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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

^.^ Event: Susan Baer, New Jersey Airports General Manager for the Port Authority of New
^j\k and New Jersey

Type: Interview

Date: October 24, 2003

Team: 7

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan

Participants (non-Commission): Susan Baer; Ed Begley, Counsel for Port Authority for
NY and NJ; Amy Revina, Counsel for Gallagher Gosseen Faller and Crowley; Michael
Crowley, Counsel for Gosseen Faller and Crowley; and Karl Lunan, Counsel for Port
Authority of NY and NJ

Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan

Location: NY/NJ Port Authority Building 1 at Newark Airport, New Jersey

(Ed Begley, Counsel for Port Authority began tern Commission staff that he sent a letter
to General Counsel (Marcus) yesterday indexing what documents will be provided to the
Commission in response to team 7 's Port Authority Document Request No. 2. The letter
addressed documents in development by the Port Authority fa* it* man Us grid hnvf nnt
any outside entity-fit the.time, v^htch regard security of nil Au I AuthurliyJ
The format for exchange of the documents in question has not been decided
yet. There is litigation going on right now that has to be decided first in order to ensure
that security at Port Authority is not compromised by the sharing of such internal
documents.

Begley also wanted to know if the Skyscraper Committee had been involved with team 7 's
work to date.

Background

Susan Baer has been the General Manager of New York and New Jersey Port Authority
airports since June of 1998. This includes Newark Liberty International Airport, Tetebbro
airport, and all general aviation airports in the area. Before 1998, she was General
Manager of La Guardia Airport in New York from 1994-98. For the I
has also managed the Lincoln Tunnel and bus terminals. -f~,.
<_U n i-t/'i *
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I \ \e is the self described, "Mayor of Newark." Her office holds the FAA/6ertification for
*— -^ operating the airport. The overall safety and security and operations at the airport are
among her responsibilities. The facilities have their own police, sanitation and electrical
components. The airport leases out space to the carriers. JBffiSats^s are long term-fen^
nimjjfc.1 iiiifllm ulilines. Before 9-11, part of the process for leasing space requireJlthat the
air carrier designate the security for their leased space. Federal standards set by FAA
provided the parameters for security and operations. Certain "Must Dos" had to be met
by the carrier in contracting, a security company. TbwTJihe FAA would-s«ad_test«
^jQgjjt** the degree to which the airline.through its security contract was meeting the
federal standards. This was afi ongoing process.

Exclusive Area Agreements

;10i\A iiaa a lull in amtiug me security Btanaarus ima out in federal

lcgulatioe-K)7.- Exclusive Area Agreements were signed by the airport, the air
carrier, and the FAA stating that a certain carrier had exclusive control and use over
certain areas of the airport that they leased. This agreement included securing access
control and doors. Therefore, it was the carriers' responsibilities to respond when certain
alarms sounded in their exclusive areas. This does not negate law enforcement's
response as laid out in FARl/107.

Carriers needed approval from Port Authority to lease space to other carriers^xPnmary
carrier would take responsibility for.terminal and was responsible for the lease of specific
gates to other carriers. A \ "~~\ \ Port Authority law enforcement at the airport responde

>y ^-' incidents in matter of seconds. As Baer put it, sometimes more cops would respond than
the security company might want." The security companies used by the carriers would
handle door issues based on exclusive area agreements. IM ,
. vjlA^

\J j Baer stressed the i nmpetojrnnfflir PA police force* '-^f something was found amiss
( j tvery phone haj^a sticker for fo j§9ft? \Eyeryone would call it.A \U^,

Testing of the System

PA had a program of their own to test the security measures at the airport, in addition to
the FAA regimen. The testing included the Exclusive Area Agreements,,, <vt5L&XJ*Y cv»

Baer saidjhehad a "zero tolerance policy" in responsecr'someone without an ID in the

ffifare^ or a door wasb&open. Records of the tests were shared with the individual
carriers, and Baer would work with the carriers to improve weaknesses in the system as
<^j necessary.

Her security manager, Bob Cody, reported to her through the operations unit. The
security manager had an additional staff member to monitor and maintain the security
measures in effect. This included the ID office, access control measures, and the

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implementation and adherence of FAA requirements. Of Cody, she said he was a very
knowledgeable and competent manager. John Jacoby, her manager of the operations
side, has been promoted to her deputy. r. ^-JULJ^an K

\yfrrie'ffogs,Baer said she ^j^™ as issues came up. On a monthly basis, she
-—I met with the carriers and others involved with the security at the airport. This Consortia
was a coordinated effort set up after the TWA 800 crash. She said the Federal Security
Manager (FAA regulatory role) participated, as did the CASFO on occasion. Local law
enforcement and the FBI would also brief the group from time to time. Minutes were kept
ofihese meetings but they were never detailed, (toe ^bt^)C\Q^SK^Q)rms^ff3n^Q^s^
•qpoktrtt£*bpnflyyfyiyc}~~Within the PA, periodically meetings were held at a high level to
discuss security at all the PA airports. It was high priority, even before 9-11.

y Tflewark airport became a category X airport shortly before 9-11. The airport had already
"X been operating and treated as a cat x airport for some time, in the sense that anm»l
comprehensive assessments of the airport were conducted every year. The biggest
change was the promotion Russell White received from CASFU to FSM.
On that note, Baer commented that she was fortunate that White was an active member of
the airport community.

othing she was aware of gave her the impression that security was lax at Newark, on 9-
11 or now. She received the same information from the SDs and ICs as every other
airport manager. Nothing she received singled out Newark as a target for terrorism.
From a vulnerabilities jgsW«eat6 standpoint, nothing ^BtUsuggested terrorists
were active in her area. YO ^

Certainly, the PA police (a day doesn't go by she doesn't talk to the chief) creates a
report (synopsis) each day and has regular discussions on particular cases with him.
Newark "has always had" an active security and crime watch program. The airport 9/11
encourages people to report suspicious activities. She stated, "If anyone kijew anything Working-level
(about the plot or potential threat), they would have done something." Employee

There exists a record of every officer dispatched at the airport. The Joint Terrorism Task
Force, and the investigation that took place immediately after 9-11, captured that
information. Begley said he may have to feach out to the Task Force on behalf of
Commission to obtain th^.police record, Baer felt confident that report was already
done. She added that the PA police has/a fairly sophisticated system of record keeping in
place^Karl I lhas been in contact/with the police oiSetakhare &§t would kae?r that
ormation.
"19/11
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I The process is very clearly articulated by the FAA regulations. The General Manager's / Information
office audits^*. The Port Authority goes beyond those measures to ensure that j
credentialing i\donc correctly.!. I
| | AttheVid of 2000, they beganfingerprintingall applicants.

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When gaps in the background investigation were found, there was an FAA generated list
of applicable explanations to prove that person was not in prison. Fingerprinting was the
most reliable way to ensure this. J3l» poiafcef credentialing and background test was
only to determine if the applicanthajLever-betin IncareeFatedjii the United States; she
stressed it was not to uncover ^ypotential terrorist affiliatic

f ) ] Baer did not recall anyone applying for a job at the airport and being turned down
'—- because of a failure to meet the background check requirement, nor did she remember
anyone repeatedly attempting to get a job at the airport. OM"
f" ?\/ j In the event an applicant was not hired, Baer was notified as to why the person was not
— credentialed. Again, she didn't recall instances of&Hf. In the case of employees hired by
the air carriers and the screener companies; she only received notifications on applicants
the carriers were sponsoring. In those instances, the General Manager's office just
"signed off on the request to credential someone, as long as the background check was
completed.

Commission staff requested that Port Authority results of SIDE-ACCESS (SIDE X)

challenges be provided to the Commission, dating back to 1998.

Cv) Baer does not recall hearing that the carriers or the security contracted for screening ever
performed self-assessments.

Baer believed that video coverage of the terminal occurred but it was not recorded. This
would have been an expense incurred by the individual carriers leasing the terminals.
Continental Airlines kept tapes of some of their screening points for liability reasons.

Baer said that there was discussion pre-9-11 of the value of security cameras. Some
footage of PA police responses to calls had proven valuable in the

9/11 Classified Information

Threats and Vulnerabilities

When asked what she thoughts the biggest threats aft€LvulrrgfS5tiBS to the airport,
Baer's response was that in her position, "you don't sit around thinking about the worst
thing that coud_hap_p_en.^a

Aircraft incidents are the worst case scenario.

'rom a security point of view, based on all the info sent to the airport in the years prior to
-11, the number 1 threat to the airport was "a car bomb on the frontage." This was what
she gleaned from the intelligence sent to her from the FAA through SDs. Most of the
information was about events in the Middle East. There was some intelligence on lEDs
as well.

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federal government determinewwhat security level is maintained by the airport. She

•6 not privy to the information used to make that determination at the national level. In
her own words, she g^the "watered down stuff that can be sent to everyone." She went
on to say that "there are the security measures you must implement that become onerous
pretty quickly," implying that the national SDs were not tailored to her airport and
became unwieldy at times. She had to implement them and seek approval from
regulatory persons on duty.

She does not recall seeing the presentation prepared by Pat McDonnell on intelligence
threats^ <il)j^ V^L, "$UJ**A*\£

On 9-11

I \J ) On 9-11, the airport was at aviation security level 2 with modifications (to this point, it
\ was later clarified that the aviation security level was at 3 with modifications).
Announcements about unattended cars; alertness among employees (such as the skycaps)
for suspicious people were examples of additional precautions taken. At Newark in
particular, because of construction, they had to have a police officer stationed at the
frontage to make sure that people kept moving.

I1 ) [ There was no curb side check-in after 9-11.

1 > s/^

A lot of stuff had happened before she found out one of the flights had taken off from
Newark. The WTC was smoking, which was 6 nautical miles away. They could see it
from the vantage point of their old building. Police said the plane hit the Trade Center.
She went to the ops office on the 4th floor and tried to get information on where the plane
came from.
t M s-
V \She watched the second plane™ the Trade Center. "Within a minute," the decision was
made to close the airport. Lralike the rest of the airport world, she could see it. She was
on the phone with La Gajffdia and Kennedy to find out if they had any information. Baer
didn't know where theffwere coming from. Planes were allowed to land, "No plane
leaves until we get some clarity," she remembers saying. She can not remember when she
found out that UA 93 took off from Newark.

When asked about the information that she received that day, "Nothing was from reliable
security people." According to hw, she was pretty much operating on logic, what made
sense at the time. She remembers getting the press release about the Pentagon attack.
C ~\ 0 j The commanding officer of the police left message with security that UA 93 was frdm
—' Newark. She was in the operations center at the time. Shortly after that,vCas* the order
to ground planes.lw*'~ ^kjM^- ^-

r\J>
^__ /"Thousands of people at Newark got off the planes and also wanted to leave that day,"
she said. They let taxis back in to take people out. Employees that were needed were
allowed to get in to the secure areas of the airport.

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Snow equipment and contracters' equipment was used to close the access points.
Complicatiiq| matters was the hugetfe^^drain because of officials going to assist at
ground zero.

n that day, the FSM was a "visible presence" at Newark. He or she was encountering
the same problems with getting useful information from authorities. "He went to av sec 4
but that didn't make much of a difference," she said.

(\) She remembers calling over to United (the local folks) at one point to see if there was
anythingjairport could do. By then, the FBI was on the scene working with detectives
andJLJnued Airlines. Nothing was done to screen those passengers that got off the plane,
would-be terrorists walked away. There was no mechanism in place at that point.

Airport did not even think about reverse screening of passengers. They were dealing with
the human needs of all the passengers. All the tunnels were closed, the bridges. The idea
at the time was for the planes to go to the closest airport.

After Action Reports, Recommendations: t ^y^

(y
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ak-^Baer did not <te an after action report. "By the time we could have gotten to
/that (writing an after action report), it wouldn't have made any sense," she said.

iat was a concern at the time and would have helped was getting better information
from a national source (from the FAA security folks). Because she was at a loss, her
decisions on that day she characterized as "reactive to the events." If she knew a little
better what was happening, maybe she would have screened passengers coming off the
planes. Without the knowledge of what was going on, she could only have so much
foresight, she said.

Certainly, there have been calls from/ll sources about how to do this better >
congressional decision to establish TSA demonstrateflj^that. Baer reported that her team
has been working closely with &em and the new players. "It is not perfect," she said. She
is lucky in that the FSD is great and working with her is a good thing. "She has been
willing to share; there have been frank discussions." Initially, Baer thought there was a
lack of clarity on roles because Congress established the TSA so quickly. She described it
as this: "set up an entity with wide power, lacking ability to fulfill it, and without talking
to others about the use of that power."

or instance, she found out in a meeting that Marcus Arroyo can shut down the airport,
She didn't know that. It isn't a turf thing, she said. It's a question of jurisdictional lines.
Notification processes, and conditions. It hasn't been properly articulated.

"Admiral Loy is getting promoted to something in DHS. He's made great strides but....
-' There is a ways to go," she said.

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(\) )She thinks the TSA "needs to bite a big bullet and implement CAPPS II." In the
-^automated age, airline reservations systems could be better coordinated.

9/11 Classified Information

There is a need to integrate the information that they do have, while maintaining the
confidentiality.

She thinks that if FAA is going to go to the trouble of credentialing someone, then at
some point, trust needs to be granted to that person. Such credentialed people should not
be subjected to the strict screening regiment each time they go out to an airport
concourse. In her opinion, it is counterproductive.

[ \ ) She talked about the need to keep people flying; and that the system could run smoother
at the airport to encourage people to fly more.

Unity of Command issues -

Shc-docsirH know if you carl create a fedeial buicau that-cap <K> all of
necessarily make the situation betters-she thought. "TS A/fias law enforce authority but no
funding for it," she remarked. Port Authority police have overall law enforcement
responsibility for the airport. She doesn't know if it't better to federalize K. She
commented, 0there is something to be said for knowing the environment and the
passengers lljal affeels the sorrily judgment.^ security personnel.*5*
j!{A)- \ Vvk xi£f-4/t lo ^ ** \jso-JttL *•*!
She thinks the problem was more (still is) a focus on an outdated paradigm. The system
was looking for what was tested- grenades, handguns, etc - they were looking at the
hijacks of the seventies. "The traditional model was never updated. In comparison, the
Israelis look for terrorists, not weapons. We still look for weapons. Given what it was
supposed to do, it did it well (which was to detect EEDs)."

Baer does not recall the_f AA security tesjresults ever showing t&t failures at Newark
that-she was-aa3£feef(Red Team Resulfsand" SEA'sJTA

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