International Harvester v. IAC Facts: 1.

Private respondent Diosdado Joson was first employed as assistant attorney by the petitioner and was thereafter promoted to various positions until he became the GRO for Government Sales Department with a salary of P2,500. 2. After 17 years, the private respondent was informed of his transfer to Fleet Account Sales on the ground of redundancy caused by the phase out of his department. It was a lesser position with less salary and without allowances although there is commission. The petitioner refused to transfer which resulted to his termination. He then filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner. Lower Court: Found the dismissal illegal and ordered the payment of damages Court of Appeals: Affirmed the decision. 3. Hence this appeal. Issue: W/N there was a valid ground for the reduction of personnel (due to redundancy) RULING: Yes, it is part of management prerogative to determine the need for ht existence of a department and thereby order the reduction of its personnel when necessary. The employer has therefore the right to demote or dismiss an employee provided it is not tainted with unfair labor practice or ULP. Herein, there was not bad faith in the part of the petitioner since it notified the employees of the management's decision to phase out the department. CHUAQUA FACTS vs.CLAVE OF G.R. No. L-49549 THE August 30, 1990 CASE:

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination. ISSUE: Was her dismissal valid? Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct? SUPREME COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying: If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic level, this only leads to the truism that the heart has reason of its own which reason does not know. Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

(NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The following facts were presented: (a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company; (b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998. (c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000. (d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy. (e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker, whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999. (f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy. (g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days as advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need of money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay. On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution. On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that: (a) The petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal: (b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and (c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit. Hence, this petition. Issues: The issues raised by this petition are: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and (2) Whether or not the respondents resignations were far from voluntary. Held: (1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136 of the Labor Code: (ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married,

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006 Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella Ponente: J. Puno Facts: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission

a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.)

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE V FIANZA 425 SCRA 41YNARES-SANTIAGO; March 9, 2004 NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS - Josephine Fianza had been employed with petitioner BenguetElectric Cooperative (BENECO) as Property Custodian under theOffice of the General Manager.- BENECOs General Manager, Versoza, issued Office Order No.42 addressed to Fianza communicating that she is temporarilydetailed to the Finance Department to assume the duties of aBill Distributor without any change in salary rate. This is linewith their efforts to reduce the cost of operation.- Fianza acknowledged receipt of the letter under protest. Sheavers that it amounts to a demotion because there aresigni ficant differences in the educational qualifications, workexperience, s kills and job description and the workingconditions of a Bill Distributor are totally different and morestrenuous and expose her to unfavourable and dangerouscircums tances, and therefore not similarly situated as that of Property Custodian.- In response, Versoza issued a Memorandum informing herthat the position of Property Custodian may eventually phasedout upon approval of the already proposed Table of Organizati on as part of business decision.- Still, Fianza refused to heed the order of the General Managerand continued to work as Property Custodian despite successiveissuance of Memorandum until the management no longer authorized her to perform the duties and functions of a PropertyCustodian. ISSUES 1. WON Fianzas transfer from Property Custodian to BillDistributor is valid2. WON the position of Property Custodian is abolished andWON the abolition is valid HELD 1. YES Ratio The management has a wide latitude to regulate,according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassignemployees according to the requirements of its business.How ever, the transfer of an employee may constituteconstructive dismissa l when it amounts to an involuntaryresignation resorted to when continued e mployment isrendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is ademotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay, or when a cleardiscrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomesunbearable to the employee.2. YES Ratio The abolition of a position deemed no longer necessaryis a management prerogative, and this Court, absent anyfind ings of malice and arbitrariness on the part of management,

notified her that 20% of the amount would be deducted from her salary. Upon petitioners demand for a full-dress investigation, she was informed of her preventive suspension until the end of the investigation. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages. Was she illegally dismissed? Did filing of damages amount to abandonment of work? A. Yes, her preventive suspension was without valid cause since she was suspended outright. Preventive suspension beyond the maximum period amounts to constructive dismissal. Likewise, her claim for damages did not amount to abandonment of work. To constitute abandonment, these should concur: 1. Failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable cause; and 2. A clear intention to sever the employee-employer relationship Case Digest on more determinative factor manifested by over acts- Labor Law. She merely took steps to protest her indefinite suspension. Her failure to report for work was even due to her indefinite suspension. MENDOZA VS RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN G.R. No.155421 Date:July, 7, 2004 Petitioner:Elmer M. Mendoza Respondent:Rural Bank of Lucban Ponente:Panganiban, J. FACTS: On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issuedBoard Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 9953, that in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existinginternal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments.Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers andemployees from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa. . Pursuant to Board Res. No. 95-52 the following branch employees; Joyce V. Zeta, Clodualdo Zagala, Elmer M.Mendoza and Chona R. Mendoza are reshuffled to their new assignments without changes intheir compensation and other benefits.Petitioner Elmer Mendoza in an antedated letter expressed his opinion on the reshuffledto the management. Upon the reply of the Bank Chairman, Daya, it informed it informed that itwas never in their intention to downgrade the position of the petitioner in the bank consideringthat his due compensation as bank appraiser is maintained and no future reduction wasintended. Petitioner filed a leave of absence for 10 days due to ailment and then another 20days leave of absence.While on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before ArbitrationBranch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -for illegaldismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages -was filed against the Rural Bank ofLucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada.Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive dismissal,because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while histable had been placed near the toilet and eventually removed. He adds that the reshuffling ofemployees was done in bad faith, because it was designed primarily to force him to resign.The Labor Arbiter rendered the decision in favor the petitioner, the respondent Bankappealed and the NLRC reversed the Decision. After the NLRC denied his Motion forReconsideration, petitioner brought before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailingthe foregoing Resolution. The Court of appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could beattributed to the NLRC. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment? HELD:

Case Digest on Blue Dairy Corporation vs. NLRC, 314 SCRA 401, September 1999- Labor Law Q. A check was mis-posted, resulting in an overstatement of a clients outstanding daily balance. The President of the bank sent a letter to petitioner to explain the mis-posting. Internal auditors, after investigation, reported that petitioner was liable, and the bank

No. The petition has no merit. Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable orunlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear discrimination,insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. In the case at bar, the reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the basis of afinding of constructive dismissal.In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative totransfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is notmotivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotionwithout sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does not givethem vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative tochange their assignments or to transfer them.There appears no justification for denying an employer the right to transfer employees toexpand their competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of theestablishment. Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also reassigned withouttheir express consent. Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or anydiminution of his salary, privileges and other benefits. This fact is clear in respondent's BoardResolutions, the April 30, 1999 letter of Bank President Daya to Branch Manager Cada, and theMay 10, 1999 letter of Daya to petitioner.The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of management.Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. Thetransfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerialprerogative that shall be upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees. HELMUT DOSCH vs NLRC Case Digest [G.R. No. L-51182 July 5, 1983] HELMUT DOSCH, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents. FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen and the resident Manager of Northwest Airlines, Inc. in the Philippines. He had been with the respondent company for 11 years, 9 of which was served in the Philippines as Northwest manager in Manila. On August 18, 1975 he received an inter-office communication from R.C. Jenkins, Northwest's Vice President for Orient Region based in Tokyo, promoting him to the position of Director of International Sales and transferring him to Northwest's General Office in Minneapolis, U.S.A., effective the same day. Petitioner, acknowledging receipt of the above memo, expressed appreciation for the promotion and at the same time regretted that for personal reasons and reasons involving his family (living in the Philippines), he is unable to accept a transfer from the Philippines. On September 9, 1975, the Vice-President for the Orient Region of Northwest advised petitioner that "in view of the foregoing, your

status as an employee of the company ceased on the close of business on August 31, 1975" and "the company therefore considers your letter of August 28, 1975, to be a resignation without notice." On September 16, 1975, Northwest filed a Report on Resignation of Managerial Employee i.e., Helmut Dosch before the Department of Labor, copy thereof furnished petitioner. The Report was contested by the petitioner and the parties were conciliated by Regional Office No. IV, Manila but failed to agree on a settlement. The case was thus certified to the Executive Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, for compulsory arbitration. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is considered resigned from his employment. HELD: The SC agree with the Labor Arbiter that petitioner did not resign or relinquish his position as Manager-Philippines, Indeed, the letter sent by petitioner to R.C. Jenkins cannot be considered as a resignation as petitioner indicated therein clearly that he preferred to remain as Manager-Philippines of Northwest. The SC treated the Jenkins letter as directing the promotion of the petitioner from his position as Philippine manager to Director of International Sales in Minneapolis, U.S.A. It is not merely a transfer order alone but as the Solicitor General correctly observes, "it is more in the nature of a promotion that a transfer, the latter being merely incidental to such promotion." The inter-office communication of Vice President Jenkins is captioned "Transfer" but it is basically and essentially a promotion for the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents. The communication informed the petitioner that effective August 18, 1975, he was to be promoted to the position of Director of International Sales, and his compensation would be upgraded and the payroll accordingly adjusted. Petitioner was, therefore, advanced to a higher position and rank and his salary was increased and that is a promotion. It has been held that promotion denotes a scalar ascent of an officer or an employee to another position, higher either in rank or salary. A transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in the service. Promotion, on the other hand, is the advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary, Whereas, promotion denotes a scalar ascent of a senior officer or employee to another position, higher either in rank or salary, transfer refers to lateral movement from one position to another, of equivalent rank, level or salary. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion, as a promotion is in the nature of a gift or a reward, which a person has a right to refuse. When petitioner refused to accept his promotion to Director of International Sales, he was exercising a right and he cannot be punished for it as qui jure suo utitur neminem laedit. He who uses his own legal right injures no one. Assuming for the sake of argument that the communication or letter of Mr. Jenkins was basically a transfer, under the particular and peculiar facts obtaining in the case at bar, petitioner's inability or his refusal to be transferred was not a valid cause for dismissal. While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employer's exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other. There can be no dispute that the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure mandated under the Constitution applies to all employees

and laborers, whether in the government service or in the private sector. The fact that petitioner is a managerial employee does not by itself exclude him from the protection of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Even a manager in a private concern has the right to be secure in his position, to decline a promotion where, although the promotion carries an increase in his salary and rank but results in his transfer to a new place of assignment or station and away from his family. Such an order constitutes removal without just cause and is illegal. Nor can the removal be justified on the ground of loss of confidence as now claimed by private respondent Northwest, insisting as it does that by petitioner's alleged contumacious refusal to obey the transfer order, said petitioner was guilty of insubordination

prerogative and were done in good faith. The transfers were aimed at decongesting surplus employees and detailing them to a more demanding branch. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were illegally dismissed. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that an employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to 'lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees' consent. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause for the private respondents' dismissal. Decision of the CA affirmed.

[G.R. No. 152057. September 29, 2003.] PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PT&T PROGRESSIVE WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, CRISTINA RODIEL, JESUS PARACALE, ROMEO TEE, BENJAMIN LAKANDULA, AVELINO ACHA, IGNACIO DELA CERNA and GUILLERMO DEMEGILLO, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner, after conducting a series of studies regarding the profitability of its retail operations, its existing branches and the number of employees, the petitioner came up with a Relocation and Restructuring Program designed to (a) sustain its (PT&T's) retail operations; (b) decongest surplus workforce in some branches, to promote efficiency and productivity; (c) lower expenses incidental to hiring and training new personnel; and (d) avoid retrenchment of employees occupying redundant positions. On August 11, 1997, private respondents received separate letters from the petitioner, giving them the option to choose the branch to which they could be transferred. Thereafter, through HRAG Bulletin No. 97-06-16, the private respondents and other petitioner's employees were directed to "relocate" to their new PT&T Branches. The affected employees were directed to report to their respective relocation assignments in a Letter dated September 16, 1997. Moreover, the employees who would agree to the transfers would be considered promoted. The private respondents rejected the petitioner's offer. Petitioner, then, sent letters to the private respondents requiring them to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their refusal to be transferred/relocated. In their respective replies to the petitioner's letters, the private respondents explained that: The transfers imposed by the management would cause enormous difficulties on the individual complainants. For one, their new assignment involves distant places which would require their separation from their respective families. Dissatisfied with this explanation, the petitioner considered the private respondents' refusal as insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order; hence, the private respondents were dismissed from work. 8 They forthwith filed their respective complaints against the petitioner before the appropriate sub-regional branches of the NLRC. In their position paper, the complainants (herein private respondents) declared that their refusal to transfer could not possibly give rise to a valid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience, as their transfer was prejudicial and inconvenient; thus unreasonable. The private respondents further opined that since their respective transfers resulted in their promotion, they had the right to refuse or decline the positions being offered to them. Resultantly, the refusal to accept the transfers could not have amounted to insubordination or willful disobedience to the "lawful orders of the employer." For its part, the company alleged that the private respondents' transfers were made in the lawful exercise of its management

NATIONAL BOOKSTORE INC V CA (YMASA,GABRIEL) 378 SCRA 194BELLOSILLO; February 27, 2002 FACTS - Petitioner National Bookstore employed private respondents Ymasa and Gabriel as Cash Custodian and Head Cashier. Theywere routinely tasked with counting the previous days salesand placing them in separate plastic bags to be deposited inINTERBANK and PCIB. The bags were held for safekeeping in theBranch vault but upon retrieval to deposit the money withroving tellers, the money was counted again but the amount forPCIB was short of P42,758.Private respondents were asked by Management to explain inwriting why they should not be dismissed for the loss of company funds and were placed under preventive suspension.Private respondents in turn denied responsibility, emphasizingthey had no access to the vault and that they were thoroughlysearched by the guard before leaving. They also asserted theirloyalty and sincerity in their work as they had been employedthere over 13years. Petitioner found their explanation unsatisfactory andterminat ed them for gross neglect of duty and loss of confidence. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegaldismissal. The Labor Arbiter found in their favor, stating that thedismissal was not founded on valid and justifiable grounds.Petitioners appeal with the NLRC was denied, as was theirpetition for certiorari with the CA for lack of merit. ISSUES WON private respondents were illegally dismissed HELD YES- The onus of proving that the dismissal of the employee was fora valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. Failure todischarge the same would mean the dismissal was not justifiedand therefore illegal.- The requisites for a valid dismissal are (a) the employee mustbe afforded due process (b) the dismissal must be for a validcause. Petitioner complied with the first requisite by furnishingthe employees with written notices stating cause fortermina tion, and having decided to do so, the reasons therefor.Petitioner accused private respondents of gross neglect of duty and loss of confidence. Gross negligence is defined as thefailure to exercise slight care or diligence. A perusal of therecords show they werent even remotely negligent of theirduties. They were able

to illustrate with candor and sinceritythe procedure they took prior to the loss petitionersallegations on the other hand, were not supported by anysubstantive evidence. Assuming arguendo they were negligent,a single act cannot be categorized as habitual and thus cannotbe a just cause for dismissal.- Loss of confidence on the other hand must be based on thewillful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.Petitioner failed to establish with certainty the facts upon whichsuch a breach of confidence could be based. Privaterespondents were thus illegally dismissed. Disposition petition is DENIED for lack of merit HEAVYLIFT MANILA vs CA Case Digest [G.R. No. 154410 October 20, 2005] HEAVYLIFT MANILA, INC. and/or JOSEPHINE EVANGELIO, Administrative & Finance Manager, AND CAPT. ROLANDO* TOLENTINO, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MA. DOTTIE GALAY and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. FACTS: On February 23, 1999, petitioner Heavylift, a maritime agency, thru a letter signed by petitioner Josephine Evangelio, Administrative and Finance Manager of Heavylift, informed respondent Ma. Dottie Galay, Heavylift Insurance and Provisions Assistant, of her low performance rating and the negative feedback from her team members regarding her work attitude. The letter also notified her that she was being relieved of her other functions except the development of the new Access program. Subsequently, on August 16, 1999, Galay was terminated for alleged loss of confidence. Thereafter, she filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against petitioners. Petitioners alleged that Galay had an attitude problem and did not get along with her co-employees for which she was constantly warned to improve. Petitioners aver that Galays attitude resulted to the decline in the companys efficiency and productivity. Petitioners presented a letter dated February 23, 1999 and a notice of termination dated August 16, 1999. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Galay was illegally dismissed. HELD: The SC held that an employee who cannot get along with his coemployees is detrimental to the company for he can upset and strain the working environment. Without the necessary teamwork and synergy, the organization cannot function well. Thus, management has the prerogative to take the necessary action to correct the situation and protect its organization. When personal differences between employees and management affect the work environment, the peace of the company is affected. Thus, an employees attitude problem is a valid ground for his termination. It is a situation analogous to loss of trust and confidence that must be duly proved by the employer. Similarly, compliance with the twin requirement of notice and hearing must also be proven by the employer. However, we are not convinced that in the present case, petitioners have shown sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to justify Galays termination. Though they are correct in saying that in this case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, still there must be substantial evidence to support the termination on the ground of

attitude. The mere mention of negative feedback from her team members, and the letter dated February 23, 1999, are not proof of her attitude problem. Likewise, her failure to refute petitioners allegations of her negative attitude does not amount to admission. Technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. Besides, the burden of proof is not on the employee but on the employer who must affirmatively show adequate evidence that the dismissal was for justifiable cause. Neither does the February 23, 1999 letter constitute the required notice. The letter did not inform her of the specific acts complained of and their corresponding penalty. The law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed two written notices before terminating his employment, namely, (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Additionally, the letter never gave respondent Galay an opportunity to explain herself, hence denying her due process. In sum, we find that Galay was illegally dismissed, because petitioners failed to show adequately that a valid cause for terminating respondent exists, and because petitioners failed to comply with the twin requirement of notice and hearing. The decisions assailed are affirmed.

Mabeza vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997] Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotels management to sign an instrument attesting to the latters compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provision. The instrument provides that they have no complaints against the management of the Hotel Supreme as they are paid accordingly and that they are treated well. The petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day, as she refused to go to the City Prosecutors Office, she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings to the hotels premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was denied by her employer. She attemptedto return to work but the hotels cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence. Three days after her attempt to return to work, she filed a complaint against the management for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Baguio City. In addition to that, she alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, night differential and other benefits. Peter Ng, in their Answer, argued that her unauthorized leave of absence from work is the ground for her dismissal. He even maintained that her alleged of underpayment and non-payment of benefits had no legal basis. He raises a new groundof loss of confidence, which was supported by his filing of criminal case for the alleged qualified theft of the petitioner. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the hotel management on the ground of loss of confidence. She appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal by the private respondent of petitioner constitutes an unfair labor practice. Held: The NLRCs decision is reversed. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employees right to

institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employees scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The labor arbiters contention that the reason for the monetary benefits received by the petitioner between 1981 to 1987 were less than the minimum wage was because petitioner did not factor in the meals, lodging, electric consumption and water she received during the period of computations. Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legalrequirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employees ages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntary accepted in writing by the employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These requirements were not met in the instant case. Private respondent failed to present any company policy to show that the meal and lodging are part of the salary. He also failed to provide proof of the employees written authorization and he failed to show how he arrived at the valuations. More significantly, the food and lodging, or electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. Abenefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work on different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondents hotel.

On May 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Upon discovering this, Solidbank First Vice-President for Human Resources Division (HRD) wrote a letter informing Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received in consideration of the SRP within five days from receipt; otherwise, appropriate legal action would be taken against him. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period, Solidbank filed a complaint. Petitioner avers that the prohibition incorporated in the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim barring him as retiree from engaging directly or indirectly in any unlawful activity and disclosing any information concerning the business of respondent bank, as well as the employment ban contained in the Undertaking he executed, is oppressive, unreasonable, cruel and inhuman because of its overbreath. Issue: Whether or not the post-retirement competitive employment ban is reasonable. Ruling: The post-retirement competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no geographical limits. The respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any competitive bank within the proscribed period. Retirement plans, in light of the constitutional mandate of affording full protection to labor, must be liberally construed in favor of the employee, it being the general rule that pension or retirement plans formulated by the employer are to be construed against it. Retirement benefits, after all, are intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, releasing him from the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for being loyal to the employer. Respondent is burdened to establish that a restrictive covenant barring an employee from accepting a competitive employment after retirement or resignation is not an unreasonable or oppressive, or in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade, thus, unenforceable for being repugnant to public policy In cases where an employee assails a contract containing a provision prohibiting him or her from accepting competitive employment as against public policy, the employer has to adduce evidence to prove that the restriction is reasonable and not greater than necessary to protect the employers legitimate business interests. The restraint may not be unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing the employees legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood and must be reasonable in light of sound public policy. Consideration must be given to the employees right to earn a living and to his ability to determine with certainty the area within which his employment ban is restituted. A provision on territorial limitation is necessary to guide an employee of what constitutes as violation of a restrictive covenant and whether the geographic scope is coextensive with that in which the employer is doing business. In considering a territorial restriction, the facts and circumstances surrounding the case must be considered.

Rolando Rivera vs. Solid Bank Corporation G.R. No.163269. April 19, 2006 Facts: Petitioner Rolando Rivera had been working for Solidbank Corporation since July 1977. He was initially employed as an Audit Clerk, then as Credit Investigator, Senior Clerk, Assistant Accountant, and Assistant Manager. Prior to his retirement, he became the Manager of the Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of the Consumers Banking Group. In the meantime, Rivera and his brother-in-law put up a poultry business in Cavite. In December 1994, Solidbank offered two retirement programs to its employees: (a) the Ordinary Retirement Program (ORP), under which an employee would receive 85% of his monthly basic salary multiplied by the number of years in service; and (b) the Special Retirement Program (SRP), under which a retiring employee would receive 250% of the gross monthly salary multiplied by the number of years in service. Since Rivera was only 45 years old, he was not qualified for retirement under the ORP. Under the SRP, he was entitled to receive P1,045,258.95 by way of benefits. Deciding to devote his time and attention to his poultry business in Cavite, Rivera applied for retirement under the SRP. Subsequently, Solidbank required Rivera to sign an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised that [he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind.

Salas v. Aboitiz
Facts: Salas was a material controller of Aboitiz, and was tasked with monitoring and maintaining the availability and supply of Quickbox needed by Aboitiz in its day-to-day operations. At one point, Salas had run out of Large Quickbox, hampering Aboitizbusiness operation. Aboitiz then wrote Salas a memorandum requiring him to explain in writing within seventy-two hours why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his (i) failure to monitor the stock level of Large Quickbox which led to inventory stock out; and (ii) failure to report to [his] immediate superior the Large Quickbox problem when the stock level was already critical, when the Large Quickbox level was near stock out, and the stock level had a stock out. Five days after, an administrative hearing was conducted to give Salas opportunity to explain his side. Twenty-two days after, Aboitiz sent him a decision notice, terminating him for loss of trust and confidence, effective mid-month. Salas then sent a letter to Mr. Hamoy requesting reconsideration of the decision, asking if he could avail of the early retirement plan, having worked for Aboitiz for ten years already. He also asked to be allowed to tender his resignation instead of being terminated. Lastly, he asked to be employed until the end of the month, so as to have enough time to look for another job. Mr. Hamoy denied the request for early retirement plan, stating that the company's table of discipline provided the penalty of dismissal for the offenses he had committed. The extension, however, was granted, and even extended for a month. Claiming termination without cause, Salas filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against Aboitiz and its president Sabin Aboitiz for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, and for payment of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. Aboitiz responded that there was valid termination, asserting that Salas was dismissed for just cause and with due process, Salas having willfully breached his duty when he ran out of Large Quickbox, justifying the termination of his employment. The Labor Arbiter sustained Salas' dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed. Gross negligence being characterized by want of even slight care acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequence, Salas could not be held guilty, having done his duty to make proper requisition in advance. Failure to follow-up is not an indicator of remission of duty. Salas can only be guilty of negligence, for failing to properly monitor and document the stocks in his custody. As he admitted during the administrative hearing, there were those which were even missing. Worst, he tampered the records to show that the stock on 31 May 2003 is for 02 June 2003. While there was no intention to defraud the company. The NLRC thus denied his prayer for backwages, and ordered the payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement Aboitiz filed a motion for reconsideration, while Salas sought partial reconsideration of the decision, both of which were denied by the NLRC. Salas and Aboitiz filed petitions for certiorari with the CA. Salas questioned the denial of his prayer for backwages and other monetary benefits, ad the order directing payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. Aboitiz questioned NLRC's reversal. The CA sustained Salas' dismissal, holding that Salas was guilty of serious misconduct under Art. 282(a) for tampering the records to show that the stock on May 31 2003 was for June 2 2003, gross and habitual neglect under Art. 282(b), and willful breach of the trust (Art. 282 (c)) reposed on Salas by Aboitiz, because as "warehouseman", and therefore a confidential employee, Salas concededly tampered company records to hide his gross and habitual neglect, and worse, sold the companys eight units of used airconditioners without authority. Issue: Whether simple negligence can be a basis for dismissal on ground of loss of trust and confidence.

Held: Salas was terminated for neglect of duty and willful breach of trust. Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. To warrant removal from service, the negligence should not merely be gross, but also habitual. Although it was Salas' duty to monitor and maintain the availability and supply of Quickbox, records show that Salas had made a requisition as early as May 21, 2003, even making several follow-ups. If there is anything that Salas can be faulted for, it is his failure to promptly inform his immediate supervisor of the nondelivery of the requisitioned items. Nevertheless, such failure did not amount to gross neglect of duty or to willful breach of trust, which would justify his dismissal from service. Moreover, there appears nothing to suggest that Salas position was a highly or even primarily confidential position, so that he can be removed for loss of trust and confidence by the employer. A "position of trust and confidence is one where a person is "entrusted with confidence on delicate matters," or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. In the records of the case, there is no semblance of willful breach of trust on the part of Salas. It is true that there was erasure or alteration on the bin card. Aboitiz, however, failed to demonstrate that it was done to cover up Salas alleged negligence. Other than the bin card and Aboitizs barefaced assertion, no other evidence was offered to prove the alleged cover-up. The CA, therefore, erred in adopting Aboitizs unsubstantiated assertion to justify Salas dismissal. The loss of trust must be based not on ordinary breach but, in the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. In this case, Aboitiz utterly failed to establish the requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence for a valid dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence. Neither can Aboitiz validate Salas dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct for his alleged failure to account for unused accountable forms. The charge came only after Salas dismissal. The subject accountable forms were issued to Salas in 2001. Inexplicably, this alleged infraction was never included as ground in the notice of termination. It was only three (3) months after the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal that Aboitiz asserted that Salas failed to account for these unused accountable forms. It is clear that such assertion of serious misconduct was a mere afterthought to justify the illegal dismissal. Aboitizs reliance on the past offenses of Salas for his eventual dismissal is likewise unavailing. The correct rule has always been that such previous offenses may be used as valid justification for dismissal from work only if the infractions are related to the subsequent offense upon which the basis of termination is decreed. While it is true that Salas had been suspended on for failure to meet the security requirements of the company, and for his failure to assist in the loading at the fuel depot, such offenses are not related to Salas latest infraction, hence, cannot be used as added justification for the dismissal. Undoubtedly, no just cause exists to warrant Salas dismissal. Consequently, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights, and to payment of backwages. However, the award of backwages is modified because Salas was not entirely faultless.

John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. vs. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, Sept. 3, 2008 Facts: Joanna Cantre Davis was agency administration officer of John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation. On October 18, 2000, Patricia Yuseco, JHLICs corporate affairs manager, discovered that her wallet was missing. She immediately reported the loss of her credit cards to AIG and BPIExpress. To her surprise, she was informed that "Patricia Yuseco" had just made substantial purchases using her credit cards in various stores inthe City of Manila. She was also told that a proposed transaction in Abenson's-Robinsons Place was disapproved because "she" gave the wronginformation upon verification. Because loss of personal property among its employees had become rampant in its office, petitioner sought theassistance of NBI. The NBI, obtained a security video from Abenson's showing the person who used Yuseco's credit cards. Yuseco and other witnesses positively identified the person in the video as Davis NBI and Yuseco filed a complaint for qualified theft against Davis but because theaffidavits presented by the NBI (identifying respondent as the culprit) were not properly verified, the city prosecutor dismissed the complaint dueto insufficiency of evidence. Meanwhile, petitioner placed Davis under preventive suspension and instructed her to cooperate with its ongoinginvestigation. Davis filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her employment without cause. The labor arbiter, inMay 21, 2002, found that Davis committed serious misconduct (she was the principal suspect for qualified theft committed inside petitioner'soffice during work hours). There was a valid cause for her dismissal. Thus, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Upon appeal, NLRCaffirmed the labor arbiter in July 31, 2003 and denied her motion for reconsideration in October 30, 2003. Upon petition for certiorari filed with theCA, CA on July 4, 2005 granted the petition holding that the labor arbiter and NLRC merely adopted the findings of the NBI regardingrespondent's culpability. Because the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did not constitute substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have assessed evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and conclusions of employers (did) notprovide legal justification for dismissing an employee". Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition wherepetitioner argues that the ground for an employee's dismissal need only be proven by substantial evidence. Thus, the dropping of chargesagainst an employee (especially on a technicality such as lack of proper verification) or his subsequent acquittal does not preclude an employer from dismissing him due to serious misconduct. Issue: Whether or not petitioner substantially proved the presence of valid cause for respondent's termination. Ruling: Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled that petitioner validly dismissed Davis for cause analogous to serious misconduct.Article 282 of the Labor Code provides: Termination by Employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employe e of the lawful orders of his employer or his representatives in connec tionwith his work;(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Misconduct involves "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, andimplies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment". For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be:of grave and aggravated character and not

merely trivial or unimportant andconnected with the work of the employee.In this case, petitioner dismissed Davis based on the NBI's finding that the latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was notcommitted against petitioner itself but against one of its employees, respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could notbe dismissed for serious misconduct. Nonetheless, Article 282 (e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which aresusceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to thoseenumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee. A cause analogous to seriousmisconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against aperson other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. Did petitioner substantially provethe existence of valid cause for respondent's separation? Yes. The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only on the affidavits of the NBI'switnesses but also on that of respondent. They likewise considered petitioner's own investigative findings. Clearly, they did not merely adopt thefindings of the NBI but independently assessed evidence presented by the parties. Their conclusion (that there was valid cause for respondent'sseparation from employment) was therefore supported by substantial evidence.