SUPPLEMENTARY CASES Lokin vs. COMELEC The Court declared Section 13 of Resolution No.

7804 of the COMELEC invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to COMELEC

VC Cadangen et al. v. COMELEC (c/o Max Diego) Facts: Petitioner is a newly formed party list representing government employees. It filed a Petition for Registration in the COMELEC. COMELEC then issued an order requiring petitioners to file a memorandum stating that its presence is nationwide, it has the financial capability to run a nationwide campaign, etc. Petitioners subsequently filed the said memorandum. Respondents then investigated as to the veracity of petitioners memorandum. Respondents found out that Petitioners only exist in Paranaque City and in QC, contrary to what they stated in the memorandum that they exist nationwide. Thus, for having failed to prove that they exist nationwide and for lying in the memorandum, respondents denied petitioners Petition of Registration. Issue: W/N the Petitioners petition should be granted and W/N Comelec abused gravely abused its discretion by denying the petition. Held: The court held that the petition should not be granted and Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion. Pursuant to RA 7941, Comelec has the power to require the submission of pertinent details to any potential party list seeking for registration and it also has the power to deny Petitions for Registrations. In Section 6 of RA 7941, one of the grounds for rejection is when the party list declared untruthful statements in its petition. Thus, the COMELEC denied the petition not only because Petitioner failed to show that it represents the marginalized but because it made untruthful statements in its memorandum.

Case of Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations G.R.No. 180643 04September2008 FACTS OF THE CASE: On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMAs and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project. 2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it. 3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.

The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUES OF THE CASE: 1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system? 2. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? - YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution. - The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. - In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked. - If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized. - YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates its own abuses. - Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the executive to function effectively. - The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent roving commissions. - The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o concurrence of the majority. HELD: RESPONENTS COMMITTEES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED.

Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486 (1969)

Powell was a Congressman who was caught in a political scandal. The House of Representatives passed a resolution to exclude him. o The resolution wasn't phrased as an 'impeachment', or an 'expulsion', and was passed with a simple majority vote. Powell sued for an injunction, claiming that the resolution was invalid. o Powell argued that in order to expel him from Congress, the Constitution requires a 2/3rds vote. But the resolution to 'exclude' him didn't garner that many votes. (See Article I, Section 2). The Trial Court dismissed the case. o The Trial Court found that they did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and that the case was not judicable.

The US Supreme Court reversed. o The US Supreme Court found that the case was judicable. The Court didn't invoke the Political Question Doctrine because they found that the case did not constitute a political question that pit one branch of government against another. Rather, it required "no more than an interpretation of the Constitution." o The Court found that Congress being the sole judge of its members qualifications (Article I, Section 5, cl. 1) and the Speech and Debate Clause (Article I, Section 6) do not preclude judicial review of Constitutional issues. o The Court found that that Congress does not have the power to develop qualifications other than those specified in Article I, Section 2, cl. 1-2. This case settled a contradiction in the Constitution. Article I Section 5 states that, "each House shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members." But Article I, Section 2, says that the House can only expel a member with a vote of 2/3rds. o The Court found that Section 2 is controlling, and Congress can't change it, regardless of what it says in Section 5.

Compare this case to Nixon v. United States (506 U.S. 224 (1993)), where, under a similar set of facts, the US Supreme Court found that they could not intervene because it was a political question and therefore not judicable.

Vilando v. HRET (SECTION 17) Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. The 1987 Constitution vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. However, such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.

CASE BOOK CASES Tobias vs. Abalos

G.R.No. L-114785 PONENTE: BIDIN, J. FACTS:

08 December 1994

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1) HELD/RULING: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution. Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional. Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Mariano Jr. V. COMELEC Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Montejo vs. COMELEC Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. In the next election, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13 March 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that 1.) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 2.) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 5.) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not it violates the equality of representation doctrine.

HELD: Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further contends that RA 9371 violates the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district has a higher number of voters as compared to the other and that one is urbanized the other is rural. This is the clarification; the law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein

Gallego vs. Verra Residence Qualification Case #1: GALLEGO vs. VERA Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioners election to the office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of Dec. 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. In June 1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in Sept. 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the election for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940, He obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for 1.5 yrs. The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that: 1.He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon 2.He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen3.He obtained a residence cert from the municipality of Malaybalay

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired anew domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. HELD: Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate there for1940. The decision of the CA is reversed. RATIO: In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: 1.Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality 2.An intention to remain there 3.An intention to abandon the old domicile The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because: 1.When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937 2.His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the election 3.He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him 4.He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the government 5.He visited his family no less than three times despite the great distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to: exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community. And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party,

and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Domino v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective

office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani. A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Co vs. House Electoral Tribunal FACTS: These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. On the issue of jurisdiction The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It

has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. On the issue of citizenship The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegate to the 1971Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino. Respondent Ongs situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that the respondents mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. The petitioners also argue that the respondents father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of citizenship. On the issue of residency The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the said place. ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1)respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a residentof the second district of Northern Samar. HELD: NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declareda natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. RATIO:

On the issue of jurisdiction In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. On the issue of citizenship In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized. According to jurisprudence that defines election, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. There is no doubt in this case about respondent Ongs being Filipino when he turned 21.The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. An attack on persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process, as he has already been laid to rest and that he has no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of his father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the respondent were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship. The same issue on natural-born citizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the respondent Ong, which is another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of residency The petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlier definition of the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. It is characterized by animus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the respondent to his home province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he always had the animus revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified.

Bengzon vs. Cruz Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen. Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Valles vs. COMELEC FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dual citizenship. HELD: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991 FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment. ISSUE: 1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION? 2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH? HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable. That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. 2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are

creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office. NOTES: - In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12). - 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened: a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries; b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior; c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and, d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Codilla vs. de Venecia G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation. ISSUES:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

RULING: First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. xxx Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. xxx (a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. (b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin. xxx A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the

Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding. Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC

ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004 Facts Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. Issue Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. Decision (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. (2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for. Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of

Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

People vs. Jalosjos Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961. Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as

speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

ANTONINO V VALENCIA MAY 27, 1974 FACTS: Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election for governor in Davao. Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged and double-crossed them, the LP would have won. Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment. Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of Antonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife) ISSUES: 1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia 2.W/N the Press Release is libelous Held/Ruling: YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the following facts: 1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino. 2.On the press release there was marked For release under the date. 3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in the same numerical order. 4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia 5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presence of the press

6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and information he received about Antonino 7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint 8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement. YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed and such presumption was not overcome as Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials. The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filedcharges against Antonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term as senator was no yet to expire. Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon. Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous ascontemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

Liban v. Gordon G.R. 175352 July 15, 2009 FACTS Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an employment.

ISSUE By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat? HELD No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit.

Puyat vs. De Guzman Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares. Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a

circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. Avelino vs. Cuenco GR L-2821, 4 March 1949 FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum the majority required of the 24-member Senate. ISSUES: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? (2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

Santiago vs. Guingona Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a

minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition (2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Osmena vs. Pendatun Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior. Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech

Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

Paredes Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan. HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled: x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a

preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a member of the House of Representatives.

CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963. Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069. Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered. Ratio: It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Astorga vs. Villegas Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker

of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266. Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments, which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner. Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof. As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government. In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are

necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of

the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Facts: This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed. Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary. Issue: WON the SET can function without the Senator members. Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.

Bondoc vs. Pineda Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

GUERRERO vs. COMELEC Facts: Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas certificate of candidacy was fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the

HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal [GR 141489, 29 November 2002]; also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490] En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the PartyList System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional

respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners. Issue [1]: Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret. Held [1]: NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.*27+ Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time. Issue [2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Held [2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chatos election protest against Unico

regarding canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of Unicos proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC. Issue: WON the court should take cognizance of Chatos election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to? WON his civil action for Certiorari will prosper. Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chatos election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper. Ratio: - In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the peoples mandate. -Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur: Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. -In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unicos proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET.

Limkaichong vs. COMELEC G.R. 178831-32 April 1, 2009 FACTS Limkaichong rans as a representative in the 1st district of Negros Oriental, with Paras as her rival. Paras, together with other concerned citizens, filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong. They alleged that she was not a natural born citizen of teh Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese, although her mom was a Filipino, also lost her citizenship by virtue of marriage. When the case was still pending in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), election still continued and votes were casted. The results showed that Limkaichong won over her rival, Paras. COMELEC, after due hearing declared Limkaichong disqualified, at about 2 days after the counting of votes. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation discqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras then petitioned before the COMELEC, regarding its proclamation. Limkaichong, on the other hand argued that the Commission had already proclaimed

her as winner, and with that, COMELEC could no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which should exercise jurisdiction from then on, not the COMELEC. And the COMELEC agreed. ISSUE When does the jursidiction of the COMELEC end and when does the jurisdiction of the HRET begin? HELD In Limkaichong's case, the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong's proclamation. The Supreme Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives (HOR), the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and disqualification ends. With that, the HRET's own jurisdiciton begins. It follows that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning COMELEC's proclamation should now present his case before the HRET, which is the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution and Section 250 of the OEC underscores, the word "sole" is used to emphasize the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.