover airport; 42.75% of a consortium operating and expanding Lima airport in Peru; 51% in the company which manages Saarbrcken airport in Germany. The shareholders of Fraport remain unchanged with 29.4% of all shares in free float and the remaining 70.6% held by local and federal German authorities. Fraport also operates its own ground handling service. This contributed 20.7% of total gross turnover in the review year and the Frankfurt operation is the world's largest provider of ground services at a single location. The share of ground handling in overall revenue declined from 27% in the previous year. Overall group passengers increased significantly, by 9.2%. The biggest relative growth rates were generated in Antalya (27.4%), Frankfurt-Hahn (+13.6%) and Lima (+11.9%). The main airport in Frankfurt remains the most important within the group but it is approaching its current capacity limit. However, the average long-term annual growth rate for Frankfurt of 5% could still be exc eeded. Even more important is FRA as a cargo hub, accounting for over 83% of all cargo traffic in the company. The various airport growth rates have different underlying reasons such as the recovery of tourism (Antalya) and the increase of low cost carrier traffic (Hahn). Saarbruecken and Hanover remained at more stable traffic levels. Frankfurt provides both the biggest challenges and the biggest business opportunities for Fraport. Challenges are related to the capacity constraints, with the absolute limit expected to be 500,000 ATMs p.a. To enhance output, several measures have been taken. With a very good connection to the German train system, about a fifth of all departing passengers arrive at the airport not by air but by train. Organisational improvements allowed for an increase from 80 to 82 ATMs per hour in the period under review. In the long run, the adjustment of Frankfurt airport to the needs of the A380, including the Lufthansa maintenance hangar (operating by 2007) on the airport, the building of a new runway (to be operational by 2009) and the use of former US Air Force facilities adjacent to the airport from 2005 on will enhance the capacity of Frankfurt airport. By 2015, the former military area is expected to provide capacity for 25 to 35 million passengers. The good cash flow results and the strong balance sheet allow for the financing of these investments worth 3.4 billion. However good these opportunities are, Munich airport is a real threat to Frankfurt airport because of its greater potential for growth, and the extension of Frankfurt facilities is needed to the airport to remain competitive not only in relation to Munich but also to the airports at London, Amsterdam and Paris. Fraport has a highly diversified business portfolio in which only 31% of group revenue is purely aviation related, 50% originates from commercial activities such as real estate development and 19% is generated from international activities. Not only interests in foreign airports, but also management and operational contracts are undertaken in 88 locations (78 airports) in 18 countries around the world. Early in 2006 the Indian government announced that a consortium in which Fraport has a 10% stake had won a 74% stake in New Delhi airport and a 30-year concession to operate it. Fraport is attempting to further diversify by considering involvement in Italy (Milan), Bulgaria, Africa and especially China.
96

Performance profile
Frankfurt
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1,35 -0,15 -0,51 -0,42 -0,81 0,43 0,68 -0,77 -0,99 0,38 -0,93 -1,28 -0,15 -0,89 -1,35

Performance Indicator

2,74 3,00 -0,89 0,55 0,50 0,44 -2,27 -1,51 0,00 0,10 0,01 -0,85 0,09 -1,05 -0,01 0,11 0,09

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

The profile for Frankfurt shows five deviations at the edge of the scale, one caused by the German tax law (taxation effect +3.17) and four caused by high staff costs (staff costs as percentage of turnover +3.61, staff costs per passenger +2.74, staff costs per 1,000 ATUs +3.00 and staff costs as percentage of staff and operational cost +3.01). The disadvantages in staff costs are partially offset by a comparatively low ratio of -0.89 for operating cost per passenger. Overall cost ratios are relatively close to the samples average (e.g. total cost per 1,000 ATUs +0.55). Aeronautical and total revenues are very close to average values, but commercial revenues are much less significantly at Frankfurt than for the rest of the sample (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue -2.27). The only strong variation for revenues (total revenue per employee -1.05) originates from the high staff count of the company. Profitability ratios are below average (operating profit -1.35) as well as asset ratios (total assets per passenger -0.77). Only the liquidity ratio (+0.43), equity ratio (+0.68) and passenger loads (passengers per ATM +0.38) are above average. All other ratios for assets, etc. are below average.

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Geneva
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 8,593,430 166,631 59,886 Change in % +6.2% +1.8% +2.4% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s CHF 27,663 CHF 228,815 CHF 35,542 Change in % +1.0% +6.4% -39.3%

Geneva is Switzerlands second largest airport. Profits were slightly higher than in 2003 with the continued recovery being attributed to the increased activity of low cost airlines. easyJet accounts for a quarter of the airports traffic and almost doubled the destinations which it served from Geneva from 8 to 15. Following the problems associated with the demise of Swissair, new airlines and an increase in charter flights brought benefits to the airport with an increased number of flights. Cargo grew for the second year in a row, reversing the previous trend. Recent infrastructure improvements enhanced the capacity of the airport and its operating efficiency. A new 10-year masterplan for the years 2006 to 2015 was being prepared during the year under review, and is now being implemented. Aroport International de Genve still operates the airport and there were no intentions for privatisation at the time this review was produced. In 2004, Geneva announced plans to turn its old terminal into a dedicated low-fare facility, whereupon the traditional carriers protested because of charge differentials with those which they incur. Low-fare traffic now accounts for 25% of all traffic but it is expected to increase to 30-35% over the next 10 years.

98

Performance profile
Geneva
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,95 0,20 -0,51 -0,66 -0,48 -0,72 -0,33 -0,25 -1,08 -0,34 -1,36 -0,53 -0,68 0,56 0,29 -0,87 1,37 1,42 0,61 0,99 0,27 -0,03 0,63 -0,28 0,45 0,62 0,19 -0,29 -0,19 -0,75 -0,42 -0,41 0,32 -0,29 -0,46

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Genevas profile shows below average ratios for capex, asset and liquidity ratios. The profitability measures such as EBITDA as a percentage of turnover (-0.95) or return on shareholders funds (+0.56) vary in both directions, leaving no clear conclusion on how overall profitability compares to the average. All partial cost ratios are above average (e.g. staff costs as percentage of turnover +1.37, operating costs per passenger +0.27) but total cost measures are close to average (total cost per 1,000 ATUs -0.03). Aeronautical revenue ratios are all shifted to the left, while commercial revenues are shifted to right, pushing the overall revenue indicators closer to average values. Total revenue indicators remain below average with the exception of total revenue per passenger (+0.32). Aeronautical revenues are relatively low because of small average passenger loads per ATM (-1.36). The overall profile shows an airport with an above average cost structure and a below average income structure as well as below average capex, equity and asset ratios. A result of the cost and revenue ratio variations is that profitability measures are also below average.

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Hong Kong
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 38,300,000 242,000 3,100,000 Change in % +38.4% +27.4% +13.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s HK$ 1,412,000 HK$ 6,506,000 HK$ 1,291,000 Change in % +363.9% +29.1% -66.2%

Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) at Chek Lap Kok opened in July 1998 and replaced the old airport of Kai Tak, at which capacity had become severely constrained. The completion of the North Runway in May 1999 and the opening of the Northwest Concourse of the passenger terminal in January 2000 marked the end of the airport's second phase of construction and increased the airport's capacity. It can now handle 45 aircraft movements an hour and the annual passenger terminal capacity has been increased to 45 mppa (initial capacity was 35 mppa and up to 3 million tonnes of freight). The design capacity is stated to be 87 mppa and 9 million tonnes of freight, and the masterplan completed late in 2001 aims to make this capacity available by 2020. The Airport is operated by the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK), which is a statutory body wholly owned by the Hong Kong SAR Government. HKIA rebounded strongly from the SARS crisis, with record traffic volumes and record profits. This was based on a strong increase of all b usiness segments while operating expenditure in all aspects remained stable. HKIA has for nine years been the busiest airport worldwide for international cargo and in 2004 it was the second busiest cargo airport worldwide. The previous effects of relatively high interest and depreciation were offset by the strong revenue growth. Airport fees are at a reasonable level and help to attract the extensive traffic volume. Average revenue per passenger declined from HK$182 to 170 while in the same review period average expenditure declined from HK$170 to 117 per passenger, increasing the gross result per passenger by more than 400%. Despite having significant scope for traffic growth, the modular nature of the airports expansion means that ten major projects are identified as being necessary in the twenty-year development plan. The Authority appears to be planning a more conservative approach to capacity provision than Singapore, as it has indicated a policy of maximising utilisation of existing facilities and investing only in new facilities essential for future revenue growth. The main infrastructure projects planned for the period to 2006 largely relate to non-aeronautical developments such as an Exhibition Centre and a multi-purpose development called SkyPlaza. Work is however in progress to construct a new express cargo terminal, together with a programme to enhance the parking stands and passenger concourse. Skymart, launched in March 2004, increased retail space. A new masterplan is already being prepared. The most important of the changes in the period to 2010 are an expected (partial) privatisation by 2008, a new cargo hub for DHL which will be operating by 2009 and the adaption to the new A380 during 2006. The main development focus of the airport is clearly on drawing in passenger traffic from the Pearl River Delta. This strategy recognises the fact that the local Hong Kong economy is both mature and continuing to deflate. The first phase of a Cross-Boundary passenger ferry terminal opened on the airport island in summer 2003, with services operated to Chu Kong and Shun Tak. This is a major part of a strategy to simplify access to the airport for passengers from the Pearl River Delta. Similarly, 70% of the airports air cargo has its origins in the Delta region, and it is possible that a large cargo consolidation centre may be built on the mainland to facilitate the transfer of cargo to the airport. September 2003 saw SkyPier in operation with direct transfer passenger times reduced and access to the PRD. This made Hong Kong airport a comprehensive multi modal transportation hub. The catchment area of HKIA includes about 800 million citizens, accounting for 64% of Chinas GDP within a two hours flight range. Despite the limitations of its domestic market, Hong Kongs geographical position next to China creates a significant competitive advantage for HKIA. Additional traffic volumes are expected from the rise of low cost carriers that are now developing services at HKIA. However, it is possible that the airports development strategy will be reconsidered in the light of its forthcoming partial privatisation. Just as Chek Lap Kok was at the time the largest construction project in the region, this is expected to be by far the most important finance project in the region for many years. Valuations of between HK$36 48 billion (US$4.6 6.2 billion) have been mooted
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(construction costs were HK$49.8 billion) and it is possible that aeronautical charges would need to be increased in order to achieve industry norms for earnings per share. Performance profile Hong Kongs profile provides a number of indications of high profitability. Commercial revenues are more important to Hong Kong than for the average (commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue +1.08), while aeronautical revenue as percentage of total revenue -0.77) is correspondingly less important. Total revenue ratios show a stronger than average income structure (e.g. t otal revenue per ATM +1.42). Very high passengers per ATM (+2.30) account for this. Staff cost ratios are well below average (e.g. staff costs as percentage of turnover -1.18) but operating cost measures and total cost measures are above average (total costs per passenger +0.32, operating costs per PAX +0.58). The strong revenues translate into profitability ratios which are significantly above average (EBITDA rate +0.67, operating profit per passenger +0.92). Capital expenditure related measures are close to average, reflecting the completion of the recent period of expansion. Overall, the analysis demonstrates the ability of the airport to achieve strong revenues with an above average but still profitable cost structure.

101

Hong Kong
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,67 1,03 -0,23 -0,58 -0,31 1,24 -0,45 0,75 1,48 -0,01 2,30 0,35 0,92 0,02 -0,42 0,25 -1,18 -0,76 -0,48 -1,39 0,58 0,78 0,32 1,10 1,08 1,45 0,14 0,58 -0,77 -0,47 0,87 1,17 0,61 1,10 1,42

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

102

Los Angeles
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 61,244,311 456,904 2,136,313 Change in % +5.6% +2.5% +3.7% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s USD 144,874 USD 615,066 USD 157,100 Change in % +10.0% +8.7% +217.8%

Los Angeles airport (LAX) is operated by the City of Los Angeles Department of Airports, which operates under the name of Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA). LAWA also operates three other airports in southern California, at Ontario (see below), Van Nuys and Palmdale. Van Nuys is the busiest general aviation airport in the US while Palmdale, currently a maintenance base, has been renovated so as to be able to provide passenger and cargo services to southern California. Los Angeles handled 61.2 million passengers in f/y 2004/05, a 5.6% increase compared to the previous financial year. The airport had for some time been the worlds third busiest airport in passenger terms after Atlanta and Chicago OHare, but this result means that it now ranks fifth globally after the two US airports, London Heathrow and Tokyo. Overall traffic continues to grow but full recovery from the effects of 9/11 has yet to be achieved. Despite a significant share of international passengers (28% of total), LAX is not the major hub for any one major airline and it has therefore a strongly diversified portfolio of customers, with four airlines (Delta Airlines, American Airlines, Southwest and United Airlines) accounting for about 50% of overall traffic in the year 2005. United and American had 15% of overall traffic each and were therefore the biggest customers. The profitability of the airport increased due to a strong increase in commercial revenues which was enabled by the continued passenger growth. The most important growth source was the revenue from car parking. Costs increased in line with revenues, mainly driven by growing staff costs. The challenge of continued economic troubles for the important customers Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines might create a decline in traffic if these airlines or their services are not continued after a possible bankruptcy. Low cost carrier South West Airlines already accounts for one in eight passengers in 2005 but there might be potential for further growth in this sector, especially if capacity constraints are eased both through infrastructure expansion and through competitors going out of business. The airport is constrained in its capacity and faces strong local opposition to an airport extension. The addition of new gates to existing terminals is prohibited under Californian environmental legislation, despite a situation in which 80% of the existing gates cannot be used by Boeing 747s. What effects this will have when airlines wish to use the new A380 remains unclear so far. Between 1999 and 2000, four alternative strategies for a new master plan to 2015 were assessed. Only two of these involved the construction of an additional runway, and in both of those cases the proposal was only for a relatively short (2,200 metres) runway. Both of these options would have provided capacity for growth to a throughput of 98 mppa and 4.2 million tonnes of cargo. Of the other two options, one envisaged no major construction work and piecemeal improvements providing capacity for 79 mppa, while the other involved realignment and lengthening of two of the existing four runways, providing capacity for 89 mppa. In April 2004, the final Master Plan was issued and a new alternative, focusing on the enhancement of safety and security, was adopted. This will be achieved by separating passenger processing from parking areas with additional new landside facilities. Furthermore, the central terminal area will be redeveloped to allow for an eventual capacity of 79 mppa, with no runway changes. Project costs could reach $6 billion, which is $3 billion less than the alternatives that included an additional runway. Implementation of the Master Plan was further delayed by litigation entered into by protesters, but consensus was eventually reached early in 2006. Performance profile The profile for Los Angeles shows a general alignment to the left of a little less than one standard deviation (= z-value of -1). The only exceptions to this are a high equity ratio (+1.11), strong ratios for staff costs as percentage of turnover (+1.23) and of operating and staff costs (+0.77) and for commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue (+0.91). The latter highlights relatively weak airside revenues, as also indicated by the variation of all aeronautical revenue ratios. In turn, commercial revenues are more important for Los Angeles than for the samples average. Staff cost ratios deviate to the right (staff costs as percentage of turnover +1.23) but cost level ratios are at average (staff costs per passengers -0.07). Operating and total cost ratios vary more strongly to
103

the left (total costs per passenger -0.67 and operating costs per passenger -0.60) but not to the same extent as the revenue indicators. The overall result is that profitability measures are also aligned to the left. Overall, the profile shows that of an airport with a below average cost structure and a revenue structure below that of the sample, resulting in below average profitability ratios. As no major investments are ongoing, asset and capex related ratios are close to but below average.
Los Angeles
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1,02 -0,18 -0,50 -0,40 -0,61 -0,63 -0,09 1,11 -0,89 -0,53 0,49 -0,43 -0,74 0,14 -0,22 -0,31 1,23 -0,07 0,09 0,77 -0,60 -0,46 -0,67 -0,32 0,91 -0,38 -0,86 -0,62 -0,63 -0,70 -0,44 -0,75 -0,86 -0,59 -0,41

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

104

Malaysian Airports
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 39,431,000 454,969 957,100 Change in % +17.8% +11.9% +10.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s RM 125,189 RM 1,024,688 RM 88,751 Change in % +47.8% +14.6% -6.1%

Malaysia Airports Berhad (MAB) operates a total of twenty airports five international, including Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), and fifteen domestic together with seventeen small airstrips used by short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft, all of them located in remote parts of the Sabah/Sarawak island. MAB is a controlled by Khazanal Nasional Berhad, a state-owned organisation, which holds 75.14% of all shares, with the remainder being in free float. KLIA opened in mid-1998, having been developed on a greenfield site around 50 kilometres south of the city centre. In its initial configuration it has two runways and capacity for 25 million passengers p.a. and 1.2 million tonnes of cargo, but sufficient land has been set aside to allow capacity to expand ultimately to 100 million passengers p.a. with four runways. Its development had been necessary in view of the very constrained location of the old Kuala Lumpur airport at Subang, 22 kilometres from the city centre. KLIA is the MABs largest airport. The activities of MAB include international interests in airports, e.g. in Cambodia and Hyderabad, India as well as the operation of an hotel adjacent to KLIA and other non-core activities. The development of KLIA was a major undertaking because of its location in a relatively undeveloped part of the country, and it was intended to act as a significant symbol of Malaysias recent economic growth. The period under review showed a strong recovery from the events of 2003 (SARS) and the outbreak of Avian Flu and the Tsunami disaster had no impact on the reporting period (but especially the latter may well have an impact in the following period). Passenger traffic, cargo traffic, plane movements, total revenue and profit all increased, three new airlines opened business at MAB airports and existing airlines increased frequencies. Despite the high degree of diversification in the operations, the revenue and profits w ere dominated by airside revenue (65% of total revenues and the highest margin); some sectors contributed a loss (e.g. event management). The main driver for the increased traffic volumes after the general recovery of global aviation is the rise of low cost carriers in the area, boosting domestic traffic. Against a background of negotiations on the financial structure of MAB, lease payments to the government for the management of the airports were suspended in the period under review. Three major projects are currently under way. These are the preparation of KLIA for the A380 by the end of 2006, the completion of a dedicated low cost carrier terminal with capacity for 10 million passengers by 2006 and the beginning of plans for a new terminal (Satellite B) for a further 10 million passengers. Future expectations include a continued global growth of aviation business and regionally stronger growth. The airport is bidding as part of a build and operate consortium for a new Hajj terminal at Jeddah airport.

105

Performance profile
Malaysian Airports
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1,26 -0,13 0,80 -0,86 -0,95 -0,81 -0,17 0,61 -1,19 -0,83 -0,15 -0,78 -1,19 -0,05 -0,50 -0,54 -0,15 -1,09 -1,04 -0,89 -0,80 -0,95 -1,16 -0,74 -0,05 -1,26 -1,15 -0,92 0,60 -0,19 -0,71 -1,13 -1,45 -1,14 -0,87

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

The profile for MAB shows 32 out of 35 indicators aligned to the left. The only ratios aligned to the right are taxation effect (+0.80), equity ratio (+0.61) and aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total cost (+0.60). The significant variation in total revenue originates from variations in both aeronautical and commercial revenue ratios (commercial/aeronautical revenue per passengers -1.26 and -1.15) compared to the sample. While commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue for MAB is at average levels (-0.05), aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total revenue deviates fairly strongly to the right (+0.60). Overall, deviations for revenue ratios are more significant than for cost ratios, which causes the profitability ratios to shift to the left. Also, as no major investments are affecting the review period, asset ratios are aligned to the left.

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Manchester Airport Group


Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 26,736,000 456,200 957,100 Change in % +5.4% +17% +10.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s 17,200 373,500 37,800 Change in % -9.5% +5.8% +16.0%

Manchester is the UK's third largest airport after London's Heathrow and Gatwick. It has a strong position serving a large catchment area in northern and central England, helped by direct rail services to and from a wide area in the northern half of the country that were extended by a new bus hub in the beginning of 2004. Manchester airport is operated by the Manchester Airport Group (MAG) PLC, the second largest airport operator in the UK. Besides Manchester it owns Nottingham East Midlands (NEMA), Bournemouth and Humberside. The increase in passenger numbers can be attributed to the recovery of scheduled services at Manchester and the growth of low cost carriers operating at the airports. MAG is controlled through the council of the city of Manchester which holds 55% of the shares, the remaining shares being held by other local authorities. A second runway opened at Manchester early in 2001, and as a result capacity was expected to be sufficient to allow growth to a throughput of around 41 million passengers by 2015. In 2003 a 5.5 million (US$8.38 million) upgrade of Terminal 1 was completed and an extensive development of Terminal 2 is underway. Manchester can now accommodate 40 million passengers p. a. without expansion of existing facilities, (i.e. terminal and runway) and within current boundaries, but more terminal capacity may be needed. Plans for a second terminal at Nottingham East Midlands to increase capacity to over 8 million will accommodate the rapid increase in short term growth. The need for this capacity has arisen rapidly, as the airport has three competing low cost airline operations based there. The profit indicated above fell due to a dividend payment of 25 million, the profit before tax rising by 31.2%. The main driver both for revenue and for profit is Manchester airport, operating 21.3 million passengers in the period under review or almost 80% of the Group total. Likewise, 78.3% of the Groups profit originates from Manchester airport: this rose by 20%. Aviation revenues account for 48.5% of total group revenue and are strongly complemented by revenue from commercial and real estate activities. The strongest growth within the commercial segment is with car parking, accounting for 11.8% of total revenue with a growth rate compared to the prior period of 11%. Main driver for the traffic growth and subsequently the improved business results is the continued strong growth of low cost carrier traffic, rising for the group by 19.7%, only partially off-set by a decline of charter traffic (-2.4% traffic compared to the previous period). To prepare for further expected growth a total of 400 million is being invested in the Groups facilities, starting in 2003. Internationally, MAG remains involved in three Australian airports and further diversification may be considered if suitable opportunities arise. For the future it can be expected that Manchester airport and its subsidiaries will continue to grow especially as a result of continued low cost carrier growth, which is enhanced by both a competitive catchment area and spare capacity, especially at the smaller airports like Bournemouth.

107

Performance profile
Manchester
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,28 0,72 2,20 -0,78 -0,56 -0,35 -0,31 0,57 0,28 -0,54 -0,16 -0,51 0,04 -0,12 -0,38 -0,38 0,24 0,59 0,58 0,15 0,54 0,47 0,60 0,26 -0,46 0,09 0,58 0,44 0,26 -0,27 0,23 -0,30 0,55 0,39 0,18

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

The profile shows mostly small variations to the left (14 of 35 measures) or right (21 of 35 measures). All variations are under the value of 1 or -1 except for taxation effect (+2.20). Both staff and operating cost ratios are aligned to the right, creating minor variations for total cost ratios (e.g. total costs per passenger +0.60). Staff costs do not account for a bigger relative share of staff and operational cost than for the average of the sample (+0.15). Commercial revenue ratios are at average levels (e.g. commercial revenue per passenger +0.09), while aeronautical revenue ratios deviate a little more to the right (e.g. aeronautical revenues per passenger +0.58). As with the cost ratios, all variations for revenue ratios are moderate, leading to close to but below average profitability measures (e.g. EBITDA as a percentage of turnover -0.28). There are no major investments affecting the reporting period, so capex and asset ratios are slightly skewed to the left. Overall, the profile shows an airport with above average revenue and cost structures but without major variations from the mean apart from the taxation effect.

108

Melbourne
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 20,780,000 180,500 207,958 Change in % +8.4% +9.2% +11.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s A$ 72,749 A$ 323,380 A$ 108,203 Change in % +77.8% +12.9% +278.2%

Melbourne is Australia's second largest airport, and handled 20.8 million passengers in 2004/05. The airport was one of the first batch of Australian airports privatised in 1997, when the government sold a 50 year operating lease on the airport to Australia Pacific Airports Corporation Ltd (APAC), at a cost of A$1.3 billion (US$729.8 million). APAC is 85% owned by two Australian fund management companies and Deutsche Bank, with the remaining 15% being held by BAA: this situation may change as a result of the acquisition of BAA by Ferrovial, due to limits on the number of airport holdings in Australia which any one company may have. APAC also holds the operating lease for Launceston airport in Tasmania. Like the other privatised Australian airports, Melbourne was from the time of its privatisation subject to a regulatory pricing formula, which governed the level of its aeronautical charges. However, following the events of September 11 2001 the main Australian airports called for a review of the regulatory system. The Productivity Commission, which carried out the review, recommended that the system of price surveillance should be revoked and replaced by price monitoring. This recommendation was accepted by the Federal Government and the new regulatory regime began with effect from 1 July 2002. The regime will again be reviewed during 2006. The airport generates its revenues in almost equal shares for aviation and non-aviation activities. Aeronautical revenues (including security fees) account for 48% of total revenue, retail alone for 38% of revenues. While property and security revenues remained stable over the last five years, aeronautical revenues grew most strongly, both in relative and absolute terms. International traffic grew twice as fast as domestic traffic both for passengers and for aircraft movements. Domestic remains the biggest traffic component with 78% of total passenger traffic. A further driver for traffic growth is the increased low cost carrier activity that generates traffic volume through point to point services. Capacity extensions aim at creating more capacity at the terminals (5,000 additional square m etres at Terminal 2), the already completed extension of a runway for the new A380 and new car parks. Overall investment in the period 2002 - 04 exceeded A$100 million. Future growth drivers are expected to be the continued rise of low cost carrier traffic, the A 380 entering operation in international traffic and local tourism inducing inflowing traffic.

109

Performance profile
Melbourne
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,46 0,19 0,70 0,00 -0,42 1,04 -0,45 -1,11 -0,79 2,89 0,82

Performance Indicator

0,34 1,16 0,72 1,63 -1,41 -1,30 -1,20 -1,40 -0,99 -0,89 -1,19 -0,64 0,48 -0,62 -0,98 -0,69 -0,96 0,67 -0,47 2,04 -0,93 -0,60 -0,39

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Melbournes profile shows strong variations both to the left (20 out of 35) and to the right (15 out of 35). The most homogeneously shifted group is the cost ratios (Staff costs as percentage of turnover to total costs per ATM from top to bottom). The major driver for the strong shift to the left is the very competitive level of staff costs compared with the sample (e.g. staff cost per passenger -1.30). The low staff count and cost at Melbourne also affect other indicators such as passengers per employee (+3.34) and ATUs per employee (+2.89). Revenue ratios also differ strongly from the average. Commercial revenues account for a larger share of total revenues for Melbourne than for the average (commercial revenues as percentage of total revenue +0.48). Even when all but three of the revenue ratios deviate to the left, profitability performs strongly for Melbourne (EBITDA as a percentage of turnover +1.46, operating profit +1.63). This highlights the effect for an airport with a very competitive cost to revenue ratio.

110

Miami
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 30,244,119 284,760 1,942,119 Change in % +2.5% +0.9% +9.4% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s USD 29,100 USD 472,000 USD 461,135 Change in % +226% +5.0% -10.5%

The Miami airport is operated by the Miami Dade County Aviation Department, which is a non-profit organisation. It also operates three local airports and two training facilities. The financial body operating the airport system is Port Authority Properti es (PAP). Serving the South of Florida, the Miami Airport system serves as major trans-shipment point between the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe. Miami airport suffered heavily from the events of September 11 2001 and it is not expected to recover from these until 2010. However, it remains the third most important international airport in the US. Over half its passengers visit Miami Dade as a tourist destination, and about one sixth of its overall passengers join a cruise ship in Miami. The airport has permission to collect passenger facility charges for the financing of investments into airport infrastructure until 2037. One of the major initiatives of the authority has been the Capital Improvement Program (CIP), from 1995 till 2005, worth US$7.2 billion overall, of which projects worth US$1.5 billion were completed in the review period with another US$2.8 billion are under construction in 2005. Revenue was stable while costs declined, because interest payments fell considerably, allowing a the substantial increase in profit. It should be noted that the strong relative growth in profit is not related to a strong absolute traffic growth. This resulted from a revaluation of interest and is therefore mostly an accounting change. Traffic at the Miami airport system is likely to remain stable as the traffic drivers are not subject to the current major developments. Potential for development may arise from low cost carriers, but this remains unclear at the time of this review. Performance profile The profile for Miami airport shows 19 variations below average values and 16 above. Profitability results are all below average (eg EBITDA -0.86, Net cash generation -1.77, operating profit per passenger -0.58). Productivity ratios such as passengers per employee (-0.41) are also below average. Capex related ratios are stronger than average (capex as percentage of turnover +1.47 and capex per passenger +1.60), reflecting the airports current stage in the construction cycle. The airports cost structure is above the average in both its components (e.g. staff costs per passenger +0.72) and in total (e.g. total costs per passenger +0.39). Unusually for a US residual cost airport, commercial revenue ratios are significantly above average (commercial revenue per passenger +0.78), and correspondingly aeronautical revenue ratios are a little below average (e.g. aeronautical revenue per 1,000 ATUs -0.17).

111

Miami
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,86 -1,77 -0,51 1,47 1,60 0,06 -0,29 -0,75 1,25 -0,39 -0,43 -0,41 -0,58 -0,18 -0,85 -0,73 0,78 0,72 0,58 0,38 0,39 0,21 0,39 0,03 0,92 0,78 -0,10 -0,17 -0,56 -0,86 -0,22 -0,30 0,14 -0,01 -0,14

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

112

Munich
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 26,814,505 370,354 192,167 Change in % +10.8% +7.7% +18.2% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s -54,108 628,386 17,773 Change in % -5.4% +5.9% -88.3%

Munich airport (MUC), Germany's second largest airport after Frankfurt (FRA), is still in the phase of adjustment after starting operations at a new airport. It is the fastest growing airport among the 10 busiest airports in Europe and is almost twice as big as the third ranked German airport Dsseldorf. It is also the first European airport to be officially certified to handle the new A380. An important contributory factor in the rapid growth of Munich is the good level of available capacity compared to Frankfurt and the strategic partnership with Lufthansa which in the review period operated more European flights from MUC than from FRA d ue to the congestion problems at FRA. The strongest relative growth in international traffic was in services to Asia, and the most popular destination was Italy. The two terminals of MUC have different functions. While Terminal 1 is designed for point to point services, hence especially low cost carrier traffic, Terminal 2 focuses on transfer of passengers within a hub and spoke network, operated by Lufthansa and its Star Alliance partners. After SARS and the Iraq crisis, aviation traffic in Germany developed to levels higher than before the crisis, which shows in the strong traffic growth figures indicated above. The airside revenues grew more strongly than the commercial revenues and overall revenues slightly exceeded operating costs. Revenue was lost airside on ground handling services, where some business has now been lost to competitors. Staff costs remained stable, while material costs grew strongly, mainly due to the first full year of operations at Terminal 2. Interest and depreciation still account for a quarter of all cost before tax. The increase in loss originates from the rise in material costs, especially additional purchases of external services and an increased tax burden. MUC intends to grow continuously as an international hub in Europe and provides sufficient capacity to do so, especially for additional long-haul business with its strategic partner Lufthansa. Also, further low cost carrier business may be attracted to Terminal 1. The cargo business has already triggered the first extension to meet demand for cargo services through Munich. Provided that traffic keeps growing and costs can be kept at bay, profits are likely to occur soon. Since the opening of Terminal 2, annual capacity at MUC is 45 million passengers. The new terminal building at Munich is a joint project by the airport operator and Lufthansa: unusually an airport and an airline co-operated in the construction and operation of a terminal. Terminal 2 at Munich Airport is exclusively dedicated to Lufthansa and its Star Alliance partners. The new terminal is specifically geared to the needs of transfer traffic and the minimum connecting time is 30 minutes. The airport met 60% of the construction costs of the new terminal, with the remaining 40% falling to Lufthansa. The required land-side and airside infrastructure such as roads, aprons and parking facilities is being financed entirely by the airport. The ownership of Munich remains firmly in the public sector, with the Federal, State of Bavaria and City governments all holding stakes. An intention to make an IPO of 25% of th e shares was reported in 1997. The most recent announcements in 2004 were that airport shares are expected to be floated by 2009 but no indication of this has been made recently. A change in this situation might occur when the airport either becomes profitable or needs new capital.

113

Performance profile
Munich
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1,53 0,45 -1,48 -1,09 -0,91 -0,64 -0,45 -0,87 -0,04 -0,78 -0,64 -0,77 -1,23 -1,00 -0,99 -1,37 0,72 1,21 0,92 -0,12 1,68 0,78 1,28 0,36 0,82 1,33 0,17 -0,03 -0,87 -1,24 -0,17 -0,70 0,70 0,30 0,02

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Munichs profile shows 20 deviations to the left and 15 to the right. All of the profitability ratios are below average, while all but one of the cost ratios are above average. Also below average are performance ratios such as passengers per employee (-0.77). Operating costs per passenger deviate most strongly within the profile (+1.68). Total cost ratios also deviate strongly though not to the same extent (e.g. total costs per passenger +1.28). For revenues, aeronautical revenue ratios are close to average levels (e.g. aeronautical revenue per 1,000 ATUs (0.03), while the importance of these for Munich airport is much less than for the average of the sample (aeronautical revenue as percentage of total revenue -0.87). Commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue is higher than average to almost the same extent. Total revenue ratios remain close to the average and deviate both to left and to right. The profile shows that Munich is not yet operating at sufficient traffic levels to perform in line with the samples average as the contribution of aeronautical revenues could be increased by more traffic. Also, the airport suffers from the high cost of the very new infrastructure. Performance can be expected to improve as traffic grows.

114

Ontario (California)
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 6,953,713 92,334 581,793 Change in % +3.0% - negligible% -3.0% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s USD 7,309 USD 86,601 USD 15,348 Change in % Loss in previous year +19.5% +34.8%

Ontario is Los Angeles second airport and serves San Bernardino and Riverside counties. Despite being a secondary airport, it had a significant throughput in the year under review of 6.95 million passengers, a slight increase of 3.3% compared to a 5.7% decrease at LAX. Growth over the past decade has been slow, despite the opening of two new passenger terminals during the financial year 1998/9, which increased the terminal floor space by a factor of eight. The new facilities were intended to allow the airport to handle at least 10 million passengers. Extensive construction work providing a new 35aircraft apron and various ancillary structures related to the new terminals was also completed. International operations remain at a modest level. Cargo throughput is an important factor in Ontarios business, and in the year under review throughput decreased by 3.0%. On tario will benefit in the future from an increasingly capacityconstrained LAX. The importance of aeronautical revenue slightly increased while the main profit driver, as with LAX, is the revenue from car parking operations. The profitability of both LAX and ONT developed at similar levels. Also, it remains unclear for both, what future impacts are to be expected from possible cessations or reductions of operations for American airlines that recently filed for bankruptcy. The overall situation and relationship of LAX and Ontario is interesting, as it is probably one of the most extreme cases in the world of airport capacity problems brought on by environmental concerns. Ontarios spare capacity of around 4 5 million passengers is likely to be absorbed quickly once the industry recovers from the events of September 11 2001, and the process by which even the selected development option for Los Angeles (with no new runway) might be approved is likely to be slow and tortuous. The situation seems to be one in which southern California, one of the most powerful economic sub-regions in the world, is likely to have to adjust to permanent constraints on air traffic growth, with probable knock-on effects on its future economic development.

115

Performance profile
Ontario
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-1,64 -0,16 -1,09 -0,68 -0,67 -0,55 -0,24 0,89 -0,33 -0,62 0,00 -0,57 -1,21 -0,08 -0,94 -1,18 1,35 0,45 0,49 0,45 0,07 -0,02 -0,05 -0,05 2,46 0,86 -1,08 -0,85 -2,36 -1,85 -0,65 -0,72 -0,47 -0,36 -0,31

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Ontarios profile shows mostly strong deviations to the left and a few to right. The biggest variance is commercial revenue as percentage of total revenue (+2.46). While aeronautical revenue ratios are all well below average (e.g. aeronautical revenue as a percentage of total cost -1.85), total revenue ratios deviate less but are still significantly below the average for the sample (e.g. total revenue per employee -0.72). Total cost ratios in turn are very close to average levels (e.g. total costs per passenger -0.05), despite higher than average staff cost ratios (e.g. staff costs as percentage of turnover +1.35). The overall picture is one of profitability ratios which are significantly below average (e.g. operating profit -1.18). This is accompanied by below average capex and asset ratios. The only ratio above average apart from the cost and commercial revenue ratios is the equity ratio (+0.89).

116

Oslo
Number 14,865,460 196,327 74,299 Change in % +8.9% +6.6% +3.2% Value in 000s NKK 89,132 NKK 2,193,934 NKK 151,026 Change in % +9188% +14.5% +19.8%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

A new airport for Oslo at Gardemoen was under construction for some time and opened in October 1998, at which time the old airport at Fornebu was closed. The airport is managed by Oslo Lufthavn, a fully owned subsidiary of the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management (NATAM), a division of the Norwegian Civil Aviation Administration, which was converted into a limited company under the name Avinor AS at the beginning of 2003. After a weak period before the year under review, the airport generated a profit again. In the prior period, the small profit was caused by a negative tax burden . The improvement was mostly due to increased traffic, especially in the international market, with 24 new destinations for the year under review. The m ain customer remains the Scandinavian airline SAS, accounting for 62.5% of all traffic. Despite currently unused capacity, constraints are expected to make a third runway necessary by 2025 to 2030. The expectations for future traffic developments remain uncertain, as the airports competitiveness is still challenged by the high tax burden levied on services and facilities provided, and the aviation market remains subject to strong competitive pressures and continuously rising fuel prices. Although it is a very new airport, there have been a number of extensions and enhancements, most recently with a terminal expansion for new retail partners which started in late 2004 and was operational by the end of 2005. Privatisation of the airport will depend both on political decisions in Norway and the development of business for the airport. If traffic growth remains relatively stable (either driven by SAS or developing low cost carriers), capacity constraints may affect the decision on whether to privatise or not and to what extent. Performance profile Oslos profile consists of 19 deviations to the right and 16 to the left. The biggest variation is net cash generation per passenger at +1.28. The other profitability ratios are also above average, but to a lesser extent (operating profit per passenger +0.75, return on shareholders funds +0.53, return on capital employed -0.07 and operating profit +0.12). The disparity is due to relatively high depreciation levels caused by the newness of the entire airport. The equity, capex and staff cost ratios are below average. Despite the latter being well below average, total costs ratios are close to average because the operating cost ratios are well above average. The slightly above average total revenue ratios reflect above average commercial revenue and below average aeronautical revenue ratios. Overall, the profile shows an airport with above average profitability compared with the sample because of its competitive cost structure and its strong level of commercial revenues.

117

Oslo
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,27 1,28 -0,02 -0,99 -0,80 0,03 0,09 -1,21 0,28 -0,04 -0,53 -0,11 0,75 0,53 -0,07 0,12 -0,85 -0,42 -0,47 -1,04 0,78 0,19 0,40 -0,01 0,79 1,21 0,34 0,13 -0,38 -0,32 -0,04 0,42 0,62 0,30 0,04

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

118

Perth
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 6,654,967 56,118 57,925` Change in % +10.2% +5.9% +6.3% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s A$ 345 A$ 140,816 A$ 45,681 Change in % -90.0% +21.1% +99.4%

Perth International Airport is the international and regional gateway to Western Australia. It is the closest large Australian airport to South East Asia, Europe and Africa. The airport ranks fourth in passenger traffic volume in Australia and handled 6.7 million passengers in the year under review, a smaller increase than in the previous period (10.2% instead of 16.4%), but still very substantial. Perth was one of the first batch of Australian airports whose operating leases were sold by the government in 1997. Westralia Airports Corporation (WAC), the company which operates Perth airport, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Airstralia Development Group (ADG) which consists of Australian banking and property interests. 16.1% of the shares were originally held by AGI, the US airport operating company, and these passed to TBI, which operated a number of secondary airports in Europe and the US, when the latter acquired AGI in 1999. During 2001, the TBI share was sold, with 15% going to BAA and the remaining 1.1% to Airstralia. As with Melbourne, the takeover of BAA by Ferrovial may have implications for the future ownership structure of Perth. The profitability of the airport is challenged by the high depreciation and interest cost the company bears. The EBITDA for this period is A$76.1 million but interes t payments alone accounted for A$60 million, and depreciation and amortisation for A$16.7 million. The strong growth in traffic translates into strong revenue growth, which is more than offset by an increase in overall costs of more than 50%. This was mostly due to write-offs and increased lease costs. Traffic volumes rose due to low cost carriers operations and the strong Australian Dollar, which resulted in a record number of international passengers from Perth. Retail benefited from a doubling of duty free allowances for international passengers. To enable the airport to deal with future developments, an A$ 20 m bond was issued to finance the expansion of Terminal 1, and a runway upgrade which includes the future ability to operate the new A 380 within the next years. Future growth will be mostly dependant on the overall development of the aviation market. Performance profile Perths profile shows mostly variations to the left (26 out of 35), but eight of these relate to belowaverage costs. The most significant variation is that of staff costs as a percentage of operative and staff costs (-1.50). The operating cost ratio is very close to average and total cost ratios are below average but to a lesser extent than the staff cost ratios. Revenue ratios indicate an above average importance for commercial revenues Perth and aeronautical revenue ratios that are significantly below average. This results in total revenue ratios that are below average, with the exception of revenue per employee which is well above average. The resulting profitability ratios are close to but below the mean, indicating a lower profitability than the average of the sample. Capex ratios are almost at average, asset ratios at or above average. The overall picture is one of an airport with high productivity levels, but one at which relatively low traffic levels impede revenue generation.

119

Perth
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,15 -0,21 -0,51 0,09 -0,22 0,77 -0,35 -0,70 0,05 0,65 0,98 0,92 -0,28 -0,79 -0,51 0,15 -1,02 -1,03 -0,90 -1,50 -0,05 -0,35 -0,62 -0,17 1,24 0,01 -0,80 -0,50 -0,97 -0,65 -0,30 0,59 -0,65 -0,33 -0,15

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

120

San Francisco
Number 33,185,424 240,439 587,603 Change in % +2.9% +0.9% +4.4% Value in 000s -USD 99,016 USD 583,776 USD 85,391 Change in % -80.1% +1.7% -14.9%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

During the year under review, San Franciscos passenger throughput was 33.2 million passengers, an increase of 5.9% compared to the previous year. Profits and revenues developed more strongly than traffic, reflecting fee increases in the preceding period. In December 2000 the airport completed its US$2.4 billion Master Plan construction programme with the opening of the new international terminal, doubling the size of the airport, and of related passenger and cargo facilities. The new terminal took the airport's capacity to 50 million passengers p.a.. It is designed to withstand an earthquake of more than eight on the Richter Scale, and its total construction costs amounted to USD 914 million. Around 50% of the programme cost was spent on features designed to reduce the airport's environmental impact, including a station for the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, and an internal transit system designed to replace a large number of road vehicle movements by shuttle buses. These extensive investments also lead to strong interest charges which challenge the airports profitability. To fill the excess capacity, carriers operating new destinations are offered special discounts on aeronautical fees. To date, there has been no recovery from the consequences of the events of September 11 2001, the Iraq crisis and SARS and none is expected for the near future. The main customers of San Francisco airport are challenged both by increasingly fierce competition both from old competitors and new ones (low cost carriers) and increasing fuel prices. However, load factors are at record levels. In 2001, San Francisco started collecting a Passenger Facility Charge. This came into force in October 2001 and will continue in force until 2007.

121

Performance profile
San Francisco
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,24 0,56 -0,51 -0,75 -0,61 0,15 -0,21 -1,13 0,95 -0,32 0,14 -0,25 -0,53 -1,35 -0,82 -0,68 0,37 0,38 0,47 0,36 0,09 0,38 0,38 0,26 -1,11 -0,65 -0,04 0,02 -0,40 -0,77 -0,01 -0,08 0,14 0,17 0,09

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

San Franciscos profile shows 16 variations above the average and 19 below. The variations below the average are generally larger than those above, with the largest variation being return on shareholders funds at -1.35. All profitability ratios are below average with the exception of net cash generation per passenger. Underlying this are slightly above average staff cost ratios and average operating cost ratios, resulting in above average total cost ratios. Commercial revenue per passenger is well below average (-0.65) but it is relatively insignificant (commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue -1.11) so aeronautical revenue per passenger which is close to the average is enough to produce above average total revenue per passenger. However, although the total revenue ratios are above average, the total cost ratios are more so, resulting in the negatively skewed profitability ratios. Capex ratios are below average as San Francisco airport is currently not undertaking significant investments, while correspondingly assets per passenger are high (0.95), reflecting the newness of the international terminal.

122

Singapore
Number 30,353,565 184,932 1,775,092 Change in % +23.1% +19.5% +10.2% Value in 000s S$ 440,000 S$ 971,000 S$ 380,599 Change in % +169.9% +24.5% +18.5%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

Singapore Changi airport is operated by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS), and handled 30.4 million passengers in f/y 2004/05, a new record for the airport, which opened in 1981. This indicates that Singapore has more than recovered from the effec t of September 11 2001 and SARS. Singapore airport is renowned for the high quality of its passenger terminals and its extensive range of retail outlets, though the latter is not particularly reflected in its rankings for unit commercial revenues. The airport consistently wins awards for the quality of its passenger facilities and service standards, gaining 19 in the year under review alone. Much of the attractiveness perceived by passengers in the terminals derives from CAAS's policy of providing capacity ahead of demand, which was reaffirmed in the latest annual report. During 2002, an extension of the Terminal 1 departure hall was completed, while work on the new Terminal 3 continued. The latter terminal is scheduled to be operational in 2008, and is expected to handle an additional 20 million passengers per year. Its construction is expected to cost S$1.75 billion. Also completed in 2003 was the extension of the Rapid Transit link to the city centre, with a journey time of 27 minutes. The upgrading work at Terminal 2 is due for completion by 2005, in time to compete with the new hub airport at Bangkok. In addition to the three terminals, Singapore is planning to build a terminal dedicated to Low Cost Carriers by 2006 worth S$ 45 million with an initial handling capacity of 2.7 million passengers p.a.. The international activities of CAAS include shares in London Luton airport through Alterra Partners and a joint venture in China, as well as consulting for Beijing airport in preparation of the forthcoming Olympic Games there. All internationally active subsidiaries or shares in c ompanies turned out profitable in the period under review. The management of CAAS continuously attempts to enter promising markets through consultancy or direct shareholding. The profitability of CAAS in the year under review was based on very strong traffic growth, exceeding both average global growth and that of the strongest region Asia. A total of nine new airlines started services from Singapore airport during the year. While costs increased by 4.1%, revenues grew strongly by 24.5%. Low cost carriers accounted for 2.7 million passengers or 7% of total traffic in the review period. A new dedicated terminal for low cost carriers is to be operative by 2006. In addition, Singapore will be the first base airport to commercially operate the Airbus A380 (expected by the end of 2006), as Singapore Airlines will be the first carrier to receive the new aircraft.

123

Performance profile
Singapore
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
1,15 0,49 -0,03 0,00 0,15 0,22 1,47 1,49 0,69 -0,37 2,52 -0,10 1,31 0,04 -0,03 0,95 -1,22 -0,92 -0,67 -1,18 -0,17 0,13 -0,32 0,49 1,15 0,98 -0,28 0,17 -1,06 -0,16 0,52 0,15 0,17 0,71 1,09

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Singapore`s profile shows 22 variations above the average of which passengers per ATM at +2.52 is the most significant. This ratio is an outlier compared to the two other output related ratios and can be explained by the role of Singapore as an international hub for long distance flights, which leads to high passenger loads. We regard this as one of the most important indicators, since it invariably generates above-average profitability. Total cost ratios per passenger are a little below average, with e staff cost ratios which are significantly below average, and operating cost ratios which are closer to average. Total revenue ratios are significantly above average, resulting from very high commercial revenue ratios. These allow for above average profitability ratios with the exceptions of return on shareholders funds and capital employed which are almost at average levels for the sample. Asset and capex ratios are around average, but the equity and liquidity ratios are above average levels, resulting from consistent profitability in the past allowing both equity and liquidity to be accumulated. The profile shows an airport with average cost levels but revenues which are well above average, leading to above average profits, while capex remains at average levels.

124

Stockholm Arlanda and the Swedish Airports Group


LFV PAX ATM Cargo+Mail Arlanda PAX ATM Cargo+Mail Number 27,959,620 618,084 217,000 Number 16,253,872 245,360 26,374 Change in % +5.5% +2.8% +8.4% Change in % +7.5% +6.0% -0.9% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s SEK 95,000 SEK 5,821,000 SEK 735,000 Value in 000s SEK 544,000 SEK 2,536,000 SEK 431,000 Change in % Loss in previous year +7.8% -45.9% Change in % +32.4% +12.5% -54.4%

The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration (Luftfartsverket - LFV) is responsible for all civil aviation operations, air traffic control and safety oversight/regulation in Sweden. It runs a total of 15 civil airports, and is responsible for civil operations at three military airfields, which have been opened to civil use. In January 2005, it was reorganised into the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority. The airport of Stockholm Arlanda is the main airport in this network and therefore considered separately. Financial targets for the new organisation remain a profit margin of 8% of revenue and an equity ratio over total assets of 25%. Price increases must not exceed a local consumer price index, whose base year is 1993. The resund Bridge was opened in July 2000, and it is increasing the competition between Copenhagen and Sturup airport (serving Malm in southern Sweden). In the longer term, LFV forecasts the development of synergies between the two airports. It has called for the urgent improvement of land connections to Sturup and a railway line to link the two airports. So far the improved surface links appear to have worked to the advantage of Sweden rather than Denmark, with significant numbers of Danes crossing the resund to use services from Sturup. This was no doubt partly due to the establishment of low-cost services between Sturup and London Stansted by Ryanair. The Groups Report and Accounts stresses the systemic approach taken to the operation of the network of airports and the fact that in the case of the smaller airports there is little or no prospect of profitability ever being achieved. However, LFV continues operating them to contribute to regional development policy. The Regional airports division comprises 15 airports or military airfields and of these, only two showed an operating surplus in 2004, as in the five previous years. A new operational model for these unprofitable airports is being developed and staff levels are under review. Investment in new infrastructure has declined as most improvements planned have been accomplished in recent years. Most investment still focuses on the main airport at Arlanda. These past investments are the main source of the 4% cost increase for the group total, as depreciation, capital cost and cost for restructuring measurements drive costs. The increase in profit results from a stronger growth in traffic, generating 8% growth in overall revenues in the review period. The main traffic growth driver was international traffic with 7.9% passenger growth compared to 2.9% for domestic traffic. Airside revenues account for around two thirds of overall revenues. Shortage of airport capacity in the Stockholm region has been a problem for a number of years. Proposals to develop a new airport to the south of the city were rejected during 2000 and LFVs policy switched to one of improving capacity at the existing Stockholm airports at Arlanda and Bromma. In 2003, the construction of a third runway and a new Control Tower at Arlanda were completed. Furthermore, the expansion of the North Terminal was completed in 2003 which was necessary following the entry of Sweden into the Schengen area in March 2001. A government Commission of Inquiry has given LFV permission to continue discussions with the Municipality around Arlanda with a view to developing a fourth runway. However, a major redevelopment for the existing Terminals 2, 3 and 4 was shelved following the traffic downturn after September 11 2001. Further challenges arise from the regulation of emissions at Arlanda which will soon arrive at their regulated limit after which no further traffic growth will be allowed. The airport operator is trying to renegotiate this arrangement as it argues that even a maintained limit would only lead to a diversion but not a prevention of additional traffic and therefore emissions. As there will be no new airport built in the near future, the traffic system will evolve around an increasingly important Arlanda airport as a gateway for international traffic, which accounted for
125

65.8% of total traffic in the year under review . The smaller airports are likely to be reorganized in a manner that minimizes inevitable financial losses but which maintains their function in terms of social and economic development. Performance profile s In the case of the overall Group the effects of operating unprofitable regional airports are reflected in the indicators of which all but 8 are below average. The largest variation is passengers per ATM (-1.59) reflecting the large number of operations with small regional aircraft. Unsurprisingly, commercial revenues are well below average while aeronautical revenues are slightly above average. Cost ratios are both above and below average, while profitability measures generally significantly below average (operating profit per passenger -1.34, return on capital employed -0.92). Capex, asset, liquidity and equity ratios are all below average.
Swedish Airports Group
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,72 0,09 -0,51 -0,53 -0,48 -0,52 -0,39 -0,69 -0,58 -0,07 -1,59 -0,41 -1,34 -0,53 -0,92 -1,38 0,61 0,28 -0,31 0,28 0,08 -0,32 0,34 -0,48 -0,92 -0,71 0,24 -0,36 1,15 -0,37 -0,49 -0,43 -0,18 -0,67 -0,70

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Stockholms profile shows 23 out of 35 variations below average, but very few are significant, with 27 out of 35 being within the range of +0.5/-0.5. The largest variation is aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total revenues with +1.22, reflecting aeronautical revenues and commercial revenues which are above and below average in roughly equal proportions. Cost ratios are slightly below or just at average levels. This in turn leads to average or slightly above average profitability ratios. All ratios for assets, capex and equity are slightly below average. The disparity between Stockholms profile and that of the Group demonstrates the extent to which Stockholm is needed to cross-subsidise the loss-making airports in the Group.

126

Stockholm
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,02 0,47 -0,36 -0,56 -0,44 -0,46 -0,33 -0,34 -0,69 -0,06 -0,85 -0,20 0,11 0,35 0,48 -0,03 -0,13 -0,09 -0,27 -0,12 0,08 -0,21 0,01 -0,31 -0,99 -0,63 0,51 0,13 1,22 0,50 -0,10 -0,06 0,05 -0,23 -0,35

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

127

Sydney
Number 28,300,000 286,484 554,000 Change in % +7.0% +17.7% +16.6% Value in 000s A$ -218.133 A$ 619,219 A$ 128,102 Change in % -17.5% +12.9% +37.1%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

Sydney airport (Kingsford Smith) was the last major Australian airport to be operated as a State owned corporation. Sydney Airport Corporation Ltd (SACL) was incorporated in May 1998 when all the other major airports had been privatised and Australia's Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) was disbanded. When SACL was established it was also given responsibility for the management of three general aviation airports at Bankstown, Hoxton Park and Camden, but it disposed of its interests in these during f/y 2000/01. The remaining shares in public ownership were sold off in 2002. Capacity at Kingsford Smith is constrained by the physical size of the site, and the possibility of constructing a second airport has been discussed for many years. However, in December 2000 Australia's Federal Cabinet decided to shelve the construction of a proposed A$5 billion (US$2.81 billion) new airport at Badgerys Creek, west of Sydney, for at least 10 years. This was intended to clear the way for the privatisation of Kingsford Smith and to increase its value. The Federal government does, however, plan to legislate to protect the Badgerys Creek site against adjacent development incompatible with its use as an airport. The privatisation of Kingsford Smith had been under consideration for some time, and following the resolution of the matters relating to Badgerys Creek the Government announced, in March 2001, its intention to dispose of its interest in the airport through a trade sale. Expressions of interest were sought in April 2001 and at that time it was expected that the sale process would be completed by the end of 2001. The process was halted immediately after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, but the government announced in March 2002 that it was being resumed. In June 2002 the Government announced that a sale to Southern Cross Airports Corporation (SCAC) had been agreed, at a cost of A$5.588 billion (US$3.14 billion). SCAC has three main partners, Macquarie Bank, Hochtief and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Traffic growth in the year under review was driven by international passengers (+8% compared to 6.8% domestic growth) mainly to and from Hong Kong, Shanghai, Dubai and London Heathrow. Revenue has grown for five consecutive years. The most important passenger groups are tourists to and from New Zealand and Australia. Despite its high degree of diversification (48% of all revenues are airside revenues) and continued revenue growth, profitability suffers from substantial dividend and interest payments and the loss in the period under review was caused by these factors. The EBITDA for the review period was almost 80% of turnover but depreciation equalled 22.5% of total revenues and borrowing costs 92.3% of total revenues. Future growth can be expected at the airport which continues to expand its business, e.g. with new office and parking facilities in 2005/06 and the ability to accommodate the new A380 by mid 2006. This is also indicated by the expanded capital expenditure. T he airport showed with a successful refinancing of A$3.155 billion that it has the ability to manage its debt and operations. Profitability can be expected as revenue grows further so as to outweigh the current burden of debt repayment and depreciation.

128

Performance profile
Sydney
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
2,11 1,03 -0,51 -0,50 -0,50 -0,21 -1,52 1,27 2,89 0,26

Performance Indicator

1,29

-0,30 1,64 -1,48 -1,23 -1,15 -0,94 -1,05 -0,68 -0,89 -0,51 0,56 0,03 -0,39 -0,24 -0,34 1,27 -0,19

-0,33 -0,19 -0,15

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Sydneys profile is characterised by a lot of significant variations both to left and right, with only 12 out of 35 variations being between -0.5 and +0.5. Four variations are beyond the scale of the graph: total revenue per employee +3.37, return on shareholders funds +3.95, passengers per employee +3.03 and assets per employee +4.80. As with the other Australian airports staff numbers are low, which shifts all staff related ratios to the right. Cost ratios are all below average, especially staff cost ratios. The commercial revenue ratio is at average but for Sydney commercial revenues as a percentage of total revenues are still more important than for the average airport. While aeronautical revenue ratios are slightly below average, they still deviate strongly to the right in relation to total costs. Total revenue ratios are slightly below average with the exception of the staff related ratio. The overall picture is one of average profitability ratios which are significantly above average, with the exception of return on capital employed (-0.30). The profile shows an airport with a very competitive cost structure and close to average revenue levels.

129

Tokyo Narita
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 31,773,736 186,633 2,297,550 Change in % +18.2% +0.2% +6.8% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s 8,064,600 175,966,000 46,641,000 Change in % Loss in previous year +15.4% -32.3%

Tokyo Narita is Japans principal international airport. It handled 31.8 million passengers during the year under review, a complete recovery from the effects of the SARS crisis in the previous year. In terms of absolute passenger numbers, Narita is still overshadowed by the older Haneda airport, which handled about 62 million passengers in 2004, almost all of whom were using domestic services. Narita also has considerable importance as a cargo airport and is the third busiest cargo airport globally. Traffic is largely international with 83.4% of all passengers in the year under review. International cargo grew by 13% in the year. Despite the continued developments, the airport is highly dependent on airside revenues, which account for 70% of total revenues. The airport opened in 1978 after protracted delays in securing the purchase of land, due to resistance on the part of various, mainly farming, landowners. It was built with a single main runway. It has now been capacity constrained for many years, but attempts to construct a second parallel runway also met with resistance from landowners to the sale of various pockets of land. A compromise interim solution had to be adopted, under which a runway of only 2,180 metres opened in April 2002. This is not only shorter than the intended runway length of 2,500 metres but also further from the area of the terminals. At the time of its opening capacity limits were expected to be reached by 2007 at 41 million passengers. In 2005, a six year project to extend the parallel runway to the originally intended 2,500 m etres began, allowing for further growth in the future which is still challenged by unresolved conflicts between landowners and the airport. Naritas other major long-running infrastructure project is the incremental expansion of the original terminal, which began in 1995. This has seen four incremental stages of growth between 1995 and 2002, consisting of new satellites and the expansion of existing facilities, with a further three stages planned for the period to 2005/06. Capital expenditure in the year under review concentrated on apron pavement construction and reconstruction work to expand the capacity of Terminal 1. Further projects aim at improving the railway connection to the airport and preparations for the operations by the new A380 from 2007. Narita International Airport Co., a public corporation wholly owned by the government was established in April 2004. This was the first step towards privatization, with an IPO or take-over to follow later on but no further steps were taken in the period under review. Until the capacity problems are solved, no further developments in terms of the privatization are expected. For the future, the airport aims to diversify its income base through commercial activities. Also, the concept of an e-airport is intended to enhance comfort for passengers by extensive on-line and electronic applications including RFID for all passengers throughout the airport. Future profits depend mostly on the ability to extend the second runway and to achieve higher revenues overall and a higher degree of diversification.

130

Performance profile
Tokyo Narita
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,12 1,64 0,73 -0,38 1,31 2,44 -0,41 -0,79

Performance Indicator

-0,14 2,71 0,21 1,35 0,02 -0,64 -0,70 -0,65 1,62 2,65 -0,83

-0,57 2,73

1,11 -0,03

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Tokyos profile shows 13 variations that are outside of the scale of the graph. Examples include total costs per passenger +4.54, aeronautical revenue per passenger +5.90, aeronautical revenue per ATM +6.28, and total revenue per passenger +4.51. These massive variations mainly originate from the high price levels and land values in Japan, although high passenger per ATM levels (+2.71) also have an effect in pushing up revenues. With both costs and revenues above average, the profitability measures are average for EBITDA, operating profit per passenger and return on shareholders funds, above average for cash generation and below average for return on capital employed and operating profit.

131

Toronto
Number 28,600,000 403,778 300,000 Change in % +15.1% +8.8% +7.1% Value in 000s C$ -112.336 C$ 832,014 C$3,211,000 Change in % +68.2% +28.6% -64.4%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Loss Total Rev. CAPEX

Toronto is Canadas busiest airport, handling 28.6 million passengers in the year under review and is operated by the non-profit organisation Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA). The strong growth indicates a recovery from the SARS crisis which affected Toronto particularly badly, but traffic levels are still a little below those of 2000. The GTAA was incorporated in 1993 as a not-for-profit corporation without share capital. I t has a mandate to operate the airport on a commercial basis, and it accordingly sets its aeronautical fees to cover its projected operating and capital costs, including debt service requirements, capital requirements for maintenance and reinvestment in existing facilities. Operating costs include a ground lease payable to the Federal government, as at Calgary. Revenues from commercial sources are offset against operating costs before aeronautical charges are calculated. The loss for the period under review significantly exceeds that for the prior period despite the strong growth in traffic and revenues, due to the regulatory approach which does not allow for non-cash items to be considered within the fee calculation and the substantial rise in finance costs (+70%) and depreciation/amortization (+95%) consuming all increases in revenues and profit. Strongest growth drivers for revenues were increased traffic with increased tariffs and for strong international passenger growth. Overall costs rose by 32.3% while revenues rose by 28.6% . The airport announced a major 10-year development programm e in 1999, consisting of (amongst others): a new infield area for freight and ancillary services and an infield apron area; the addition of two new runways and associated taxiways, each closely parallel to the two existing runways of which the first was completed in October 2002; a new single terminal (T1 New) to replace the old terminals 1 and 2, with the first phase opened in April 2004. Incremental additions to the new terminal will open in 2006 and 2008, with a fourth stage opening as demand dictates thereafter. Two gates able to operate the new A380

The combined capacity of T1-New and T3 will ultimately be 50 million passengers p.a. The cost for the new Terminal 1 amounted to C$3.6 billion (US$2.37 billion) and as such it is one of the most expensive terminals in the world. The cost of this largest private-sector infrastructure project in Canada was financed by bonds issued and increased charges for airlines. The related interest shows in the review periods result. Operations were successfully moved from the old to the new terminal 1 in April 2004. With the further capacity enhancements planned, the airport should be able to generate further traffic and regain profitability within the restrictions of its regulation.

132

Performance profile
Toronto
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,44 1,01 -0,68 -1,19 -1,04 0,95 -0,48 -1,02 1,55 0,27 -0,69 0,12 -0,42 -1,20 -0,86 -0,68 -0,81 -0,48 -0,56 -1,32 1,23 0,27 0,61 0,02 -1,67 -0,96 1,35 0,78 2,34 0,59 0,34 0,63 0,39 0,07 -0,14

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Torontos profile shows a number of significant variations in both directions, with six negative variations of more than -1.0 and five positive variations of more than +1.0. The largest variation is aeronautical revenues as percentage of total revenue at +2.34. This value is offset by low commercial revenues per passenger (-0.96) are offset so that overall revenue ratios are only slightly above average. For costs, staff cost ratios are all well below average, but these are off-set by above average operating cost ratios, resulting in above average total costs. This and the average revenues account for below average profitability measures, where the only exception is a strong net cash generation per passenger (+1.01). Other significant variations are those of equity ratio (-1.02), capex ratios (-1.19 and -1.04) and assets per employee (+0.95). The three last components are related to the recent completion of an investment programme including the opening of the new Terminal 1. Overall, the profile shows an airport with very competitive staff cost ratios but above average total costs, while commercial revenues ratios are well below average and not completely offset by high aeronautical revenues. Profitability measures therefore remain under the average values of the sample.

133

Vancouver
Number 15,700,000 270,400 233,926 Change in % +9.8% +8.0% +8.5% Value in 000s C$ 44,838 C$ 299,918 C$ 123,555 Change in % +90.8% +9.3% +103.3%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

Vancouver has been run as a locally managed, not-for-profit (NFP) airport authority since 1992, having been privatised by Transport Canada, the State entity with responsibility for airport and air traffic control operations. It is Canada's main international gateway for trans-Pacific traffic and the country's second largest airport, handling 15.7 million passengers in 2004; in addition, it is the second busiest international gateway on the West Coast of the continent. Future traffic volumes are expected to be 21 million passengers by 2010 and 23 million passengers by 2013. When the airport authority took control in 1992 there were a number of pressing needs for infrastructure improvements and additions. An extensive capital investment programme through most of the 1990s, including the opening of a new runway and international terminal, means that there are now no significant capacity problems at the airport and capital projects are therefore relatively modest. A major upgrading of the domestic terminal, including new baggage sorting and flight information systems and self-service check-in facilities, was completed in 2002 and the International Terminal Building was also upgraded and completed in 2004 to accommodate the 23 mppa expected by 2013. The strong traffic growth indicates a recovery from the effects of the SARS and Iraq War crises. Revenues were further enhanced as tariffs were raised. Aeronautical revenue accounts for 58.5% of overall revenues, and 19.9% of total revenues originate from the airport improvement fee collected to refinance capital expenditure. The increase in profitability was based on a stable cost level (+2.1% in review period) whilst revenues increased in line with traffic (+9.3% more revenues overall). The airport authority is active in selling its expertise externally, to 19 airports in Canada, Chile and elsewhere, and to various locations where it has taken over parts of the management of operations. The rent paid to the government of Canada for the land on which the airport is situated represents the biggest share of the operating expenses and accounts for a quarter of overall revenues. To prepare for expected traffic development, the airport is already able to operate the new A380 and continued to improve its infrastructure, such as its local rail connections and further terminal improvements, in the period under review. Also the airport is attempting to achieve a review of the lease cost to improve its financial position.

134

Performance profile
Vancouver
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
-0,91 -0,51 -0,50 0,17 -0,03 -0,14 -0,12 0,41 -0,79 1,14 -1,13 0,63 -0,73 0,02 -0,37 -0,61 -0,76 -0,80 -0,91 -1,44 0,57 -0,44 -0,20 -0,49 -1,21 -1,01 -0,19 -0,43 0,58 -0,24 -0,48 0,55 -0,43 -0,63 -0,63

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

This profile is significantly skewed to the left, with only 7 out of 35 variations to the right. The strongest variation is that for staff cost as a percentage of operating and staff cost of -1.44 which indicates the very competitive labour cost ratios, as is also the case at the other Canadian airports. These are only partially offset by above average operating cost ratios, resulting in below average total cost ratios. The revenue ratios show that aeronautical and commercial revenue ratios are below average compared to the sample. Aeronautical revenues as a percentage of total revenues are more important for Vancouver than for the mean of the sample. Profitability ratios are all below average, while capex, asset and equity ratios are at average. Like the other Canadian airports, this airport shows competitive labour cost ratios which are off-set by above average operating cost and below average revenues, resulting in below average profitability measures.

135

Vienna
Number 14,800,000 224,809 209,625 Change in % +15.7% +14.1% +21.0% Value in 000s 71,700 398,300 185,300 Change in % +1.2% +14.3% +60.9%

PAX ATM Cargo+Mail

Profit Total Rev. CAPEX

Vienna International Airport achieved a passenger throughput of 12.8 million passengers in the year under review, an increase of 6.8% compared to the previous year, restoring traffic to a little over its 2000 level. This was a record for the airport. The effects of the industry downturn in 2001 had been tempered in Viennas case by the entry in the previous year of Austrian Airlines into the Star Alliance, resulting in significant increases in the number of transfer passengers. The 2003 traffic figures were again maintained by high transfer passenger numbers, now accounting for 33.9% of total passengers, while passenger numbers still increased in the year under review. Turnover increased slightly, to 348.4 million (US$400.2 million), and post tax profit increased by 0.8%, to 70.8 million (US$81.3 million), Ground handling revenues fell slightly, but still accounted for 32% of turnover. The introduction in 2000 of competition in this area in compliance with the European Commissions Directive appears to have had relatively little effect on the airports handling business: while turnover decreased by 11% between 2000 and 2002, operating profit was hardly affected, and while EBIT in 2003 was down it still represented a 13% margin. An otherwise largely static financial result was improved by savings in personnel expenses, due to reversals in provisions for pensions made possible by the settlement of pension claims. In the year under review operating profit remained largely unchanged. Flughafen Wien Group was one of the first airports in Europe, after BAA, to be subject to a privatisation process. Unusually 10% of the total shares are owned by the airport itself, being placed in an Employee Foundation. As a result, the airport is able to pay employees a dividend on the shares held by the Foundation, and in so doing has been able to reduce employment costs by terminating a bonus scheme which operated previously. The airport has for some time been active in seeking to capitalise on its location near to the developing economies of Eastern Europe, and in developing transfer traffic between those countries and Western Europe. Following improvements in border crossing procedures with ten of the 2004 Accession States, it is expected that the number of potential passengers within a two hour surface journey of Vienna airport will increase by 155%. The airport has been working to a Master Plan, which is based on traffic forecasts of around 20 million passengers by 2010. A major expansion to the terminal, known as VIE-Skylink, will add 13 17 additional aircraft parking spaces at the new Pier South. This had been scheduled for completion in 2007, although the airport is attempting to keep its investment scheduling flexible in the light of the slowdown in traffic growth. An additional runway is also expected to be built by around 2010. Vienna airport is attempting to expand into airport operations outside Austria. It has a 5% interest in the company contracted to build and operate a new international passenger terminal at Istanbul Airport, which opened in January 2000. In addition, in 2002 a consortium led by Vienna won a 40% stake in a 65-year concession to operate Malta International Airport. On the other hand its attempts to take a stake in the new Berlin Brandenburg International airport ultimately proved unsuccessful, and the 2002 financial statements included a 1.6 million (US$1.58 million) write-off of its investment in this venture. The airport also announced in the review year its complete withdrawal from the project to construct a greenfield airport in the Spanish city of Cuidad Real. Performance profile Viennas profile shows a strong deviation to the right. T he largest variations are staff costs per passenger at +2.50 and staff costs as percentage of operating and staff costs at 2.52, indicating well above average staff cost ratios. Operating costs in turn are below average and total cost ratios only slightly above average, which means that below and above-average values almost offset one another. Revenue ratios also deviate to the right. Commercial revenues are slightly above average but are not as important for Vienna as for the rest of the sample, while aeronautical revenues are above average and more important for Vienna than for the rest of the sample. Total revenue ratios vary only slightly from the average except for total revenue per passenger which deviates by +0.92.
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Profitability ratios are above average with EBITDA close to average. Capex, asset and liquidity ratios do not differ significantly from the average, but the equity ratio is at +0.83 which may be related to the partial privatization in the past that included an IPO. Overall the profile shows an airport with slightly above total cost and total revenue ratios, resulting in above average profits, while there are no other significant variations.

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Washington Dulles and National


Dulles PAX ATM Cargo+Mail Number 22,648,372 393,331 135,548 Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 15,903,324 265,765 2,061 Change in % +35.4% +51.3% +10.6% Change in % 12.5% +7.0% -1.6% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s US$4,769 US$306,094 US$309,704 Value in 000s 53,635 201,868 40,228 Change in % Loss in previous year +18.3% +36.8% Change in % +72.2% +13.5% -28.9%

The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) operates the two Washington airports of Dulles and National under a lease from the US Department of Transportation: its duration was recently extended until 2067. The Authority's Annual Report is sufficiently detailed for separate analyses of the two airports to be made, a nd this allows us the opportunity to examine the performance of two similarly sized airports operated by the same organisation, with the main difference being that National is a purely domestic airport, while 25% of Dulles total traffic is international. Dulles airport suffered significant traffic reductions in 2002 and these continued in 2003, albeit at a lesser rate of 1.7%. The reductions were triggered initially as a result of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and then by SARS and the Iraq war. Both airports were closed in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, along with all other US airports, and while Dulles was re-opened reasonably quickly, National remained closed until 4 October 2001. It was operating at 90% of its pre-September 11 activity level by the end of 2003. Dulles airport has recovered from the adverse affects of these events with a boom in passenger growth, seven times stronger than the US average in the period under review. The period saw two new low cost carriers starting operations at Dulles. The systems profitability is founded on the strong traffic growth and the ability to generate commercial revenues. 28.9% of total revenue originates from car rental business alone. Challenges arise mostly from legal restrictions, e.g. the restrictions on cargo throughputs at Reagan National airport. While revenues increased strongly, cost increased only slowly, mostly due to an increase in depreciation, which was to be expected with the amount of new facilities commencing operations in recent years. Dulles Airport was the fastest growing major airport in the world in 1999 and a number of major projects were scheduled to be carried out in the period to 2006. For the period from 2001 to 2011, an extension programme worth USD 3.97 billion was approved. The Airports Authority is operationally self-supporting, using aircraft landing fees and revenues from concessions to fund operating expenses. The Capital Development Program is funded by bonds issued by the Authority, Federal a nd State Airport Improvement Program funds, and Passenger Facility Charges. MWAA is unusual among US airports in that its aeronautical charging structure is based on a sharing of total net profits from all airport activities, including commercial operations. This is a similar approach to the system of pricing based on a "single till" appraisal of revenues used in the case of the regulated UK airports, but it differs from the general US approach of pricing, under which prices are set according to the residue of costs left after all commercial revenues have been taken into account. The system operates through the adjustment of each year's charges to take account of the share of the previous years profit due to airline users.

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Performance profiles
Washington Dulles
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,34 -1,36 -0,51 1,97 1,32 0,43 -0,05 -0,87 0,71 0,40 -1,15 0,08 -0,47 -0,12 -0,75 -0,31 -0,14 -0,40 -0,61 0,15 -0,51 -0,50 -0,28 -0,53 1,68 0,54 -0,80 -0,81 -1,52 -1,18 -0,70 -0,02 -0,41 -0,63 -0,63

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Washingtons international airport shows a mostly below average profile with only 10 variations above average, although all cost ratios are below average. The strongest variation is capex as a percentage of turnover at +1.97, caused by a major expansion programme at the airport. The second largest variation is commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue at +1.68. Aeronautical revenue ratios are well below average in all categories, with a stronger variation than the commercial revenue ratio. As a result overall revenue ratios are slightly below average levels. Cost-wise, all cost ratios are below average except for staff costs as a percentage of operating and staff costs which is slightly above average. Total cost ratios are below average, too, but not by as much as total revenue ratios. This results in negative variations for most of the profitability ratios: all except EBITDA rate are below average.

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Washington National
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,26 0,37 -0,51 -0,58 -0,61 -0,34 -0,06 -0,33 -0,60 0,21 -1,07 -0,05 0,10 0,61 0,13 0,48 0,05 -0,36 -0,55 0,37 -0,60 -0,69 -0,61 -0,63 2,31 0,74 -1,05 -0,96 -2,23 -1,26 -0,78 -0,21 -0,51 -0,66 -0,64

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Washington Nationals profile is quite similar to that of Dulles. Its profile mostly deviates to the left, with the strongest variation being commercial revenue as a percentage of total revenue at +2.31. Commercial revenues per passengers are also above average. Aeronautical revenues in turn are well below average for all ratios, leading to total revenue ratios also being below average in all categories. Cost ratios are below average, almost at the level of the total revenue rates. This explains the slightly above average profitability ratios. Also notable about the airport is the strong variation for passengers per ATM (-1.07) due to a large number of relatively small regional aircraft and the below average ratios for capex and asset ratios. The main difference between Dulles and National is therefore in respect of capex, which is below average for National and above average for Dulles. National also achieves above average performance in return on shareholders funds and operating profit, unlike Dulles.

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Zurich
Number PAX ATM Cargo+Mail 17,252,906 266,660 362,939 Change in % +1.3% -1% -6.9% Profit Total Rev. CAPEX Value in 000s CHF 17,301 CHF 637,000 CHF 200,100 Change in % +458.2% +13.5% -34.1%

Zurich is Switzerlands largest airport and handled a total of 17.25 million passengers in the year under review. This result was significantly worse than at most other European airports because of the consequences of the collapse at the beginning of October 2001 of Swissair, the principal carrier based at the airport, which resulted in the grounding of the entire Swissair fleet at Zurich airport. The new airline Swiss International, which was formed out of the former Swissair and Crossair, its regional counterpart, is approximately 25% smaller than its predecessor and therefore the passenger capacity is far less. Therefore, Zurich has lost some of its function as a hub, indicated by the continued decline of the share of transfer passengers in overall traffic (from 35% of all passengers down to 28% while overall volume declined strongly). The airport underwent the first stage in a privatisation process during 2000. This consisted of an Initial Public Offering of 28% of the shares to the public and institutional investors in November 2000. By the end of 2000 the public sector holding had fallen to 52.7% by the Canton of Zurich and 5.4% by the City of Zurich. The Cantons holding was further reduced to 49% during 2001. For private shareholders, voting rights are limited by law to a maximum of 5%, leaving the control of the company with the public authorities. No significant changes occurred in the period under review. A new operating licence valid for 50 years was issued to the new airport operating company, called Unique Flughafen Zurich, in June 2001. Unique was formed out of the former airport property division (FIG) in what has been referred to as a reverse takeover. This entailed the transfer of the airports assets and liabilities by the Canton to Unique in exchange for shares in the airport to the value of the assets. The share capital required was created via an increase in capital achieved through the IPO. The disagreement between Germany and the airport over the approach routes of aircraft to the airport has still not improved, leading to a considerable noise impact on one of the most expensive real estate areas in Europe to the east of the airport. No changes seem to be underway as attempts to find a different solution have failed so far. The problem stems from the level set for a quota limit on flights over Germany at sensitive times of the day and week. In the review period, increased profitability resulted mostly from the increase in traffic, the first after three consecutive years of traffic volume decline. The additional traffic resulted mostly from more local originating passengers, which indicates the change of the airport away from an international hub to a local airport. The retail and car parking business developed especially strongly, reaching results of the level before the collapse of Swissair. Aviation revenue grew overall at 7% due to higher fees while non-aeronautical revenue grew at 18.9%. Costs in turn mostly increased, with growing depreciation values, which occurred due to newly built facilities. As well as its activities in Switzerland, Unique operates internationally in Venezuela, India and Chile. The fifth and final building phase of an extensive and heavily delayed extension program was completed in the review period. The work included a new railway terminal, new metro and road tunnels, taxiways and new apron areas and various terminal developments including an expanded commercial area. Challenges for Zurich arise from the review of the aviation policy through the government where strong local resistance poses a threat towards future traffic growth and the continued problems with Germany.

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Performance profile
Zurich
EBITDA as Percentage of Turn-Over Net Cash Generation per PAX Taxation Effect CAPEX as Percentage of Turnover CAPEX per PAX Assets per Employee Liquidity Ratio Equity Ratio Total Assets per PAX ATUs per Employee PAX per ATM PAX per employee Operating Profit per PAX Return on Shareholders Funds Return on Capital Employed Operating Profit Staff Costs as Percentage of Turnover Staff Costs per PAX Staff Costs per 1,000 ATUs Staff Costs as a Percentage of Operating and Staff Costs Operating Costs per PAX Total Cost per 1,000 ATUs Total Costs per PAX Total Costs per ATM Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenue Commercial Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per PAX Aeronautical Revenue per 1000 ATUs Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Revenue Aeronautical Revenues as a Percentage of Total Cost Aeronautical Revenue per ATM Total Revenue per Employee Total Revenue per PAX Total Revenue per 1,000 ATUs Total Revenue per ATM
0,13 0,40 -0,78 -0,16 0,47 -0,18 -0,45 -0,62 1,01 -0,52 -0,56 -0,53 0,06 -0,23 -0,53 -0,61 -0,01 0,84 0,63 0,15 0,81 0,88 1,37 0,45 0,34 1,42 0,81 0,46 -0,39 -0,73 0,16 -0,10 1,24 0,72 0,30

Performance Indicator

-3

-2

-1

0 Z-Value

Zurichs profile is mainly deviating to the right, although this includes all of the cost categories. The strongest deviation is commercial revenue per passenger at +1.42: commercial revenues are also slightly more important for Zurich as a percentage of total revenues than for the sample. Aeronautical revenue ratios per passenger and 1,000 ATUs are also above the samples mean but account for less of the total cost and total revenues than the average. Total revenue indicators show above average income ratios, especially total revenue per passenger at +1.24. Within the above-average costs, staff cost ratios vary more strongly than operating cost ratios. The total cost ratios deviate more strongly above the average than the total revenue ratios for passenger and ATM ratios and vice versa for ratios relating to 1,000 ATUs. Profitability measures are all below average apart from EBITDA and operating profit per passenger which are at average levels and net cash generation which is at +0.40. Also notable is the variation of total assets per passenger of +1.01, indicating spare capacity following the collapse of Swissair. Overall, the profile shows an airport with spare capacity, above-average cost and revenue structures but higher ratio variations for costs than revenue, with consequent average or below average profit measures.

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5.

MEASURING TOTAL PERFORMANCE

Introduction Section 3 provides the reader with a series of measures w hich look at various aspects of airport performance. These are sometimes referred to as partial performance measures. There has for some time been a debate, largely within academic circles, as to whether a series of measures of this kind which examine performance in a particular industry can in some way be combined, so as to produce a single measure which assesses total or overall performance. We have explored this subject jointly with Durham University Business School since 1998. The School has been supplied with the data used as a basis for analysis within this publication, and has applied various different analytical techniques to them. Much of the content of this section is a distillation of the work which Durham has carried out on this subject. Their work continues to make a very helpful contribution to research in this area. Data Envelopment Analysis In 1998, we attempted to apply a process known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA defines efficiency as the ratio of a weighted sum of outputs divided by a weighted sum of inputs. This process has been applied to various industries which were the subject of research over a period of around 20 years. DEA relies on the concept of making comparisons based on weightings which are unique to each airport so as to maximise the efficiency of each airport in turn. The results of the initial work based on this principle produced an efficiency ranking in which the top 22 airports were equally ranked as being 100% efficient. We understand that this is a common problem encountered in linear programmes (such as DEA) which are assessing greater numbers of units of assessment than attributes. Nevertheless, a result of this nature seemed to us to be not particularly helpful in identifying airport best practice. A second approach was made in which a common set of weights was applied in place of the individual efficiency maximising set. This produced a more plausible distribution of results, but a number of the results were unexpected, to the extent that they caused us to have misgivings about the process as a whole. In exploring relatively new techniques of analysis such as this it is clearly possible that some results will be surprising, but the number of counter-intuitive results was such that the process did not appear to be producing answers which the industry at large would find plausible or acceptable. This may have been as a result of the combination of inputs (operating costs, personnel costs, employee numbers, capital expenditure and total assets) and outputs (three categories of revenue, passengers, cargo and mail) which were chosen. A smaller range of variables might have produced different results, but this would have defeated the purpose of seeking a measure which encompassed a wide cross-section of performance measures. Multi-Attribute Assessments In 1999, we moved away from the use of DEA and concentrated instead on an approach known as multi-attribute assessment, which combines a number of performance measures as a weighted sum. Six measures were chosen, whose performance may be regarded as being optimised either when maximised or minimised, as shown below:
Measure EBITDA Concession revenues per passenger Aeronautical revenues per ATM ATUs per unit of asset value ATUs per employee Operating plus staff costs per passenger Optimisation requirement Maximise Maximise Minimise Maximise Maximise Minimise

The analysis presented here is a development of the analyses made in previous years. For each measure, each airport has been measured according to how it has performed relative to the other airports in the set. Airports were given a score of one if they were the best performer and zero if they were the worst, so that these values represent the degree to which the best observed performance has been matched. This is one articulation of the concept of benchmarking. An overall summary measure for each airport may be found as the weighted sum of these six relative performance scores. The weights in such an analysis usually represent the prioriti es of whoever is carrying out the analysis or receiving the results of the analysis. Either statements may be made
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directly about the relative values of weights, or some small decision problems are presented (such as two airports and two measures) and a choice made as to which is the superior performance. From such statements a set of values for weights may be inferred which best reflects the views expressed. These expressions of opinion as to the appropriate different relative weights are not always easy to justify empirically and, especially when the results (as here) are for third parties which the analyst may not be in a position to assess fully, the imposition of one viewpoint may not be helpful. It is common, therefore, to make an analysis using equal weights, thereby putting equal emphasis on all six aspects of performance, since this may be taken as the most neutral stance. However, although these equal weights present a good basis for analysis it is unlikely that a strict adherence is either reasonable or feasible. It is more likely to be the case that "about equal" weights more accurately reflect the viewpoint taken and, further, that there is some inherent uncertainty as to what these "about equal" values ought to be. A well-tried method of modelling this uncertainty is to give probability distributions for the value of each weight and this is the approach taken in our analysis. All weights were described by symmetric triangular probability distributions, the most likely value being one sixth and the range being zero to one third; in other words each weight was one sixth plus or minus one sixth. If there is uncertainty in the inputs to the evaluation model then there must correspondingly be uncertainty as to the outputs, namely the assessed performance for each airport. As a result it is not necessarily possible to discriminate between all pairs of airports and so it may be preferred that a ranking, as provided in the case of the main series of individual performance measures in this publication, is not given. What is possible, however, is to seek those groups of airports which seem to have reasonably similar levels of performance and then to rank order these. This was the approach used here. First, groups of airports were identified in which none of the constituent airports could be said to differ significantly from any other. These groups are called blocks. Most airports were members of a block but one airport was significantly different from all others, and was called a singleton. The inter-block differences identified by the cluster analysis were significantly different at the 95% confidence level. Blocks were then ranked according to the average performance of airports in each group. The scaling approach used for the past two years is a normalisation scale (x-mean)/(standard deviation) called Normal z. This ensures a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1, so negative scores mean below average performance, rather than scores below 0.5 as is the case with the linear scaling approach which we used prior to 2005. The primary argument in favour of normalising is that inasmuch as the airport data represent a sample of all airports this scaling is more robust, being less sensitive to sampling fluctuations. It is believed that this method provides a way of making some useful discrimination between airports based upon their performance. At this stage no more discrimination is attempted than that which is compatible with the uncertainties inherent in this assessment of weights. Should some firmer views on weights become available then more discrimination, and so a more detailed ranking, would be possible. Results The aggregated results for each airport were as shown below. These are shown in both alphabetic form and as a list of descending aggregated values. The latter is not intended as a ranking, but it provides an easily identifiable view on the range of aggregated results, in which the maximum possible score is 6.0.

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Table 36: Airports used in the analysis, and aggregated results


Aggregated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH 2.5425 2.9279 2.5465 2.4083 2.6130 2.8631 3.0496 2.2539 2.1990 2.5613 4.2894 3.2268 1.9997 2.2844 3.3548 2.6839 2.9683 2.7264 2.4546 2.9700 3.0795 1.9703 1.9988 2.9420 2.7847 2.8849 2.8460 2.6113 2.5661 2.9587 2.6835 2.2330 3.4917 2.4080 2.3892 2.3076 2.5064 2.3915 2.6840 2.7194 2.1808 2.6796 2.5120 2.6037 3.5067 2.1168 1.8086 2.8222 2.3041 2.4557 ATL SYD MEL BNE BAA DCA AKL CPT CAL LHR GVA ACS IAD AEN JNB VAN HKG CHI PER OSL DFW MAB SIN ADR LAX SWE LGW ATH AdM AAT STO ONT ZRH CPH ADP MIA PEK MON MUN VIE BHX AMS MAN ANA SFO TOR BER FRA FIN TYO Ranked 4.2894 3.5067 3.4917 3.3548 3.2268 3.0795 3.0496 2.9700 2.9683 2.9587 2.9420 2.9279 2.8849 2.8631 2.8460 2.8222 2.7847 2.7264 2.7194 2.6840 2.6839 2.6835 2.6796 2.6130 2.6113 2.6037 2.5661 2.5613 2.5465 2.5425 2.5120 2.5064 2.4557 2.4546 2.4083 2.4080 2.3915 2.3892 2.3076 2.3041 2.2844 2.2539 2.2330 2.1990 2.1808 2.1168 1.9997 1.9988 1.9703 1.8086

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The process of block selection produced the following groupings, where the airport numbers correspond to those shown in the first two columns of the table above:

Table 37: Block and Singleton Membership


Block/singleton A B C D E F G H Members 11 2, 7, 20, 21, 27, 33, 45 15, 26 1, 3, 5, 6, 12, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48 10, 43 19, 29, 34, 35, 38 4, 8, 9, 14, 23, 32, 36, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50 13,22 Mean score per block 0.715 0.521 0.520 0.458 0.423 0.407 0.369 0.331

The individual scaled values and mean scores for each airport are shown at Annex 5. Interpretation Table 37 shows seven blocks and one singleton. 19 out of the 50 airports fall within one block with a mean score of 0.458, indicating that the results of a large number of airports are highly interconnected in terms of the six performance measures. In fact all airports in Block D achieved relatively modest results for EBITDA apart from BAA/Heathrow and AENA, and also for ATUs per employee apart from Calgary and Vancouver. On the other hand there was a clear pattern of above average results in aeronautical revenues per ATM . The distribution of the airports into the different blocks reflects the process of compressing data contained within six dimensions into two dimensions. This process is analogous to compressing data recorded on a six-sided object onto a flat plane, and it is achieved by means of what is known as a Multidimensional Scaling which describes the distance between airports in multidimensional relations, and is a common means of representation of the essentials for cluster analysis. Atlanta as the singleton has no similarities with any other airport, as has been the case previously. It achieves maximum scores in terms of ATUs per unit of asset value and operating and staff costs per passenger and very high scores in ATUs per employee and aeronautical revenues per ATM. In the first three of these cases its performance is likely to have been enhanced by its high level of passenger throughput. On the other hand it performs poorly in terms of concession revenue per passengers. Comments This methodology appears to be useful in that it can non-contentiously be used to identify those airports which are unequivocally good or poor performers. Whether or not the airports in between the two extremes are ranked or not, it is possible to get an overall impression of relative performance. This year we have, for the first time, produced a ranking of results in Table 36, in view of the fact that we have received no strong views from users of this publication to suggest that this would be inappropriate or unhelpful. As is always the case, we would welcome any comments on this change. We continue to feel that the overall approach has some merit. Notwithstanding minor changes in the composition of the airport sample, a pattern has emerged over the past five years of a number of airports which appeared consistently to be either high or low performers. This situation was confirmed last year with the introduction of the new normalised scaling system, with the same conclusions being drawn this year. Whichever of the scaling methods is used, and regardless of whether a significance test of 0.2% or 5.0% is applied, the orderings do not change significantly. Also, the blocks at both ends of the list are small, indicating that really good and really poor performance is genuinely distinctive. On balance, therefore, we feel that this work is a useful step towards the identification of a system of overall performance assessment. We will continue to work with Durham to refine the process further. The Use of Combine d Data in Regulation In 2001, the UK Civil Aviation Authority launched a study intended to determine whether benchmarking could become a useful part of its quinquennial review of aeronautical charges at a number of UK airports. An important part of this study sought to establish whether a reliable model to
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predict airport costs can be derived, based on data from a range of other airports. TRL was involved in this work in providing a database of airport revenues, costs and operational statistics accumulated through the production of Airport Performance Indicators. It is interesting to note that although the CAA was initially interested in examining the use of DEA as part of this study, it eventually chose to rely on more conventional statistical regression methods. However, the outcome of this work was that the CAA felt that the results produced were not sufficiently robust for it to be used as a central tool within its regulatory process. In its preparation for the next quinquennial review, which will define the level of charges to be applied with effect from 1 April 2008, the CAA indicated that it is interested in revisiting the concept of the use of benchmarking. In the past work the approach was on a top down basis. During the current review the focus is likely to be on a more bottom up basis, with benchmarking of specific functions, processes and operating practices being the main target. Clearly benchmarking at this level is a matter for individually commissioned work rather than work reliant on published sources, since detailed information of this kind which is likely to be commercially sensitive is most unlikely to be publicly available.

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ANNEX 1 ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO RAW DATA TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF NON-CORE ACTIVITIES
ACSA The South African airports operate their own car parks. Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers, and to tax paid. ACSA has also provided car parking data relating to the individual airports at Johannesburg and Cape Town, and also Head Office costs attributable to those airports. Aeroporti di Milano (AdM) Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks, ground handling and direct retailing. Tax, current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have then been adjusted correspondingly. ADP Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks, ground handling and construction and consultancy. Tax, capital and reserves, current assets and current liabilities have then been adjusted correspondingly. ADR Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks and ground handling. Tax, current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have then been adjusted correspondingly. AENA Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks and catering and air traffic services and the sale of fuel. Interest, tax, current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have been adjusted correspondingly. Staff numbers and costs have been adjusted for Corporate Office staff. Amsterdam Adjustments have been made as appropriate for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers relating to car parking and pass-through charges on utilities. Tax, current assets and liabilities and balance sheet reserves have been adjusted correspondingly. Athens Adjustments have been made as appropriate for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers relating to car parking and pass-through charges on utilities. Balance sheet measures have been adjusted correspondingly. Auckland Adjustments are made for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers for car parking and for revenues and operating costs in the case of utility pass-through charges. Tax, current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have been adjusted correspondingly. BAA, London Gatwick and London Heathrow Adjustments are made for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers, interest, tax and balance sheet measures for the World Duty Free operation, overseas airport investments and management contracts. Balance sheet measures are adjusted correspondingly and in addition assets are adjusted to remove the effect of the Heathrow Express services, and also for non-airport investment properties. Staff numbers for the individual airports have been adjusted with a proportion of Head Office staff.

148

Beijing Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to ground handling, retail activities, in-flight catering, car parking and restaurant operations. Corresponding adjustments have also been made to tax, current assets and liabilities and capital and reserves. Birmingham Adjustments have been made as appropriate for revenues and operating costs relating to cargo and fuel throughput fees and pass-through charges on utilities. Tax has been adjusted correspondingly. Brisbane Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks. Current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have then been adjusted correspondingly. No adjustment was made to tax since none was payable. Calgary Calgary operates its own car parks. Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers. Current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have been adjusted correspondingly. No adjustment has been made to tax since those incurred are property taxes rather than corporation tax. Chicago Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks. Current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have been adjusted correspondingly. No adjustment was made to tax since none was payable. Copenhagen Revenues and operating costs were adjusted to take account of consultancy services. Dallas/Fort Worth Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks, an hotel and utilities pass-through charges. Finnish Airports Group Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of the Flight Safety Authority, Air Navigation Services and Head Office/internal services. Interest, current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves have been adjusted accordingly. No adjustment was made to tax since none was payable. Fraport Fraport operates a substantial ground handling business and its own car parks: it also operates a security and training consultancy. It provides details of costs and revenues relating to various joint ventures. Adjustments have been made as appropriate for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers, to tax, and to balance sheet measures. Geneva Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks, and current assets, capital and reserves and current liabilities have been adjusted correspondingly. Los Angeles/Ontario Around half of the staff based at Los Angeles also work for other LAWA airports or for the Aviation Department. Staff numbers and costs have been adjusted down at Los Angeles and up at Ontario to take account of this. Revenues for fuel fees and utility pass-throughs, and costs relating to utility passthrough charges have been deducted.
149

Malaysian Airports MAB provided details of information used in presentations to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange which allow us to exclude the financial effects of various non-core activities including the motor racing circuit and agricultural activities. Adjustments are also made in respect of direct retailing. Current assets and capital and reserves were adjusted correspondingly. Manchester Adjustments relating to consultancy, ground handling operations and car parking have been made as appropriate to revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers, and to current assets, capital and reserves and current liabilities. Melbourne Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks. No adjustment was made to tax since none was payable and none to the balance sheet measures since the effect of the adjustments was very small. Capital expenditure has been adjusted to take account of the ownership of Launceston airport. Munich Munich has a ground handling operation and operates its own car parks: it also makes a pass-through charge on utilities. Adjustments have been made as appropriate for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers, tax paid and balance sheet measures have been adjusted correspondingly. Perth Adjustments have been made for revenues, operating costs, staff costs and staff numbers with respect to the operation of car parks. Balance sheet measures were adjusted correspondingly. No adjustment was made to tax since none was payable. Singapore Singapores Accounts include data for the Singapore Aviation Academy and the air traffic control service: there are also pass-through charges on utilities. Adjustments are made for capital expenditures, revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers relating to these activities. Corresponding adjustments were made to trade creditors as part of current liabilities and to current assets and capital and reserves. Stockholm and the Swedish airports group The Accounts are for the Swedish Civil Aviation Administration, which operates an air navigation service, a ground handling service, an aviation safety department, and its own car parks: there are also passthrough charges on utilities. Adjustments are made for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers relating to these activities. Interest, tax and balance sheet measures are adjusted correspondingly. Sydney Revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers are adjusted for the operation of car parks. Tokyo Revenues are adjusted in respect to fuel throughput charges. Toronto Revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers are adjusted for the operation of car parks. Balance sheet measures are adjusted correspondingly.

150

Vancouver Revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers are adjusted for the operation of car parks. Corporation tax is not payable by Vancouver, so no adjustment is made to reflect the effects of the parking adjustments, though Grants paid in lieu of taxes (which we regard as being equivalent to a tax) are included without adjustment. Vienna The airport operates a ground handling service and its own car parks. Adjustments are made for revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers relating to these activities and interest and tax and balance sheet measures are adjusted correspondingly. Washington airports Revenue and operating cost adjustments are made in relation to pass-through charges on utilities. Interest and balance sheet measures are adjusted correspondingly. No tax is paid so no adjustment to it is made. Zurich Revenues, operating and staff costs and staff numbers are adjusted for the operation of car parks and for fuel throughput charges. Adjustments are made to current assets, current liabilities and capital and reserves.

151

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT (SDR) RATES USED IN CONVERTING LOCAL CURRENCIES TO A SINGLE UNIT OF CURRENCY
Airport Code AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH Airport Airports of Thailand ACSA Aeroporti di Milano Aroports de Paris Aeroporti di Roma AENA Auckland Amsterdam Group ANA Athens Atlanta BAA Group Berlin Group Birmingham Brisbane Dallas Fort Worth Calgary Chicago O'Hare Copenhagen Cape Town Washington National Finnish Airports Group Frankfurt Geneva Hong Kong Washington Dulles Johannesburg Los Angeles London-Gatwick London-Heathrow Malaysian Airports Manchester Melbourne Miami Aroports de Montreal Munich Ontario Beijing Oslo Perth San Francisco Singapore Stockholm Swedish Airports Group Sydney Toronto Tokyo Narita Vancouver Vienna Zurich
152

ANNEX 2

Source: International Monetary Fund. Rates shown are units of local currency per 1 SDR in July 2004.

SDR Conversion rate 59.7918 9.0775 1.2071 1.2071 1.2071 1.2071 2.3099 1.2071 1.2071 1.2071 1.4688 0.8082 1.2071 0.8467 2.1001 1.4688 1.9688 1.4688 8.9733 9.0775 1.4688 1.2071 1.2071 1.8344 11.5515 1.4688 9.0775 1.4688 0.8082 0.8082 5.5816 0.8082 2.1001 1.4688 1.9688 1.2071 1.4688 12.1572 10.1893 2.1001 1.4688 2.5216 11.0861 11.0861 2.1001 1.9688 158.8550 1.9688 1.2071 1.9018

ANNEX 3a Operating Data


Total Passengers 45,114,098 25,826,978 30,679,174 75,313,343 30,675,613 164,076,521 11,256,077 44,331,000 19,422,320 13,662,332 83,188,586 141,728,100 14,871,700 8,819,766 15,884,687 59,095,000 9,172,847 75,534,692 19,000,000 6,242,140 15,903,324 14,613,690 77,050,185 8,593,430 38,300,000 22,648,327 14,727,686 61,244,311 32,007,200 67,654,600 39,431,000 26,736,000 20,780,000 30,244,119 10,335,768 26,814,505 7,034,899 34,883,190 14,865,460 6,654,967 33,185,424 30,353,565 16,253,872 27,559,620 28,288,150 28,615,709 31,773,736 15,725,694 14,786,000 17,252,906

AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH

Cargo/Mail 1,088,497 327,775 507,313 1,993,009 153,746 715,315 229,348 1,421,066 139,029 118,999 862,230 1,809,137 48,932 10,538 82,769 832,000 124,000 1,689,304 335,649 40,000 2,061 131,404 2,217,547 59,886 3,100,000 135,548 327,775 2,136,313 227,469 1,323,530 985,577 456,200 207,958 1,942,119 251,820 192,167 581,793 668,690 78,028 57,925 587,603 1,775,092 101,760 217,000 554,000 300,000 229,755 233,926 222,291 386,500
153

Total WLUs 55,999,068 29,104,728 35,752,304 95,243,433 32,213,073 171,229,671 13,549,557 58,541,660 20,812,610 14,852,322 91,810,886 159,819,470 15,361,020 8,925,146 16,712,377 67,415,000 10,412,847 92,427,732 22,356,490 6,642,140 15,923,934 15,927,730 99,225,655 9,192,290 69,300,000 24,003,807 18,005,436 82,607,441 34,281,890 80,889,900 49,286,770 31,298,000 22,859,580 49,665,309 12,853,968 28,736,175 12,852,829 41,570,090 15,645,740 7,234,217 39,061,454 48,104,485 17,271,472 29,729,620 33,828,150 31,615,709 34,071,286 18,064,954 17,008,910 21,117,906

ATMs 295,444 319,928 352,010 735,223 353,291 1,751,842 158,452 431,456 216,929 191,048 964,858 1,219,703 222,926 107,908 159,932 732,999 135,966 992,427 272,517 65,406 265,765 260,628 754,522 166,631 242,000 393,331 162,536 581,725 245,104 469,560 454,969 309,100 180,500 384,760 235,209 370,354 77,099 304,778 196,327 55,557 240,439 184,392 245,360 618,084 286,484 403,777 186,633 270,399 224,808 231,086

Employees 3,370 1,673 1,957 5,838 1,860 5,068 256 2,036 1,395 698 836 9,540 1,497 691 142 1,387 137 1,665 1,485 313 557 1,451 16,797 556 976 711 774 3,400 1,877 3,752 4,594 1,684 172 1,614 543 3,054 489 5,953 552 121 1,450 1,120 666 1,469 252 864 891 334 942 1,133

ANNEX 3b Financial Data - Revenues (000s Local Currency)


Aeronautical 8,660,671 1,069,520 200,352 854,520 199,410 799,907 129,677 506,658 147,864 195,985 259,767 811,000 118,875 65,538 85,059 279,834 96,041 370,009 1,319,700 214,157 61,591 155,980 588,900 110,446 3,033,000 117,464 696,191 297,630 145,500 485,300 506,560 181,300 125,896 266,498 144,922 224,300 26,369 1,781,368 1,145,103 49,594 303,015 411,376 1,465,808 2,202,000 296,058 625,698 122,007,126 175,450 186,323 302,295 Commercial 4,485,949 626,660 158,471 450,705 224,292 364,901 115,094 230,122 72,662 113,387 165,585 739,000 60,802 41,814 98,095 112,089 28,143 106,984 583,600 121,611 136,039 73,358 71,959 87,566 3,286,000 179,410 423,163 297,023 193,700 491,200 290,870 94,540 120,523 262,712 53,587 231,619 63,120 409,044 1,045,101 58,647 131,182 487,003 496,006 785,500 251,160 112,192 52,060,000 58,294 78,857 241,986
154

AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH

Other 877,414 58,042 93,816 305,973 25,509 4,963 0 78,722 8,117 13,042 58,256 44,000 3,645 0 17,814 82,053 2,915 21,429 406,800 8,508 2,494 7,851 377,900 5,159 50,000 4,270 27,942 8,453 10,400 63,700 0 28,400 30,203 2,429 17,486 26,130 821 15,098 3,730 1,014 149,579 30,331 109,048 159,000 15,347 9,504 1,683,000 43,454 20,812 35,894

Total 14,024,034 1,754,222 452,639 1,611,198 449,211 1,169,771 244,771 815,502 228,643 322,414 483,608 1,594,000 183,322 107,352 200,968 473,976 127,099 498,422 2,310,100 344,276 200,124 237,189 1,038,759 203,171 6,369,000 301,144 1,147,296 603,106 349,600 1,040,200 797,430 304,240 276,622 531,639 215,995 482,049 90,310 2,205,510 2,193,934 109,255 583,776 928,710 2,070,862 3,146,500 562,565 747,394 175,750,126 277,198 285,992 580,175

ANNEX 3c Financial Data - Expenditure (000s Local Currency)


Operating 2,630,466 419,209 141,819 567,235 139,372 363,779 31,783 346,972 71,709 74,267 39,622 460,806 98,479 32,366 44,609 104,535 56,472 172,092 299,300 102,296 55,042 92,502 160,700 66,036 2,152,000 84,897 243,167 211,145 121,100 313,800 422,159 102,937 66,743 197,610 97,028 232,453 39,082 905,330 801,145 36,021 186,357 249,942 682,984 1,157,115 82,980 351,636 64,740,240 149,479 41,929 175,056 Personnel 2,136,227 310,406 95,892 437,762 82,409 277,500 19,300 136,398 70,916 31,901 49,846 384,795 79,217 26,830 12,073 97,142 9,976 124,946 611,500 65,582 41,726 65,226 598,700 70,081 522,000 57,018 166,877 199,238 79,000 173,100 150,245 69,371 16,049 150,918 36,414 133,849 31,014 299,975 255,226 10,752 141,092 71,757 394,610 838,431 28,415 89,986 23,981,160 34,710 108,449 117,386
155

AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH

Depreciation 1,367,379 225,600 119,728 329,472 104,023 300,515 31,895 152,650 52,373 99,632 63,944 185,099 36,766 16,793 45,124 125,075 28,882 137,661 476,200 45,878 32,252 39,535 235,100 41,927 1,680,000 93,103 45,878 59,710 46,200 166,000 81,326 68,600 41,350 103,971 61,075 97,260 13,842 458,939 494,423 16,819 165,062 203,070 440,174 1,036,005 139,418 188,389 59,985,000 46,505 42,926 190,118

Total 6,134,072 955,215 357,439 1,334,469 325,804 941,794 82,978 636,020 194,998 205,800 153,412 1,030,700 214,462 75,989 101,806 326,752 95,330 434,699 1,387,000 213,756 129,020 197,263 994,500 178,044 4,354,000 235,018 455,922 470,093 246,300 652,900 653,730 240,908 124,142 452,499 194,517 463,562 83,938 1,664,244 1,550,794 63,592 492,511 524,769 1,517,768 3,031,551 250,813 630,011 148,706,400 230,694 193,304 482,560

ANNEX 3d Financial Data - Results (000s Local Currency)


Op surplus BIT 7,889,962 799,007 95,200 276,729 123,407 227,977 161,793 179,482 33,645 116,614 330,196 563,300 -31,140 31,363 99,162 147,224 31,769 63,723 923,100 130,520 71,104 39,926 44,259 25,127 2,015,000 66,126 691,374 133,013 103,300 387,300 143,700 63,332 152,480 79,140 21,478 18,487 6,372 541,266 643,140 45,663 91,265 403,941 553,094 114,949 311,752 117,383 27,043,726 46,504 92,688 97,615 Net interest 343,115 -44,589 -6,831 -94,044 -92,187 -122,995 -36,085 -28,726 -12,011 -73,930 -97,082 -71,000 -16,585 -5,121 -111,206 -63,324 -14,340 -109,808 -156,300 -10,458 -17,469 -2,240 -15,200 -4,192 -281,000 -61,514 -25,448 15,235 -1,300 -84,600 -6,825 -28,400 -79,300 -81,544 -40,094 -31,103 -2,473 -20,418 -518,418 -58,976 -190,281 -17,790 -270,608 -336,326 -571,988 -267,973 -11,291,000 -22,056 1,983 -106,190 Tax 2,470,723 244,955 37,215 145,215 20,624 1,032 41,185 60,126 8,199 469 0 175,429 1,220 9,501 24,988 0 4,442 0 224,799 35,014 0 0 21,763 0 320,000 0 171,027 791 29,100 92,900 70,397 23,992 36,264 0 0 45,846 -3,410 156,281 35,590 0 0 108,761 30,000 0 0 24,097 7,904,000 264 30,320 2,405 Op surp after IT 5,762,354 509,463 51,154 37,470 10,596 103,950 84,523 90,630 13,435 42,215 233,114 316,871 -48,945 16,741 -37,032 83,900 12,987 -46,085 542,001 85,048 53,635 37,686 7,296 20,935 1,414,000 4,612 494,899 147,457 72,900 209,800 66,478 10,940 36,916 -2,404 -18,616 -58,462 7,309 364,567 89,132 -13,313 -99,016 277,390 252,486 -221,377 -260,236 -174,687 7,848,726 24,184 64,351 -10,980

AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH

156

ANNEX 3e Financial Data - Balance Sheet (Local Currency)


Fixed assets 44,257,315 4,074,502 1,151,922 4,280,335 2,423,581 8,999,001 1,261,633 3,192,418 1,078,334 1,693,780 1,068,681 6,795,474 529,965 321,236 1,997,938 4,728,020 619,121 3,199,996 7,762,500 788,265 712,670 637,916 2,206,430 308,562 48,219,000 2,509,573 2,689,271 1,910,023 1,421,000 6,497,600 3,078,232 1,373,500 1,416,715 4,091,654 1,126,317 1,752,626 439,544 7,351,545 9,201,507 840,479 4,179,027 5,116,360 5,938,358 11,524,597 5,853,640 6,372,941 922,721,000 900,094 768,730 2,986,607 Current assets 21,467,442 339,267 278,737 765,488 328,801 519,253 0 372,023 104,413 307,371 492,869 1,471,526 340,060 86,795 98,872 1,113,047 60,020 1,925,303 577 14,670 203,778 725,376 901,200 46,824 988,000 306,644 50,333 718,195 134,600 614,600 1,038,287 133,239 15,892 495,380 76,969 150,266 62,209 1,862,070 1,388,285 24,597 355,602 1,320,303 581,061 645,625 327,531 32,505 45,143,000 115,071 144,326 130,329 Total assets 65,724,757 4,413,769 1,430,659 5,045,823 2,752,382 9,518,254 1,261,633 3,564,441 1,182,747 2,001,151 1,561,550 8,267,000 870,025 408,031 2,096,810 5,841,067 679,141 5,125,299 7,763,077 802,935 916,448 1,363,292 3,107,630 355,386 49,207,000 2,816,217 2,739,604 2,628,218 1,555,600 7,112,200 4,116,519 1,506,739 1,432,607 4,587,034 1,203,286 1,902,892 501,753 9,213,615 10,589,792 865,076 4,534,629 6,436,663 6,519,419 12,170,222 6,181,171 6,405,446 967,864,000 1,015,165 913,056 3,116,936
157

AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE ZRH

Capex 300,576 485,485 120,518 548,700 51,642 1,403,695 127,773 294,120 154,394 28,498 362,704 1,403,000 89,434 22,369 59,000 450,665 78,607 246,074 450,000 113,942 40,228 48,234 232,100 35,452 1,291,000 309,704 277,267 157,100 131,000 1,133,000 88,751 41,900 108,230 461,135 320,500 17,773 15,348 520,082 151,100 45,861 85,391 361,854 431,000 686,000 128,102 3,211 46,641,000 123,555 73,486 195,300

Capital+ Reserves 58,397,306 3,389,972 415,305 1,458,656 756,280 3,520,661 436,664 2,134, 599 234,995 653,945 2,623,235 4,950,900 44,481 212,495 491,177 1,536,292 232,012 742,451 3,230,700 610,344 296,464 551,616 1,981,000 123,734 32,394,000 444,696 2,447,182 2,024,536 1,058,300 2,314,200 2,535,027 907,939 118,894 892,195 166,066 300,621 351,411 7,156,347 547,301 180,950 357,595 5,713,190 2,089,298 2,611,623 -270,097 721,025 177,548,000 562,780 623,585 734,780

Current Liabilities 4,575,233 724,408 246,665 117,667 120,921 87,898 409,757 385,343 168,049 141,818 27,733 773,500 66,546 39,391 68,164 306,045 38,259 344,112 712,300 87,142 72,000 16,740 149,600 46,158 3,783,300 105,888 219,067 277,048 173,900 3,977,400 504,762 112,708 73,797 375,416 157,511 569,783 38,649 2,149,151 363,920 26,474 193,185 102,684 555,659 1,029,000 178,167 854,160 90,356,000 47,305 176,221 508,809

Long Term Liabilities 2,752,218 299,389 251,321 2,303,231 1,758,748 4,111,141 402,514 959,664 237,764 1,181,434 2,876,645 2,766 386,928 132,927 1,537,469 3,998,730 396,630 4,017,944 4,396,500 104,343 621,064 127,517 650,400 166,407 13,040,000 2,186,994 73,517 326,634 323,400 720,600 1,076,730 448,300 1,236,105 3,319,453 960,251 1,459,040 111,873 104,320 9,264,769 653,841 3,983,849 233,127 3,547,057 5,072,700 6,273,911 5,657,975 676,221,000 414,224 20,903 1,831,867

ANNEX 4 GLOSSARY OF TERMS


Aeronautical revenues This includes landing and parking charges for aircraft and passenger-related charges. We include Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) at US airports: these are often shown separately in these airports Accounts. We exclude air traffic control fees and ground handling revenues which are treated as aeronautical revenues in airport Accounts. Commercial revenues This covers all revenues from rents, concessions and profit- or turnover-related agreements with concessionaires. Excluded items include revenues from car parks, hotel operations and other non-core activities as discussed in Section 2. Other revenues This term is used to cover any further revenues which relate to core airport activities. Operating costs This covers all non-staff cash expenditure on day-to-day operations, such as maintenance, utilities and minor equipment purchases which are not capitalised. Air Transport Movement (ATM) Either a landing or a take-off by an aircraft in use for commercial aviation purposes. Private or business aircraft movements do not count as ATMs, though air taxi movements generally do. Work Load Units (WLUs) One WLU is either one passenger or 100 kgs of cargo or mail. See discussion in Section 4. Airport Throughput Units (ATUs) The ATUs of an airport are calculated from the formula: Passengers +(10 x freight in tonnes) + (100 x ATMs) See discussion in Section 4. Capital expenditure Capital expenditure on buildings, infrastructure such as r unways, and equipment. In some cases, interest charges on finance needed for infrastructure projects is also capitalised and treated as capital expenditure in the year in which it is incurred.

158

Scaled values and mean scores by airport


EBITDA AAT ACS AdM ADP ADR AEN AKL AMS ANA ATH ATL BAA BER BHX BNE DFW CAL CHI CPH CPT DCA FIN FRA GVA HKG IAD JNB LAX LGW LHR MAB MAN MEL MIA MON MUN ONT PEK OSL PER SFO SIN STO SWE SYD TOR TYO VAN VIE RH 0.1630 0.1174 0.1882 0.5400 0.1994 0.4728 0.0859 0.2936 0.0723 0.1894 0.2862 1.0000 0.0000 0.0567 0.0695 0.1961 0.0284 0.1437 0.1642 0.0160 0.0713 0.0664 0.2461 0.0346 0.3421 0.1126 0.0831 0.1373 0.1957 0.7380 0.0387 0.1721 0.0951 0.1302 0.0404 0.0990 0.0099 0.0842 0.1161 0.0272 0.1843 0.2562 0.0922 0.1076 0.2281 0.1635 0.5895 0.0462 0.1169 0.1591 Concession rev per pax 0.0932 0.1991 0.3674 0.4385 0.5538 0.1120 0.3829 0.3697 0.2438 0.6396 0.0609 0.5952 0.2739 0.5058 0.2271 0.0543 0.0822 0.0200 0.2777 0.1439 0.5293 0.3548 0.0000 0.5011 0.6974 0.4842 0.2507 0.2650 0.7038 0.8606 0.0574 0.3775 0.2084 0.5388 0.1949 0.6690 0.5592 0.0200 0.6421 0.3587 0.2010 0.5858 0.2074 0.1884 0.3620 0.1276 1.0000 0.1163 0.3820 0.6919 Aero rev per ATM 0.9160 0.9468 0.9207 0.7966 0.9217 0.9443 0.9503 0.7940 0.8972 0.8251 0.9936 0.8320 0.9282 0.8586 0.9759 0.9742 0.9492 0.9757 0.9035 0.9487 1.0000 0.8520 0.8765 0.9486 0.7657 0.9885 0.9206 0.9519 0.8543 0.7167 0.9895 0.8565 0.9559 0.9207 0.9608 0.9131 0.9810 0.9184 0.8952 0.9325 0.8905 0.8163 0.9037 0.9587 0.9155 0.8410 0.0000 0.9566 0.8664 0.8661 ATU / unit asset value 0.3715 0.6884 0.2944 0.1702 0.1286 0.2161 0.2573 0.1330 0.2095 0.0715 1.0000 0.1089 0.2692 0.2016 0.1471 0.1557 0.3592 0.2603 0.2812 0.8475 0.3719 0.1247 0.3174 0.7594 0.0402 0.1496 0.5875 0.3643 0.1312 0.0296 0.6654 0.1409 0.3027 0.0857 0.2932 0.2004 0.2180 0.4854 0.1550 0.1329 0.0857 0.0678 0.3799 0.4549 0.0689 0.0804 0.0000 0.4646 0.2551 0.1018 ATU / employee 0.0603 0.1174 0.1133 0.0757 0.1216 0.2666 0.4462 0.1564 0.0939 0.1745 0.9487 0.0855 0.0725 0.0889 0.9926 0.3981 0.7242 0.4422 0.1017 0.1463 0.3095 0.0597 0.0000 0.1674 0.2546 0.3598 0.1427 0.1202 0.0969 0.0990 0.0434 0.1159 0.9987 0.1548 0.2456 0.0545 0.0976 0.0087 0.2461 0.4232 0.1746 0.1595 0.2403 0.2384 1.0000 0.3261 0.2190 0.5483 0.1405 0.1224

ANNEX 5
Op + staff Costs per pax 0.9386 0.8587 0.6624 0.3872 0.6879 0.8513 0.9268 0.5072 0.6823 0.6613 1.0000 0.6052 0.4559 0.5729 0.9426 0.9055 0.8250 0.8845 0.7263 0.8676 0.7975 0.5127 0.5588 0.5309 0.6847 0.7902 0.8614 0.7727 0.5842 0.5148 0.8891 0.5701 0.9308 0.5777 0.6542 0.3717 0.6408 0.8747 0.6295 0.8448 0.6447 0.7940 0.6885 0.6557 0.9322 0.5781 0.0000 0.6903 0.5433 0.5144 Mean 0.424 0.488 0.424 0.401 0.436 0.477 0.508 0.376 0.367 0.427 0.715 0.538 0.333 0.381 0.559 0.447 0.495 0.454 0.409 0.495 0.513 0.328 0.333 0.490 0.464 0.481 0.474 0.435 0.428 0.493 0.447 0.372 0.582 0.401 0.398 0.385 0.418 0.399 0.447 0.453 0.363 0.447 0.419 0.434 0.584 0.353 0.301 0.470 0.384 0.409

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Did you know TRL also produces two other annual aviation publications?
Airline Performance Indicators 2006
TRLs Airline Performance Indicators is an analysis of an extensive range of 38 airline performance measures. The document analyses operational and financial outputs and results of a total of 50 airlines, to assist airline managers, financial analysts and regulators around the world assess the performance of airlines in which they have a particular interest.

Review of Airport Charges 2006


TRLs Review of Airport Charges allows airline and airport managers, financial analysts and regulators around the world to compare the relative costs, using a sample of 50 of the worlds leading airports.

For details and to order please visit www.trl.co.uk or contact: Peter Mackenzie-Williams Head of Aviation TRL Crowthorne House Nine Mile Ride Wokingham Berkshire, RG40 3GA United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 1344 770424 Fax: +44 (0) 1344 770618 Email: aviation@trl.co.uk

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TRL Crowthorne House Nine Mile Ride Wokingham Berkshire RG40 3GA United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)1344 770424 Fax: +44 (0)1344 770618 Emai: aviation@trl.co.uk www.trl.co.uk