Republic SUPREME Manila THIRD DIVISION

of

the

Philippines COURT

G.R. No. 126005 January 21, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES an !L"NN PLE#ETTE $", petitioners, vs. COURT OF !PPE!LS, %ILL" CER%O an JON!TH!N CER%O, respondents.

P!NG!NI%!N, J.: In our cri inal !ustice s"ste , the public prosecutor has the #uasi$!udicial discretion to deter ine %hether or not case should be filed in court. &ourts ust. respect the e'ercise of such discretion %hen the infor ation filed a(ainst the accused valid on its face, and no anifest error, (rave abuse of discretion or pre!udice can be i puted to the public prosecutor. The Case )efore us is a Petition for Revie% under Rule *+, see,in( to reverse the -une ./, 0112 Decision and the 3u(ust .4, 0112 Resolution of the &ourt of 3ppeals 1 in &3$5R SP No. 6270/. 2 The assailed Decision dis issed the Petition for Certiorari filed b" the petitioners, %hich sou(ht to annul and set aside t%o Orders of the Re(ional Trial &ourt of Nabunturan, Davao8 the -une ./, 011* Order dis issin( the Infor ation for urder filed a(ainst Private Respondent )ill" &erbo and the 3u(ust 0/, 011* Order den"in( petitioners9 otion for reconsideration. The assailed 3u(ust .4, 0112 &ourt of 3ppeals :&3; Resolution li,e%ise denied petitioners9 otion for reconsideration. The Facts The case belo% arose fro the fatal shootin( of Petitioner D"9s other, Rosalinda D", in %hich the pri ar" suspect %as

Private Respondent -onathan Respondent )ill" &erbo.

&erbo,

son

of

Private

The procedural and factual antecedents of the case %ere su ari<ed in the challen(ed Decision of the &ourt of 3ppeals as follo%s8 On 3u(ust 67, 0116, Rosalinda D", accordin( to the petition, %as shot at pointblan, ran(e b" private respondent -onathan &erbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent )ill" &erbo at Puro, 1, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao. On Septe ber ., 0116, e"e%itness =lsa ). 5u ban e'ecuted an affidavit positivel" identif"in( private respondent -onathan &erbo as the assailant. :3nne' &, Rollo, p. 6*;. On Septe ber .7, 0116, private respondent -onathan &erbo e'ecuted a counter$affidavit interposin( the defense that the shootin( %as accidental :3nne' D8 Rollo, pp. 6+$62;. On October 2, 0116, the 6rd Municipal &ircuit Trial &ourt of Nabunturan$Ma%ab, Davao, after a preli inar" investi(ation, found >sufficient (round to en(ender a %ell$founded belief> that the cri e of urder has been co itted b" private respondent -onathan &erbo and resolved to for%ard the entire records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Ta(u , Davao :3nne' =, Rollo, pp. 64$6/;. 3fter ?an@ infor ation for urder %as filed a(ainst -onathan &erbo, petitioner 3l"nn Ple<ette D", dau(hter of the victi Rosalinda D", e'ecuted an affidavit$co plaint char(in( private respondent )ill" &erbo of conspirac" in the ,illin( :3nne' A, Rollo, p. 61;, supported b" a supple ental affidavit of =lsa ). 5u ban, alle(in( >in addition> to her previous state ent that8 6. In addition to " said s%orn state ent, I voluntaril" and freel" aver as follo%s8

a; I vividl" recall that %hile " istress Rosalinda 5o and I %ere in the office of )ill" &erbo at about 008*+ a. . on 3u(ust 67, 0116, Mr. &erbo personall" instructed e to fetch the food fro the ,itchen ?and to brin( it@ to the office instead of the dinin( roo . b; Bhile brin(in( the food, Mr. &erbo a(ain instructed e to place the food ?o@n a corner table and co anded e to sit behind the entrance door and at the sa e ti e Mr. &erbo positioned Rosalinda ?on@ a chair facin( the entrance door for an eas" tar(et. c; I ediatel" after Rosalinda %as shot, Mr. )ill" &erbo called his son -onathan %ho %as runnin(, but did not and ha?s@ never bothered to brin( Rosalinda to a hospital or even appl" first aid. d; To " surprise, Mr. )ill" &erbo, instead of brin(in( Rosalinda to the hospital, brou(ht her to the funeral parlor and i ediatel" ordered her to be e bal ed %ithout even infor in( her children or an" of her i ediate relatives '''.9 3nne' 5. Rollo, p. *7.; Private respondent )ill" &erbo sub itted a counter$affidavit den"in( the alle(ations of both petitioner 3l"nn Ple<ette D" and =lsa ). 5u ban :3nne' H, Rollo, pp. *0$*.;. On or about 3pril /, 011*, Prosecutor Protacio Cu an(tad filed a >Motion for leave of court to reinvesti(ate the case> :3nne' I, Rollo, pp. *6$**; %hich %as (ranted b" the respondent !ud(e in an order dated 3pril ./, 011* :3nne' -, Rollo, p. *+;. In his resolution dated Ma" +, 011*, Prosecutor Cu an(tad reco ended the filin( of an a ended infor ation includin( )ill" &erbo >. . . as one of the accused in the urder case . . .> :3nne' D8 Rollo, pp. *2$*1;.

3ccordin(l", the prosecution filed an a ended infor ation includin( )ill" &erbo in the urder case. 3 %arrant for his arrest %as later issued on Ma" .4, 011* :Rollo, p. .4;. Private respondent )ill" &erbo then filed a otion to #uash %arrant of arrest ar(uin( that the sa e %as issued %ithout probable cause : Rollo, p. .4;. On -une ./, 011*, respondent -ud(e issued the first assailed order dis issin( the case a(ainst )ill" &erbo and recallin( the %arrant for his arrest?E@ the dispositive portion of ?the order@ reads8 IN TH= CI5HT OA 3CC TH= AOR=5OIN5, ?an@ order is hereb" issued DISMISSIN5 the case as a(ainst )ill" &erbo onl". Cet, therefore, the %arrant of arrest, dated Ma" .4, 011*, be R=&3CC=D. The prosecution is hereb" ordered to %ithdra% its 3 ended Infor ation and file a ne% one char(in( -onathan &erbo onl". SO ORD=R=D. :Rollo, pp. .1$67;. Private Prosecutor Ro eo Ta(ra filed a otion for reconsideration %hich %as denied b" the respondent !ud(e in his second assailed order dated 3u(ust 0/, 011* :3nne' ), Rollo, pp. 60$ 66;. & The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In its 07$pa(e Decision, the &ourt of 3ppeals debun,ed petitioners9 assertion that the trial !ud(e co itted a (rave abuse of discretion in recallin( the %arrant of arrest and subse#uentl" dis issin( the case a(ainst )ill" &erbo. &itin( !urisprudence, ' the appellate court held as follo%s8 The rulin( is e'plicit. If upon the filin( of the infor ation in court, the trial !ud(e, after revie%in( the infor ation and the docu ents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause e'ists, ust either call for the co plainant and the %itnesses or si pl" dis iss the case.

Petitioners #uestion the applicabilit" of the doctrine laid do%n in the above?$@ entioned case, alle(in( that the facts therein are different fro the instant case. Be rule that the disparit" of facts does not prevent the application of the principle. Be have (one over the supple ental affidavit of =lsa ). 5u ban and ta,in( into account the additional facts and circu stances alle(ed therein, %e cannot sa" that respondent !ud(e (ravel" abused his discretion in dis issin( the case as a(ainst private respondent )ill" &erbo for lac, of probable cause. ''' ''' ''' The prosecution, if it reall" believed that )ill" &erbo is probabl" (uilt" b" conspirac", should have presented additional evidence sufficientl" and credibl" de onstratin( the e'istence of probable cause. ''' ''' '''
5

In su , the &ourt of 3ppeals held that -ud(e =u(enio Valles did not co it (rave abuse of discretion in recallin( the %arrant of arrest issued a(ainst Private Respondent )ill" &erbo and subse#uentl" dis issin( the Infor ation for urder filed a(ainst the private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate such char(e. Hence, this petition. 6 The Assigned Errors Petitioner D" avers8 0; The &ourt of 3ppeals (ravel" erred in holdin( that the Re(ional Trial &ourt -ud(e had the authorit" to reverse ?the public prosecutor9s@ findin( of probable cause to prosecute accused . . . and thus dis iss the case filed b" the latter on the basis of a otion to #uash %arrant of arrest. .; The &ourt of 3ppeals (ravel" erred in full" and un#ualifiedl" appl"in( the case of 3llado, et. al. vs. P3&&, et. al. 5.R. No. 006267, ?to@ the case at bench despite ?the@ clear difference in their

respective factual bac,drop?s@ and the contrar" earlier !urisprudence on the atter. ( On the other hand, the solicitor (eneral posits this sole issue8 Bhether the &ourt of 3ppeals erred in findin( that no probable cause e'ists to erit the filin( of char(es a(ainst private respondent )ill" &erbo. ) =ssentiall", the petitioners are #uestionin( the propriet" of the trial court9s dis issal, for %ant of evidence, of the Infor ation for urder a(ainst Private Respondent )ill" &erbo. In resolvin( this petition, the discussion of the &ourt %ill revolve around the points8 first, the deter ination of probable cause as an e'ecutive and !udicial function and, second, the applicabilit" of Allado and Salonga to the case at bar. The Court's Ruling The petition is eritorious. The trial court erred in dis issin( the infor ation filed a(ainst the private respondent. &onse#uentl" the &ourt of 3ppeals %as li,e%ise in error %hen it upheld such rulin(. Executive Determination of ro!a!le Cause The deter ination of probable cause durin( a preli inar" investi(ation is a function that belon(s to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, 9 the correctness of the e'ercise of %hich is atter that the trial court itself does not and a" not be co pelled to pass upon. The Separate :&oncurrin(; Opinion of for er &hief -ustice 3ndres R. Narvasa in Ro!erts v. Court of Appeals 10 succinctl" elucidates such point in this %ise8 ''' ''' ''' In this special civil action, this &ourt is bein( as,ed to assu e the function of a public prosecutor. It is bein( as,ed to deter ine %hether probable cause e'ists as re(ards petitioners. More concretel", the &ourt is bein( as,ed to e'a ine and assess such evidence as has thus far been sub itted b" the parties and, on the basis thereof, a,e a

conclusion as to %hether or not it suffices >to en(ender a %ell founded belief that a cri e has been co itted and that the respondent is probabl" (uilt" thereof and should be held for trial.> It is a function that this &ourt should not be called upon to perfor . It is a function that properl" pertains to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as cri es co(ni<able b" a Re(ional Trial &ourt are concerned, and not%ithstandin( that it involves an ad!udicative process of a sort, e'clusivel" pertains, b" la%, to said e'ecutive officer, the public prosecutor. It is oreover a function that in the established sche e of thin(s, is supposed to be perfor ed at the ver" (enesis of, indeed, prefatoril" to, the for al co ence ent of a cri inal action. The proceedin(s before a public prosecutor, it a" %ell be stressed, are essentiall" preli inar", prefator" and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative ad!ud( ent of the (uilt or innocence of the persons char(ed %ith a felon" or cri e. Bhether or not that function has been correctl" dischar(ed b" the public prosecutor F i.e., %hether or not he has ade a correct ascertain ent of the e'istence of probable cause in a case, is a atter that the trial court itself does not and a" not be co pelled to pass upon. It is not for instance per itted for an accused, upon the filin( of the infor ation a(ainst hi b" the public prosecutor, to pree pt trial b" filin( a otion %ith the Trial &ourt pra"in( for the #uash or dis issal of the indict ent on the (round that the evidence upon %hich the sa e is based is inade#uate. Nor is it per itted, on the antipodal theor" that the evidence is in truth inade#uate, for the co plainin( part" to present a petition before the &ourt pra"in( that the public prosecutor be co pelled to file the correspondin( infor ation a(ainst the accused. ''' ''' ''' Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to deter ine %hether probable cause e'ists and to char(e those %ho be or she believes to have co itted the cri e

as defined b" la%. Other%ise stated, such official has the #uasi$!udicial authorit" to deter ine %hether or not a cri inal case list be filed in court. 11 Thus, in Crespo v. "ogul, 12 %e ruled8 It is a cardinal principle that all cri inal actions either co enced b" co plaint or b" infor ation shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a cri inal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He a" or a" not file the co plaint or infor ation, follo% or not follo% that presented b" the offended part", accordin( to %hether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the (uilt of the accused be"ond reasonable doubt. The reason for placin( the cri inal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent alicious or unfounded prosecutions b" private persons. . . . Prosecutin( officers under the po%er vested in the b" the la%, not onl" have the authorit" but also the dut" of prosecutin( persons %ho, accordin( to the evidence received fro the co plainant, are sho%n to be (uilt" of a cri e co itted %ithin the !urisdiction of their office. The" have e#uall" the dut" not to prosecute %hen the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. This broad prosecutoral po%er is ho%ever nor unfettered, because !ust as public prosecutors are obli(ed to brin( forth before the la% those %ho have trans(ressed it, the" are also constrained to be circu spect in filin( cri inal char(es a(ainst the innocent. Thus, for cri es co(ni<able b" re(ional trial courts, preli inar" investi(ations are usuall" conducted. In #edesma v. Court of Appeals, 1& %e discussed the purposes and nature of a preli inar" investi(ation in this anner8 The pri ar" ob!ective of a preli inar" investi(ation is to free respondent fro the inconvenience, e'pense, i(no in" and stress of defendin( hi selfGherself in the course of a for al trial, until the reasonable probabilit" of his or her (uilt in a ore or less su ar" proceedin( b" a co petent office desi(nated b" la% for that purpose. Secondaril", such su ar" proceedin( also protects the state fro the burden of the

unnecessar" e'pense an effort in prosecutin( alle(ed offenses and in holdin( trials arisin( fro false, frivolous or (roundless char(es. Such investi(ation is not part of the trial. 3 full and e'haustive presentation of the parties9 evidence is not re#uired, but onl" such as a" en(ender a %ell$(rounded belief than an offense has been co itted and that the accused is probabl" (uilt" thereof. )" reason of the abbreviated nature of preli inar" investi(ations, a dis issal of the char(es as a result thereof is not e#uivalent to a !udicial pronounce ent of ac#uittal. Hence, no double !eopard" attaches. $udicial Determination of ro!a!le Cause The deter ination of probable cause to hold a person for trial ust be distin(uished fro the deter ination of probable cause to issue a %arrant of arrest, %hich is a !udicial function. The !udicial deter ination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest %arrants has been e phasi<ed in nu erous cases. In %o v. eople, 1' the &ourt su ari<ed the pertinent rulin(s on the sub!ect, as follo%s8 The above rulin(s in Soliven, &nting and #im, Sr. %ere iterated in Allado v. Dio'no, %here %e e'plained a(ain %hat probable cause eans. Probable cause for the issuance of a %arrant of arrest is the e'istence of such facts and circu stances that %ould lead a reasonabl" discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been co itted b" the person sou(ht to be arrested. Hence, the !ud(e, before issuin( a %arrant of arrest, > ust satisf" hi self that based on the evidence sub itted, there is sufficient proof that a cri e has been co itted and that the person to be arrested is probabl" (uilt" thereof.> 3t this sta(e of the cri inal proceedin(, the !ud(e is not "et tas,ed to revie% in detail the evidence sub itted durin( the preli inar" investi(ation. It is sufficient that he personall" evaluates such evidence in deter inin( probable cause. In (e!! v. De #eon %e stressed that the !ud(e erel" deter ines the probabilit", not the certaint", of (uilt of the accused and, in doin( so,

he need not conduct a de novo hearin(. He si pl" personall" revie%s the prosecutor9s initial deter ination findin( probable cause to see if it is supported b" substantial evidence. ''' ''' ''' In li(ht of the aforecited decisions of this &ourt, such !ustification cannot be upheld. Cest %e be too repetitive, %e onl" e phasi<e three vital atters once ore8 Airst, as held in Intin(, the deter ination of probable cause b" the prosecutor is for a purpose different fro that %hich is to be ade b" the !ud(e. Bhether there is reasonable (round to believe that the accused is (uilt" of the offense char(ed and should be held for trial is %hat the prosecutor passes upon. The !ud(e, on the other hand, deter ines %hether a %arrant of arrest should be issued a(ainst the accused, i.e., %hether there is a necessit" for placin( hi under i ediate custod" in order not to frustrate the ends of !ustice. Thus, even if both should base their findin(s on one and the sa e proceedin( or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct ob!ectives. Second, since their ob!ectives are different, the !ud(e cannot rel" solel" on the report of the prosecutor in findin( probable cause to !ustif" the issuance of a %arrant of arrest. Obviousl" and understandabl", the contents of the prosecutor9s report %ill support his o%n conclusion that there is reason to char(e the accused of an offense and hold hi for trial. Ho%ever, the !ud(e ust decide independentl". Hence, he ust have supportin( evidence, other than the prosecutor9s bare report, upon %hich to le(all" sustain his o%n findin(s on the e'istence or non$e'istence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibilit" of deter inin( personall" and independentl" the e'istence of non$e'istence of probable cause is lod(ed in hi b" no less than the ost basic la% of the land. Parentheticall", the prosecutor could ease the burden of the !ud(e and speed up the liti(ation process b" for%ardin( to the latter not onl" the infor ation and his bare resolution, but also so uch of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to a,e his personal

and separate !udicial findin( on %hether to issue a %arrant of arrest. Castl", It is not re#uired that the co plete or entire records of the case durin( the preli inar" investi(ation be sub itted to and e'a ined b" the !ud(e. Be do not intend to undul" burden trial courts b" obli(in( the to e'a ine the co plete records of ever" case all the ti e si pl" for the purpose of orderin( the arrest of the accused. Bhat is re#uired, rather, is that the !ud(e ust have sufficient supportin( docu ents :such as the co plaint, affidavits, counter$affidavits, s%orn state ents of %itnesses or transcript of steno(raphic notes, if an"; upon %hich to a,e his independent !ud( ent, or at the ver" least, upon %hich to verif" the findin(s of the prosecutor as to the e'istence of probable cause. The point is8 he cannot rel" solel" and entirel" on the prosecutor9s reco endation, as the Respondent &ourt did in this case. 3lthou(h the prosecutor en!o"s the le(al presu ption of re(ularit" in the perfor ance of his duties and functions, %hich in turn (ives his report the presu ption of accurac", the &onstitution, %e repeat, co ands the !ud(e to personall" deter ine probable cause in the issuance of %arrants of arrest. This &ourt has consistentl" held that a !ud(e fails in his bounded dut" if he relies erel" on the certification or the report of the investi(atin( officer. ''' ''' ''' Veril", a !ud(e cannot be co pelled to issue a %arrant of arrest if he or she dee s that there is no probable cause for doin( so. &orollar" to this principle, the !ud(e should not override the public prosecutor9s deter ination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the (round that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest %arrant %as insufficient, as in the present case. Indeed, it could be unfair to e'pect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filin( of the infor ation a(ainst the latter. The reason is found in the nature and the ob!ective of a preli inar" investi(ation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide %hether there is evidence be"ond reasonable doubt of the (uilt of the person char(edE the" erel"

deter ine >%hether there is sufficient (round to en(ender a %ell$founded belief that a cri e . . . has been co itted and that the respondent is probabl" (uilt" thereof, and should be held for trial.> 15 =videntiar" atters ust be presented and heard durin( the trial. 16 Therefore, if the infor ation is valid on its face, and there is no sho%in( of anifest error, (rave abuse of discretion and pre!udice on the part of the public prosecutor , the trial court should respect such deter ination. &napplica!ilt) of Allado and Salonga The &ourt of 3ppeals anchored its rulin( on the pronounce ent ade in Allado v. Dio'no8> . . . ?I@f, upon the filin( of the infor ation in court, the trial !ud(e, after revie%in( the infor ation and the docu ents attached thereto, ust either call for the co plainant and the %itnesses the selves or si pl" dis iss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further e'pose hi to an open and public accusation of the cri e %hen no probable cause e'ists.> 1( In 3llado, Petitioners Diosdado -ose 3llado and Roberto I. Mendo<a, practicin( la%"ers, %ere accused b" the Presidential 3nti$&ri e &o ission :P3&&; of ,idnappin( %ith urder and ordered b" -ud(e Roberto &. Dio,no to be arrested %ithout bail. The petitioners #uestioned the issuance of the %arrants for their arrest contendin( that the respondent !ud(e acted %ith (rave abuse of discretion and in e'cess of his !urisdiction in holdin( that there %as probable cause a(ainst the . The" contended that the trial court relied erel" on the resolution of the investi(atin( panel and its certification that probable cause e'isted, %ithout personall" deter inin( the ad issibilit" and sufficienc" of the evidence for such findin( and %ithout statin( the basis thereof. The" aintained that the records of the preli inar" investi(ation, %hich %as the sole basis of the !ud(e9s rulin(, failed to establish probable cause a(ainst the that %ould !ustif" the issuance of %arrants for their arrest. The &ourt declared that -ud(e Dio,no has indeed co itted (rave abuse of discretion in issuin( the arrest %arrants. &ontrar" to the constitutional andate and established !urisprudence, he erel" relied on the certification of the prosecutors as to the e'istence of the probable cause, instead of personall" e'a inin( the evidence, the

co plainant and his %itness.> Aor other%ise,> the &ourt said >he %ould have found out that the evidence thus far presented %as utterl" insufficient to %arrant the arrest of the petitioners> 1) In cate(oricall" statin( that the evidence so far presented did not eet the standard of probable cause and subse#uentl" (rantin( the petition, the &ourt noted the follo%in( circu stances8 first, the corpus delicti %as not established, and there %as serious doubt as to the alle(ed victi 9s death8 second, the e'tra !udicial state ent of the principal %itness, %ho had priorl" confessed his participation in the cri e, %as full of aterial inconsistenciesE and third, the P3&& operatives %ho investi(ated the case never i plicated the petitioners. &itin( Salonga v. Cru*+ a,o, the &ourt of 3ppeals pointed out that %hen there %as no prima facie case a(ainst a person sou(ht to be char(ed %ith a cri e, >the !ud(e or fiscal, therefore, should not (o on %ith the prosecution in the hope that so e credible evidence i(ht later turn out durin( trial, for this %ould be fla(rant violation of a basic ri(ht %hich the courts are created to uphold.> 19 In the aforecited case, Petitioner -ovito R. Salon(a sou(ht to bar the filin( of an Infor ation for violation of the revised 3nti$Subversion 3ct, %hich -ud(e =rnani &ru<$Pano had ordered to be filed a(ainst hi . In sustainin( the petitioner, the &ourt held that the evidence upon %hich the Infor ation %as based %as not sufficient to char(e hi for a violation of the Revised Subversion 3ct. In all, the &ourt decreed in both cases that there %as no basis in la% and in fact for the !udicial and e'ecutive deter ination at probable cause. The &ourt also held that the (overn ent, %hile vested %ith the ri(ht and the dut" to protect itself and its people a(ainst trans(ressors of the la%, ust perfor the sa e in a anner that %ould not infrin(e the perceived violators9 ri(hts as (uaranteed b" the &onstitution. Ho%ever, the present case is not on all fours %ith Allado and Salonga. Airst, =lsa 5u ban, the principal e"e%itness to the ,illin( of Rosalinda D", %as not a participation or conspirator in the co ission of the said cri e. In Allado and Salonga, ho%ever, the ain %itnesses %ere the confessed perpetrators of the cri es, %hose testi onies the court dee ed 9tainted9. 20 Second, in the

case at bar, the private respondent %as accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias durin( the investi(ation of the case can be i puted to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the &ourt noted in 3llado the >undue haste in the filin( of the Infor ation and in the inordinate interest of the (overn ent> in pursuin( the caseE 21 and in Salon(a, > . . . the failure of the prosecution to sho% that the petitioner %as probabl" (uilt" of conspirin( to co it the cri e, the initial disre(ard of petitioner9s constitutioner ri(hts ?and@ the assive and da a(in( 22 publicit" a(ainst hi .> In other %ords, %hile the respective sets of evidence before the prosecutors in the Allado and Salonga %ere >utterl" insufficient> to support a findin( of probable cause, the sa e cannot be said of the present case. Be stress that Allado and Salonga constitute e'ceptions to the (eneral rule and a" be invo,ed onl" if si ilar circu stances are clearl" sho%n to e'ist. )ut as the fore(oin( co parisons sho%, such si ilarities are absent in the instant case. Hence, the rulin(s in the t%o afore entioned cases cannot appl" to it. "otion (ithout Re-uisite .otice One ore thin(, Petitioners aver that Private Respondent &erbo did not (ive the a cop" of the Motion to Huash the Barrant of 3rrest, %hich had been issued a(ainst hi , or a notice of the scheduled hearin(. Thus, the" contend, -ud(e Valles should not have entertained such otion. It is settled that ever" %ritten otion in a trial court ust be set for hearin( b" the applicant and served %ith the notice of hearin( thereof, in such a anner as to ensure its receipt b" the other part". The provisions on this atter in Section * and +, Rule 0+ of the Rules of the &ourt, 2& are cate(orical and andator" character. 2' Inder Section 2 of the said rule, no otion shall be acted upon b" the court %ithout proof of service thereof. The rationale for this rule is si ple8 unless the ovants set the ti e and the place of hearin(, the court %ill be unable to deter ine %hether the adverse parties a(ree or ob!ect to the otions, since the rules the selves do not fi' an" period %ithin %hich the" a" file their replies or oppositions. 25 The otion to #uash the %arrant of arrest in the present case bein( pro forma, inas uch as the re#uisite cop" and

notice %ere not dul" served upon the adverse part", the trial court had no authorit" to act on it. Epilogue In (rantin( this petition, %e are not pre!ud(in( the cri inal case or the (uilt or innocence of Private Respondent )ill" &erbo. Be si pl" sa"in( that, as a (eneral rule, if the infor ation is valid on its face and there is no sho%in( of anifest error, (rave abuse of discretion or pre!udice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dis iss it for 9%ant of evidence,9 because evidentiar" atters should be presented and heard durin( the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in >the proper sche e of thin(s> in our cri inal !ustice s"ste should be clearl" understood. The ri(hts of the people fro %hat could so eti es be an 99oppressive> e'ercise of (overn ent prosecutorial po%ers do need to be protected %hen circu stances so re#uire. )ut !ust as %e reco(ni<e this need, %e also ac,no%led(e that the State ust li,e%ise be accorded due process. Thus, %hen there is no sho%in( of nefarious irre(ularit" or anifest error in the perfor ance of a public prosecutor9s duties, courts ou(ht to refrain fro interferin( %ith such la%full" and !udiciall" andated duties. In an" case, if there %as palpable error or (rave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor9s findin( of probable cause, the accused can appeal such findin( to the !ustice secretar" 26 and ove for the defer ent or suspension of the proceedin( until such appeal is resolved. BH=R=AOR=, the petition is 5R3NT=D. The assailed Decision of the &ourt of 3ppeals is hereb" R=V=RS=D and S=T 3SID=. The case is R=M3ND=D to the Re(ional Trial &ourt of Nabunturan, Davao, %hich is ordered to reinstate the a ended infor ation a(ainst Private Respondent )ill" &erbo and to proceed %ith !udicious speed in hearin( the case. No. costs. SO ORD=R=D.