Republic 435c-441e: The tripartite soul Main claim (Republic 435b-c): The soul has three parts on analogy

to the parts of the cityreason, spiritedness, and appetitivenesseach part minding its business. This is the claim for which Socrates argues, dialectically with Glaucon, at Republic 435c-441e. To see this general argument, however, one must work through the sea of argument (441c2) along with Socrates and Glaucon. Claim 1 (435b-436a): The soul acts analogously to the city. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Thracians and Scythians act with spiritedness. Athenians learni.e. act with reason. Phoenicians and Egyptians desire moneyi.e. act appetitively (Implied) Actions are done by individualscitizensand individuals have souls. Thus, the soul in general seems to act spiritedly, appetitively, and by reason, analogously to cities.

Corollary (436a-b): While this argument reveals inductively that the soul acts similarly as the city, it is insufficient to show necessarily that the soul has three parts or one. It is unclear, at this point, whether the soul reasons, desires, and is spirited with respect to one or many parts; does the soul reason, desire, and act spiritedly in the same or different ways? Therefore, an inquiry into the manyness of the soul is required. The principle of functionality (436b-e): Before Socrates and Glaucon work through the sea of arguments to show why and how the soul has three analogous parts with the city, an argument is made at 436b-e to show that nothing acts and does not act in relation to the same thing, in the same part, at the same time. I call this the principle of functionality such that to each part there is one and only one function. Thus, no part can perform its opposite, whatever that may be. This is meant, I suggest, as a kind of principle to be used later in the argument to allow Socrates to show necessarily that the parts of the soul are many. The argument for this is, therefore, a crucial component of the overall argument. 1. Because rest and motion are opposed, by PNC, it is impossible that something be at rest and move in relation to the same thing, in the same part, at the same time. 2. Whatever is at rest and moves at the same time and the same way must, therefore, be in different parts. This is evident from the spinning top. 3. (Implied) Acting and not acting is motion and rest respectively. 4. Thus, acting and not acting are opposed. 5. Thus, nothing acts and does not act in relation to the same thing, in the same part, at the same time. Claim 2 (437a-438a): The soul has an appetitive part. 1. Appetites are desires with respect to opposites, i.e. assent/dissent, wanting/rejecting, etc. 2. Thirst/being-quenched, hunger/being-satisfied are appetites since they are desires with respect to opposites. 3. The soul thirsts and hungers. 4. Thus, the soul has an appetitive part.

Claim 3 (438b-439d): The soul has a rational part. Sub-argument 1: All things that are related to something are related either to something else in particular or in general to what is similar in kind. 1. What is greater is greater than something else in particular just as what is lesser is less than something in particular. This is the same for all sorts of relations between particulars; particular things are related to other particulars. 2. (Implied) However, whatever is not related to any particular thing is related to what is similar in kind since it must be related to something. 3. Thus, all things that are related to something are related either to something else in particular or in general to what is similar in kind. Sub-argument 2: Every appetite necessarily desiresis impelled toits object, what is similar in kind to the appetite. 1. Thirsting is the need for drinking. 2. However, thirsting is not related to any particular drink, since any drink quenches thirst. 3. (From sub-arg. 1) All things that are related to something are related either to something else in particular or in general to what is similar in kind. 4. Thus, thirsting is related to what is similar in kind: the need for drinking. Corollary: Because thirst is related to what is similar in kind, drinking, this is a necessary relation. Thirst must desire drinking, since it would be contradictory to desire what is not similar. Thirst is therefore impelled to drinking. In addition to this, just as thirst is impelled to what is similar in kind, so too is every other appetite. No appetite is related to a particular object of desire, but to the relevant desire in general, e.g. thirst is related to drinking in general, hunger to eating in general. Socrates point here is that an appetite cannot help but seek after that which it desiresthis is its function. Sub-argument 3: There must be something else causing the appetite to be restrained. 1. However, there are times when one is restrained from drinking or eating for some reason or another. 2. (Implied) Nothing acts and does not act in relation to the same thing, in the same part, at the same time. 3. The restraint cannot be because of thirsting, drinking, or any appetite itself that the appetite is restrained since appetites are impelled to what they desire. 4. Thus, there must be something else causing the appetite to be restrained. Sub-argument 4: Rational calculationreasonis another part of the soul, in turn showing that the soul has at least two parts, the reason and the appetites. 1. What is restrained is restrained as a result of rational calculation in the soul, since it is because of some reason that an appetite is held back by the soul. 2. Since nothing acts and does not act in relation to the same thing, in the same part, at the same time, rational calculation is other than the appetitive. 3. Thus, rational calculation is another part of the soul. 4. Thus, the soul has at least two parts, the rational calculative part and the irrational appetitive part.

Claim 4 (439e-441b): The soul has a spirited part. Sub-argument 1: Spirit aligns with reason 1. Anger sometimes wages against the appetites, as it is evident from Leontius anger towards his desire to gaze upon the pale corpses, accusing his eyes for succumbing to something base. 2. Anger is the souls reproach for going against reason, since anger arises in response to injustice and justice belongs to what is by reason. 3. Anger is a sort of spiritedness 4. Thus, spirit aligns with reason. Sub-argument 2: The soul has a spirited part because it is different than the other parts. 1. Spirit wages against the appetites and aligns with reason (provided that it itself is not corrupted by bad education/upbringing). 2. (Implied) Nothing acts with respect to opposites in the same way and at the same time. 3. Thus, spiritedness is different than reason and the appetites. 4. Thus, the soul has a spirited part. Claim 5 (441c-e): The soul has three parts on analogy with the parts of the cityreason, spiritedness, and appetitiveness. 1. In the city, each part minds its business, for this is justice. 2. As each part of the soul is to each part of the city, the parts of the soul act similarly as those of the city. 3. Thus, just as in the city, where the wise rules, the guardians defend what is wise, and the producers attend to their assigned tasks, in the soul, reason takes command, spirit defends what is rational, and the appetites attend to their assigned tasks, each part mind its business according to its proper function. The overall argument (435b-441e) comes by treating Claims 1-4 as premises and Claim 5 as the main conclusion: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The soul acts analogously to the city. The soul has an appetitive part. The soul has a rational part. The soul has a spirited part. Thus, the soul has three parts on analogy to the parts of the cityreason, spiritedness, and appetitiveness.

Note: The overall argument is formed only as a result of working through each sub-argument, and treating the conclusions in each sub-arguments as constituents of the general argument.