The Journal of Physical Security 5 (1) 2011

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"#$% '( )'*+%*+,

!"#$%&' ") *+,-./&' 01/#$.2,- .'$/0% 1234- 5633
ISSN 2157-8443
Web: http:/ / jps.anl.gov

Euitoi's Comments, pages i-iv

Papei 1 - }T }ackson, }i., "Tiivial Befeat of a Balanceu Nagnetic Switch", pages 1-11

Papei 2 - S Neioni, "vulneiability Assessment anu Secuiity Auuit of Election Bay Polling Place
Pioceuuies foi the Apiil S, 2u11 Nunicipal Election in Chicago, Illinois",
pages 12-72

Papei S - Ru }ohnston anu }S Wainei, "Suggestions foi Bettei Election Secuiity", pages 7S-77

Papei 4 - T} Nuiphy, "A Compaiison of Cybei Attack Nethous", pages 78-82

}ouinal of Physical Secuiity S(1), i-iv (2u11)
i
!"#$%&'( *%++,-$(
Welcome to the S
th
volume of the }ouinal of Physical Secuiity (}PS). This issue contains aiticles
about vulneiabilities in balanceu magnetic uooi switches, elections, anu computeis.
The papei by Shaion Neioni uiscusses an analysis of election secuiity in Illinois. The finuings
aie uistuibing anu ielevant to elections elsewheie in the countiy. Election integiity is a
homelanu secuiity issue, anu we hau bettei stait taking it seiiously. Suggestions foi bettei
election secuiity aie offeieu both in hei papei, anu in the viewpoint papei that follows. Speaking
of election secuiity, we in the vulneiability Assessment Team at Aigonne National Laboiatoiy
iecently uemonstiateu anothei man-in-the-miuule physical attack on a uiffeient electionic
voting machine. See http:www.ne.anl.govcapabilitiesvatelection-secuiity.
We uon't usually publish papeis in }PS about cybei secuiity, but the final papei by
unueigiauuate stuuent Tylei Nuiphy uoes a nice job of emphasizing the impoitance of physical
secuiity in cybei secuiity, anu also points out the iisks of social engineeiing.
As usual, the views expiesseu by the euitoi anu authois in !"# %&'()*+ &, -"./01*+ 2#1'(0!. aie
theii own anu shoulu not necessaiily be asciibeu to Aigonne National Laboiatoiy, the 0niteu
States Bepaitment of Eneigy, oi the authois' home institutions.

***************************

Reseaich at Baivaiu, Buke , anu the 0niveisity of Toionto inuicates that people aie moie
honest in filling out foims if they aie askeu to sign an honesty pleuge oi acknowleuge an ethics
policy oi iesponsibility at the top of the foim, iathei than the moie tiauitional bottom of the
foim. See K Weisul, "0ne Blinuingly Simple Way to Impiove Bonesty",
http:www.bnet.comblogbusiness-ieseaichone-blinuingly-simple-way-to-impiove-
honesty1641 anu N Nazai, et al., The Bishonesty of Bonest People: A Theoiy of Self-Concept
Naintenance", http:uuke.euu~uanuanPapeisuishonesty0fBonest.puf.
People seem to neeu to be ieminueu up fiont of the impoitance of being honest. Theie aie
significant implications foi secuiity involving such things as loss pievention, secuiity inciuent
iepoits, backgiounu checks, anu secuiity cleaiances.

***************************

Chailes Kuizman has wiitten an inteiesting book entitleu, 3"# 40//0)5 4*(!.(/6 7". 3"#(# 8(#
2& 9#: 4'/+0; 3#((&(0/!/ (0xfoiu 0niveisity Piess, 2u11). Kuizman points out that
appioximately 1Su,uuu people have been muiueieu in the 0niteu States since 911. Islamic
teiioiism has taken fewei than S uozen lives on 0.S. soil in the same time peiiou. Fewei than
2uu Nuslim Ameiicans have been caught planning oi engaging in teiioiist acts, out of a 0.S.
population of 2.S million
ii

***************************
}on Ronson's new book, 3"# -/.1"&<*!" 3#/!6 8 %&'()#. 3"(&'5" !"# 4*=)#// >)='/!(., claims
that Chief Executive 0fficeis (CE0s) of laige coipoiations aie 4 times moie likely to be
psychopaths than the geneial public, about 1% of whom aie psychopaths. It's not cleai what
peicentage of manageis below the CE0 level aie psychopaths, but I'm betting on a much highei
numbei. The peicentage of sociopaths is piesumably even laigei.
A new ieseaich stuuy. "The Bestiuctive Natuie of Powei without Status", to be publisheu in the
%&'()*+ &, ?@<#(0;#)!*+ 2&10*+ -/.1"&+&5. finus that supeivisois anu manageis with powei but
low oiganizational status oi iespect may be the most likely to be bully oi uemean theii
suboiuinates. Theie aie impoitant implications foi mitigating the insiuei thieat anu foi secuiity
manageis anu supeivisois. Noie on this stuuy can be founu at
http:www.cnn.com2u11u924uscalifoinia-powei-status-stuuyinuex.html.hpt=hp_t2.

***************************

Some inteiesting quotes about homelanu secuiity...

|The TSA isj moving towaius iisk-baseu secuiity.
-- }im Fotenos, TSA spokesman
Comment: It's been a uecaue since 911 anu we'ie only +%.#-/ $%01&"( iisk-baseu secuiity!.!

Taking my tweezeis away is not going to win the wai on teiioiism.
-- Aiiline passengei Ross Ratcliff

So fai, BBS seems pietty efficient at uetecting loseis anu wackos, then entiapping them into
some kinu of inane teiioiist plot. It woulu piobably be bettei if they concentiateu on seiious
thieats.
-- Anonymous

Aftei 911 it was liteially like my mothei iunning out the uooi with the chaige caiu. What we
ieally neeueu to be uoing is saying, 'Let's iuentify the thieat, iuentify the capability anu capacity
you alieauy have, anu say, 0K, what's the shoitfall now, anu how uo we meet it.'
-- Al Beinut, Nebiaska Emeigency Nanagement Agency

So if youi chance of being killeu by a teiioiist in the 0niteu States is 1 in S.S million, the question
is, how much uo you want to spenu to get that uown to 1 in 4.S million.
-- }ohn Nuellei
iii

***************************

The Centei foi Investigative Repoiting has a web site that lists many questionable homelanu
secuiity expenuituies anu initiatives: http:centeifoiinvestigativeiepoiting.oig. Some
examples:

1. The Secuie Boiuei Initiative was a Boeing Co. contiact to set up a netwoik of suiveillance
cameias, iauai, anu othei secuiity measuies along a 2,uuu-mile length of the 0.S.-Nexico
boiuei. 0iiginally intenueu to be up anu iunning by 2uu9, the pioject misseu ueaulines, hau
seiious peifoimance pioblems, anu iesulteu in seveie cost oveiiuns. The pioject enueu up
costing $1 billion befoie it was meicifully canceleu.

2. $SS7,4uu of iescue anu communications geai was pioviueu by Bepaitment of Bomelanu
Secuiity (BBS) funus to piotect 1,Suu iesiuents of Noith Pole, Alaska.

S. In Iuaho, the state's smallest county, Claik, population 91u, ieceiveu neaily $6uu,uuu in anti-
teiioiism giants uuiing the yeais immeuiately following 911. Claik County officials spent moie
than $2u,uuu on bouy bags. Anothei $1u,uuu paiu foi "explosive uevice mitigation anu
iemeuiation equipment".

4. Cheiiy County, Nebiaska (population 6,148) got thousanus of BBS uollais to buy cattle nose
leaus, halteis, anu electiic pious to ueal with potential bioteiioiism attacks on cows.

S. West viiginia puichaseu $S,uuu of lapel pins with BBS funus.

6. The city of Benvei useu BBS giants to buy iefiigeiatoi magnets, baseball caps, pens, anu
othei swag totaling ovei $SS,uuu foi its "Reauy Coloiauo" campaign, even though feueial
guiuelines uiun't allow such piomotional items to be puichaseu with feueial money.

7. Benvei also foigot about a $1 million check fiom BBS anu faileu to cash it.

8. A Su-foot tiailei woith $S4K puichaseu with BBS giants by Binsuale County, C0 was
appaiently not useu 4 yeais aftei it was puichaseu. New mobile iauios weie helu in stoiage foi
neaily a yeai.

9. A high school in Tennessee spent $Su,uuu of BBS funus foi a uefibiillatoi to keep on site
uuiing a uistiict basketball touinament.

1u. Nissouii spent seveial million uollais of BBS funus to buy 1S,uuu chem-bio waifaie suits at
$4uu each. This was enough peisonal piotection "foi each anu eveiy full-time law enfoicement
officei in the state, iegaiuless of the type of community in which he oi she woiks."

11. New Yoik spent $S million on a custom automateu public health iecoiu system to help
iuentify bioteiioiism thieats. A 2uu8 investigation, howevei, leaineu that the employees who
iv
useu the system weie completely unawaie of its potential foi bioteiioiism uetection.

12. In Califoinia, a so-calleu "fusion centei" useu by police to collect thieat infoimation bought
SS big-scieen uigital Tvs to be useu foi tiaining employees. But the tiaining system was nevei
puichaseu, anu when auuitois showeu up, all of the televisions weie tuneu to a single television
station.

***************************

Secuiity often involves complex tiaueoffs. This ieality uoes not, in my view, excuse the
iepiehensible conuuct of Bay Aiea Rapiu Tiansit (BART) in blocking cellphone ieception in San
Fiancisco stations on August 11 foi S houis uue to thieateneu piotests. (See 3"# A*B+*)=
3(0C')#, August 12, 2u11 oi http:www.homelanusecuiitynewswiie.comgioups-seek-fcc-
iuling-bait-s-cell-phone-shutuown.) The iuea was that the loss of cellphone communication
woulu make it moie uifficult foi potential piotesteis to cooiuinate theii effoits.
In unueitaking this electionic censoiship (also iepoiteuly being contemplateu by the 0niteu
Kinguom to ueal with flash mobs), BART fiimly placeu itself in the company of Bosni Nubaiak,
Bashai al-Assau, Nahmouu Ahmauinejau, vlauimii Putin, Wen }iabao, Thein Sein, anu othei
uictatois, thugs, anu oppiessois. Inteifeiing with the basic iight of fiee expiessionbefoie
anybouy bioke any laws no less!is a violation of basic human iights. (Theie weie also seiious
safety implications foi BART passengeis being unable to use theii cell phones.)
The ieality of libeity anu fieeuom is that they aie not consistent with absolute safety. They'ie
uangeious. They aie also moie impoitant than public safety. If we have to auapt unenlighteneu,
illegal, oi moially iepiehensible tactics that compiomise oui basic piinciples in the name of
secuiity, we'ie no longei the goou guys. As Ben Fianklin saiu, "They who woulu give up an
essential libeity foi tempoiaiy secuiity, ueseive neithei libeity oi secuiity".

-- Rogei }ohnston, Aigonne National Laboiatoiy, Septembei 2u11

}ouinal of Physical Secuiity S(1), 1-11 (2u11)

1
!"#$#%& ()*)%+ ,* % -%&%./)0 1%2.)+#/ 34#+/5

}ohn T. }ackson, }i., NS
}ackson Reseaich
www.jimagnetics.com
678+"%/+

Balanceu Nagnetic Switch vulneiabilities ienuei it uefeatable by tiivial means. A uetaileu
uesciiption of the most common BNS anu pioceuuies geimane to its uefeat incluuing a
methou of how to uesign uefeat tools anu appaiatus foi analysis of any common BNS baseu
upon glass ieeu technology aie pioviueu.

9.+",0:/+#,.

The patent foi the fiist Balanceu Nagnetic Switch oi BNS, otheiwise known as the Tiiple Bias
Switch, was issueu to Bolce |2j in 198u as a "Bigh Secuiity" uevice intenueu foi use in physical
electionic high secuiity systems uesigneu to piotect high value taigets. It was supposeu to
ieplace othei magnetic sensoi uevices with known vulneiabilities. The intent was that it
shoulu be invulneiable to any kinu of uefeat oi tampeiing so that even if its piesence was
known, theie was no effective way aiounu it. Buiing its uevelopment, it piobably coulu have
met that ciiteiia. Bowevei, by the time the patent issueu, it was alieauy obsolete anu quite
vulneiable to uefeat by tiivial means as was its pieuecessoi. To see how this uevelopeu, we
neeu to examine histoiical aspects that affecteu the technology anu its peiception. Then, we
will take a uetaileu look at how it woiks anu why it is so easily uefeateu. A laboiatoiy set up
will be uesciibeu wheieby anyone can tailoi a uefeat tool taigeting any manifestation of the
BNS switch baseu upon glass ieeu technology oi any technology opeiating on a similai
piinciple.

;#8+,"<

The fiist patent foi a glass ieeu switch was fileu by Elwoou in 194u |1j. The basic Foim A
uevice consists of two magnetic wiies in close pioximity sepaiateu by a small gap as shown in
Figuie 1. It is a Noimally 0pen Single Pole Single Thiow switch. The switch is closeu when in
pioximity to a magnetic fielu, geneially pioviueu by a peimanent magnetic in secuiity sensoi
aiiangements. The two blaues attiact each othei unuei the influence of a magnetic fielu. The
baie Foim A uevice is actuateu in the piesence of a sufficiently stiong magnetic fielu making a
closeu ciicuit. Although the actuating fielu zones tenu to be lobeu, the uevice is basically
omniuiiectional

The oiiginal magnetic sensoi useu on uoois anu winuows foi physical electionic secuiity
systems was a simple glass ieeu in combination with a single feiiite oi Alnico peimanent
magnet. A typical application embeus the glass ieeu switch in a plastic shell of which two
common embouiments of this appioach aie shown in Figuie 2 anu Figuie S. The moving pait
is always a peimanent magnet. The switch siue is connecteu to the secuiity system by two
conuuctois. 0bviously, shoiting out the two conuuctois makes the switch appeai secuie
whethei oi not the switch is open oi closeu.

2

This combination is still useu in "Bome Electionic Secuiity Systems" touay. Since it is
fiequently inconvenient to access the leau wiies, it is quite common to finu electionic secuiity
systems using this type of sensoi bieacheu by taping a peimanent magnet onto oi neai the
sensoi switch allowing opening of the uooi oi winuow, to which the sensoi magnet is fixeu,
without uetection. It is calleu the "Refiigeiatoi Nagnet Befeat" technique. These "singles" oi
"bullets", Figuie 2, as they aie sometimes calleu, aie only an inconvenience to a piofessional.
The suiface mounteu veision is shown in Figuie S. These enuemic uevices obviously have no
place in any "Bigh Secuiity" installation.

The BNS was inventeu by Bolce to auuiess this vulneiability. It shoulu not be suipiising that
it was uefeatable by a similai tiivial technique by the time the patent issueu. New
auvancements in the fielu of peimanent magnet mateiials became the nemesis of the Bolce
BNS. The two most common peimanent magnets, piioi to iaie-eaith magnets, weie Alnico
Figure 1: Form A Glass Reed Switch Architecture
Figure 2: Typical single glass reed and permanent
magnet security sensor or bullet.
Figure 3: Common surface mount security sensor
typically seen on doors and windows.

S
anu ceiamic feiiites. Feiiite magnets weie quite populai because theii cost was uiamatically
less than Alnico, being a cobalt alloy. These two mateiials weie obvious choices foi the BNS
inventeu by Bolce. It is uncleai if Bolce knew anything about the new iaie-eaith peimanent
magnets. Be nevei mentioneu them in any of his woik. The fiist iaie-eaith peimanent
magnets became public uuiing the same time peiiou as Bolce uevelopment woik. In those
uays, iaie-eaith peimanent magnets weie Samaiium Cobalt alloys. They hau been uevelopeu
at Wiight-Patteison Aii Foice Base, ueclassifieu anu ieleaseu to the aeiospace inuustiy uuiing
the 7us just piioi to the Bolce patent issue uate, 198u. 0bviously, they weie too expensive to
be consiueieu foi geneial commeicial applications. Bowevei, saciificing secuiity as a
compiomise against cost violates the funuamental concept of the BNS. Bolce maue the iight
choice foi a commeicial item, but the BNS has nevei been one. Anu, it is the iaie-eaith
magnets that maue his invention obsolete by the time the patent issueu. We will see why
latei.

To complicate matteis fuithei, magnetic appaiatus uesign was usually limiteu to sliue iules
anu hanu calculations. Calculatois weie a new item. Computeis weie usually limiteu to the
aeiospace inuustiy anu not available to the geneial public. Computei aiueu uesign was in its
infancy. Theie was no finite element magnetics softwaie. 0bviously, numeious vaiiations
maue in a piototype shop weie cost piohibitive. Betaileu numeiical analysis by hanu was
time piohibitive. Consequently, theie was consiueiable tiial anu eiioi without a cleai
unueistanuing of how those uevices behaveu fiom any analytical point of view. Even with the
issueu 0S patent, the actual manufactuie of the oiiginal Bolce uevice was shiouueu in seciecy,
iequiiing a complex bias magnet aujustment uuiing the manufactuiing piocess.

Shiouueu in mysteiy anu fighting an up hill battle all the way, Bolce finally convinceu the 0S
goveinment to use his invention. All of the oiiginal 0S goveinment specifications |Sj weie
wiitten aiounu the Bolce uevice fiom a puiely opeiational point of view anu iemain
essentially unchangeu. Some Lockheeu secuiity uocuments make iefeience to oiiginal uevice
specifications. The piesent uay uevice is liteially iuentical to its veiy fiist manifestation with
changes only in its packaging. 0vei time, the BNS Bigh Secuiity Switches became known as
the "Fiist Line of Befense" in mouein electionic secuiity systems.

Bow it woikeu was obvious the moment I saw it which leu to the fiist alteinative |Sj that was
unique while actually meeting all of the Feueial uevice specific specifications |Sj. It became
the vehicle foi my ieseaich into the next geneiation of BNS technology. The next technology
became the basis foi my Nastei's Thesis |6j at the 0niveisity of Nevaua, Reno anu anothei
patent |4j The new technology cieates a BNS without any ieliance upon glass ieeu
technology. Ny thesis exposeu some of the existing BNS vulneiabilities in giaphic uetail anu
hinteu at a special uefeat tool iefeiieu to as "uefeat keys" anu iefeienceu the invulneiability of
my new technologies to it.

0nce my fiist BNS patent |Sj issueu anu the Bolce patent ian out, seveial othei companies
intiouuceu clones. Theie aie seveial on the maiket. They aie all baseu upon the same
unueilying piinciple; tiiple biaseu glass ieeus. They aie all vulneiable to the uefeat keys I
have been selling as "Befeat Sticks".
!5) 3=)/#*#/%+#,.8

4

All Feueial anu 0L specifications call out a small zone aujacent to the face of the fixeu switch
which is a ueau zone. The switch is actuateusafesecuie when the actuatoi magnet assembly
is between ioughly u.6u inches uown to ioughly u.2u inches fiom the switch face. Closei than
u.2u inches sets off the alaim. This ueau zone is its guaianteeu vulneiability. It was
uetiimental, but solu as a featuie by maiketing people anu wiitten into all of the Feueial
specification uocuments as well as the latest 0L 6S4 specification.

All Bigh Secuiity Balanceu Nagnetic Switches, BNS, baseu upon "ulass Reeu" technology,
iegaiuless of aichitectuie, can be easily uefeateu by tiivial means. In fact, most BNS that can
be chaiacteiizeu by 2-B magnetic fielu analysis, as opposeu to "inheiently S-B" magnetic fielu
analysis, can be uefeateu by a vaiiety of tiivial means. This is paitly uue to the fact that most
existing BNS uevices aie eithei clones of the oiiginal Bolce BNS uevice oi a ueiivative of the
unuei lying concept embouieu in the oiiginal Bolce patent |2j. The basic objective was to
pievent uefeat by a single magnet ignoiing the fact that it was always uefeatable by a copy of
its own actuatoi magnet.

To make matteis woise, the new 0L 6S4 specification is both uesigneu aiounu the Bolce
uevice as well as uesigneu to excluue it in a combination of contiauictoiy iequiiements. The
0L specification was lobbieu by the electionic secuiity inuustiy's coipoiate executives with
total uisiegaiu foi anything technical. It iepiesents funuamentally a wai of specifications
intenueu to incluue ceitain piouucts while excluuing otheis. 0ne shining example is the
iequiiement that all BNS must contain iaie-eaith magnets excluuing all feiiites anu Alnicos
which obviously taigets the Bolce BNS. The 0L 6S4 specification is intenueu to suggest that
any BNS that meets its iequiiements is somehow unuefeatable. This is simply not the case. It
is a political uocument in its entiiety impaiting a false sense of secuiity.

The 0L 6S4 specification suggests a means to manufactuie a "Befeat Stick". It suggests that
any BNS that can pass this test is impeivious to this foim of attack. It is quite possible to
uesign a BNS that passes these piovisions anu can still be uefeateu by a "Befeat Stick" not
anticipateu within the scope of the uocument. Beie again, it piouuces a false sense of secuiity.
Theie aie no known uevices utilizing glass ieeu technology that aie impeivious to this foim of
attack. Theie is one manufactuiei using a glass ieeu alteinative anu claims to be impeivious
to this foim of attack. This is also not tiue.

0ne caveat is the inclusion of magnetic shieluing by some manufactuieis to piotect against
ceitain types of uefeat attack. 0ne such example is the use of a 0 shapeu shielu. It is neithei
novel noi effective. Since the Bolce BNS is uefeatable by its own actuatoi |6j, magnetic
shielus weie intiouuceu to mitigate that possibility in competing uesigns. These magnetic
sheet metal shielus shoit out the actuatoi magnetic fielus. When the magnetic fielu becomes
sufficiently stiong, the shielu becomes satuiateu anu no longei effective. Special uevices
similai to the Befeat Stick can be tailoieu to penetiate these shielus, which is a biute foice
attack. Refeience 6 goes into much gieatei uepth.


S
!5) !)/5.,&,2<

The basic piinciple of the BNS is to use thiee alteinating polaiity actuatoi magnets in
combination with thiee polaiity sensitive glass ieeu switches making the entiie assembly
iesistant to uefeat by a single magnet. This iequiies biasing the glass ieeu switches so that
they aie each actuateu by low level local magnetic fielus. The bias magnet in combination
with the glass ieeu achieves polaiity sensitivity to some extent. Foim A switches cannot be
useu heie since the biaseu glass ieeu switch in combination with the actuatoi magnet in a
secuie position woulu be an open ciicuit. A closeu ciicuit with the actuatoi magnet in a
secuie position iequiies a Nagnetically Biaseu Foim C Bouble Pole Single Thiow switch as
shown in Figuie 4. When the actuating magnets, whose polaiities aie in opposition to theii
coiiesponuing biaseu glass ieeu switches, aie in the secuie position, the magnetic fielus
aiounu the glass ieeus cancel out by vectoi auuition anu fall below the actuation thiesholu.
When the actuatoi magnets aie outsiue the actuation zone, the bias magnets uominate. When
the actuatoi magnets ieach the ueau zone, the actuatoi magnets ovei powei the bias magnet's
fielus anu ie-actuate the glass ieeus.

Figure 4: Magnetically Biased Form C Glass Reed Switch

6

Figuie S is a Finite Element Nagnetics fielu plot of the Bolce actuatoi of the pieuominant
uevice shown in Figuies 6, 7, 8 anu 9. It consists of thiee ceiamic feiiite peimanent magnets
fixeu to a sheet metal stiip anu embeuueu in epoxy as seen on the iight siue of Figuies 6 anu
7.

Figure 5: Holce Actuator Finite Element Magnetic Field Plot
Figure 6: Minimum Actuation Gap Showing Dead
Zone measured from the switch face.
Figure 7: Maximum Actuation Gap measured
from switch face.

7
uap uistance is measuieu fiom the BNS housing face set as the oiigin. uap lengths aie
positive anu position insiue the housing is negative. Figuie 6 shows the minimum gap, u.2
inches, foi which closei appioach sets off the alaim; the "Beau Zone". The uppei cuive labeleu
Ninimum uap in uiaph 1 is a plot of the magnetic fielu insiue the switch when the actuatoi
magnet is at its minimum appioach. Figuie 7 shows the maximum sepaiation uistance, u.6
inches, fiom the switch. The lowei cuive labeleu Naximum uap in uiaph 1 is a plot of the
magnetic fielu when at maximum sepaiation. The space between these two extiemes is the
safe oi secuie position. A gap gieatei than the Naximum sets an alaim state.

;,4 +, ()*)%+ 9+

The uefeat stick fits into the ueau zone anu makes the switch think it sees its own actuatoi.
The uefeat stick is quite innocuous anu not usually noticeu unuei casual inspection. This ueau
zone is an aitifact of the bias glass ieeu technology. The uefeat stick is maue possible by iaie-
eaith peimanent magnets anu computei aiueu uesign.

The only iequiiement to uefeat the switch is that an actuatoi naiiowei than u.2 inches be
intiouuceu into the "Beau Zone" with a suitable magnetic fielu. The Befeat Stick magnetic
fielu, as measuieu noimal to its centei magnet, must fall between the uppei anu lowei cuives
shown in uiaph 1. These two cuives aie founu by measuiing the fielu noimal to the centei
magnet of Figuie S anu off setting it by u.6 inches to get the bottom cuive anu off setting it by
u.2 inches to get the top cuive with the oiigin at the face in each case. Cleaily the magnetic
fielu will be gieatest at the neaiest appioach anu ueciease in magnituue as the sepaiation
incieases. These two cuives iepiesent the magnetic fielu uppei anu lowei bounuaiies of the
secuie state insiue the switch housing.

Figuie 8 shows a Befeat Stick on its siue at the actuation face of the switch. Figuie 9 shows
the Befeat Stick piopeily positioneu in the Beau Zone. The switch iegisteis safe oi secuie in
this position. To fuithei aggiavate the situation, the Befeat Stick can be inseiteu when the
actuatoi is in position without a single glitch.


8

Graph 1: Maximum and Minimum magnetic fields inside the BMS housing for switch activation
measured from the housing face toward the housing back wall.
Figure 8: Defeat Stick top view near BMS housing
face.
Figure 9: Defeat Stick in position for "live"
defeat. The BMS thinks it sees its actuator.

9
The aigument that the actuatoi magnets shoulu be iaie-eaith mateiials to avoiu this type of
attack is iiielevant, because the glass ieeus insiue the switch only neeu to see the actuatoi
magnetic fielu iange between the two cuives in uiaph 1. The type of peimanent magnet
mateiial only affects the physical uimensions of the actuatoi magnets neeueu to achieve the
iequiieu actuatoi magnetic fielu piofile. The uefeat stick will always be effective iegaiuless of
the magnet mateiial. Naking the bias peimanent magnets moie poweiful causes the actuatoi
magnets to be moie poweiful, but can shoiten the actuation iange uiamatically. The balance
between all of the components can only be effectively achieveu with computei aiueu uesign
taigeting specific geometiies.

The concept of alteinating magnet poles fiom N-S-N to S-N-S only means theie neeus to be
two uefeat sticks anu a hall sensoi to ueteimine which polaiity aiiangement to use. I have
one that looks like a pen anu only inuicates N oi S. Swipe the hall sensoi thiough the gap anu
pick the appiopiiate uefeat stick. The entiie kit fits into a shiit pocket iesembling a pen anu
small iulei.

!5) 9.+":0)"

The most common misconception iegaiuing high secuiity physical electionic installations is
that most intiusions aie fiom the outsiue bieaking into the facility. Bowevei, neaily 7S% of
all secuiity bieaches aie "insiue jobs." |7j In eithei case, high secuiity is usually focuseu on
the piofessional intiuuei who has some expeitise uefeating electionic physical secuiity
systems with the intent that these systems make this uifficult, eiioi pione anu time
consuming. Piofessionals stuuy theii taigets anu uevelop a bieach stiategy. Even a non-
piofessional who is just an employee has all the time in the woilu to stuuy the system, uevise
a scheme anu execute it at just the iight moment. If hanuleu piopeily, the bieach might
actually go completely unuetecteu. With the secuiity sensois sabotageu, one coulu walk in
anu out unnoticeu unless something was actually missing that exposeu the bieach. The BNS
is peifect foi this type of opeiation. Anyone coulu sabotage these sensois, bieach the system
completely unuetecteu anu latei iestoie the system without iaising suspicion. Too make
matteis woise, the BNS is wiuely believeu to be "unuefeatable." Bue to this misconception,
they aie even placeu exteiioi to an egiess with the total confiuence that no one can pass
unuetecteu. The BNS is so highly iegaiueu that othei types of sensois aie fiequently not
installeu with complete ieliance on the BNS. In fact, some viueo suiveillance cameias aie only
active when tiiggeieu by the BNS, so that anyone coulu walk in anu out of a facility at will
without evei being seen.

>%7,"%+,"< 1)%8:")?).+8

The test fixtuie shown in Figuie 1u is all non-magnetic on a piecision tooling plate with
jeweleu beaiing sliues anu S axis stages. The combineu position accuiacy is within u.uu1
inches. uauss meteis aie laboiatoiy giaue to within 1%. The laboiatoiy enviionment is
kept a 22C 1C with Relative Bumiuity less than 4u%. The stanuaiu ueviation obseiveu on
commeicially available BNS was 2u%.


1u

0nly the fielu plot of any paiticulai actuatoi magnet along the actuatoi magnet noimal axis
foi any BNS that ueviates fiom the Bolce constiuction anu its actuation iange is neeueu to
ueteimine the specifications foi a new uefeat stick using computei aiueu uesign. The
pioceuuie is to measuie anu plot the actuatoi magnetic fielu anu aujust the uefeat stick's
magnetic fielu until it fits into the gap with the same piofile. All the BNS I testeu weie
uefeatable by the same set of uefeat sticks. This same piinciple can be applieu to any angle of
appioach, such as the top oi the back. Shieluing only means the magnets must be laigei to
penetiate the shielu, which can be taken into account with goou computei aiueu uesign.
Blocking the Beau Zone is not enough. All BNS consisting of glass ieeus have othei similai
zones of vulneiability as uetaileu in }ackson et al., |6j.

@,./&:8#,.

The basic concept behinu the tiauitional BNS as uesciibeu in the cuiient liteiatuie anu
vaiious specifications is obsolete, highly vulneiable to tiivial attack anu impaits a false sense
of secuiity. A pluiality of alteinating magnetic poles in combination with glass ieeu switches,
oi theii equivalent, can always be uefeateu by tiivial means in any physically iealizable
piactical configuiation. The "Befeat Key" is the piincipal foim of successful attack. It is
viitually impossible to piotect against except foi a few veiy specializeu cases. The BNS is not
an obstacle to a piofessional intiuuei. It is only an annoyance. Any alteinative technologies
consiueieu as ieplacements foi the BNS shoulu be veiy caiefully examineu to avoiu an
Figure 10: Precision Tooling plate and 3D stages for BMS laboratory grade measurements.

11
unfounueu confiuence on tiivially uefeatable oi unieliable technologies. The stanuaiu BNS
utilizing glass ieeu technology is no bettei than a home secuiity single anu impaits a false
sense of secuiity. Anyone, not just piofessionals, can uefeat it tiivially, incluuing the janitoi.

67,:+ +5) 6:+5,"

}ohn T. }ackson, }i., NS ieceiveu his BS Physics fiom 0iegon State 0niveisity anu his NS
Electionic fiom the 0niveisity of Nevaua, Reno. Be is the inventoi of the "Wiue Aii uap
Peimanent Nagnet Notois" (slotless motoi). Be has patents in the fielu of physical secuiity.
Be is a magnetics specialist anu maintains a piivate ieseaich anu uevelopment laboiatoiy in
Bong Kong.

A)*)")./)8

|1j Elwoou, Waltei B., "Electiomagnetic Switch", 0S Patent # 2,264,746, fileu 194u.

|2j Bolce, Thomas }., "Nagnetically Actuateu Sensing Bevice", 0S Patent # 4,21u,889, 197u

|Sj }ackson, }ohn T., }i., "Bigh Secuiity Balanceu Type Nagnetically Actuateu Pioximity Switch
System", 0S Patent # S,668,SSS, 1997.

|4j }ackson, }ohn T., }i., "Balanceu Nagnetic Pioximity Switch Assembly", 0S Patent #
S,929,7S1, 1999.

|Sj Feueial Specification Components foi Inteiioi Alaim Systems, Balanceu Nagnetic
Switches, W-A-4Su1 August 28,199u.

|6j }ackson, }ohn T., }i., "The }ackson Bigh Secuiity Switch anu Rauio Fiequency System",
thesis 0NI Numbei 1S894S6, Copyiight 1997 - 1998. Bownloau PBF copies at
www.jimagnetics.com

|7j Impioving Secuiity fiom the Insiue 0ut, A Business Case foi Coipoiate Secuiity
Awaieness, copyiight 2uu4 National Secuiity Institute.
12
v0LNERABILITY ASSESSNENT ANB SEC0RITY A0BIT
0F ELECTI0N BAY P0LLINu PLACE PR0CEB0RES
F0R TBE APRIL S, 2u11 N0NICIPAL ELECTI0N
IN CBICAu0, ILLIN0IS

!"#$%& ()$%&*
Executive Biiectoi
Befenu the vote

Telephone: 847-S82-11uu
Email: ShaionBefenuThevote.com

KEYW0RBS
Election Secuiity, Election Auuiting, Election Integiity, Befenu The vote, Auuit The vote, Chicago Elections,
Chicago Boaiu of Elections, Illinois State Boaiu of Elections, voting, Election Integiity, Elections, Auuit, Illinois,
Shaion Neioni

1S
+!"##$ &'()'*$ +,-) ,-." +" /')0- 1"234#5( '* - 6'7-*(,89
-: 1"234#5($ 5; 8'3 (-7 <""2 5)=
>>Benjamin Fianklin (17u6-179u)

,-./ 01 2-3. 4.5661 7-893: It's amazing how complicateu it can be to answei such a simple
question. The moie ballot integiity is investigateu, the moie questions that aiise!
At Befenu the vote, we believe the only way to have an accuiate vote is thiough stiict anu
tianspaient pioceuuies that holu those in chaige accountable foi the secuiity of the ballot. These
pioceuuies must pioviue a tianspaient iecoiu on the chain-of-custouy of each event that
potentially impacts the integiity of the vote, especially uuiing the piocess of casting anu counting
the ballot. It also incluues secuiity piotocols aiounu election machines anu mateiials uuiing theii
stoiage anu tianspoitation; befoie, uuiing anu aftei elections.

Seal piotocols aie vital to the integiity of any election, but just because someone places a seal on a
uevice uoes not magically piotect it. Seals can be tampeieu with even with the best piotocols in
place. In Illinois, "tampei eviuent" seals aie placeu on ballot supplies anu equipment to secuie
ballot boxes, voting-machines anu the components that opeiate them, the bags useu to tiansfei
election iesults, anu the laige equipment containeis that tiansfei the equipment fiom one location
to anothei.

0n the suiface, the Chicago Boaiu of Elections (CBE) looks like a legitimate oiganization that is
genuinely conceineu about the integiity of oui votethat's theii job, aftei all! Boes the CBE have
secuiity measuies in place that ieasonably assuie an accuiate vote.

?," *"@"-*(, ('7)-57"A 57 ),5@ *"2'*) ('7(#3A"@ ),"8 A' 7')= !" ;57A )," -()3-# 2*'("A3*"@ 57 2#-("
-*" 57-A"B3-)" "."7 +,"7 ),"8 +"*" ;'##'+"A= 0ui investigations uncoveieu that cuiient Election
Bay voting secuiity pioceuuies aie not tiackeu, maintaineu, oi ieinfoiceu. Seals useu to inuicate
tampeiing, theii use piotocols, anu othei ielateu secuiity measuies aie not sufficient to uetect oi
uetei tampeiing with the ballot. Bow lax has the system become.

This iepoit focuses on the piocesses anu pioceuuies in place to secuie votes cast uuiing Election
Bay polling. We lookeu at pioceuuies uesigneu to pioviue a chain-of-custouy ovei ballot ielateu
supplies anu equipment. We lookeu at eviuence thiough F0IA's by attenuing public testing of
machines befoie elections (Pie-LAT's), the S% Auuitoi ballots cast aftei each election, anu thiough
a suipiise vulneiability assessment anu secuiity auuit of pioceuuies in place at 2S9 piecincts
uuiing the Apiil S
th
Nunicipal Runoff Election.

We founu the following:
Cuiient seals anu ielateu secuiity measuies uo not pioviue sufficient guaiantees of election
integiity.
The seals in use uo not ieliably inuicate when they have been tampeieu with.
Pioceuuies in place foi the use of seals completely invaliuate theii use as a measuie of
secuiity.
Pioceuuies in place foi testing machines both befoie anu aftei elections aie inauequate in
assuiing a tampei iesistant voting enviionment.
The CBE fails to pioviue auequate secuiity piactices in the stoiage, tianspoitation, anu
chain-of-custouy foi voting supplies anu equipment.
Cuiient seal installation, tiaining mateiials anu instiuctions, anu follow-up piotocols aie
insufficient foi ueveloping a secuiity cultuie.
14
The cuiient secuiity cultuie at the CBE fails to pioviue inuepenuent secuiity anu
vulneiability assessment of the CBE peifoimance on pioviuing a secuie voting
enviionment.
uENERAL STATENENT 0F P0RP0SE
This iepoit anu its unueilying investigation suppoit tianspaient anu public elections to assuie faii
anu accuiate iecoiuing of the vote. Ballot integiity is vital to assuie that no votei is
uisenfianchiseu, that eveiy eligible votei is able to cast a ballot, anu that eveiy legitimate ballot cast
is accuiately tabulateu. voteis cannot piesume the accuiacy of the vote without auequate means to
evaluate voting systems anu piocesses. This incluues inuepenuent evaluation anu testing of
pioceuuies put in place by election authoiities to assuie the integiity of the elections, as well as
subsequent compliance with these pioceuuies.
Being a human enueavoi, no election will be peifect. But elections can be impioveu, both to ensuie
accuiate vote totals anu to pievent fiauu.

Accoiuingly, foi the "Supplementaiy Alueimanic Election of Apiil S, 2u11" (the municipal iun-off
election in 14 Waius), a vulneiability assessment anu secuiity auuit of ballot integiity pioceuuies
in the polling place (heieaftei the "Auuit") was conuucteu as an investigatoiy measuie.

In the Auuit, pollwatcheis askeu questions of CBE peisonnel anu inspecteu equipment.
Pollwatcheis useu woiksheets ueiiveu fiom the Chicago Boaiu of Election's juuge tiaining manual,
which auuiesseu 1S uiffeient questions oi inspection tasks uiiecteu to ballot integiity. A key aspect
of the Auuit was to obseive anu iecoiu the use of seals at the polling place.
Elections cannot be effectively oi faiily conuucteu without the vital seivice of liteially hunuieus of
thousanus of volunteei election juuges acioss Ameiica. The Auuit was unueitaken with complete
confiuence that the vast majoiity of Chicago Election }uuges aie simply fellow citizens honestly
seiving theii community in a complicateu iole. That opinion iemains unchangeu aftei the Auuit.
No pait of the Auuit was, oi is now intenueu to impugn the juuges oi theii goou seivice. Rathei, the
Auuit is uesigneu to pioviue a view into a complicateu, but still suspect system of ballot integiity in
Chicago elections unuei which oui election juuges must opeiate.
In peifoiming the Auuit, a pieliminaiy uatabase of infoimation was cieateu to assess how the
Chicago Boaiu of Elections is peifoiming in the auministiation of Chicago's elections. We believe
that the Auuit iesults anu ielateu implications have a wiuei application thioughout the State of
Illinois.
$.5/-9/ ;-4 3<. #8=>3

Pieliminaiy investigations of Chicago Boaiu of Elections election pioceuuies weie conuucteu by
attenuing public pie anu post election events, by visiting voting sites in Chicago uuiing Eaily voting
anu Election Bay balloting, thiough ieview of election tiaining manuals, anu with the use of F0IA's
foi auuitional infoimation. These investigations, conuucteu piioi to the Auuit, inuicateu that issues
of non-compliance with ballot equipment secuiity stanuaius anu pioceuuies might wiuely exist in
Chicago elections.
1S
Pieliminaiy investigations inuicateu a pattein of pioblems ielateu to maintaining valiu secuiity
seals on balloting equipment, which iepiesenteu a significant secuiity iisk in the opeiation of
elections. The potential implications to the integiity of the vote iaiseu by these pieliminaiy
investigations weie piofounu.
A seconu iationale was that the Chicago Boaiu of Elections uoes not cuiiently auuit piocesses oi
pioceuuies foi Election Bay polling place activities. Illinois statute iequiies a S% manuatoiy
statewiue auuit;
*
howevei, the local election authoiities confine that auuit to ballots cast on
Election Bay in the polling place.

In auuition, motivating this Auuit is the lack of infoimation available to the public about secuiity in
the voting piocess. Foi example, it is uifficult anu sometimes impossible to obtain infoimation
about the auministiation of the voting piocess, anu the uata is not collecteu oi ieauily available to
the public.
(.3<-=/
0vei 2u Pollwatchei Auuitois anu 6 Supeivisois auuiteu 7 waius; visiting 2S9 piecincts. Each
pollwatchei conuucteu obseivation of poll opening pioceuuies, poll closing pioceuuies, anu
inspection of multiple polling places uuiing the peiiou the polls weie open.
$./863/ !800541

0f the piecincts auuiteu, ?@AB C.4. ;-89= 3- <52. /8D/3593>56 >//8./ -; 9-9+7-0E6>597. C>3<
>0E-43593 D566-3 /.784>31 E4-7.=84./= S7% of the piecincts hau multiple instances of pioceuuial
non-compliance. 0nly 21 piecincts of the 2S9 hau peifect scoies, oi less than 1u%.
(5>9 F-9768/>-9
This stuuy finus that significant pioceuuial failuies aie occuiiing on an ongoing basis thioughout
the election piocess. We finu even if cuiient pioceuuies aie followeu, these pioceuuies completely
fail to pioviue a tampei-iesistant balloting enviionment. As a iesult, the integiity of votes cast in
Chicago elections is subject to question.

0ui next step is to uo a citizen-iun secuiity assessment (an auuit) of the entiie state of Illinois.

: C'*" A")-5#"A @3CC-*8 '; )," -3A5)D@ *"@3#)@ (-7 4" ;'37A @)-*)57/ '7 2-/" EF= ?," @"()5'7 '7 2'##57/ 2#-(" "B352C"7) G22=
HF>HIJ 5@ *5(, +5), 57;'*C-)5'7 @2"(5;5( )' K,5(-/' -7A L##57'5@= ?," @"()5'7 '7 MN"-#@ -7A O-()@ :4'3) N"-#@P G22= HQ>HRJ
"S2#-57@ )," @5/75;5(-7(" '; @"-#@= ?," 57;'*C-)5'7 ;'37A 57 M:AA5)5'7-# T3#7"*-45#5)5"@P 2*'.5A"@ 5C2'*)-7) 57;'*C-)5'7
-4'3) ,'+ '3* "#"()5'7@ -*" *37= G22= UV>UQJ

*
Piioi to the pioclamation, the election authoiity shall test the voting uevices anu equipment in S% of the piecincts within the election
juiisuiction. 1u ILCS S24C-1S
0ui ieseaich also uemonstiateu that Eaily voting piogiams in Illinois have nevei been auuiteu. The Illinois State Boaiu of Elections has
not uevelopeu pioceuuies to auuit Eaily voting.

16
0vERvIEW
G57HI4-89= 59= !7-E.

The intiouuction of new electionic voting systems has significantly alteieu how elections aie
conuucteu, especially in the past uecaue. Yet multiple methous still exist by which an election can
be compiomiseu. The methou chosen to compiomise the vote is often contingent on the level of
access to unpiotecteu (oi pooily piotecteu) ballot equipment oi mateiials that a potential offenuei
has. The fiist aiea of focus must theiefoie be the polling place, wheie the vote is initially collecteu.
Pioceuuies foi equipment use anu ballot collection aie installeu in the polling place to assist in
pieseiving the integiity of the election. These pioceuuies incluue seals that aie uesigneu to secuie
vulneiable aspects of the technology oi equipment in the polling place. The scope of this
investigation involveu obseivation anu iecoiuing of pioceuuies on Election Bay at the polling place.
This Auuit uiu not focus on a specific aiea in iesponse to a specific iepoit oi suspicion of fiauuulent
activity. The Auuit was not uesigneu to uetect specific instances of fiauu. The Auuit checkeu
piocesses anu pioceuuies on Election Bay to ueteimine compliance with ballot secuiity measuies
anu pioceuuies.
Auuitionally, absentee voting, nuising home voting, anu eaily voting aie not incluueu in this Auuit.
No assessment of voting systems can be consiueieu complete without consiueiing eaily voting anu
absentee voting. Receiving Stations wheie election mateiials aie piocesseu immeuiately aftei the
election weie not incluueu in the Auuit.
J5E/ >9 K9-C6.=I.

It is impossible to quantify how effective the cuiient pioceuuies aie in pieventing fiauu. Theie is a
lack of oveisight leauing to a lack of accountability, especially in ciitical matteis ielating to the
secuiity of the voting equipment. We cannot accuiately assess what is not measuieu by election
authoiities.
Auuitionally, knowleuge of the pioceuuies foi election equipment stoiage anu piotection between
elections anu just befoie Election Bay iemains laigely limiteu oi unavailable. Chain of custouy gaps
in voting equipment, mateiial management, anu the ielateu piocesses can cieate vulneiability foi
the integiity of the vote.
What cannot be seen, tiaceu, oi inspecteu can be coiiupteu in the election piocess. The pioblem is
magnifieu when theie is no public oveisight, auuiting, oi accountability. This Repoit shoulu
theiefoie be iegaiueu as only a beginning in the woik of Befenu the vote.
#EE4-57< 59= #8=>3 (.3<-=-6-I1
Timing was veiy shoit. Theie weie but 4 uays to plan anu oiganize the Auuit aftei final
commitment of financing. We hau a small gioup of lawyeis on call, incluuing Steve Boulton, ueneial
Counsel foi the Chicago u0P, who volunteeieu to be in the fielu the entiie uay. Steve also acteu in a
geneial auvisoiy iole foi the Auuit, anu assisteu in the wiiting of this Repoit. Petei Bella, as
17
Executive Biiectoi of the Chicago u0P, ieciuiteu anu supeiviseu teams of pollwatcheis anu acteu in
a geneial auvisoiy iole.
?"-C@W The city was uiviueu into sections baseu on geogiaphy. Each Chicago waiu hau supeivisois
anu 2 oi moie pollwatcheis in teams which weie cooiuinateu to covei the waiu. Besiues Steve
Boulton on the giounu all uay as a volunteei lawyei, we hau seveial local lawyeis on call.
The best case scenaiio conceiveu was that teams coulu tiavel to S-4 piecincts an houi. Each stop
was expecteu to take 1u minutes plus tiavel time. About Su% of the polling places have multiple
piecincts, shoitening the tiavel iequiiement. The teams weie uesigneu to make S stops an houi.
Supeivisois geneially uiove anu cooiuinateu the teams; occasionally they went into the polling
place.
}ust befoie Election Bay, two tiaining sessions weie helu foi the teams. Woiksheets to be useu in
the Auuit weie uistiibuteu. Pollwatcheis weie instiucteu to get in anu out of the polls as quickly as
piacticable, anu not inteiiupt juuges who weie busy with voteis. The pollwatcheis weie instiucteu
to take on the iole of an objective obseivei anu iecoiuei of infoimation, anu not to coiiect eiiois at
the poll unless it involveu a seal. If a seal was bioken, the pollwatcheis weie to iecoiu the issue anu
ask the juuges to place a new seal on. The pollwatcheis weie instiucteu to iepoit othei issues to
theii supeivisois, who woulu ueciue if they woulu contact the legal team oi Election Cential.
0n Election Bay, the teams began the uay befoie uawn, ueploying as close to S:uu am as possible at
multiple piecinct polling places. The pollwatcheis began by auuiting the opening of the polling
place until the polls openeu using the Poll 0pening Pioceuuies woiksheet. Following the opening,
teams weie to switch woiksheets to the Baytime Pioceuuies woiksheet anu visit multiple polling
place locations. Theie was time allocateu foi lunch bieaks. Teams pickeu polling places that hau
multiple piecincts to auuit the closing pioceuuies anu to collect the closing tapes, using the Poll
Closing Pioceuuies woiksheet. That night, the teams met to ieceive pay anu to tuin in theii
woiksheets anu poll tapes.
!"#$%&''(%) Thiee woiksheets weie cieateu anu useu containing specific questions anu inspection
pioceuuies to be askeu of polling place peisonnel:
0pening Polling Place Woiksheet: S:uu am to 6:Su am
Baytime Woiksheet: 6:Su am to 6:Su pm
Closing Polling Place Woiksheet: 6:Su pm to 8:uu pm
The woiksheets taigeteu pioceuuial compliance at the polling place anu, in paiticulai, the tiacking
of seals useu as secuiity measuies on balloting equipment. The woiksheets also guiueu the
pollwatchei in what infoimation to iecoiu. The woiksheets pioviueu space foi notes by the
pollwatchei on what was obseiveu.
The woiksheets weie piimaiily baseu upon the pioceuuies stateu in the The }uuge of Election
Banubook foi the Feb. 22, 2u11 Nunicipal ueneial Election anu the Apiil S, 2u11 Supplementaiy
Election issueu by the Chicago Boaiu of Elections. It was expecteu pollwatcheis woulu attempt to
get as many answeis as possible. The pollwatcheis weie instiucteu not to piess foi answeis if they
encounteieu any iesistance fiom the election juuges on answeiing a woiksheet question.
18

The answeis weie tiansciibeu into spieausheets soiteu by waius anu then by the numbei of ieu
scoies. Thus, the woiksheets aie the basis foi the subsequent uata analysis foi the Auuit.

*+(+) Soiteu by waius, the uata is gioupeu baseu on 1S tasks, to which thiee iesponses aie
possible. Yes (in compliance); No (not in compliance); anu NA (no answei is iecoiueu). NA
iesponses aie counteu but not otheiwise scoieu. The uata is soiteu by counting the Yes anu No
iesponses, then ueteimining a peicentage foi "No" inuicating noncompliance. Bata peicentages aie
calculateu foi the 1S items foi the piecincts, the waiu, anu finally a city scoie. Aveiages aie useu to
pioviue a scoie foi the section.
The 1S questions oi tasks aie coueu as "Reu" (ciitical: potentially impacting the vote) oi "Yellow"
(caution: uoes not likely impact the vote.). In some of the scoiing, Yellow scoies weie noteu but not
incluueu in the iesults. 11 of the 1S aieas auuiteu weie scoieu as Reu. 2 questions weie scoieu as
Yellow. Compliance with each question was answeieu as a Yes, No, oi NA.
$./863/B (.4>3 59= #EE6>753>-9/

As uemonstiateu by the uatabase summaiies attacheu, out of the 2S9 piecincts auuiteu, 21S
piecincts faileu with one oi moie Reu Task eiioi. 1SS piecincts (oi S7%) hau moie than one Reu
Task eiioi, 79 (oi S4%) of these hau S oi moie Reu Task eiiois.
0nly 21 piecincts (oi 9%) hau no eiiois.
This Auuit pioviues a cuiient uatabase of knowleuge assessing the effectiveness of pioceuuies in
place on Election Bay. Results will be useu to encouiage voluntaiy compliance to new auuit
pioceuuies beginning with the Naich 2u12 Piimaiy Election anu to guiue futuie auuits acioss the
state. These iequests will begin with Chicago Boaiu of Elections anu the Illinois State Boaiu of
Elections.

19
NATERIALS, ESSENTIAL INF0RNATI0N ANB BATA
WARBS ANB TBE P0LLINu PLACE
0n Apiil S, 2u11, theie weie 14 Chicago waius that helu iun-off elections.
The following waius weie auuiteu:
S6, S8, 41, 4S, 4S, 46, anu pait of Su.
Attempts weie maue to gain cieuentials
to polling places in the following waius: 6, 1S, 16, 17, 2u,

24, 2S. Without canuiuate cieuentials, these polling places coulu not be auuiteu.
)6.73>-9 L8=I./M The polling places shoulu have a minimum of S juuges. Chicago Election }uuges
must be iegisteieu voteis in Cook County. }uuges aie assigneu baseu on Paity affiliation; Bem:Rep
oi Rep:Bem in a 2:S iatio that switches equally fiom piecinct to piecinct. Accoiuing to
Commissionei Rowan's office, the tuinout foi this election was anticipateu to be low, so some
piecincts hau fewei juuges than usual.
Each polling place is alloweu two Stuuent Election }uuges. These stuuents aie tiaineu at school. In
geneial they have the same iesponsibility (anu pay) as iegulai Election }uuges. Stuuent juuges
cannot, howevei, take election supplies to Receiving Stations. They aie counteu as pait of the
iegulai S-peison election team, but in some instances they aie in auuition to it.
N-66>9I N657. #=0>9>/3453-4M Each polling place shoulu have at least one Polling Place
Auministiatoi ("PPA"). A PPA is a Chicago Boaiu of Election employee. They aie iesponsible foi
assuiing the poll is set up coiiectly anu that it iuns smoothly. PPAs aie tiaineu to assist with the
equipment ielateu pioblems that uo not iequiie a technician.
The Chicago Boaiu of Elections hiies anu tiains PPAs then assigns them to supeivise each of the
polling places. Single anu multiple piecinct polling places will be supeiviseu by one oi moie PPAs.
To qualify as a PPA you uo not neeu to be a 0SA Citizen. The PPA fills out a Foim I-9. The PPA uoes
not ueclaie a paity affiliation, anu infoimation about paity activities is not collecteu. The PPA
iepoits to the CBE. They aie not an election juuge anu uo not make uecisions about voteis at the
polling place. PPAs have unsupeiviseu access to election mateiials anu equipment. They help with
set up, closing, anu Election Bay pioceuuies.
TBE P0LLINu PLACE ANB RECEIvINu STATI0N
N-66>9I N657.M Polling is uone in-piecinct on Election Bay at single oi multiple piecinct polling
places. Chicago polling places aie locateu within the Waiu at a convenient location within (oi as
close as possible) the piecinct. Polling places aie schools, iestauiants, chuiches, libiaiies, etc.
Nany polling places have multiple piecincts.

Bemociat anu Republican pollwatching cieuentials weie not available foi this election. Pollwatcheis useu vaiious
canuiuate cieuentials.

2u
$.7.>2>9I !353>-9/M #77-4=>9I 3- *66>9->/ /35383.B once the polling place closes, voteu ballots,
memoiy uevices anu othei essential mateiials aie to be tianspoiteu to a pie-uesignateu counting
station (AKA: Receiving Station) wheie Illinois statue uesignates the chain of custouy switches fiom
election juuges to Chicago Boaiu of Election employees.

The Chicago Boaiu of Elections establishes ieceiving stations acioss the City. Baseu on
geogiaphical pioximity, election juuges' tianspoit voteu ballots to the ieceiving station that is
assigneu to them. As a team of two, one peison fiom each paity is supposeu to tianspoit the
mateiials. }uuges uo not have to uiive togethei but they shoulu tiavel as a team.
This stuuy uiu not scoie pioceuuies at the Receiving Stations; howevei pieliminaiy investigations
fiequently uemonstiateu these pioceuuies aie not followeu.
TBE P0LLINu PLACE EQ0IPNENT
G566-3/ 59= G566-3 !316./M Each piecinct has multiple ballot styles; most piecincts in Chicago have
2 oi S, some as many as 7. Biffeient ballots styles allows voting foi canuiuates anu issues that aie
split within piecincts.
Theie aie papei anu electionic ballots. Papei ballots aie ueliveieu on caiu stock which,
immeuiately aftei voting, is scanneu into the ballot scannei to iecoiu the vote. Electionic ballots aie
ueliveieu thiough the Sequoia EugePlus - Touch Scieen machine anu iecoueu on a papei scioll anu
on a 0SB flash uiive.
**

0n Election Bay, the vast majoiity of voteis take a papei ballot. Papei ballots aie placeu in the ESC
(Equipment Supplies Caiiiei) befoie it leaves the Peishing Stieet Waiehouse. When the ESC is
openeu on Election Bay, the ballots aie founu insiue, unsealeu, unnumbeieu, packageu into gioups
of Su, anu wiappeu in plastic wiap. 0nuseu ballots aie ietuineu unsealeu in the same ESC.
Aftei the election, voteu ballots aie piocesseu by the election juuges. 0nce counteu, these ballots
aie placeu in a plastic bag that is sealeu with a papei seal signeu by all of the juuges. Instiuctions
say:
,'+- +/0 %12/ (&' 3+2) X#-(" )," T')"A Y-##')@ N"(3*5)8 N"-# '."* )," *"(#'@"-4#" @"-#= 1"('*A
)," 2*"(57() -7A +-*A '7 )," @"-#= :## Z3A/"@ '; "#"()5'7 C3@) -;;5S ),"5* @5/7-)3*" '7 ),"
@"(3*5)8 @"-#=P X VR
[[

The cleai plastic ballot bag is placeu insiue the blue tiansfei case pictuieu on the next page. All S
juuges must sign a papei seal useu on the cleai bag. The blue tiansfei case is ueliveieu to the
Receiving Station uuiing the evening of Election Bay anu contains the ballots, poll tapes, etc.

Theieupon two of the juuges of election, of uiffeient political paities, shall foithwith anu by the most uiiect ioute
tianspoit both ballot boxes to the counting location uesignateu by the county cleik oi boaiu of election commissioneis.
(1u ILCS S24A-1u)
**
All Eaily voting in Chicago anu Cook County is uone on the Sequoia EugePlus. Note: City anu county wiue, each of these
machines contain all of the ballots foi Chicago anu Cook County. These aie loaueu fiom the *"@3#)@ (-*)*5A/".
0ui ieseaich uocuments that the CBE uoes not tiack compliance with this iequiiement. When the S% auuit is
completeu, the auuitois uo not check compliance with this pioceuuie. Auuitois (who aie CBE employees anu not Election
}uuges) bieak the seal when they open the bag foi the iecount. At the conclusion of the auuit, they ieplace the papei seal
with a similai one that they sign.
21
Nemoiy uevices aie ietuineu in bubble bags. Also, an unsealeu black bag is sent to the Receiving
Station containing piovisional ballots, spoileu ballots, anu othei foims that aie iequiieu to be
completeu anu then piocesseu by election authoiities (pay voucheis, etc). 0nly the blue tiansfei
case is sealeu with a ieu seal.

Voted Ballots Security Seal Sealed Ballot Bag and the Transfer Case
Investigations show the sealing of the tiansfei case uoes not pioviue a secuie chain of custouy foi
the voteu ballots. While the election juuges sign a papei seal placeu on the plastic bag containing
voteu ballots, election juuge names aie not cioss-checkeu in the S% auuit to assuie they aie the
actual juuges. Election juuges uo not iecoiu ANY seal numbeis uuiing opening oi closing
pioceuuies. The election juuges uo not iecoiu the seal numbei on the blue tiansfei case befoie
leaving the poll at the enu of the voting.
The ieu seal numbei on the blue tiansfei case is wiitten uown =84>9I the S% Auuit, but that
numbei is not cioss-checkeu with the oiiginal seal placeu on the blue tiansfei bag by the juuges. If
the numbei is iecoiueu on Election Bay at the Receiving Station, that numbei is not sent to those
completing the S% auuit to assuie it is the same seal. Theie is no place in the papeiwoik to check
seal numbeis oiiginally placeu on the tiansfei case. The S% auuit iecoius the numbei of the seal
they finu, but the numbei is not ciosscheckeu piesumably because oiiginally it is not iecoiueu.
*92./3>I53-4/ 7<.7H.= E5E.4C-4HB 59= O8./3>-9.= .6.73>-9 P8=I./B 59= C.4. 895D6. 3- 6-753.
591 E657. C<.4. /.56 980D.4 54. 4.7-4=.= D1 .6.73>-9 P8=I./ 53 >9+E4.7>973 E-66>9I E657./B -4
74-//+7<.7H.= C<.9 3<.1 I- 3<4-8I< 3<. QA 58=>3R

Year after year, the same ESC (Election Supply Carriers) is usually sent to the precinct filled with that precincts equipment. The
ESC is sealed and locked with a filing cabinet type key that fits multiple ESCs. The ESC is sealed with a thin green seal on the
outside of the door.
)6.73>-9 !8EE61 F544>.4/ S)!FT/UM Laige containeis calleu ESCs G\#"()5'7 N322#8 K-**5"*J aie useu
to stoie the election supplies foi each piecinct. At the Peishing Stieet Waiehouse, these aie loaueu
anu lockeu with a univeisal key, anu then sealeu with a thin plastic gieen seal.
22
The ESC contains collapsible voting booths, thiee machines, a ballot box, all election instiuctions
anu supplies, anu the papei ballots foi the piecinct. Polling places with multiple piecincts have a
sepaiate ESC foi each piecinct.
Reviewing uocuments pioviueu thiough a F0IA, shipping uocuments foi the ESC containeis uo not
iecoiu the seal numbeis. Investigatois piove when the ESC is ueliveieu fiom the tiucking company
to the polling place, the numbei on the sealeu ESC is not iecoiueu. The foim pioviues a section foi
"uamage fiom ueliveiy" but this is only useu if the actual ESC is uamageu, not the seal. The seal
numbei is not mentioneu in any of the uocuments we ievieweu.
Investigations thiough F0IA anu fiom a ieview of tiaining manuals piove ESC gieen seal numbeis
aie not pioviueu to the election juuges oi the PPA to iecoiu oi veiify.
In Novembei 2u1u, investigatois questioneu Robeit Sawicki, ueputy chief auministiative officei foi
the Chicago Boaiu of Elections. Ni. Sawicki stateu that the gieen seals tiiggei peisonnel at the
waiehouse that the ESC is ieauy to be shippeu.
Insiue an unsealeu blue box that is stoieu insiue each ESC, theie aie extia gieen seals placeu to
ieclose the unit with. These seal numbeis aie not iecoiueu. 0seu seals aie not ietaineu. Election
juuges iepoit they ioutinely thiow them out because they aie not given any instiuctions to ietain
them. Election juuge papeiwoik, which lacks iecoiu keeping pioceuuies foi the seals, backs this
claim up.
Theie is a smallei veision of the ESC that is useu in polling locations wheie the laigei veision has
access uifficulties. These ESCs uo not secuie all of the voting equipment insiue. *(N%$V#&VM The
ESC is uioppeu off anu pickeu up by 4 outsiue tiucking companies cuiiently unuei contiact with
the Chicago Boaiu of Elections. ESCs may be uioppeu off as eaily as two oi thiee weeks befoie an
election. Baseu on the logistical iotation foi uiop off anu ietiieval, the ESCs iemain in place at the
polling place foi appioximately the same amount of time both befoie anu aftei the election.
ESCs aie ieceiveu at a polling place by a *"@2'7@54#" 2-*)8 who signs foi it. While theie is the
expectation that the ESC will be piotecteu, theie is no iequiiement to keep the ESC in a lockeu
ioom. They might be stoieu in a coinei in the gym, oi sometimes tuckeu away in a hallway.
Investigations lookeu foi anu coulu not finu uocumentation of the chain of custouy of the ESCs
while at the polling place. The Chicago Boaiu of Elections explains this is the iesponsibility of the
owneis of that facility.
G566-3 G-WM
Secuiing the ballot box is basic to the integiity of the polls. By law, ballots must be unuei seal.

0ui investigations founu ballot boxes weie not sealeu S9% of the time at polling place. Baseu on 1u
ILCS S1S-1 (fiom Ch. 46, pai. 1S-1) the CBE is iequiieu to seal the ballot boxes.
Similaily, the

While the ballot box uiscusseu heie is foi papei ballots, electionic ballots (anu theii papei copy) must also be kept
sealeu.
(1u ILCS S1S-1) (fiom Ch. 46, pai. 1S-1)

Sec. 1S-1. (a) Except in municipalities opeiating unuei Aiticle 6 of this Act, the county boaiu shall pioviue a sufficient
numbei of ballot boxes, with secuie locks anu keys...
(b) The county boaiu may pioviue ballot boxes not of a peimanent type, not of woouen oi metal constiuction, not
iequiiing locks oi keys, noi having uoois oi winuows, if (1) such ballot boxes aie so constiucteu as to be completely
sealeu anu empty units upon ueliveiy to the polling place. (Souice: P. A. 77-6).
2S
tianspoitation of ballots aftei voting is not uone accoiuing to coue which iequiies they be secuiely
sealeu.
The ballot box is set up by the election juuges anuoi the PPA. The ballot scannei is placeu on top
of the ballot box. Pollwatcheis anu juuges check to that the box is empty piioi to the sealing of the
box. Two seals aie placeu on the ballot scannei anu the ballot box, binuing them togethei. Pioviu-
ing a 'chain of custouy', the puipose of the seals is to assuie no one uistuibs the ballots aftei voting.
It is the job of election juuges anu the PPA to seal the collapsible ballot boxes to the ballot scannei.
Repoits aie plentiful of investigatois anu othei Boaiu employees coming anu going at polling places
without assuiing the ballot boxes aie sealeu. Instiuctions foi sealing states: 4N"(3*" 4-##') @(-77"*
)' 4-##') 4'S 48 ),*"-A57/ )," @"-# ),*'3/, )," ,'#"@P (pg 17).

Unsealed, the ballot scanner on top of the ballot box EdgePlus Touch Screen paper scroll on right side.
)6.73>-9 (57<>9./M Theie aie thiee machines useu to cast a vote in Chicago:
Sequoia (Bominion) Touch Scieen EugePlus (vvAT - votei veiifieu Auuit Tiail - Papei ballot)
Sequoia (Bominion) 0ptech Insight Plus 0ptical Scan (Ballot Scannei)
Sequoia (Bominion) Bybiiu Activatoi anu Accumulatoi (BAAT - Caiu Activatoi)

!.O8->5 S,-0>9>-9U V-87< !74..9 )=I.N68/ - This machine is calleu the Touch Scieen (TS).
The TS contains the electionic ballot. As alieauy noteu, the TS is useu foi Eaily voting too.
***
The
vote is iecoiueu onto a M*"@3#)@ (-*)*5A/"P which is a 0SB Flash Biive inseiteu into the caitiiuge
poit. voteis aie given an activateu votei's caiu when they iegistei. This caiu is inseiteu into the
machine which iecognizes what ballot to electionically pioviue to the votei.
The TS machine is a fiimwaie shell
uiiven by the softwaie loaueu fiom these caitiiuges. The

iesults caitiiuges iecoiu the seiial numbei of the machine useu to iecoiu the vote. These machines
aie testeu anu sealeu at the Peishing Stieet Waiehouse piioi to being loaueu into the ESC.
At the waiehouse, the machine is loaueu with the ballots foi that piecinct thiough the caitiiuge
poit using a iesults caitiiuge= A iesults caitiiuge is left in the machine insiue the caitiiuge poit
which is secuieu at the waiehouse with a ieu seal. Election juuges aie not given this numbei to
check to assuie the seal was not tampeieu with aftei it was placeu on at the waiehouse. We weie
unable to uocument any chain of custouy on these seals oi theii numbeis once placeu on the
machine. Election juuges iepoit they ioutinely toss these seals in the gaibage.

***
Pioceuuies foi Eaily voting aie uiffeient then Election Bay. The TS is loaueu with the ballots foi the entiie City foi
Eaily voting. This will be uiscusseu in a sepaiate uocument.
Fiimwaie is a combination of softwaie anu haiuwaie that have uata oi piogiams iecoiueu as 'ieau only' on them.
24
A papei scioll is locateu on the siue of the machine anu is the papei tiail foi the vote cast. The votei
appioves what is piinteu on the scioll befoie iemoving theii votei caiu anu leaving the voting
booth. This papei scioll is the iecoiu of the electionic ballot anu as such it must be secuieu at all
times. It is the manuateu (IL Public Act u9S-uS74) votei veiifieu Papei Auuit Tiail (vvPAT).
votei caius foi the EugePlus aie piogiammeu with the Caiu Activatoi machine. They aie ieusable.
The TS has thiee seals. 0ne on the papei scioll, one on the 0penClose Poit anu one on the
Caitiiuge Poit (pictuieu below). The 0penClose Poit aiiives at the polling place with a yellow
seal. The ieu seal is stoieu in the poit as shown in the pictuie on the iight below. When the poll is
openeu, the yellow seal is bioken anu ieplaceu with the ieu seal. The Election juuges aie
iesponsible foi ieplacing the seal. Seal numbeis aie not iecoiueu. Theie aie extia seals in the ESC
supply box which aie uniecoiueu.

The back of the touch screen has two seals. The picture on the left shows a machine from the 11
th
Ward that has both seals
open. The yellow seal is replaced by a red one when judges open the polls. The middle picture has the seals correctly applied.
The picture on the right shows the red seal stored in the open/close port.
!.O8->5 %E3.7< *9/>I<3 N68/ %E3>756 !759 SG566-3 !7599.4UM Election Bay voting is piimaiily
uone thiough papei ballot. The ballot scannei ieaus the papei ballot. The ballot scannei is
haiuwaie anu a fiimwaie shell. It iecoius the vote by optically scanning the ink maiks on the
ballot. The machine iecoius the vote on the 5'5"#6 7+8$, which is a memoiy uevice. Besiues the
memoiy pack, 0NLY when theie is a pioblem scanning the ballot, the eiioi is iecoiueu on the papei
scioll piinteu by the scannei. This aleits the juuge to issues iecoiuing the vote, piompting
iesolution to allow the ballot to be counteu. This scioll uoes not piint the vote, it iecoius eiiois
that occui causing the ballot to be iejecteu when scanning (i.e., ovei vote, unuei vote, no vote, no
juuge's initial). The memoiy pack iecoius the actual vote that is cast.
Theie aie thiee seals on the ballot scannei. 0ne foi the memoiy pack (applieu at the waiehouse)
anu two to secuie the scannei to the ballot box (applieu at the poll). These seals aie essential to
secuiity of the ballot.
The back uooi of the ballot scannei is lockeu with a univeisal key. This key is stoieu in the ESC in
an unsealeu supply box. The memoiy pack is secuieu insiue this lockeu poit uooi with a numbeieu
ieu seal. The seal is placeu on at the waiehouse. Again, theie is no tiacking of the numbei on the
seal anu multiple untiackeu ieplacement seals aie left in the supply box.
M1"C'." 4-##') @(-77"* <"8 ;*'C 4#3" @322#8 4'S= ]7#'(< *"-* A''* '; 4-##') @(-77"* -7A
."*5;8 ),-) *"A @"-# 5@ -))-(,"A )' A''*= L; C"C'*8 2-(< A''* 5@ @#5/,)#8 '2"7"A$ 23@, A''*
(#'@"A= 6-<" @3*" )," 2'+"* ('*A 5@ 2#3//"A 57)' )," *"-* '; )," 4-##') @(-77"*P (pg 18).
}uuges aie instiucteu to check foi the seal; theie is no instiuction to iecoiu the seal numbei oi what
to uo if the seal is not piopeily secuieu. These instiuctions fail to aleit juuges that a bieach of this
2S
seal is a secuiity issue that Election Cential must be infoimeu about. Theie is no place in the
papeiwoik to iecoiu seal issues. Fiequently election juuges uiu not want to open the lockeu uooi
to piove the memoiy pack has a seal. Nany juuges iepoiteu they weie unawaie the seal exists.
At the enu of the election, the machine is tuineu off, the seal is bioken anu the memoiy pack is
iemoveu anu placeu in the BAAT oi Caiu Activatoi to ieau. The papei scioll is placeu in the blue
tiansfei bag that is taken to the Receiving Station aftei the election. The ieu seal is ioutinely tosseu
in the gaibage. Theie aie no pioceuuies oi instiuctions to ietuin useu seals to election authoiities.

Front of Ballot Scanner Back of scanner-The memory pack is placed here.

Key locks the back of the ballot scanner The seal on the memory pack The memory pack
!.O8->5 "1D4>= #73>253-4 59= #77808653-4 S"##VUM The votei Caiu Activatoi has seveial
functions: it activates the votei's caiu with theii ballot style on the TS, ie-piogiams the electionic
votei caius foi each votei, consoliuates the ballots fiom the TS anu the Ballot Scannei, anu
tiansmits the election iesults to Election Cential. The votei caiu activatoi tiansmits election
iesults to Election Cential with cellulai technology. Election Cential on Washington Stieet iecoius
if the votei caiu activatoi is online uuiing the voting uay.
Aftei voting concluues, the iesults caitiiuge anu the memoiy pack aie iemoveu fiom the TS anu
the ballot scannei, anu placeu into the votei caiu activatoi (BAAT) which consoliuates the two
types of ballots into a single total. This total is then tiansmitteu thiough cellulai technology to
Election Cential on Washington Stieet.
When the Caiu Activatoi uoes not piopeily consoliuate oi tiansmit the iesults, the iecoiu of the
vote is ietaineu on the two memoiy uevices. These aie taken to the ieceiving station, anu they aie
consoliuateu anu tiansmitteu theie. This pioceuuie shoulu be uone in fiont of election juuges fiom
both paities.
26

This is the seal on the Card Activator paper scroll. Judges instructions neglect to inform the Election Judges of the
use for this seal or to replace it when changing the paper scroll.
Theie is one seal on the Sequoia Caiu Activatoi. This seal is on the papei scioll which secuies a
papei iecoiu of actions iecoiueu by the Sequoia Caiu Activatoi. The Banubook uoes not pioviue
iefeience to this seal, except in the uefinition of seals on page II$ M*"A @"-#@ -*" '7 )," ;'##'+57/
"B352C"7) +,"7 A"#5."*"A )' )," 2'##57/ 2#-("^P
Election juuges piint a "zeio count" ieceipt at the beginning of the uay, anu place this in the blue
tiansfei case. This machine also piints out the closing tapes at the enu of the elections. These tapes
aie given to pollwatcheis. Poll tapes must be signeu by all of the juuges anu placeu in the tiansfei
case. This pioceuuie is not tiackeu foi compliance.

Back of the Card Activator Preparing to transmit to Election Central. Box wheie some seals aie placeu.
!-;3C54.M All softwaie is placeu on the ]NY O#-@, &*5." anu the C"C'*8 2-(<@ at the computei
ioom at the Washington Stieet office. Investigation of this piocess is ongoing. Theie aie contiactual
anu copyiight iestiictions on access to this infoimation. Theie aie also secuiity-baseu iestiictions.

V<. E8D6>7 =-./ 9-3 <52. 577.// 3- 3<. /-;3C54. 7-=.R Theie is a small winuow wheie the
political paities can iequest access; howevei they must pioviue a specialist to examine it. This is
especially costly when one consiueis theie aie ovei 2Suu piecincts, each with 1 to 7 sepaiate ballot
styles. Theie is a pioceuuie to seal the softwaie coue. This pioceuuie is unuei investigation. In
geneial all access to the infoimation about the softwaie coue is secietive anu cumbeisome to finu
out about anu iequiies access thiough multiple iestiictive baiiieis.

Theie aie employees fiom Sequoia who aie pait of the CBE team. These employees have offices
anu facilities on site. Buiing the Apiil S% test, one employee was available at the test site but
woulu not answei the investigatoi's questions.

Theie is an assumption that the integiity of the softwaie coue is affiimeu in the Pie-Lat testing
when each machine is testeu to assuie all canuiuates get a vote. Investigations of Pie-Lat testing aie
ongoing anu have alieauy pioven that this testing uoes not test the integiity of the softwaie.

Fuithei investigation is 0RuENTLY neeueu to auuiess the substantial integiity issues in this aiea.

27
SEALS ANB FACTS AB00T SEALS
M_"7"*-##8 @2"-<57/$ - @"-# 5@ - A".5(" ),-) 5@ 7') A5;;5(3#) )' *"C'."$ 43) 5@ @322'@"A )' #"-."
".5A"7(" '; )-C2"*57/ 5; 5) 5@ *"C'."A= N"-#@ C3@) ,-." - 2,8@5(-# A"@5/7 ),-) +5## @,'+ @'C"
A5;;"*"7(" 57 -22"-*-7(" '* 4",-.5'* 5; ),"8 -*" *"C'."A -7A *"-22#5"A= N"-#@ -*" /"7"*-##8
@"*5-#>73C4"*"A G'* '),"*+5@" C-*<"A +5), - 375B3" 5A"7)5;5"*J$ @' ),-) 5; @'C"'7" *"C'."@
)," @"-# -7A *"2#-("@ 5) +5), - ;*"@, '7"$ )," 7"+ '7" +5## ,-." - A5;;"*"7) 73C4"*=

?," 23*2'@" '; @"-#@ -))-(,"A )' - 4-##') 4'S 5@ )' -@@3*" ),-) 4-##')@ -*" 7') )-C2"*"A +5),
G'* *"2#-("AJ 4")+""7 )," )5C" ),-) .')"*@ A"2'@5) ),"C -7A )," )5C" ),"8 -*" ('37)"A= N"-#@
-))-(,"A )' .')57/ C-(,57"@ -*" C"-7) )' 2*')"() -/-57@) C-78 -))-(< ."()'*@$ 57 2-*)5(3#-*
)' -@@3*" ),-) )," .')">('37)57/ @';)+-*" 5@ 7') *"2#-("A G+5), ;*-3A3#"7) .')">C5@('37)57/
@';)+-*"J 4")+""7 )," )5C" )," .')">('37)57/ @';)+-*" 5@ 57@)-##"A G"=/=$ +,"7 )," C-(,57" 5@
C-73;-()3*"AJ -7A )," )5C" ),-) "#"()5'7 *"@3#)@ -*" *"2'*)"A= K#"-*#8$ 57 )," #-))"* (-@" ),"
@"-#@ ,-." - C3(, C'*" A5;;5(3#) Z'4 )' -(('C2#5@,$ @57(" ),"8 C3@) 2*')"() ;'* - 2"*5'A ';
8"-*@ A3*57/ +,5(, C-78 C'*" 2"'2#" C-8 ,-." -(("@@ )' )," .')57/ C-(,57"=P
```

Plastic seals aie useu as pait of the secuiity check anu balance on machines. Seals aie useu to
secuie the memoiy packs, 0SB iesults caitiiuges, anu the papei sciolls. They aie also useu foi the
ESCs that tianspoit equipment to the piecincts foi Election Bay anu foi the blue tiansfei case that
is useu to tianspoit voteu ballots aftei the election. The intenueu puipose of seals is to pioviue
pioof that the election mateiials aie secuieu anu unuistuibeu. Theie aie sepaiate pioceuuies foi
tiacking seals on the equipment useu foi Election Bay anu Eaily voting. This section ielates only to
Election Bay piocesses.

A huge weakness in the piesent system is that seal numbeis aie not tiackeu befoie oi aftei they aie
placeu on balloting equipment. Seal numbeis aie not iecoiueu by CBE pioceuuies. Tiacking of the
seal numbeis once they aie on the machines is nonexistent. New oi bioken seal numbeis aie not
iecoiueu. Election juuges aie not tiaineu to watch foi missing oi uamageu seals. The tiaining foi
ieplacing seals is inconsistent oi lacking altogethei. Fiequently, PPAs uo not ieplace bioken seals.
When technicians come out to ieplace malfunctioning machines uuiing the election, they fiequently
uo not ieplace the seals. Election Bay pioceuuies uo not iequiie bioken seals to be ietuineu in the
ESC. Election juuges iepoit that they aie ioutinely tosseu in the gaibage.

The plastic seals useu aie especially susceptible to counteifeiting anu tampeiing. 0niecoiueu seal
numbeis pioviue untiaceable oppoitunities foi counteifeiteu seals to be useu to ieplace valiu seals.
The paiticulai bianu of seal useu is flimsy anu especially vulneiable to tampeiing.

!.56/ X/.=M Theie aie at least 4 plastic seals useu in Election Bay polling places: the gieen seal on
the ESC, ieu seals useu on papei sciolls anu memoiy uevices, yellow seals that aie ieplaceu by the
juuges when the poll is openeu, anu blue seals to seal the ballot boxes. These numbeieu seals aie
flimsy anu easily openeu without uamage by inseiting a papeiclip insiue anu uislouging the
seiiateu top fiom the bottom.

Secuiity Seals 0n voting Nachines: A Case Stuuy, by Anuiew W. Appel. :K6 ?*-7@-()5'7@ '7 L7;'*C-)5'7 -7A N8@)"C
N"(3*5)8 G?LNN\KJ, 2u11, in piess. http:www.cs.piinceton.euu~appelvotingSeals0nvotingNachines.puf
28
Besiues the plastic seals, upon closing of the polling place$ papei seals aie placeu on useu ballots in
cleai plastic bags befoie they aie taken to the ieceiving station. Election juuges aie supposeu to
sign these papei seals. This pioceuuie is not checkeu. In auuition, uuiing the manuatoiy S% auuit,
auuitois aie not askeu to check oi iecoiu if the sealeu ballots have an unuistuibeu papei seal oi if
the papei seal on the ballot bag has the coiiect names of the juuges on it.

}uuges also sign vaiious envelopes acioss the flap closing the envelope to seal insiue piovisional
applications anu ballots, anu spoileu ballots.

The }uuges Nanual pioviues this infoimation on ieu seals:

9'0 ,'+-% : 1"A C"-7@ N?aX= &' 7') 4*"-< - *"A @"-# 37)5# )," 2'##@ (#'@"= 1"A @"-#@ -*" '7
)," ;'##'+57/ "B352C"7) +,"7 A"#5."*"A )' )," 2'##57/ 2#-("W )," 4-##') @(-77"* C"C'*8 2-(<
A''*b )," )'3(, @(*""7 2*57)"*$ )," *"@3#)@ (-*)*5A/" A''* -7A )," X'##@ a2"7cK#'@"A A''* G-;)"*
)," 2'##@ ,-." 4""7 '2"7"AJ= : *"A @"-# +5## 4" 2#-("A '7 )," )*-7@;"* (-@" -;)"* -## ),"
*"B35*"A 5)"C@ ,-." 4""7 2#-("A 57@5A"P (pg 66).

0thei than this waining, a few limiteu seal instiuctions aie pioviueu in sections on setting up the
polling place.

F6-/.= !.56/ 59= !.784>31M The availability of a vaiiety of untiackeu seals invaliuates the seals as a
secuiity measuieR The investigation continues, but we have pioven the key to unlock the ESC is not
specific to the unit. The same key opens multiple units.

Incluueu in the extia seals pioviueu in the supply box stoieu insiue the ESC aie seveial gieen seals
useu to secuie the outsiue of the ESC. 0nce insiue the ESC, theie is unfetteieu access to ballots,
election machines, anu memoiy uevices. If a machine is uistuibeu, an untiackeu ieplacement seal is
kept insiue the same ESC. The equipment anu ESC is simply iesealeu with one of these extia seals.
Theie is no tiacking of the numbeis oi ietention of seals.

*9 7-9768/>-9B 5 76-/.= /.56 =-./ 9-3 >9=>753. 3<53 350E.4>9I <5/ 9-3 35H.9 E657.R It is smoke
anu miiiois shieluing a complete bieakuown in secuiity.

V45>9>9I -9 !.56/M Theie is little to no tiaining on seals foi the election juuges oi the PPAs.
Instiuctions uo not incluue secuiing seals oi iecoiuing seal numbeis foi the machines. Instiuctions
uo not highlight the impoitance of seals oi iequiie the iepoiting of seal issues. In many cases the
election juuges aie not infoimeu they neeu to attenu to seals. Theii tiaining manual has few
instiuctions about seals.

The Tioubleshooting uuiue pioviueu to election juuges (p 68-77) uoes not have a section on seals.
The }uuge of Election Banubook uoes not instiuct the juuges to ieplace the seal on the TS scioll. It
uoes not pioviue instiuctions foi the caiu activatoi scioll.

When the ballot scannei neeus to have the papei scioll changeu, instiuctions aie to cut anu ieplace
the blue seals on the siue of the ballot box
. This act exposes the ballot box so two juuges must be

piesent foi changing the papei ioll. This inuicates the CBE is awaie it must keep a chain of sealeu

Theie is geneially only one set of blue seals incluueu in the ESC. These aie the same ballot box seals that weie not
applieu in S9% of the piecincts.
29
custouy on voteu ballots, yet the Boaiu's employees anu investigatois visit polls without assuiing
the ballot box anuoi the papei scioll is sealeu.

!>I9>;>7597.

The seal issues piesent a significant secuiity flaw. The lack of oveiall tiacking anu the libeial access
to untiackeu seals completely invaliuates them as a secuiity tool foi Election Bay voting. They uo
not pioviue any meaningful eviuence of tampeiing oi lack theie-of.

Seal integiity issues occui at all levels of the election piocess.
The Chicago Boaiu of Elections cannot state that seals pioviue secuiity at any phase of the
election piocess.
Tossing useu seals in the gaibage is veiy pooi piactice foi many, many ieasons.
Seal numbeis have to be secuieu, not just the seals themselves.
To pievent counteifeiting, seals must be secuieu piioi to use, anu befoie they aie applieu,
seals must be checkeu to assuie they have not been tampeieu with.
The yellow anu ieu seals shown on page 14 aie especially susceptible to tampeiing anu
must be caiefully guaiueu anu inspecteu to uiscein if tampeiing occuiieu.

Su
A0BIT RES0LTS
In total, 2S9 piecincts weie successfully auuiteu in 7 waius. Theie weie 1S questions oi tasks
aieas: 11 ciitical (ieu) anu 2 cautionaiy (yellow) which weie checkeu.

?@A SYZQU -; 3<./. E4.7>973/ ;5>6.= 53 6.5/3 -9. -; 3<. ZZ 74>3>756 $.=
O8./3>-9/[35/H/R
Q\A SZ]QU -; 3<. E4.7>973/ ;5>6.= >9 0-4. 3<59 -9. 35/H 54.5R
] E4.7>973/ SZAU <5= ^.66-C ;5>684. /7-4./ D.758/. 3<.1 ;5>6.= 3- ;-66-C E4-7.=84./
4.653>9I 3- >=.93>;>753>-9 -; 3<. P8=I./ 59= NN# C>3< D5=I./ 53 3<. E-66>9I E657.R
YZ -83 -; Y]? E4.7>973/ S?AU 4.7.>2.= E.4;.73 /7-4./R

The timing of the uecision to peifoim this Auuit was such that we weie not able to get cieuentials
fiom each waiu. As a iesult, the Auuit was scaleu back accoiuingly. The following waius weie
auuiteu: S6, S8, 41, 4S, 4S, anu 46.

_-4H/<..3/M

%E.9 N-66>9I N657. _-4H/<..3 (S:uuam to 6:Suam): Completeu at Su locations. These answeis
aie iecoiueu in the appiopiiate waiu's spieausheet which is in the Appenuix - (Summaiy of
Results foi Waius)
This woiksheet is specific to opening pioceuuies only. Two questions on this woiksheet aie not
incluueu in the uata analysis of the 1S questions on the 2S9 piecincts. The fiist question was, "Bo
the juuges check foi a zeio public count." Results: 24 yes, u no, anu 6 NA. The pioceuuie foi
checking the zeio count is ieinfoiceu because the opening poll tape must be piinteu anu placeu in
the tiansfei case when the polls open. The seconu question was, "Was the ballot box empty befoie
the polls open." Results: 1u yes, u No, anu 2u NA. The pollwatcheis uiu not check the ballot box
2S of the time anu when they uiu, it was empty. The piimaiy ieason foi 2u NA is because many
of the boxes weie set up piioi to the pollwatcheis' obseivations.
,513>0. _-4H/<..3 (6:Suam to 6:Supm): Completeu at 2u9 piecincts. The uetaileu iesponses aie
available on the !800541 -; $./863/ ;-4 _54=/ uata sheets. The uata is gioupeu by waiu anu
itemizeu at the piecinct level. The Summaiy of Results foi Waius bieaks uown each piecinct but
uoes not uisplay the piecinct numbeis.
F6-/>9I N-66>9I N657. _-4H/<..3 (6:Supm): Completeu at 19 locations. These piecincts hau
pieviously been visiteu uuiing the uaytime poition of the Auuit. The uata collecteu on the Closing
Poll Woiksheet was insufficient to scoie. The majoiity of iesponses weie NA. Poll tapes weie
collecteu, howevei.
A few teams weie not able to get to theii closing poll in time to obseive the closing pioceuuies. In
otheis, multiple piecincts weie obseiveu in the closing because polling places foi multiple piecincts
weie locateu at one site. As it woikeu out, to complete the woiksheet the pollwatchei coulu only
obseive one piecinct. In these situations, poll tapes weie collecteu but closing pioceuuies weie not
completely obseiveu anu answeis weie maikeu NA. In auuition, the woiksheet hau flaws in the
phiasing of some of the questions, which clouueu inteipietation of the answeis.
S1
Key uata neeus to be obtaineu to veiify how accuiately juuges peifoim theii ioles of closing the
polls, tallying the ballots, consoliuating the iesults, tiansmitting to Election Cential, anu closing up
the ESC foi latei ietuin to the waiehouse. Key seal infoimation neeus to be tiackeu that affiims
juuges sign the papei seals anu iecoius seal numbeis on the ESC anu the blue tiansfei bag.
Pait of the closing pioceuuies incluue placing the following into an unsealeu black bag: special
voteu ballots (piovisional, spoileu, ietuineu absentee, etc.), poll uocuments (such as poll tapes, pay
voucheis, anu cieuentials), the ESC keyB 59= 3<. D8DD6. D5I 7-935>9>9I 3<. .6.734-9>7 2-3.
4.7-4=.= -9 3<. 0.0-41 E57H 59= X!G ;65/< =4>2. S3<. 4./863/ 75434>=I.UR This unsealeu black
bag is then tianspoiteu to the ieceiving station anu left theie foi CBE employees anu contiactois to
piocess.
****
This action shoulu be completeu by two election juuges togethei. The instiuctions in
the Banubook aie not cleai about how these shoulu be tianspoiteu. It is cleai theie is no sealeu
chain of custouy when tianspoiting the black bag containing the electionic ballots anu some of the
papei ballots. This lack of secuiity is magnifieu when the votes uiu not consoliuate anu tiansmit
coiiectly fiom the poll.
Buiing the Auuit, one key question involves the seal applieu on the tiansfei case (containing
iegulai voteu papei ballots) uuiing the close of the polls. Bow is this seal tiackeu in the system.
,84>9I 3<. QA #8=>3B 3<. /.56 980D.4 -; 3<. D68. 3459/;.4 75/. >/ 4.7-4=.= 5/ >3 >/ D4-H.9
59= 5I5>9 C<.9 3<. 75/. >/ 4.+/.56.= 53 3<. .9= -; 3<. 58=>3R "-C.2.4B 3<. /.56 980D.4 59=
3<. />I9.= E5E.4 D566-3 /.56 54. 9-3 7<.7H.= 3- 5//84. 3<.1 54. 3<. /50. /.56/ 5EE6>.= -9
)6.73>-9 ,51 D1 3<. .6.73>-9 P8=I./R
Pioceuuial infoimation on closing pioceuuies neeus fuithei investigation.

****
Fiom the ieceiving station the memoiy uevices aie taken to the Peishing Stieet Waiehouse. Latei, they aie
tianspoiteu back to the Washington Stieet 0ffice. In the section "Auuitional vulneiabilities" (pSS-SS) we uiscuss flaws in
the secuiity with stoiage of these memoiy uevices.
S2
BATA ANALYSIS
Ward Audited Totals Percentage
The number of precincts Audited by 239 (x 13) = 3107 Procedure Fail Rate % = ProcFR%

13 Procedures = total Items:
Answers = Y, N, N/A
(Yes + No)
Yes No N/A
ProcFR% = % of No's
(Yes + No)
1
2 Judges were present when the ESC opened and
poll set up. (Red Error)
(225)
190 35 14 35 No's is 11% of 225
2 Green Seal was closed on ESC. (Red Error)
(233)
174 59 6 59 No's is 25% of 233
3 Judges have badges on. (Yellow Error)
(201)
177 24 38 24 No's is 12% of 201
4 PPA has a badge on. (Yellow Error)
(191)
152 39 48 39 No's is 21% of 191
5 Judges took their oath. (Red Error)
(212)
198 14 27 14 No's is 7% of 212
6 Blue cones were at 100ft. (Red Error)
(217)
204 13 22 13 No's is 6% of 218
7 T/S scroll is sealed. (Red Error)
(234)
218 16 5 16 No's is 7% of 234
8 Red seal is on T/S Open/Close port (Red Error)
(230)
189 41 9 41 No's is 18% of 230
9 T/S Cartridge Port is sealed. (Red Error)
(230)
210 20 9 20 No's is 9% of 230
10 The Card Activator is sealed. (Red Error)
(227)
203 24 12 24 No's is 12% of 227
11 The Ballot Box is sealed. (Red Error)
(236)
97 139 3 139 No's is 59% of 236
12
The Ballot Scanner is locked and the Red Seal is on
the back. (Red Error)
(215)
168 47 24 47 No's is 22% of 215
13
The Early Voter labels are on the ballot applications at
6am. (Red Error)
(173)
150 23 66 23 No's is 14% of 173

Total = (Y+N)
N/A not figured in FR %
Yes No N/A
(2824)
2330 494 283
AvgProcFR=18% (ProcFR%) = 228% No

ProcFR% is N% of (Y+N):
WardProcFR averages the ProcFR% by Ward
(See pg 23, part 6}
The CityProcFR averages WardProcFR to provide
a score across the city.
20%
CityProcFR
AvgProcFR = 228% /by 13
228% /13 = 18%
18% Avg FR (of 13 Procedures)

239 Precincts were Audited
Citywide Precinct Fail Rate: CityProcFR
By Ward, precincts with error on one or more of
the 11 red error procedures noted above.
90% Fail Rate
215 Precincts w/Red Errors
21 Precincts w/ No Errors
3 Precincts w/Yellow Errors
215 Red = 90%
21 Perfect = 9%
3 Yellow = 1%
90% = CityProcFR

,535 C5/ 7-66.73.= 53 Y]? E4.7>973/ >9 \ _54=/R Z] 54.5/ C.4. .W50>9.=R
(NA) iesponses, while they aie iecoiueu in the uata, aie not factoieu into the scoie. Each of the
peicentages calculateu aie baseu only on infoimation iecoiueu as a Yes oi No. Theie aie uiffeient
totals foi iesponses to the 1S items because, foi vaiying ieasons, the pollwatcheis uiu not iecoiu a
Yes oi No iesponse.
11 pioceuuies aie maikeu Reu Eiioi, 2 pioceuuies aie maikeu Yellow Eiioi. Reu eiioi pioceuuies
aie juugeu as having a potential impact on the vote. The two Yellow pioceuuies ielate to the
bauges of the Election }uuges anu PPA. Piopei iuentification at the polls is an essential pait of
secuiity. The iuentification eiiois aie scoieu as cautionaiy.

SS
Peicentages aie ueteimineu by:
ZU F>31C>=. N4-7.=84. `5>6 $53. SaF>31N4-7`$bUM ?@AR 2S9 piecincts weie successfully
auuiteu. 21S of these (9u%) faileu in at least one of 11 Reu eiioi pioceuuies, anu weie
scoieu as Reu. S piecincts (1%) ieceiveu a Yellow scoie ielateu to bauge issues, anu 21
piecincts (9%) achieveu a peifect scoie by successfully following all 1S pioceuuies.

2S9 piecincts acioss 7 waius
9u% = 21S piecincts hau one oi moie Reu scoies, plus some also hau Yellow scoies
9% = 21 peifect scoies - Eiioi fiee
1% = S hau Yellow scoies only (no Reu scoies)

YU (863>E6. N4-7.=8456 )44-4/ c N.4 N4.7>973/: The numbei of eiiois pei piecinct aie
totalleu. These aie then compileu into a giaph to illustiate how many piecincts have multiple
eiiois. The numbeis aie stunning.
&80D.4 -; )44-4/ + 59=
&80D.4 -; N4.7>973/ C>3< 3<53 .44-4
Z@ZA
S$-89=.= AU
@ )44-4/ YZ N4.7>973/ SYZRQZU ?A
Z )44-4 d] N4.7>973/ Sd]ReQU ]QA
Y )44-4/ Qe N4.7>973/ SQ\R]eU YfA
] )44-4/ ]\ N4.7>973/ S]QRdQU ZQA
f )44-4/ Yf N4.7>973/ SY]R?U Z@A
Q )44-4/ ZZ N4.7>973/ SZZR?QU QA
e )44-4/ f N4.7>973/ SfR\dU YA
\B dB ? )44-4/ ] N4.7>973/ SYR]?U
ZA

The CityPiocFR of 9u% inuicates that 9u% of the 2S9 piecincts hau a Reu scoie oi at least one
ciitical pioceuuial violation. When we look ueepei into the actual eiiois, we finu that out of
2S9 piecincts, S7% (1SS) hau 2 oi moie eiiois.

The giaph on the next page pioviues a visual iepiesentation of the numbei of multiple
pioceuuial fails that each piecinct hau.

S4
]U Pioceuuial Eiiois Pei Piecinct: 2S9 Total Piecincts

fU N4-7.=84. `5>6 $53. N.47.935I. SaN4-7`$AbU is tallieu by auuing the (Yes) anu (No)
answei to each of the 1S questions anu then ueteimining what peicentage of that total the
(No) ieflects. This peicentage takes in consiueiation all answeis to that item. It uoes not
factoi in NA iesponses. Piecinct by piecinct bieakuown on each pioceuuie is incluueu in
the Summaiy Results by Waiu that is attacheu in the Bocument poition of this iepoit.

The PiocFR% tallies all of the piecincts foi a city-wiue scoie on each pioceuuie.
The PiocFR% pioviues insight, citywiue, into what aieas aie in neeu of ieinfoicement. It also
uemonstiates ciitical lapses in secuiity, allowing foi fuithei analysis.

Inuiviuual vaiiances between pioceuuies illustiate paiticulai aieas wheie the lapses aie moie
pievalent. Foi instance, sealing of the ballot box faileu S9% peicent of the time; contiasteu
with the pioceuuie foi juuges to take the 0ath, which faileu 7% of the time.

QU The #2.45I. N4-7 `5>6 $53. N.47.935I. Sa#2IN4-7`$bU is 18%. The AvgPiocFR is tallieu
aveiaging the PiocFR% foi all 1S questions into one scoie.

0n aveiage, acioss all 1S items in the Auuit, pioceuuies weie not followeu 18% of the time.
Statistically, city-wiue, theie is a 1 in S chance any given pioceuuie will not be followeu. This
figuie pioviues peispective on how well the CBE is uoing in its iole as auministiatois of the
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SS
ciitical election pioceuuies on Election Bay. 0n aveiage pei question, they fail on secuiity
pioceuuies 18% of the time.

What is an acceptable scoie. Statistically theie is no basis foi compaiison. Consiueieu with the
PiocFR% of 9u%, anu the fact that S7% of these piecincts have multiple Reu scoies, 18% aleits
the citizeniy that secuiity at the polls is inconsistent, often happenstance, anu untiaceable.
eU _54= #2.45I. N4-7.=84. `5>6 $53. N.47.935I. Sa_54=N4-7`$bU Piecinct by piecinct,
the total answeis foi each waiu aie tallieu anu aveiageu. Again, only the Yes anu No
answeis aie figuieu in
. This numbei iuentifies the aveiage peicentage of non-

compliance 7'# 7#"8'0;#' in that waiu. To unueistanu the uata consiuei that in Waiu 46
(2S% WaiuPiocFR) theie is a about a 1 in 4 chance that any given secuiity pioceuuie will
be not be followeu. In Waiu S6 (WaiuPiocFR 18%) the chances aie closei to 1 in S. This
statistic is meant to pioviue piospective on the oveiall non-compliance with the any
pioceuuie in the inuiviuual waius.

uioupeu by waiu, inuiviuual numbeis aie shown on the Summaiy Bata Spieausheet. (See
Auuenuum: Summaiy Bata pS8)

In oiuei of non-complianceM
Waiu 2u - 27% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu 46 - 2S% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu 4S - 21% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu S8 - 16% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu S6 - 18% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu 41 - 16% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies
Waiu 4S - 1S% non-compliance with secuiity pioceuuies

,535 $.2>.CM F>31C>=.

?@A SYZQ -83 -; Y]?U -; 3<. E-66>9I E657./ <5= 5 $.= /7-4. >9=>753>9I 9-9 7-0E6>597. >9 5
74>3>756 6-753>-9R
Waiu 2u - 81% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu S6 - 91% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu S8 - 91% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu 41 - 8S% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu 4S - 94% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu 4S - 9u% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois
Waiu 46 - 1uu% Piecincts hau Reu Eiiois

Nany piecincts hau multiple issues. The uata is iepiesenteu in inuiviuual spieausheets bioken
uown by waius into piecincts on the Summaiy of Results by Waiu sheets. Relevant comments on
inuiviuual polling places aie incluueu. The Summaiy of Results by Waiu iecoius answeis fiom the
woiksheets. Inuiviuual pioceuuies aie ievieweu by waiu anu by pioceuuie in the Bata Summaiy.

The ieason only yes anu no answeis aie useu is because we cannot factoi the NA, meaning Non-Answei. This Auuit
assumes all items woulu not necessaiily be answeieu. The auuitois weie instiucteu to uo theii best. While the NA total
is incluueu, only the yes anu no answeis aie factoieu into the iesults.
S6
,535 !800541 + %; 3<. Z] N4-7.=84./ !38=>.=M N4-7`$A

Q?A `5>6 $53.M SZ]? -83 -; YY\U G566-3 G-WM Ballot boxes aie iequiieu to be secuieu to the ballot
scannei to assuie that ballots aie not auueu to the box except thiough the scannei. In pait, this
high failuie iate is because of tiaining. The election juuges anu PPAs aie iesponsible foi applying
these seals, yet many uiu not know they existeu. 0ne PPA insisteu she hau just gone thiough
tiaining anu hau nevei been infoimeu about these seals. Shockingly, in multiple instances,
technicians anu investigatois fiom the Boaiu aiiiveu anu left polling locations without checking
that the ballot boxes weie sealeu.
Failuie of this pioceuuie means that in S9% of the polling places, the ballot box was unsealeu foi
the election. When the scannei is lifteu slightly fiom the box, the top is open anu exposes the
ballots below.

YQA `5>6 $53. SQ? -83 -; Y]]UM V<. J4..9 )!F !.56M The seal on the ESC was missing in S9
instances. This is impoitant because the seal shoulu ensuie that no one has tampeieu with the
lockeu ESC. The key foi the ESC is a geneiic key with multiple copies.
This seal is oiiginally

applieu at the waiehouse. It shoulu be ieapplieu if the ESC is openeu anu left unattenueu both
befoie anu aftei the election.
Theie aie many pioblems with this secuiity system. In essence, the ESC is tianspoiteu anu then
stoieu foi a couple of weeks at the polling location. Foi example, it may be stoieu in a school gym.
Theie is no basis in fact allowing the citizen to assume, noi the Boaiu to asseit, theie is ieliable
secuiity measuies that assuie the ESC is not tampeieu with aftei it is piepaieu foi Election Bay anu
sent to the polling place. Theie is none. The key is not specific to the unit. 0nce the unit is openeu,
multiple untiaceable ieplacement seals aie locateu in the supply box to ieseal the ESC unit.
Keep in minu that the ESC contains unsealeu (wiappeu in plastic) ballots. It also contains the
machines which aie loaueu with theii memoiy uevices. It contains untiaceable seals foi these
machines. Seal issues on the machines fuithei expose the vote to glaiing secuiity vulneiabilities.
V<.4. >/ 9- .2>=.97. 3- /8D/3593>53. 3<53 5 /.56.= )!F >9/84./ 3<. )!F C5/ 9-3 350E.4.=
C>3<R
In the specific instance of the 2S% failuie to have seals, theie is no chain of custouy to uiscein at
what stage in the piocess the seal was lost. Was it not piopeily placeu on at the waiehouse. Biu
the shipping piocess cause foi it to be openeu. Was it openeu befoie Election Bay at the polling
place. Anu then theie aie the "who" ielateu questions!
YYA `5>6 $53.M Sf\ -83 -; YZQU G566-3 !7599.4 (.0-41 N57H !.56M The ballot scannei contains a
memoiy pack in the back of the ballot scannei. This seal ensuies that the coiiect memoiy pack is
secuieu in the scannei. The memoiy pack contains the softwaie that iuns the machine anu iecoius
the vote. The seal is put on at the waiehouse. Theie is a lockeu uooi in the back of the scannei,
potentially pieventing easy access to the ballot scannei. The key to this uooi is a univeisal key. It is
stoieu in the supply box, so anyone with access to the ESC has access to the memoiy uevice. Again,
theie aie multiple ieu seals also placeu in the supply box.
The impoitance of this lack of secuiity is immeasuiable when evaluating the integiity of the vote.

The chain of custouy on the keys is unuei fuithei investigation

S7
In one instance, a matuie election juuge team expiesseu uismay that the night befoie they hau set
up the voting booths up as a team anu piopeily ie-sealeu the ESC, which still containeu the election
equipment. In the moining, they founu a ballot scannei out on the table. No one knew how it got
theie, noi uiu they know who hau access to the ioom aftei they left. As a team, they passionately
confiimeu it was not theie the night befoie. Still, they hau not iepoiteu the pioblem to Election
Cential anu they weie using the machine to iecoiu votes.
The lack of accountability anu instiuctions on secuiity pioceuuies iesults in pioblems such as
unsealeu ballot scanneis going unnoticeu anuoi uniepoiteu by oui election juuges.
We uocumenteu multiple instances wheie the technicians hau been out to the poll to iepaii
malfunctioning equipment anu hau not placeu seals on the machines when they left.
Sometimes juuges iefuseu to open the back to allow inspection of the seal. These weie iecoiueu as
a NA.
YZA `5>6 $53. S]? -83 -; Z?ZU NN# G5=I.M Biu the PPA have theii bauge on. This is a Yellow item
foi scoiing because the lack of IB uoes not jeopaiuize the vote. It is a secuiity lapse that neeus to be
iemeuieu.
Woithy to note: the PPAs, who aie CBE Employees, weie twice as likely to fail to put theii bauges
on compaieu to election juuges. The Auuit founu multiple instances of pooily tiaineu PPAs.
The iuentification of people in the polling place is pait of secuiity. The cuiient bauges aie auhesive
bauges which aie haiu to ieau anu get lost because of simple pioblems such as haii getting caught
in them.
Piopei iuentification in the polling place is impoitant anu shoulu be tieateu as such. It woulu be
simple to pioviue plastic pin bauges with blanks foi the election team to peisonalize.
ZdA `5>6 $53. SfZ -83 -; Y]@UM !.56 >//8./ -9 3<. %E.9[F6-/. N-43 V[! )=I.N68/. This machine
is supposeu to come with a yellow seal attacheu by CBE contiactois at the waiehouse anu with a
ieu seal stoieu insiue the poit uooi to be applieu by the election juuge when the polls aie open,
secuiing no one tuins the machine off anu on uuiing voting.
Sometimes the negative scoie was because the machine aiiiveu without the piopei seals. 0thei
times, the election team uiu not put the ieu seal on the machine. Theie was an instance wheie the
machine came without the ieu seal, but it hau the yellow seal attacheu. The election team uiu not
think to get a ieu seal fiom the supply box. In othei instances, technicians aiiiveu to iepaii the TS
anu uiu not ie-apply seals.
What is the effect of this poit being uistuibeu uuiing the voting uay. Why is theie a seal theie at
all. Why is theie a yellow seal. We have not founu uocumentation to explain the potential
consequences of failuie in this pioceuuie. What happens if the machine is tuineu off anu on while
in tianspoit. Boes that inuicate a vulneiability to vote tampeiing. If so, why is this piocess not
tiackeu. If the machine is tuineu on anu off uuiing the voting uay, how uoes this impact the
integiity of the piocess. Fuithei answeis aie iequiieu.
S8
Without tiacing the chain of custouy, we cannot uiscein the cause foi this pioceuuial failuie.
Bowevei, the CBE cannot blame pooily tiaineu juuges, as the PPA, technicians, anu investigatois
also uiu not secuie seal placement.
ZfA `5>6 $53. SY] -83 -; Z\]UM )5461 g-3>9I /3>7H.4/ C.4. 9-3 E657.= -9 D566-3 5EE6>753>-9/.
Ev stickeis aie incluueu in the papeiwoik given to the key juuge the uay befoie the election.
Election juuges aie to apply them to the ballot applications befoie the polls open. These labels
contain Eaily voting, uiace Peiiou, oi Absentee voting infoimation foi voteis.
This is a ciitical fail ielateu to applying the Ev stickeis to the ballot applications to assuie uuplicate
voting uoesn't occui. 14% of the time, the stickeis weie eithei not applieu at all oi not applieu
completely. Theie weie two iepoits of teams not having ieceiveu stickeis. 0ne juuge team uiu not
know they existeu.
The pioblem with iecoiuing Eaily voting voteis is that the votei books aie manually upuateu. This
leaves ioom foi human eiioi (acciuentally oi uelibeiately) to miss iecoiuing who voteu, allowing
foi potential multiple voting. 0ne ieason foi this failuie is because the juuges simply uo not have
the time to apply Ev stickeis uuiing the hectic eaily moining set up. Tiaining is also lacking. In the
Banubook, pages 28 anu S2 have a few paiagiaphs about the stickeis. Theie is no check anu
balance to assuie the juuges have completeu this task. ueneially speaking, unless caught by a
pollwatchei oi investigatoi, the lapse will go unnoticeu if they fail.
Auuit investigatois aie unawaie of pioceuuies to check the inciuences of multiple voting as a iesult
of eaily, giace, anu absentee voting. This woulu involve a faiily simple uata check anu shoulu be
ioutinely followeu up on with election authoiities. To pievent multiple voting, theie shoulu be a
state-wiue iequiiement foi a ieconciliation of voteis who voteu using one methou oi the othei.
This ieconciliation woulu take place aftei the election, allowing law enfoicement to become
involveu in instances wheie multiple voting is founu. At this point, no eviuence is collecteu anu we
uo not know how often multiple voting occuis.
ZYA `5>6 $53. SYf -83 -; YY\UM !.56 -9 3<. F54= #73>253-4R In 24 instances, the caiu activatois
lackeu a seal on the papei scioll. The papei iecoiu veiifies the actions of the caiu activatoi. The
papei scioll piints poll tapes foi the moining anu evening pioceuuies anu establishes a iecoiu of
zeio anu a final vote count. The caiu activatoi contiols electionic voting, consoliuating of the vote,
anu tiansmitting the vote. This papei iecoiu, iecoiueu on the scioll, is a secuiity measuie.
The seal pioceuuie on the caiu activatoi is not mentioneu in the }uuges Banubook. The ieu seal is
applieu by contiactois at the waiehouse. This seal shoulu be piesent 1uu% of the time. 0nless the
piintei is not woiking, theie is no ieason foi the seal to be bioken. Because the tiacking of the seal
is nonexistent, we cannot uiscein the ieason the seal is missing oi the potential consequences such
a secuiity lapse inuicates to the integiity of vote.
ZYA `5>6 $53. SYf -83 -; Y@ZUM L8=I./T G5=I./R ueneially speaking, election juuges usually have
theii bauges on. This is a Yellow aiea of non-compliance. If some juuges hau bauges on anu some
uiu not, it was taggeu as a (No) but iecoiueu in the notes.
Piopei iuentification is impoitant to secuiity anu it is impoitant foi the votei, who ielies on the
election juuges. voteis shoulu be able to easily iuentify who the juuge is anu what paity they
iepiesent.
S9
ZZA `5>6 $53. S]Q -83 -; YYQUM N-66 !.3+8E N4-7.=84./. In 4S instances, the polls weie set up
without compliance to the secuiity piocess. When the poll was set up by at least 2 election juuges,
it was scoieu as in compliance even though all election juuges weie not piesent.
Nultiple instances weie uocumenteu wheie a single peison was piesent when the ESC was openeu.
The set up of polling equipment iequiies foi a Republican anu Bemociat }uuge to be piesent. The
ESC is fiequently openeu with only one peison piesent, oi without both political paities
iepiesenteu. It was not uncommon foi the Piecinct Captain, who is not an election juuge, to open
the ESC to allegeuly make suie eveiything was ieauy foi the vote.
Impiopei pioceuuies foi setting up polls aie a secuiity iisk because it allows foi untiaceable access
to the election equipment.
Polls aie fiequently set-up the night befoie. Polling place set-ups the night befoie the election aie
uone to iemove the stiess of set-up in the eaily moining. Yet all too often it is uone without the
iequiieu team of election juuges. 0nueistanuably, juuges want to have the polling place aiiangeu
the night befoie, anu the Banubook iecommenus the juuges meet the uay befoie to assuie
eveiything is piesent anu woiking. The Banubook uoes not stiess coiiect secuiity pioceuuies foi
setting up the polls as a team. These pioceuuies uo instiuct the team to ieseal the ESC until the
following moining. The manual uoes not insist that a Bemociat anu Republican be piesent.
Secuiity pioceuuies aie not ieinfoiceu by iequiiing uocumentation of who set the polls up.
Essentially, this infoimation is not askeu foi, noi is it collecteu (Banubook pages 1u-11).
We uocumenteu instances wheie only the booths (no voting mateiials) weie set-up anu otheis
wheie the entiie poll was set-up the night befoie. This becomes a compliance issue when voting
mateiials aie left unsecuieu when election juuges aie not piesent. Also, the ESC is fiequently not
iesealeu following its opening.
The ieason foi poll set-up secuiity lapses is ease of access, lack of tiaining, lack of accountability,
anu an olu boy mentality d M+" ,-." -#+-8@ A'7" 5) ),5@ +-8=P Theie is a systemic piactice of
piecinct captains opening the ESC to check it befoie the election.
Impoitantly, as alieauy noteu, a sealeu ESC uoes not assuie it was not tampeieu with. The seal is
essentially winuow uiessing.
votei Piivacy: The auuitois uocumenteu numeious instances wheie the aiiangement of the polls
uiu not pioviue votei piivacy. We noteu this, but otheiwise uiu not scoie it.
?A `5>6 $53. SY@ -83 -; Y]@UM !.56 0>//>9I -9 3<. V[! F5434>=I. N-43. The TS is a fiimwaie
shell uiiven by the softwaie that is accesseu thiough the caitiiuge poits. It iecoius the vote totals
onto the 0SB flash uiive. The 0SB flash uiive loaus the ballots anu iecoius the vote. It is calleu a
*"@3#)@ (-*)*5A/"=
The touch scieen machine has a caitiiuge poit wheie the iesults caitiiuge is inseiteu. In 9% of the
instances, the seal secuiing this ciitical iesults caitiiuge was missing. V<>/ /.56 >/ E83 -9 53 3<.
C54.<-8/.R Aftei the election, the juuges bieak this seal anu iemove the 0SB flash uiive. This
iesults caitiiuge contains the iecoiu of the vote, specific to the piecinct's ballot styles. Theie is no
ieason foi it to be toucheu by anyone until aftei the election.
4u
The causes foi secuiity lapse coulu be as innocent as an election juuge opening the wiong
compaitment, to seals not being placeu coiiectly on machines at the waiehouse. Even if a seal is
theie, it uoes not mean the machine was not tampeieu with. Nultiple untiackeu seals aie stoieu in
the supply box foi easy ieplacement aftei tampeiing.
In 2u instances the TS Caitiiuge Poit was not sealeu. We aie not awaie of any calls to Election
Cential about these seals uespite these instiuctions:
\#"()5'7 e3A/" f-7A4''< @)-)"@W MT"*5;8 ),-) - *"A @"-# 5@ '7 )," K-*)*5A/" X'*)@ G*"@3#)@
(-*)*5A/"J A''*= L; )," @"-# 5@ C5@@57/$ 5CC"A5-)"#8 (-## \g\K?Lah K\h?1:g -) EiH>HIR>QjQF
(pg 22).
The iesults caitiiuge uiives the TS machine. Tampeiing with iesults caitiiuges of the exact same
TS mouel was iecoiueu in 2uu9 in the Philippines, wheie iesults caitiiuges weie founu in the
gaibage uumpstei with iecoiueu votes on them. A lack of secuiity on the iesults caitiiuge assuies
theie is immeasuiable vulneiability to vote manipulation.
&-3.M Even though the TS machine is bioken, the chain of custouy of the iesults caitiiuge shoulu
be similai to the ballots. This is not the case. Seals aie ioutinely not ieplaceu oi ignoieu altogethei.
It is impossible to state that a sealeu TS caitiiuge poit pioviues secuiity that the iesults caitiiuge
was not tampeieu with. Theie is no eviuence iecoiuing the chain of custouy on the seal secuiing
the poit. Because the seal numbeis aie not iecoiueu anu cioss-checkeu, election juuges cannot
ieliably uetect tampeiing which effectively is a 1uu% fail iate.
\A `5>6 $53. SZe -83 -; Y]fUM V<. V-87<+!74..9 2-3.4 2.4>;>753>-9T/ E5E.4 /74-66. The seal on
the papei scioll is essential as a iecoiu of the ballot. It can be legally aigueu that it iequiies a seal.
The TS Scioll was not secuieu with a seal 7% of the time. This scioll is the piinteu iecoiu of the
vote anu is consiueieu a backup foi the iesults caitiiuge. The seal is secuieu to the machine by the
CBE contiactois at the waiehouse.
The piinting mechanism that piints the scioll fiequently bieaks. When it uoes, tiaining
instiuctions anu follow-up uo not assuie a seal is placeu on the machine when it is iepaiieu. It is
not cieuible to say that the eiioi is causeu by the election juuges. Technicians anu PPAs iepaiiing
the scioll aie uocumenteu as not ieplacing the seal.
In auuition, the scioll containei is attacheu to the TS machine as a sepaiate numbeieu pait. The
pait numbei shoulu be the same as the machine's SN numbei. This is not checkeu. This is
impoitant because the scioll is the papei iecoiu of the vote. The chain of custouy on the scioll
iecoiuing the vote shoulu be similai as the papei ballot. The scioll can be changeu without
touching the seal simply by switching the paits.
voteis aie assuieu that the papei iecoiu pioviues secuiity that the vote is iecoiueu coiiectly. In
fact, this is a smoke anu miiiois illusion. Yes, a papei iecoiu uoes help, but without access to the
softwaie, piopei auuiting techniques foi the papei scioll
, anu to a chain of custouy on the paits

We uo not auuit Eaily voting which is all uone on the TS. In Apiil 2u11, the CBE has aumitteu to the Auuit
investigatois that they uo not have techniques available to auuit Eaily voting anu the ISBE has not pioviueu them with
techniques. Fuithei iepoit is foithcoming.
41
anu seal, this iecoiu of the vote is vulneiable to manipulation. This secuiity vulneiability is
magnifieu when theie aie secuiity lapses with the iesults caitiiuges.
\A `5>6 $53. SZf -83 -; YZYUM V5H>9I 3<. )6.73>-9 L8=I. %53<. In at least 7% of the instances,
the election juuges uiu not take theii oath. This is ciitical because eveiy act the election juuge takes
in theii official iole is potentially nullifieu if they aie not unuei oath.
The oath is taken by ieauing a caiu. It is incluueu in the hanubook as an impoitant pioceuuie. In
one instance an auuitoi noteu that an expeiienceu team uiu not take theii oath. Appaiently, they
uiu not see the immeuiate impoitance foi it. Investigatois aie not awaie of a back-up pioceuuie to
assuie the oath has been taken oi to follow up when it was not.
eA `5>6 $53. SZ] -83 -; YZdUM (54H>9I -; Z@@;3 C>3< 3<. D68. 7-9./R The blue no-electioneeiing
cones weie not coiiectly placeu outsiue. This is consiueieu a ciitical aiea because of the
impoitance of allowing voteis to vote unmolesteu by electioneeiing conuucteu too close to the
polling place.
Election juuges tenu to be awaie of the placement of the cones because without them, voteis will
complain when electioneeiing uoes take place. Some teams uiu not have the cones in theii ESC.
Sometimes the cones hau been moveu anu sometimes they weie impiopeily placeu. Besiues the
election juuges, the PPAs shoulu assuie that signage anu cones aie placeu coiiectly. This neeus to
be ie-checkeu inteimittently thioughout the uay.
We also noteu, but uiu not scoie, multiple instances wheie the signage was incoiiect.
!800541 -; $./863/ D1 _54=M Noie in-uepth uata analysis is available in the Summaiy of Results.
The iaw uata was consoliuateu into summaiy sheets foi each waiu anu aie incluueu in this iepoit.
This Summaiy of Results by Waiu pioviues a visual oveiview of the iesults of the scoies. They aie
soiteu baseu on the numbei of "Reu" anu then "Yellow" scoies. The piecincts with the highest
numbei of Reu scoies aie soiteu top to bottom.
J.9.456 h>0>353>-9/ 59= #//80E3>-9/M
This stuuy iepiesents a suipiise auuit of 2S9 piecincts on Election Bay, Apiil S, 2u11. We uiu not
look foi fiauu, noi uiu we iuentify the piesence oi lack of fiauu. 0ui stuuy is on the pioceuuies
useu to keep tampeiing oi fiauu fiom occuiiing, oi to aleit us that it uiu happen.
It is impossible to assess fiauu causeu by a lack of pioceuuies because uata is not collecteu.

42
BISC0SSI0N
!800541 -; (5>9 `>9=>9I/M
0ne of the piimaiy iesponsibilities of goveinment is to assuie the accuiacy of the vote. Theie is a
tenuency of the citizeniy to tiust this is being uone. Equally so, theie is a fiustiation among the
electoiate that feels the integiity of the vote is so coiiupteu, why bothei to vote. This is especially
tiue in Illinois, which has a globally infamous ieputation foi holuing coiiupt elections.
With the evolution of technology, balloting systems have been unueigoing iapiu change. Since
2uuu, the iise in electionic voting has substantially changeu how Ameiicans vote. In auuition,
changes to Absentee voting anu Eaily voting have impacteu how we cast, iecoiu, anu tally the vote.
These changes continue, fiequently untesteu by objective analysis about theii impact to the
integiity of the vote. We aie in a place of iapiu change in voting methouologies. This impacts
legislation; especially in Illinois, which is infamous foi its patchwoik appioach to election
legislation anu the ielateu case law.
Theie aie seveial tienus in elections which aie notewoithy of investigation, but this stuuy
piimaiily auuiesses the veil that is placeu on equipment to pioviue an appeaiance of secuiity. A
lack of tianspaiency of the voting piocess is inheient in electionic voting. voteis aie tolu that
theie is enhanceu accountability anu secuiity in iecoiuing the vote electionically, but uon't know
how oi wheie to ueteimine if theie is such secuiity.
0ui stuuy uiu not look foi fiauu. We stuuieu how auequate the system is in pieventing anuoi
catching fiauu thiough maintenance of pioceuuies uesigneu to assuie the system's secuiity anu
thus, the integiity of the vote.
0ui finuings piove that the Chicago Boaiu of Elections fails to maintain secuiity sufficient to assuie
that each vote is accuiately cast anu counteu. ueneially the system ielies on seals as measuies of
secuiity. Seal use piotocols aie ciucial to unueistanuing the use of seals on election equipment anu
supplies.
!.56 8/. N4-3-7-6M Election authoiities neeu to have secuie, consistent anu veiifiable seal use
piotocols.

"Seal use piotocols aie the foimal anu infoimal pioceuuies foi choosing, piocuiing, tianspoiting,
stoiing, secuiing, assigning, installing, inspecting, iemoving, anu uestioying seals. 0thei
components of a seal use piotocol incluue pioceuuies foi secuiely keeping tiack of seal seiial
numbeis, anu the tiaining pioviueu to seal installeis anu inspectois. The pioceuuies foi how to
inspect the object oi containei onto which seals aie applieu is anothei aspect of a seal use piotocol.
Seals anu a tampei-uetection piogiam aie no bettei than the seal use piotocols that aie in place."
|Bi. Rogei }ohnston, Aigonne Labs 2u1u,
*****
24j

*****
}0BNST0N, R. u. 2u1u. Insecuiity of New }eisey's seal piotocols foi voting machines.
http:www.cs.piinceton.euu~appelvoting}ohnston-Analysis0fN}Seals.puf
4S
Bi. }ohnston uiscusses vital consiueiations in choosing seals foi election equipment. "The physical
uesign of seals useu foi this puipose neeu to be easy to iemove, anu shoulu pioviue eviuence when
they aie iemoveu oi tampeieu with. These seals neeu to be seiial-numbeieu so that when new
seals aie applieu, the numbeis aie iecoiueu as pait of the tiail of eviuence of secuiity." GX"*@'7-#
('CC375(-)5'7 +5), 1'/"* e',7@)'7$ T3#7"*-45#5)8 :@@"@@C"7) ?"-C$ :*/'77" h-)5'7-# g-4'*-)'*8J
Stanuaiu piotocols foi seal secuiity incluue a numbei of steps to be effective.
- 0iganizeu iecoius must be kept ielating to seal numbeis anu to when the seal was put on
anu iemoveu. These iecoius neeu to be secuieu.
- Quality Assuiance pioceuuies neeu to be followeu that incluue inspection of the seals
anu the uocuments suppoiting the application of the seals.
- Seal useis neeu to be tiaineu on the piopei use of seals. This incluues how to apply seals
anu how to uetect obvious anu subtle signs of tampeiing.

This stuuy pioviues inuisputable eviuence theie aie few contiols pioviuing accountability that
secuiity pioceuuies aie followeu. Nost of the secuiity ielateu pioceuuies in place piesent a meie
veneei of secuiity, when in tiuth they aie not tiackeu, maintaineu, oi ieinfoiceu.
_<.9 /.56 E4-3-7-6 >/ 577-893.= ;-4B 3<>/ /38=1 ;>9=/ 3<.4. >/ 5 Z@@A ;5>6 453.R V<. /.56 8/.
E4-3-7-6/ 8/.= D1 3<. F<>75I- G-54= -; )6.73>-9/ 54. 7-0E6.3.61 >95=.O853. >9 =.3.73>9I
350E.4>9IR
*0E-43597. -; i856>31 #//84597.M Without tiacking, we fiequently uon't get to "If" it was
tampeieu with. Foiensically, it becomes uifficult to ieconstiuct what is lost. Statistically, we cannot
assess vulneiabilities when theie is no uata collecteu by the election authoiities. To establish a
base line foi assessment iequiies extiaoiuinaiy means such as this Auuit iepiesents. 0theiwise,
the uata is not collecteu!
The CBE's management of seals is entiiely ineffective, which causes the seals to cieate a meie
veneei of secuiity. ueneially, election juuges anu PPAs uo not know the puipose of the seals anu no
one iecoius theii numbeis. Noieovei, theie aie uncontiolleu supplies in the ESC, allowing seals to
be bioken anu ieinstalleu without iaising any aleits of tampeiing to iesponsible paities.
The vote is vulneiable at any point wheie the piocess is not tianspaient. We lose contiol ovei the
piocess when we lose sight of the chain of custouy. An offenuei finus places to compiomise the
vote accoiuing to theii access point to uo so. Theie aie multiple points of access: waiehouse,
shipping, inventoiy, polling place inteifeience, computei iooms, mechanical anu electiical
inteifeience, etc. Assuiing secuiity becomes especially pioblematic with vaiieu voting options such
as is piesenteu in Election Bay anu Eaily voting.
V<. 4./863/ ;4-0 3<>/ 58=>3 54. /3899>9Ij Weie they pieuictable. In the complicateu polling
place, suiely theie is always ioom foi vaiiations anu mistakes! The task of auministeiing elections
is not a small one. vaiiations in pioceuuial compliance uo not necessaiily iepiesent eviuence of
fiauu. Inueeu, most of oui election authoiities aie electeu anu the County Cleiks aie accountable to
the people.
44
This uoes not mean the voting system is secuie noi, is it an excuse foi a lack of secuiity!
The pioblem iemains: how uo we holu oui goveinment accountable to conuuct secuie, faii, anu
honest elections. The only way to assuie an accuiate vote is to have secuiity oveisight. This
oveisight must be 1uu% tianspaient anu accessible to voteis anu to canuiuates. It must incluue seal
use piotocols. Theie must be a quality assuiance piogiam employeu to holu election authoiities
accountable foi stanuaius that aie iecognizeu in the inuustiy as pioviuing a ieasonable measuie of
secuiity ovei the piocess of casting anu counting the Ameiican vote.
The citizens must also iecognize the impoitance of theii involvement in the piocess of casting anu
counting the vote. Theie is an element of citizen involvement that is pait of the oveisight of
elections anu thus pait of election secuiity. Foi the most pait, to be involveu, you must be a
iegisteieu votei. Pollwatching piogiams pioviue impoitant access anu as pollwatcheis, voteis
have access to view all election equipment anu mateiials. Election juuge piogiams aie anothei
avenue foi votei involvement. Inuiviuuals anu gioups (you uon't have to be iegisteieu to vote)
have the iight to F0IA uocuments anu to attenu public uemonstiations of the equipment.
Citizens cannot assume electeu officials have the integiity of the vote secuieu.
This Auuit pioves they uon't!

4S
ABBITI0NAL v0LNERABILITIES
0ui investigations have uncoveieu the following auuitional vulneiabilities:
!357H/ -; -E.9 D566-3/ >9 3<. C54.<-8/.M

0npiotecteu ballots photogiapheu uuiing the S% auuit anu the open uooiway 6Sft away.
X9E4-3.73.= D566-3/ E<-3-I45E<.= 53 3<. N.4/<>9I !34..3 _54.<-8/.k aiounu the coinei fiom
these ballots is an open uooiway to the shipping uock anu stieet ally which employees ioutinely
use without visible secuiity piesent. Auuit investigatois weie iepeateuly uenieu access to this
uooiway's secuiity. These ballots weie stoieu just feet away fiom the S% State-wiue auuit that was
taking place in the same aiea.
h57H -; !.784>31 54-89= (.0-41 ,.2>7./M Note in the pictuie of the open uooi (taken uuiing a
uiffeient visit to the waiehouse), the unsealeu caiuboaiu boxes to the left (close-up below).
*&F$),*Gh^, each one of these boxes contains ALL of the electionic memoiy uevices foi one of the
City's waius. These memoiy uevices (0SB flash uiives calleu iesults caitiiuges anu the ballot
scannei's memoiy pack) contiol the election machines. These boxes weie left unsealeu next to the
open uooiway while waiehouse contiactois weie testing the machines anu while uock woikeis anu
tiuckeis weie busy moving election equipment. The unsealeu boxes weie waiting foi shipment
back to Washington Stieet anu weie stoieu in the location in the pictuie foi weeks.

Close-up - These aie the boxes waiting foi shipment back to Washington Stieet anu aie left without secuiity foi extenueu
peiious of time next to the open uooi leauing to a shipping uock. The box on the left is the box being useu foi Pie-LAT
testing of Waiu 11 at the same location. All memoiy uevices aie shippeu anu stoieu in this box.
46
F-934573-4/ 59= )0E6-1..s: The Chicago Boaiu uses both contiactois anu employees to
supeivise anu opeiate all aspects of the election piocess. Although not incluueu in this iepoit, oui
investigations have pioven that the Chicago Boaiu of Elections is not in compliance with I-9
iegulations which iuentify the iight foi the inuiviuual to woik in the 0SA. Eviuence conclusively
pioves the Boaiu appioves Foims I-9 wheie the employee uiu not check theii woik status. Fuithei
investigation is unueiway.
As the pictuie above pioves, contiactois have access to the most vulneiable paits useu in voting.
Yet who aie they. The CBE uoes not secuie they aie legally entitleu to woik anu 4-83>9.61 looks
the othei way when they uo not iuentify theii iight to woik on the I-9.
V<>/ /.784>31 65E/. >/ 74>3>756. Who is woiking as PPAs, contiactois at the waiehouse, anu in othei
ciitical ioles. What backgiounu check is completeu. Who is iesponsible foi scieening pioceuuies.
What aie these pioceuuies. Who checks up.
*0E-4359361M )5461 g-3>9I />3./ >9 F<>75I- 8/. .0E6-1../ >9 E657. -; .6.73>-9 P8=I./R V<./.
.0E6-1../ 54. 9-3 4.O8>4.= 3- D. 7>3>l.9/R ,.;.9= 3<. g-3. <5/ =-780.93.= 3<. 4.+-77844>9I
E4-7.=84. -; F<>75I- )5461 g-3>9I />3./ D.>9I -E.453.= D1 9-9+7>3>l.9/R *9 5==>3>-9B C.
=-780.93 3<. FG) <5/ C-4H.4/ 4899>9I )5461 g-3>9I C>3< `-40/ *+? -9 4.7-4= 3<53 54. ;>66.=
-83 C>3<-83 3<. =.765453>-9 S89=.4 E.4P841U -; 3<. 4>I<3 3- C-4H /3538/ -; 3<./. >9=>2>=856/
4899>9I 3<. )5461 g-3>9I E-66>9I 6-753>-9/R V<>/ 0.59/ C. =-9T3 <52. 591 =.765453>-9 -4
7-9;>40>9I 4.7-4= 3<53 3<.1 54. 6.I5661 .6>I>D6. 3- C-4Hj
)O8>E0.93 `5>684./M Election Coue iequiies a state-wiue S% auuit of all election equipment anu
iesults. In the Apiil election, investigatois obseiveu that theie was a piecinct with S4 ballots; 22:12
votes cast by papei ballot foi the Alueiman's iace in the 24
th
Waiu, 16
th
Piecinct. This piecinct was
ianuomly chosen as pait of the S% auuit which Befenu the vote investigatois attenueu. Buiing the
S% auuit, the CBE contiactois ie-scanneu the ballots (into a new ballot scannei anu memoiy pack)
anu the votes iecoiueu 21:1S. visual counting assuieu the iesults weie 22:12. Nultiple attempts to
get the same iesults fiom the ballot scannei weie futile. Aftei about 2 houis, the auuitois (CBE
contiactois) uisceineu they coulu not figuie out what the eiioi was anu sent in theii iesults foi
that piecinct, noting but not iesolving the vote uisciepancy. Nultiple CBE supeivisois weie
involveu in this situation.
CBE supeivisois iepoiteu that theie was no papei tiail following this auuit iesult. No iepaii iecoiu
oi tiouble shooting iepoit woulu be fileu. Essentially, theie was no way foi oui team to tiack the
iesolution of this pioblem in the system. No fuithei iesolution was foithcoming with the CBE.
V<>/ >/ 5 74>3>756 ;65C >9 3./3>9I E4-7.=84./R The lack of accountability when eiioi is founu
secuies that it cannot be investigateu to uiscein the potential ieasons foi anu implications to the
vote this flaw causes. Bow can we assess the flaw when it is not iecoiueu. !>0E61B D1
05>935>9>9I 9- 3457H>9I E4-7.=84./B 3<. >//8. 4.05>9/ >97>=.9356 59= 7599-3 D. 8/.= 3-
=>/7.49 ;65C/ >9 3<. 2-3>9I /1/3.0 3<53 3<. QA !353.+C>=. 58=>3 >/ =./>I9.= 3- 7537<R
#D/.93.. g-3>9I 59= )5461 g-3>9IM Befenu the vote has uocumenteu substantial iiiegulaiities in
Eaily voting anu Absentee voting pioceuuies. A follow-up iepoit on this topic will be foithcoming.
F.668654 V.7<9-6-I1M The CBE has a policy iestiicting cellulai technology aiounu the voting
equipment at the Washington Stieet facility anu at the Peishing Stieet waiehouse. They have only
47
stateu that it coulu inteifeie with the opeiation of the equipment. Bow is inteifeience causeu, what
can it uo, anu what measuies aie in place to pievent it anuoi catch it shoulu it occui.
*0E-4359361B C<1 >/ /87< .O8>E0.93 8/.= >9 E-66>9I E657./ C<.4. 7.668654 E<-9./ 54. 8/.=
D1 .6.73>-9 E.4/-99.6:
Note: The caiu activatois tiansmit election iesults by cellulai technology. Theie is no notation in
the Banubook iestiicting cell phones at the polling place.
!-;3C54.: The fact that we have no public oi piivate iecoius pioving the veiacity oi not of softwaie
iunning oui voting equipment uemonstiates just how vulneiable we aie to vote manipulation.
Secuiity checks on contiactois who woik foi the Boaiu piogiamming the softwaie is pioblematic
anu must be investigateuR
V<.4. 54. 0863>E6. E>.7./ -; .O8>E0.93 >92-62.= >9 .6.73>-9/B .57< C>3< ;>40C54. 59=
/-;3C54. 3<53 >/ 9-3 577.//>D6. 3- E8D6>7 4.2>.CR !-0. -; 3<>/ .O8>E0.93 <5/ D..9
>92./3>I53.=B D83 >/ 9-3 0.93>-9.= >9 3<>/ 4.E-43R _>3< 5 ?@A ;5>684. 453. -9 /.784>31
E4-7.=84./B C. E4-2. <-C 76-/.61 3<. FG) 0-9>3-4/ /.784>31 E4-7.=84./R V<. 7844.93
/1/3.0 4.6>./ -9 E4--; -; ;458= 3- >9/E>4. 7-44.73>2. E4-7.=84./ 59= ./35D6>/<./ E4573>7./
3<53 05H. >3 >0E-//>D6. 3- E4-2. >; 3<.4. C5/ 350E.4>9I C>3< 3<. 2-3.R
V<.4. >/ 9- /.784>31 7<.7H 577.//>D6. 3- 3<. E8D6>7 2.4>;1>9I 3<. 57784571 -; 3<. /-;3C54.
4.7-4=>9I 3<. 2-3.R V<. /-;3C54. 7-=. 08/3 D. 3459/E54.93 3- E4-2>=. 591 <-E. ;-4 /.784>31
-; 3<. 2-3.R ^.3B 577.// >/ =.9>.= D1 2.9=-4 7-934573B 657H -; E4-7.=84./B 59= C>3< -3<.4
/.784>31+4.653.= P8/3>;>753>-9/R

48
C0RRECTIvE ACTI0NS ANB NEXT STEPS
Theie aie seveial next steps that we iecommenu that will solve /-0. of the secuiity issues.
ZU Election juuges shoulu be given a check list that must be completeu anu signeu off by all
juuges at 6:uuam. This incluues checking anu iecoiuing seal numbeis. The check list will
ieminu the election team of each step anu holu them iesponsible foi compliance as a team.
When equipment comes without a seal oi with a uamageu seal, the election juuges shoulu
note that foi >00.=>53. follow up investigation.
YU All seal numbeis applieu at the Peishing Stieet Waiehouse shoulu be iecoiueu on a
tiiplicate-uuplicate foim. 0ne copy is foi waiehouse iecoius, one foi the CBE, anu the othei
goes to the election juuges. Election juuges check these seal numbeis to confiim they aie
the same. Cuiiently, the CBE uses foims with multiple uuplicates foi othei aspects of
iecoiu keeping at the waiehouse. Aujusting the foim is all that is iequiieu to fix this aspect
of the pioblem.
]U Seals numbeis placeu on equipment anu on the blue tiansfei case by elections juuges
shoulu be cioss-checkeu at the Receiving Stations anu foi the S% Auuit.
fU All useu anu unuseu seals shoulu be ietuineu to the waiehouse in a sepaiate envelope in
the blue tiansfei case anu stoieu along with the ballots until the ballots aie uestioyeu.
Confiiming the chain of custouy on the seals anu the iecoiueu numbeis shoulu be pait of
each step of the piocess anu pait of the S% Auuit.
QU A uiffeient coloi must be useu foi ieplacement seals in the ESC foi use at the polling place.
The use of these seals shoulu be iecoiueu in the juuge's papeiwoik. Biffeient seals (in
appeaiance) pioviue a way to ieplace seals without compiomising the integiity of the seals.
This pioceuuie must be accompanieu by a uocumentation sheet that iecoius when the seal
is changeu, by whom, anu the ieason foi the change.
eU The Banubook shoulu be changeu to incluue infoimation on the seals anu theii impoitance.
Theie shoulu be a section on secuiity anu theie shoulu be a FAQ that specifically peitains to
seal issues. Seal tiaining shoulu be iequiieu foi all election juuges anu PPAs.
\U CBE technicians anu PPAs must ieplace seals when they iepaii equipment anu incluue the
new seal numbeis in the juuge's papeiwoik befoie the iepaii is consiueieu completeu. The
iecoiuing of the change shoulu be maue in election juuge papei woik as uesciibeu in #2.
dU When the CBE mails pay checks to the election juuges, they shoulu incluue blank polling
place evaluation foims to allow foi continuing oppoitunities to election juuges to pioviue
feeuback on the polling place expeiience. Election juuges neeu to have the oppoitunity to
iepoit polling place conceins aftei the election. This woulu help catch ieoccuiiing
pioblems anu pioviue the election juuges with an oppoitunity to confiuentially iepoit
conceins.
?U Election juuges anu PPAs aie given pinneu bauges. The papei auhesive ones uo not last
thiough the uay anu aie haiu to ieau.
49
INPLICATI0NS 0F TBE ST0BY
*0E6>753>-9/ [ !>I9>;>7597. -; 3<. !38=1
This stuuy shoulu be publisheu acioss the state anu nationwiue. voteis shoulu unueistanu that the
Chicago Boaiu of Elections issues iepoiteu heie aie not exceptions to the iule, but aie the iule. 2S9
out of 7uu piecincts is a significant sampling pioviuing inuisputable eviuence that, left on theii
own, election authoiities uo not necessaiily pioviue auequate secuiity.
Nationally, until we begin to measuie secuiity of voting pioceuuies, the implication to the vote is
liteially immeasuiable! Local gioups shoulu feel empoweieu by this iesult to auuit election
piactices in theii communities.
Conveisations shoulu be immeuiately initiateu with election authoiities acioss the state, seeking
voluntaiy inclusion of auuit pioceuuies to assuie the polling place maintains secuiity.
The Illinois State Boaiu of Elections shoulu ieceive a copy of this iepoit with a iequest to iesponu
to its iesults. The Boaiu is iesponsible unuei law to iepoit to the State Legislatuie on election
matteis, anu this iepoit shoulu be the basis of such a communication.
The State Legislatuie shoulu be contacteu with the puipose of launching a statewiue investigation.
Builuing upon the uepth of expeiience gaineu in conuucting the Auuit, Befenu the vote will now
seek to cieate a citizen auvocacy mechanism to auuit the vote anu auvance ballot integiity acioss
Illinois. 0ui next step is to peifoim a vulneiability assessment anu secuiity auuit acioss the entiie
state of Illinois foi the upcoming 2u12 elections. We ask all inteiesteu paities to join oui ongoing
anu upcoming effoits.
ACKN0WLEBuENENTS
O37A57/ Y'A5"@W Champion News anu }ack Roesei
L7."@)5/-)'*@: Befenu the vote
:3A5)'*@: Thank you to the many auuitois who woikeu to make the auuit happen!
6-Z'* K'##-4'*-)'*: }ack Roesei, Publishei of Champion News, anu Steve Boulton ueneial Counsel
of the Chicago u0P.
:A.5(" -7A N,-*57/ '; \S2"*)5@": }ack Roesei, Steve Boulton, Petei Bella, Cail Segvich, }im Fuchs, }im
Leahy, anu a special thank you to the auuitois who came fiom vaiious Tea Paity uioups.
Rogei u. }ohnston, Ph.B., CPP, heau of the vulneiability Assessment Team (vAT) at Aigonne
National Laboiatoiy, was invaluable foi his auvice anu expeitise on seal piotocols.
Thank you to the peei ievieweis with the }ouinal of Physical Secuiity who helpeu to make this
iepoit stiongei anu who appioveu it foi publication.

Su
REFERENCES
The }uuge of Election Banubook foi the Feb. 22, 2u11 Nunicipal ueneial Election anu the Apiil S,
2u11 Supplementaiy (Run-0ff) by the Chicago Boaiu of Elections.

APPENBICES
S0NNARY BATA W0RKSBEET
S0NNARY 0F RES0LTS- WARB 2u
S0NNARY 0F RES0LTS- WARB S6
S0NNARY 0F RES0LTS- WARB S8
S0NNARY 0F RES0LTS- WARB 41
S0NNARY 0F RES0LTS- WARB 4S

Summary Data Chart for the April 5th 2011 Chicago Audit
Ward Audited 20 36 38 41 43 45 46 Totals Percentage
The number of
precincts audited by 9 (x 13) = 117 42 (x 13) = 546 52 (x 13) = 676 33 (x 13) = 429 45 (x 13) = 585 38 (x 13) = 494 20 (x 13) = 260 239 (x 13) = 3107
Procedure Fail Rate
% + ProcFR%
13 ques = total Items:
Answers = Y, N, N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A Yes - No - N/A
(Yes + No)
Yes - No - N/A
FR = % of No's
(Yes + No)
1
2 Judges present when
the ESC opened and poll
set up. (Red Error) 6 3 1 29 8 5 39 12 1 26 6 1 42 0 3 28 6 4 20 0 0
(225)
190 35 14
35 No's is 11% of
225
2
Green Seal closed on
ESC. (Red Error) 4 5 0 35 6 1 38 12 2 26 7 0 30 15 0 25 12 1 16 2 2
(233)
174 59 6
59 No's is 25% of
233
3
Judges have badges on.
(Yellow Error) 4 4 1 32 4 6 42 0 10 25 4 4 36 3 6 29 3 6 9 6 5
(201)
177 24 38
24 No's is 12% of
201
4
PPA have badge on.
(Yellow Error) 7 2 0 24 8 10 29 9 14 27 4 2 32 8 5 25 6 7 8 2 10
(191)
152 39 48
39 No's is 21% of
191
5
Judges took their oath.
(Red Error) 7 0 2 31 0 11 48 2 2 29 2 2 41 0 4 29 5 4 13 5 2
(212)
198 14 27
14 No's is 7% of
212
6
Blue cones were at 100ft.
(Red Error) 6 3 0 36 2 4 43 4 5 32 1 0 42 0 3 34 3 1 11 0 9
(217)
204 13 22
13 No's is 6% of
218
7
T/S scroll is sealed. (Red
Error) 8 1 0 38 4 0 49 3 0 30 3 0 43 0 2 34 4 0 16 1 3
(234)
218 16 5
16 No's is 7% of
234
8
Red seal is on T/S
Open/Close port (Red
Error) 5 2 2 32 10 0 46 6 0 29 4 0 38 7 0 29 7 2 10 5 5
(230)
189 41 9
41 No's is 18% of
230
9
T/S Cartridge Port is
sealed. (Red Error) 5 2 2 39 2 1 48 4 0 31 2 0 41 4 0 32 3 3 14 3 3
(230)
210 20 9
20 No's is 9% of
230
#
The Card Activator is
sealed. (Red Error) 6 0 3 38 4 0 46 6 0 30 3 0 42 3 0 25 7 6 16 1 3
(227)
203 24 12
24 No's is 12% of
227
#
The Ballot Box is sealed.
(Red Error) 4 3 2 16 26 0 33 19 0 16 17 0 12 33 0 13 25 0 3 16 1
(236)
97 139 3
139 No's is 59% of
236
#
Ballot Scanner is locked
and the Red Seal is on
the back. (Red Error) 5 1 3 24 13 5 30 19 3 30 3 0 34 4 7 31 4 3 14 3 3
(215)
168 47 24
47 No's is 22% of
215
#
Early Voter labels are on
the ballot applications at
6am. (Red Error) 5 0 4 23 2 17 35 2 15 23 9 1 37 1 7 15 7 16 12 2 6
(173)
150 23 66
23 No's is 14% of
173
Total = (Y+N)
N/A not figured in FR %
Yes No N/A
(98)
72 26 19
(486)
397 88 60
(624)
526 98 52
(419)
354 65 10
(548)
470 78 37
(441)
349 92 53
(208)
162 46 52
(2824)
2330 494 283
(484=18% Avg FR)
(ProcFR%)+ = 228%
No's.
ProcFR% is N% of
(Y+N): On 13 ques, Avg
FR of precs per Ward
27%
Total 98: 26 No =
27% of 9 prec
18%
Total 486: 88 No
= 19% of 42 Prec
16%
Total 624: 98 No
= 16% of 52 Prec
16%
Total 419: 65 No=
16% of 33 Prec
15%
Total 548: 78 No=
15% of 45 Prec
21%
Total 441: 92 No=
21% of 38 Prec
23%
Total 208: 46 No=
23% of 20 Prec
20% - Avg FR per
procedural item, city
wide.
ProcFR Avg 18%
228% /13 = 18%
AvgProcFR-18%

239 Precincts audited
CityProcFR
By Ward, precincts
results are tallied.
81% Red Errors
2 Perfect
Precincts 0 Prec
Yel Errors 7
Prec-Red Errors
91% Red Errors
2 Perfect
Precincts 2
Prec-Yel Errors
38 Prec-Red
Errors
91% Red Errors
5 Perfect
Precincts 0 Prec-
Yel Errors 47
Prec-Red Errors
83% Red Errors
5 Perfect
Precincts 1
Prec -Yel Errors
27 Prec-Red
Error
94% Red Errors
3 Perfect
Precincts 0 Prec-
Yel Errors 42
Prec-Red Errors
90% Red Errors
4 Perfect
Precincts 0 Prec-
Yel Errors 34
Prec-Red Errors
100% Red Errors
0 Perfect Precinct
0 Prec-Yel Errors
20 Prec-Red
Error
90% of 239 Failed
215 with Red Errors
21 Perfect Precinct
3 Prec w/Yel Errors
90% CityPrecFR
215 Red = 90%
21 Perfect = 9%
3 Yellow = 1%
Summary Data - Compiled Chart 51
Summary of Results for Ward 20
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
20 9 MA Only No No No N/A No No No No N/A No N/A N/A
Wasn't able to complete inspection of
election equipment due to Election
Judge refusing access
20 7 BB Only No No No PPA N/A No Yes No No N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wasn't able to complete inspection of
election equipment due to Election
Judge refusing access
20 3
All - PPA
set up Yes No Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A Yes No Yes N/A N/A
Ballot counter was locked no access
didn't let me proceed
20 2 SC Only Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A
20 2 PPA ALL No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - No Yes N/A
20 2 All No No Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Didn't let me proceed
20 1 All - PPA No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A
20 0 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - N/A Yes Ballot boxes locked
20 0
All and
PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward 20 Summary of Data 52
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
36 5 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes- ? No No Label 3
36 5 S alone No Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing N/A Yes No No N/A N/A
36 5 N alone Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes Broken seal reported to Tech
36 5
1 or 2
Judges No No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No N/A N/A
36 4 N/A No seal Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing Yes Yes No No N/A N/A
36 3 A. alone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
36 3
2 or 3
Judges No Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing Yes Yes No N/A N/A
Ballot Scanner Key is kept in EJ's
pocket
36 3 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
36 3 All No Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing Yes N/A No Yes Yes N/A
36 3 S. alone No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A Yes
Green Seal was removed the
night before, and not replaced. S.
set the polls up.
36 3 All - Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
36 3 3 Judges Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No N/A Yes
No cones when I arrived, in place
when I left
36 3 DA alone Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A
36 3 All Yes Not all No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
Did not observe seal on ballot
scanner.
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yellow Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A
36 2 J. alone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
36 2 C. alone Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
36 2 S. alone Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- No Yes
One Judge set the polls up alone
and self reported the green seal
was present.
36 2 N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes
There was no yellow seal, but a
red seal was put on. - Did not see
locks on ballot machine -
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes N/A
Refused access to Ballot Box
Back
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? Yes N/A
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No N/A N/A
36 2 S. alone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
36 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Labels Labels were not delivered.
36 2 3 Judges Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
36 2 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Missing Republican judge
36 2 All Yes Not all Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - yes Yes Not all judges wore their badges
36 1 All - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Seal on card activator broken on
table
36 1 All Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes N/A N/A
36 1 3 out of 5 Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
Damaged
Seal Yes Yes -? Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
36 1 2 out of 3 Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
36 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A Refuse
36 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
36 1 All Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes
Yel Seal
missing Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A
36 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? N/A
Refused to show back of ballot
counting machine
36 1 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A N/A N/A
36 1 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
36 1 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
36 0 All Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes N/A
Refused to show back of ballot
machine
36 0 A & F (2) Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes
36 0 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's ? Notes
38 6 V. No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
38 6 B. No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes - No Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
38 6 C and J No Yes No No N/A Yes Yes
Yes-
damaged Yes No Yes - Yes N/A
N/A - Key was discarded and they
had to fish it from the trash
38 5 J. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No No N/A
38 5 CK No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
38 5 All No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes - No N/A N/A
38 5 EG, CG Yes Yes N/A Yes No Yes
open
yellow Yes Yes N o Yes -No Yes
PPA not around and no one knew her
name
38 4 B Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes
Seal was laying on top of the
machine- opened
38 4 CK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No - No Yes
Red O/C seal was unused, laying in
the case.
38 4 P & M No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes
The PPA was not around, EJ's
complained. They did not have
PPA's name either.
38 4 BJ Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes -No Yes No PPA showed up
38 4 All No N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes - N/A N/A
No cones in the ESC . The ESC was
locked but did not have a seal.
38 4 All No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
When EJ showed the seal, it was so
flimsy it broke - No Extra Names List.
38 3 S Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
38 3 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes -No Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's ? Notes
38 3 All Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Open seal Yes Yes No No N/A Yes
PPA was sleeping - EJ's put up
stands last night as a team. Card
Activator seal was missing, seal on
Scroll for T/S open.
38 3 GF Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
38 3 All
Yes
unlocked Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 3 N/A No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes - Yes Yes Seal added at PW request
38 3 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Damaged
Seal Yes No Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
Placed seal on at PW request. Also,
M.was concerned that the PPA was
not doing anything .
38 2 All N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes
No - EJ
failure Yes Yes No N/A N/A
EJ's mishandled putting the
open/close seal on
38 2 All Yes Yes N/A Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes N/A N/A
38 2 W & J Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
38 1 All N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No One Yes - Yes N/A Ballot box was replaced.
38 1 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - No Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? N/A N/A
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? N/A Refused to open Ballot Scanner
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - Yes Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -No Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
Ballot box seals off until requested.
Said they couldn't find the seals.
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's ? Notes
38 1 All No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes N/A Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A N/A N/A
38 1 All Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? N/A Refused to open the back
38 1 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -N/A Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - ? Yes
No seals for the ballot box in the ESC
- Judges refuse to open back of the
ballot scanner.
38 1 3 judges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
refused to place seals on Ballot
Boxes
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - No Yes N/A
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - No Yes
Voting booth open to judges (see
paper for picture)
38 1 All Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 1 MK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - N/A Yes N/A
38 1 DD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 1
PPA + 2
judges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes No
EJ's report they did not receive
stickers for early voting/absentee.
EJs explained they have been
checking list as votes come in.Key
Judge no show - PPA has key
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- ? Yes
They do not have the seals to seal it -
Refuse to open the back of the
memory pack seal.
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes C/P was on, but it was open
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes N/A N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's ? Notes
38 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes N/A N/A
38 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes N/A N/A
38 0 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
38 0 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes N/A
38 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Advised them to turn electronic
polling so screen isn't visible to crowd
38 0 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Poll watchers present checking
names
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was
the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are
there
blue
cones
at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV
labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
41 5 All No No N/A Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes N/A N/A
41 4 No No Yes N/A N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes
Green Seal -No seal last night, A green seal was put
on last night and it was there this morning - Booths
set up last night by K. - Alone
41 4 All No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes
Put seal on upon request - said had to remove seal
to start machine - Seals missing in 3 locations
41 4 No No N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes
Yellow
Seal only Yes Yes Yes Yes No
WM opened the ESC alone and set the poll up
alone. Not done with the EV stickers when the PW
left
41 4 All Yes Not All Fell off Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Yes -
Yes Yes
The PPA had a badge that fell off. The team put
card activator seal on upon request at 5:47
41 4 All Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes-Yes Yes
41 3 B. Only Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 3 All No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes
Took down touch screen prior to my arrival. Tags
were off. Said no one used it all day. The PPA
reported she left the envelope at home with badges.
41 3 3 judges Yes Not All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - No
No - not
all
120 stickers - most were done before open - 20 left.
1 extra name - was checked and inserted.
41 3 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes - No
Sticker not completely applied - Voter not in book
per Rachel M.
41 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
41 2
No - Key
Judge
only Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
KW (key judge) set up poll alone (Double check this
) Card Activator was not sealed. PW request
caused for it to be sealed.
41 2 3 judges No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes-Seal
Damaged Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Set up evening of 4/4/11 Mr. C. reported there was
no green seal, they did not call
41 2 All + ppa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was
the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are
there
blue
cones
at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV
labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
41 2
3 judges +
ppa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Judges report no EV stickers received.
41 2
D.E &
PPA alone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 2 BS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
BS openned ESC alone, BS and JJ set up the poll -
at 6:50 the EV stickers still had not been started
41 2 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Scroll Seal - Not present, but was placed on while
pollwatcher was present. - EV Stickers were not
completed until 6:45 am
41 2 3 judges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
No -
Broken Yes
Judges reported the Ballot Scanner had to be
replaced. New unit came about 6:45am. Judges
stowed ballots in ESC until new came per instruction
41 1 3 judges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 1 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 1 All + ppa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes N/A
41 1 All Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No EV not finished when the polls opened
41 1 All No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Not at
6:35
Electronic ballot box allows visibility beyond voter
visibility. The EV stickers were not completed when
the PW left at 6:45 am
41 1 3 Judges Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
HS opened precinct 21 ESC with key from precinct
22 (ward 41) because AC (key judge for precinct 21)
was late. HS stated "all the keys for the ESC are the
same."
41 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes T/S broken in the morning.
41 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 0 N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
ER
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was
the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are
there
blue
cones
at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV
labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
41 0 3 judges Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Yes Yes
DS noted that one early voter sticker did not have
corresponding page on applications for ballot. DS
called board regarding this
41 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Yes Yes N/A
41 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - es Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
43 4 All + PPA No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes
Open Red
Seal No No No Yes - N/A Yes N/A
43 4 All + PPA No Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes N/A
The Judges would not disclose if they
had the stickers on.
43 4 All + PPA No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes N/A
43 3
3 judges
PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Open Red
Seal No Yes No Yes- Yes N/A N/A
43 3 All No Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - No Yes N/A
43 3 2 + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A
Machine
Broken
Machine
Broken Yes No Yes- Yes Yes
43 3 All + PPA No N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - No Yes N/A
43 3 N/A No N/A No N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
Judge refused to the ballot scanner and
called Election Central
43 2 4 + PPA No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 2 All + PPA No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - No Yes N/A
43 2 All Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes - ? Yes
Yellow Seal was on, no Red Seal (T/S
O/C)Locked did not show me
43 2 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes- Yes Yes
All signature papers w/ labels were
removed from the binder and placed on
the spindle before polls opened and
were not numbered.
43 2 All + PPA No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes N/A
43 2 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Open Yel
Seal Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
43 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
T/S
Broken Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 2 N/A No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 2 3 Judges No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A
43 2 All No N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A
43 2 All + PPA No N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A
43 1 All PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes
Lots of pages of signature book doesn't
contain any signature for long time
voters
43 1
All and
PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes N/A
43 1
3 Ej's +
PPA Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1
5 EJ's +
PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes N/A
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes N/A
43 1
3 Judges
+ PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes- Yes N/A N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
43 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - Yes Yes N/A
43 1
3 Judges
+ PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes N/A
43 1 All No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes EV stickers done last night -
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes N/A N/A
43 1 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes
Why are so many signatures missing
from ballot application book?
43 1 All + PPA Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - N/A N/A N/A
43 0
3 Judges
+ PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- Yes Yes N/A
43 0 N/A Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A
43 0 All + PPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- Yes Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
45 8
G. and S.
did it
alone the
night
before No No N/A No
Yes -
Signs
were
wrong Yes Yes Yes No No Yes- Yes
No
Stickers
placed on
Judge (S.)and the Janitor (G.) live there.
They set up the polls night before in a
Gym. S. was poorly trained yet considered
the lead judge. He recently moved in to live
there. The signage was incorrect out front.
The EV stickers were not on at 6:30PM. I
reported this to the EC at 6:49 PM. The
Card Activator seal was missing. G.
insisted we look at the kitchen he just
finished painting,
45 4 N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No N/A N/A
There was no sign on the front door. No
seals on ballot box. - T/S Scroll was broken
from the morning - When repaired the
technician did not replace the seal.
45 4 All Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes No Yes No No Only 1 Yes - Yes N/A
No seal on the Card Activator. T/S missing
seal on scroll
45 4 T - Alone
Yes
Broken Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes - Yes Yes
The PPA fixed the invalid message by
powering up and down the machine 5-6
times. They report the card activator does
not consolidate properly (last 3 elections).
They report the ballot counter got an error
"wrong cartridge" they rebooted and it
connected itself. They want the machines
fixed - noteworthy because ESC label
wasn't on. The TS had to be repaired 4 or
5 times. Judges felt the paperwork was
confusing. (Green Seal Notes: T. reported
seal was broken - she inspected the ESC
alone and resealed it )
45 4
One
judge set
up alone
on
Sunday
night N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Open -
Damaged
Seal Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
One Dem judge set up polling place alone
on Sunday night - same judge placed EV
stickers on the books - alone. EC had a
phone check. The PPA was very adamant
she was not trained in seals. (Green ESC
Seal Notes moved: Reported yes but no
seal was there.)
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
45 4
C. only
one No - N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
M. was the Dem judge at the table. Literally
building the poll list for a pollwatcher who
was not there. Missing ballot box and
TS/OC seals - C. set up alone -
unsupervised - Dem judge (Green Seal
Notes C set up booths alone, then he
applied a seal for the morning - no seal
from factory.)
45 4 N/A No Yes No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes - No N/A
This poll had several Garrido pollwatchers
out front and inside. They were missing 1
judge and couldn't take the time
45 4 All Yes Yes No Yes on 1 side Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - No N/A Investigator 5x
45 4
All set up
Mon night Yes Some Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes-
Damaged Yes Yes No Yes - Yes N/A
Ballot box won't transmit to consolidator.
Last two elections.
45 3 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No seal &
broken
machine No
No seal -
Broken Yes Yes Yes - N/A N/A
Experienced team. Report that the last 5
elections the same TS was sent to them
broken (placed a small mark on a label to
ID the same machine). No seals on TS.
This team gets an error message
(001445). This team set the polling place
up the night before.
45 3 All
Yes -
broken Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - N/A Yes
Sign announcing the polling place was
inside the door, not outside. EV stickers
were placed on. D. reported she called in
that the ESC had a broken seal on it when
she arrived - she was very concerned
about it. Young man repeated they did not
take the oath. No ballot box seals. D.
reported the Green Seal was broken when
she arrived
45 3 All No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -N/A Yes
Taught Judges how to put seals on Ballot
Box. There was no sign out front. V.
called EC to check if she had to show the
back of the ballot machine
45 3 All No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes - Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
45 3 Team
Yes -
Unsure Yes
N/A No
PPA Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes N/A Yes
I was unclear if ESC had a seal but did not
want to press the judge who did not want to
show it. Touch screen did not have the
open/close seal. Ballot box unsealed.
45 3 All Yes Yes
PPA
asleep Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Yes -See
Notes N/A
When this team arrived the ballot scanner
was out on the table. The judges were
upset about this because it was not there
the night before. They all state they did not
leave it out. No seal on ballot box.
45 3 All Yes N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Seal
Open Yes No Yes - Yes N/A
The seal on the T/S Cartridge Port was
open.
45 3 All Yes No No Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes None Yes ? N/A Could not read seals on the T/S
45 2 All No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes
Yes -
Strange
seal from
U-Line N/A N/A Yes Yes - Yes N/A
When they take ballots to transfer station -
officials seal them there (big box of them). -
The T/S open/close seal was an
unrecognized seal from "U-Line"
45 2 All Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes
The location lacked the cone - there was a
large group (10 - 12) of people outside the
poll, too close - electioneering - Asked the
Ejs to put the cone out. They walked
outside but were not too concerned - we
did not remain to see it resolved.
45 2 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
Mature EJ team - did not have ballot seals
on - they had a tech for the broken seal.
The T/S Malfunctioned. - Technician did
not replace the seal. The T/S Scroll seal is
open and damaged.
45 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -N/A No
No Ballot Box Seals - Added the seals -
They forgot to add the EV stickers and
added them in the mornings.
45 2 J - Alone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A N/A N/A
45 2 All No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes No seals on the ballot boxes.
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
45 2 N/A No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A
EV stickers were on. They did not have
seals on the ballot box. This team has a
card activator that has had trouble
transmitting in the past.
45 2 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A No Yes - Yes Yes
2 broken seals were besides the machine -
red and yellow - PPA/Judge reported the
red one came broken so they replaced it.
45 2 All Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes -N/A Yes Yes
Yellow seal on O/C was broken before they
arrived and there was o Red Seal. (T/S -
O/C)
45 1 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes - No N/A N/A
45 1 Alll No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes - Yes Yes No ESC Seal
45 1 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -? Yes Judges placed blue seals on after I arrived
45 1 All Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes - Yes N/A No seal on the card activators
45 1 All Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -Yes Yes
They worked together for a long time. No
seals on ballot box.
45 1 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -Yes N/A N/A
45 1 Team Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes - Yes Yes
EV stickers were on. The EJ reported the
ballott scanner was broken. The technician
came out to repair it and he did not place
seals on the machine. I viewed the work
order proving he came out. No ballot box
stickers.
45 1 N/A Yes Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes N/A N/A N/A
45 1 R. alone Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes N/A N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
Was the
Green
Seal
closed
on the
ESC?
Did the
Judges
have
their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA
have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
Are the
EV labels
placed
on the
ballot
app's? Notes
45 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - N/A Yes
This team loved their PPA, who set the poll
up for them in the morning (they were all
present). This team worked great together -
they had the judges table with 8 people on
it (too many) but otherwise this was a well
run team
45 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes - Yes N/A
One EJ pointed out that we should check
the serial #s on the touch screen unit and
printer - also wanted us to make sure metal
45 0 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes N/A N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
46 6 All Yes No No Yes Yes No N/A No Yes No Yes -No Yes
The T/S machine was broken. Seals
were removed.
46 5 All Yes Most No Yes Yes Yes No - Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes
Yellow Seal is open on the T/S Open
Close Port.
46 5 All No No Yes Yes N/A Yes No N/A Yes No Yes- Yes No N/A
46 4 All No Yes Yes No - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes No
They were checking lists and judge
said they did not have stickers. After
asked, another judge found stickers. -
PPA showed ballot scanner seal -
Election Judges 5-40 years
experience, skipped swearing in.
46 3 All Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes Open Seal No No N/A N/A
Broken scroll on the Card Activator
The tape broke and they had to break
the seal and did not replace it.
46 3 All Yes No 4/6 N/A Yes Yes Yes
No - Seal
broken Yes Yes No N/A- N/A Yes
Additional list of names not marked in
book, said they were checking but list
was buried under activator at the
time
46 3 All Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes- Yes N/A N/A
46 2 All Yes Yes N/A No Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes
Checking extra list? Yes-
Touchscreen display visible to
everyone entering polling location
(see paper for drawing) Veteran
judges skipped swear in.
46 2 All Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -No Yes N/A
Ward
Prec
FR
Who was
present
when the
ESC was
opened
and the
poll was
set up?
Was the
Green
Seal
closed on
the ESC?
Did the
Judges
have their
badges
on?
Did the
PPA have
their
badge
on?
Did the
judges
take the
oath?
Are there
blue
cones at
100ft?
Is the T/S
Scroll
Sealed?
Is there a
red seal
on the
T/S polls
Open/
Close
port?
On the
T/S is the
Cartridge
Port
sealed?
Is the
Card
Activator
sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Box
Sealed?
Is the
Ballot
Scanner
locked
and the
Red Seal
on the
back?
Are the
EV labels
placed on
the ballot
app's? Notes
46 2 All Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes No N/A Yes N/A
46 2 All N/A Yes
N/A
No PPA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No Yes N/A PPA was not present
46 2 G and G Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
46 2 All Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
46 1 All Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - N/A Yes
Could not see Ballot scanner seal,
Judges wouldn't open it until polls
close
46 1 All Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes- Yes Yes N/A
46 1 All Yes N/A N/A No N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes - N/A N/A
1 judge difficult - question re: opening
ballot box seal door.They called
Election Central.
46 1 All N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes N/A Yes N/A No Yes N/A N/A
46 1 All Yes N/A Yes No N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes- Yes Yes N/A
46 1 All Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A Yes Yes No Yes- Yes N/A
Judges volunteered to unlock and
show seal
46 1 All Yes N/A
N/A
No PPA Yes N/A Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A

}ouinal of Physical Secuiity S(1), 7S-77 (2u11)
7S
Summaiy of Common Secuiity Nistakes
1. Electionic voting machines that funuamentally lack
secuiity thought anu featuies, incluuing an ability to uetect
tampeiing oi intiusion, oi to be ieliably lockeu oi sealeu.

2. Failuie to uisassemble, inspect, anu thoioughly inspect
(not just test) a sufficient numbei of voting machines
befoie anu aftei elections in oiuei to uetect haiuwaie oi
softwaie tampeiing.

S. Assuming that tampei-inuicating seals will eithei be
blatantly iippeusmasheu open, oi else theie is no
tampeiing. In ieality, even amateuis can spoof most seals
leaving (at most) subtle eviuence.

4. Inauequate seal use piotocols anu tiaining of seal
installeis anu inspectois. Failuie to show examples of
blatantly anu subtly attackeu seals to seal inspectois.

S. 0vei confiuence in use of a votei veiifieu papei iecoiu
(vvPR). A vvPR is an excellent secuiity counteimeasuie,
but it is not a silvei bullet, especially foi an election
oiganization with pooi oveiall secuiity.

S. Little oi no insiuei thieat mitigation.

6. A pooi secuiity cultuie, incluuing uenial anu no ! #$%&$%
pioceuuies foi uealing with secuiity questions oi
conceins.

About These Suggestions
The following suggestions foi bettei election secuiity aie
pioviueu by the vulneiability Assessment Team (vAT) at
Aigonne National Laboiatoiy. The suggestions fall into
two categoiies, "Ninimum", which aie secuiity featuies
that aie essential in oui view, anu "Recommenueu", which
aie neeueu foi the best secuiity. (Foi moie infoimation on
the vAT see http:www.ne.anl.govcapabilitiesvat.)

Baiuwaie & Softwaie Inspection
Recommenueu: Piioi to the election, at least 1% of the
voting machinesianuomly chosenshoulu be iemoveu
fiom the polling places anu testeu, then uisassembleu,
__________
*Euitoi's Note: This viewpoint papei was not peei-ievieweu.

inspecteu, anu the haiuwaie examineu foi tampeiing anu
alien electionics.

The softwaiefiimwaie shoulu also be examineu, incluuing
foi malwaie. It is not sufficient to meiely test the machines
in a mock election, oi to focus only on cybei secuiity
issues! This analysis shoulu be completeu piioi to the
election.

Ninimum: It is completeu less than 6 weeks aftei the
election.

'()*$+%(, !-%*( *-*.+$&(%.) %(+& !( *-*.+$&(%. /&+%(, 0!.1%(*
%( ! .-!))%. 2(&(3.45*$6 70!(3%(3+1*30%88-*9 !++!.:;

Ninimum: Within 4 weeks aftei the election, at least 1% of
the voting machines actually useu in the election
ianuomly chosenshoulu be testeu, then uisassembleu,
inspecteu, anu the haiuwaie examineu foi tampeiing anu
alien electionics. The softwaiefiimwaie shoulu also be
examineu, incluuing foi
malwaie. It is not sufficient to meiely test the machines in
a mock election, oi to focus only on cybei secuiity issues!

Recommenueu: The voting machines foi the above
ieveise engineeiing (oi tiial biibeiy uiscusseu below)
shoulu be ianuomly chosen baseu on pseuuo-ianuom
numbeis geneiateu by computei, oi by haiuwaie means
such as pulling numbeis oi names fiom a hat. No

viewpoint Papei

!"##$%&'()% +(, -$&&$, ./$0&'() !$0",'&1
*

<;=; >&1()+&( !(8 >;?; @!$(*$
AB-(*$!5%-%+4 C))*))0*(+ D*!0
C$,&((* E!+%&(!- F!5&$!+&$4

!"#$%&' ") *+,-./&' 01/#$.2, 34567 89:88 4;<556

74
inuiviuual shoulu make the ianuom choices without the
aiu of haiuwaie oi softwaie.

Insiuei Thieat
Ninimum: All election officials, technicians, contiactois, oi
volunteeis who piepaie, maintain, iepaii, test, inspect, oi
tianspoit voting machines, oi compile "substantial"
amounts
of election iesults shoulu have backgiounu checks,
iepeateu eveiy S-S yeais, that incluue a ciiminal
backgiounu histoiy, cieuit check, anu (when piactical)
inteiviews with co-woikeis.

Ninimum: Piioi to each election, all poll woikeis, election
juuges, election officials, anu ielevant contiactois anu
technicians shoulu take an oath to piotect election
integiity. They shoulu be waineu of the legal penalties foi
vote tampeiing anu fiauu, anu ieminueu of theii patiiotic
anu ethical iesponsibility to help guaiantee faii elections.
They shoulu also be thankeu foi taking on this impoitant
iesponsibility, anu being vigilant of election secuiity.

Ninimum: Befoie each election, the 0.S. citizenship of
eveiy poll woikei anu election juuge shoulu be veiifieu in a
ieliable mannei.

Recommenueu: 0n a iegulai basis, tiy biibing a small
subset of poll woikeis, election juuges, election officials,
technicians, cleiks, anu peisonnel who tianspoit voting
machines anu othei election mateiials. Let them keep the
money anu hail them publicly as honest heioes if they
uecline the biibe. (Allow at least S6 houis foi the biibe to
be iepoiteu oi ueclineu.) Theie aie legal entiapment
issues heie, but the point isn't so much to iuentify anu fiie
uishonest inuiviuuals as it is to make biibes untenable by
cieating publicity anu unceitainty about whethei an
appaient biibe is some kinu of test.

Recommenueu: A wiitten policy shoulu be in effect anu
peiiouically communicateu to all employees anu
contiactois that biibeiy attempts must be iepoiteu
immeuiately, anu wheie oi to whom they shoulu be
iepoiteu.

Locks
Ninimum: Locks on voting machines shoulu not all open
with the same key.

Ninimum: 0pening of a lock on a voting machine oi
containei shoulu be accompanieu by a caieful examination
of the exteiioi of the voting machine oi containei in oiuei
to tiy to ueteimine if the integiity of the voting machine oi
containei has been compiomiseu without uistuibing the
lock. This incluues looking foi eviuence of cosmetic iepaii
of the voting machine oi containei walls aftei they have
been bieacheu. Election officials, juuges, anu technicians
shoulu be tiaineu on how to inspect the ielevant voting
machines oi containeis, incluuing the unueisiue.

Tampei-Inuicating Seals
Foi infoimation on tampei-inuicating seals, see C0*$%.!(
?.%*(+%)+ !"(6), S1S-S2S (2uuS); CGH D$!()!.+%&() &(
'(I&$0!+%&( !(8 ?4)+*0 ?*.B$%+4, 14, 1-29 (2u11);
http:www.cs.piinceton.euu~appelvoting}ohnston-
Analysis0fN}Seals.puf anu
http:www.ne.anl.govcapabilitiesvat.

Ninimum: Avoiu the assumption that tampei-inuicating
seals will eithei be blatantly iippeusmasheu open, oi else
theie is no tampeiing. In ieality, even amateuis can spoof
most seals leaving (at most) subtle eviuence.

Ninimum: Piioi to each election, all poll woikeis anu
election officials who inspect seals (incluuing tampei-
eviuent packaging) neeu to have a minimum of 1u minutes
of tiaining pei kinu of seal useu. This tiaining will incluue
infoimation as to how to install (if appiopiiate) anu
inspect the seal. This shoulu incluue multiple samples,
photos, oi viueos of that specific kinu of seal that has been
attackeu subtly anu samples, photos, oi viueos of that
specific kinu of seal that has been attackeu blatantly, e.g.,
by being iippeu open oi smasheu.

Ninimum: Peisonnel who inspect seals that piotect "laige"
numbeis of election iesults shoulu have an auuitional 1u
minutes pei kinu of seal. This shoulu incluue hanus-on
piactice in spotting sample seals that have been openeu
subtly anu those that have been openeu blatantly.

Recommenueu: 0nly a small numbei of election officials
shoulu be authoiizeu to oiuei tampei-inuicating seals, anu
the seal manufactuiei oi venuoi shoulu contiactually
agiee to iefuse oiueis not placeu by those inuiviuuals oi by
anyone who uoes not know the seciet passwoiu iequiieu
foi seal puichases foi a given election uistiict, anu to
iepoit faileu attempts to officials of that election uistiict.

Recommenueu: The venuoi oi manufactuiei of seals useu
foi election puiposes shoulu contiactually agiee not to
pioviue 2 oi moie seals with the same seiial numbei
(incluuing at a latei time) to anyone.

Recommenueu: A two-peison iule shoulu be in effect
when a seal is applieu to ciitical election assets. Each
peison shoulu veiify that the coiiect seal was coiiectly
!"#$%&' ") *+,-./&' 01/#$.2, 34567 89:88 4;<556

7S
applieu, anu that its seiial numbei is coiiectly enteieu into
the uatabase of seal seiial numbeis.

Ninimum: 0nly tampei-inuicating seals with unique seiial
numbeis shoulu be useu.

Recommenueu: Signing oi initialing seals offeis little
effective secuiity anu shoulu not be uone.

Ninimum: All seal inspections iequiie checking the seal
seiial numbei against the secuieu uata log of seal seiial
numbeis. Each seal must also be caiefully examineu foi
eviuence of both subtle anu blatantly obvious opening,
counteifeiting, uamage, oi iemoval.

Ninimum: The list of seal seiial numbeis foi seals applieu
to voting machines anu containeis oi packages of sensitive
election mateiials must be caiefully piotecteu fiom
tampeiing, theft, oi substitution.

Recommenueu: Seals shoulu not be useu in sequential
oiuei baseu on seiial numbei (so that an auveisaiy cannot
pieuict a seal seiial numbei in auvance).

Ninimum: Seal inspectois must not be fooleu by a seal of
the wiong kinu oi coloi that has the coiiect seiial
numbeia common mistake.

Ninimum: Seals must be inspecteu alongsiue an iuentical
(except foi seiial numbei), well-piotecteu unuseu seal of
the same kinu. Theie must be a compaiison of size,
moiphology, coloi, suiface finish, anu seiial numbei font,
uigit spacing, anu uigit alignmentoiientation.

Recommenueu: Ninimize the use of (piessuie sensitive)
auhesive label seals (because these tenu to be easy to
counteifeit oi to iemove, then ieplace without leaving
easily uetectable eviuence, plus they iequiie an inoiuinate
amount of tiaining anu inspection time to be effective).

Ninimum: With auhesive label seals, piioi to installing the
seal, the suiface the seal is to be applieu to must be cleaneu
anu checkeu foi eviuence of oil oi othei substances that
can ieuuce suiface auhesion.

Ninimum: With auhesive label seals, the way the seal
behaves when it is iemoveu is often a ciitical methou foi
checking foi tampeiing. To be effective, howevei, the seal
inspectoi must know how the seal is supposeu to behave
when iemoveu.

Ninimum: Any checking of a seal foi eviuence of being
bioken oi tampeieu shoulu be accompanieu by a caieful
examination of the containei oi package oi voting machine
the seal is attacheu to in oiuei to tiy to ueteimine if the
integiity of the containei oi package oi voting machine has
been compiomiseu without uistuibing the seal. This
incluues looking foi eviuence of cosmetic iepaii of the
containeipackagevoting machine walls aftei they have
been bieacheu. Seal inspectois shoulu be tiaineu on how
to uo this inspection foi each kinu of containei, package, oi
voting machine.

Ninimum: All useu seals shoulu be pieseiveu until at least
S months aftei the election foi possible examination, then
thoioughly uestioyeu (not just uiscaiueu in the tiash) so
that the paits cannot be useu by auveisaiies to piactice oi
execute seal attacks.

Ninimum: All unuseu seals shoulu be piotecteu oi
guaiueu piioi to use fiom theft oi unauthoiizeu access.
Seal installeis must be iequiieu to piotect anu tuin in any
unuseu seals.

Secuie Tianspoit
Recommenueu: Escoit the voting machines to anu fiom
the polling place if at all possible. 0se #$& 5&(& volunteeis
if necessaiy.

Recommenueu: Bo not allow technicians to woik on a
specific voting machine without authoiization anu
oveisight.

Recommenueu: Peisonnel oi contiactois who tianspoit
voting machines to oi fiom the polling places shoulu be
bonueu.

Ninimum: Some inuiviuual oi gioup shoulu be
iesponsible foi accepting voting machines anu sensitive
election mateiials ueliveieu to the polling place befoie oi
on election uay, sign foi them, anu be iesponsible foi
pioviuing oveisight to the extent piactical. (This can
incluue stuuents at a school, foi example.) It shoulu be
possible to ueteimine if theie was an unexpecteu uelay in
ueliveiy of any such voting machines oi election mateiials,
anu this uelay must be investigateu immeuiately. Similaily,
any uelay in ieceipt of the voting machines back at the
stoiage waiehouse aftei the election shoulu be uetectable
anu immeuiately investigateu.

Chain of Custouy
A chain of custouy is a piocess that helps to secuie voting
machines, ballots, iecoius, memoiy uevices, seals, keys,
seal uatabases with seiial numbeis, anu othei election
mateiials. We hencefoith iefei to these items neeuing
piotection fiom theft, tampeiing , copying, oi substitutions
!"#$%&' ") *+,-./&' 01/#$.2, 34567 89:88 4;<556

76
as "assets". (Note: A "chain of custouy" is not a piece of
papei that multiple people sign oi initial.)

Recommenueu: An effective chain of custouy staits by
checking that eveiyone to be involveu in hanuling the
assets in question is tiustwoithy. This is best ueteimineu
by peiiouic backgiounu checks.

Ninimum: An effective chain of custouy iequiies
pioceuuies to make suie that each peison hanuing off the
assets to anothei is suie of the iuentify of the peison they
aie hanuing the mateiial to, anu that this peison has been
authoiizeu to ieceive the assets.

Recommenueu: Each inuiviuual in the chain of custouy
must know the seciet passwoiu of the uay oi the election
befoie being alloweu to take contiol of the assets.

Ninimum: Each inuiviuual in the chain of custouy must
assume the inuiviuual iesponsibility of safeguaiuing the
assets while in theii custouy, not letting the assets out of
theii sight to the extent possible, anu secuiing the assets
unuei lock oi seal when not in sight.

Ninimum except wheie noteu: A chain of custouy log
shoulu be kept with the assets. It must be signeu by each
iecipient in the chain of custouy when accepting the assets
with a caiefully signeu signatuie (not initials) along with a
piinteu, legible listing of theii name, the uate, location
(Recommenueu), anu time (Recommenueu). This log must
also be piotecteu fiom tampeiing, counteifeiting, oi
substitution.

Inuepenuent Secuiity Review
Ninimum: The majoiity of auvice on election secuiity
shoulu not come fiom venuois oi manufactuieis of voting
machines oi of tampei-inuicating seals oi othei secuiity
piouucts useu in elections. It is necessaiy to seek out
objective, inuepenuent secuiity expeitise anu auvice.

Ninimum: Election officials will aiiange foi a local
committee (#$& 5&(& if necessaiy) to seive as the Election
Secuiity Boaiu. The Boaiu shoulu be maue up piimaiily of
secuiity piofessionals, secuiity expeits, univeisity
piofessois, stuuents, anu iegisteieu voteis not employees
of the election piocess. The Boaiu shoulu meet iegulaily
to analyze election secuiity, obseive elections, anu make
suggestions foi impioveu election secuiity anu the stoiage
anu tianspoit of voting machines anu ballots. The Boaiu
neeus consiueiable autonomy, being able to call piess
confeiences oi otheiwise publicly uiscuss its finuings anu
suggestions as appiopiiate. Employees of companies that
sell oi manufactuie seals, othei secuiity piouucts often
useu in elections, oi voting machines aie not eligible to
seive on the Boaiu.

Ninimum: At least once eveiy S yeais, the Election
Secuiity Boaiu shoulu oveisee oi conuuct a
compiehensive vulneiability assessment of the local
election piocess, involving exteinal consultants,
volunteeis, anu secuiity expeits (incluuing #$& 5&(&) to the
extent piactical.

Ninimum: A Chief Election Secuiity 0fficei (paiu oi
unpaiu) shoulu be appointeu who may have othei uuties as
well. Be oi she is iesponsible foi analyzing anu oveiseeing
election secuiity issues anu secuiity tiaining. The Secuiity
0fficei also ueals with anu investigates secuiity questions,
conceins, anu inciuents on election uay. Beshe seives on
the Election Secuiity Boaiu (uiscusseu above) as a voting
membei, but uoes not chaii the Boaiu oi appoint its
membeis.

Recommenueu: The Chief Election Secuiity 0fficei shoulu
maintain a publicly posteu, fiequently upuateu list of what
heshe juuges as the ten best suggestions (fiom the Boaiu,
oi othei inteinal oi exteinal souices) foi potentially
impioving election secuiity, anu the piospects foi
implementing them. Public comments on this list shoulu
be encouiageu.

Cieating & Nuituiing an Effective Secuiity
Cultuie
The key to goou secuiity is to have a healthy secuiity
cultuie. This iequiies eveiyone to pay attention to secuiity
issues, be thinking ciitically anu continuously about
secuiity, to ask goou questions, avoiu uenial, anu to be fiee
to iaise conceins anu be listeneu to about secuiity issues.

Ninimum: When election secuiity is questioneu, the fiist
iesponse of election officials anu the Chief Election Secuiity
0fficei must not be to ueny the possibility of secuiity
vulneiabilities, but iathei to seek to leain moie anu solicit
auvice fiom the peison(s) iaising these questions (anu
otheis) as to possible counteimeasuies oi secuiity
impiovements.

Recommenueu: Befoie each election, uiscuss in some
uetail with poll woikeis, election juuges, anu election
officials the numeious ways that the voting piocess can be
tampeieu with, anu what to watch out foi. Bave them
inuiviuually, oi in gioups suggest othei ways they woulu
tampei with votes if they weie so inclineu, incluuing
fanciful ways, using insiueis oi outsiueis oi insiueis
collaboiating with outsiueis. (The meiits of the attack
!"#$%&' ") *+,-./&' 01/#$.2, 34567 89:88 4;<556

77
scenaiios they uevise aie less impoitant that instilling a
minuset of thinking like the bau guys).

Recommenueu: Poll woikeis, election juuges, election
officials, anu othei peisonnel involveu in iunning elections
shoulu be waineu anu euucateu about techniques foi
misuiiection anu sleight-of-hanu, peihaps by having these
techniques explaineuuemonstiateu by a magician, live oi
on viueo. (The sense of aleitness to malicious acts that this
engenueis is actually of gieatei benefit than awaieness of
misuiiection anu sleight-of-hanu #*$ )*, though the lattei is
not negligible.)

Recommenueu: Befoie each election, uiscuss with poll
woikeis, election juuges, anu election officials the
impoitance of ballot seciecy, anu the impoitance of
watching foi miniatuie wiieless viueo cameias in the
polling place, especially mounteu to the ceiling oi high up
on walls to obseive voteis' choices. The polling place
shoulu be checkeu foi suiieptitious uigital oi viueo
cameias at least once on election uay.

Recommenueu: Poll woikeis, election juuges, election
officials, anu othei peisonnel involveu in iunning elections
shoulu be tolu how to accuiately veiify the iuentify of
authoiizeu election anu law enfoicement officials, as well
as election woikeis who may be piesent on election uay.

Recommenueu: Secuiity must not be baseu substantially
on seciecy, i.e., Secuiity by 0bscuiity is not a viable
secuiity stiategy, noi is seciecy conuucive to obseiveis,
ciitical ieview, piocess impiovement, feeuback,
tianspaiency, oi accountability. Somewhat countei-
intuitively, the best secuiity is secuiity that is tianspaient.
(Note: Some shoit-teim seciecy may be waiianteu, such
as shoit-teim passwoius oi seciecy about the uetails of
voting machine tianspoit.)

Ninimum: Secuiity is haiu woik so expect it to be haiu
woik. Any secuiity uevice, system, pioceuuie, oi stiategy
that sounus too goou to be tiue almost ceitainly is.

Ninimum: Theie must be a convenient way foi poll
woikeis, election juuges, election woikeis anu contiactois,
election officials, anu the geneial public to iepoit secuiity
conceins, incluuing anonymously on election uay. Theie
must be mechanisms in place to iesponu in a timely
mannei to these conceins, peihaps thiough the Chief
Election Secuiity 0fficei uiscusseu above.

Recommenueu: Welcome, acknowleuge, iecognize, piaise,
anu iewaiu goou secuiity piactice, as well as ieasonable
secuiity questions anu suggestions fiom any quaitei,
incluuing fiom employees, contiactois, poll woikeis,
election juuges, jouinalists, bloggeis, anu the geneial
public.

Recommenueu: Election officials aie often electeu oi aie
political appointees. It is impoitant foi a goou secuiity
cultuie to attempt to uiffeientiate anu sepaiate conceins,
questions, anu ciiticisms about election secuiity fiom
political attacks on those election officials.

Recommenueu: Secuiity is uifficult anu involves
complicateu, value-baseu tiaueoffs. Thus, secuiity policy
anu piactice is intiinsically a contioveisial topic woithy of
uebate anu analysis, anu shoulu be vieweu anu tieateu as
such. The existence of uisagieement anu uissent in iegaius
to secuiity must not be taken as a sign of weakness, but
iathei welcomeu as a sign of a healthy secuiity cultuie.

0thei Suggestions
Recommenueu: Election officials shoulu piessuie
manufactuieis of voting machines to uesign them with
bettei physical secuiity, cybei secuiity, anu
tampeiintiusion uetection. Insist that manufactuieis of
voting machines uesign them with secuie hasps that allow
the use of locks anu seals othei than piessuie sensitive
auhesive label seals.

Ninimum: Poll woikeis, election juuges, anu election
officials shoulu be able anu expecteu to ueteimine if a
voting machine has been ieplaceu by an unauthoiizeu
voting machine oi counteifeit voting machine.

Recommenueu: A hash shoulu be piinteu on each papei
ballot on election uay aftei each votei has completeu the
ballot. This hash shoulu be geneiateu fiom a seciet
algoiithm that is uiffeient foi each election, anu possibly
each polling location.


78
! #$%&'()*$+ $, #-./( !00'12 3/04$5*

Tylei }. Nuiphy
Lewis 0niveisity
Romeoville, Illinois

6+0($5710)$+
Bave you evei seen the movie "Swoiufish". Bo you iemembei when Bugh uiant was
wiiting that "supei woim" that was going to punch thiough the banks secuiity systems anu
steal a whole bunch of money foi }ohn Tiavolta. What sticks out foi me is that while he was
wiiting his "supei woim", theie wheie giaphical cubes floating aiounu his 6 monitois, anu
eveiy time something went wiong one of the cubes woulu shoot out of oiuei. When he
finisheu the hack, eveiything fit togethei like he was woiking on a jigsaw puzzle oi something.
0nfoitunately, that is exactly how ieal woilu hacking uoesn't happen.

Theie is an almost iuealizeu view touay of "hacking". In the meuia anu in populai cultuie,
they usually show a splash scieen of some guy with eaiiings, oi a bunch of uonuts sitting in
fiont of a computei staiing at binaiy coue, babbling about how he is going to bypass the
fiiewall by ciacking the enciyption. Not veiy iealistic!

While I was uoing my unueigiauuate woik at Lewis 0niveisity, I wanteu to uo compaiison
of cybei attacks. In paiticulai, I wanteu to compaie attack vectois. Which woulu be the best.
Which woulu giant me access the fastest. So, I chose thiee attacks fiom the many uiffeient
potential attack vectoisS that typically ieceive much of the attention. The fiist is physical
access. The seconu kinu of attack is phishing oi social engineeiing. The thiiu attack is the
famous attacking of the computei netwoik.

All the attacks I exploieu anu uemonstiateu weie uone on my own computei, oi else on a
computei anu netwoik with the full knowleuge anu consent of the owneis (who offeieu me no
assistance in actually executing the attacks).

6, 8$7 #'+ 9$714 04/ :$;< 8$7 =>+ 04/ :$;? @4-*)1'A !00'12
I setup a Winuows XP system, a Nacintosh 0SX 1u.S system, anu a Winuows vista Laptop
foi this expeiiment. The passwoius weie completely ianuomizeu anu I hau no iuea what they
weie. As is well known, passwoius uo not iepiesent a uaunting hackei challenge. In the case
of the Winuows XP system, I useu my own passwoiu ciackei, but you can finu them all ovei
the Inteinet. Basically the ciackei I useu was a bootable IS0 image. I simply iebooteu the
taiget system anu uioppeu the IS0 (in my case it was a 0NIX B00T 0S) into the optical uiive,
anu then followeu the on-scieen instiuctions. It has you mount the haiu uisk, select boot
paitition, etc. The actual ciacking uoes not take place until the softwaie locates the Winuows
SAN file. This file is wheie Winuows stoies a hasheu veision of youi passwoiu. The pioblem
is, the file is wiiteable. Nost of these "ciack uisks" give you an option to change the passwoiu
to something else. This, howevei, ieally isn't a goou choice because the hacking victim is
going finu something is amiss when the passwoiu heshe has useu foi the past 6 months

79
uoesn't woik anymoie. So the hackei shoulu simply select "blank passwoiu" option. This
basically ueletes eveiything insiue the same file effectively making the passwoiu blank.

The Nacintosh 1u.S system similaily offeieu little iesistance. In fact, all the hackei neeus is
a 1u.S-opeiating uisk. Nacintosh supplies you with a passwoiu-ieset utility, which basically
uoes the same thing as the Winuows "ciack" uisk. You can also boot the system in single sign-
on moue anu uelete the initial set-up iecoiu. You will have to go thiough the annoying fiist
time scieens, but you get to cieate you veiy own aumin account at the enu.

0nly slightly moie uifficult to hack was the BI0S passwoiu foi the vista laptop computei.
The BI0S passwoius (foi most systems) aie contiolleu by the C-N0S chip. To ieset the
passwoiu, all the hackei has to uo is ieset the chip. This can be uone by iemoving the Sv
lithium batteiy on the motheiboaiu. The batteiy is easy to spot anu is useu in many othei
electiic uevices. The othei way to ieset it is a button locateu on the motheiboaiu.

These attacks weie baseu on having physical access to the computei systems. Even though
theie aie many othei ways to ciack into an un-supeiviseu computei, one of my favoiites
(which is often quite effective) is to look aiounu the uesk aiea foi a sticky note with the
passwoiu.

In my view, the best way to insuie oveiall secuiity against a physical attack is to ueploy 2
pieces of technology that have been aiounu foi thousanus of yeais, the uooi anu the lock This
is wheie physical anu cybei secuiity conveige. In my expeiience, theie has been a veiy
intense focus on tiauitional cybei secuiity measuies, while physical secuiity has been on the
back buinei since the 198u's. As a cybei secuiity analyst, I have often seen a $SuK Cybei
Intiusion Betection System, oi auvanceu fiiewall put into use in a ioom piotecteu by an easy-
top-uefeat $2 lock. Time anu time again, I have walkeu by seivei iooms wheie the uooi is
wiue open anu nobouy has even botheieu to ueploy the ineffective lock. This is a uangeious
secuiity piactice that can leau to seiious consequences. Physical Secuiity is an integial pait of
Cybei Secuiity: you cannot have a secuie computei infiastiuctuie without a physically secuie
facility to house it.

B$+/ @4)*4)+C '+5 6 #'7C40 ' :)C =+/? D$1)'A E+C)+//()+C !00'12
Recently, social netwoiking sites anu theii spin offs have become all the iage. This ciaze
has leau to a uiamatic inciease in Social Engineeiing attacks. Social netwoiking sites like
Facebook, NySpace, anu Twittei aie making these types of attacks veiy easy to uo. I view
phishing attacks as a kinu of netwoik attack (with the exception of phone anu mail scams)
because they aie opeiateu fiom a iemote location using the netwoik as a conuuit. 0n the
othei hanu, phishing is ultimately about hacking a peison.

Foi my social engineeiing attack, I ueciueu to attack my biothei (with his geneial
knowleuge anu peimission, but without his knowing any uetails of the attack). I liveu in an
apaitment about Su miles away fiom him, anu hau no inteinal knowleuge of his netwoik.
Since many attackeis like to taiget a specific peison, I ueciueu to go with a taigeteu phishing

8u
attack. It's a bit like using a fish finuei foi ieal outuoois fishing. In my case, the fish finuei
was Facebook.

I uiu not cieate a fake Facebook account because uoing so is a violation of Facebook's usei
agieementnot that a ieal hackei woulu much caie about this!) I insteau useu a legitimate
Facebook account of a fiienu of mine (with hei knowleuge anu consent). It tuins out that
when a 17-yeai olu boy (my biothei, the taiget) gets an invitation fiom an attiactive college-
age blonu female (my fiienu who's Facebook account I boiioweu), to be his Facebook "fiienu",
he is eagei to accept.

Piioi to this expeiiment, I hau veiy little expeiience with Facebook, so I was suipiiseu to
leain how much infoimation is just shot acioss the Inteinet. Ny biothei hau a piivacy filtei
on, so only his fiienus coulu see uetails of his account, but out of what seems to be thousanus
of his Facebook fiienus, veiy few blockeu anonymous useis fiom viewing !"#$% content. I
founu the best bait foi my biothei was a fiee online game that he anu his fiienus kept talking
about. Aftei figuiing out the name of game, I uiu a quick iecon on the games exteinal website
anu got a feel foi what the game was about. I even signeu up foi the fiee newslettei so that I
coulu latei simulate the look anu feel of an email coming fiom the game site. Aftei only about
2u minutes of uetective woik, I hau a game plan.

I ueciueu to spoof a fake e-mail auuiess pietenuing to be the suppoit staff of the game site.
Aftei that, I woulu slip him some coue anu piesto I woulu have access to my biothei's
computei. Now the olu auage is, "it is easiei saiu than uone". Bowevei, in this case, it was
almost as easily uone as saiu.

I thought about using an "smtp" hack in which I woulu biute foice the passwoiu on a viitual
"smtp" poit, then spoof the inuex knowing he woulu not check. Alteinately, I coulu use my
alieauy existent web-hosting client. I choose the web-hosting client. Ny fake email was
uecoiateu with the site's logo. anu hau the look anu feel of the official newslettei.

The online gaming site was fiee, so I ueciueu to attack my teenagei biothei wheie it huits
the most, his wallet. I wiote up an email claiming that the game was going to stait chaiging
foi online seivices, howevei since he has been a loyal playei he was going to be selecteu to
ieceive the paiu veision foi fiee. Theie was a catch, howevei: the fake email claimeu that
they wanteu to iun netwoik tests anu giaphical tests to assess theii useis' computeis. If he
wanteu to keep playing foi fiee, he woulu have to install some softwaie.

Now I coulu have wiitten malicious coue, anu ciafteu it to his computei but I ueciueu to go
even simplei than that. I useu totally legal anu fieely available softwaie to take contiol of his
system. I useu a viitual Netwoik Contiollei (vNC) client netwoik tunneling softwaie anu a
few hanuciafteu batch files to shut off the pesky Winuows fiiewall anu stait a backgiounu
install. Within about 1 houi of senuing off my bait to him, the fish bit uown haiu. As soon as
he ian the batch files, the tunnel openeu iight up anu I coulu use the vNC client to connect
iight to his system. }ust like that, his system was unuei my contiol.


81
What I like most (as the hackei) anu uislike most (as a computei secuiity analyst) about this
attack is its ease. It took little auvanceu knowleuge of piogiamming oi netwoik
infiastiuctuie. The attack was successfully completeu with knowleuge fieely available on the
Inteinet. If my biothei hau simply lookeu at the email auuiess, oi even the BTNL inuex, he
woulu have seen that it was coming fiom a bogus souice. 0nfoitunately, he is not alone in this
behavioi. People anu oiganizations fall victim to social engineeiing attacks all the time. In
Apiil of 2u11, foi example, The 0.S. Bepaitment of Eneigy's 0ak Riuge National Laboiatoiy
fell victim to the same type of attack as my 17-yeai-olu biothei uiu. (See, foi example,
Elizabeth Notalbano, "Phishing Attack Bits 0ak Riuge National Laboiatoiy",
"http:www.infoimationweek.comnews
goveinmentsecuiity2294u2u48).

0nfoitunately foi Netwoik Auministiatois, theie is no silvei bullet to fix these kinus of
phishing attacks. The only thing you can uo is tiain youi employees to be awaie anu vigilant.
A goou way to ieuuce the iisk of becoming a taiget is to limit how much exposuie you give
youiself ovei social netwoiking sites. As foi the mass spam emails, iemembei these common
sense iules: " N0 0NE EvER uIvES AWAY ANYTBINu F0R FREE" anu "IF Y00 B0N'T
RENENBER SIuNINu 0P F0R TBE SPANISB NATI0NAL L0TTERY.. Y00 PR0BABLY BIBN'T".

F+$12< F+$12G H4$I* 94/(/J? K/+)'A $, D/(L)1/ MK=DN !00'12
If I coulu go back in time to when I piefoimeu this expeiiment anu still ietain the
knowleuge anu expeiience I have now, I woulu uo one thing uiffeiently: 0nly expeiiment with
the fiist two attack vectois. The law got in my way moie than any secuiity featuie uiu. B0S
attacks aie only effective if the hackei faces eithei attacking an extiemely small taiget with
limiteu banuwiuth, oi if he has a massive (illegal) bot net at his uisposal to take on a laigei
netwoik. Because I uiu not want to bieak any laws (though a ieal hackei might not be so
constiaineu), I focuseu on attacking my paients netwoik (again with theii knowleuge anu
consent).

I enteieu in thiough theii wiieless netwoik, thankful as the hackei (but not pleaseu as the
goou son) that nobouy hau tolu my paients that WEP is not a secuie piotocol. So aftei some
ARP ielays, anu a iun thiough with KISNET, I was in. I useu the netwoik mapping tool NNAP
to uiscovei the location on the netwoik. (0f couise, any oiganization with minimal cybei
savvy woulu black hole the ping sweep in a heait beat.) I founu my taiget, my othei biothei
who uses my paient's computei system.

Insteau of using a ciuue ping bomb, I useu an ARP bomb. Basically I simply askeu his
system about 1u,uuu times foi his ARP tables. Bis system was so conceineu with getting me
this infoimation that it lockeu up all othei seivices. The systems netwoik tiaffic came to a
halt instantly anu then he coulu not use any othei netwoik seivices. If you can imagine a laige
clustei of systems attacking at the same time, you can see how effective this methou can be.

The B0S attack is quite easy to accomplish, but its effectiveness is limiteu to just being an
annoyance. B0S attacks, howevei, aie the majoiity of netwoik-baseu attacks because they aie

82
easy to uo. 0sing IBS systems (oi just about any othei monitoiing tool that tiacks netwoik
tiaffic), auministiatois can pievent these attacks ielatively easily.

#$+1A7*)$+
All of these attacks aie useu eveiy uay out in the ieal woilu. The movies anu meuia have
painteu the image of the hackei as someone staiing at binaiy coue oi a sciolling thiough text
file anu spitting out ianuom lines of coue. The ieality is much less iomantic: hackeis (oi
ciackeis) aie going to use the path of least iesistance. They aie going to use the most effective
attack at the lowest cost oi level of effoit. In this stuuy, the cheapest anu most ieliable attack
was the phishing attack. This is probably not surprising: social engineering is often the best way
to compromise security.

!12+$>A/5C/%/+0
Rogei }ohnston helpeu to euit this papei.

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!

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to polling places in the following waius: 6, 1S, 16, 17, 2u,

(1u ILCS S1S-1) (fiom Ch. 46, pai. 1S-1)

uiiven by the softwaie loaueu fiom these caitiiuges. The

. This act exposes the ballot box so two juuges must be

. This numbei iuentifies the aveiage peicentage of non-

This seal is oiiginally

The chain of custouy on the keys is unuei fuithei investigation

, anu to a chain of custouy on the paits

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