A2 Philosophy Revision Platos Republic: Appearance and reality

Platos epistemology is passive i.e., he believes that there is an objective form of truth that we can discover; this is opposed to active Therefore, he believes that there are absolute moral values to which we should adhere Nietzsche holds the opposite, perspectivist viewpoint: truth is subjective and socially determined Plato holds a two-world view: 1) The realm of appearance the external world, consisting of objects/particulars, which are those of opinion and belief 2) The intelligible realm reality only accessible through reason; true knowledge the Forms

The Forms The Forms cannot be accessed through experience, so are a priori Forms Unqualified bearers of predicates they are simple and cannot be broken down into further parts Immutable they do not change over time Static As they do not change over time, it follows that they do not move either Eternal they have always existed and always will exist. Some commentators interpret this as meaning that they are outside of time Transcendent the intelligible realm is outside of space A priori Particulars Qualified bearers of predicates they are complex and can always be analysed in terms of parts Mutable they change over time; notably by decaying In motion Transitory they come into existence and then fade away over time Immanent the world of appearances is the spatial world we exist in A posteriori

Essentially, the intelligible realm is one where everything is fixed and not subject to change; and the realm of appearances is one of constant change and flux

Plato was influenced by Heraclitus, he reports:

Heraclitus says somewhere that everything gives way and nothing stands fast, and likening the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that you cannot step into the same river twice Plato, Cratylus (1997a, p120) Plato agreed with Heraclitus, but was deeply unsatisfied with this as an account to ultimate nature of being He thought that the realm of the Forms must exist in order to provide a set of values we must aspire to and live by

The argument from opposites Commencing from line 475 in The Republic, Plato offers an argument for the Forms, as follows: He distinguishes between those who have access to the Forms and those who only have access to the realm of appearances The former are the philosophers; the latter are Sight-lovers and art-lovers and practical men [who] are delighted by beautiful sounds and colours and shapes, and the works of art which make use of them. Plato (1987, 476b) Plato is distinguishing between the beauty conceived in its pure form, and the beauty displayed in particulars The sight-lover perceives beauty at the level of the particular, but Plato believes we can contemplate a pure Form in the abstract He draws a distinction between the Form and its particulars according to the above table He argues that qualities all have opposites these include: 1) Beauty/ugliness 2) Justice/injustice 3) Good/evil If a particular possesses one quality, it must also possess the opposite For example, a painting may contain some elements which are less harmonious than others, and a beautiful person may become less beautiful as he or she ages Particulars contain opposites as they are relative to each other For example, the statement painting A is more beautiful than painting B, also means that painting A is not as ugly as painting B. When applied to particulars, difference in individual perspective means that binary opposites dont function as mutually exclusive terms Plato claims that there are absolute versions of qualities - which are accessible through reason - and are the basis on which the particulars are judged If a particular contains both a quality and its opposite, then knowledge of the relationship of that quality to the particular is impossible This leads to the faculties argument

The faculties argument Plato argues that our faculties, e.g. the faculty of reason and the faculty of sight, have rigid boundaries i.e. a facultys field is unique to that faculty He argues that knowledge and opinion are separate faculties, which leads to this critical piece of dialogue: Since knowledge is related to what is, and ignorance, necessarily to what is not, we shall have to find out whether what lies between them there corresponds something between ignorance and knowledge, if there is such a thing. Yes. Isnt there something we call opinion? Of course Is it the same faculty as knowledge or different? Different. So opinion and knowledge must have different correlates corresponding to their difference of faculty? They must. Then knowledge is related to what is, and knows what is as it is. Plato (1987, 477a-c) It is disputed what Plato means by is in this passage He is not concerned with the existential is, found in a proposition such as he is If we accept that he means we can only truly know that which exists, the corollary would be that Plato would be committed to the absurd position of we could only be ignorant of what doesnt exist If opinion lies between knowledge and opinion, Plato is surely not implying that its objects simultaneously do and do not exist It seems likely his focus is upon is as a form of prediction, or attribute of a property This would give us the following definitions: 1) Knowledge is related to what is I know property p of x, if and only if I attribute p to x, and p is true of x 2) Ignorance is related to what is not I am ignorant of property p of x, if and only if I attribute p to x and p is not true of x. 3) Opinion lies between knowledge and ignorance I believe property p of x, if I attribute p to x, whether or not p is true of x. So a Form is an unqualified bearer of a predicate

The Forms (e.g. beauty) capture the essence of a Form they are pure Particulars never possess the quality (e.g. beauty) in its pure state The Mona Lisa painting is a concrete example we may say The Mona Lisa is beautiful, but this isnt a necessary truth, as it is my not be perceived as beautiful from all cultural positions Furthermore, it may degrade in time and become less beautiful Thus, the Mona Lisa is not unqualified, pure beauty. So the statement The Mona Lisa is beautiful is both true and not true To Plato, this is opinion, not knowledge He makes a further claim about the distinction between knowledge and opinion: A little while ago you agreed that knowledge and opinion were different. Yes, he replied, because no reasonable person would identify the infallible with the fallible Plato (1987, 477e)

Knowledge is infallible and necessarily true; opinion is fallible and may or not be true When we have knowledge of something we are certain of the fact. Plato takes this as common knowledge We may think we know things in the realm of the particulars, but we can never be certain, as everything is contingent. Plato links infallibility with the intelligible realm if we can contemplate a thing, we can distinguish it from particulars, which we hold just opinion of This leaves the question open as to whether a reasonable person would dispute this point, as it less commonsensical as Plato makes it out to be This is only an argument for some of the Forms; Plato explicitly states that every object in the world has a Form The argument from opposites succeeds if, in order to have certain knowledge of one part of a binary opposition, one must be able to have access to the pure Form of it However, it is hard to see how an object like a bed or a toaster would have an opposite The material bed is only a partial representation of its Form, but it difficult to see how this works in the same way as the distinction between, say, beauty and ugliness

For Plato, there is a sharp distinction between objects as particulars and objects as self-predicating Forms

Access to the Forms In seeing the oppositions within particulars, our minds are actively drawn to focus upon these, and to abstract the qualities from the particular in order to focus on the unqualified aspect So we move from the visible (particular) to the intelligible (the Form) In reply to the criticism about the Form of the Bed, we can focus on the essentials that constitute the particulars Plato is a rationalist this can be contrasted with the empiricist viewpoints of Berkeley and Hume. He denies that experience itself leads to knowledge He believes that reason itself leads us to genuine truths, unlike Descartes Classical rationalism that employs hyperbolic doubt on a firm epistemological basis to discover truths

Levels of truth Different levels of reality imply a hierarchy of truth; particulars partake less in the Forms as they move down the scale The Form is the pure version of the object, the particular is less pure, and the artists representation of the object is less pure still. As Plato says, The artists representation stands at third remove from reality Plato (1987, 597e) This theory forms the basis of Platos argument for the censorship and banning of art in The Republic: If he [the poet Homer] really knew about the things he represented, he would devote himself to them and not to their representations; he would try to leave behind him the memory of many deeds well done, and be more anxious to be praised himself than to write in praise of others. Plato (1987, 599b) Plato also divides the Forms themselves he does this by claiming there is a superior Form that the rest are dependent on This is the Form of the Good: good meant in both qualitative and ethical terms In this case, the Good relates both to that which is the most perfect example of something, and that which provides actions with positive moral value For neo-Platonic Christians, the Form of the Good corresponds to God

The Sun There is no direct argument for the Form of the Good in The Republic Like the concept of infallibility, Plato imports it as a given: You have certainly often been told that the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of the form of the good, from which things are just and so on derive their usefulness and value. Plato (1987, 505a) He takes it for granted that his audience shares his conception of the Good The simile of the sun illustrates the role of the Form of the Good in his metaphysics, as below: Form of the Good Source of truth in the intelligible realm Imparts reality to the Forms Imparts intelligibility and allows the mind to know

Sun Source of light in the visible realm Allows particulars to grow Lights the world and allows the eyes to see

Plato is not claiming that reason cannot function only directly in light of the Good, just that we can use it more efficiently and reliably with the Good This is analogous to the eye we can see with the aid of artificial light or the light of the moon, but not as well as we could with light from the sun We cannot fully access the Forms without reason: Just as it was right to think of light and sight as being like the sun, but wrong to think of them as being the sun itself, so here again it is right to think of knowledge and truth as being like the good, but wrong to think of either of them as being the good, whose positions must be ranked still higher.

Plato (1987, 508e-509c) The Form of the Good imparts reality onto the other Forms as they partake in it If one is able to separate the Forms from the Good, surely they are not so simple after all One response is that the Form of the Good supplies a notion of complete perfection to the other Forms so any Form would be comprehensible if one understood this notion of perfection The generalised notion of perfection may be required to access the other Forms

The divided line The divided line illustrates different levels of truth The gradations in the line illustrate how one moves up the line in order to arrive at contemplation and the Form of the Good It is part of his educational programme, and justifies why mathematics is an important part of the education of the philosopher Platos claim for mathematics as a route to the Forms is that, as mathematical figures are more abstract than most particulars that we encounter, working through mathematical proofs is training our mind to think in the abstract We can then move from mathematics to dialectic, where we abstract unqualified predicates from particulars Mathematicians such as A.N. Whitehead have been drawn towards Platonic theories Questions about the reality of numbers are amenable to explanation in terms of the theory of the Forms Numbers are universal there is an issue s to what it means to claim the number two is a real number Other accomplished philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibniz, have been mathematicians perhaps the two disciplines lend themselves to each other? The lower end of the line divides into illusion and belief Belief is associated with studies of the material world Illusion corresponds to copies of the objects of belief, such as artistic representation

The cave The cave is the most important simile in The Republic it encapsulates the similes of the sun and divided line, and represents Platos many concerns The main concerns are: 1) To illustrate Platos metaphysical claims about appearance and reality and knowledge and belief, and the process of education as the philosopher moves towards knowledge of the Good 2) To reinforce the role of the Form of the Good by extending the simile of the sun 3) To illustrate the role of the Forms in Platos ethical theory and the political implications 4) To illustrate what Plato thinks that the role of the philosopher in society should be, his actual status, and why it is undervalued We shall address the first two points

******************* Insert/refer to diagram of the cave*******************

The cave corresponds to the visible realm, while the world outside the cave corresponds to the intelligible There are subdivisions of each realm according to the line The journey of the prisoner who is mysteriously released from his bonds then illustrates the results of thorough philosophical education on one who is suited to it Key aspects are: 1) the bound prisoners are at the level of illusion all they see are shadows and reflections. It is not obvious whether seeing nothing but shadows is ever a feature of everyday life. We must assume that, as the cave dwellers are at the level of opinion, that the shadows and reflected noises stand for opinions picked up from others, and possibly raw sensory experience 2) the prisoner turns and becomes accustomed to the light he notices men making shadows with objects, but copies of objects. This is known as double deception; sometimes characterised by those who carry them. The passage of the prisoner seeing the shadows arent real, to the fact the objects arent real, to the fact that the men are carrying the objects is indicative of the passage from ignorance to even firmer belief 3) The fire performs the same role in the cave as the sun does outside the fire is a false Form of the Good that the prisoners opinions are based upon and judged upon 4) The prisoner is forcibly dragged up the steep slope this represents the rigours of education. Presumably, those forcing him along are his teachers. Every stage in the simile is either difficult to traverse or painful on the eyes. The implication is that many will either turn back or stop before they reach the final stage; they are reluctant to see the truth 5) The outside the reflections of objects in water represent the geometrical figures and so on that comprise mathematical studies. They are more real than the objects in the cave, but not as real as the objects themselves, which are of course, the Forms 6) The sun at first, the Forms can only be seen in a dim manner, but as the philosophers training reaches completion, he is able to see them in the full light of the sun, or Good, and finally look at the sun itself. It is by looking at the objects in relation to the sun that he is able to understand the seasons, etc. which is to say, how the forms relate to, and partake of, the Form of the Good

Counter arguments: knowledge/opinion Many commentators think Platos claim about knowledge and opinion is unsustainable, or constitutes a radical definition of what knowledge is It is questionable whether Plato is talking about knowledge as we commonly understand the term We can argue that if knowledge is to be equated with certainty, we can be certain about things without reference to the Forms For example, I can be sure of the relationship between particulars. For example, I may not be certain of all aspects of a bed or pillow, but the statement that a pillow is laying on my bed is surely true and not just a matter of opinion. So once a proposition is contextualised, it can become certain. For instance, the proposition, the Mona Lisa is beautiful may not be true for all time, but to claim that it was/is beautiful from a particular cultural perspective at a point in time does seem to be true for all time We can attack Plato with David Humes necessary relations of ideas. It can be argued that we can be certain of statements that are true independent of experience, for example, bachelors are unmarried men. Surely we can believe this without knowing it to be the case. Platos account breaks down here However, Julia Annas offered a revised reading of Plato, claiming he is not committed to saying we can only have knowledge of the Forms rather we can only hold knowledge of the Forms, never opinion Although, Annas admits that some passages of The Republic cannot be read in this way Essentially, these commentators are saying that Platos account of the Forms is inconsistent

Contradiction? There is a further problem of consistency in Platos set up of the argument of opposites: Since beauty and ugliness are opposites, they are two. Of course. And as they are two, each of them is single. That is so. Plato (1987, 475e-476a) This introduces the idea that particulars can simultaneously partake of a Form and its opposite in order to show that we cannot have knowledge of them

 However, it is clearly stated in the simile of the sun that all Forms partake in
the Form of the Good and a movement away from the Form, via particulars, and so forth is one of decay or corruption The clear implication is that the Form isnt in an opposing pair, but is the approximated the further one moves away from it This seems reasonable in terms of the simile of the sun, but it is hard to see how the perfect Form of ugliness partakes in the Form of the Good. There seems to be no reconciling argument with the argument from opposites Also, one of Platos examples of paired opposites is good and evil. It is hard to see how the Form of Evil could partake in the Form of the Good In the simile of the sun, we would say there is light and darkness, and the latter is absence of the former darkness does no partake in the sun in any way whatsoever There seems to be no way to resolve the contradiction here

The status of Platos similes Are Platos similes framed as arguments or just simply illustrations? If the latter, cant we simply reject the analogy? In the simile of the cave, if we grant Plato his initial premises, the rest of the steps are corollaries, but why would we grant this set up? A realist could object that our situation is in no way analogous to that of the prisoners; they may respond that there is no cave and the only world is that of the sunlight in which we spend our days If we take this position, it is hard to see how a simile could have the power to convince us otherwise There is also a tension between Platos attitude towards art i.e. that artistic representation is in the category of illusion and is removed from reality and his use of similes What is a simile if it is not a representation of an argument opposed to the proper argument itself? If Plato is correct in saying that artwork is somehow second-hand and distorts the truth, then his similes must suffer from the same objection; the similes are inferior to rational argument

Aristotle on the Forms Aristotle found the Forms deeply unsatisfactory for many reasons The first objection is known as the problem of the third man (Metaphysics, 1984) If we take man as an example, Plato claims there are particular men, all of whom share a common quality which defines them as men done by partaking in the Form of Man Aristotle argues that in order for the two categories of particulars and Forms to relate to each other, they must share something in common which can be identified as such

If we take Plato seriously as to the relationship between qualities, this new common quality must be due to another entity that they all partake in, and we call this the third man So we have introduced another element. If we look at a group of three elements, the reason they relate to each other is because they share something identifiable in common: we require a fourth man in order to relate them all together We can continue in this process ad infinitum and are stuck in vicious infinite regress, where the Forms of the Forms have Forms, and so on Aristotles second objection, found in The Nichomachean Ethics is a twofold attack. Firstly, he points out there is not one universal good that means the same whenever we apply it: Things can be called good in two senses: some as good in their own right, and others as means to secure these Therefore good is not a common characteristic corresponding to one idea. Aristotle (2004, p11-12) This would imply there is no single, unifying, Form of the Good Furthermore, Aristotle questions whether the Form of the Good could have any practical advantage gained from contemplating it: What advantage is his art will a weaver or a joiner get from knowledge of the good-itself? Or how will one who has had a vision of the idea itself become thereby a better doctor or general? Aristotle (2004, p13) Plato fails to distinguish between the theoretical and practical knowledge he assumes that knowing something in the abstract puts that knowledge to practical use Just because I might know what a doctor does and have a good knowledge of medicine, that does not mean I will necessarily have the skills to make a good doctor

Imitation Plato thinks there is a hierarchy of imitation that moves away from the Forms and decreases in value as it does so However, just because something, like a work of art, is far removed from the Forms, does this mean we cannot learn anything from it? Rosalind Hursthouse gives the following example: One might still think that some knowledge of reality could be gained even from something which stood at a third remove from it. If I am trying to gain true knowledge of the Form of the Bird, for

example, might not my search for this knowledge be aided by pictures of birds the like of which I have never seen, brought from other countries? Few of us have seen kiwis; it is the pictures of them that aid us towards the knowledge that (as Plato might say) the Form of the Bird is not that of a winged creature. Hursthouses example indicates there is a possibility of improving ones grasp of the Form by a consideration of the imitations of particulars Perhaps a different approach to the problem of universals and particulars is required. Wittgenstein highlights one such approach:

Consider for example the proceedings we call games. I mean board games, card-games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Dont say: There must be something common, or they would not be called games but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: dont think, but look! Look for example at board games, with multifarious relationships. Now pass to card games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out and others appear. [] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than family resemblances. Wittgenstein (1992, p31-2) Wittgensteins approach could accommodate Hursthouses example of the kiwi Furthermore, his claim about the grouping of particulars by a network of resemblances debases Platos argument for the Forms, as it is no longer the case that a given particular need to share any resemblances with a second one; they could be grouped by a third To take the example of games: - X is said to be a game because it possesses property p - Y is said to be a game because it shares property p with X. It also possesses property q - Z is said to be a game because it shares property q with Y. Although it shares no properties with X (including property p), both are games because of their (differing) resemblances to Y. On Platos account, p would be the Form of the Game, so Z could not possibly be a game

However, the definition is much more informal than Plato would have us believe, as Z can be identified as a game because of its relation to Y, via q The definition of game can shift as new resemblances are recognised or generated This explanation complies with Aristotles third man argument as, far from particulars having to share a common quality via an entity above them, the relationship is entirely between particulars without the Form This position also solves the problem of infinite regress, and there is no necessity of a third man to relate Forms to particulars