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1. Introduction
Social psychology realizes the need to account for the variability in cultural, environmental and social factors to explain human behavior. In general, different populations of the world tend to respond differently to similar psychological phenomenon. But is the same claim also valid for cognitive psychology, a sub-discipline of psychology broadly defined as the study of the mind? If so, then what could be different at the basic level of internal mental processes and representations that may explain psychological variability across populations, if at all?

Henrich et al. (2010), review these questions in their article The Weirdest People in the World?. They present empirical evidence to support the claim that differences amongst

populations exist even across phenomenon that are presumed to be psychological universals. Particularly, their study focuses on cognitive aspects like visual perception, spatial reasoning, categorization, moral reasoning, self-concepts and the like. In doing so, they make a comparison between WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) and the non-WEIRD societies. The article comprises four sub-comparisons: industrialized societies versus small-scale societies, western versus non-western societies, contemporary Americans versus the rest of the world and finally, typical contemporary American subjects versus other Americans. The authors highlight psychological diversity between all contrasts, in addition to pointing out that the majority research work in psychology has in fact examined only the WEIRD populations, particularly American undergraduates. Henrich et al. (2010) further claim that by studying this narrow and unusual slice of humanity, researchers have inaccurately derived generalizability from their results which may not hold true for the rest of the world.

In the section below, I present a summary of the key findings and evidence presented in this article, followed by a synopsis of the relevant commentaries from peer review. However, the main objective of this essay is to critically analyze the strength of the evidence presented in support of cognitive variation across cultures. Firstly, I try to assess whether this variation occurs at the level of mental content or mental processes and if the two subcomponents can be completely disconnected from each other. Secondly, I discuss the relevance of cultural and social factors in cognition, which are commonly known to be the focus of social psychology. Thirdly, I present some contradicting findings on the topic of self-enhancement, arguing that cross

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population variation may not only be due to cultural differences but also individual differences, hence a multicultural comparative study may not be the answer to the problem. Finally, the debate over the misinterpretation of experimental task and its consequences on inflating cross population variation is highlighted upon. Though few cross-population similarities have also been mentioned in the article, but my focus would be on the differences drawn upon to categorize the WEIRD population as an outlier.

2. Summary of Target Article

The first comparison is drawn between industrialized and small-scale societies. In the domain of visual perception, Muller-Lyer illusion was tested across various societies (Segall et al. 1966). The industrialized American and South African-European societies showed greatest intensity of illusory effect. The samples constituted both adults and children with both showing similar trends across societies. This suggests that in determining the nature of differences in illusory effect across different societies, developmental effects are outweighed by cultural and evolutionary aspects, otherwise a correlation between the response of children and adults would not have been observed. Or alternatively, as Henrich et al. (2010) mention that developmental effect itself could be shaped by socio-cultural factors. However, an important conclusion

derived by the authors is that significant variation could be observed in a domain like visual perception, otherwise considered to be universal across populations. Similarly, evidence from folkbiological reasoning shows that for WEIRD adults and children, basic category (e.g. tree) is first learned, frequently used and found to be more typical than subordinate category (e.g. maple tree). The level of basic category is lower in non-industrialized societies because of greater cultural exposure to natural environment. Next, the authors examine variability in spatial reasoning, giving evidence that English speakers employ egocentric approach (relative to themselves) where as other non-urban languages use an absolute or object-oriented frame of reference for spatial orientation. The nature of these differences is however debatable.

In comparing westerners versus non-westerners, Henrich et al. (2010) point out that the differences between the two sub-populations are quantitative as well qualitative in nature. In terms of self-concepts, Westerners develop relatively independent self-concepts which lead to self-enhancing and positive self views, a greater emphasis on personal choice and a lower

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motivation to conform. Stemming from this over-reliance on independent self-concepts is the tendency of westerners to exercise analytic rather than holistic reasoning, focusing attention on the object (and its attributes) irrespective of the overall context. Contrary to this, non-western populations consider the relationships between objects and contexts while reasoning, a trend deep-rooted in the cultural and social set-up of non-western communities. With respect to moral reasoning, one comparative examination illustrates that western samples show an over-emphasis on abstract ethical principles (such as justice and human rights), which are under-developed in non-western societies. It is noted that the difference is not due to variation in education levels between west and non-west as some highly educated non-western samples also show a lack of reasoning on basis of abstract moral standards.

Henrich et al. (2010) further go on to establish that a sample comprising only American subjects would not be representative of even the western sub-population, let alone for the rest of the world. Research cited views an average American as more individualistic, self-independent and opportunistic than other westerners, probably explained by the political and demographic history of America which has led to an overvaluation for the right to freedom. Also, child-rearing methods used by American parents inculcate the importance of independence from a very young age.

A further micro-level comparison between typical contemporary American subjects (usually university undergraduates) and other Americans highlight the former as an outlier yet again, as supported by evidence from social psychology and behavioral economics. In addition, the effects of poverty are also analyzed. For example, poor American children do not show any sexdifferences in spatial reasoning, assumed otherwise to be a universal finding. Similarly, the nature of the interaction of genes and environment in IQ heritability differs across low and highSES (Socio Economic Status) children, where environment, being a highly variable factor for low-SES children, plays a much greater role, relatively.

In the general discussion that follows, Henrich et al. (2010) mention that there are numerous reasons for cross-population variation including cultural, environmental, genetic and evolutionary. However, their discussion largely draws from cultural causes. The validity of such

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causes for phenomenon that are cognitive in nature will be discussed in a later section. The authors further clarify that the use of WEIRD samples should not always be avoided, depending on the type of research question. So if for example the purpose is to find existential evidence, any sample whether from WEIRD or non-WEIRD population would do. More importantly, the article also attempts to address potential challenges against its validity: (1) exaggeration of crosspopulation differences by presenting consenting research only and ignoring the rest and (2) methodological difficulties in conducting cross-population research where variation could reflect differences in interpretation. The authors only partially address this by mentioning that there is a need to collect more broad-based comparative data and that the findings reviewed in this article are based on diverse fields of study, employing various methodological techniques (e.g. implicit techniques, children-oriented subject pools). However, Henrich et al. (2010) acknowledge that majority of these findings compare the means of self-reported responses, which can be highly subjective in nature. As a way forward, the authors recommend expanding comparative data through various means of incentivizing cross-population research.

3. Summary of Peer Commentary

The target article is followed by an open peer commentary, which includes some critiques dissenting from the main argument, while others agreeing to it in addition to mentioning alternative explanations and recommendations for the generalizability problem. While the target article has basically focused on cultural reasons to account for cross-population variability, many commentaries propose the variation may be due to differences in the way information is input by subjects. This broadly includes differences in interpretation and communication. In comparative studies, questions may be mistranslated in other historical contexts (Rita). Nicolas further related this to economic games, explaining the reason Americans do not make generous monetary offers to fellow participants does not lie in a different moral psychology from the rest of the world but rather in a different interpretation of the situation- living in a large scale society and not knowing most people around, American do not feel a sense of sharing. Similarly, Sangeet et al. argue that what may be deemed as a cultural difference may actually be a difference in individual strategies (where each individual may respond differently to the same task at different points in time depending on how he/she interprets the instructions) while Edouard maintains that the captured cultural differences may actually reflect differences in task conceptualization rather than

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difference in psychological mechanisms. The same idea is elaborated by Shweder using David Campbells argument that cross-population differences are largely an artifact of failure of communication, misperceived as differences of cultural cause. Failure of communication to subjects of a specific culture arises because of the difficulty of conveying/representing a situation which is actually relevant to other dissimilar cultures. The view that cross-population variation is rather a matter of interpretation stresses that since same situations are interpreted differently, a direct comparison between them would be a flawed strategy to account for this variation. That is to say, subjects in a comparative study may not be playing the same game (Shweder), and therefore, we should only compare what is comparable (Boesch). One solution to the interpretation problem has been provided by Stephen et al. suggesting that subjects should be exposed to various contexts of the same situation to try to ease the process of meaning derivation.

Other methodological difficulties include the use of WEIRD experimental techniques which the non-WEIRD populations cannot much relate to, for example testing Muller Lyer illusion rather than the Moon illusion which may be ecologically more convincing to a wider range of people (Rochat). Another source of variation is the researcher bias arising because of the cultural similarity between the researcher and the researched (Bennis et al., Fessler), as most experimenters themselves are WEIRD (Meadon et al.) and use research techniques which are culturally more apt for their own people. Different types of research questions place different demands on cognitive processing and the higher the load, the greater the variability observed across populations as in a task involving economic games (vs. face recognition) (Rochat). Majid et al. points out that WEIRD sample may also appear as an outlier because of linguistic reasons, as English language itself is a unique language in many ways. To see if WEIRD and nonWEIRD subjects differ at a neural level, Joan et al. cite evidence from brain imaging showing differences in brain activated regions to the same phenomenon.

Few critiques develop the argument that underlying the diverse populations are some commonalities such as uniform mental processing. Danks et al. draw a distinction between mental representations and mental processes, whereby the variation in former is explained by cultural and environmental discrepancies but the uniformity in latter is explained by similar

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genetic and evolutionary causes. Furthermore, this critique mentions that experimental evidence presented in Henrich et al. (2010) focuses primarily on cognitive representations rather than processes, hence implying an overstated cross-population variation. Gaertner et al. further elaborate on the phenomenon of universal psychological processes citing research on selfenhancement. According to them, both Westerners and Easterners show evidence of selfenhancement as opposed to the findings presented in target article, though across different domains. For example, Westerners use self-enhancing statements in the domain of individualism whereas Easterners self-enhance in the domain of collectivism. Hence, the expression may vary across cultures but the underlying processes are similar. Moreover, Easterners are usually more reluctant to publicly express positive self-views due to modesty norms in their culture, and implicitly controlling for modesty level may eliminate the East-West variation as far as selfenhancement is concerned.

Other critiques diverge from the target article on the perspective that WEIRD people are not necessarily unrepresentative of the human species at large as with increasing trend in globalization and industrialization, the world population is converging to the WEIRD standards and becoming more and more homogenous (Maryanski, Rozin). Another class of

commentaries provides recommendations such as the use of internet (Gosling et al) and naturalistic environment (Rai et al.) to incorporate greater cultural diversity in experiments.

4. Critical Analysis
4.1. Internal vs. External/Cognitive vs. Cultural/ Processes vs. Content
I now return back to the initial question of evaluating if humans really differ in cognitive aspects that are internal to the mind, and if so, what is the nature of such differences? Before exploring this debate, it is crucial to define cognitive science and its domain. The subject matter of cognitive science is individual human cognition (Eckardt 1995). Highlighting assumptions behind cognitive approach, Eckardt (1995) maintains that human cognition can be successfully studied by focusing exclusively on the individual cognizer and his or her place in the natural environmentthe influence of society or culture on individual cognition can always be explained by appealing to the fact that this influence is mediated through individual perception and representation and further points out that although there is considerable variation in how

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adult human beings exercise their cognitive capacities, adults are sufficiently alike when they cognize and it is possible to arrive at generalizations about cognition that hold (at least approximately) for all normal adults. Taking this in to consideration, is this article then trying to challenge the assumptions characterizing cognitive science?

In my view point, the distinction between what is internal to the mind and what is external is not a very clear one. External influences like culture and environment shape up internalized procedures of thinking and perception. So if these external factors vary across the human species, then naturally differences in response to psychological phenomenon are likely to be observed. But should we classify these as cognitive differences or cultural differences since the causal factors appear to be cultural in nature? Since both external and internal influences interact to produce a psychological response, we cannot neatly classify the cause under one category. Moreover, what people think about impacts how people think (Bang et. al 2007), implying that cultural processes affect cognitive processes, as also reported by Henrich et al. (2010) in their response to the peer commentary. One suggestion as to how the transmission from cultural to cognitive processes takes place is provided by the evolving field of culture-gene co-evolution which if broadly described contends that cultural factors influence gene evolution and genetic factors in turn affect adaptation to a given culture. Similarly, the field of epigenetics studies the changes in gene expressions that are associated not by the alteration in the underlying DNA sequence but rather by the variation in the local circumstances of the individual (Henrich et al. 2010).

Considering this, we cannot completely separate mental content from mental processes, as presumed in some of the critiques. We can only make the claim that contents are dissimilar whereas processes are universal across humans if there is no interaction between both. However, there is an overlap. For example, human knowledge and beliefs about plants differs across naturalistic and urban environments, hence forming different mental contents, but this influences the basic level category people form in turn, hence their mental processes for evaluating and using the taxonomic categorizations also vary.

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While not entirely consenting with the critiques argument about the separation of variable mental content from universal mental processes, I still feel that Henrich et al. (2010) have not done complete justice to address it. To explain that even basic level processes deemed to be universal such as visual perception can exhibit significant variation, they cite an example about underwater human visual ability. In particular, the claim is that generalization about this ability cannot be inferred if research focuses solely on undergraduates ability to see underwater. According to the reported finding, a tribe called Mokens who live in islands and collect food from sea floor as means to subsistence, have twice the underwater visual ability compared to Europeans. However, Mokens is but one unique group of people exposed to such extreme location factors which will naturally have a consequence on their visual capacity. Differences across most world populations are not as concrete as differences between land and water but rather more subtle. More importantly, human eye is not adaptive to see underwater and this would not only apply to undergraduates but to a wide range of human species who do not share the unique experience exclusive to Mokens. This should compel Henrich et al. (2010) to reconsider who is weird: undergraduates who share underwater visual ability with the general human population or the Mokens who are exposed to exceptional local conditions? Secondly, to illustrate that the processes involved in motor development too are not universal, Henrich et al. (2010) report differences in human foot anatomy and henceforth in the quality of running across populations. However, such physical differences are bound to exist due to different environmental and evolutionary factors and therefore seem irrelevant to the core discussion trying to establish evidence for psychological rather than physiological diversity. Moreover, Henrich et al.s claim that by studying only the WEIRD runners you get the wrong answer appears to be too extreme as getting a different answer does not necessarily classify it as wrong. Other evidence presented against universal mental processes concerns changes in brain in response to changes in culture and experience. The authors point out that expertise such as musical training and taxi driving are associated with structural changes in brain, and since cultural influences are more consistent than expertise influences, they should affect the physiology of brain more significantly. Even though such changes at the neural level have been identified by Joan et al., we should be careful in interpreting brain scans because imaging by itself does not reveal the causes behind activation.

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4.2.

Culture in Cognition

The target article presents evidence for cognitive variation across populations and it mainly does so by emphasizing the role of culture. Even though culture impacts cognitive processes (as we established earlier), it is still only one of the many factors that account for psychological diversity. Machery in his commentary puts forward the question that why are most examples in the target article drawn from social psychology? to which Henrich et al. (2010) correctly point out that their study rather focuses exclusively on areas from cognitive psychology. Even though not precisely phrased, I deem Macherys concern valid in the essence of what he intended to convey. The domains studied in Henrich et al. (2010) are unquestionably cognitive in nature, but the experimental techniques appear to be such so as to promote cultural diversity in response. For example, as reported from Segall et al. (1966), differences in visual perception between smallscale and industrialized societies are observed when subjects are tested on geometric illusions such as Muller Lyer illusion, Sander-Parallelogram and Horizontal-Vertical illusions. Because people in industrialized societies are exposed to such angular variations in the surrounding architecture and buildings, they henceforth show a more powerful illusory effect for geometric objects. If on the other hand, subjects were tested on something they could universally relate to, such as the Moon illusion (see Rochat), then cultural variation could be explicitly controlled for in explaining visual perception. If cross-population differences still arise, then perhaps we can make a stronger claim about cognitive diversity.

Another example to explain the above argument is that of economic games, whereby subjects are asked to evaluate the monetary amount they would be willing to share with their fellow participants and to decide punishments for non-cooperative and free-riding participants. Even though the subject matter of decision making is part of cognitive science, the questions put forward concerning valuation of sharing, trust and punishment are social in nature and directly depend on the socio-economic set up of the communities. This is not to deny the role of social factors in determining cognitive response, but to suggest that cognitive capacities should be attempted to be studied in isolation from other non-cognitive capacities. Moreover, cultural influences are essentially the subject matter of social psychology, and while we acknowledge the impact of culture on cognition, an overemphasis on culture may deviate us from the traditional cognitive approach and make blurry the distinction between cognitive and social psychology.

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4.3.

Self-enhancement- Caution for Researchers

Henrich et al. (2010) in their response give ample space to address Gaertner et al.s critique. To reiterate, Gaertner et al. talk about positive self-valuation as a natural human tendency, whereby culture influences the domain of the self-enhancement motive (individualism or collectivism) and not its existence. However, Henrich et al. (2010) point out that Gaertner et al. only reach to this conclusion by ignoring studies with contrary findings. Moreover, even after employing implicit experimental techniques to control for modesty levels, cross-cultural variation in selfevaluation does not vanish except under the technique of Implicit Association Test (IAT) which Henrich at al. report to be less valid being the only method amongst a total of 31 that confirms to Gaertner et al.s findings. Evidence presented against Gaertner et al.s commentary is, however, quantitative in nature and lacks a qualitative perspective as to what makes IAT less valid, what are other better implicit techniques and why different studies yield contrary evidence in the first place. In my opinion, divergent evidence on self-enhancement motive may be explained more by individual rather than cultural differences, otherwise people within the same culture should not exhibit a variation in their self-view response. For example, Brown and Kobayashi (2002) find that Japanese students not only evaluated themselves and their friends more positively than other students but also against other Japanese. The latter evidence indicates that self-enhancement is not solely a cultural phenomenon and suggests that in order to establish the nature of differences, a within culture study should be undertaken first to ensure individual differences are not being misunderstood for cultural variation. Also, if variation in self-enhancement is not at cultural but individual level, then perhaps conducting multi-cultural research, as proposed by Henrich et al. (2010), would not resolve the problem of generalizability. A better approach would be to redirect attention to the examination of individual differences and the reasons behind them.

However, even if researchers are able to establish cultural diversity in self-enhancement, they should be careful in interpreting it. Easterners may derive greater self-enhancement by assigning higher positive valuation to their friends and family than to themselves. As mentioned in Brown and Kobayanshi (2002), parents, for example, may take pride in thinking their children and smarter and more talented than are they. Researchers therefore should not only look at the quantitative rating or the subjective response of the participants but also at the underlying reasons behind it. These reasons may exhibit similarity at a deeper cognitive level, in this case a

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similarity in the objective of maximizing self-esteem, which could be achieved through alternate means depending on different cultural variables. Depending on whether we look at it from a deeper or a surface level, we may classify the phenomenon either as a psychological universal or as a psychological diversity, and not be wrong with either of the classification because we are using a different lens to study the same phenomenon.

4.4.

Role of Misinterpretation in Cross-population Variation

Another area of debate raised in some of the critiques was over the interpretation of the tasks. People from different cultures develop different understanding of the underlying tasks and thus diverge in their responses. This raises the question that if information is being input differently in the first place, then is it correct to compare the output response which is a function of how information is input. More importantly, should the output variation be attributed to cognitive variation? The answer though not very clear cut can be hypothesized upon. The three stages in any information handling system are input, process and output. If there is variation in the first stage of information handling, it will consequentially predict variation in last stage too. However, this output variation cannot be causally attributed to how information is processed in the intermediate stage and hence we cannot make a strong claim for diversity in cognitive processing. If on the other hand, we assume that people from various cultures input information equivalently, but still show an output variation then it can most likely be explained in terms of how information is being processed. This would involve making use of different cognitive processes hence supporting the claim for cognitive diversity. For this reason, it is important to ensure that interpretation of task requirements be consistent across subjects. If not, we must look at why different people register the same information differently. If it is due to subjects finding the task very unfamiliar and peculiar (which I term as the first kind of misinterpretation), then before dismissing universality we should first modify the experimental set up such that all subjects at least understand the basic demands of the task. But if subjects indeed understand the task but interpret differently depending on their cultural and social norms (termed as second kind of misinterpretation), then of course the universality claim stands in jeopardy. The point to convey is that while I consent with the argument in critiques that misinterpretation of a task is a cause of concern for establishing evidence for cognitive variation (due to reasons mentioned above), it is only the first kind of misinterpretation that should be avoided whereas the second

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kind should serve as a basis to further strengthen the case for cognitive diversity across cultures as how you input and cognize information (post understanding of task) is a function of social, economic and cultural variables.

5. Conclusion
While cognitive psychology essentially looks at individual behavior, we must not discard external factors like culture which differentiate how we cognize about everyday things in life. However, even for purely cognitive phenomenon, the nature of the cross-population variation may not always be cognitive in nature as other factors like misinterpretation and artificiality of the underlying task may overemphasize the role of culture in cognitive diversity. Wide-ranging methodological techniques including extensive contexts and well-controlled experiments can help solve this problem. Moreover, the extent of the psychological variation depends on the nature and scope of the research question. For example, the more specific the research question, the narrower would be the lens of study and therefore, the greater the expected variation. Consequently, the extent of the generalizability problem is not same across all areas of cognitive psychology. Nonetheless, Henrich et al. (2010) have highlighted an important concern of apriori establishing universality from a narrow group of subjects. A way forward is for research to focus on not only the similarities but also the differences across populations, and more importantly, to identify the grounds for these differences which currently seems to be an area of debate.

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